【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人

小豆丁梅西

中场在更衣室里Sergio Batista布置了些什么没人知道

或许过些日子会有球员爆料或炮轰


不过塔瓦雷斯确实是作了些有意义的调整
北极海 发表于 2011-7-19 22:34

唉，我就纳闷了， 11人打10人，反而不如11人落后时干11人来的有劲，什么毛病？？


都说老马不行，我看老马如果场上领先一人， 绝对干的比SB要好！！

Penelope

Uruguay 2-0 Peru: Tabarez changes formation again to take Uruguay to the final
July 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

Luis Suarez scored two second half goals in a confident Uruguayan performance.

Oscar Tabarez was without Diego Perez, so Napoli’s Walter Gargano took his place. Sebastien Coates returned at centre-back.

Sergio Markarian brought in Giancarlo Carmona for Renzo Revorendo, and Yoshimar Yotun for William Chiroque.

With both sides contesting the quarter-finals as underdogs and both used to playing reactive football in this competition, much of the game was something of a stalemate, with neither side committing enough players into attack to overload the opposition.

Formations

There were a couple of surprises in the formations. Markarian decided to use Juan Vargas higher up in close support of Paolo Guerrero, in a formation that could vaguely be described as 4-1-3-1-1, with Adam Balbin sitting ahead of the back four and keeping an eye on Diego Forlan.

With the exception of the two changes, which were essentially like-for-like swaps due to suspension, Tabarez kept the same XI players that had played a 4-4-1-1 against Argentina. He shifted his side into a back three, however, taking advantage of Martin Caceres’ versatility, and the energy of his two wing-backs. Coates was a spare man at the back, and Egidio Arevalo played as a sole holding player, rather than in the double pivot he’s used to. Walter Gargano played as a left-sided carrilero, with he and Alvaro Gonzalez moving out to close down the opposition full-backs.

Spare man

As we’ve discussed countless times before, a back three is generally favoured against a two-man strikeforce, in order to retain a spare man at the back. Peru had played one upfront in their previous game, though, and a similar shape in the meeting between the two sides. Vargas was advanced, but not quite as advanced as he was in this game. Tabarez’s other reason for using a back three – as an all-out defensive system, as against France last year – was surely not the reason here.

As it happens, the more advanced positioning of Vargas meant that Uruguay’s system worked quite well. Diego Lugano stepped out of the back to mark Vargas – although Luagano probably had to come higher up the pitch than he would have liked – and Coates swept up behind. The only slight confusion was about whether Cacares or Alvaro Pereira picked up Luis Advincula – and a late run into the box from him in the first half was probably Peru’s best chance of a goal. Like in the win over Colombia, Guerrero played to the left of the pitch to try and link up with Vargas, which meant Caceres wasn’t picking him up, as you would expect against a traditional front two.

Areas of strength

The idea in a battle between two different formations is to maximise your advantage in one particular area of the pitch. Uruguay did so with their spare man at the back – Fernando Muslera had little to do – but Peru failed to make the most of their free players, the full-backs. They had no direct opponent, but their attacking contribution was very little. They should have either come forward, linked up with the wide midfielders and played 2 v 1s down the flanks, or focused on drawing Gonzalez and Arevalo out to the flanks, then exploiting the space in the middle of the pitch (or down the other flank, as either of those two players tucked in).

Another option would have been to drop Vargas a little deeper and then focus on possession, overpowering Uruguay in the middle of the pitch, giving them a surplus at the back. In the end, Peru basically played into the hands of Tabarez.

Suarez

The Uruguay manager will have been content with how the game was developing – he had the safety-first approach of keeping things tight at the back, then wa confident Suarez could nick a goal – or two – upfront. Suarez replicated his role against Argentina – which was essentially to be an irritant, to run his legs off, to buy free-kicks and to work the channels. His movement to the flanks was possibly another reason why the Peruvian full-backs were so reserved, and he topped off this performance with two good finishes.

That, combined with Vargas’ red card, wrapped things up fairly early. On that note, by the second half Tabarez switched Lugano and Coates, which meant the former swept up, and the latter was the man coming up to meet Vargas – hence why he got the Fiorentina man’s elbow into his face.

Conclusion

Tabarez changes his shape frequently – this was an interesting game because Uruguay were the favourites, and therefore there was some speculation he might take the lead, forget about nullifying the opposition and focus upon his attacking strengths. No chance – it was another reactive (but excellent) display of tactics.

Markarian has done excellently to reach this stage, but Peru’s performance here was poor. The lack of any meaningful contribution from the full-backs was the main problem – those two were content to defend, when they should have been helping stretch Uruguay.

Penelope

128楼参考译文：占位

Penelope

Japan 2-2 United States (AET): Japan win their first ever Women’s World Cup
July 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

Japan came back from 1-0 and 2-1 down to triumph on penalties.

Norio Sasaki kept an unchanged team from the side which overcame Sweden in the semi-final.

Pia Sundhage made a couple of changes. Rachel Buehler replaced Becky Sauerbrunn at centre-back, and Megan Rapinoe came in for Amy Rodriguez, with Lauren Cheney moving upfront.

This was an entertaining game that took a strange pattern – Japan dominated possession (53%) but had significantly fewer attempts on goal (14 to 27), and the US are the side who will feel they should have won the game in normal time.

Overall framework

The tactical battle here was, on paper, very simple. Two 4-4-2s – with some modifications – lined up against each other, and that was broadly how the formations remained for the entire game. This not inherently a very tactical battle.

However, this produced a very open game, even if the scoreline at the end of normal time doesn’t reflect the number of chances. The key factor was the positioning of the wide players – although they sometimes picked each other up when the ball was dead, as attacks formed the battles were more frequently wingers v full-backs than wingers v wingers, and with neither side having a spare man at the back, any quick passing combinations that bypassed an opponent, or any runs on the ball that beat a single player, often resulted in chances.

Different approaches

Japan’s wide players came inside and tried to move into the ‘red zone’ in the centre between the US lines of midfield and defence, and in that respect they played a little like Villarreal. They also benefited from the movement into deep areas of Kozue Ando, who was involved in more good link-up play than either of the US forwards.

That showed the contrast in styles in this match. Japan were much more patient, favouring slow build-up play and clever through-balls towards the forwards. The US were more direct, and had a more obvious and successful gameplan, to hit Japan with pace and power. They had a decent chance in the opening minute through Cheyney, who exploited the lack of pace in the Japanese backline (in particular, Izusa Iwashimizu), which was a dangerous tactic when playing so high up the pitch.

Morgan introduction

Cheney’s intelligent runs into the channels were very dangerous, and it was a slight surprise when she was replaced by perennial supersub Alex Morgan at half time, especially when Sundhage had the option of pushing Cheney to the left of midfield to accommodate Morgan upfront.*

It turned out to be an inspired move, however, because Morgan was the game’s best player for the final 75 minutes of the match. Just as Cheney had threatened from balls over the top early on, Morgan’s goal was another simple situation with sheer pace getting past a high line, only this time with an emphatic finish.

Midfield battle

The presence of only four central midfielders meant that this area of the pitch was open for forward runs. Carli Lloyd broke forward to have numerous (generally inaccurate) shots from the edge of the box early on, whilst Japanese captain Homare Sawa grew in stature as the game went on – she drove the side forward, with Mizuho Sakaguchi playing a more disciplined holding role alongside her.

For a side so intent to play pretty football, it was something of a surprise that Japan got their equaliser purely through sheer panic in the US defence, and a scrappy finish from Aya Miyama, who had come inside into a goalscoring position. Sasaki deserves credit for encouraging his wide players into the middle of the pitch – the knock-on effect was that the full-backs had space to motor into, and were more of a force in the game than the US full-backs, who remained more conservative. In fact, the way Japan shuffled across the pitch to create space for their overlapping full-backs was very similar to the way their men’s side shifted to create space for Atsuto Uchida and Yuto Nagatomo at this year’s Asian Cup, which they also won.

Extra time

Extra time was more balanced than normal time, with the US’ dominance less obvious. Fitness levels started to come into the equation, and with Japan much better at retaining the ball and tiring the US players, they looked more confident.

The key player was still Morgan, however. She produced two good crosses from the left flank in succession, the second of which was headed in by Wambach. This was another dimension Morgan provided – she is left-footed and could move across to that flank and deliver good balls into the box, something that had happened relatively rarely considering the wingers were coming inside.

Japan’s second equaliser came from a corner, converted by Sawa – but that corner was won by another great forward run from right-back Yukari Kinga, demonstrating the importance of bringing full-backs into play.

Morgan still could have been the hero – an excellent run from the right channel put her through on goal, and but for Iwashimizu denying her a clear goalscoring opportunity with a foul, it could have been 3-2. That was in the 120th minute, fully 120 minutes after Iwashimizu had first looked troubled by pace. It went to penalties, where Japan were much more composed.

Conclusion

Overall this game was relatively uninteresting tactically – two 4-4-2s. The more specific aspects of the game provided more excitement – particularly the introduction of Morgan (the only brave decision either manager took in the 120 minutes), which changed the game and should have been enough for the US to take victory.

Penelope

130楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Paraguay 0-0 Venezuela (AET): Paraguay win on penalties – again
July 21, 2011


The starting line-ups

Paraguay are, amazingly, through to the Copa America final having drawn all five games in the competition so far.

As he did for the Spain game in last summer’s World Cup, Gerardo Martino made numerous changes to his side, partly because of Antolin Alcaraz’s suspension, which meant a big reshuffle at the back. Nestor Ortigoza returned to the midfield.

Cesar Farias also changed things due to Tomas Rincon’s ban – Giacomo Di Giorgi replaced him. Upfront, where Farias has rotated his strikers all tournament, Alejandro Moreno played just off Jose Rondon.

The game was not as tedious as a “0-0 after extra time” may look on paper – Paraguay played good attacking football in the opening stages, whilst Venezuela should have scored at least once in extra time.

Paraguay shape

With Venezuela lining up in their usual 4-4-2 / 4-2-2-2, the interest in this game came from Paraguay. Martino is fairly set on a 4-4-2 / 4-3-3 hybrid that involves a striker starting in a wide position, but he switched things around here, by playing Nelson Valdez predominantly from the left, rather than from the right. He made diagonal runs from the left flank and often ended up in the right-sided channel, combining well with his ex-club teammate Lucas Barrios upfront. A couple of early balls into that channel put Valdez through on goal, but his first touch was often poor.

The first of those balls came from Ortigoza, who provided the invention Paraguay had missed against Brazil. In that game, Martino wanted mobility in the centre of midfield to press Brazil, but here Ortigoza had time and space to pick out clever passes to the flanks and to the forwards – Paraguay might not have scored, but they were still more of an attacking threat.

Because of the change to the shape of the Paraguay side (and Dario Veron moving into the centre) Martino brought in an attacking right-back, Marcos Cacaeres, for his first start of the competition. His positioning and forward runs were good – he stretched the play and forced Juan Arango back, but he frequently played poor passes and failed to put good balls into the box.

Venezuela didn’t simply play on the counter, because there was some desire to win the ball higher up the pitch and break up Paraguayan moves before they’d really started. They struggled to connect their wide players and the two forwards, however, and didn’t create too much in open play. They really missed Rincon’s driving runs from the midfield, and lacked attacking intent from that zone.

Second half + extra time

We haven’t seen many inspiring substitutions in this Copa America, and the six changes here did little other than slowing the tempo and making both sides disjointed. Martino brought on Marcelo Estigarribia for Barreto on the right, and then Roque Santa Cruz for Valdez. Santa Cruz went to the right, with Estigarribia over to his preferred position on the left. Then, however, Santa Cruz only lasted five minutes before collecting an injury, which meant Osvaldo Martinez became the fourth right-winger within ten minutes – and Paraguay were noticeably lacking in ideas when they went forward – as if their midfielders had to check which two players were actually occupying the two wide roles before playing a pass.

The one exception was Farias’ introduction of Giancarlo Maldonado, a forward, for Cesar Gonzalez down the right. He offered a direct attacking option from the flank, and with Paraguayan left-back Ivan Piris playing a much more reserved role than Caceres on the other side, Maldonado didn’t have to do much defending. This substitution, in the 85th minute, helped Paraguay push on in extra time, and Maldonado’s good skill and shot produced a good chance for fellow substitute Miku – his instinctive effort hit the post.

Paraguay played the second half of extra time with ten men after Jonathan Santana’s red card – yet another holding player who has been lured into a needless tackle when already on a booking.

Conclusion

Martino won the tactical battle early on – his shape worked well, creating chances for the front two. The reintroduction of Ortigoza was a big factor in the increased creativity from the centre of the pitch.

Martino’s substitutions hampered Paraguay, however – although he can’t be blamed for Santa Cruz’s injury, which was one sub completely wasted. His side looked disorganised late on, and Farias used his final change for a pure attacking move with the introduction of Maldonado – if it wasn’t for the woodwork, that would have been an inspired move.

Alex2011

132楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

正在古巴接受癌症治疗的委内瑞拉总统胡戈-查韦斯，在推特上发表了一连串的信息。

“他们偷走了我们的制胜球！”

“为什么那位裁判要像恶魔一样吹掉如此精彩的一粒进球？”

这粒无效进球发生在昨天比赛的上半场。维兹卡隆多的进球被判越位在先。

白与蓝之舞

多么性情的国家元首啊。

Alex2011

跟老马当年抨击fifa时说得差不多，“他们砍断了俺的双腿”，“从意大利到美国，fifa黑手党阴魂不散”

Alex2011

Uruguay 3-0 Paraguay: Tabarez gets things right
July 24, 2011


The starting line-ups

Uruguay won their record 15th Copa America with an excellent, controlled performance.

Oscar Tabarez likes to spring a surprise with players and formations, but it was his expected XI for this match, in the 4-4-1-1 system that can reasonably be described as his first choice shape throughout this tournament.

Gerardo Martino’s side was less predictable – he made four changes from the semi-final win over Venezuela, but kept roughly the same system – a narrow 4-4-2 / 4-5-1 with Pablo Zeballos making forward runs from a wide-left position, although Nelson Valdez sometimes switched positions with him.

Uruguay were better all over the pitch – they were more secure at the back, more potent upfront, and most crucially, they won the midfield battle.

Uruguay early pressure

Many expected a slow, patient final in Buenos Aries, so it must have come as something of a shock to Paraguay that they were pinned into their own penalty area for the opening period of this game. Uruguay piled the pressure on immediately, forcing five corners in the opening seven minutes, and producing a couple of very good chances in this spell – that set the tone for the game, and put Tabarez’s side in charge straight away.

Like many interesting tactical games, the battle here was about tempo. Paraguay wanted to play at a slow pace – calming the game, gently moving forward and looking to score almost as an afterthought, having progressed to this stage with five draws so far. Uruguay were quicker, more eager to get the ball forward, and keener to close down.

Ortigoza

The central midfield zone was the place where this battle took place – and more specifically, it involved Nestor Ortigoza, Ortigoza is a superb deep-lying playmaker with an excellent passing range, and crucially, is Paraguay’s chief tempo setter. He slows the game by playing intelligent passes, but he’s not particularly mobile. He doesn’t want a fast game. Martino knows this and doesn’t use Ortigoza when he wants energy – for the quarter-final game against Brazil when he needed his side to press heavily, Ortigoza did not play.

The fact that he did start here told you everything about Martino’s approach. He wanted a slow game, and Tabarez knew that. As a result, Tabarez gave Diego Perez and Egidio Arevalo license to play higher up the pitch than usual – possibly as Paraguay had no forward runs from midfield – shutting down the opposition midfielders extremely quickly. Arevalo, arguably Uruguay’s best player in this competition, played to the left of the two, and therefore had the responsibility of closing down Ortigoza.

The incident for the second goal – when Arevalo charged down Ortigoza, won the ball, then slipped in Diego Forlan to finish – summed up the tactical battle brilliantly. It was, although a different method of winning the ball, very similar to how Yaya Toure exposed Michael Carrick in the FA Cup semi-final. The clever deep-lying playmaker needed time on the ball, whilst the powerful, determined physical player wasn’t allowing him to. The struggle for tempo is often decided that way in midfield – it’s just rare that such incidents result in a goal so obviously.

Lack of width

Martino had made an error in his team selection, which contributed to Ortigoza’s downfall. With Zeballos coming inside quickly – and frankly, barely involved – Paraguay were using four central midfielders with absolutely no width at all. It was a complete waste to play Ortigoza, a man adept at spraying the ball into wide positions, and then having no-one in those zones for him to pick out.


Ortigoza's two problems: (1) Arevalo closing him down. (2) No forward options in wide areas.

Again, that was the specific result of a wider issue – which was that Paraguay wanted to pass slowly, but by restricting their midfield to a lateral area of, say, 20 yards rather than 50 yards, it made it much easier for Uruguay to close down, and much harder to keep the ball. There is a reason why Barcelona play with so much width, increasing the active playing area. Midfield battles can be won by dominating the centre of midfield with numbers, but you always need an out-ball. With no-one stretching the game laterally and forward runs very rare, it was difficult to understand how Paraguay were going to try and get up the pitch.

But maybe that was the problem – they weren’t going to try too hard, they were happy with 0-0. That makes conceding the first goal something of a disaster.

Second half

Amazingly, Martino decided not to change anything at half-time. But equally amazingly, Paraguay came into the game. The key factor was Uruguay standing off . Tabarez probably knew that his players wouldn’t be able to press intensely for the whole game, and with Diego Perez, Martin Caceres and Maxi Pereira all on bookings, it wasn’t worth continuing the high pressure. A needless second yellow card, a theme in this tournament, would have been a lifeline for Paraguay. Besides, in terms of fitness levels, Perez looked absolutely exhausted when he was withdrawn midway through the second half. In a rare game (in this tournament) played in the middle of the day, the slightly warmer temperature may have been an issue.

Of course, then Ortigoza had more time on the ball, and therefore came into the game. With no-one on the flanks to chip the ball to, he instead had to hit the front players. He did that with a brilliant ball to Valdez, who volleyed a great shot onto the woodwork from just inside the box. Then, Ortigoza finally got some movement down the flanks from Ivan Piris’ run forward from right-back – the ball was again exceptional, and Piris’ low cross should have been turned in by Cristian Riveros. That was Paraguay’s best chance.

Martino went for permanent width on 65 minutes with Marcelo Estigarribia down the left, and Hernan Perez down the right. Caceres and Vera departed. Paraguay looked slightly better, but their third substitute was a disaster. Lucas Barrios was clearly nowhere near fit – he felt his hamstring running onto the pitch – and broke down after five minutes. Like the introduction of Roque Santa Cruz in the semi final, which ended in similar disaster, this ended Paraguay’s attacking hopes. It also opened them up for Uruguay’s counter-attacks, and a brilliant move involving Edinson Cavani, Luis Suarez and Forlan produced the tournament’s best goal in its final attack.

Conclusion

There were, of course, various other factors in this game. Suarez was barely mentioned above, yet ran Paraguay’s defenders ragged – working the channels, winning free-kicks, holding the ball up. His man-of-the-match award was no surprise, but in tactical terms, that was simply a player doing a ‘classic’ job very well.

The ‘real’ tactical battle here was about tempo in the midfield, and it centred around Ortigoza. When he was allowed to play (in the second half) he was the game’s key player. When he wasn’t (in the first) he was a liability.

Tabarez deserves huge credit for his decisions in this tournament. There have been so many different players used (all 20 outfield players got playing time), as well as various formations and strategies without the ball. Almost every approach has worked, however – and although Uruguay started slowly, their performances in the semi-final and the final were two of the most convincing of the tournament.

Alex2011

137楼参考译文
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由 barcargentina 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

乌拉圭3-0巴拉圭：塔巴雷斯做对了
July 24, 2011



首发阵容

乌拉圭凭借出色的表现控制了比赛，他们也因此赢得了创纪录的第15个美洲杯。

塔巴雷斯喜欢在球员和阵型上制造惊喜，但这场比赛他的首发11人没有出人意料，4-4-1-1阵型也可以说是他这次美洲杯的首选阵型。

相对而言，马蒂诺的战术就没那么容易预测了。于半决赛战胜委内瑞拉的比赛相比，他做了4处人员调整，但阵型基本上没有变化。巴拉圭的阵型介乎4-4-2和4-5-1之间，塞瓦略斯在左边位置进行前插，不过有时巴尔德斯会和他换位。

乌拉圭整场比赛都做得更好。他们后防更稳，前场更强。最关键的是，他们在中场争夺中取胜。

乌拉圭早期的压制

很多认为在布宜诺斯艾利斯会有场慢节奏的，有耐心的决赛，所以当巴拉圭在开场就被压在己方禁区肯定让他们震惊了。乌拉圭一开始就压制对手，在开场7分钟就获得了5个角球，还在这段时期制造了两次很好的机会。这定下了比赛的基调，让塔巴雷斯的球队立马控制了比赛。

和很多有趣的战术性比赛一样，这场比赛是节奏控制战。巴拉圭希望在慢节奏下踢球，让比赛平静，慢慢推进，几乎不考虑进球，他们正是凭借5场平局走到这一步。乌拉圭则更快，更希望让球向前，渴望速战速决。

奥蒂戈萨

中场中路是节奏控制战的地点，而奥蒂戈萨是参与者。奥蒂戈萨是个很出色的传球范围广的的后场组织者，最重要的是，他是巴拉圭的主要节奏控制者。他通过聪明的传球让比赛慢下来，但他的机动性不好。他不喜欢快节奏的比赛。马蒂诺知道奥蒂戈萨的特点，所以当他需要动力时就不用奥蒂戈萨。例如1/4决赛对巴西时，他要让他的球队给对手制造很大压力，奥蒂戈萨就没上场。

奥蒂戈萨首发完全说明了马蒂诺的想法。他要场慢节奏的比赛，塔巴雷斯也知道这点。因此塔巴雷斯允许迭戈-佩雷斯和阿雷瓦洛比平常压得更上，极快地限制住对方的中场球员。（由于巴拉圭没有从中场前插的前锋，这是可行的）阿雷瓦洛可能是这场比赛中乌拉圭最好的队员，他作为左路的两名队员之一完成了限制奥蒂戈萨的任务。

导致第二个进球的事故充分诠释了战术上的争斗。阿雷瓦洛冲向奥蒂戈萨，得到了球，再挑传给弗兰完成进球。这很像足总杯半决赛亚亚-图雷断卡里克的球，虽然得球的方式不同。聪明的后场组织者需要控球时间，但有力量和决心的肌肉男不给他时间。对节奏的苦苦追求通常决定了中场的形势，只是这直接导致进球不多见。

缺乏宽度

马蒂洛阵容选择的一个错误导致了奥蒂戈萨的杯具。塞瓦略斯几乎整场都在快速内切，这使得巴拉圭在中场有4名中路球员却完全没有宽度。用奥蒂戈萨完全是浪费，他习惯把球分往边路，但这些区域却没有队员接应他的传球。


Ortigoza's two problems: (1) Arevalo closing him down. (2) No forward options in wide areas.

还有一个宽度的问题。巴拉圭想减缓比赛节奏，但他们把中场宽度限制在20码而不是50码，这让乌拉圭的限制更容易，这也让控球更难。巴萨经常利用边路增加活动面积是有原因的。中场争夺可以通过人数优势控制中路获得，但你永远要出球。没人扯到边路，前锋又很少往边上跑，很难理解巴拉圭要怎样努力去控制比赛。

但也许这就是问题所在。他们不想太努力，他们对0-0很满意。这使得第一个失球成了巨大的灾难。

下半场

令人吃惊的是，马蒂诺在中场休息时竟然不做任何变动。同样令人吃惊的是，巴拉圭融入了比赛。主要原因是乌拉圭退后了。塔巴雷斯可能知道他的队员没法整场比赛都紧紧压住对手。迭戈-佩雷斯，马丁-卡塞雷斯和马克西-佩雷拉都吃牌了，不值得继续强压对手。不必要的第二张黄牌可能给巴拉圭带来一线生机，这届杯赛乌拉圭是有过这种经历的。除此之外，体力因素也是塔巴雷斯战术调整的原因，佩雷斯在下半场中段被换下时看起来已经精疲力竭了。这场比赛是这届杯赛中少有的在一天正中举行的，有点温暖的气温也可能是个因素。

当然这是奥蒂戈萨有了更多控球时间，从而融入了比赛。因为边路没人接球，他只能穿给前面的队友。他传了个好球给巴尔德斯，巴尔德斯禁区边缘凌空抽射击中门框。之后，由于皮里斯从右后卫位置插上，奥蒂戈萨终于给边路传出了好球，皮里斯的低球传中应该被里维罗斯踢进的。那是巴拉圭最好的机会。

马蒂诺在65分钟时决定一直利用宽度，他用埃斯蒂加里维亚打左路，埃尔南-佩雷斯打右路。卡塞雷斯和贝拉被换下。巴拉圭看起来有所好转，但他们的第三次换人是个灾难。巴里奥斯明显不适合比赛，他上场5分钟后就因大腿肌肉拉伤下场。如同半决赛换上圣克鲁斯，同样的灾难终结了巴拉圭进攻的希望。这也让他们暴露在乌拉圭的反击下，卡瓦尼，苏亚雷斯和弗兰的精妙配合完成了这届杯赛最后一次进攻，也是最佳进球。

总结

当然，这场比赛也有其他因素。上文几乎没提到苏亚雷斯，尽管苏亚雷斯通过制造空档，赢得任意球和控球让巴拉圭的后卫疲于奔命。他获得最佳球员是理所应得，但在战术的角度上，他只是个很好地完成了一流工作的球员。

这里真正的战术争斗是中场的节奏，其中的关键是奥蒂戈萨。当他（在下半场）有空间时他是比赛的关键球员。当他（在上半场）没有时他是罪人。

塔巴雷斯应该因为他在这届比赛中的决定得到巨大的赞扬。他用了那么多球员（20名非门将球员全都得到了比赛时间），各种各样的阵型和无球时的战术。虽然乌拉圭有些慢热，但几乎所有的方法都起到了作用，而且他们在半决赛和决赛的表现是整届杯赛最令人信服的。

Alex2011

萨贝拉也是打4411的好手

colinfirth

Jonathan Wilson believes a fear of failure is undermining international football
乔纳森威尔逊认为，国际足球界正蔓延着一股对失败的恐惧暗流，其根基受到侵蚀
Posted 4 days ago


Unable to compete with Brazil on equal terms, North Korea opted for a damage limitation 4-5-1 line-up

A year ago it seemed that football might be entering a new age of attrition. Internazionale had won the Champions League playing reactive football, halting – with the help of an Icelandic volcano –Barcelona’s tiki-taka parade and revelling in the fact that they had only 16 per cent of possession in the second leg of their semi-final win.

Tiki-taka prevailed in the World Cup, but it was a glum form of it, as Spain, faced with massed defences, simply circulated possession, knowing a mistake would be made and a goal would come eventually. They were the best side at the World Cup by a distance, probably the most deserving World Cup winners – in the sense of being demonstrably better than the opposition – since West Germany in 1990, yet eight goals scored in seven games tells its own story. When Arsene Wenger spoke of “sterile domination”, he was talking about Barcelona, but the term is surely more applicable to Spain.

As it turned out, though, the season that followed the last World Cup wasn’t much different to the previous one, with the exception that this time, without any volcanoes to stop them, Barcelona passed their way to a second Champions League in three years. Watching club sides again, both in domestic action and in the early qualifying rounds of European competition, there was a tremendous sense of release; after the stodginess of the World Cup, here were teams playing with attacking fluency. When even the opening stages of a club competition are a breath of fresh air, the World Cup has a major problem.

There hasn’t been a good World Cup since 1998, and even that has gained in lustre by comparison with what has come since. In Japan/South Korea and Germany it was possible to blame the weather (although it was hot in France), but the South African winter should have been ideal for football. There was controversy over the balls and talk of player fatigue from their domestic seasons, but a significant part of the issue was tactical.

Over the past two decades, football has become increasingly systematised, a point made clearly in the UK’s Guardian newspaper each week by the “Secret Footballer”, an unnamed Premier League player who, from behind his anonymity, has cast off the code of omerta that so often seems to prevent footballers from speaking openly about their craft.

“The level of detail that goes into games still, to this day, amazes me,” he wrote. “Every player has his own script, what to do, when to do it, information on the player he’s up against…we memorise every single set-piece, where we have to stand, run and end up – and even for the other players so we know where everyone else will be at any given time.

“You know that pass when you say  to yourself: ‘How did he spot that?’ Often he didn’t need to; he knew the player would be there because, the night before in the hotel, he read about the runs he would be making. It’s exactly the same pass after which you might say: ‘Who was that to?’ The receiving player either forgot to be there or was taken out of the game by a tactical manoeuvre by his opposite number. Football at this level is very chess-like, certainly to those inside the game.”

At club level, players have weeks to learn those moves as they train together day after day, and play perhaps 50 games a season. Over time, a mutual understanding develops, the “chess-like” moves becoming instinctive. At international level, though, in the limited time available, it’s impossible to achieve that coherence. Moves are less slick because players constantly have to look for team-mates rather than knowing intuitively where they’ll be – a difference of a fraction of a second that is compounded over the course of a long move, making it easier for defenders to get wise and cover.

So most managers start with the basics and pack men behind the ball. If defenders or holding midfielders go forward, they risk leaving spaces that, at club level, would be filled by team-mates. Most are far less adventurous for their countries, maybe fearing the consequences of a mistake, the effects of which are magnified by relatively few international fixtures played – and the result is the “broken teams” that characterised the last World Cup.


Holland effectively lined up with 6 defensive players against Brazil in South Africa

Even Holland – whose “Total Football” in the 1970s introduced the world to new levels of internal coherence and movement – effectively played with six defenders and two forwards, linked only by Dirk Kuyt’s industry and the creativity of Wesley Sneijder.

The problem is intensified by the number of mismatches at the World Cup, borne out by the confederation tournaments in which the standard is less varied. A 32-team event feels bloated but, more than that, the need to satisfy every confederation means they’re not even the best 32 in the world. The likes of North Korea, New Zealand and Algeria have little option but to defend or risk a hammering. Defensive football is, as the great Italian theorist Gianni Brera put it, “the right of the weak”, but then what are the weak doing at the World Cup in the first place?

For now, international football draws much larger audiences than even the best club football, but the gap is closing. Empty stands in South Africa and estimates that only two-thirds of the expected 450,000 overseas visitors materialised must also be troubling. What if this is evidence not of the global economic crisis but of a growing disillusionment with international football? What if frustration at the lack of quality and entertainment starts to outweigh the patriotic urge to watch games?

Bad football, no matter how packaged, cannot be a spectacle forever.

Those countries who missed out on hosting the World Cup in 2022 may feel they had a very lucky escape.

By Jonathan Wilson
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colinfirth

140楼参考译文
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Jonathan Wilson：失败的恐惧侵蚀了国家队足球  

由 Diosdemadao 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

去年，足球似乎要进入消耗战的新时代。国际米兰以防守足球打败了巴塞罗那的Tiki-taka，赢得欧冠。当然，他们也有冰岛火山爆发的帮助。他们还陶醉于半决赛第二回合仅得16%的控球率。


实力上不能够在平等的条件下与巴西对抗，因此朝鲜选择了极端防守的4-5-1阵型。

Tiki-taka在世界杯上赢得胜利了，但那个只是Tiki-taka的一种消极的形态。西班牙面对着铁桶阵，只能一次又一次地控制住球，期望对手最终会出现失误，然后入球就随之而来。他们世界杯上最好的球队，从他们对对手明显的压制来看，或许是自从1990的西德后，最值得赢取世界杯冠军的球队，但他们只能以七场八球的成绩写下自己的故事。温格曾经谈论过“无意义的支配”，当时他指的是巴塞罗那，但这个词无疑是更适用于西班牙。

正如我们看到的，世界杯之后的赛季和前一个赛季并没有什么大分别，但有一个例外，这一次没有了火山爆发的阻碍，巴塞罗那成功夺取了三年内的第二个欧冠杯。无论是在国内联赛还是欧州杯赛早段的资格赛，再次欣赏球会比赛带来了极大的解脱感；在枯燥无味的世界杯过后，有些球队打起了流畅的进攻。即使球会竞争的开局阶段令人耳目一新，但世界杯仍然有个很严重的问题。

自从1998年之后就再没有精彩的世界杯，即使那届世界杯的好评亦只是因为接下来的几届太过差劣。在日本/南韩和德国的世界杯上，大家可以将踢得不好的责任推到天气上(虽然98年世界杯的主办国法国也是很热)，但这次在南非的冬天却是非常适合踢足球。大家将争议点都转移在皮球上和球员们的疲劳，但最为显著的问题其实是战术。

过去的两个十年，足球变得越来越系统化。一位匿名的英超球员抛弃了禁止球员公开内幕的缄默法则，在英国报章Guardian每星期推出的“Secret Footballer”明确地指出了这一点。

每一场比赛资料的详细程度直至今天仍令我惊讶不已，”他写道。“每一位球员都有自己的剧本，有什么要做，要什么时候去做，需要对付的那位球员的资料……我们要记住每一个定位球，自己需要站在哪和跑去哪－甚至连其他球员的也要记住，这样才知道其他人会在什么时候出现在什么位置。”

“当你看到那个精妙的传球时，或许会问：‘他是怎么策划的？’其实，他通常都不需要策划；他知道那个球员会在那里，因为前一晚在酒店里，他已经阅读过那个走位了。有时，你看到完全一样的传球时，会问：‘这球是要传给谁啊？’这只是要接球的球员忘记了走位，或者是被对手的战略阻碍了。这个程度的足球就像在下国际象棋，准确地说，是成为了棋盘上的棋子。”

在球会，球员们在日复一日的训练里学习那些走位，每个赛季大概踢上五十场比赛。随着时间的推移，与队友互相的瞭解就会建立起来，而这些像在下国际象棋的行动也会变成本能。在国家队，时间是有限的，想要达到跟球会一样的一致性是不可能的。行动的流畅度也会大打折扣，因为球员们需要不停地观察队友的位置，不能再仅凭直觉就找到他们－即使是微小至秒的差异，在一长串的行动中会不断叠增，这就会令对方的防守球员更容易作出判断和补位。

所以，大部分主帅都会选择最简单的做法，让球员守在后场。如果后卫或后腰前插了，他们留下的空当是很危脸的，不过在球会，队友会马上进行补位。大部分主帅都不敢为他们的国家去冒险，或许是害怕一个错误所带来的后果，由于国际比赛相对地少，所以一个错误的影响也会被放大－而结果，上届世界杯就被人们以“一帮破烂球队”来形容。



即使是荷兰也功利地使用起六名防守球员和两个前锋，仅靠库伊特的勤劳和斯奈德的创造力将球队连贯起来。要知道他们在1970年代将“全能足球”推广到世界，让球队内的一致性和运转推到新的层次。

世界杯上大量实力悬殊的比赛令这个问题变得更加严重－每届世界杯能走到决赛阶段的球队其实都大同小异，亦证明了球队之间的水准差异。一共有32队参与的赛事感觉是个盛大的宴会，不过，为了让每个州协会都能满足，必须给每个州分配一定数量的参赛名额，这意味着这些参赛队伍未必是世界上最佳的32队。比如说北韩、纽西兰和阿尔及利亚这些实力较弱的球队，他们眼前的路就只有两条，死守或是被屠杀。就如同伟大的意大利理论家詹尼-布雷拉所说，防守足球是“弱队的权利”，但弱队为什么要出现在世界杯上？

目前，国际足队仍比最好的球会能吸引多很多的观众，但这个差距也正渐渐收窄。南非世界杯上出现了空座位，当初预期海外旅客的人数会达到450,000，但最后人数只有这个数字的三分之二，当然昂贵的旅费也造成了影响。但若是这个证据并不是证明全球经济危机，而是人们渐渐对国际足球的幻想破灭的话，会怎么样？若是出于爱国的动力也驱策不了人们去观看质素低下和缺少娱乐性的比赛的话，又会怎么样？

无论人们如何去包装，劣质的足球永远也成不了独特的风光。

那些错失了主办2022年世界杯的机会的国家或者会庆幸能逃离一劫。

Jonathan Wilson

Alex2011

ZM’s Copa America Best XI
July 29, 2011


The starting line-ups

The outstanding performers from July’s Copa America tournament in Argentina.

Justo Villar (Paraguay)
Getting to the final without winning a game or scoring a goal in the knockout stages relies on a good record at the back. Paraguay’s constantly changing back four were generally impressive, but Villar was superb. Some fantastic saves against Brazil were followed by some impressive saves in the shoot-out, a trick he repeated in the semi-final against Venezuela.

Juan Zuniga (Colombia)
A utility man for Napoli, but a key man for Colombia. In a defence which didn’t concede a goal in the group stages, Zuniga contributed to the good defensive record whilst also being a constant threat going forward, showing good quality with the ball at his feet.

Sebastian Coates (Uruguay)
The youngest of Uruguay’s impressive collection of centre-backs, but the standout performer in this competition. After Diego Lugano and Mauricio Victorino had a nightmare against Paolo Guerrero in Uruguay’s opening game, Coates came into the side and steadied the defence. Comfortable either as a man-marker in a four-man defence or as a sweeper in a three, Uruguay always seemed more comfortable when he was in the side.

Oswaldo Vizcarrondo (Venezuela)
A fantastic penalty box defender – uncompromising, committed and positionally-excellent. Venezuela often had to put up with the opposition enjoying the majority of possession, but Vizcarrondo was the main reason they could be comfortable with this. He also popped up to score a great header in the quarter-final against Chile.

Alvaro Pereira (Uruguay)
Pereira started the tournament on the bench against Peru when Uruguay desperately needed his width and attacking drive from left-back – but after that he started every game on the way to the final. His versatility came in handy – he is able to play as a left-back, a left-wing-back or a left-sided midfielder.

Egidio Arevalo (Uruguay)
A fierce competitor in the heart of midfield – and whilst Luis Suarez received the official man of the match award for the final, it was Arevalo’s closing down of Nestor Ortigoza that set the tone for the Uruguayan performance. Arevalo has been used to performing in a double act with Diego Perez, but Perez’s red card against Argentina and subsequent suspension against Peru brought the best out of Arevalo as the sole holding player.

Tomas Rincon (Venezuela)
A powerful but technically gifted midfielder, and officially named as the best player at the tournament. His harsh red card against Chile robbed him of the chance to play in the semi-final against Paraguay – and without their driving force in midfield, Venezuela were much less likely to score.

Juan Arango (Venezuela)
Another Venezuelan who showed technical quality in the middle of the pitch, as well as great ability from dead balls. Indeed, with this tournament being dominated by set-pieces, Arango’s delivery was crucial for Venezuela – especially in the 2-1 win over Chile, where both goals came from dead ball situations.

Alexis Sanchez (Chile)
Not quite at the level he reached for Udinese last season, but a constant threat. He also came up with an end product at important moments – a good goal against Uruguay, a key assist against Venezuela.

Luis Suarez (Uruguay)
A good finish against Peru was crucial to Suarez staying in the side over Edinson Cavani, as Oscar Tabarez switched from a front three to a front two after that opening game. That gave Suarez more freedom and more of a central role – he was able to work the channels, picking up the ball between full-back and centre-back and looking to come inside. He also showed an amazing ability to win free-kicks and get opponents booked – especially against Argentina, where this knack was crucial to Uruguay remaining in the game.

Paolo Guerrero (Peru)
The classic all-round centre-forward – holding the ball up, working the channels, trying to get onto balls over the top and relishing crosses, Guerrero was a handful for every defence he faced, despite frequently getting little help from his teammates. He and Suarez finished as the two top scorers, but they were also the best forwards as a whole.

Honourable mentions

Fernando Muslera (Uruguay)
–
Mario Yepes (Colombia)
Diego Lugano (Uruguay)
Dario Veron (Paraguay)
Maicon (Brazil)
Pablo Armero (Colombia)
–
Carlos Sanchez (Colombia)
Nestor Ortigoza (Paraguay)
Jorge Valdivia (Chile)
Ganso (Brazil)
–
Sergio Aguero (Argentina)
Lionel Messi (Argentina)
Diego Forlan (Uruguay)
Joel Campbell (Costa Rica)

Alex2011

142楼参考译文
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Zonal Marking：美洲杯最佳11人

由 ccmaximus 发表在GoalHi足球·



最佳阵容（首发）：7月阿根廷美洲杯舞台上的佼佼者们

胡斯托·比拉尔（巴拉圭）

巴拉圭能够以全程不胜和淘汰赛一球未进的“优良”战绩最终跻身决赛，依靠的是一条坚固的防线。该队对于4后卫人员搭配的频繁变化令人印象深刻，但是比拉尔的表现更是卓越的。1/4决赛对阵巴西的比赛中，他上演了数次精彩扑救，而在之后的点球决战中零封对手。半决赛对阵委内瑞拉时，他又复制了上一场的表现。

胡安·祖尼加（哥伦比亚）

那不勒斯的多面手，但却是哥伦比亚的关键先生。在一条小组赛保持零失球的防线中，祖尼加不仅在防守中贡献良多，而且能持续向前制造威胁，展示了优秀的脚下能力。

塞巴斯蒂安·科亚特斯（乌拉圭）

乌拉圭优良中后卫群中的最年轻者，但在本届比赛中脱颖而出。在迭戈-卢加诺与毛里西奥-维多利诺在保罗-格雷罗面前经历了噩梦般的揭幕战后，科亚特斯站出来稳固了蓝军的后防。他既能在4后卫阵型中出任盯人中卫，又在3中卫中的清道夫位置上发挥自如。他在场时，乌拉圭队似乎总能发挥得更好。

奥斯瓦尔多·比斯卡隆多（委内瑞拉）

一位杰出的禁区内防守者—永不妥协，责任感加上出众的位置感。委内瑞拉队通常必须忍受对手占据着大量的控球时间，比斯卡隆多是该队能够应付自如的主要原因。在四分之一决赛对阵智利的比赛中，他还攻入了一粒漂亮的头球。

阿尔瓦罗·佩雷拉（乌拉圭）

乌拉圭人在本届美洲杯首战与秘鲁的交锋中一度迫切需要拉开阵型宽度以及增加来自后场左路的进攻，佩雷拉从替补席站了出来——之后他在包括决赛的所有比赛中首发出场。多才多艺的他在场上快捷而迅速。他能够在左后卫、左翼卫或左边前卫的位角色上自如切换。

埃吉迪奥·阿雷瓦洛·里奥斯（乌拉圭）

中场腹地一个凶猛的斗士——虽然路易斯-苏亚雷斯在决赛中荣膺官方授予的当场最佳，但却是阿雷瓦洛对于内斯托-奥蒂戈萨的封锁为乌拉圭的胜利奠定了基础。阿雷瓦洛已经习惯于同迭戈-佩雷斯形成2人搭档，但佩雷斯在对阵阿根廷时中吃到红牌并因此缺席与秘鲁的比赛则成就了阿雷瓦洛的个人表演。

托马斯·林孔（委内瑞拉）

一个兼具力量与技术的天才中场，官方评定的赛会最佳球员。对阵智利时一张过于严厉的红牌剥夺了他在半决赛中出战巴拉圭队的机会——而失去中场发动机的委内瑞拉队则失去了进球的希望。

胡安·阿朗戈（委内瑞拉）

另一个在中场展示了精湛技术和定位球水准的委内瑞拉人。实际上，在这届被定位球主宰的美洲杯上，阿朗戈的精确制导对于委内瑞拉队来说是决定性的——尤其是在2比1力克智利的比赛中，两粒进球都来自定位球。

阿莱西斯·桑切斯（智利）

并没有达到他上赛季在乌迪内斯队所展现的水准上，但仍是球场上一股持续的威胁力量。他也能在重要的时刻闪光——对阵乌拉圭时的漂亮进球和对阵委内瑞拉时的关键助攻。

路易斯·苏亚雷斯（乌拉圭）

当奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯在首场与秘鲁赛后将锋线人数由3人变为2人时，比赛中攻进的精彩一球成为了苏亚雷斯力压卡瓦尼，留在首发阵容中的关键。这个变化使得苏亚雷斯更为自由，踢得更像一个中锋的角色——他有能力在前场突破，接应边后卫和中后卫的传球，进而转向禁区。他同时展示了一种绝妙的能力：获得任意球和引诱对手吃牌——特别是在对阵阿根廷的比赛中，这个窍门对于乌拉圭队在劣势下维持着一线生机起到了决定性的作用。

保罗·格雷罗（秘鲁）

经典的全能中锋——拿球，突破，争抢过顶球和接应传中，虽然从队友那儿得到的帮助不多，但格雷罗对于他所面对的每条防线来说都是个大麻烦。他和苏亚雷斯名列射手榜前两位，但从整体能力来看，他们俩也是最好的前锋。

荣誉提名

费尔南多·穆斯莱拉（乌拉圭）
马里奥·耶佩斯（哥伦比亚）
迭戈·卢加诺（乌拉圭）
达里奥·贝隆（巴拉圭）
麦孔（巴西）
保罗·阿尔梅罗（哥伦比亚）
卡洛斯·桑切斯（哥伦比亚）
内斯托·奥蒂戈萨（巴拉圭）
乔治·巴尔迪维亚（智利）
甘索（巴西）
塞尔吉奥·阿圭罗（阿根廷）
梅西（阿根廷）
弗兰（乌拉圭）
乔尔·坎贝尔（哥斯达黎加）

Alex2011

阿根廷梅西和阿奎罗都在替补阵容里

Alex2011

入围候选但未进入最佳阵容的多大14人，除守门员1人外，后卫5人、中场4人、前场4人