【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人

Penelope

Set-pieces dominate the first week of the Copa
美洲杯小组赛第一轮，定位球破门是主导

July 7, 2011



For a tournament often hailed for its flair and unpredictability, the Copa America has clearly been lacking excitement.

So far, the goals per game count stands at a pathetic eight, from seven matches. That gives a goals per game rate of just 1.14 – roughly half the goals per game rate of last summer’s World Cup, where the figure was 2.27. There have been three 0-0s, and only Chile have scored more than once.

Further analysis of the method of the goals reveals that – five of the eight goals have been scored from set-pieces. Only three have been from open play – Javi Guerrero’s cool finish after a long ball against Uruguay, Luis Suarez’s quick shot in that same game against Peru, and Adrian Ramos’ winner against Costa Rica.

The other five goals have come quickly after set pieces. The ratio of goals scored from dead ball scenarios is generally between 30-40%, but so far in this tournament it is 62.5%.

It’s not as if teams are actually scoring a greater number of goals from set plays, simply a greater proportion. To take a ‘normal’ number of goals per game (let’s take the ratio of the World Cup, 2.27) and multiply that by the number of games so far (7), we could have expected 15.89 goals.

Since the ‘normal’ percentage of goals scored from set-plays is 30-40%, we would have expected to have seen between 4.77 and 6.34 goals from set-plays so far. The figure of five is nothing unusual.

The problem, of course, is those goals have been obvious as there have been few goals scored from other methods. Three goals in seven games from open play is a disastrous figure – and whilst defensive organisation should get some of the credit, it’s been obvious that the main problem has been a lack of creativity.

Too many sides are depending upon one player (Lionel Messi, Ganso) for creating chances, rather than possessing a number of skilful players in the side to play key passes. The most exciting side so far, Chile, have been the side who have attacked with the greatest number of players – they’re also the only side to score two goals, and the only side to win a game against eleven men. And yet, even Chile’s two goals both came from set-pieces.

Hopefully managers will pick a greater number of players in the second week and the Copa will improve, as this is a worrying trend.

Penelope

26楼参考译文
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由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

美洲杯第一周 定位球是关键

美洲杯因其人才济济，充满不确定性而盛名在外，但现在的它明显缺乏激情。

到目前为止7场比赛的进球数只有可怜兮兮的8个，这使得场均进球才1.14个——大概是去年夏天世界杯场均进球的一半左右，当时是2.27个。目前有3场0-0，只有智利打入了一球以上。

对进球的进一步分析得，8球中有5球来自定位球，只有3球是运动战进球——对阵乌拉圭时格雷罗拿到长传后一个漂亮的击杀，苏亚雷斯在同一场比赛中攻入秘鲁大门的快速一击，以及对阵哥斯达黎加时拉莫斯的制胜球。

其他5个进球都是发定位球后很快就得分了。从死球开出后的得分的比例大概在30~40%，而目前美洲杯的比例是62.5%。

这实际上并不是球队们从定位球中获得更多的进球，单单只是一个更高的数据比例而已。用场均的“正常”进球数（就用世界杯的2.27吧），乘以目前的比赛场数（7），我们本应该能看到15.89个的。

既然从定位球得分的“正常”比例是30~40%，我们期望的定位球进球在4.77到6.34个之间，目前的5个没啥出人意料的。

这些进球存在的问题很明显，当然是从其他手段进的球太少了。7场比赛3个运动战进球，这个数据简直就是灾难性——防守端因此可以获得掌声，但同时最主要的毛病也是明摆着的：他们很缺乏创造力。

许多球队都过于依赖某一个球员（梅西，甘索）来创造机会，而阵中没有一批技术好的球员来完成关键的传递。目前最令人兴奋的球队智利，是调动球员参与进攻人数最多的——他们也是唯一一支攻入两球的球队，唯一一支对手11人全勤也获胜的球队。但是，就连智利的两个进球也是来自定位球。

希望第二周的比赛中，教练们能排出一批更出色的球员，美洲杯的比赛能更为好看，目前的情势可着实让人担心

Alex2011

根据zm分析所言，梅西和特维斯的战术上不兼容，是因为都是伪9号造成的。

一是表现在前场，伪9号特维斯在国家队的边锋位置不适应，但是前一场后半段，特维斯顶上去打中锋时也不适应啦，他做不了比利亚，那排什么433阵形呢？

退一步讲，梅西打左边锋，特维斯打伪9号，拉维奇打右边锋，这样也可以委曲求全吧？但是俺估计，这样的配置上，特维斯也完不成这个角色的

二是梅西后撤中场，与巴内加和坎比，也不能形成合力，这说明什么呢？

如果中场配置上这里不能跟梅西有效配合，还谈什么高仿巴萨呢？

这不是扯淡吗？！

Alex2011

Lionel Messi is an easy target for Argentina's collective failings

阿根廷集体失败，责难铺天盖地，而梅西首当其冲

When the albiceleste underperform with Messi in the side, he's the one blamed. Against Colombia, they underperformed again

当梅西和蓝白军团在本届美洲杯首演表现不佳时，他梅西就是那个被指责的人。对阵哥伦比亚，梅西们再次表现不佳。。。


Lionel Messi reacts after Argentina's goalless draw with Colombia in the Copa América. Photograph: Fernando Vergara/AP

He had his opportunity. With 10 minutes to go, Argentina won a free-kick by the right corner of the Colombia box. Lionel Messi stepped up. This was his chance to silence the grumblers, to mark his return to his home province with a deft assist, or perhaps even a goal. For a left-footer, the angle seemed inviting. He approached the ball – one step, two steps, three. Back went the left-foot, and ballooning high and wide went the ball, neither shot nor cross nor anything other than an indication of the lack of confidence that seems to submerge his game every time he pulls on the albiceleste shirt. As he trudged off at the final whistle after a goalless draw against Colombia, a smattering of boos rippled across the Estanislao López.

What makes it worse is that this was supposed to be his triumphant return home. It was only 110 miles to the south that Messi first kicked a ball. Some people say the boy's grandmother made the coach do it; Salvador Ricardo Aparicio himself says that he was a player short and asked the boy's grandmother if the five-year-old, who'd been kicking a ball against a nearby wall, would like to play. Everybody who was there on that dusty field in Rosario agrees what happened next. The ball came to the boy, clad in a shirt several sizes too big for him. He prodded at it with his right foot. When it came to his left, though, he started dribbling "as if he'd done that all his life", his grandmother said.

Those around reacted as if they'd seen a vision. Here was a pibe in action, the incarnation of the ideal of Argentinian football. The figure is an archetype that runs back to the earliest days of Argentinian football, from the days in the first decade of the 20th century when it first began to establish an identity distinct from that of the British ex-pats who had established the game in the country.

If Argentina wanted to erect a statue to its footballing spirit, the journalist Borocotó wrote in El Gráfico in 1928, it should depict "a pibe with a dirty face, a man of hair rebelling against the comb; with the intelligent, roving, trickster and persuasive eyes and a sparkling gaze that seem to hint at a picaresque laugh that does not quite manage to form on his mouth, full of small teeth that might be worn down by eating yesterday's bread."

The true embodiment of the pibe, of course, was Diego Maradona. Even Maradona accepts that Messi is his equal for skill, and he has a similar urchin build. Notably, though, Messi's hair no longer rebels against the comb – in fact, his may be the most sensible footballer's haircut since the days of Kevin Sheedy and Peter Davenport; a streak of European discipline has entered his soul.

It seems a trivial point, but it's not insignificant. Messi left Rosario for Spain at the age of 13, and there is a sense that Argentinian fans still don't entirely trust him. In that, he resembles another native of Rosario who found fame abroad and was never entirely accepted back home: Che Guevara. The move undoubtedly did Messi good, and not just because it secured him the growth hormones Newell's Old Boys could no long afford. It protected him, both against temptation – Pep Guardiola, then the reserve coach, quickly stepped in when he started partying with Ronaldinho – and against the machinations of agents, which may yet destroy the career of his contemporary Carlos Tevez.

But it also means that every time Messi underperforms for the national team – or, more accurately, every time the national team underperforms with Messi in the side – he is the one who takes the blame. In part that is natural for the best player in the team: he is the star, the genius, it's his shirt the counterfeit merchants are selling outside the grounds; therefore it's his job to drag the game the way of his side. But there is also a sense that whatever he does it will not quite be enough, that there will always be a suspicion that he doesn't quite give his all for Argentina. Given that he had the opportunity to play for Spain's youth teams and turned it down, that seems a little unfair.

To an extent the issue is generational. Younger fans accept that players leave for Europe as soon as they can; older fans seem still to find it hard to accept that the primera has become a diminished league. After the first game a taxi-driver even claimed that Argentina would be better picking only four Europe-based players if they wanted the team to play with pride.

There were chants for Messi before kick-off in Santa Fe but even here, the cheer for Tevez, rougher-edged and thus the more authentic avatar of pibismo, was much louder than the one for Messi when the teams were read out before kick-off. The stadium announcer neatly encapsulated the mood: "Con la 10, el mejor del mundo, Lionel Messi. Y con la 11, el jugador del pueblo, Carlos Tevez." Messi is the best in the world, but Tevez is the player of the people.

Messi, in truth, didn't look much like the best player in the world. He mooched around looking largely ineffective, perhaps all too aware that when he came deep in search of the ball it was not Xavi or Andrés Iniesta going ahead of him as it would be at Barcelona, but Esteban Cambiasso. Only once, after 34 minutes, as he slid a pass through for Ezequiel Lavezzi, was there a flash of his brilliance. The Napoli forward, though, described by Sergio Batista as Messi's co-pilot, was denied by Luis Martínez.

It's not Messi's fault, of course. Tevez, however popular he may be, was no more effective. This is an environment in which no player looked comfortable, anxious with the expectation and burdened by a tactical system that seems to suit nobody. As against Bolivia, Batista switched to a 4-2-1-3 late on, but Messi looked as uncomfortable as an enganche as he had as a false nine. This is a collective failure, tactical and mental, and ultimately Batista must take responsibility. It is Messi, though, the pibe with the European manners, who provides the easier target.

Posted by Jonathan Wilson in Santa Fe Thursday 7 July 2011 14.57 BST guardian.co.uk

Alex2011

上楼参考译文
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阿根廷集体失败 梅西却成替罪羔羊
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球



美洲杯阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚后梅西的反应。图片来源：Fernando Vergara/AP

曾经有一个机会摆在他的面前。比赛仅剩10分钟了，阿根廷在哥伦比亚禁区右角的位置获得一个任意球。梅西走上前去，这是属于他的机会，可以让那些叽叽喳喳的人闭嘴，他能用一记精彩的助攻，甚至是一粒进球来昭示他的王者归来。对于一个左脚将来说，这个角度看上去是个不错的机会。他走近皮球——一步，两步，三步。他抡起左脚，放了一记高炮，皮球不见踪影。这球既不是射门，也不是传中，其中除了自信心的缺乏再无他物，而每次当他拉起身上的蓝白球衣捂脸时，不自信似乎都要将他淹没。最后终场哨声响起，阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚，当他蹒跚而行时，几丝嘘声撕裂了洛佩斯球场的天空。

更为糟糕的现实是，人们原本期待这是他的荣归故里，这里离他第一次踢球的地方只有110英里远。有人说是他的祖母让教练带他去踢球的；阿帕里西奥他自己说当时缺一个队员，便问这孩子的祖母，这个对着旁边的墙踢球的5岁男孩愿不愿意过来踢球呢。每个当时在罗萨里奥那片尘土飞扬的空地上的人都知道接下来发生了什么。球滚到男孩的脚下，他身上还穿着一件大几个码的衬衫。他用右脚捅了一下皮球，当球滚到左边时，虽然是左脚，他开始带球，如他祖母所说，“他好像之前的一辈子都在做这件事。”

周围的人好像看到了一个幻影：这有一个跃动的孩子，是阿根廷足球理想的化身。他就像阿根廷足球早期时的一个典型球员，那还是在上世纪的第一个十年，是在英国移民把足球引入这个国度后，阿根廷开始发展与之不同、自己特有的足球的时期。

1928年记者Borocoto在《体育画报》杂志写道，如果阿根廷想要为她的足球精神立一座雕像的话，就应该塑造“一个脸上脏兮兮的小孩儿，头发桀骜不驯，眼神透露出聪慧，漂泊，狡猾，雄辩，还要带有一种闪光的凝视，其中流露出流氓式的笑意，嘴却没什么变化，其中满是小小的牙齿，好像啃一点儿昨天的剩面包就会掉下来。”

这个小孩儿的真实例子，毫无疑问就是马拉多纳。连老马都承认梅西在技术层面和他是同一个档次的，而梅西也是一个类似的顽童形象。尽管值得注意的是，梅西的头发不再张牙舞爪了——事实上他的头发也许是自凯文-席迪和彼得-达文波特的时代之后，最服服帖帖的足球运动员发型了，欧洲的纪律性已经深入他的灵魂。

这看上去是个不起眼的小细节，但它非常重要。梅西在13岁时离开罗萨里奥前往西班牙，我们能感觉到阿根廷球迷还不是完完全全地信任他。在这个意义上，他很像另一个在国外获得盛名，却在家乡永远也没能被完全接受的罗萨里奥人：切-格瓦拉。远走他乡对梅西而言毋庸置疑是有好处的，这不仅仅是因为在异国他能接受纽维儿老男孩提供不了的激素治疗。这里保护着他不受诱惑的勾引——瓜迪奥拉，这位之后的巴萨教练在梅西开始和小罗一起踢球时就很快介入了；也保护他不受经纪人阴谋的影响，而这有可能毁了他的同胞特维斯。

但这也意味着每次梅西在国家队表现不尽如人意时——或者更准确地说，每次当国家队阵中有梅西而表现不佳时——他总是替罪羊。在某种程度上这对于队中最优秀的球员来说是很自然的：他是闪耀的明星，是才华横溢的天才，场外那些盗版商买的都是他的球衣，因此带领球队走上正轨也是他的责任。但也会有人这么想：无论他做什么，那都还不够；人们总是质疑他没有为阿根廷奉献自己的全部。考虑到梅西曾有机会为西班牙的青年队效力，但他拒绝了这个邀请，这种质疑有些不公平。

在某种程度上这个问题是跟球迷的世代相关的。年轻的球迷能接受球员尽早前往欧洲踢球，而年纪稍大的球迷则还是很难接受阿甲日益式微的现实。在第一场比赛之后，一位出租车司机甚至说，要是阿根廷想要为荣誉而战的话，他们该只选入4个在欧洲踢球的球员，那整体会踢得更好。

在圣塔菲，开球之前有人为梅西高歌。但即使是在这儿，当开球前宣读球员名单时，人们为特维斯的欢呼远远高过为梅西的，这欢呼原始粗犷，于是他更像是理想中那个孩子的化身。体育场播音员很干净地表达了这情绪：“接下来是10号，世界上最好的球员，梅西。再接下来是11号，人民的球员，特维斯。”梅西是世界最佳，特维斯却是属于人民的。

事实上，梅西看起来并不像世界上最好的球员。他四处散步，看上去很没效率，也许他太清楚自己要是后撤拿球的话，这里不会像在巴萨那样有哈维和伊涅斯塔前插，这里只有坎比亚索。只有一次他闪现了他的天才，那是在第34分钟他妙传拉维奇。尽管被巴蒂斯塔称作梅西的副驾驶，这个那不勒斯前锋的球还是被马丁内斯扑出。

这当然不是梅西的错。不管特维斯人气有多么高，他也没什么效率。目前的这个环境没有人能踢得舒服，大家都因巨大的期望而焦虑不已，又被不知道是为设计的战术体系所累。在对阵玻利维亚时，巴蒂斯塔后来换阵4213，但梅西在踢伪9号时，看上去像是被什么钩住了一样不舒服。这是集体的失败，战术上和精神上的失败，最根本的是巴蒂斯塔必须担负这个责任。而梅西，这个带有欧洲风度的孩子，却成了更容易被攻击的目标。

Alex2011

狗孩一位网友说，全世界都知道梅西是阿根廷人，唯有阿根廷人例外

elite

关于智利1-1乌拉圭之战，下面有一个带有图的简要战术分析帖子
http://bbs.goalhi.com/2464807.html

elite

Argentina's failures at the Copa America are system-based
美洲杯开赛以来阿根廷发挥不佳源于系统性桎梏

Story Highlights 全文要点：

Lionel Messi has borne the brunt of the criticism for Argentina's poor play；
梅西在遭受因阿根廷队表现不佳的责难中而首当其冲；

The real issue is the use of three holding midfielders and no real link man；
这个真正的实质性的问题在于使用了三后腰却没有真正串联之人；

Argentina's players have also been guilty of overdribbling at times
阿根廷球员也屡犯带球过多的毛病


The use of three holding midfielders such as Esteban Cambiasso (right) has stifled Argentina's midfield creativity. Jaso Jacome/Landov 使用象坎比亚索这样的三后腰战术（图中右边）已经限制了阿根廷中场创造性发挥

One player has emerged from the first week of the Copa America with his reputation enhanced. Sadly for Argentina, that player is Spain's Xavi Hernandez. 美洲杯开赛1周以来，有一个球员的形象愈发突现在球场上，人们对他渴望与日俱浓。（但是），这种渴望对阿根廷人来说是悲伤的，那位球员就是西班牙队的哈维-赫尔南德斯。

Outside of the Barcelona support structure, without the tiki-taka legions at his back, Lionel Messi has looked worryingly ordinary. 离开巴萨支持结构、缺乏身后的tiki-taka系的支援，梅西在美洲杯赛场上已经显现出之前令人担忧的平庸。The doubts that Argentina fans had about him have been magnified by his performances in the draws with Bolivia and Colombia. 阿根廷球迷对他的质疑，已经被他在阿根廷与玻利维亚和哥伦比亚两场交战的平局中的表现所强化。This has been a systemic failure, tactical and mental, for Argentina, and the more Sergio Batista tries to calm the fury of fans and the media by insisting this tournament is primarily about preparation for the World Cup, the more loudly comes the response that the next stage of that preparation will be to get rid of him. 这种情势和后果，对阿根廷队而言，已经是系统性失败了，不论战术还是精神层面；不仅如此，塞尔吉奥-巴蒂斯塔，还一再强调这届美洲杯主要是为2014世界杯作准备的，这样来面对球迷以及媒体的不满和愤怒，他愈加想要保持平静，那么，舆论对此反应是，下一步的准备工作就是要他从主帅位置上滚蛋的吼声，则愈发强烈。

Against Colombia on Wednesday in a 0-0 draw, it wasn't just that Argentina lacked a little spark, as it had against Bolivia, it was that it was shockingly, crassly open at the back. Colombia's Adrian Ramos and Dayro Moreno were guilty of extraordinary misses, and three one-on-ones were wasted in the second half. Colombia should have won the game comfortably and, had that happened, Argentina would be facing Monday's game against Costa Rica needing a win just to be assured of third in the group.

"The worst moment under Batista," said La Nacion. "Batista is directing the Titanic into an iceberg," said As. "The national team doesn't start," said Clarin. It was shambolic. The pattern was similar to the Bolivia game -- 20 minutes of calm, measured if slightly toothless soccer, followed by 70 minutes of panic and chaos. And at the heart of it all, oddly glum, stood Lionel Messi. Anybody who still believes soccer is just about picking the best players and letting them get on with it needs only to look at Batista's Argentina to see how flawed that idea is.

Batista has done his best to retract the comment, but before the opening game he said he wanted his team to play like Barcelona: a 4-3-3 with Messi used as a false nine, dropping deep from his center-forward's position to create space for the wide forwards to cut in, and for players to make breaks form midfield. This, he had decided, rather than as a classic enganche -- literally "hook" -- between midfield and attack, was the way to get the best out of his best player.

That may be true, but soccer is a holistic game. Can Carlos Tvez and Ezequiel Lavezzi cut in from wide? Yes, they can. In that sense the front three should work, and there were indications against Colombia, most notably in the sublimely-weighted pass Messi slipped through for Lavezzi 10 minutes before halftime, that some sort of understanding was being generated there. These things, of course, take time: at Barcelona they have been worked out over a period of a decade or so at La Masia; note how it took even David Villa, coming in to a settled and successful side, four or five months fully to adapt. Batista doesn't have a decade -- he has had maybe three weeks -- and to that existent he is due the sympathy of any national coach in the modern era.

So let's move to the next layer. When Messi drops deep for Barcelona, he has Xavi and Andres Iniesta breaking beyond him; with Argentina, it's Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso. Banega and Cambiasso are perfectly serviceable holding midfielders. Cambiasso has even shown a certain knack for getting forward to score over his career, but they are hardly players of the wit, intelligence or movement of Xavi and Iniesta. When they get the ball, it stops -- as it does with Tevez and Lavezzi; this isn't the pass-and-move tiki-taka of Barca; it's something a little more ponderous, something, frankly, heretical as it may seem in Argentina, with too much dribbling, and it leaves Messi playing at a different rhythm to the rest of his team.

Then there is the issue of the fullbacks. At Barcelona, the wide forwards can drift inside knowing that they have a very attacking fullback overlapping, both providing width and drawing the opposing fullback. This is the beauty of Barcelona's system: when Messi goes deep a midfielder can go forward or a wide forward can cut in opening space for a surging fullback. One player's movement creates a vacuum and that generates the swirl of movement. Argentina simply doesn't have that. With Pablo Zabaleta, Argentina had a measure of attacking width from deep -- he certainly seemed far better suited to the system than Marcos Rojo had -- but he is no Dani Alves (after all, who is?), and neither can the 37-year-old legs of Javier Zanetti offer regular surges forward on the other flank. Moreover, when players do push on, the instinct to cover isn't there. Javier Mascherano drops in as a third center-back at times, as the holding player does for Barcelona, which should in theory liberate the fullbacks , but the mutual understanding isn't yet there -- and, with the players available, may never be.

Amid all the Batista-bashing, it should also be said that Colombia's coach, Hernan Dario Gomez, got it absolutely right tactically. The use of Carlos Sanchez as a holding player in a 4-1-4-1 meant that there was always a player in the space into which Messi wanted to move, so that he never had the opportunity to turn and run at goal from that dangerous central area 30-40 yards out. The use of Ramos and Moreno wide also helped dissuade Zabaleta and Zanetti from being too aggressive.

So what does Batista do next? He could, as he did in the final stages, field Gonzalo Higuain as an out-and-out center forward with Messi in behind in a 4-2-3-1. Or he could heed the calls of the public for Javier Pastore to be used in midfield and stick with his 4-3-3. In theory, the linkup between Messi and Pastore could be devastating, but the dangers are twofold, particularly given the lack of practice-time available. Messi and Pastore could effectively end up occupying the same space and/or Pastore, not being used to this style of 4-3-3, could play too high up the field become isolated from the two holders, as Ganso did for Brazil.

The bonus for Batista is that Costa Rica should provide limited opposition; this is a game in which there probably is scope for experimentation before the quarterfinals. Then again, everybody thought that about Bolivia.
Jonathan Wilson is the author of Inverting the Pyramid; Behind the Curtain; Sunderland: A Club Transformed; and The Anatomy of England. Editor of The Blizzard.

Read more: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/jonathan_wilson/07/07/argentina.struggles/index.html#ixzz1RaU4J6Nk

elite

33楼参考译文
-------------------------------

Jonathan Wilson：美洲杯阿根廷的失败得怪体系

由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


派上3个像坎比亚索这样的后腰限制了阿根廷中场的创造力。Jaso Jacome/Landov

美洲杯开赛一周以来，有一个球员浮现在人们视野之中，声誉大振。可这对阿根廷来说很遗憾：这个球员是西班牙的哈维。

没有了巴萨体系的支持，没有了身后的Tiki-taka军团，梅西看上去不过是一个焦躁的庸才。阿根廷球迷对梅西一直心存怀疑，而对玻利维亚和哥伦比亚的平局中，他的表现加深了这疑虑。对阿根廷而言，这是一个体系的失败，不论是战术上还是精神上。巴蒂斯塔坚称这次锦标赛主要是为下届世界杯做准备，以此为借口企图平息球迷和媒体的愤怒，他费的力越多，民众中“下一个阶段的准备工作就是赶他下台”的反对之声也越大。

周三阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚，这场不仅仅是像上一场对玻利维亚时阿根廷就差那么一点儿闪光的火花，这次是后防线令人震惊、无比粗糙地门户大开。哥伦比亚的拉莫斯和莫雷诺该为他们没能把握住的绝佳机会而自惭形秽，下半场浪费了3个单刀。哥伦比亚本应该舒舒服服地全取3分，而要是这样的话，那阿根廷在下周一面对哥斯达黎加时必须赢下比赛，以保证小组第三的位置。

“这是巴蒂斯塔执教后最糟糕的时期”，《民族报》如是说。“巴蒂斯塔正开着泰坦尼克号撞冰山”，《阿斯报》戏谑。“阿根廷国家队未能成功启动”，《号角报》评论道。这场比赛就是个大混乱，走势和上场对玻利维亚有类似之处——前20分钟很冷静，踢得谨慎，甚至可以说是有点缺乏锐气，之后70分钟是惊慌失措和一团浆糊。在这一切的最中央，站着一个古怪而闷闷不乐的梅西。任何以为足球就是选出最好的球员，然后让他们自己去踢的人都得来见识一下巴蒂斯塔的阿根廷，这样他们才知道这个想法错得有多不靠谱。

巴蒂斯塔已尽全力少说话，但在揭幕战开始之前他曾说过，他希望这支队伍能像巴萨那样去踢：排433，让梅西踢伪9号，从他中锋的位置后撤，为边锋内切和队友从中场突破留出空间。他已拿定主意，这就是能让手下最好的球员最大力度发挥实力的方法，而不用那种将中场和进攻结合的古典Enganche——字面是“钩子”的意思。

这可能是正确的，但足球是一个集体项目。特维斯和拉维奇会内切吗？对啊，他们当然能做到。在这个意义上前场三叉戟应该能起作用，而在对哥伦比亚时他们之间也有了些相互理解的迹象，这最明显的是中场前10分钟梅西传给拉维奇那精彩的一球。这种理解当然需要时间，在巴塞罗那梅西和他的队友可是在拉玛西亚一起踢了十年或更长。但巴蒂斯塔没有十年的大好光阴——他只有大概3个星期——在某种程度上，他也应该得到现代任何一个国家队主教练都应得的同情。

那让我们继续到下一层吧。当梅西在巴萨位置后撤时，他有哈维和伊涅斯塔两个队友可前插，而在阿根廷队他只有巴内加和坎比亚索。这两人都是非常称职的后腰，而坎比亚索甚至在其职业生涯中展现出一种前插得分的特殊天赋，但与哈维和伊涅斯塔相比，他俩还是远不具有那种聪慧、才智和跑位。当他们拿球时，进攻就终结了——特维斯和拉维奇也是一样。阿根廷踢的不是巴萨式一传一跑的Tiki-taka，他们踢得更笨拙，而坦白地说，他们现在的踢法就阿根廷传统而言像是旁门左道，带球太多，并使得梅西和他的其他队友不在一个步调上。

接下来看看边后卫的问题。在巴萨，边锋知道自己身后还有个攻击欲望强烈的边后卫上前助攻，于是他们可以向中路移动，为己方提供宽度，也调动对方的边后卫。这是巴萨系统的美丽所在：当梅西后撤时一个中场可以前场，或者是一个边锋内切，并给插上的边后卫留出空间。一个球员的跑位造出一个空当，并继续生出一连串移动。阿根廷就是没有这一套东西。拥有萨巴莱塔的阿根廷可以选择从后场开始，利用宽度来进攻——他当然比罗霍要更适合目前体系得多——但他还不是阿尔维斯（毕竟又有谁是呢？），而另一侧37岁高龄的萨内蒂也扛不住来来回回的前插冲刺跑。此外，当真有球员前插时，剩下的人没有补位的意识。马斯切拉诺有时会后退一些作为第三个中后卫，就像在他巴萨踢后腰时所做的那样，这在理论上能解放边后卫，但他们现在缺乏默契——就目前的人员配备来说，也许永远都不会有了。

在一片对巴蒂斯塔的口诛笔伐之中，我们也得说哥伦比亚主教练戈麦斯的战术布置非常正确。在4-1-4-1阵型中让桑切斯踢后腰，这意味着在梅西想要移动的空间中总能有一个队员在那儿，于是梅西从来没机会在中路距球门30~40码的危险位置转身并奔向球门。让拉莫斯和莫雷诺拉边也有助于压制萨巴莱塔和萨内蒂的助攻。

于是乎巴蒂斯塔下一步该做些什么呢？他可以像比赛后期那样，让伊瓜因首发做一个彻底的中锋，梅西在其身后，变阵4-2-3-1。或者他可以听从民众的呼唤，让帕斯拖雷司职中场，坚持他的4-3-3。在理论上梅西和帕斯拖雷的联合将无坚不摧，但也存在两重风险，特别是考虑到他们缺乏有效的训练时间。梅西和帕斯拖雷可能会位置重叠，而同时也许帕斯拖雷不适应这种形式的4-3-3，在场上的位置太靠前而孤立在其他两个后腰之外，就像甘索在巴西的问题一样。

给巴蒂斯塔的额外收获是哥斯达黎加的威胁并不大，在这场四分之一决赛之前的比赛里他可以大胆尝试一把。最后再提一句，在对阵玻利维亚时每个人也都这么想的。

elite

34楼的翻译，明显有个人喜好在里面的。例如，正文的第一二段的翻译中一些词的使用上，不是很恰当的。

看俺的翻译，味道肯定不一样。

例如“庸才”一词，这是个定性说法，最好不要轻易使用。而原文只不过是ordinary， 乃普通、平常、正常等的意思。

俺们可以说某球员某场表现不佳、平常、糟糕等，都是切合实际的，但是动不动使用天才、庸才，往往就是走极端的表现。一个天才级的球员，突然就成了庸才，这是量变还是质变？还是突变呢？如果是突变，那得是遭受了核辐射才对

弗爵爷

有没有ZM给乌拉圭VS智利的战术复盘？

Alex2011

有没有ZM给乌拉圭VS智利的战术复盘？
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-7-9 16:17

还木有这么快吧，至少也得等到明日凌晨以后吧

弗爵爷

好的，我等着，先谢过90兄了

智利确实打的很有内容，有整体有个体

sailor_l

如果这界比赛收获一个罗梅罗也算是好事。

Alex2011

Chile 1-1 Uruguay: in-game changes dictate the pattern of play
智利1-1乌拉圭: 比赛中调整支配着双方发挥的格局
July 9, 2011


The starting line-ups

Goals from Alvaro Pereira and Alexis Sanchez meant another Copa draw. 阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚和阿莱克斯-桑切斯的分别进球意味着，智乌之战是两队自美洲杯开赛以来的又一场平局，这场战罢，他们在c组均各积2分，分列第3、4名。

Both managers made changes. Claudio Borghi dropped Mati Fernandez and brought in Luis Jiminez behind the front two, but kept the same shape as in the opening day win over Mexico. 两队的主教练都对阵容做了调整。克劳迪奥-伯尔奇撤下马迪-菲尔南德斯而是让路易斯-吉米内斯出现在两位前锋之后，不过仍保持同首场取胜墨西哥时一样的首发阵型，即3412。

Oscar Tabarez made two changes from the draw against Peru. Nicolas Loderio dropped out and was replaced by Alvaro Pereira, whilst at the back Sebastian Coates came in for Mauricio Victorino, as Uruguay switched to a three-man defence. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯对首战秘鲁平局的阵容做了2处调整。首战打中场的尼克拉斯-罗德里奥被拿下，代之以阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚出场，而后卫线上用塞巴斯蒂安-克雅特斯替换马里西奥-维克多里奥，这样乌拉圭则改打三后卫阵型了。

The game took a similar pattern to Chile’s game against Mexico – they were the stronger side in possession but couldn’t break down the opposition until late in the game. 比赛走向同智利与墨西哥之战一样的格局——智利队在控球方面则显得更强一些，但是难以给对手致命打击，直到比赛后期才破门逼平对手。

Uruguay defence

Tabarez has switched to a three-man backline before – he did so against France in the opening game of the World Cup, when he was (perhaps too modestly, in hindsight) playing for a 0-0, having experimented with the shape in the pre-tournament friendlies. This three-man defence was more about creating a spare man at the back against the pace and power of Humberto Suazo and Alexis Sanchez, and the youngster Coates had a very good game as the sweeper, constantly covering for the other two centre-backs and getting in the way when Suazo thought he was clear.

The three-man defence was less successful as a whole, however. Sanchez is a very intelligent player and understands the tactical nuances of the game very quickly, and recognised that there was little point in him remaining high up against the centre-backs. Instead of moving to the right, as he did against Mexico, he dropped into the midfield more, as he did at Udinese throughout 2010/11 – see the game against Inter, for example. This meant Uruguay had a surplus of defenders, and Chile dominated the midfield ground.

The other interesting element of the midfield battle was that, with Lodeiro not in the side and an extra man at the back, the Perez-Arevalo duo had more freedom, with Arevalo venturing forward more.

Chile defence

The main battles were at either end, though, and Chile had to put up with a dangerous 3 v 3 situation at the back. Borghi’s predecessor Marcelo Bielsa always wanted a spare man, of course, and would have instantly changed to a back four – but Borghi stuck with his three, with the small caveat that Gary Medel dropped back and helped out.

The difference in the numbers in defence meant the two sides played with very different styles in their build-up play. Chile had midfield superiority and had to try and overload the Uruguayan defence, so played slowly and patiently in order to get midfield runners forward. On the other hand, Uruguay tried to play more direct to take advantage of the 3 v 3 situation. Their best two chances (a Luis Suarez shot and a Diego Forlan volley) came after long balls.

The 3 v 3 also meant they could press Chile at goal kicks easily, and Borghi’s side struggled to pass out from the back.

Uruguay three becomes a four

Tabarez and Uruguay realised that with Sanchez dropping into midfield, they didn’t really need three centre-backs, and so as the game progressed, they increasingly looked more like a four at the back. This was a simple switch – Maxi Pereira played deeper, Alvaro Pereira pushed on, and Martin Caceres moved back out to become more of a left-back. It was a 4-4-2ish system. The half-time change – forward Edinson Cavani off and midfielder Alvaro Gonzalez on down the right – was another sign that Tabarez had changed system.

A byproduct of this change was actually crucial in the goal, because Alvaro Pereira found himself in the box and swept home the opening goal – it’s difficult to imagine that he would have been in that position as a wing-back, rather than a winger.

Borghi makes attacking change

Typically, Chile became even more attacking after going behind. Unlike against Mexico, Borghi’s substitution didn’t change the shape of the side, but it was an even more offensive move – Arturo Vidal became the left-sided centre-back, Gonzalo Jara was taken off, and Jorge Valdivia, the number ten, came on to provide clever passes from the centre of midfield.

This had an immediate impact – four minutes later, Valdivia’s incisive pass to the left played in Jean Beausejour, who cut the ball back to Sanchez, who finished.

Chile then had the momentum, although bringing on Carlos Carmona for Beausejour seemed to kill this slightly.
Tabarez tried to go for the second goal with Lodeiro on for Arevalo, but it finished 1-1.

Conclusion

This was an interesting match, with Tabarez switching to three at the back to deal with Chile, and then reverting to a back four when he realised that Sanchez was increasingly dropping off the front. The change to a 4-4-2ish shape meant both sides ended up with a spare man at the back, rather than the situation at the start when Uruguay had two spare men, and Chile had none.

Alex2011

40楼参考译文:占位

北极海

乌拉圭是不断在三、四后卫中进行切换

智利的三后卫就相对明显一点

实际上智利队在防守阵型中也经常变成四后卫，后腰梅德尔的位置会回收到庞塞的身边，作为一名上抢的中卫

Penelope

乌拉圭是不断在三、四后卫中进行切换

智利的三后卫就相对明显一点

实际上智利队在防守阵型中也经常变成四后卫，后腰梅德尔的位置会回收到庞塞的身边，作为一名上抢的中卫 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-10 10:57

看来南美人都爱玩很潮的战术？

Alex2011

Brazil 2-2 Paraguay: Brazil snatch the draw
July 10, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes ditched the “European” 4-2-3-1, went for a Dunga-style compromise system, then ended up with 4-2-2-2…

He dropped Robinho from his starting line-up, favouring Jadson who played much narrower on the right, as he has done in previous friendlies.

Gerardo Martino went for the 4-4-2 / 4-3-3 hybrid that he often favoured at last summer’s World Cup. Roque Santa Cruz played on the right, and made diagonal runs to a centre-forward position.

Both sides were ahead at some point in the game, but neither side ever had overall control. Brazil were much better than in the first game going forward, but looked significantly more vulnerable at the back (perhaps because they were up against a better team).

Paraguay tactics

Martino had a habit of frustrating bigger sides at the World Cup last year with this shape, and Brazil found it difficult to stamp their authority on the game. Santa Cruz nullifed Andre Santos, who wasn’t brave or intelligent enough to influence the game on the left, and the left-back also switched off and let Santa Cruz run past him for a couple of chances.

In the midfield, Enrique Vera sat deep and picked up Ganso, with two central midfielders ahead doing battle with Brazil’s two holders. Marcelo Estigarrabia took on Dani Alves. Paraguay generally defended very narrow both at the back and in midfield, forcing Brazil to go down the flanks.

Brazil tactics

The decision to bring in Jadson over Robinho was not about personnel, it was about shape. In Brazil’s first game against Venezuela, Ganso struggled to provide decisive passes for Brazil’s front three. Part of the problem was that there was too much emphasis placed upon him for creativity, and there was a separate issue: he played too high up, and Brazil couldn’t find him with an initial pass from midfield.

In purely numerical terms, having one man providing creativity and using three men higher up the pitch ready to put the finishing touches to moves didn’t make sense – the introduction of Jadson, in a deeper, more central role than Robinho, was about shifting the balance. Jadson meant Brazil’s build-up play was more gradual, and Ganso had a colleague in close proximity to help create.

Ganso-Jadson
This worked pretty well, even if Brazil’s attacking play was still patchy. The Ganso-Jadson combination caused problems for Paraguay between the lines, and twice they linked up well – first when exchanging passes for a great chance Pato wasted, and then for the goal, where Ganso teed up Jadson to fire home.

Interestingly, this change in system also meant an alteration to the way the two holding midfielders played. In the Venezuela game, Ramires generally played to the left of Lucas, but here he played to the right, presumably as Menezes wanted him to shuttle out to the right and cover the (barer than usual) right flank. Pato also moved out to the right more – his movement was less restricted with only one forward alongside him. Brazil again tried to hit long balls towards Pato, though, which doesn’t really play to his strengths.

Paraguay compete in midfield

Paraguay were defending well as a unit, pressing at the right moments and meaning that Ganso rarely picked up the ball on his way to goal – he had to come deep, or receive the ball with his back to goal, unlike in the first game, where Venezuela pushed up too high and gave him space between the lines.

Nestor Ortigoza was good on the ball for Martino’s side, dictating play from deep, and coming short to collect the ball. This caused Brazil some confusion in midfield as Lucas moved up the pitch to close down Ortigoza, when he would have preferred to sit deep with Ramires higher up.


The five stages of Menezes' move from 4-2-3-1. ONE: The 4-2-1-3 against Venezuela. TWO: The modified 4-2-1-3 for this game, with Jadson in for Robinho, and the two holders switching ides. THREE: Elano replaces Jadson on the right. FOUR: Lucas Moura comes on for Ramires, with Elano moving deep. FIVE: Fred replaces Neymar.

Second half

Menezes made a change at half time, withdrawing Jadson and bringing on Elano in the same position. His reasoning, presumably, was to guard against a second yellow card – and with Alves being given something of a difficult time by the tricky Estigarrabia, some extra cover was needed.

Unfortunately, this destabilized the Brazilian side, and despite enjoying a good relationship at club level, the Elano-Ganso combination didn’t work particularly well. Nor did it help defensively – Elano was caught out for Paraguay’s equaliser. Alves made an individual error for the slightly fortunate second Paraguayan goal.

Brazilian subs

Menezes made two further attacking substitutions to try and get back in the game. First, Ramires went off, and Lucas Moura came on. This meant Elano going deeper into the Ramires role, and Lucas Moura playing as something approaching a second number ten alongside Ganso, even more narrow than Jadson had played. There was now no right-winger, with Alves trying to cover the entire flank by himself.

That narrowed Brazil on the right, and the second change narrowed them on the left. The ineffectual Neymar was removed for Fred, who played as a central striker, and suddenly Brazil were more like a 4-2-2-2 – Lucas Leiva and Elano holding, Ganso and Lucas Moura creating, Fred and Pato upfront. This narrow system almost played into the hands of Paraguay’s narrowness, but late on an attack right through the middle got Brazil their equaliser – Ganso again got the assist with a clever flick, and Fred struck the ball into the corner.

Conclusion

The first Copa game with more than three goals in it – first and foremost, this was an entertaining match.

Martino kept roughly the same shape throughout, whilst Menezes chopped and changed. Neither conclusively won the tactical battle – Paraguay defended well in open play but sometimes got overloaded between the lines with two Brazilian creators.

Brazil’s problem defensively was their right flank, although Andre Santos had a habit of switching off and letting men run past him. Another change for the final group game wouldn’t be a surprise, perhaps with Fred starting permanently as a central striker.

Alex2011

44楼参考译文：占位

KAY

34楼的翻译，明显有个人喜好在里面的。例如，正文的第一二段的翻译中一些词的使用上，不是很恰当的。

看俺的翻译，味道肯定不一样。

例如“庸才”一词，这是个定性说法，最好不要轻易使用。而原文只不过是ordinary ...
elite 发表于 2011-7-9 15:12

ordinary在字典里查是普通正常的意思，但是真正用来形容人是基本上就是委婉的骂人（参见电影美国美人末尾段，邻居家的儿子是怎么用ordinary来形容主角家女儿的那个漂亮同学的），类似于mediocre，说是庸才也不算违背原意，当然从语气上说，稍微过了一点点，说是凡夫俗子比较贴合英文原意

KAY

如果这界比赛收获一个罗梅罗也算是好事。
sailor_l 发表于 2011-7-9 16:37

罗梅罗感觉比在世界杯时反应更敏捷了，但他还是有明显技术缺陷，抓球不稳，表现在比赛中很多把球扑出和击出，常常给对手二次进攻的机会

Alex2011

Alex2011

Alex2011