[ZM欧洲杯西意篇] 板鸭4球决胜载入史册

rolex

意大利国歌最雄壮。

白与蓝之舞

我还是觉得毛子国歌最雄壮。

rolex

27# 白与蓝之舞

Alex2011

Spain 4-0 Ireland: whitewash

June 14, 2012


The starting line-ups

The biggest win of Euro 2012 so far.

Vicente del Bosque made one change, leaving out Cesc Fabregas and playing with a proper striker – Fernando Torres started upfront.

Giovanni Trapattoni also made a single change upfront – Kevin Doyle dropped out, and Simon Cox started behind Robbie Keane.

Spain were clearly the better side here – so much so, that the tactical battle was almost non-existent. Ireland did well to get to half-time at only 0-1, but Spain wrapped the game up soon into the second half. Neither side did anything different or unusual tactically.

Opening stages

It was the usual from Ireland – two banks of four behind the ball, though now Cox was dropping back to become a fifth midfielder, and Keane stayed high up the pitch, drifting towards the left and testing the Spanish offside line.

Ireland shot themselves in the foot by conceding another early goal, so it was difficult to get a fair impression of how they would have coped for long periods against a Spanish team needing to score.

Stephen Ward and John O’Shea tucked in and stayed very narrow, which often frustrated Spain when they tried to play through the back four. There was again little width high up the pitch from del Bosque’s side, although both Jordi Alba and Alvaro Arbeloa were more attack-minded than against Italy, enjoying the space out wide when Damien Duff and Aiden McGeady got sucked into the midfield battle.

1-0

After going behind to Torres’ goal, Ireland coped reasonably well defensively. Their problem was with the ball – no-one expected them to even compete in terms of possession, but they really struggled with Spain’s pressing high up the pitch, often getting caught in possession within their own third.

This was where Spain’s narrowness does work quite well – Spain didn’t press the entire Irish defence at the same time, but generally focused it on one area of the pitch. For example, if O’Shea had the ball, Spain would shut out all the passing options close to him, all moving towards one side of the pitch. A better technical team than Ireland would have transferred the ball quickly to the opposite flank and countered, but the Irish defenders didn’t even see this option, and often hoofed the ball forward hopefully.



But Spain were in their comfort zone far too early, playing possession football with little penetration, and for the final 20 minutes of the first half, Ireland rarely looked like conceding a second. There were more clever runs from the Spanish attacking midfielders, with David Silva moving into some good positions, but because Ireland defended so deep, the through-ball had to be incredibly precise, and was particularly difficult because of the narrowness of the Irish back four.

Second half

Trapattoni had decisions to make at half-time, and his lone change – Jon Walters on for Cox – was quite unambitious, giving Ireland no extra attacking intent. It’s difficult to fault his general approach, though – if Ireland had attacked at the start of the second half and scored early, one got the feeling that Spain would be able to step it up and win the game. Trapattoni’s best bet was to continue playing defensively, to hope that Spain maintained playing without any penetration, and then attack later on in the second half, when a goal would be more decisive.

But, for the fourth half running, Ireland conceded a goal within the first four minutes. Silva poked the ball in, and at 2-0 Spain had won the game.

Substitutions

The rest of the game was something of a training exercise for Spain. Torres scored another goal after Ireland again failed to deal with the pressing, before being replaced by Fabregas, who later scored his second goal of the tournament. Javi Martinez replaced Xabi Alonso, who had performed very well but was on a yellow card, while Santi Cazorla got some deserved playing time in place of Andres Iniesta, another star performer.

Trapattoni finally introduced James McClean on the flank, but at 3-0 down and with no chance of the Sunderland winger influencing the game. Paul Green got a late run-out, but things were barely relevant at this stage.

Spanish passing

It’s also worth pointing out how dominant Spain were with their passing. They completed more passes than any side has in a single game in European Championship history, while Xavi took the same record for an individual player. The difference in passing between the two sides was not unexpected, but still extraordinary.




Conclusion

Trapattoni’s approach will be questioned, but his overall strategy made sense – Ireland sat back and tried to deal with Spanish pressure, but individual mistakes let them down. That will be hugely frustrating for Trapattoni, especially as the same thing happened against Croatia. That opening match, rather than this defeat to Spain, was their downfall.

Spain were again frustrating, packing the centre of the pitch and appearing complacent at 1-0. They were always likely to win the game from that position, but their defence simply isn’t as strong as two years ago – they can’t afford to rely upon a clean sheet, and allowed Ireland a couple of half-chances at 1-0. In fairness, they played quicker passes and provided more incisive balls after half-time, and played some excellent football.

Del Bosque’s side looked better with one fewer playmaker and a proper striker upfront. Torres simply gave them a different option, bringing variety to their attack and natural centre-forward runs in behind the defence. It still makes sense for Spain to use a player who offers width, in order to stretch the play, but del Bosque wants to dominate possession heavily in the first half, then attack more relentlessly once the opposition have tired.

Alex2011

29楼参考译文
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来自虎扑足球

西班牙4-0爱尔兰：实力悬殊的对话

2012-06-15


首发阵容

这是本届欧洲杯开赛以来最悬殊的比分。

博斯克对他的阵容做出了一处调整，他没有派上法布雷加斯，而是让真正的前锋托雷斯领衔锋线。

特拉帕托尼也对首发进行了一处改动——多伊尔被拿下，西蒙-考克斯首发，位于罗比-基恩身后。

西班牙显然是水准占优的一方——双方实力相差过于悬殊，几乎看不到战术上的争斗。爱尔兰其实一开始做的不错，他们在上半场只落后一球，但是斗牛士们在下半场迅速席卷了对手。两支球队都打得中规中矩，并没有使用什么不寻常的战术。

开场阶段

爱尔兰按照通常惯例排出了两排四人防线，考克斯后撤成为第五位中场，基恩留在前边，并朝左边移动，试探西班牙的越位线。

但是爱尔兰早早地就丢了一个球，搬起石头砸了自己的脚，因此也就很难知道他们若长时间面对着急于得分的西班牙队，会运用怎样的策略。

沃德和奥谢收得很紧，这让西班牙在试图穿过四人防线的时候举步维艰。博斯克的球队又一次在前场缺乏宽度，不过阿贝罗阿和阿尔巴比在对阵意大利的时候更具有攻击性，再加上达夫和麦吉迪疲于应付中场的争斗，西班牙的两位边后卫在边路有着足够的空间可以尽情发挥。

1-0

托雷斯的进球让爱尔兰0-1落后，他们随即更加注重防守也是理所当然。爱尔兰的问题发生在他们持球的时候——虽说不会有人期望他们能跟西班牙争控球，但是在西班牙非常靠前的压迫之下，他们几乎无所适从，经常在自己后场就丢掉了球权。

这其实也是西班牙狭窄阵型的奏效之处——斗牛士们并没有同时压迫爱尔兰的整条防线，而是基本上只集中于场上的一个区域。比如说，如果奥谢拿球，那么西班牙会全体移动到球场的一端，来封堵奥谢附近所有的出球空间。如果是一支比爱尔兰技术好的球队，他们会很快将球转移到另一个边路发动反击，但是爱尔兰后卫们甚至根本看不到这个选择，只好抱着试试看的心态朝前开大脚。



不过西班牙太早就进入了随心所欲的模式，他们乐于控球，没什么穿透性，在上半场的最后20分钟里，很少看到爱尔兰有丢第二球的危险。西班牙的攻击型中场做出了更多的精彩跑动，大卫-席尔瓦的几次跑位非常出色，但是由于爱尔兰退守得很深，直塞球必须要精准无比，这几乎是不可能的任务，因为爱尔兰四后卫摆出了非常狭窄的防线。

下半场

特拉帕托尼在中场休息的时候需要做出决定，但是他唯一的调整——用沃尔特斯换下考克斯——有点太不思进取了，这并没有加强爱尔兰的进攻。不过，也很难指责他的基本战术——如果爱尔兰在下半场开始的时候发起攻击并早早取得进球，西班牙一定会迅速以牙还牙赢得比赛。特拉帕托尼最大的筹码就是继续防守，同时寄希望于西班牙继续不进行任何渗透，然后在下半场后期进行反击，绝杀显然更具有决定性。

但是爱尔兰在4分钟之内再丢一球。席尔瓦推射破门使本队2-0领先，这时西班牙已经基本拿下了比赛。

换人

接下来的时间几乎就是西班牙的训练对抗。托雷斯在爱尔兰再次面对压迫被断球时梅开二度，随即就被法布雷加斯换下，后者也在10分钟之后打入自己在本届欧洲杯的第二球。哈维-马丁内斯替下了哈维-阿隆索，后者的表现无懈可击，只是有一张黄牌在身，桑蒂-卡索拉也得到了出场机会，他替下了同样表现出色的伊涅斯塔。

西班牙的传球

另外需要指出的是西班牙的传球具有压倒性优势。他们完成了欧洲杯有史以来单场比赛最高次数的传球，哈维则创下了同样的个人记录。两队在传球方面的差距并不出人意料，但是仍旧值得一提。





结论

特拉帕托尼的战术会引起质疑，但他的总体策略合乎情理——爱尔兰退守后方，试图应对西班牙的压迫，但是个人失误让他们早早落后。这会让特拉帕托尼失望无比，尤其是首战对阵克罗地亚的时候也是因此输球。对爱尔兰来说，相比输给西班牙，其实那场比赛才是他们出局的真正原因。

西班牙又一次让人有些沮丧，他们挤在中路，1-0领先之后又似乎觉得满意了。其实西班牙从那时起就一直展现出一副胜者姿态，但是他们的防线显然比两年前要脆弱许多——他们没法承担起保证零失球的责任，1-0领先之后给了爱尔兰好多次机会。公平来讲，西班牙在下半场的传球更快，打得也更犀利，这个时候才算是踢出了精彩的足球。

这次博斯克的球队少了一位组织核心，多了一名真正的前锋，看起来好得多了。托雷斯的出场给了西班牙一个不同的选择，带来了进攻方式的多样性，对方的防线之后现在有一名真正的中锋了。不过西班牙仍旧应该派上一位可以提供宽度的球员来拉开阵型，不过博斯克可能想在上半场先进行强力控球，待对手体力下降之后再给予致命一击。

Alex2011

Italy 1-1 Croatia: Pirlo dictates first half, Croatia dominate the second after half-time switch

June 15, 2012


The starting line-ups

Croatia initially had problems with Italy’s 3-5-2, but a clever half-time switch by Slaven Bilic got them back into the game.

Cesare Prandelli kept the same formation and starting XI, so Mario Balotelli remained upfront despite Antonio Di Natale’s impact as a substitute in the 1-1 draw against Spain.

Bilic rewarded the eleven players that played in the 3-1 win over Ireland with a second start.

A game of two halves. In the first, Italy recorded 11 shots compared to Croatia’s three. In the second, Croatia ‘won’ this statistic 7-3, summing up the change in the balance of play.

First half

This was role reversal – Italy had the least possession of any of the 16 sides in the opening round of games. That was mainly because they were up against Spain, of course, but it was still a completely different situation to see them taking the game to the opposition early on here. Croatia, on the other hand, were the dominant force against Ireland – but this time sat back and let Italy come onto them.

Italy were again a standard 3-5-2, but Croatia’s formation was different from against Ireland. Luka Modric sat much deeper, Ivan Rakitic moved inside from the right flank even more and Darijo Srna pushed higher up on the right with Ognjen Vukojevic looking to cover for him. Higher up, Mario Mandzukic started the game by dropping onto Andrea Pirlo when out of possession.

Formation battle

So where were the free players? Italy broadly had a 3 v 2 situation at the back when Mandzukic was high up the pitch, but at the other end, Croatia had no spare man. Mario Balotelli and Antonio Cassano against spent the game working the channels, particularly towards the left, as Srna moved higher up the pitch than Ivan Strinic.

In theory, Croatia’s advantage was on the flanks, where they should have had 2 v 1 situations. But they rarely took advantage of this, with Strinic staying in position at left-back and Ivan Perisic cutting inside down the left. On the right, Rakitic moved into the middle so quickly that it was difficult to overload Emanuele Giaccherini. Interestingly, Rakitic rarely tracked Giaccherini back, leaving him to Srna.

Midfield battle

But the key to the first half was Pirlo, and Italy’s dominance in midfield. In the first few minutes, Mandzukic did a good job, dropping deep onto Pirlo and forcing him to play sideways passes – they left Italy 3 v 1 at the back, and forced the two outside centre-backs, particularly Giorgio Chiellini, to step forward and play passes into the midfield. The game was fairly even.

But Mandzukic, for some reason, stopped tracking Pirlo. This may have been pure laziness, and he stayed higher up the pitch next to Italy’s centre-backs. This didn’t help Croatia at all – it didn’t even eliminate Italy’s spare man, they were still 3 v 2 – though maybe it stopped the advance of Chiellini.

However, it meant Pirlo became free. And he was the most important player in the first half, enjoying time on the ball and looking to hit good long diagonals towards Balotelli, who clearly fancied his chances up against Vedran Corluka. It’s also worth asking what Rakitic’s defensive task was – he wasn’t doing much to stop Giaccherini, and could have been asked to help shut down Pirlo. Pirlo’s opening goal came from a free-kick rather than from open play, but he was the appropriate goalscorer.



Second half


The second half line-ups

Bilic didn’t make any substitutions at half-time, but he did completely change the shape of his side. Croatia were now a 4-2-3-1 – Rakitic came into a deep midfield position with Vukojevic, with Modric moving forward to a number ten position. Mandzukic was moved away from Pirlo, and became a right-winger / second striker.

The most important development in all this was Modric up against Pirlo. Italy’s creative fulcrum was now closed down quickly and no longer had such an influence on the game. He couldn’t hit those diagonals into the channels, and it also meant he wasn’t getting time on the ball and allowing Italy to push higher up the pitch – that’s particularly important with wing-backs – often Italy only had two players in attacking positions, whereas in the first half they were getting plenty of players forward.

Croatia were now in charge of the game, pushing Italy back into their own half. Now, the 2 v 1s down the flanks became much clearer, particularly with Strinic moving higher up on the left (although there was no real reason he didn’t attack more in the first half). Italy’s wing-backs became full-backs, and Croatia started putting more crosses into the box, putting Italy under constant pressure.

Equaliser

Danijel Pranjic came on for Perisic down the left, but he and Vukojevic had briefly switched positions for the goal. Still, Vukojevic made a good run along the flank to create a 2 v 1 versus Maggio, and Strinic had plenty of time and space to cross for Mandzukic at the far post for the equaliser.

Of course, Italy should have been able to cope with crosses – they still had 3 v 2 at the back when Mandzukic arrived from the right wing into the box, and it was a simple misjudgement by Chiellini that was crucial for Croatia’s equaliser.
Like in the Spain game, Prandelli brought on Sebastian Giovinco and Di Natale upfront to offer a different attacking threat, while Bilic replaced Nikica Jelavic with Eduardo – but a third goal wasn’t forthcoming, and a draw was a fair result.

Conclusion

Croatia’s starting shape would have worked if Mandzukic had been stricter with his defensive job on Pirlo, or if Rakitic moved into the centre permanently to help defend in that zone. But Pirlo was allowed the freedom of the midfield, a suicidal strategy. Manduzkic staying high up meant Italy were effectively playing against a 4-4-2, and were comfortable with a spare man at the back.

Croatia were better when they switched to a system with only one forward. Italy now had a surplus at the back and were matched in midfield, and Croatia’s improved use of the flanks highlighted Italy’s wing-backs’ inability to cope with two direct opponents at once.

Alex2011

31楼参考译文
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意大利 1-1 克罗地亚战术分析：皮尔洛主导上半场，克罗地亚换人后统治下半场

译者：Alex2011

2012-06-17


双方首发阵容

面对意大利队3-5-2阵形时，克罗地亚率先出了问题。但是半场过后，斯拉文·比利奇在换人调整上的智慧促使克罗地亚球员重新找回比赛感觉而追平了比分。

塞萨雷·普兰德利本场仍然沿用上场的阵型和首发11人，所以无论在上一场战平阵西班牙队时作为替补打进领先球的安东尼奥·迪纳塔莱给人留下多么深刻印象，马里奥·巴洛特利照旧首发担任前锋。

比利奇对上场3-1战胜爱尔兰的首发阵容11人给予奖励，本场让他们再次联袂首发。

这是两队各胜半场的一场比赛。上半场，意大利获得了11次射门，而爱尔兰仅获得3次。下半场，爱尔兰在7-3统计对比中占得上风，射门优势最终导致了球队追平比分。

上半场


阵型比拼


中场较量




下半场


下半场阵容


扳平比分


结论


（工地中）

Alex2011

Spain 1-0 Croatia: Navas snatches late winner

June 18, 2012


The starting line-ups

Spain played an extremely cautious game, but won after Croatia pushed forward.

Vicente Del Bosque kept the same starting XI, meaning Fernando Torres again spearheaded the attack.

Slaven Bilic made various changes, effectively using a version of the 4-2-3-1 system he finished the Italy game with. Domagoj Vida started at right-back, pushing Darijo Srna forward to the right of midfield. Danijel Pranjic started on the left, with Luka Modric as the number ten. Nikica Jelavic and Ivan Perisic were only substitutes.

Spain were particularly unimpressive despite their eventual win, predictably dominating possession but creating few chances.

Croatia system

The interesting part of this game was Croatia’s shape. Bilic adapted his side significantly, changing Croatia’s style of play to suit the challenge of Spain. Whereas they’d previously played with one solid holding midfielder in position at all times, here Ivan Rakitic played deep alongside Ognjen Vukojevic and occupied the space in front of the back four.

Modric played higher up, not looking to get space between the lines, but instead dropping in and helping battle in midfield, generally getting goalside of Sergio Busquets. On the flanks, while Srna and Jordi Alba spent the game tracking each other up and down the line, on the other side Pranjic came inside and effectively was another central midfielder at times, with Alvaro Arbeloa allowed the entire right wing to himself – always in space, but not considered a real threat.

It’s difficult to say how much the formation contributed to it, as Spain have been slow, predictable and unimaginative with their use of the ball in all three first halves in this tournament, but Croatia defended very well. They stayed compact, they didn’t get dragged around and they always had numbers in midfield, with Modric and Pranjic helping the two holders.

Spain

Spain had the same old problems – a slow tempo, no width, and not enough forward runs from midfield. The exception, as against Italy, was Andres Iniesta, who was direct on the ball and had a good chance when he stormed into the box to get a pass from David Silva. Elsewhere, Spain were simply too horizontal – always looking for the sideways ball, never getting around the Croatian defensive unit, with Arbeloa too slow and Alba being tracked.

Interestingly, with Croatia packing the midfield zone and bringing Mandzukic back to remain compact, both Spanish centre-backs stepped forward in the first half, and had long-range shots.

By virtue of Spain having the full-backs so high up the pitch, Croatia sometimes threatened on the counter. Sergio Ramos made rash decisions when moving out to the left flank to cover for Alba (something he also did against Italy).

Second half

Croatia immediately became more fluid after half-time, within the same system. The two holders were given more freedom – Rakitic is the more natural attacking player, but Vukojevic also moved forward a couple of times.

Modric really came into the game in the second half. He’s a perfect player for playing against Spain, as he has the composure to look up and pick a pass, helping his side keep possession, but also trickery to get past Spain’s initial press. He led the charge, and his superb outside-of-the-foot cross for Rakitic should have produced the game’s opening goal.



Substitutes

Croatia had to go for the win, so moved roughly back to their 4-4-1-1 system, or 4-1-3-2 with the ball. Pranjic and Vida were withdrawn, with Srna dropping to right-back and storming forward on the overlap. Rakitic went to the right of midfield, Modric dropped deeper into the centre, while Perisic came on down the left, and Mandzukic was now just behind Jelavic upfront.

Croatia looked more threatening with two strikers, although they struggled to win the ball from Spain and could have been much more energetic with their closing down. Modric, in a deeper position, continued to drive his side forward.
Del Bosque went for two more direct players, with Navas on – in place of Torres, with Silva briefly becoming a false nine – and then Fabregas introduced upfront in place of Silva, so an Iniesta-Fabregas-Navas frontline.

The key change was Navas – he stretched the play, ran with the ball, made Spain much more varied in possession and made it difficult for Croatia to crowd out Spanish attacks in the centre of the pitch. Navas also stopped Ivan Strinic getting forward, which was important considering the way Croatia dominated the left late on against Italy.



Were it not for the situation in the group, this probably would have meandered to a 0-0, but Bilic really tried to force the crucial goal, bringing on Eduardo for Vukojevic, with the Brazilian-born striker seemingly playing down the right flank. This was probably a change too far, and while you can’t blame Bilic for trying it, the third substitution didn’t really help Croatia in any way. It meant Modric had to cover a large space in front of the back four, and was too far from goal.

Spain’s goal came from their three most dangerous attacking players of the game – Fabregas, Iniesta and Navas. Fabregas’ chip over the top of the defence was superb, but it was obvious how much space he had to work in – the space Vukojevic would have been covering.

Conclusion

A bit of a ‘false’ match – Croatia needed the win more than Spain (because of slightly unfortunate circumstances – who had battered Ireland by more) and had to push forward for the win. Instead, they got caught out on the counter-attack, but they’d been equally as impressive as Spain for the majority of the game.

Croatia can be pleased with their performance at this tournament – a comfortable victory over Ireland, a spirited fightback against Italy courtesy of a clever change from Bilic at half-time, then a commendable display against the World Champions. Bilic leaves on a disappointing note, but hopefully having restored some pride after a brief problematic period a couple of years ago.

For Spain? Nothing new. They’re still not scoring as many goals as they should, nor creating as many chances as they should. Perhaps it’s unfair to judge them upon this game, when a 0-0 would have suited them, but continued false domination is a risky game, and del Bosque simply isn’t making the most of his considerable resources.

That said, Spain generally improve after half-time, and their constant possession play is unquestionably tiring for the opposition, who struggle to play against them for 90 minutes. Still, you can’t help wanting more from such a ludicrously talented squad.

Alex2011

33楼参考译文
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来自虎扑

西班牙1-0克罗地亚：纳瓦斯收获姗姗来迟的致胜球
June 18, 2012


首发阵型

西班牙打了一场极其小心谨慎的比赛，不过却在克罗地亚大举压上之际一锤定音。

博斯克的首发与第二场小组赛一致，托雷斯再次首发出任单箭头。

比利奇则调整了多个位置，摆出的是上场对阵意大利后半段时使用的4-2-3-1。维达首发担任右后卫，这样就把斯尔纳推到右边锋的位置。普拉尼奇在左路首发，莫德里奇出任10号位。耶拉维奇和佩里西奇都坐上了替补席。

尽管是西班牙最终获胜，他们的表现却非常平淡，照例在控球上占了上风，却没创造出几次机会。

克罗地亚的阵型

这场比赛最耐人寻味的是克罗地亚的阵型。比利奇显然做出了不小的变动，他改变了克罗地亚的风格以适应西班牙带来的挑战。之前他们一直有一个固定的控球中场一直卡住自己的位置，但这一次，拉基蒂奇和武克切维奇一起搭档双后腰，覆盖了后防四人身前的空间。

莫德里奇的位置很靠上，他没有试图进入对方两条线之间的位置，而是后撤加入中场的争斗，基本上是位于布茨克斯的身后位。在两翼，斯尔纳和阿尔巴在整场比赛中都互相盯防着来回奔跑，另一边的普拉尼奇内切，时不时成为另一位中场球员，把整个右路都留给阿贝罗阿——其实阿贝罗阿一直有着足够的空间，但是他并不能形成真正的威胁。

很难讲清楚这个阵型到底起了多大的作用，因为西班牙本届大赛以来，在三个上半场中的节奏一直很慢，动向也一直被对方看穿，运球时也没什么想象力，不过克罗地亚的防守非常出色。他们阵型收缩得很近，并没有被对方的跑动扯开，中场也一直保持着人数上的优势，因为莫得里奇和普拉尼奇一直在协助两名后腰。

西班牙

西班牙的问题一直得不到解决——节奏缓慢，没有宽度，中场的前插也做得不够。唯一的例外是对阵意大利时候的伊涅斯塔，他拿球的时候非常果断直接，接到来自席尔瓦的传球后突入禁区创造了一次不错的机会。除此之外，西班牙的阵型过于扁平——总是试图横向分球，从来不去包抄克罗地亚的防线，阿贝罗阿太慢，阿尔巴又被盯得很死。

有意思的是，克罗地亚在中场区域囤积兵力，又让曼季茹基奇后撤来保持阵型的紧凑，西班牙的两个中卫都在上半场前插过，还都尝试了远射。

由于西班牙的边后卫压得很靠上，克罗地亚凭借反击创造出几次威胁，导致拉莫斯在左移给阿尔巴补防的时候不得不匆忙出脚（他在对阵意大利的时候也陷入过几次这样的窘境）。

下半场

克罗地亚在下半场虽然没有变阵，但却立即变得更具有流动性。两位后腰的自由度更大了——拉基蒂奇本来就是一位攻击属性更强的球员，但是武科耶维奇也进行了几次前插。

莫德里奇其实在下半场才真正开始影响比赛。他是非常适合对阵西班牙的球员，可以镇静沉着地观察场上形势，拦截对方的传球来加强本方的控球，还可以巧妙地越过西班牙的第一重压迫。莫德里奇领导了整支球队，他给拉基蒂奇的那次无与伦比的外脚背传中本可以带来打破场上僵局的进球。



换人

克罗地亚必须求胜，于是在拿球的时候会变回4-4-1-1或者4-1-3-2。普拉尼奇和维达被换下，斯尔纳后撤成为右后卫，时不时会套边插上。拉基蒂奇来到中场右路，莫德里奇进一步后撤来到中场中路，而佩里西奇来到左路，曼季茹基奇则留在锋线上耶拉维奇的身后。

克罗地亚双前锋的时候更具有威胁性，虽然他们费劲九牛二虎之力也没能赢下西班牙，而且他们在贴身紧逼的时候本该更强硬些。莫德里奇虽然后撤了，但仍然可以推动整支球队继续进攻。

博斯克换上了两位更直接的球员，纳瓦斯换下托雷斯，席尔瓦变成假九号，然后法布雷加斯换下席尔瓦，这时的锋线上是伊涅斯塔-法布雷加斯-纳瓦斯组合。



关键的换人是纳瓦斯的上场——他拉开了比赛的宽度，而且凭借自己的带球突破让西班牙的控球更具有多样性，致使克罗地亚很难仅靠中路就挤死西班牙的攻击。纳瓦斯也掐断了斯特里尼奇的前插，看看克罗地亚在对阵意大利的时候左路的优势，就知道这一点有多重要了。

如果不考虑到当前的小组出线形势，这场比赛很有可能以0-0收场，但是比利奇真的尽了最大努力来寻求绝杀，于是他用爱德华多换下了武科耶维奇，这位巴西出生的前锋可以在右路下底。这个换人有点太孤注一掷了，虽然没法指责比利奇的尝试，但这最后一个换人名额并没有真的帮上克罗地亚。这样一来，莫德里奇必须得覆盖后卫线四人之前的更大空间，他离球门太远了。

西班牙的进球来自于他们本场比赛中最具有威胁性的攻击手们——法布雷加斯、伊涅斯塔和纳瓦斯。法布雷加斯的过顶球精彩绝伦——但你也要看到他得到了多大的空间——本来这是武科耶维奇一直占据着的。

结论

有点像“假球”——克罗地亚比西班牙更需要一场胜利（克罗地亚在爱尔兰身上捞的净胜球不够多），因此必须要大举压上，结果被对方抓住机会反击成功，但是整场比赛大部分时间里，两队一直平分秋色。

克罗地亚应该为自己在本届大赛中的表现感到满意——先是酣畅淋漓地战胜爱尔兰，接着凭靠比利奇精彩的中场调整逆转形势逼平意大利，最后在与世界冠军的较量中也可圈可点。比利奇带着令人失望的标签走到今天，不过经历了这几年的艰难时期之后，应该也重新建立了些许自豪感。

西班牙？没什么可说的。他们仍然没能取得足够多的进球，也没有创造出足够多的机会。也许单凭这场比赛来评判他们的表现有些不公平，0-0的比分也许更适合他们的表现，这种并非真正占据上风的比赛非常危险，博斯克并没有充分打出自己的一手好牌。

不过，西班牙总是在下半场有所改进，他们的控球打法毫无疑问会消耗对手的体力和意志，谁都没法跟他们绕上90分钟。然而，对于这样一支天赋过剩到奢侈浪费的球队，你总要想看到更多。

Alex2011

面对意大利和克罗地亚，板鸭徒有华丽攻击性，却至今未有与此匹配的丰硕收成，反而在攻守平衡中容易出现为数不多却具有致命伤的较大纰漏，好在他们还有一个杯赛不露馅的圣卡西，如果是巴尔德斯抑或是阿根廷队罗梅罗，恐怕出局就不是克罗地亚了

peterhu

觉得欧洲杯的小组出线规则有点搞笑。。。0比0还能是净胜球更多的队伍出局。先比较同分球队的胜负关系，比方，净胜球，进球数。。
昨晚的比赛对克罗地亚不公平。

pedro

觉得欧洲杯的小组出线规则有点搞笑。。。0比0还能是净胜球更多的队伍出局。先比较同分球队的胜负关系，比方，净胜球，进球数。。
昨晚的比赛对克罗地亚不公平。 ...
peterhu 发表于 2012-6-19 22:08

对头

还有丹麦队的出局也可惜

荷兰队最后一战都不能为丫世界杯亚军的荣誉而战，难道就为了如此曲线地报丹麦队首场赢了丫的仇吗

真心觉得丫是本届最烂队伍，木有之一

爱尔兰虽是鱼腩队伍，但是最后一战却是其在小组赛打得最好的一场战斗，至少是失球最少的一场比赛；特拉帕托尼也木有给祖国球队开闸放水的

北极狐

齐达内日前说：“西班牙会选择控球，因为他们习惯这么做，并且做得很好。法国知道这一点，我们等着看在中场会发生什么。现在我们知道西班牙是热门球队，不仅仅在每场比赛中，更是欧洲杯的夺冠热门。西班牙非常清楚他们要走到哪里。”

齐达内并不想和伊涅斯塔作比较，但是他承认伊涅斯塔是欧洲杯的明星球员之一，他说：“伊涅斯塔对整支西班牙队来说有着巨大的影响。比如说，在西班牙最近的这场比赛中，他一开始表现平平，但是当他开始发挥的时候，几乎很难去阻止他。西班牙踢得好是因为他们拥有很多出色的球员，但是伊涅斯塔更出挑。他甚至可以做守门员。”

Alex2011

31楼参考译文
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来自虎扑

意大利1-1克罗地亚：皮尔洛统治上半时，格子军接管下半时

2012-06-15



首发阵容

上半时克罗地亚很难应对意大利的3-5-2，但是通过中场休息时比利奇的巧妙调整，他们下半时及时找了比赛状态。
意大利队的首发阵容和阵型与第一场完全相同，虽然迪纳塔莱在对西班牙的比赛中为意大利打入重要进球，但普兰德利还是坚持使用巴洛特利作为首发前锋。

比利奇在球队3-1战胜爱尔兰之后，同样没有对阵容做出任何变动。

这场比赛的上下半场截然不同。上半时，意大利队11次射门，克罗地亚队只有3次；而下半时变成了克罗地亚7次射门，意大利队3次。这一数据直观地反映了上下半场局面天平的倾斜变化。

上半时

上半时，双方的表现相比各自的第一场比赛就像是角色倒转。在第一场比赛中，意大利的控球率是首轮16支球队中最低的，主要原因当然是因为他们的对手是西班牙。但本场比赛一开局，意大利队占据上风，体现出与上场比赛不同的风貌。另一方面，克罗地亚在首场比赛中全面压制爱尔兰，本场比赛却稳坐后方，等待意大利的压上进攻。

意大利队仍然排出了3-5-2的阵型，但克罗地亚的阵型与上一场不同。莫德里奇回撤得更深，拉基蒂奇在右路的位置更靠近中路，斯尔纳则大幅度前插，身后的空当由武科耶维奇为他补位。前场的曼季茹基奇则负责在丢失球权后干扰皮尔洛。

阵型之战

而其他的球员中，意大利在曼季茹基奇进攻时，基本能够保持后场拥有3打2的人数优势。另一端的克罗地亚并没有安排更多人手协防，巴洛特利和卡萨诺不停地在克罗地亚的肋部穿插，尤其是左路，因为斯尔纳比另一边的斯特里尼奇前插幅度更大。

从牌面上看，克罗地亚的优势在于两个边路，他们本应拥有2对1的人数优势，但是实际上却很少看到他们利用这一点。斯特里尼奇安分地待在左后卫的位置上，佩里西奇则不断从左路内切。右路的拉基蒂奇靠向中路，这就减轻了本该与他对位的贾切里尼的压力。而且拉基蒂奇很少回防，而是把贾切里尼完全留给他身后的斯尔纳防守。

中场之战

上半时的关键球员是皮尔洛，正是由于他的高水准发挥，意大利完全控制了中场。刚开场的前几分钟，曼季茹基奇表现出色，他回撤到很靠后的位置盯防皮尔洛，迫使皮尔洛只能更多地向两个边路分球。克罗地亚在前场只留下一名前锋面对意大利的三后卫，但是正因为他们压制了皮尔洛，使得意大利两边的后卫尤其是基耶利尼只能前插向中场传球。这一阶段，双方看起来势均力敌。

但是不知出于什么原因，曼季茹基奇停止了盯防皮尔洛，也可能只是出于疲懒，他就只是待在前场靠近意大利后卫的位置上。但是这对于克罗地亚毫无帮助，甚至不能扭转意大利后防线上的人数优势，他们仍是以3对2在人数上领先克罗地亚。但是曼季茹基奇的这一变化也带来一个好处，那就是压制了基耶利尼的前插。

但是不管怎么说，这意味着皮尔洛处于无人盯防的状态。他是上半时最重要的球员，可以从容自在地持球，并瞅准机会传出精准的长传球找到前场的巴洛特利。巴洛特利几次戏耍乔尔卢卡，但却没有把握住机会进球。让人生疑的是拉基蒂奇的防守任务究竟是什么，他在面对贾切里尼时几乎毫无作为，也没有协助队友看防皮尔洛。皮尔洛在上半时以一记直接任意球破门得分，虽然他的进球来自定位球而非运动战，但是上半时由他为意大利进球再合适不过。



下半时


下半时阵容

比利奇在半场时没有进行任何换人，但是他完全改变了阵型，克罗地亚下半时的阵型变为4-2-3-1，拉基蒂奇后撤与武科耶维奇搭档双后腰，莫德里奇前移至10号位，曼季茹基奇不再与皮尔洛对位，而是变为右边锋或者二前锋的角色。

这其中最重要的变化是让莫德里奇对位皮尔洛，意大利创造力的核心很快被冻结，很难再对比赛产生什么影响。皮尔洛无法传出穿透克罗地亚肋部的传球，带球也不再游刃有余，无法指挥意大利向前压上，这对于两名边前卫的影响尤其大。意大利在下半时只有两名球员留在攻击位置上，而上半时他们负责进攻的球员要多得多。

克罗地亚接管了比赛，将意大利压回了自己的半场。克罗地亚现在在边路2打1的人数优势体现得更加明显，尤其是斯特里尼奇在左路的前插更加积极（虽然他上半时也没什么理由不前插）。意大利的翼卫变成了边后卫，克罗地亚向禁区内的传中明显增多，使意大利持续处于压力之下。

扳平比分

普拉尼奇上场替下左路的佩里西奇，但是他很快与武科耶维奇交换了位置。武科耶维奇在边路的跑动非常积极，与斯特里尼奇一起继续保持着二人对马乔一人的人数优势。而斯特里尼奇也因此有了更多的空间和机会传中。

意大利队本来完全可以应付克罗地亚的传中战术，就算曼季茹基奇从右路冲入禁区，意大利在后场也仍然是3打2，而克罗地亚打入的扳平一球则是由于基耶利尼的判断失误。

就像与西班牙的比赛一样，普兰德利在前锋线换上乔文科和迪纳塔莱，试图变换进攻风格制造威胁，比利奇用爱德华多换下耶拉维奇，但第三个进球始终没有到来，双方握手言和，这是一个公平的结果。

结论

如果曼季茹基奇能够加紧盯防皮尔洛，或者拉基蒂奇能够果断进入中场对皮尔洛进行协防，那么克罗地亚的首发阵型也完全可以发挥作用。但是他们让皮尔洛在中场拥有太多自由，这无疑是自杀式战术。曼季茹基奇一直待在前场，这就意味着意大利可以灵活运用后场自由人，随时切换至4-4-2阵型。

克罗地亚下半时将阵型变换到单前锋之后，表现有了很大起色。意大利在后场空余人手，中场的优势却完全被抵消了。克罗地亚在两个边路的高光表现使意大利的翼卫们在直接对话中难以招架。

colinfirth

当今足坛最佳门将之一！布冯个人集锦

Alex2011

Spain v France preview
June 23, 2012

   
Possible starting line-ups

Spain have never beaten France in a competitive fixture – can they put that record straight tonight?

Spain approach

Spain are clearly the favourites here, and as the side less likely to change their shape or spring a tactical surprise, it makes sense to consider them first.

Vicente del Bosque hinted yesterday that he’d consider changing his side slightly, and while it’s almost unthinkable that he’d change the ‘first’ nine players (ie Iker Casillas through to Andres Iniesta), the other two positions, occupied by David Silva and Fernando Torres, are less secure.

Torres remains the favourite to start, despite competition from Fernando Llorente and Alvaro Negredo. There’s certainly an argument that Llorente would be better suited to this game, to test the aerial ability of the French centre-backs, and one could also argue that Negredo is now better at playing Torres’ old game than the Torres of 2012. Del Bosque places loyalty and familiarity before tactical concerns, though, and seems more likely to stick with the Chelsea striker.

The other (slight) issue is Cesc Fabregas. Without wanting to go over old ground, he brings Spain more verticality, and having scored two goals already despite starting only once, he must be in del Bosque’s thoughts. He could start in a right-ish position in place of Silva, or del Bosque could even return to the false nine system we saw against Italy…but this might be overcomplicating things, as del Bosque will probably leave the side unchanged.

France selection

Laurent Blanc will have to make at least one change from the defeat to Sweden. Philippe Mexes is suspended, so Laurent Koscielny will replace him. This isn’t a huge blow – Koscielny’s been in better form than Mexes over the past year, and his style suits playing against Spain – he’s quick and reads the game well. Indeed, Koscielny is the only other recognised centre-back in the squad, and Blanc is one injury away from having to play Alou Diarra out of position at the back, because of his strange decision to name only three centre-backs in the squad. The concern isn’t about Koscielny’s ability, but about whether he has a relationship with Adil Rami.

That is a certain change, so it’s barely a debate. Instead, Blanc’s main selection dilemma is in the centre of midfield. Yohan Cabaye missed the Sweden game with a small injury, so Blanc fielded Yann M’Vila and Diarra together in a strong holding midfield pairing. Samir Nasri was ahead as the number ten in a 4-2-3-1.

France lost the game, of course, but a similar selection might be on the cards here. France need to pack that central midfield zone, the position where literally half Spain’s team likes to operate. Diarra on his own would be a risk – he likes to stick tight to opponents, and would be drawn out of position by one player (Silva?) and the resulting space would be exploited by another (Iniesta?).

Despite the Sweden result, it does make sense to play both Diarra and M’Vila. That doesn’t necessarily have to mean Cabaye misses out, though – he played well in France’s first two games, particularly when moving higher up the pitch. He might play at the head of the midfield trio, which in turn would push Samir Nasri into the front three, into the right-sided role he played against England on the opening day – when he was the key player.

In isolation, Blanc might prefer to play Nasri in midfield, but this seems the best solution – Cabaye in the centre and Nasri on the right is a better bet than Nasri in the centre and either Jeremy Menez or Hatem Ben Arfa on the right. Menez did well against Ukraine, but might not be the best player to track Jordi Alba’s runs.

Overall approach

That’s the most important selection decision, but France’s overall approach will decide the nature of the game. Spain are a known quantity, but France have the ability to vary their play. Generally they’ve focused upon ball retention so far in this competition, and while they certainly won’t dominate possession in this match, Blanc has to decide whether to compete in midfield, or defend deep and counter quickly.

The second approach is more natural when playing against Spain, but it remains to be seen whether France’s defence is good enough to withstand constant pressure, and they’d probably be relying as much on Spain’s lack of verticality as their own defensive strength.

Ribery v Arbeloa

They do have an obvious out-ball, though – Franck Ribery on the left. His battle with Alvaro Arbeloa will be the most interesting individual clash of the game. Arbeloa is probably Spain’s weak link – his attacking isn’t purposeful enough, his passing is too slow, and Xavi Hernandez keeps shouting at him, telling him to press quicker.

Ribery was involved in the key battle of the game against Ukraine, when Oleg Husiev kept running past him. Ribery didn’t track, Ukraine should have punished him by using Husiev on the overlap, but then Ribery was in a position to prompt counters and helped created the opening goal, when Husiev was out of position. Arbeloa will be more cautious than Husiev, but this zone of the pitch will be crucial.

It will also be important as Karim Benzema moves to that flank, looking to get the ball to feet and becoming the ‘wall’ for Ribery’s one-twos that enable him to storm towards goal. Gerard Pique’s marking of Benzema will be crucial, and Ramos might become the sweeper.

Spain are strong favourites, likely to keep the ball for long periods in the first half, then look to penetrate more after half-time. Blanc will have to come up with something clever to defeat the World Champions.

Alex2011

41楼参考译文

北极狐

zm预测，还是估测不准板鸭无锋阵

皑皑

法国队没练过前场配合么？各种迅速传球眼神走位。。。

Alex2011

Spain 2-0 France: Blanc’s double right-back plan fails and Alonso deservedly scores both goals
June 24, 2012


The starting line-ups

Laurent Blanc named an extremely reactive team – but France neither stifled Spain’s threat down the left, nor played their own game effectively.

Vicente del Bosque had hinted he would make changes from the team that beat Croatia, though it was still a surprise to see Cesc Fabregas return to the side in a false nine role, meaning Spain played the XI that started against Italy in the opening game – an experiment that didn’t go well.

Blanc’s XI was a huge surprise. He named Mathieu Debuchy on the right side of midfield, practically given a man-marking job on Jordi Alba. That meant Anthony Reveillere made his first start of the tournament at right-back. Florent Malouda was given a role in the centre of midfield, while Samir Nasri was only on the bench. France had come to contain rather than to attack.

But their performance was remarkably feeble. Their gameplan from the outset failed, and Blanc then found himself unable to react effectively at 1-0 down. Spain weren’t spectacular, but they were clearly the better side.

France right / Spain left

There’s no getting away from the game’s main story. Blanc decided to field two right-backs in tandem, which was paying a huge compliment to Jordi Alba, Spain’s left-back. As it happens, Alba is part of the most successful double-full-back combination in Europe at the moment, playing behind Jeremy Mathieu at Valencia. Alba plays a very important role in the Spanish side – ZM pinpointed him as (possibly) Spain’s key player pre-tournament, because he’s the only man who offers width. Blanc’s thinking was this – if you nullify Alba, you make Spain congested and predictable in the centre of the pitch.

It was certainly a brave decision, arguably a foolish one. What it showed, though, was how one moment can change how a manager’s entire tournament decision-making will be viewed – Debuchy’s stumble when attempting to track Alba’s run for Xabi Alonso’s opening was unfortunate from Blanc’s point of view (he can hardly legislate for a player simply losing his footing) but it meant his gameplan had failed.

For the rest of the game, Alba wasn’t such a big influence. But France had to be completely secure down that side for such a deliberate, obvious strategy to be rendered a success.

Spain right / France left

On the other side, Blanc’s strategy was completely different. Alvaro Arbeloa against Franck Ribery seemed the key battle before the game, and Arbeloa’s runs went completely unchecked throughout the first half – he constantly moved forward on the overlap, and Ribery had no intention of marking him. France didn’t believe Arbeloa was good enough on the ball to cause them any harm – although the Spanish players didn’t seem to have much more faith. A delayed pass from Fabregas early on, when he used Arbeloa as a last resort despite the right-back being in an excellent position, showed how reluctant they were to use them. Had Alba (or Dani Alves at Barcelona) been in that position, Fabregas would have played the ball immediately.

As shown below, Alba was involved in build-up play much more, with Arebloa the crossfield option.



Ribery could have countered, as he did against Ukraine, but Spain made sure the right-back position was covered, with Sergio Busquets moving across to defend that side of the pitch when Arbeloa went forward. It was more important to cover the right than the left, of course, as Ribery stayed high up and remained a threat, while Debuchy was moving back with Alba.

Spain movement

Spain may have played the same system as against Italy, but it was completely different performance. There was so much more variety in their play – Xavi Hernandez played higher up, making the formation less 4-3-3 and more 4-2-3-1, offering a clear forward pass for the other two midfielders. David Silva stretched the play more, staying wider (see below) when Spain had the ball at the back, and moving inside when Arbeloa wanted to get forward, rather than doing so incessantly for the sake of it. The tempo of the passing was better, with Alonso more forward-thinking with his distribution – and even without his goals, he was Spain’s star man.



There was also good movement from the front three. Iniesta drifted inside, dragging Reveillere into uncomfortable positions and opening up space for the Alba v Debuchy battle, while Fabregas’ movement drew Adil Rami forward. Laurent Koscielny covered, and France rarely seemed likely to be opened up through the centre, but it was a much more promising situation than against Italy, where Cesare Prandelli’s side often had three spare men.

Alonso

By wasting two players on the right, it’s arguable France conceded too much room in midfield. There, the midfield roles were unclear, and the main man to benefit was Alonso. Xavi played higher up and often found himself surrounded, but Yohan Cabaye was slow to press Alonso and therefore the Real Madrid midfielder was the game’s most prolific passer. It’s not often he outperforms Xavi for Spain (in terms of passing figures, and overall influence on the game) – but he did so tonight, and deserved to be in the headlines for his goalscoring.

There may have been a few too many unsuccessful straight passes, but we can hardly criticise him for that, having given Spain stick for playing sideways too frequently.



France with the ball

France were extremely poor on the ball in the first half – Spain pressed them well, but France resorted to long balls too often, and too readily. The role of Malouda was particularly unclear – presumably he was meant to shuttle forward and link midfield and attack, but Blanc dropped him after the England game because he failed to do that effectively, and his selection was more baffling than that of Debuchy, which at least had a clear (if unsuccessful) purpose.

If Blanc wanted defensive strength he could have used Alou Diarra, if he wanted creativity he could have used Nasri. Malouda was the best of neither world, and just as Alonso’s key role was summed up by his headed finish for the first, Malouda was responsible for the goal, with some utterly non-existent defending. That said, after the first three games, midfield runs from Spain was something of a shock…

There was no transition plan – Busquets shut out Ribery, Karim Benzema was isolated. France couldn’t turn all-out-defence into any form of attack.

Second half

This was, frankly, a complete non-event. France managed zero shots on target, Spain mustered one – which came in the 89th minute, from the penalty spot. It was a poor half of football contested between two teams playing within themselves – France because they lacked organisation, Spain because they weren’t forced to be good.

The substitutions were vaguely interesting, but more for the coaches’ intentions than the resulting impact upon the game. Blanc used Nasri in place of Malouda, and Jeremy Menez for Debuchy, and more of a clear 4-2-3-1. Nothing much changed, and the subsequent introduction of Olivier Giroud for M’Vila was a final, desperate roll of the dice – but it meant France struggled to win the ball .

Del Bosque used Pedro Rodriguez in place of Silva, though he played wide on the left, with Iniesta moving to the right. Torres replaced Fabregas and tried to hold the ball up – neither sub changed the game significantly, though Pedro won the penalty for Alonso’s second.

Boring Spain?

Spain will face more accusations of “boring football” after coasting their way through this match. That’s terribly harsh – for over 70 minutes of the game they were ahead and content to slow the tempo, while France struggled to win the ball, or do anything with it.

It was fair to criticise Spain for being unambitious and unimaginative with the ball when they were drawing 0-0 against Italy (and looking more likely to concede than score), and also against Croatia when they came close to not topping the group having lacked penetration throughout. Even the 45 minute spell between the first and second goals against the Republic of Ireland was hugely frustrating, because Spain were being dull against probably the competition’s weakest side.

But here, determined ball retention was completely justifiable from a tactical point of view. If your side is 1-0 up at half-time, and you manage to go the entire second half without conceding a shot on target, your gameplan has been successful.

There was little difference from previous games in terms of pure playing style  - but the scoreline for most of the game was 1-0 and not 0-0. That might not placate those who want more of a spectacle. But the difference in the situation of the game translates into the difference between Spain playing poorly, and Spain playing effective, controlled defensive football to maintain a lead.

Conclusion

“We were strong on the left with Jordi and Iniesta, that’s where the first goal came from,” said del Bosque.

“If you look at our team, we knew Spain’s left side was very strong,” Blanc said. “In Alba and Iniesta, they have two players who overlap constantly. And what’s frustating is that we conceded a goal from that side. If you look at the first half, it’s the only time Alba was able to put a cross in…it’s a frustrating feeling. We knew they were dangerous on that side, we changed our team to compensate, and they score from that side.”

You can question Blanc’s approach, but you can’t fault his summary.

Alex2011

45楼参考译文
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来自虎扑足球

西班牙2-0法国战术复盘：双右后卫收效甚微，百场先生星光闪耀

June 24, 2012


首发阵容

布兰科排出了一个极具被动性的阵型——不过法国队既没有在左路遏制住西班牙的威胁，也没能有效执行自己的作战计划。

博斯克之前暗示过他会对对阵克罗地亚的阵型进行改动，不过看到法布雷加斯回到伪九号位置仍然让人有些惊讶，也就是说，西班牙的首发11人与小组赛第一轮对阵意大利时完全一致——那次的试验其实并不成功。

布兰科的首发让人震惊。他把德布希放在中场右路，任务是盯住阿尔巴。也就是说，安东尼-雷维埃迎来了自己本届欧洲杯的首次首发，他是本场比赛的右后卫。中场中路的是马卢达，纳斯里坐在了板凳上。法国队这次的目的是防守而并非进攻。

不过他们的表现相当无力。法国队的计划在一开始就失败了，接下来布兰科又发现自己在1球落后的时候无能为力。西班牙的表现比较一般，但显然是更强的一方。

法国队的右路/西班牙的左路

布兰科决定派上一前一后两名右后卫，表现出对西班牙左后卫阿尔巴非常忌惮。这是因为阿尔巴在瓦伦西亚的位置是在马蒂厄身后，两人组成了目前欧洲最成功的双边卫搭档。阿尔巴在西班牙阵中的角色非常重要——ZM在欧洲杯前就认定他（可能）是西班牙的关键球员，因为只有他一个人可以提供宽度。布兰科的想法应该是这样的——如果能冻结阿尔巴，就能把西班牙堵在中路，对方的意图也就更有可能被预料到。

这个决定的确非常大胆，但也称得上有些愚蠢。不过，这倒也体现了一些片断是如何在主帅做整个对战计划时影响他的决策的——德布希在试图盯防阿尔巴的跑动时表现得跌跌撞撞，这也直接导致了阿隆索的首开纪录，从布兰科的角度来看可能是运气太糟（他也没法立下什么法规不准球员失去平衡吧），不过也意味着他的计划全盘失败了。

在剩下的比赛里，阿尔巴的影响就没有这么大了。不过法国不得不全力确保这一侧的安全性，因为对方这种毫不掩饰的战略已经成功过一次了。

西班牙的右路/法国的左路

在另一侧，布兰科的策略完全不同。赛前预测的关键争斗是阿贝罗阿对抗里贝里，但是阿贝罗阿在整个上半场的跑动几乎是踏入无人之境——他持续地套边插上，但里贝里却并没有要去防他的意思。法国队并不认为球在阿贝罗阿脚下时能对自己造成什么威胁——不过即使是西班牙队友们对他也一样没什么信心。比赛早期法布雷加斯曾犹豫了一下才把球传给他，显然把他当成了不得已的选择，尽管当时阿贝罗阿正处于一个再好不过的位置，这表明了西班牙并不乐意把球传给阿贝罗阿。如果处于那个位置的是阿尔巴（或者是巴塞罗那的阿尔维斯），法布雷加斯一定会立即把球传过去。

如下图所示，阿尔巴更多地参与了组织进攻，而阿贝罗阿则主要是斜长传的参与者。



里贝里本应该多反击，正如对阵乌克兰时那样，不过西班牙保证了自己右后方的安全性，阿贝罗阿突前时，布茨克斯会移到那个区域过去补位防守。当然，覆盖住右路比左路更重要，因为里贝里一直留在很前场的位置保持威胁，而德布希则会跟着阿尔巴一起移动。

西班牙的移动

西班牙可能沿用了对阵意大利时的体系，不过从表现上来看却判若两队。他们的打法很具有多样性——哈维留在前场，保持了一个更像4-2-3-1而不是4-3-3的阵型，为身前的两位中场提供干净利落的传球。大卫-席尔瓦进一步拉伸了比赛，西班牙后场拿球时他会留在更靠边的位置（见下图），而阿贝罗阿想要前插的时候他就会内切进来，不再仅仅为了内切而内切。西班牙传球的节奏好得多了，阿隆索的分球也更具有进攻性——就算没有那两个进球，他也是西班牙最耀眼的一位。



前场三人的跑动也很出色。伊涅斯塔移到中路，把雷维埃带到自己不擅长的位置，为阿尔巴与德布希的对抗留出空间，而法布雷加斯则把拉米引到了前边。科斯切尔尼的补位很及时，法国的中路看起来很少有突破的空间，不过比对阵意大利的时候要有希望多了，普兰德利的球队通常在中路布置三个人。

阿隆索

右路占据了两个人，那么法国在中路的空间就被对手大大压制了。在这个区域，法国球员们的任务分配并不清晰，于是阿隆索成了受益最大的一位。在前场活动的哈维经常陷入对手的包围圈，但是卡巴耶在压迫阿隆索的时候动作太慢，这就让皇马中场成为了这场比赛最高效的传球手。阿隆索在西班牙国家队很少有压过哈维的表现（指传球数据方面，还有对比赛的整体影响）——但是他今晚做到了，再加上那两个进球，全场最佳当之无愧。

也许他不成功的直塞稍微多了一点，但是我们很难在这一点上指责阿隆索，因为西班牙走边路的次数太频繁了。



有球状态下的法国队

上半场法国队在拿球的时候表现很糟糕——西班牙有效地压迫了对手，但是法国也太依赖自己的长传了。马卢达的角色尤为不明——理论上说他应该前后移动来串联中场和攻击线，但是布兰科在打完英格兰之后就把因其表现不好而没有再使用过他，而且马卢达这次的入选比德布希还无厘头，后者至少有个清晰的目的（先不管成功与否）。

如果布兰科想要增强防守，他可以使用阿劳-迪亚拉，如果想要增强创造性的话还有纳斯里。马卢达则两头不靠谱，正如阿隆索的头球体现了自己的关键作用一样，马卢达在这个失球上负有绝对责任，他的防守太不积极了。也就是说，在前三场比赛过后，西班牙中场做出的跑动在某种意义上还是震惊了对手……

下半场

坦白的说，下半场几乎什么都没发生。法国一次射正都没，西班牙只有一次——89分钟时那个点球。下半场非常无趣，两支球队各玩各的——法国是因为缺乏组织性，西班牙则是缺乏动力。

换人的意义也模糊不清，可能双方主帅都想做一些尝试，而并不在意会不会对比赛产生影响。布兰科用纳斯里换下马卢达，用梅内换下德布希，这时法国的阵型更像是4-2-3-1了。场上形势没有什么变化，后来的吉鲁换下姆维拉则更像是最后一搏——但是法国就更难从对手脚下抢到球了。

博斯克用佩德罗换下席尔瓦，不过佩德罗留在了左路，伊涅斯塔换到右路。托雷斯换下了法布雷加斯，试图把球控制在更前场的位置——这两个换人都没能对比赛有什么显著影响，尽管佩德罗制造了一个点球，让阿隆索梅开二度。

无聊乏味的西班牙？

西班牙在这场比赛中的表现会招致更多关于“打法无聊”的指责。这其实过于苛刻了——超过70多分钟的时间里他们都处于领先而试图降低比赛节奏，而法国则很难抢到球权，抢到了也没有什么作为。

在西班牙与意大利打成0-0（而且看起来更像会丢球而不是进球）的时候，还有在对阵克罗地亚时，缺乏穿透力的他们看起来很难拿到小组头名的时候，指责他们的进取心不足或者拿球的时候缺乏想象力更为公平。甚至在对阵爱尔兰的比赛里，第一个进球和第二个进球之间那45分钟也很令人崩溃，因为西班牙在对阵可能是小组中最弱的对手，却仍然显得无精打采。

但是在这场比赛里，从战术角度来看，保持控球率的决策是无可非议的。如果你的球队在上半场就1-0领先，而下半场又确保了对手一脚射正都没有，这个作战计划绝对称得上是成功的。

这几场比赛单纯从打法角度来看并没有很大区别——不过大部分比分是1-0而不是0-0。这也许无法安抚那些期待更多大场面的观众。然而，各场比赛在形势上的不同转化成了西班牙在表现上的差别：或者踢得很差劲，或者有效地踢出了控制防守足球并保持了领先。

结论

“我们的左路很强，有约尔迪（阿尔巴）和伊涅斯塔，第一个进球正是来自这里，”博斯克说。

“看看我们法国队，我们都知道西班牙的左路非常强大，”布兰科说，“有阿尔巴和伊涅斯塔，他们这两位球员不停套边插上。令人崩溃的是我们的丢球就是来自那一边。看了上半场就知道，那是唯一一次阿尔巴能送出传中的机会……这种感觉令人很沮丧。我们知道他们在那个边路的威胁性很大，因此调整了球队来应对，结果还是被他们在那一边进了球。”

你可以质疑布兰科的战术，但是他的总结无可挑剔。

北极狐

西意还在继续，看这个帖能否存活到决赛？

乔治六世

无责任无压力预测

葡萄牙 1-3 西班牙

乔治六世

无责任无压力预测

葡萄牙 1-3 西班牙

Alex2011

Portugal v Spain preview

June 27, 2012


Probably starting line-ups - Moutinho and Meireles may switch

Will Portugal be able to break up Spain’s dominant passing game? More to the point, will they attempt to?

Selection

There will be few surprises in selection. Paulo Bento, having kept the same starting XI for his previous six competitive games, has been forced to bring in Hugo Almeida upfront in place of the injured Helder Postiga. Nelson Oliveira is another option, and some would argue that his greater mobility brings more to Portugal’s game. But he’s seen as a supersub by Bento, and will probably replace Almedia after around an hour, to give Portugal’s attack more pace.

Vicente Del Bosque’s only area of concern is in the same position. Having used Cesc Fabregas as a false nine in two games, and Fernando Torres as a proper nine in the other two, it’s a difficult decision to predict. Spain acted as if they didn’t know how to play with a false nine against Italy in their opening game (which is understandable, as Cesc Fabregas said they hadn’t trained in that system before) but were much improved against France.

Fabregas seems to be the logical option. Bruno Alves and Pepe are two very physical centre-backs, more vulnerable to quick movement and intricate passing than a static player, which is increasingly what Torres is, rather than a pacey forward. Besides, if del Bosque wants a permanent number nine, he’ll remember Fernando Llorente’s excellent impact from the bench against Portugal two years ago – but Fabregas probably deserves a start based upon his performance in the game against France.

Approaches

Spain will dominate possession, and Portugal will play a more reactive game. But how reactive? Against Germany, Portugal sat very deep in a 4-5-1 system and countered down the flanks. They were criticised for it, but the plan wasn’t too far away from working – it took a deflected cross to a powerful number nine to break the deadlock.

Bento has promised not to park the bus. “We must show ambition to get possession of the ball, courage to attack them and patience when we don’t have it, without becoming unstable. We know in what areas we want to press the opponents, and who we will use to do that job. We don’t want to spend the whole time defending…at times we are going to have to suffer, and wait for the best time to apply pressure again. This is all down to managing each moment of the game.” (quotes from Portugoal)

Portugal can probably afford to be more proactive than against Germany, who take advantage of space between the lines brilliantly, and offer more cohesive, integrated movement than Spain. Tonight, Portugal’s midfield three will probably work as a unit, pressing Spain’s midfielders up until around 40 yards from goal, closing down after a forward pass, and forcing Xavi Hernandez and Xabi Alonso to play backwards.

Portugal’s defensive line depends upon who Spain play upfront. If Fabregas is the focal point, they can defend deep and try to prevent Spain crafting the type of goal they scored against Italy, which involved finding space behind the defence. If Torres or (in particular) Llorente plays, Portugal won’t want that player in the box, so will push up higher.
Spain will play broadly the same way they always play, though they must be aware of what they did differently against France. There was more separation of the midfield responsibilities with Xavi higher up, more overlappping runs from full-back, more width from David Silva and more forward runs from the centre of midfield.

The key Spanish player is probably Andres Iniesta. He’ll have the most freedom of movement of any Spanish player – while Alvaro Arbeloa will probably be defensive-minded, meaning Silva has to stay wide, Jordi Alba’s overlapping will allow Iniesta to go where he pleases. He could help out in the midfield zone, to create a 4 v 3, or he could lead the Spanish attacks with dribbling, as he did against Italy.

Key battlegrounds

There appear to be two main zones of interest. The first is Cristiano Ronaldo against club teammate Alvaro Arbeloa. There are a range of possibilities here. Will Arbeloa stay deep and prevent Ronaldo getting space in that zone? Will he try to man-mark, like Theo Gebre-Selassie did? Or will he push higher up, inspired by his brave performance against Franck Ribery last time out? That’s the main battle.

Then, there’s the midfield. The positioning of the two midfield trios is of paramount importance. For Spain, it will be interesting to see how high up Xavi plays – whether he’s a third central midfield in the same zone as Xabi Alonso and Busquets, or whether he links the play and looks to find space in between the Portuguese lines. In turn, that depends on how wide Silva stays, and what Iniesta is up to.

As for Portugal’s midfield, Miguel Veloso will sit in the holding role, but the positions of Raul Meireles and Joao Moutinho have changed since Portugal’s opening game of the tournament. Bento could ask them to play either way around, though it might be wise to have Meireles pressuring Alonso, the man who was Spain’s best player against France. Moutinho would sit deeper to the left and find space to work in – he’s probably the player likely to prompt Portugal’s counter-attacks with quick balls out to Ronaldo and Nani.

It will be interesting to see how much both sides press, and also how much Spain look to rotate their triangle. These countries traditionally produce intelligent central midfielders, and while the game might be won and lost elsewhere, the midfield strategies will be the most interesting tactical feature of the match.