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[ZM欧洲杯西意篇] 板鸭4球决胜载入史册

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51#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-27 23:53:37 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-28 00:21 编辑

50楼参考译文
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52#
发表于 2012-6-28 00:07:24 | 只看该作者
以牙还牙?
青面獠牙?
铁嘴钢牙?
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53#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 00:23:59 | 只看该作者
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54#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 00:34:49 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-28 16:47 编辑

有意思的是,时至目前ws评选的欧洲杯最佳11人是
http://www.whoscored.com/Regions/247/Tournaments/124/International-EURO-Cup

4-4-2

守门员:乔哈特(英国/曼城)

后卫:
阿韦洛亚(西班牙/皇马)
胡梅尔斯(德国/多特蒙德)
佩佩(葡萄牙/皇马)
阿尔巴(西班牙/瓦伦西亚)

中场:
扎戈耶夫(俄国/中央陆军)
皮尔洛(意大利/尤文)
杰拉德(英国/利物浦)
阿尔沙文(俄国/阿森纳)

前锋:
伊布(瑞典/米兰)
曼季茹基奇(克罗地亚/沃尔夫斯堡)
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55#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 00:44:00 | 只看该作者


伊布走了

范佩西走了

里贝里走了

鲁尼也走了

剩下4人

c罗还是哈维留下?

厄齐尔还是皮尔洛留下?
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56#
发表于 2012-6-28 05:08:21 | 只看该作者
无责任无压力预测

葡萄牙 1-3 西班牙
乔治六世 发表于 2012-6-27 23:41


距离点球战2-4结果很接近

关键是方向性很对
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57#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 12:14:53 | 只看该作者
对50楼的原文,给出“西‘扳’牙前瞻”中文叫法,还是有味道的
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58#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 12:15:28 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-28 12:38 编辑

Spain 0-0 Portugal: Portugal upset Spain’s rhythm but fail to record a shot on target

June 28, 2012


The starting line-ups

Spain defeated Portugal on penalties after a 0-0 draw.

Vicente del Bosque surprisingly named Alvaro Negredo as his lone striker, meaning Cesc Fabregas dropped to the bench. The rest of the side was as expected.

Paulo Bento was forced to change his striker, with Helder Postiga injured. As already announced, Hugo Almeida replaced him.

A difficult game to summarise – Portugal pressed well in midfield, broke up Spain’s passing and restricted the number of opportunities del Bosque’s side had. However, they lacked a goal threat of their own, and then Spain were the better side in extra time.

Pressing

The most interesting feature of the game was Portugal’s bravery in midfield. Unlike many other sides, and unlike themselves against Germany, Portugal competed in the midfield zone, three versus three. Generally, Miguel Veloso picked up Xavi Hernandez, who had one of his quieter games. Further up, Raul Meireles was on Sergio Busquets, and Joao Moutinho on Xabi Alonso. These three were happy to switch around, however.

At some points Spain threatened to play the ball past the pressure, but on the whole they looked unsettled, nervous and uncomfortable being forced into hurried passes. That was a surprise – these are amongst the most technically capable midfielders around – but they were simply unaccustomed to this pressure, more used to first halves spent knocking the ball from side to side, picking their moment to increase the tempo.

Spain didn’t press particularly heavily – they stood off and kept a more solid shape than usual, sometimes looking like 4-4-1-1 with the wide players deeper than Xavi. Del Bosque was possibly concerned that Spain had two days less to prepare for the game, and wanted to conserve his side’s level of fitness.



High line

Of course, in combination with midfield pressing, Portugal had to play a reasonably high defensive line to make sure there wasn’t a huge gap between midfield and attack, which David Silva and Andres Iniesta would have enjoyed working in. They did this well – again, they were simply brave with their positioning, with Pepe generally getting himself in a covering position, as the centre-back with more pace.

A couple of times Spain tried long balls over the top for Negredo. This can be looked at in two ways – on one hand, it was a demonstration that Portugal’s pressing in midfield was forcing Spain to play a type of football they’re not used to. On the other, one could say Spain were adapting to the situation and looking to exploit the space they were presented with – which was in behind the defence, not in front of it. Either interpretation makes sense, but as Spain struggled to create chances with this approach, the former seems more appropriate.

Negredo

Part of Spain’s problem was Negredo, who was barely involved in the game. Much of that was not his fault – the players behind weren’t getting time on the ball to provide him with good service.

However, his role in the side was unclear, and it wasn’t certain what del Bosque wanted him to do. Negredo’s an interesting player, an all-rounder. Whereas Fernando Llorente is obviously Spain’s most physical striker, Fernando Torres is/was their quickest, and Fabregas is the man geared to clever link-up play, Negredo is a jack of all trades.

As David Cartlidge writes here, “Negredo is comfortable playing in many different ways; he can drift into the channels and hold off opponents until support arrives, play on the shoulder with a ball in-behind and importantly operate adeptly with his back to goal.” Which is a tremendous range of attributes, but which was he supposed to showcase here? Why was he picked ahead of Torres, Llorente and Fabregas? To play on the shoulder, presumably, but Spain didn’t provide him with clever service to exploit that ability, and Portugal defended well at the back.



Portugal left / Spain right

The other interesting part of the pitch was, as expected, the Cristiano Ronaldo v Alvaro Arbeloa battle. Arbeloa spent the first half pushing high up past his club teammate, providing an out-ball for long diagonals, and sometimes forcing Meireles to come across and intercept passes intended for him.

Ronaldo played more like a second striker at times. Spain needed bodies in a midfield zone they didn’t have control of, so Busquets couldn’t move over and cover. A couple of times Ronaldo got into good positions, but the pass rarely came, and when it did, Gerard Pique moved towards him.

Going the other way, twice Arbeloa and David Silva created 2 v 1 situations against Fabio Coentrao, who spent the first half playing deeper than usual. Spain could have been more intelligent in these situations, but they were demonstrating width and forward drive, often lacking in previous games.

But the really interesting part of Ronaldo v Arbeloa was how this movement affected the positioning of other players. Silva, for example, came inside quickly to create space on the overlap and seemed narrower than against France, but didn’t get any time on the ball between the lines. At the other end, Almeida moved over towards that side, trying to take advantage of the space that came when Arbeloa was high up, or when he was sticking tight to Ronaldo.

Second half

The pattern of the game changed after half-time. First, Arbeloa stopped moving in advance of Ronaldo so readily, and the opportunities down that flank (and the resulting movement from elsewhere) dried up. Around the same point, Ronaldo and Nani switched wings for a brief period – it was probably coincidental, but Spain seemed to settle down into a much better spell of passing.

The game became a little dull here, with Spain dominating possession without creating real chances. Portugal’s pressing dropped, and the sides played in front of each other.

Substitutes

Both coaches looked to the bench, and here Spain had the upper hand in terms of squad size. Bento has used his bench more productively than most coaches in this tournament, as both Nelson Oliveira and Silvestre Varela have had good cameo roles. However, Del Bosque had a much greater range of options and completely reformatted his attack.

Spain went from having Silva and Iniesta on the flanks, and Negredo upfront, to Jesus Navas and Pedro Rodriguez wide, and Fabregas dropping deep from a centre-forward position. This was probably the closest we’ve seen to a Barcelona-style ‘false nine’ system, with Fabregas moving into midfield and two quick players coming inside from wider positions.

In fact, this nearly worked brilliantly. In extra-time Fabregas won a high ball, dragged the defenders towards him, and slipped the ball to Pedro, darting centrally from the left. He was briefly clear of the Portuguese backline, but turned inside rather than taking the ball on, and was tackled in a not dissimilar fashion to the way he wasted a fine chance at this stage of the World Cup two years ago.



Spain had other chances, too – most notably one from Iniesta that produced a fine save from Patricio. Again, this came following width – and Spain were able to turn up the tempo and fly down the wings as Portugal tired.

The final stages were about fitness and discipline. Both sides tired, and there were nine yellow cards shown, all to defenders or holding midfielders. Both sides focused upon keeping their shape rather than pressing.

Maybe Bento’s side were exhausted having pressed heavily early on. Their opportunities came from two sources – either Ronaldo free-kicks, or counter-attacks. Their chance in the final minute of normal time, when Meireles’ poor pass to Ronaldo meant the captain couldn’t take the ball into his stride, was a huge opportunity. They were on the verge of the perfect performance against Spain, and Bento’s tactics throughout the game can barely be faulted, despite Iker Casillas not having to make a save.

But even Bento would accept Spain were more dangerous in extra time. Pedro, Navas and Jordi Alba were the main men as Spain flooded forward down the flanks. If either side was going to win it, it was Spain – but 0-0 was a fair scoreline after 120 minutes.



Conclusion

Spain progressed, but Bento was the more tactically astute manager here. Portugal were highly impressive, pressing energetically and remaining compact. Their transitions could have been better, and they didn’t counter-attack as prolifically as Bento would have hoped – but it only needed one moment. That Meireles – Ronaldo incident was it.

Overall, Portugal’s performance in this tournament has been very good, and Bento deserves a great deal of credit. Portugal, after all, were only third favourites to progress from their group – so getting within penalties of the final is a good, if frustrating, achievement. Aside from not sorting out his left flank against Denmark, the majority Bento’s decisions were justified.

The same can’t be said for del Bosque – the Negredo move was fruitless. His substitutes had a good impact, but he still isn’t sure of his best attacking combination, and it’s now twice in five games (after the match against Italy) where his side looked genuinely clueless in the final third for the first hour of the game.

For as long as Spain continue their astonishing record of clean sheets in the knockout rounds (that’s now nine in a row) they won’t be embarrassed. They’re in the final, of course, and their incredible array of attacking players, their cohesive overall footballing philosophy and del Bosque’s consistency of selection (throughout the majority of the side) deserves much admiration.

But in individual games they can be nullified by an intelligent coach, as Cesare Prandelli, Slaven Bilic and now Bento have shown. The question is, can they be beaten?
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59#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 12:16:02 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-6-28 15:28 编辑

58楼参考译文
------------
来自虎扑

西班牙0-0葡萄牙: 成功破环西班牙节奏,但葡萄牙忘带射门靴

2012年6月28日


双方首发

在120分钟的0-0之后,西班牙通过点球大战淘汰葡萄牙晋级。

博斯克在本场比赛中令人意外地将内格雷多摆在西班牙单前锋的位置,这意味着法布雷加斯将会坐在替补席上。而首发其余球员都是常规主力。

由于波斯蒂加之前受伤,保罗-本托被迫在锋线上做出调整。就像此前公布的那样,阿尔梅达出现在首发的位置。

本场比赛很难简单地概括——葡萄牙在中场的压迫很成功,他们不但破坏了西班牙的传接配合,还减少了斗牛士的射门机会。然而,葡萄牙自己也没有创造太多威胁,而西班牙则在加时赛表现更好。

中场压迫

这场比赛最有趣的地方是葡萄牙在中场非常勇敢。与其他球队甚至他们自己和德国对战的情况不同,葡萄牙选择通过3vs3与西班牙争夺中场。总体而言,维罗索很好地看住了哈维,使得后者打出近年来最安静的比赛之一。而在前场,梅雷莱斯负责盯防布斯克茨,穆蒂尼奥负责看管阿隆索。不过,这三人也会频繁互换盯防对象。

在比赛中西班牙偶尔能够破坏对方的中场压迫而制造威胁,但总体而言他们看起来非常焦急和紧张,而且对被迫进行快速传递感到很不适应。这是一个令人意想不到的地方——西班牙的这些中场球员都是这次参赛球员中技术和个人能力最好的——但他们反而对这样的逼抢感到不适应。而他们更加适应的,反而是上半场那种两翼传中以及自我提速的比赛。

西班牙本场比赛并没有特别注重倒脚——他们的阵型比以往保持得更加紧密而稳固,有时候看起来像4411,哈维充当突前的前腰。博斯克可能考虑到西班牙比葡萄牙少休息2天,因此他想在比赛中减少球队的体能消耗。



防线前压

除了中场压迫之外,葡萄牙也相应地将自己的防线推前,这使得葡萄牙在三线之间都不会存在巨大的空位,因为席尔瓦和伊涅斯塔会非常喜欢这些空间。葡萄牙在这方面干得不错,他们的阵型站位非常勇敢,让跑动更多的中卫佩佩在后面负责补位。

西班牙曾经数次使用长传球找内格雷多的头顶。这可以分成2方面来解读——葡萄牙在中场的压迫使得西班牙被迫选择一种他们并不习惯的战术,长传是这一情况的最好体现;而从另一方面看,我们可以说西班牙适应了葡萄牙的压迫战术,并且尝试寻找葡萄牙防线的空档——这种空档不是在防线前面,而是在防线身后。无论哪一种解读都是合理的,但由于西班牙在这种战术下很难创造射门机会,因此第一种解读似乎更加合理。

内格雷多

在西班牙遇到的问题之中,其中一部分来自在本场几乎没有什么表现的内格雷多。这其中大部分都不是他的责任,因为他身后的西班牙中场球员们都无法拿住皮球并且为他传出好球。

然而,他的作用在西班牙阵中并不明确,而且我们也无法确定究竟博斯克希望他在比赛中做些什么。内格雷多是一名有趣的球员,他喜欢满场奔跑。略伦特显然是西班牙阵中最强壮的前锋,托雷斯是现在(或以前)西班牙阵中速度最快的前锋,法布雷加斯是一个能够在前场负责串联组织的球员,而内格雷多则是综合了每个人的部分优点。

就像大卫-卡德里奇在这里写的那样:“内格雷多在很多战术中都会如鱼得水;他能够移到边路并扛住对手护住皮球,等到支援队友的到来;他也可以在对方中卫身边游弋等待后面队友的传球;更重要的是,他对背身拿球非常熟练。这使得他在球场上战术作用很丰富,但在今天的比赛中,他应该起哪种作用呢?他为什么能够排在托雷斯、略伦特和法布雷加斯之前拿到首发位置?据我估计,这是因为他可以在对方中卫身边游弋吧,但西班牙的中场球员都没有为他送出直塞而让他展现能力,而且葡萄牙在后卫线上的防守很出色。



葡萄牙的左路/西班牙的右路

另一个在比赛中的有趣的地方是C罗与阿韦洛亚的对抗。阿韦洛亚在上半场压得非常靠前,甚至前于他的皇马队友。他的压上为西班牙斜长传调度提供了一个接球点,而且有时候还迫使梅雷莱斯前来封堵这些斜长传。

C罗有时候更像一个第二前锋。西班牙需要在他们无法完全控制的中场中路增加人手,因此布斯克茨不能跑回去补位。C罗有几次都跑到了不错的位置上,但他很少得到过队友的传球;当他接到队友的传球时,皮克就会主动前往防守他。

在另一个半场,阿韦洛亚和大卫-席尔瓦面对位置比以往更加后撤的科恩特朗曾经2次创造出2打1的机会。西班牙本可以在这样的情况下做得更加聪明,但他们打出了阵型宽度和纵深,这在前几场都很少看见。

但C罗阿韦洛亚的对抗之中真正有趣的部分是这两人的跑位如何影响其他队友的位置。例如,为了阿韦洛亚能完成套边,席尔瓦经常很快回收至中路,甚至收得比在与法国之战时更深。不过,他在回收时无法拿到皮球。而在另一边,阿尔梅达经常在阿韦洛亚压上助攻或者紧贴盯防C罗时跑到右边寻找空档。

下半场

比赛的战术在有所改变。首先,阿韦洛亚由于忌惮C罗而停止压上助攻,因此西班牙右边的空档(以及由此引起的其他跑位)都消失了。与此同时,C罗和纳尼完成了短时间的换位——这也许是碰巧发生的,但西班牙似乎逐渐稳定到一个更加舒适的传球模式之中。

比赛在此时变得有点沉闷,西班牙虽然占据控球优势,但却没有创造实质性的威胁。葡萄牙的压迫也渐渐消去,因此两边的三线都几乎退到对方的锋线前面。

替补球员情况

两个主帅都在准备换人,西班牙似乎由于整体阵容强悍而拥有更好的牌。相比本届大赛的其他大部分教练,本托在替补的使用上更加富有成效,因为奥利维拉和巴雷拉的上场都曾经起到了很好的作用。不过,博斯克的选择更加丰富,而且他完全改组了他的锋线。

西班牙从席尔瓦、伊涅斯塔分居两翼而内格雷多突前变成纳瓦斯佩德罗分局两侧而法布雷加斯从中锋位置深度后撤。这也许是我们曾经见过的最接近巴萨的“伪9号”阵型,法布雷加斯回撤到中场,而两边的飞翼能够内切至中路。

实际上,这个调整几乎完全奏效。在加时赛中,法布雷加斯在争下高球之后吸引了对方防守球员,然后挑传给从左路内切插上的佩德罗。佩德罗曾经一度形成单刀,但随后他选择扣球到内线而不是继续向前带球,最终被回追的对手拦截。这一幕与2年前南非世界杯他的错失单刀有似曾相识之处。



西班牙还有另一个机会——而且这也是全场最好的机会,最终伊涅斯塔的射门令帕特里西奥做出精彩的扑救。这一次进攻还是来自阵型被拉宽,西班牙趁着葡萄牙体能下降而提速并在边路形成了下底传中。

比赛最后阶段的重点是体能和犯规情况。两边体能都下降得很厉害,而且比赛中总共出现了9张黄牌,这些牌都给了双方的后卫和防守中场。两边都是尽力保持自己的阵型,而不是继续压迫。

也许由于此前的压迫防守,本托的球队现在已经精疲力尽了。他们的射门机会主要来自两个方面——C罗的任意球或者反击。他们在曾经在常规时间的最后一分钟获得绝佳机会,当时梅雷莱斯在反击中给C罗送出一个糟糕的传球,而葡萄牙队长最终无法将球送进对方大门。他们在这场与西班牙的表现曾经一度接近完美,而且尽管卡西在本场比赛中没有做出任何扑救,但本托全场比赛的战术都几乎没有任何错误。

但是,本托也承认西班牙在加时赛之中更加危险。佩德罗、纳瓦斯和阿尔巴是西班牙进行边路冲击的主要球员。如果其中一方会在加时中赢下比赛,那一定是西班牙。但经过120分钟,0-0的比分是合理的。



结论

西班牙在逐步改变,但本托在战术上更加精明。葡萄牙的表现令人印象非常深刻,他们不断地对西班牙进行压迫,而且阵型保持紧密。他们由守转攻时也许能做得更好,而且他们在反击上没有表现出本托所期望的效率,但是他们只需要一次机会,就是那次梅雷莱斯传给C罗的机会。

总体而言,葡萄牙在这次大赛上的表现非常出色,而且本托的指挥应该值得肯定。毕竟,葡萄牙是死亡之组里面第三被看好会出线的球队,因此他们只是因为点球而没法进军决赛的表现已经很不错了。尽管他们很沮丧,但他们的确取得非凡的成就。除了在对丹麦时没有解决右路的问题,本托在本届比赛的大部分决定都是正确的。

但对博斯克,我们就不能施以赞美之词了——内格雷多首发被证明是一个失败的调整。尽管博斯克的替补们拿出了给力的表现,但他还是不知道如何才能组合出最强的锋线,而且在与意大利的比赛之后,这已经是5场比赛中第2次出现西班牙在比赛的前60分钟在进攻三区毫无办法的情况。

只要西班牙能够延续他们在淘汰赛不失球的骇人纪录(现在已经是连续9场不失球了),那么他们都不会有麻烦。当然,他们现在已经进入了决赛,他们拥有数量惊人的优秀攻击球员,他们一脉相承的足球理念以及博斯克对国家队阵容的稳定性(在大赛中基本保持一致)都应该值得我们赞美。

但在单场比赛中,西班牙有可能会被像普兰德利、比力奇和本托那样聪明的主帅活活闷死。现在的问题是,他们会被打败吗?
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60#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 12:42:53 | 只看该作者
博斯克首发祭出内阁罗的突兀阵容,令zm预测也大跌眼镜

所以,zm在板鸭0-0葡萄牙战术分析中,总结到,虽然板鸭晋级了,但是本托才是本场最具战术把握和指挥的敏锐性的教头
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61#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 15:16:57 | 只看该作者
http://164.177.157.12/img/Euro-Banner.jpg

伊布走了

范佩西走了

里贝里走了

鲁尼也走了

剩下4人

c罗还是哈维留下?

厄齐尔还是皮尔洛留下?
Alex2011 发表于 2012-6-28 00:44


哈维被提前换下,但却走得更远些

c罗打满120分钟,却连罚点球机会都木有
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62#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-28 15:20:50 | 只看该作者
本托本场指挥更精明些,而不倒翁博斯克本场的确好运来

按照上届欧洲杯以及世界杯的特点或者说规律吧,1/4赛或者半决赛板鸭凭借点球大战淘汰强劲对手,而决赛总能绝杀对手的

呵呵
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63#
发表于 2012-6-29 04:57:15 | 只看该作者
lz,安排介个专题,看来是个押宝的好选项
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64#
发表于 2012-6-29 04:57:45 | 只看该作者
厄齐尔也回家了
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65#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-6-29 14:42:23 | 只看该作者
普兰德利完爆博斯克,不过博斯克水平也就那样,没有勇气对叠床架屋的指挥中枢进行一次有深度的改革
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2012-6-11 14:59



牛!

不过,博斯克还有一次证明姜还是老的辣的机会的
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66#
发表于 2012-6-30 06:38:47 | 只看该作者
Euro 2012 Focus: The Final - Spain vs Italy
by Martin Laurence at Friday, Jun 29 2012 15:55



So, it's decided. Spain will face Italy in the final Euro 2012 after many believed that Germany were shoe-ins to progress past the Azzurri. Much of the credit should go to Cesare Prandelli for the Italian's surprise appearance in Sunday's showdown, with the former Fiorentina boss taking a team who had failed so spectacularly at the World Cup in 2010 and has turned them into one of Europe's finest once again.

In comparison, after Spain hit the heights of world glory in South Africa many have begun to claim their style of play is boring and predictable. The fact is that Del Bosque's side's style is predictable but only as one can assume that they will dominate possession of the ball and be patient in carving out chances. Whether that is boring or not is highly debatable.

There is no doubt that the reigning champions will remain favourites to retain their title this weekend, but if the two sides play as they did in the semi-finals respectively, another shock could well be on the cards.

Déjà vu?

These two teams will be extremely familiar with one another having contested their opening match of the tournament, which ended in a stalemate. There were some interesting tactical decisions made in the game, with Italy opting for 3 at the back in the absence of Barzagli and Spain playing without a recognised striker.

However, it would be hard to see the same systems played come Sunday, with Italy growing with every game and settling into a 4-3-1-2 system extremely nicely in the latter stages. Del Bosque, meanwhile, has been questioned for not knowing whether to field a centre-forward or not, with Negredo doing the case for ‘not’ no harm with a non-existent display against Portugal.

When Spain did bring on Fernando Torres when the two sides met earlier in the month, however, the Chelsea man caused problems for a makeshift Italy backline, and that could see him start this weekend. Makeshift, though, is certainly not a term you could use for Prandelli's fully fit defence, with 4 of the back 5, including keeper Buffon, inspiring an unbeaten season in Serie A for champions Juventus.

Organisation vs Fluidity

Much has been made of Italy's traditional in your face style of play, frustrating teams with drilled defences and not looking to entertain. The fact of the matter is, Prandelli has ensured that they haven't ditched their famed solidity but merely looked to build from it as a base from which to entertain, with the two forwards asked to do very little in terms of tracking. The Azzuri midfield, perhaps more so than the defence, now represents the real steel of the team, getting through a substantial amount of work. The likes of De Rossi (2.4 tackles and 3 interceptions per game) and Marchisio (2.4 tackles and 1.6 interceptions per game) are certainly the unsung heroes for the side.

In Pirlo they have a real master of the pass, with an 88% accuracy, and though many are quick to say he doesn't have the legs anymore he has played every single minute of Italy's tournament so far, including the entirety of extra time against England. He can keep possession as well as play direct balls to the target man, with a tournament high of 9.8 long passes per game, but now also has further creative options up field in Montolivo and Cassano.




A comparison of the player positions of the two sides in the semis shows just how organised Italy are, yet remaining flexible to flit between tactics, while Spain have far more freedom in their movement. Their map vs Portugal shows as many as 5 players in and around the centre circle, which of course doesn't mean that they are stationed in the middle, but constantly switching positions from side to side.

Del Bosque asks his players rotate in attack but also likes his full-backs to bomb on, with Jordi Alba impressing up to now in particular, with 1.4 dribbles per game the second most of any defender at Euro 2012. They will therefore look to get at Italy's right-back on the day, be it Balzaretti, Abate or Maggio, and Marchisio is likely to be tasked with helping to quash the threat of Iniesta and co., with the Barca-midfielder sharing the unenviable lead for shots without scoring, with 19.

Key Battle

In terms of an individual contest, many will be keen to see who comes out on top in the battle of the midfield maestros, with arguably the two greatest passers in the game right now going head to head, as Andrea Pirlo meets Xavi. Going into the tournament, the naive will have overlooked Pirlo's impact on a rejuvenated Juve side and in turn his pivotal role in the national set-up. Xavi, meanwhile, is lauded the world round, and rightly so, but has the pendulum now swung in favour of the Italian.




Form suggests that this is the case, with the WhoScored ratings from the tournament so far indicating Pirlo's growing dominance on the competition since the opener against Xavi's Spain. In contrast, the Barca-man was imperious against Italy but has faded since; completing a mortal's tally of 70 passes in the semi-final. The Spaniard's will be mindful, however, that Xavi was on another level against Italy last time out, with 107 passes helping him to his best rating of 7.82 at the tournament, with Pirlo's modest tally of 39 leading to his worst, yet still impressive rating of 7.18.
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67#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-7-1 06:34:35 | 只看该作者
66楼参考译文
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68#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-7-1 06:35:09 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-7-1 06:37 编辑

Euro 2012 final: Spain v Italy preview

June 30, 2012


Potential starting line-ups

Of the 30 games at Euro 2012 so far, the 1-1 draw between these two countries in the first game of Group C was probably the most fascinating in a tactical sense. A back three battled against a false nine – not a formation match-up you see very regularly.

Unfortunately, we’re unlikely to see such a contest this time around, now Italy have moved away from a 3-5-2 to a midfield diamond. But then again, the diamond is also unique in this tournament – and besides, it gives us an entirely different tactical battle.

It’s odd that these two managers should produce interesting strategic battles. Both are fine coaches, but neither are particularly keen tacticians.

Vicente del Bosque is primarily an organiser, a communicator and a father figure. His talents shouldn’t be underestimated – he’s won the World Cup, and did so because of some excellent strategic moves – but he is more concerned with creating a harmonious dressing room, and making the most of Spain’s cohesive footballing identity. According to him, Spain’s success has “foundations in many things – in the structure of our football, in the academies, and in better coaches.” He downaplays his own role: “When the players are good, the manager is good.” It’s his usual modesty, and it’s partly to deceive the opposition. But it’s also partly true.

Prandelli is not dissimilar. He focuses upon getting his side to play a positive, attractive brand of football and avoids game-to-game switches based around the opponent. Granted, he’s changed formation completely from a 3-5-2 to a diamond in this competition, but in natural tactical terms, moving away from a three-man defence for the Ireland game was an unconventional move. The 3-5-2 thrives against a 4-4-2 – whereas Italy’s diamond had problems against it, particularly down the flanks. Listen to why Prandelli changed formation – “We maintained a certain balance over the last few games…the team that opened the tournament had a different approach, but over time we found fitness and the balance we had been looking for, so rediscovered the certainty we had lost before the competition” – and it’s all about his own players being comfortable, rather than because of the challenge of specific opponents.

But this is a challenge for Prandelli – Spain are both the favourites and the more predictable side. The tactical battle is all about how Prandelli can stop Spain, and exploit their weakness – he’s spoken at length about this in pre-match press conferences.

Spain formation & selection

To a certain extent, it’s the same as always. The first nine names on the teamsheet are unquestionable (despite some reports Xavi could be dropped) but the balance and feel of the side changes according to the names of the centre-forward and the right-sided attacking midfielder.

The centre-forward – if you can call him that – seems likely to be Cesc Fabregas. You can take it as a process of elimination – Fernando Llorente hasn’t featured yet, Fernando Torres hasn’t convinced, Alvaro Negredo was invisible against Portugal – but it’s probably more accurate to look at the midfield battle. In basic terms Italy have a 4 v 3 in that zone, and having struggled to cope with Andrea Pirlo when it was a 3 v 3, del Bosque will want the extra midfielder to compete there, and possibly to put direct pressure upon Pirlo.

The right-midfielder will, in all probability, be David Silva. He’s started all five games, but so frequently the introduction of a proper winger, Jesus Navas, has made Spain more dangerous. The previous meeting against Italy was a fine example – OK, it was against a three-man defence, but with Italy’s full-backs likely to lack protection from ahead here, a natural wide player would stretch the play and create gaps for others. Silva will probably start the game but not finish it.

Italy formation and selection

Will Prandelli consider moving back to the 3-5-2? “In all honesty, no, I haven’t considered it,” he says. “We maintained a certain balance over the last few games, although we understood that during the match we can switch to a 3-5-2 if we want to.” That settles that.

Giorgio Chiellini should continue at left-back alongside his Juventus centre-back colleagues, and the real question is on the other side. Ignazio Abate is the natural option, but might not be fit. Christian Maggio is naturally right-sided, but is more of a wing-back than a full-back, so Federico Balzaretti is more likely to continue – he played well there against Germany, though is probably the weakest of the three players going forward from that flank, as he’s played at left-back for the past few years.

Elsewhere the only slight question is at the top of the diamond. Thiago Motta did well against Spain in the first game, but lost his place to Riccardo Montolivo because of injury. There’s no reason he should get it back – Montolivo’s forward-playing destroyer role worked brilliantly against Germany, although this drains his energy, which means Motta has a good chance of replacing him midway through the game.

Mentalities

Spain will do their usual – relentless ball retention, moving it quickly between players, but rarely moving it forward with any speed. They’ll attempt to tire Italy in the first half, before attempting the breakthrough with greater penetration after half-time. It always feels like del Bosque would be happy with a 0-0 at the break (even against much weaker sides), safe in the knowledge Spain will have conserved energy, and have more options from the bench.

Italy’s approach is more uncertain. Prandelli says Italy are “not so arrogant as to say we’ll control the game from start to finish,” and accepts that “Spain will go into the game as favourites.” Italy are likely to take a hybrid approach, not seeking to dominate possession wholly, but trying to minimise Spain’s dominance to frustrate them. When Spain do have long periods on the ball, Italy are likely to break forward quickly through the forwards. “Our tactical approach will be positive and attacking, where the first objective is to close space to get the ball back. Obviously where we try to win back possession will depend on our attitude and Spain’s performance,” Prandelli states.

Key battlezone 1 – the midfield zone

Spain’s usual area of strength is in midfield, but del Bosque will be concerned about being outnumbered in that zone. As a result, expect to see others playing drifting there – all three attackers are likely to drop even deeper than usual to make up the numbers. This means Spain will lack width high up the pitch, and who will provide runs in behind Penetration will be an afterthought.

Prandelli is looking to “create superiority in midfield” and knows that “the other midfielders work in such a way as to allow Pirlo to control the midfield.” This probably means that Prandelli wants Daniele de Rossi, Claudio Marchisio and Riccardo Montolivo to push back Xavi Hernandez, Sergio Busquets and Xabi Alonso, creating space for Pirlo to dictate the game from. Getting him free is the key, and if de Rossi has to drop in and allow Pirlo forward, Italy will use that approach too.

Key battlezone 2 – the advance of the Spanish full-backs, and the space in behind

Del Bosque will need to make the most of the full-backs’ freedom. This is a tricky battle, because the more the full-backs advance, the more Mario Balotelli and Antonio Cassano will drift wide (Pirlo’s diagonals will find them) and drag the centre-backs out of position. Therefore, moving only one full-back at a time would make sense. Jordi Alba could push forward more permanently and attack down the left, leaving Alvaro Arbeloa to effectively form a back three, keeping a spare man.

Against Spain in the first match, and then again against Germany after they went 1-0 up, the Italians forwards took up very wide positions. They’ll probably look to block off a simple pass to the full-backs, but not actually track them – simply making them nervous about moving forward. Then, when Italy win possession, Balotelli and Cassano should be in a position to break quickly into the channels.

A related tactic against Spain was how Italy looked to attack the space to the side of, and in behind, Gerard Pique when Arbeloa was high up the pitch. Both strikers moved more to the left of the pitch than to the right; one would drop deep and try to bring Pique out, then the other would sprint in behind. Their first goal against Germany was vaguely similar – it depended upon the German right-back being dragged up the pitch (Silva must watch Chiellini), then one centre-back being dragged towards Cassano on the left, and Balotelli headed in. Despite the fact the ball won’t spend much time there, that zone in and around Pique could be the most important on the pitch.
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69#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-7-1 06:38:40 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-7-1 19:05 编辑

68楼参考译文
--------------
来自虎扑

ZM欧洲杯决赛战术前瞻:中场对抗赢球关键,皮克区域双方必争

June 30, 2012


预计双方的首发阵型

从战术角度讲,本届欧洲杯截止到目前的30场比赛里,C组首场意大利1-1战平西班牙的比赛可能是最吸引人的一场。三后卫大战伪九号——难得一见的战术对决。

不幸的是,决赛里我们将很难再次看到类似的对抗,现在意大利已经将阵型从3-5-2换成了菱形中场。但是话说回来,菱形中场在本届欧洲杯也算是独树一帜——所以,这将会是又一个完全不同的战术对抗。

在这两位主教练碰面时看到精彩的战术对决其实有点奇怪。两人都是非常好的教练,但都对战术都不是非常敏感。

应该说,博斯克首先是一位组织者、一位导师、一名父亲,其次才是主教练。当然我们也不能小看他的才华——他已经赢得了世界杯,而且是靠着精彩的战术调整获得的——但他的注意力主要在营造一个和谐的更衣室氛围,将全队紧密的结合起来。根据他自己的说法,西班牙的成功“来自很多方面——足球体系、青训以及更好的教练们”。他轻描淡写的带过了自己的角色:“当球员们都很出色的时候,教练也就很出色”。这是他一贯的谦逊态度,也有部分迷惑对手的意思,但也有一定的真实度。

普兰德利跟他也是大同小异。他致力于为球队打上积极的、进攻型的足球标签,并避免根据对手而一场一换战术。但是,在本届欧洲杯上,他做出了彻底的调整,由首场的3-5-2变阵为菱形中场,从传统的战术角度来说,对阵爱尔兰时放弃三后卫阵型是一个非常规的举措。3-5-2阵型对阵4-4-2的优势明显——而意大利的菱形中场阵型对阵4-4-2则遇到不少问题,尤其是两个边路。我们来听听普兰德利对于变阵是怎么说的——“在过去的几场比赛里,我们保持了良好的平衡……首场对阵西班牙是因为我们的战术策略不一样,随着时间的推移,我们找到了状态以及一直想要的平衡,重新发现了我们在欧洲杯之前丢掉的东西”——也就是说,他的出发点在于球员,让球员们找到最舒适的位置,而不是根据对手调整战术。

但是普兰德利的挑战在于——西班牙不光是大热门,战术打法也是谁都知道。所以战术对决的看点在于普兰德利如何限制西班牙,如何利用西班牙的弱点——他在赛前发布会上最终也谈到了这点。

西班牙阵型以及首发

从某种程度上说,一定还是老样子。有9个人肯定会出现在首发阵容中(虽然有消息说哈维可能会被放弃),但是根据中锋和右边锋的不同人选,西班牙的战术打法会很不同。

中锋位置上——如果你非要说是中锋的话——应该会是法布雷加斯。这是根据排除法做出的选择——略伦特目前一分钟都没出场过,托雷斯的表现说服力不够,内格雷多在对阵葡萄牙时隐身——但事实上,这更多的是出于对中场控制的考虑。鉴于双方在这一领域的对抗会是4对3,而且在小组赛中场3对3时就没办法防住皮尔洛,所以博斯克应该会在加上一名中场,很可能会让他直接去协防皮尔洛。

右边锋很可能是席尔瓦。他首发了本届欧洲杯的所有5场比赛,但是在更正统的边锋纳瓦斯的频繁出场后,西班牙的威胁性更大。首场对阵意大利的比赛就是个很好的例子——好吧,虽然面对的是三后卫阵型,但哪怕是四后卫阵型,意大利的边后卫们对后防的保护也不够,所以一个传统的边锋可以拉开意大利的防线,为其他人在中路创造条件。席尔瓦很可能首发但在中途被换下。

意大利的阵型以及首发

普兰德利会考虑换回3-5-2吗?“老实说,我不会,我压根就没考虑过”,他说到,“在过去的几场比赛里,虽然我知道我们可以在比赛里随时变阵3-5-2,但我们保持了很好的平衡。”所以他会坚持菱形中场。

基耶利尼应该会继续出现在左边后卫的位置上,中卫组合依然是他的俱乐部队友们,真正的问题在右边后卫位置。阿巴特本是首选,但他可能因伤无法出场。虽然马乔主打右路,但是他更像是个右翼卫,而不是右边后卫,所以巴尔扎雷蒂应该还会继续首发——虽然算是右边路三名球员中最弱的点,而且在过去几年里一直打左后卫,但他在对阵德国的比赛里发挥出色。

其他位置上,唯一的变数来自菱形中场的顶端位置。莫塔在首场对阵西班牙的比赛中表现不错,但是由于伤病,他的位置被蒙托利沃抢走。他也没有理由再从蒙托利沃手中抢走首发的位置——蒙托利沃的前场破坏角色在对阵德国时效果明显,但是这也消耗了他的能量,所以莫塔很可能在比赛中段替换他出场。

双方策略

西班牙会像往常一样——无限的控制球权,快速的球员间倒脚,但很少快速向前。他们应该会尝试在上半场拖垮意大利,下半场再开始用更具渗透力的打法击破对手。看起来在上半场结束前,博斯克总是对0-0的比分很满意(哪怕是对阵弱旅),这也说明他对西班牙保存实力的踢法很有自信,替补席上的选择也更多。

意大利的策略变数更多。普兰德利表示“意大利不会自大到认为会全场掌控比赛”,他也接受“西班牙是热门”的说法。意大利可能会采取混合型的策略,不指望掌控球权,但是会尽量减少西班牙的球权并挫败对手。如果西班牙确实球权更多,那么意大利则会采取快速反击的策略,首要目标就是压缩对手的空间,夺回球权。普兰德利表示,“我们在哪夺回球权显然取决于我们的态度以及西班牙的表现”。

关键区域1——中场

通常来说,西班牙的强点在中场,但是对阵意大利,西班牙很可能在这一区域被对手围剿。所以,西班牙很可能会让其他球员过来支援——三名攻击型球员都有可能比以往回撤的更深,以增加这一区域的人手。这就意味着西班牙在前场将会缺乏宽度,所以在对方后卫身边游弋跑动的球员渗透力一定要强。

普兰德利追求“中场的优势”,他也知道“多上一名中场不仅能带来这一优势,也能让皮尔洛更从容的组织控制”。所以,基本上普兰德利会派上德罗西、马尔基西奥、蒙托利沃来压迫哈维、布斯克茨以及阿隆索,给皮尔洛创造空间。让皮尔洛拥有自由空间是关键点,不过这样可能需要德罗西后撤而让皮尔洛向前,意大利也应该会使用这样的策略。

关键区域2——西班牙边后卫的前插,以及他们身后的位置

博斯克需要让边后卫有最大的自由度。不过这也算是把双刃剑,因为边后卫们前插的越靠上,巴洛特利和卡萨诺就越可能拉到边路(皮尔洛的对角线长传会找到他们),这样就把西班牙的中卫们带离了位置。因此,一次只有一个边后卫前插助攻看起来更合理。阿尔巴在左路可以一直前插助攻,而把阿韦罗亚留在后场,这样可以在面对意大利的双前锋时多一个防守球员。

在首场对阵西班牙,以及随后对阵德国时,1-0领先后,意大利的前锋们的站位就非常靠近边路。此举很可能是想阻断对方给边后卫们的传球,而不是盯防他们——只是想让对方在前插助攻时有所忌惮。而当意大利获得球权时,巴洛特利和卡萨诺则会跑到可以迅速斜插对方肋部的区域。

有鉴于此,面对西班牙,意大利应该在阿韦罗亚助攻到前场时找寻皮克身边以及身后的位置。首次碰面时,巴洛特利和卡萨诺在左路的跑动都比右路要多;其中一人回撤到深位,想要把皮克带出来,而另一个就在皮克身后准备加速冲刺。对阵德国时的第一球也有些类似——德国的右后卫被牵扯在了前场(席尔瓦要注意好基耶利尼),而另一名中卫则被卡萨诺带到了左边,随后巴洛特利头球得分。在决赛里,皮克身边的区域将会是最重要的地方,尽管皮球在这一区域的时间可能并不多。
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70#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-7-2 11:28:55 | 只看该作者
Spain 4-0 Italy: Spain win Euro 2012

July 2, 2012

The line-ups for most of the first half - Iniesta and Silva had started the other way around

Spain produced by far their best performance of Euro 2012, and won the final with ease.
Both teams were as expected. Vicente del Bosque made a single change – Cesc Fabregas returned upfront in place of Alvaro Negredo.
Cesare Prandelli also made one change, bringing back Ignazio Abate at right-back, with Federico Balzaretti dropping to the bench. Giorgio Chiellini continued at left-back, although didn’t last long before Balzaretti replaced him.
Spain were the better side by a considerable distance. They didn’t settle for mere dominance of possession, and instead attacked with speed and determination to produce a wonderful display of football.

Midfield battle
This was an interesting challenge for Spain – usually, they’re assured of winning the midfield battle, but here they encountered an Italian side that used four central midfielders and attempted to compete in that zone. Del Bosque was concerned about the pure numbers game in midfield, and asked Andres Iniesta and David Silva to help out.
Iniesta started on the right and Silva on the left, the opposite to usual – although they switched after around ten minutes. But this wasn’t particularly important – what was more vital was their positioning and movement. In the defensive phase of play, they formed a second bank of four with Xavi Hernandez clearly ahead of them, but they quickly drifted into the centre of the pitch and effectively became the fourth and fifth central midfielders either side of Andrea Pirlo, meaning Spain were outnumbering Italy and could play around them.

Rondo
That wasn’t enough, of course, and the most important factor was the sheer speed of Spain’s passing moves, which was unlike anything they’ve done previously in this tournament. It was superb one-touch football, combined with more movement than usual. Riccardo Montolivo, who had broken up Germany’s rhythm so effectively in the semi-final, couldn’t get close to Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets, and Italy’s diamond was dragged around as they attempted to close down.
Italy’s pressing was much less effective than Portugal’s pressing against Spain in the semi-final – maybe as the numbers game was more complex – Italy had 4 v 3, that turned into 4 v 5 and players seemed unsure of their responsibilities. Portugal had pressed 3 v 3, and each player had a clear opponent to mark.
False (?) nine
Ahead of the midfielders was another, Fabregas. He’s clearly not a natural forward, but it might actually be inappropriate to label him a false nine here – his positioning was that of a classic centre-forward, his runs were that of a classic centre-forward, and he rarely dropped deep into the midfield zone. His clever link-up play was vital, of course, but Fabregas was really simply playing as a striker, motoring towards goal and working the channels excellently. He played much higher up than in the previous meeting between the sides, and received the ball much less frequently.

His movement for the opening goal was tremendous, getting in behind the defence and then cutting the ball back to Silva. Iniesta – Fabregas – Silva was the combination – the front three. All in central positions, but all playing different roles in the move – previously, all three would have been getting into a position to play the first pass.
Xavi v Pirlo
Just behind Fabregas was Xavi, who had an excellent game. In the previous meeting between the sides, Xavi was relatively anonymous, playing too deep and broadly in the same role as Busquets and Alonso. His pressing of Pirlo was also inconsistent.
Here he was much better – he stayed high when Italy had the ball, and Spain often looked like 4-4-2 when out of possession, as Xavi made sure Pirlo couldn’t drop deep unmarked. When Spain won the ball, Xavi was on hand to provide a clear option for a forward pass, drifting either side of Pirlo into space, and attempting through-balls.
Italy tried to get around this problem by dropping Daniele de Rossi deeper to free up Pirlo, and often de Rossi moved between the centre-backs before spraying long passes forward. He can do that job, but really Italy wanted Pirlo playing the diagonals – his only long ball towards Balotelli, a constant tactic against England, came when a wayward pass from Alonso gifted him possession (away from Xavi, for once). In all, he had to work in much deeper zones than in the 1-1.

Spain full-backs
The midfield was the first battlezone, the second was the area involving the Spanish full-backs – and del Bosque’s side were superior in this area, too. Out wide, Alvaro Arbeloa and Jordi Alba were completely free – which was predictable, with no direct opponent, but as the Italian midfield became compressed and disorganised as they ran around trying to press Spain, the out-balls were even more obvious.
Arbeloa had plenty of freedom because de Rossi was playing deep and central to help out Pirlo, so there was often no-one on that. There was the problem that Antonio Cassano was looking to make runs in behind, and Gerard Pique had a couple of nervous moments when dealing with him 1 v 1 in wider positions (Pique picked up a yellow card for a clumsy tackle from behind), but Arbeloa was brave with his positioning, as he has been throughout this tournament. Long diagonals always found him in space and switched the angle of the attack, and as Italy had to shuffle over to the opposite side of the pitch, gaps appeared for the midfielders to play through. The first goal was a fine example of this – Silva scored moments after a long Alonso diagonal from left to right.
On the opposite side, Alba was less free because Claudio Marchisio was wider than de Rossi, and shuttled out to that side quickly, but the new Barcelona left-back was more direct and purposeful on the ball. He has arguably been Spain’s most important player (separating ‘most important’ from ‘best’, though he’s not far off in that category either) because of the verticality he’s offered throughout this tournament. Spain couldn’t have scored their second goal without him – he provided the finish, but more importantly, provided a burst of sheer speed which took him clear of three Italians to get the ball from Xavi. No-one else in the side would have made that run, and that immediacy is vital to complement Spain’s tiki-taka.

Italy woes
This was more about Spain being brilliant than Italy being poor. But what went wrong for Prandelli’s side? There were two main issues – first, they simply couldn’t compete in the midfield zone, both in terms of possession and (maybe more surprisingly) mobility. Second, they couldn’t get the ball to the forwards quickly enough, mainly because of Pirlo being closed down.
Italy’s best chance of success was when the full-backs overlapped. Both Abate and Chiellini got forward well, and when Chiellini was forced off and replaced by Balzaretti, it didn’t seem a particularly bad thing for Italy – it gave them more natural drive down the left flank, and Balzaretti delivered a dangerous cross towards towards Balotelli – Casillas flapped at it.
Things are always clearer with hindsight, but perhaps Prandelli would have been better shifting to 3-5-2 when Balzaretti was introduced. That was the formation Italy used successfully against Spain in the opening game, and with de Rossi practically dropping in and playing as a centre-back anyway at times (he was the third centre-back in the 1-1), it would have made sense. The full-backs, Abate and Balzaretti, could have moved forward and pushed back Alba and Arbeloa and stopped Spain playing the ball out to the flanks so easily. It almost certainly wouldn’t have made a difference to Spain’s victory – but it would have been interesting to see, and after Prandelli said Italy were capable of switching to 3-5-2 midway through a game, he could have given it a go, to make del Bosque and Spain think.
Italy substitutions
At 2-0 down, Prandelli had to change things. His first substitute was the logical option – Antonio di Natale was introduced in place of Cassano, told to test the Spanish offside line, having scored the opener in the 1-1. He had Italy’s best chance of the second half, getting the ball level with the Spanish defensive line from a superb Montolivo pass, forcing Casillas into action.
But Prandelli’s third change (having been forced to introduce Balzaretti in the first half) turned out to be fatal. Montolivo was tired having closed down to little effect, so Motta replaced him…but he only lasted five minutes before going off with a hamstring injury. Can Prandelli be criticised for using his third substitute so early? Maybe – but he needed to make alterations, and such an immediate blow is extremely rare.
Now Italy were down to ten men – not only that, but they’d lost their ‘forward destroyer’, man whose job was winning the ball. Italy weren’t going to see much more of the ball, and weren’t going to stand a chance at coming back from 2-0 down. Jose Mourinho showed the way to play a 4-3-2 formation in the Milan derby a couple of years ago, but that relied on the opposition having to come forward.
Spain substitutions
Spain have been aesthetically frustrating throughout this tournament with their lack of attacking intent – too often, even at 0-0, they’ve been content to play keep-ball and turned down opportunities to penetrate the opposition defence. It would have been classic del Bosque to replace his front three with ball-players, like Santi Cazorla or Javi Martinez.
But instead, the forward trio were replaced with even more attacking players – Pedro Rodriguez, Fernando Torres and Juan Mata. They provided fresh energy and determination upfront – Torres and Mata grabbed a goal each, Pedro missed an easy chance (albeit from an offside position). Italy were outnumbered, exhausted and probably a little embarrassed. The contest was over long before the final whistle.
Conclusion
Spain narrowed their wide midfielders to win the numbers game in the centre, then advanced the full-backs to stretch the play. That’s what they usually do, of course, but here it was combined with rapid passing and constant runs in behind the defence. It was almost unstoppable, and the beauty of their first two goals (when the game was proper contest, at 11 v 11) was the difference in style. Silva’s goal came after 14 passes, Alba’s after only 4. Silva’s goal arrived after 36 seconds of possession, Alba’s after just 13. Spain finally found the right balance, mixing possession with penetration.
Del Bosque will be delighted that this victory was achieved with with six passing midfielders in conjunction with a back four. Before the tournament that seemed impossible, as Spain appeared to need more directness from the flanks and a more direct centre-forward. In terms of personnel, he was justified in returning to the XI that started the 1-1 – and he’ll be particularly delighted that Silva got the goal, as del Bosque had gone to great lengths to include him in the side, at the cost of attacking variety.
But it was notable that both Iniesta and Silva got into the box more, and that Fabregas was making runs in behind the defence. Alba, meanwhile, provided a superb display to provide directness from wide, his most impressive display of an excellent tournament. Ultimately, you do need off-the-ball runs and movement in behind the defence, which wasn’t forthcoming for long periods throughout this competition. Because of that, Spain earned a slightly unfair tag of being ‘boring’ before tonight, but there was a large element of frustration in those allegations – people wanted Spain doing more; passing more rapidly, penetrating more readily. A lot of the negativity was actually rooted in optimism – that Spain were capable of more than pure tiki-taka. They proved tonight that they were – this was as impressive a performance as you’ll ever see in an international final.
Spain’s first two goals provided their crowning moments – pieces of pure footballing brilliance that also sum up their playing style. Every great side needs a ’shortcut’ – people don’t remember the entirety of Brazil’s 1970 World Cup campaign, but they remember Carlos Alberto’s goal, and that summarises Brazil’s brilliance. Silva and Alba’s goals provide that microcosm. As del Bosque is the first to point out, Spain’s success has “foundations in many things – in the structure of our football, in the academies, and in better coaches.” The goals weren’t typical 2012 Spain, but they were certainly typical tiki-taka.
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 楼主| 发表于 2012-7-2 11:30:34 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-7-3 00:08 编辑

70楼参考译文
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来自虎扑

西班牙4-0意大利战术复盘:斗牛士军团捧得冠军归

July 2, 2012


上半时大部分时间里的阵型,其中伊涅斯塔和席尔瓦首发时的位置是互换的

西班牙打出了他们在本届欧洲杯上最完美的一场比赛,在决赛中轻松获胜。

两支球队的首发阵容都与赛前预测相仿,博斯克只做出了一处调整,法布雷加斯重回首发,换下了上一场比赛首发出场的内格雷多。

普兰德利也只做了一处调整,阿巴特回到右后卫的位置,巴尔扎雷蒂坐到了替补席上,基耶利尼首发左后卫,但他只踢了不长时间就被巴尔扎雷蒂换下。

从各种角度考虑,西班牙的表现都要更好。他们不再只追求控球率上的优势,而是更加坚决更加快速地打起了进攻,最终为球迷们奉上了一场精彩的比赛。

中场之战

本场比赛的中场之争,对于西班牙来说是一个颇为有趣的挑战。通常在大部分比赛中,他们都会毫无悬念地控制着中场,但是本场比赛,西班牙遇到了一支中场排出四名球员,竭力在此区域一争高下的意大利队。博斯克赛前自然考虑到了中场的人数问题,他的对策是派伊涅斯塔和席尔瓦协助中场。

比赛刚开始时,伊涅斯塔首发的位置在右边,而席尔瓦在左边,这个站位与他们平时的比赛正相反。10分钟后,两人就交换了位置,但这只是一个无关大局的细节。更加关键的是两个人的跑位,在防守时,席尔瓦和伊涅斯塔与两名后腰组成第二道四人防线,而哈维位于他们身前,因此两人能够迅速回收到中路,贴到皮尔洛的两边,形成本方的第四名和第五名中路球员,这就意味着西班牙在防守意大利时就拥有了人数上的优势。



轮舞曲

然而仅凭以上一点是不够的,西班牙本场比赛获胜最重要的因素是传跑的速度,这与他们在本届欧洲杯上此前任何一场比赛都是截然不同的。西班牙的一脚触球极其出色,跑动也比以往更多。蒙托利沃曾经在半决赛上成功地打断了德国队的节奏,但是他在这场比赛中甚至很难近身阿隆索和布茨克斯。意大利试图控制中场,但在此过程中他们的菱形中场站位反而被对手扯得七零八落。

相比起半决赛中葡萄牙给西班牙所施加的压力,意大利本场比赛中的压制要低效得多。也许是因为在中场人数的变动更为复杂,意大利本来拥有以四对三的局部优势,但是正如上文所述,实际上他们是以四敌五处于劣势,意大利的球员们对自己的责任也不甚明确。而葡萄牙始终与对手处于三对三的形势下,而且每人都有一个明确的对手进行盯防。

假(?)九号

西班牙队站在中场前面的法布雷加斯,他并不是一名正统的前锋,但在这里将他称为假九号可能也并不合适,因为他的位置,他的跑动都更像一名中锋。他很少回撤到中场区域。法布雷加斯的串联能力毋庸置疑,但他在本场比赛中踢得就像是一名单纯的前锋,在前场的做球和拉边在肋部的穿插都极其出色。他比起两队在小组赛交手时的站位更加靠前,触球机会也更少。



法布雷加斯的跑位在西班牙的第一球中起到了重要的作用,他从后卫身后高速插上,将球回传给席尔瓦,前场三人组伊涅斯塔——法布雷加斯——席尔瓦完成了这个进球。虽然三人都在中路,但他们的跑位完全不同,如果是在前几场比赛中,三人可能都会跑到第一下传球的位置。

哈维VS皮尔洛

法布雷加斯的身后是哈维,他在本场比赛中的表现堪称大师级。在两队小组赛相遇的那场比赛中,哈维的位置太靠后,与布茨克斯和阿隆索角色重叠,基本没有什么表现,对皮尔洛的压制也不够。

本场比赛他的表现就有了很大起色,当意大利持球时他的站位很靠前,因此西班牙在无球时的阵型类似于4-4-2,哈维负责盯防皮尔洛,确保皮尔洛无法自由地回撤。而当西班牙控球时,哈维就离开皮尔洛的身侧,负责为锋线送球,多次尝试直塞。

意大利意识到了这个问题,他们尝试将德罗西的位置拉得更靠后来解放皮尔洛,德罗西也经常在中卫之间跑动,送出长传球找前场。德罗西可以胜任这项工作,但意大利仍然希望由皮尔洛来扮演这个角色,他的长传球找巴洛特利是意大利对英格兰时一项行之有效的战术,但是在本场比赛中,皮尔洛的分边传球经常被阿隆索拦截(还有一次是被哈维),总地来说,相比起意大利与西班牙的那场小组赛,皮尔洛在本场的位置非常靠后。



西班牙的边后卫

中场是第一战场,第二战场就是西班牙边后卫负责的区域。博斯克手下的边后卫能力也非常强大。阿韦罗亚和阿尔巴在两个边路完全无人盯防,这一点在赛前就可以预料得到,因为意大利在两个边路并没有与他们对位的人选。而当意大利的中场试图压制西班牙不成,反而受到对手的压缩和瓦解时,西班牙在两个边路的优势就更加明显。

由于德罗西将很大精力放在中路以及协助皮尔洛上,阿韦罗亚在边路获得了完全的自由,完全没有人对他进行盯防。西班牙在防守上面有一个隐患,就是卡萨诺喜欢埋伏在中卫线身前伺机冲刺,而皮克几次在边路与他进行一对一对抗时都让人有些提心吊胆(皮克还有一次因为鲁莽的背后铲断而领到一张黄牌)。但是阿韦罗亚在整届欧洲杯上都表现出了出色的位置感,当球队向边路的空当传球时,阿韦罗亚总能恰到好处地出现,并帮助球队转换进攻角度;而当意大利队的中场试图在这一侧进攻时,阿韦罗亚的防守就像横在他们面前不可逾越的沟壑。西班牙打进的第一球就是一个很好的例子,阿隆索从左至右的对角线斜传找到阿韦罗亚,后者将传球交给中路,才有了接下来席尔瓦的进球。

另一边的阿尔巴自由度相对较小,因为马尔基西奥的站位比另一边的德罗西要更靠近边路,而且更热衷于快速拉边。但是这位新近转会巴塞罗那的左后卫传球更加直接,目的性也更强。他这届欧洲杯上在左路的垂直上下移动为西班牙提供了重要的作用,他几乎可以算得上是西班牙队最重要的一名球员(最重要而非最佳,虽然在竞争球队最佳的行列中他的排名也会很靠前)。如果没有阿尔巴,西班牙的第二粒进球就不会存在,这不仅仅是因为他最终亲自破门,更重要的是他的高速插上摆脱了三名意大利球员,成功接到了哈维的传球。换成其他人都无法在边路拥有阿尔巴的速度,而这一点对于西班牙的tiki-taka战术非常重要。



意大利的灾难

本场比赛的比分更多是由于西班牙发挥出色,而不是意大利踢得糟糕。但是普兰德利的球队出了什么差错呢?首先,他们在中场的对抗中全面处于下风,在控球和灵活性(这一点可能更令人吃惊)上都不足以与对手抗衡;其次,他们在得球之后的向前传递不够快速,这一点更多是因为皮尔洛受到了限制。

意大利取胜的最好机会来自于边路,阿巴特和基耶利尼都非常擅长前插。而当基耶利尼受伤下场,巴尔扎雷蒂替补出场,这对于意大利来说不一定是坏消息,这让他们进攻更加左倾,巴尔扎雷蒂为巴洛特利送出过一记非常有威胁的传中,可惜被卡西拦下。

有些事总是赛后看得更清楚,但是也许普兰德利在巴尔扎雷蒂上场之后将阵型变为3-5-2效果可能更好,意大利曾利用这个阵型在小组赛中成功地抗衡了西班牙,而且尤其应该将德罗西放回到中卫的位置(他在意大利打平西班牙的比赛中就出任三中卫之一)。两名边后卫阿巴特和巴尔扎雷蒂的位置应该前提,将对位的阿尔巴和阿韦罗亚压制回自己半场,限制西班牙在两个边路的进攻。如果这样的话,西班牙获胜的结局也许不会改变,但是场面也许会好看得多。普兰德利曾经说过意大利队有在比赛中半路变阵3-5-2的能力,他应该放手一搏,让博斯克和西班牙队去思考对策。

意大利的换人

0-2落后之后,普兰德利必须做出改变,他的第一次换人(不算上半时巴尔扎雷蒂换下受伤的基耶利尼的被动换人)从逻辑上很容易理解,用迪纳塔莱换下卡萨诺,迪纳塔莱的上场对于西班牙防线造越位的能力是一大考验,而且他在小组赛意大利1-1战平西班牙的比赛中为球队打入一球。他在下半时拥有意大利全场最好的一次得分机会,蒙托利沃的传球穿透了西班牙的防线,迪纳塔莱的射门迫使卡西做出了一次扑救。

而普兰德利接下来的最后一次换人事后证明是致命的失败。蒙托利沃在场上疲于奔命,但效果一般,因此莫塔将他换下。谁知仅仅五分钟之后,莫塔就因为大腿后侧肌肉拉伤不得不下场。普兰德利应该被批评最后一张牌打得太早了吗?或许吧,但当时的局势使他不得不做出改变,而刚一换上就受伤下场的意外情况实在不多见。

莫塔下场之后意大利只能以10人应战,不仅如此,他们失去了中前场的破坏力,因为此时队中已经没有了能抢下球来的人选。意大利此后就很难再获得球权,也再无力反攻。几年前,穆里尼奥曾在米兰德比中为国际米兰排出过4-3-2的阵型,但是那一次要压上进攻的是对手。

西班牙的换人

西班牙本届杯赛上因为缺乏进攻欲望,一直饱受审美学家的批判。即使是在0-0的情况下,西班牙也更愿意控球,而非尝试着打穿对方的防线。本场比赛领先之后,如果按照经典的博斯克思路,他应该换下前场三人进攻组合,换上卡索拉或者马丁内斯这样持球型的球员。

但是博斯克并没有这么做,他反而换上了更富攻击力的球员——佩德罗,托雷斯和玛塔。这三位球员为球队注入了新鲜的活力,也向场上的球员传达了坚持进攻的信念。托雷斯和玛塔各入一球,佩德罗则错过了一次很好的机会(虽然越位在先)。意大利队在人数上居于劣势,球员疲惫不堪,盼望着屈辱的比赛尽早结束。在终场哨声响起前的很长时间内,场上都是这样的状况。

总结

西班牙通过边路球员向中场收缩的战术,在中场赢得了人数的优势,然后利用他们边后卫的一流能力拉宽阵型的宽度。这是他们一贯的打法,但是这一次还要加上快速的传球和后卫身前不断的跑动冲击。这样的西班牙队是难以阻挡的,他们的前两个进球体现了两种不同风格的美(当场上还处于11人对11人的均势时),席尔瓦的进球经过了14脚传递,而阿尔巴的进球只用了4脚传球;席尔瓦的进球是在36秒的控球之后,而阿尔巴的进球只经过了13秒控球。西班牙终于在控球与穿透对手之间找到了一个完美的平衡点。

四名后卫与六名中场球员所组成阵容最终获得这样一场大胜,最高兴的莫过于博斯克。在这届欧洲杯开始之前,西班牙阵容中的短板就是缺乏犀利的边锋和一名正统的中锋,要以这样的阵容取得胜利看来是不可能的任务。在人员安排上,他在决赛中的阵容回归到了小组赛打平意大利那场的首发,博斯克应该也为打入一球的席尔瓦高兴,他使用席尔瓦加强纵深,但却一定程度上使得球队的进攻方式相对单一。

值得注意的是伊涅斯塔和席尔瓦这次都更多地进入到禁区里面,而法布雷加斯则埋伏在后卫身前随时准备穿透对方防线,这一安排非常高明。阿尔巴在边路的进攻更加直接,他的发挥是一流的,也是这届欧洲杯上发挥最好的一场。正基于此,西班牙需要在对方的后卫线面前进行大量的无球跑动拉扯,而这一点在西班牙本届杯赛此前的几场比赛中并不多见,也许这就是为什么人们认为西班牙足球“无聊”的原因。人们的抱怨包括以下几种观点:西班牙的传球应该更快,打透对方的防线应该更容易。这些看起来负面的评价其实包含了对西班牙队能力的认可,他们认为西班牙的实力不仅仅只是踢tiki-taka足球。而决赛中西班牙的表现证明他们确实可以做到更多。在世界大赛的决赛中,可不容易看到这样酣畅淋漓的比赛。

西班牙队的前两粒进球已经足够让他们王冠加冕,高超的足球技艺更为他们的风格加分。每一支伟大的球队都需要一个可以快速启动人们记忆的“快捷方式”,人们可能并不记得巴西队在1970年世界杯整届杯赛上的表现,但是他们不会忘记卡洛斯-阿尔贝托的进球,而这个进球就是巴西足球的精华和缩影。席尔瓦和阿尔巴的进球也能够起到同样的作用。博斯克曾经第一个指出西班牙足球的成功“来源于许多方面打下的基础,比如西班牙足球的组织结构,足球学校,以及大量出色的教练。”西班牙决赛上的进球可能无法代表他们在2012年欧洲杯上的典型风格,但却绝对是典型的tiki-taka式进球。
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72#
发表于 2012-7-2 17:22:30 | 只看该作者
西班牙靠一招灌意大利4球 无锋阵自有无解打法(图解)

2012年07月02日15:27


  新浪体育讯 西班牙4比0战胜意大利,成为首支蝉联欧洲杯的球队,打破了“无球队蝉联欧洲杯”历史规律的同时也创造了一项世界纪录,四年内三夺桂冠的伟业就此诞生。继2008年1比0战胜德国捧起德劳内杯之后,2010年站在世界之巅,2012年再次傲视欧洲群雄。
  西班牙6场比赛以进12球仅失1球(不包括点球决胜)的骄人战绩昂首蝉联,放眼欧罗巴,唯有西班牙!西班牙此役首发再次派出无锋阵型,进球的四名队员中只有下半时出场的托雷斯是正牌前锋,其他三名队员有两名是前卫,另一名是左后卫阿尔贝。面对以防守著称的意大利队,缘何西班牙即便派出无锋阵型也能够轻松大胜?
  请注意,西班牙的四粒进球,无论是席尔瓦的头球还是阿尔巴等人的推射,无一例外均是在意大利的罚球区里完成的,这绝不是巧合。西班牙人很聪明,面对有身高优势的意大利中后场防守队员,依然沿用着屡试不爽、至今无解的地面整体控球打法,于无声处炸惊雷。即便是席尔瓦短平快的头球,之前也是伊涅斯塔精准的直塞找到了突然插上的法布雷加斯所致。
  西班牙整场比赛的四粒入球几乎都是一个模式,直插/斜插的同时同伴送出精准的直传/斜传。同时,意大利选择了压出去与西班牙对攻的打法和策略,也令西班牙的前场获得了更多的空当,哈维和伊涅斯塔并没有受到意大利中场太多的限制和紧逼,所进的四个球,有1个来自伊涅斯塔的策动,其余三个来自哈维的发起。意大利没有选择小组赛首轮对阵西班牙时那种务实的打法,如果继续压缩后防空间或许就不会如此快的丢球抑或不会城池四度被破。因此,当西班牙在传、跑两方面没有遇到强硬抵抗的时候,进球也就顺理成章的一接踵而至。
  西班牙的传跑进攻并非从比赛伊始就展开,而是非常明确地用远射的方法迫使意大利队前压,以创造出更多的空间。开场第9分16秒至9分40秒短短的24秒内,西班牙队由哈维和伊涅斯塔连续完成三脚远射,虽然被后卫挡出或稍稍高出横梁,但连续在罚球区外发炮,已经达到了逼迫意大利后防线前提压上的目的。4分钟后效果便显现了出来,西班牙就是趁意大利肋部出现的空当,伊涅斯塔直塞插上的法布雷加斯,后者强行回传,席尔瓦头顶破网,如图1—5。
图1 哈维斜传小白,法布雷加斯伺机插上
图2 小白直塞法布雷加斯,皮尔洛对其传球并无刻意封堵
图3 博努奇并没有对基耶利尼的身后进行协防
  请注意图3中的蓝色阴影区域,意大利后防前提之后,与守门员布冯之间的空间过大,导致1、西班牙队有足够多的前插和直传的空间;2、守门员出击封堵的距离过远,无法及时出击弥补后防漏洞。
图4 法布雷加斯强行回传
图5 席尔瓦头顶破门
  西班牙队的进攻就像牵着意大利队的鼻子,先是通过远射迫使意大利阵线前提,身后的空当出来后,在倒脚中突然直塞杀入罚球区。
  在阵地战时如此,在快速进攻中,西班牙队同样可以做到这点。41分钟,卡西利亚斯长传发动进攻,阿尔巴后场得球斜传哈维然后高速远距离前插,在超越了意大利三名防守队员后接到哈维及时的直塞,面对布冯推射入网。,如图6—10。
图6 阿尔巴传球给哈维
图7 哈维接球后向前,阿尔巴从身后高速插上
  请注意图6和图7中哈维的周边情况,当哈维接球时和接球后,身前的区域(红色阴影部分)没有意大利的球员在对其进行紧逼,哈维可以轻松的向前带球推进。德罗西当时的位置太靠近中路,无法在第一时间限制哈维。
图8 哈维送出直传
  从上面的图8可以看到,即便当哈维为阿尔巴送出直传时,“大脑”的身前依然没有意大利球员在紧逼。而且哈维传球时,意大利队的三名队员已经组成了一个比较标准的防守三角形,德罗西在前,巴尔扎利和博努奇(微博)在后协防。问题是,虽然选好了防守位置,可是没有进行紧逼和盯防。德罗西没有限制哈维的传球,甚至没有干扰,巴尔扎利和博努奇也没有关门封堵住这一传球路线和插上的阿尔巴。因此,就是在这转瞬即逝的机会下,在很狭小的空间里,在高速推进的状态下,哈维送出了致命一传,阿尔巴完成了致命一击。
图9 阿尔巴形成单刀
图10 阿尔巴推射入网
  哈维快速推进时送出的精准传球,没有减慢阿尔巴的速度,反而有助于阿尔巴停球后的突破。下半时托雷斯的推射和回做助攻马塔的进球,也都来自哈维适时的直传,进球方式大同小异,这里就不赘述了。
  西班牙的整体提速令意大利措手不及,而快速、精准的传球更是无解。自从08年问鼎欧洲杯以来,西班牙的打法和风格已经延续了4年,是否还会继续下去,下届欧洲杯又将谁主沉浮,2016年法国再见!
  (董午志(微博))
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73#
发表于 2012-7-2 17:25:18 | 只看该作者
板鸭是1996年欧洲杯扩军至16支队伍以来,首支蝉联冠军的队伍,也是21世纪首支欧洲杯卫冕冠军,实属创世纪
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74#
发表于 2012-7-4 00:43:23 | 只看该作者
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发表于 2012-7-5 21:22:34 | 只看该作者
Analysis: Where Italy went so very badly wrong


Alex Keble See all posts  

Tuesday 03 July 2012 17:02

Spain seemed all-conquering in the Euros, but Italy had held them in the opener. Why, asks Alex Keble, did they change their tack?

Italy's strategy in their opening game of Euro 2012 had more success with nullifying Vicente del Bosque's Spanish magicians than any other team. Their 3-5-2 formation caught everyone by surprise, stunting the Spaniard's attacks and allowing them to counter with speed and fluidity. In the final, they played the 4-4-2 diamond midfield that had proved so successful throughout the tournament, only to find themselves completely overrun. What went wrong?

Stifling the deep-lying playmaker

In Italy's opener, puppet-master Pirlo dominated, as his incisive long-field passes freed the ever-impressive Antonio Cassano and bypassed the Spanish midfield. By July 1st, everyone in the world knew who was pulling all the strings, and Spain worked hard to stunt his activity.


In the first encounter, the Italian wizard had the freedom to spray the ball around the field, stretching the opposition and carving out attacks for the advancing wing-backs. In the final, Spain minimised his threat by applying pressure quickly, forcing Pirlo to release the ball hurriedly and therefore with less attacking intent – hence the sideways passes deep in his own half, and lack of completed passes in the Spanish third.

Moreover, in the final Pirlo had less support. In the opener, Italy's defensive trio meant that Daniele De Rossi could afford to step forward when Italy were in possession and provide support to Pirlo, taking some of the creative burden off the 34-year-old's shoulders.

Between De Rossi and Pirlo, Italy were successful with many long diagonal passes, contributing greatly to their forward threat. By releasing Cassano et al with diagonal passes, Italy found themselves with the ball in advanced wide positions, where opposition from Spanish wingers Andres Iniesta and David Silva was invariably and conspicuously absent.

The diamond midfield relied too heavily on influencing play high up the pitch, and with Iniesta and Silva drifting infield to provide support, the Spanish simply outnumbered the Italians in the middle of the park. After bypassing Spain's midfield in the opening game with accurate long passes, Italy afforded themselves the solitary threat of Pirlo in the final, and the Spaniards knew exactly who they needed to mark closely. Without his and De Rossi's sweeping passes, Italy's Riccardo Montolivo and Claudio Marchisio were rendered ineffective.

Abandoning the back three

The effects of De Rossi's positional shift weren't only felt in attack. By moving him from the back three to form part of a midfield quartet, Cesare Prandelli left the Italians open and exposed.

In the opening game, Italy sat back and absorbed the pressure, allowing the Spanish to dominate possession and pass the ball in front of them. With the wing-backs dropping into defence, Spain were trying to carve open a team with a back five protected by a central three.

In the final, buoyed by the fluidity of their midfield throughout the rest of the tournament, Italy were expansive and depended upon a higher defensive line without the solidity of six players defending centrally. This was particularly the case in the first half: after the break, two goals and a man down, the Italians found themselves helplessly retreating.


These screens indicate Italy were playing much higher up the pitch, allowing Spain to play in behind them – exactly what Xavi, Iniesta, Silva and Cesc Fabregas wanted. The inadequacy of this tactic was only exacerbated by Xavi being employed higher up the pitch (partly to mark Pirlo out of the game and partly to escape the cluster of Italian midfielders playing closer to Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets), and Fabregas playing more like a traditional centre-forward.


Clipping the wing-backs' wings back

In the 1-1 draw, Italy's wing-backs provided an excellent source of attack and defence. Recognising the narrowness of Spain's play, Prandelli's 3-5-2 provided them with a line of five when defending, while also – with three central defenders to cover any counter-attacks – giving the wing-backs licence to roam forward and exploit the inevitable space out wide. Iniesta and Silva will always drift inwards and rarely track back, leaving plenty of room to utilise. Italy clearly knew this, given their long-range diagonal passing.


Perhaps more important than this was their ability to nullify the Spanish full-backs' attacking impetus. Wing-backs are notoriously difficult to combat as an opposing full-back: how far can I afford to venture forward? How much should I hold back? Do I stick tight to them, or let them go? If I stay tight then I will most likely be dragged high up the pitch, allowing other players to exploit the space behind me. If I hold back, I give them the chance to build up speed when running at me. Spain's defenders chose the latter, rarely risking a venture forward, perhaps fearful of their team-mates' defensive indiscipline.

Unfortunately for Italy, their later 4-4-2 completely obliterated these positive aspects of their play. The narrowness of their midfield diamond gave little or no opportunity for full-backs to overlap, and the increased defensive duties in a flat back four stifled their attacking intent.

With Iniesta and Silva coming infield and Alonso and Busquets taking Montolivo and Marchisio out of the game, the wings were more open than ever; unlike in their previous encounter, Alvaro Arbeloa and Jordi Alba were given license to burst forward, whilst Ignazio Abate and Giorgio Chiellini were forced to hold back.


The positive effect on the Spanish full-backs is just as obvious:


The player influence screen (below) speaks volumes: both teams were congested in the middle, but where Italy's full-backs were tentative and wary of the Spanish threat, Spain's pair caused havoc, most notably for Alba's goal. No longer troubled by the impending threat of the tricky Maggio (who had, although unnoticed by many, an outstanding game in the 1-1 draw), Alba abandoned his fellow defenders on numerous occasions, and to devastating effect.

Conclusion

Italy have learnt a valuable lesson, albeit one that comes too late: you simply can't "take on" the Spanish. Having defended doggedly in their opening encounter, employing a rigid strategy of deep, narrow defending and direct counter-attacks created by deep-lying playmakers (plural), Italy paid the price for being more adventurous in the final.

Prandelli's diamond relied on several key players being influential high up the pitch, which proved simply impossible in such a heavily congested area. It also stunted their width and ultimately left Pirlo helplessly alone, and unable to control the game.
Up until the 4-0 thrashing, Spain have increasingly been labelled 'boring'. In my opinion, the blame lies with the overwhelming negativity of the opposition, forcing the Spaniards to play patiently in-front of an ever-retreating defence. They have had to become faster and faster, finding ever more ingenious ways of breaking down their terrified opponents.

Even Jose Mourinho came to recognise the impossibility of overcoming tiki-taka, winning La Liga by defending desperately against Barcelona after several failed attempts at outplaying them.

Spain are seen as boring because teams don't play against them: they simply try and stop them. For once, a team came out and tried to win the match, not just avoid defeat. And, for once, Spain were able to get in behind a team, and utterly destroy them.
Spain can't be called boring any more. Perhaps Italy, and anybody else hoping to knock Spain off their pedestal, needs to take a word of advice from the Special One: "If you have a Ferrari and I have a small car, the only way I can win is by putting sugar in your petrol tank."

About Alex Keble
Alex Keble is a sports journalist based in London, and a long time season ticket holder at Aston Villa. Alex writes mainly about football politics and tactics. He produces the Football Matters blog, which can also be found on Twitter.
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