【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人

Alex2011

Argentina 1-1 Bolivia: Batista tries two systems but neither works well as Bolivia grab point 阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔连试两套战术皆不如玻利维亚抓住要害的战术那样奏效 July 2, 2011 The starting line-ups Bolivia took the lead at the start of the second half, but Sergio Aguero’s thumping volley rescued a draw for the hosts in the opening Copa America game. Sergio Batista’s main decision was whether to start Carlos Tevez or Angel di Maria on the left of his front three. He went for Tevez. Marco Rojo got the nod at left-back, and Sergio Romero started in goal. Gustavo Quinteros chose a 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 system, with Edivaldo Rojas just off Marcelo Moreno Martins upfront. The stars here were Bolivia, of course, but all the tactical interest came from Argentina’s two systems. Quinteros’ formation was extremely effective but also very simple – a defensive-minded shape with two narrow banks of four, trying to make it difficult for Argentina to play through them. Argentina wide forwards Just as in South Africa last summer, Tevez has forced his way into the side despite seemingly being out of the coach’s intended first XI shortly before the tournament started. He was asked to play as a left-sided forward here. There was an interesting contrast, then, between the positioning and movement of Tevez and Ezequiel Lavezzi. Lavezzi is used to playing as a wide forward for Napoli all season (albeit usually on the opposite flank), and his positioning -starting outside the full-back, before making diagonal runs towards goal – suited Messi well. The number ten could dribble with the ball and then slip it between centre-back and full-back to Lavezzi, as he did most famously in the 5-0 Clasico. This produced a good chance on 25 minutes, but Lavezzi’s finish was wayward – and the Napoli man’s end product throughout the first half was poor, and didn’t take advantage of his good understanding of the system. Tevez generally played narrower and was less effective at trying to stretch the Bolivia defence, which wanted to be narrow. They were also happy to play reasonably high up the pitch, however. Although one defender often came out to meet Messi, the full-backs tucked in to prevent the centre of the pitch opening up. They also had the pacey Ronaldo Rivero to cover, and besides, there was often no Argentina player looking to exploit the space anyway. That problem was related to the role of Banega, who did a decent job with the ball at his feet connecting midfield and attack, but was cautious with his movement off the ball. When Messi plays in the centre and drops deep he attracts two or three players to him, opening up space for an attacking midfielder to exploit – at club level, most frequently Andres Iniesta. Banega remained quite deep, however, and there was no real need for him to do so with both Javier Mascherano and Esteban Cambiasso in that zone, plus no real driving runs from midfield from Bolivia. Another difference between Argentina and Barcelona, in relation to Messi (it must be said that comparing Batista’s side to the greatest club side in the world and arguably one of the best of all time is extremely harsh, but since replicating those conditions for Messi has been one of his main goals, the comparison must be made) is the fact that Argentina don’t press anything like as much as Barca, and the wide players instead drop back when they lose possession. That leaves Messi as the highest player up the pitch in a 4-1-4-1ish shape, which prevents quick combinations between he and the two wide forwards on the break. Second half Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half All of this meant that Batista immediately turned to his plan B at half time, a 4-2-1-3. Cambiasso was removed, with Angel di Maria on as a left-winger, and Tevez becoming a centre-forward. Messi moved deeper, behind the three forwards. The issue is then about Messi’s positioning – he appeared too deep, generally picking the ball up deeper than the two Bolivia holding players, forced away from goal by Tevez’s presence. Just as Tevez rather got in Messi’s way and forced him too deep against Argentina last year as a second striker, he was broadly doing the same thing as the main central striker here. What kind of player would Messi want to play behind in this system? Tevez, a false nine at club level, is probably not the best option. Amongst all this, something far more important happened – Bolivia scored from their first real attempt of the game, as Rojas flicked in a corner kick at the near post, and Banega miscued the ball over the line. Bolivia could then sit deeper, with Rojas dropping off as more of a fifth midfielder and pressuring Argentina’s two holders. Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament. Here, we had a brief glimpse of it – Moreno had all the time he liked with a one-on-one against Romero, but wasted the chance. Batista had already reached for his alternative shape, and so had to stay with that same system. Sergio Aguero came on for Lavezzi and had an instant impact – superbly volleying home after Nicolas Burdisso had gone forward for a free-kick. That raised another question – whether Argentina needed a proper number nine who could, like Burdisso, be an aerial threat in the box. Argentina rallied late on, but Bolivia defended well and were content to do the basics as Argentina struggled to work out their best system. Conclusion The tactical decision-making and the actual game were almost two different things here. Both goals came from set-plays – and from (a) a mistake on the line and (b) a brilliant finish, rather than any great example of combination play. The match further outlined how many attacking options Batista has – Diego Milito, Gonzalo Higuain and Javier Pastore weren’t used at all – but provides more questions than answers. Tevez and Messi in the same team appears to be a problem unless their relationship improves significantly, and it would be a surprise if Batista starts against Colombia with the same team that played here.

Alex2011

上楼译文
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由 barcargentina 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔两套战术皆不成功，玻利维亚抓住了重点

July 2, 2011

The starting line-ups

































玻利维亚在下半场开场就取得了领先，但阿圭罗精彩的凌空射门为东道主在美洲杯揭幕战拿到了一场平局。

巴蒂斯塔最主要的问题是用特维斯还是用迪马利亚首发打三前锋中左边的位置。他选择了特维斯。罗霍成为了首发左后卫，罗梅罗是门将。

古斯塔沃-坎特罗斯选择了4-4-2/4-4-1-1阵型，莫雷诺在最前面，罗哈斯在他身后。

这场比赛出彩的当然是玻利维亚，但所有值得关注的战术都来自阿根廷的两套打法。

坎特罗斯的阵型十分简单也十分有效——以防守为主，两排4人组成的狭窄防线令阿根廷难以突破。


阿根廷的边前锋

就像去年夏天在南非一样，尽管特维斯似乎不是教练心目中的首发十一人之一，但在杯赛开始前不久他仍然成为了首发。他在这场踢左边前锋。

特维斯和拉维奇的位置和跑动的差异很有趣。拉维奇整个赛季都在那不勒斯打边前锋（虽然一般在另一边），他喜欢从边后卫外侧向内切，这种风格和梅西很配。梅西可以先自己带球，然后从中卫和边卫间把球传给拉维奇，就像他在5-0的那场国家德比中一样。第25分钟这种打法创造了一个好机会，但拉维奇踢飞了——整个上半场，那不勒斯人的临门一脚都很烂，他没利用好自己对战术的深刻理解。

特维斯一般在小范围内踢球，由于玻利维亚后防正希望如此，他在撕破防线上没多大作用。然而玻利维亚后防也乐于压上。尽管一个后卫经常跟随梅西上前，但边卫会收缩保护中路。他们还有速度快的里维罗来补位，而且一般没有阿根廷球员去利用这一空间。

这个问题和巴内加的角色有关，他持球时能很好地连接中前场，但他无球跑动很少。当梅西回撤很深时，两三个球员会被他吸引出来，这就给进攻型中场提供了前插的空间，就像伊涅斯塔在俱乐部经常做的。巴内加却待在很后面，由于马斯切拉诺和坎比亚索都在那个位置，而且玻利维亚中场几乎没有压上，他这么做完全不必要。

阿根廷和巴萨的另一个不同和梅西有关。（需要说明的是，把巴蒂斯塔的球队和世界上最好的，甚至可能是史上最佳之一的俱乐部相比很不厚道，但由于他的主要目标之一正是为梅西复制在巴萨的环境，这种比较很有必要）阿根廷不像巴萨一样压迫对手，当失去球权时，边路球员反而会回收。这让梅西在一个类似4-1-4-1的阵型中成了顶在最前面的人，导致进攻时他无法和两个边锋进行快速配合。

下半场

Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half

由于上半场的表现，巴蒂斯塔在下半场换到了B方案，4-2-1-3。坎比亚索被换下，迪马利亚上场打左边锋，特维斯打中锋，梅西回撤到三前锋身后。

这时的问题是梅西的位置——他位置太靠后了，一般在玻利维亚的两个后腰身前拿球，由于特维斯的存在，他基本没有进球机会。去年特维斯打二前锋时占据了梅西的跑动路线，使得梅西回撤很深，这次他在中锋位置也是如此。在这套战术里，梅西希望在谁身后？特维斯这个在俱乐部踢伪九号的球员大概不是最好的选择。

这期间发生了件十分重要的事——玻利维亚第一次真正的攻门就进球了。罗哈斯在前点接角球后蹭，巴内加不小心把球撞过了门线。之后玻利维亚可以更加收缩了，罗哈斯回撤后更像是第五名中场球员，他们一起压迫阿根廷的两个后腰。

阿根廷的压上暴露了后防缺乏速度的问题，这是个肯定会在这届杯赛上的某个时刻暴露的问题。在这场比赛中我们就看到了这个问题——莫雷诺得到了和罗梅罗1对1的机会，但他浪费了这次机会。

巴蒂斯塔已经换了备用阵型，所以他只能用这个战术了。阿圭罗换下了拉维奇，很快这就收到了成效。布尔迪索上前接任意球传给阿圭罗，阿圭罗漂亮地凌空一脚得分。这带来了另一个问题——阿根廷是否需要一个像布尔迪索这样的9号球员在禁区内制造空中威胁。

阿根廷此后士气大振，但玻利维亚防守很好。玻利维亚一直在做最基本的事情，而阿根廷在艰难地寻找他们的最佳战术。

结论

在这场比赛中，战术设计和实战基本是两个不同的东西。两个进球都来自定位球——一个由于门线上的失误，一个由于灵光一现，两个进球都不是精妙配合的产物。

比赛还显示出巴蒂斯塔的进攻选择到底有多丰富——米利托，伊瓜因，帕斯托雷根本没上场——但这带了的更多是问题而不是答案。特维斯和梅西的共存是个问题，除非他们的关系能显著改善。如果巴蒂斯塔还用这套人员打哥伦比亚，人们会震惊的。

showfun

A组另外一场比赛哥伦比亚1：0小胜哥斯达黎加

Alex2011

A组另外一场比赛哥伦比亚1：0小胜哥斯达黎加
showfun 发表于 2011-7-3 09:07

仅仅看了一小会儿，1-0之后的主哥队踢客哥队很有章法的

CFT

Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament.

这句话太可怕了！

Alex2011

Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament.

这句话太可怕了！
CFT 发表于 2011-7-3 12:20

天足论坛有人说，这时才像巴萨，就20分钟

Alex2011

Colombia 1-0 Costa Rica: Ramos goal beats ten man Costa Rica
哥伦比亚1-0哥斯达黎加：主队凭拉莫斯的进球击败10人应战的客队

July 3, 2011


The starting line-ups

Colombia squeezed past Costa Rica in a poor game.

Hernan Dario Gomez surprisingly left out Cristian Zapata, sticking with the partnership of Luis Parea and Mario Yepes at the back. Hugo Rodallega was also on the bench.

Costa Rica are participating in this tournament with an Olympic squad, so the majority of players are under 23, and the XI was unrecognisable from the side which contested the Gold Cup.

The match was disappointing – played at a very slow pace, with Colombia dominating possession but not creating many chances. There were only two real points of interest – first, Costa Rica’s formation, and second, how Colombia immediately readjusted after Randall Brenes, the Costa Rica forward, was sent off in the first half.

Costa Rica formation

Costa Rica’s formation was very odd, and impossible to categorise into a set formation in numerical terms. They’d been expected to line up in a 3-5-2 formation – and that is probably the closest you can come to describing it easily, but there were significant differences from how you would expect a 3-5-2 to line up.

For a start, Diego Madrigal played very high up the pitch, as a left-winger rather than a left wing-back – whilst on the other side, Jose Salvatierra played much deeper, between the lines of midfield and defence.

To compensate for Madrigal’s advanced positioning, the left-sided central midfield Hugo Leal played very deep, and looked to cover that side. But there was further confusion because he frequently seemed to swap positions with the left-sided centre-back, Francisco Calvo, who turned up all over the pitch in the first half. The result was a strange, disjointed system that seemed to feature too many players in deep positions, and the confusion in the centre-left channel may have contributed to Ramos’ goal, which started with a run from that zone.

Colombia


The line-ups after Costa Rica went down to ten men

Gomez’s starting system was a simple 4-5-1 / 4-3-3. The two wide players started relatively deep, which seemed overcautious considering Costa Rica were happy to let Colombia have the ball, and also because moving them forward and looking to stretch the three-man Costa Rican defence would surely have caused more problems.

The one area of interest was how deep Gustavo Bolivar played – he dropped into the back at times and allowed the two full-backs to motor on. Pablo Armero is the most naturally attacking of the two and had more space to exploit, but Juan Zuniga was probably more of a threat down the right.

When Brenes was sent off on 27 minutes, Gomez waited just five minutes to change his system and push men forward. he removed Abel Aguilar, who had been playing as the passing midfielder, and brought on Rodallega. This meant Fredy Guarin playing a little deeper, and Colombia moving to a 4-2-3-1 system, with the forward four players (with the slight exception of Falcao) allowed to switch around at will. The goal came partly because Colombia were overloading the Costa Rican defence, although it was through the simple addition of another attacker, rather than a more subtle tactical switch.

Conclusion

Not much to get excited about here – Colombia are the first side to pick up a win in the 2011 Copa, but they didn’t play particularly well and would have been in for more of a game had Costa Rica not gone down to ten so quickly.
The Colombian side seems to lack creativity to turn possession into chances. Guarin is the most attack-minded midfielder, but his first though is always to shoot (he must have had six or seven long-range attempts here) rather than thread a pass through the defence. There also needs to be a consideration of the roles of the wide players – Falcao thrives on crosses, but had little to work with here.

For Costa Rica this tournament is purely a learning experience. They’ll be reasonably proud of their efforts in keeping Colombia down to one goal, and caused some problems on the break.

Alex2011

7楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Brazil 0-0 Venezuela: Brazil fail to impress
巴西0-0委内瑞拉之战术评析：巴西未能留下深刻印象
July 4, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes’ first competitive game as Brazil manager ended with a poor 0-0 draw against a resilient Venezuela side.

Menezes played his expected side, which meant Ganso playing as the playmaker behind a front three.

Cesar Farias named a solid 4-4-2 side, with La Liga duo Nicolas Fedor and Jose Rondon upfront.

Brazil dominated possession, of course, and in the first ten minutes of the game looked like they were going to run riot. The longer Venezuela went without conceding, however, the more confidence the underdogs had, and the better they defended.

Opening stages

The match started at a much higher tempo than many of the Copa matches so far. Brazil looked to press from the front early on, whilst Venezuela closed down in the midfield, in a 4-4-2 system that became 4-2-2-2 when they won the ball.

Venezuela’s commitment to closing down got them into difficulties within the first ten minutes. Their two central midfielders, Franklin Lucena and Tomas Rincon, looked to pressurise Ramires and Lucas, but this simply left a yawning gap between their defence and midfield, which left Ganso in oceans of space. Brazil easily worked a 4 v 4 with Ganso on the ball after a few minutes, although they didn’t take advantage of the situation.

As we’ve seen before, most notably with Australia’s disastrous tactics against Germany in their opening World Cup game last year, closing down in midfield is suicidal if you have a numerical disadvantage in that zone.

Venezuela settle down

Unlike Pim Verbeek in that Australia v Germany game, Farias understood the situation here and told his two central midfielders to sit deep. The wide players joined them, and the whole Venezuela side played behind the ball and made it difficult for Brazil to play through them.

Brazil frequently looked like a broken team, with Ganso too high up the pitch close to the front three, rather than playing as the link man in midfield. The two central midfielders struggled for an available man to pass to, and Brazil’s dominance of possession wasn’t turned into chances. The best bet looked to be when the full-backs became involved, as the Venezuela wide midfielders often got drawn into the centre of the pitch, but they produced little on the ball.

The man who tried to connect the defensive ’six’ and the attacking ‘four’ with his typical energetic running was Ramires, but when he moved forward this left Lucas exposed in front of the defence (a little like Javier Mascherano in last summer’s World Cup), and Venezuela’s counters looked dangerous. Lucas was forced into two tactical fouls to stop breaks, and was fortunate to escape without a caution.

Second half

The first half pattern continued after half time. Venezuela got stronger at the back and actually looked more dangerous going forward – with the wide players coming narrow and making a 4-2-2-2, quick forward passes were always an option. They also dropped Fedor deeper, around Lucas, to help out in midfield.

Brazil continued to suffer from having a broken team in midfield, and long diagonal balls for Pato increasingly became their strategy. He controlled a couple of them well but Venzuela’s centre-backs positioned themselves intelligently, with Oswaldo Vizcarrondo particularly impressive.

Brazil brought on attacking substitutes – Elano, Lucas and Fred – and sometimes looked more like their 4-2-2-2 than their 4-2-1-3, but they had no cohesion in attacking zones and were relying on an individual moment of magic that never arrived.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming Copa game, with the underdogs able to shut out the favourites with relatively unspectacular tactics.

Brazil were poor in the final third and Menezes needs to work on the problems with a lack of compactness, but Brazil weren’t terrible. Unlike with Argentina, the shape and structure of the side seems OK, they just need some fine-tuning and some cohesion upfront.

Alex2011

9楼参考译文
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由 Sulley 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

巴西 0-0 委内瑞拉: 桑巴军团王气黯收
July 4, 2011

两队首发

在一支韧性十足的委内瑞拉队面前，马诺-梅内塞斯就任巴西国家队主帅之后的首场正式比赛最终以0比0黯然收场。

梅内塞斯的阵容选择在人意料之中，甘索在三名前锋身后扮演组织者的角色。

塞萨尔-法里亚斯则排出了一个稳健的四四二阵型，西甲二人组米古（尼古拉斯-菲杜尔）和何塞-容东搭档锋线。

不出所料，巴西队在控球方面占据了主动，开场十分钟内，他们的攻势看起来非常凶猛。然而，由于他们迟迟未能攻破委内瑞拉的大门，实力较弱的后者反而越踢越有信心，防守也愈发坚固。

开场阶段

比赛开场后的节奏远超前面的多场美洲杯小组赛。巴西似乎希望在比赛早期展开前场压迫，而委内瑞拉则选择卡死中场，一旦得球，即由四四二切换至四二二二。

委内瑞拉的中场紧逼战术让他们在前十分钟内颇为被动。两名中前卫富兰克林-卢塞纳和托马斯-林孔试图压迫拉米雷斯和卢卡斯，但这却一策略却使其防线和中场之间暴露出了巨大的空当，甘索四周一片开阔。当甘索控球时，巴西可以轻松形成前场四打四的局面，但他们却未能从中获得任何优势。

正如我们此前所见，以去年澳大利亚在其世界杯首场挑战德国时的灾难性战术安排为典型案例，在该区域人数处于劣势时采取中场紧逼无异于自取其辱。

委内瑞拉稳定战局

与率澳大利亚迎战德国时的皮姆-维尔贝克不同，法里亚斯发现了此刻的局势，并命令其两名中前卫回收。在两名边前卫也随之回收之后，整支委内瑞拉队形成了稳守的态势，让巴西人很难从中突破。

由于甘索站位过于靠上，几乎与锋线三人平行，却未能承担起衔接中场的任务，巴西看上去经常像一支被拦腰截断的队伍。两名中前卫很难寻觅到合适的传球目标，桑巴军团空有控球优势，却无法将其转化成破门良机。鉴于委内瑞拉边前卫经常收缩至中路，巴西队的最佳解决方案似乎来自于两名边后卫的插上，但他们得球之后同样建树寥寥。

一名球员试图以其标志性的积极跑动连接球队的“六”后卫和“四”前锋，他便是拉米雷斯，然而当他前插时，卢卡斯就被独自暴露在了本方防线之前（稍有类似于去年夏天世界杯上马斯切拉诺的处境），而委内瑞拉的反击则显得危险性十足。卢卡斯曾先后两次被迫用战术犯规来阻止对方的反击，并十分侥幸的逃过了裁判的处罚。

下半场

上半场的局势在中场休息之后得到了延续。委内瑞拉的防守愈发稳固，事实上，其进攻看起来也比巴西队更具威胁——通过让两名边锋向内收缩并切换到四二二二，他们总是能够觅得快速传切的空间。此外，他们还让米古后骚扰防卢卡斯，以便减轻中场的压力。

巴西依然深受前后脱节之苦，斜长传找帕托逐渐成为了他们的主要战术。帕托成功控制住了其中的几次，但委内瑞拉中后卫的选位非常聪明，奥斯瓦尔多-维斯卡隆多发挥得尤为出色。

桑巴军团相继换上了几位进攻型的替补球员——埃拉诺、小卢卡斯和弗雷德，相比四二一三，他们的阵型有时更接近于四二二二，然而他们在危险区域毫无默契可言，也始终未能等来某一名球员的灵光闪现。

结论

又一场略显乏味的美洲杯比赛，弱旅毫不出奇的战术让球迷眼中的豪强无能为力。

巴西在对方腹地表现不佳，球队的松散是梅内塞斯急需解决的问题，但巴西队也绝非一塌糊涂。与阿根廷不同，这支球队的基本打法和阵型结构都没有明显的问题，他们所需的只是战术上的微调和一些前场球员之间的默契。

pedro

Tevez and Messi in the same team appears to be a problem unless their relationship improves significantly, and it would be a surprise if Batista starts against Colombia with the same team that played here.

连zm这种非口水风格的技术帖子，都直言不讳提到野兽和梅西兼容问题，可见非是战术层面可以解决的问题了！

何况，还是SergioBatisa教练！

pedro

SergioBatisa再捣糨糊，据说排出跟首战几乎一样的战阵，迎战哥伦比亚

阿根廷怎样

不排除烟雾弹

elite

不排除烟雾弹
阿根廷怎样 发表于 2011-7-5 11:08

但愿如彼

Penelope

Uruguay 1-1 Peru: Guerrero and Lodeiro the key men as both sides waste chances to win it乌拉圭1-1秘鲁：双方都浪费了取胜机会，而格雷罗和罗德依洛成为关键之人

July 5, 2011


The starting line-ups 双方首发阵容

A more exciting game than many of the previous Copa America contests resulted in another draw. 美洲杯开赛以来更为激动人心的一场比赛，结果又是一场平局。

Oscar Tabarez named his expected side, with all three of his star forwards on the pitch, supported by Nicolas Lodeiro from midfield. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯排出了他中意的阵容，前方是三前锋，之后由中场尼可拉斯-罗德依洛来支持。

Sergio Markarian wasn’t able to call upon Juan Manuel Vargas from the start, and so instead used Yoshimar Yotun, more frequently used as a defender, on the left flank. 塞尔吉奥-马卡连没能让胡安-曼纽尔-瓦伽斯（巴尔加斯）首发，而是代之以更频繁地出任后卫的友石马-约顿担纲左翼重任。

The match was played at a higher tempo than the previous four matches in the tournament, with Uruguay closing down quickly early on, and Peru trying to get the ball forward quickly to Paolo Guerrero upfront. 这场比赛，随着乌拉圭早早地快速推进，而显得比本届杯赛开赛以来前4场气氛都高涨，同时秘鲁队也欲求快速地将球传给突前的帕奥罗-格雷罗。

Uruguay shape

Uruguay’s system was very similar to their formation in the infamous game against Ghana at last summer’s World Cup – two holding players with a more attack-minded player to the left, and Diego Forlan starting central, then dropping deep to drag a centre-back out, usually Alberto Rodriguez. That space wasn’t exploited particularly well by his two fellow forwards, however – Luis Suarez was the closest man to Forlan, with Edinson Cavani staying wide, although the two did switch flanks.

Some good combinations early on came to nothing, and Uruguay suddenly burst into life later in the first half when Lodeiro went from being invisible in the first 20 minutes, to being the game’s key player. He drifted forward unnoticed into great positions in the centre of the pitch, a little like Andres Iniesta does, and looked to get beyond Forlan when the Atletico striker moved away from goal. Exploiting that space helped Uruguay create chances – first Lodeiro seemed to lose track of the ball coming towards him when making a forward run into a great position, but later on he threaded the ball through to Suarez who finished well. Strangely, after that excellent 15-minute spell, Lodeiro was much quieter after half time.

Peru strategy

Peru played a very simple game – they hit direct balls forward to Guerrero, who led the line excellently and brought the two wingers into play well. He most frequently combined with Luis Advincula down the right, although the opening goal cut out any combination play altogether – a huge long ball over the top to Guerrero saw him break the offside trap and round Fernando Muslera to score.

Peru’s other threat came from the long throw of Yotun down the right, but he was mainly focused upon his defensive duties. Maxi Pereira steamed forward from right-back and provided the same attacking thrust he does with Benfica. On the other side, Martin Cacares had a lot of time on the ball with Advincula trying to move central and link up with Guerrero, but is so right-footed that he didn’t really stretch the play as much as he should have – it would have been nice to see Alvaro Pereira used there to provide overlaps, but Tabarez seems to see him more of a wide midfielder than a full-back. Still, Cacares had enough time on the ball to start the move for the goal – but that sums up how much space he had at that point, rather than acting as an advert for his quality in possession.

Second half

The same pattern continued in the second half, although with Lodeiro fading, Uruguay looked less potent. Suarez become more involved, however, and he and Forlan created a good chance that the latter blazed over the bar.

Tabarez’s substitutions didn’t really change the game, with Abel Hernandez and Cristian Rodriguez straight swaps for Cavani and Lodeiro. Uruguay still needed more from left-back, but Pereira remained on the bench.

In fact, it was Peru who grew into the game, and the introduction of Vargas pushed them forward. He replaced Advincula, with Yotun moving to the right and nullifying Cacares.

Vargas’ quality also pushed back Maxi Pereira, and suddenly Peru were well in the game, having simply played defensive, direct football in the first half. Vargas had a couple of efforts that tested Muslera, and then late on his cross found Guerrero at the near post, who headed wide.

Conclusion

A little more excitement here, but there’s still been relatively little tactical interest from the Copa America – we’re still waiting for a game to be won through strategy, or for a manager to change things drastically from the bench. This was a decent game, but basically just the stronger side playing well and then struggling in front of goal, against an underdog getting men behind the ball and then hitting it long for the frontman.

Penelope

15楼参考译文：占位

pedro

小组赛首轮战，仅有智利队打进2球。火热的南美足球热情，在阿根廷寒冷天气里还没高涨起来。

pedro

乌秘之战，很开放的，谁赢都很正常的。但是，令人印象很深的一点，还是弗兰一脚任意球直接打门，那么远距离质量特高，弗兰仍很老辣，要不是秘鲁守门员神级发挥，就进了

Alex2011

Argentina and Brazil stutter out of the blocks at the Copa América

Both teams have tactical and selections issues to resolve after being held to draws in their opening games



Both Argentina and Brazil lacked cohesion in their opening-match draws at the Copa América. Photograph: Martin Acosta/Leo La Valle/Reuters/EPA

After a week of sporting gloom for Argentina, at last in La Plata on Sunday there came something to lift the mood. The misery began with River Plate's relegation, continued with Argentina's disjointed draw with Bolivia in the Copa América, and reached its nadir on Sunday when Argentina's women's hockey team lost a shoot-out to the Netherlands in the final of the Champions Trophy. Only then did there come a break in the clouds, as Brazil also began their Copa campaign with a disappointing draw, failing to score against a youthful but disciplined Venezuela.

In part, the pitch in the Estadio Unico may be to blame. The grass is longer than ideal, and a close look reveals a bumpy surface given a misleading sheen by piles of green sand. The ball didn't run smoothly, and that perhaps affected the rhythm of both sides. Nonetheless, both Argentina and Brazil have significant issues to resolve if they're to win the tournament.

It would be easy, in focusing on the two giants' shortcomings, to neglect how well Bolivia and – in particular – Venezuela played. Venezuela has never been a football country – it's won three times as many Miss Universe contests than it has matches at the Copa América – but reaching the quarter-final on home soil four years ago has given the sport a boost and qualification for the finals of the World Under-20 championship two years ago brought a number of young players to prominence.

Tomás Rincón, the Hamburg midfielder, was exceptional on Sunday, breaking up Brazilian attacks and carrying the ball forward with verve and imagination. Oswaldo Vizcarrondo, long-haired and muscular, was commanding in the centre of defence, while Renny Vega was quick off his line and surprisingly effective with his one-handed takes. They rode their luck to an extent in the first half, Pato hitting the bar for Brazil and numerous shots being blocked with desperate challenges, but in the second they were rarely troubled.

That fact, the way Brazil lost their way after half-time, is probably the biggest concern for Mano Menezes. In the first half Neymar was lively, if a little inclined to over-complicate; in the second he vanished. Ganso, in just his second appearance for the national team, struggled to make an impression, and seemed at times to be playing too far forward, so he was always receiving the ball under pressure. Pato, operating as a more orthodox No9 than might have been expected, was the pick of the forwards, one touch in taking down a long diagonal from Dani Alves quite sublime, but Robinho flickered to little effect.

Argentina had similar problems on Friday. Sergio Batista's talk of making Argentina play like Barcelona always seemed over-ambitious – trying to create the work of a decade in a fortnight – and so it proved. Lionel Messi may have played as he does for Barça, but it didn't matter, because Ezequiel Lavezzi, Carlos Tevez, Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso didn't play much like David Villa, Pedro, Andrés Iniesta and Xavi. Nor did – or can – Javier Zanetti and Marcos Rojo offer the sort of thrust from full-back provided by Dani Alves and Eric Abidal.

Batista criticised his team for becoming "too vertical" – a term, if not coined by Marcelo Bielsa then at least popularised by him, describing the tendency to head directly for goal, whether with long passes, dribbles or runs, rather than patiently building play. It usually suggests a lack of patience, a sense of anxiety, and Brazil could be said to have suffered the same problem (which isn't, of course, a million miles removed from a succession of England coaches lamenting the long-ball, headless-chicken tendency). Too many players tried to solve the problem individually, every dribble down a blind alley, every aimless cross, signifying a lack of faith in the team unit. That touches on a deeper issue – the growing gulf, both in terms of quality and entertainment, between club and international football.

A recognition of the bigger picture is of little use to Batista and Menezes, though. Both must energise their sides ahead of ostensibly tougher games later this week: Argentina face Colombia in Santa Fe on Wednesday; Brazil play Paraguay in Cordoba on Saturday. Batista seems likely to rejig his forward line, probably with Sergio Agüero, scorer of the superb equaliser on Friday, coming in. But does he replace Lavezzi, who was poor on Friday but has linked well with Messi in the past, or Tevez, who was equally ineffective, but whose popularity with the fans was demonstrated by the volume of the cheer when his name was announced? He may also change the make-up of the midfield, and introduce Angel Di María in a relatively deep role to offer a little more creative drive.

Menezes faces similar dilemmas. When he substituted Robinho and Neymar, the decisions were met by booing; dare he risk public wrath by leaving either out next Saturday? Neymar's first-half performance – which was enough to win him the nonsense that is the man-of-the-match award (which might more honestly be renamed the most-famous-attacking-player award) – should be enough for him to retain his place, but Elano could come in for Robinho and Ganso may find his position under threat.

In practical terms, the stuttering starts made by the two giants shouldn't matter. Assuming both finish in the top two, they can't meet in either quarter- or semi-finals, and it's fair to assume the organisers are desperate for a third straight Brazil-Argentina final. Bolivia and Venezuela, though, offer a reminder that there's more to South America than the big two.


Posted by Jonathan Wilson in La Plata Monday 4 July 2011 10.10 BST guardian.co.uk

Alex2011

19楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Chile 2-1 Mexico: Borghi’s change in formation prompts Chile’s comeback
智利2-1墨西哥：博尔基变阵提示智利回归3313
July 6, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chile recovered from 1-0 down to record a 2-1 victory in an excellent contest.

Claudio Borghi lined up with a 3-4-1-2 formation containing various players who are familiar from last year’s World Cup, and there were no major selection surprises.

Like Costa Rica, Mexico are competing with an Olympic squad in this tournament, and assistant manager Luis Fernando Tena is in charge. He played a 3-5-2, with Giovani dos Santos just behind Rafael Marquez Lugo, not to be confused with the more established Rafael Marquez.

This was the first game of the tournament that has provided real tactical interest. With both sides playing three at the back, it was an unusual and interesting match-up of formations.

Formation match-up

Tena instructed his midfield to play with one man deeper, Diego Reyes, who broadly tracked Mati Fernandez across the pitch. There were then two midfielders slightly further forward against two Chile holders, which meant that the battle in the central midfield saw each player occupied, 3 v 3. With the two sides both playing wing-backs, who competed against each other, plus 3 v 2 situations at either end, the game had an unusual but simple feel.

Chile were the more proactive side, retaining many of the pressing qualities that were a hallmark of Marcelo Bielsa’s reign. They conceded their first foul after just three seconds of the match because of some over-eager closing down, and Fernandez moved forward to join the two strikers and press 3 v 3 when Luis Michel had the ball.

Chile attacking intent

As we’ve become accustomed to, they also played an open, attacking game with the ball that saw plenty of forward runs, plus lateral movement from the two creative players, Fernandez and Alexis Sanchez. Their game was all about trying to create angles for clever neat passing between the lines, and a couple of fantastic moves produced good chances for Humberto Suazo, who moved from side to side and was always in a position to get on the end of moves.

Their football is less direct and more patient than under Bielsa, and there is much less natural width upfront – Sanchez now plays a support striker, like at Udinese, whilst Jean Beausejour is fielded deeper, as a wing-back rather than an outside-left. The combinations on the opposite side are generally more promising – Sanchez can move out to the right and combine with his Udinese teammate Marucio Isla, whilst Pablo Contreras plays an amazingly energetic role for a right-sided centre-back, often overlapping Isla to allow him inside.

Mexico were pressed into their own half of the pitch and rarely constructed good moves. With the three midfield players closed down quickly and the wing-backs a little slow to get forward, there was a huge gap between the midfield and the two forwards, who had to fend for themselves – their only promising moments in open play came when Giovani dos Santos got on the ball and ran with pace, as he did so brilliantly in the Gold Cup final. Still, their man chance of a goal was from a set-piece, and that’s where it came from, through Nestor Araujo.

Second half


On 60 minutes, Borghi changed shape

Like so many of the favourites in this competition, Chile were dominating possession but struggling for goals, and Borghi waited 15 minutes before making a substitution, bringing on Esteban Paredes for Beausejour. This meant a change of shape as Chile went make to an (even more) attacking version of the 3-3-1-3 that Bielsa loved – more like 3-1-3-3, in fact. Arturo Vidal, who didn’t have the influence on the game one might have expected in the centre of midfield, came to the left and cut inside to act as a third central midfielder, whilst Paredes played as a left-sided striker (rather than a winger) and Sanchez moved slightly to the right.

The impact of this shape was obvious – Mexico no longer had a spare man at the back, with Chile placing three forwards up against the Mexican back three. Because of that (or, to look at it another way, because Chile no longer had numerical superiority in midfield), Borghi’s side played much more direct with the ball, and the Mexican back three had immediate difficulties facing the longer passing. Paul Aguilar tried to play a little bit deeper, but this would have been a good time for Mexico to be able to shift between a back three and a back four, as their ’senior’ national side does so well.

Chile’s two goals came within 13 minutes of the change in shape. Granted, both came from corners (a notable feature of this tournament), and therefore it wasn’t the different combinations in open play that unlocked the Mexican defence. However, the increased pressure and more direct passing certainly had an impact, and the corners were both won by the restored Isla-Sanchez combination down the right, with the latter playing wider.

Conclusion

Chile were by far the most positive side we’ve seen in the competition so far, and it was amazing that they managed to find themselves a goal down at half time, because their proactive play without the ball had limited Mexico to very few chances.

The 3-4-1-2 actually suits Chile very well considering Sanchez’s move from being a winger to a second striker over the past twelve months, and will probably work better later in the competition. Here, however, they were up against a back three that was in a good position to nullify Chile, with a spare man at the back, and therefore it made sense to revert to a modified version of the old 3-3-1-3.

With such an unfamiliar squad, no-one was sure what shape Mexico would play, so Borghi can’t be blamed for not starting with that system, and should be praised for the attack-minded change – it is the best individual decision of the Copa America so far.

Alex2011

21楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

很有意思，智利队新教练，在搞了60分钟的3412后，又回归到贝尔沙的3313老路来了

Penelope

Argentina 0-0 Colombia: another goalless draw阿根廷0-0哥伦比亚：主队破门乏术，又是一场0平局
July 7, 2011


The starting line-ups

The third 0-0 from seven Copa America games so far, as Argentina again struggled.

Sergio Batista made one change from the opening day 0-0 against Bolivia. Marcos Rojo dropped out, with Pablo Zabaleta coming in on the right. Javier Zanetti moved to the left.

Hernan Dario Gomez also made a single change, bringing in Carlos Sanchez for Gutavo Bolivar, a straight swap in midfield.

Argentina had much of the play but failed to create enough chances to get the breakthrough, a common feature of this tournament. Colombia sat back and played on the break, and deserved their point.

Tactics v Messi

Colombia’s first task, of course, was to stop Lionel Messi. Unlike in the opening game against Bolivia, where was up against two holding players, here he was up against a sole deep-lying midfielder who looked to track his movement into deep positions, and therefore had to be more intelligent with his movement, diagonally moving away from goal to collect the ball.

The Colombian centre-backs rarely followed Messi – with the exception of one occasion when Luis Perea came out and harried him in midfield – they instead focused upon sitting deep, not allowing Carles Tevez or Ezequiel Lavezzi to find space in the back four.

With Messi-minding left to Sanchez, this meant that Argentina had 4 v 3 in the midfield when Messi moved deep, a situation they didn’t take full advantage of. A slight problem with a 4-1-4-1 is that when the holding midfielder is taken away from the centre (or if he departs completely, like Pepe in the Champions League semi-final first leg) and the midfield doesn’t drop deeper, there can often be too much space between the lines. Neither Ever Banega nor Esteban Cambiasso moved into that ‘red zone’ often enough – it was (surprisingly) the latter who did find himself in space there on 30 minutes, but Argentina didn’t play the ball to him.

Argentina disjointed

Colombia’s tactics higher up the pitch worked excellently. They let Nicolas Burdisso and Gabriel Milito have time on the ball, confident that neither are technically proficient enough to provide clever passes from the back. Instead, they dropped deep into their own half and pressed as soon as the ball was played into midfield, forcing Cambiasso and Javier Mascherano to return the ball to the back. The two Colombian wide players tracked the full-back, where there was less overlapping than in the first game, with Zabaleta not a great attacker, and Zanetti on the ‘wrong’ flank (albeit somewhere where he is comfortable).

Argentina’s best chance of a goal came from the same method as in the first game – Messi moving deep, then slipping the ball for Lavezzi between Mario Yepes and Pablo Armero. Again, Lavezzi’s movement was good but his end product was poor. On the opposite flank, Tevez still looks unsuited to that wide role – having played as a false nine all season, he seems more comfortable receiving the ball with his back to goal and moving towards play – and with Messi doing broadly the same thing, Argentina’s only real method of penetration was from Lavezzi.

Colombia breaks

Colombia were threatening throughout the game on the counter-attack, particularly with the two wide players moving inside and the full-backs overlapping – both Armero and Juan Zuniga have been very impressive in the two Colombia games in the competition so far. Argentina’s defence looks incredibly prone to pace – and considering Argentina are generally on the attack, Gabriel Milito and Nicolas Burdisso are high up the pitch, leaving lots of space in behind. Their first reaction when Argentina lose the ball is to back off quickly towards their own goal, which in turn leaves Mascherano stranded and forced to cover a lot of space by himself. It’s rather surprising that Argentina haven’t conceded a goal from open play in this tournament yet.

Batista tried to change things in the second half, first with Fernando Gago and Sergio Aguero straight swaps for Cambiasso and Lavezzi, then with Gonzalo Higuain on for Banega, and more of a 4-2-1-3. Argentina didn’t really get any better, and Batista will surely be forced into changes for the final game of the group phase.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming match – the tactical interest here came from Colombia’s tactics. The way they pressed the ball coming into midfield worked well, and by not allowing their centre-backs to be dragged out of the back, Argentina rarely looked likely to break through their defence.

Argentina’s side was almost unchanged from the first game, and their problems remain the same.

Penelope

24楼参考译文
------------------------

阿根廷 0-0 哥伦比亚：破门乏术，阿根廷继续沉沦
July 7, 2011

两队首发

截止至目前的七场美洲杯比赛中的第三场平局，阿根廷依然没能找回自己的强队风范。

相比揭幕战对阵玻利维亚时的阵容，塞尔吉奥-巴蒂斯塔只做出了一处变动。尼古拉斯-罗霍无缘首发，帕布罗-萨巴莱塔出任右边后卫。哈维尔-萨内蒂则被换到了左闸位置。

埃尔南-达里奥-戈麦斯同样有一处调整，在中场用卡洛斯-桑切斯直接取代了与其位置相同的古塔沃-玻利瓦尔。

阿根廷在控球时间上占据了很大优势，但却并未创造出多少打破僵局的机会，这也是本届杯赛迄今几场的普遍特征之一。哥伦比亚则采取了稳守反击的策略，他们的表现配得上这场平局。

遏制梅西

哥伦比亚的首要任务无疑是遏制梅西的发挥。与首战玻利维亚时被两名后腰夹击不同，此次他所要应付的是一名专职的拖后中场，其任务便是在他回撤时保持如影随形，因此，他必须以更加聪明的跑动方式，沿斜线方向远离球门拿球。

除了路易斯-佩雷亚的一次中场破坏之外，哥伦比亚中后卫几乎从不紧逼梅西，相反，他们专注于收缩防守，不给卡洛斯-特维斯和埃泽奎尔-拉维奇留下在四名后卫之间觅得空当的机会。

在桑切斯一心盯防梅西的情况下，只要梅西回撤，阿根廷即可形成中场四打三的局面，但这一优势并未得到他们的充分利用。四一四一阵型中一个细微的问题是：若单后腰被带离中路（或与中场其他球员完全脱节，例如欧冠半决赛首回合中的佩佩），且其他中场球员没有随之后移，则中场首尾之间便会出现严重的真空。但埃维尔-巴内加和伊斯特班-坎比亚索出现在此“危险区域”里的次数却都不够多——而当第三十分钟，后者在这里跑出空当的时候，队友们又（令人诧异的）没有及时送上传球。

阿根廷混乱无章

哥伦比亚的前场战术效果显著。他们放任尼古拉斯-布尔迪索和加布里埃尔-米利托拿球，自信此二人皆不具备从后场策动攻势的技术水准。相反，他们稳守本方半场，一旦球至中场便立刻展开紧逼，迫使坎比亚索和哈维尔-马斯切拉诺回传防线。两名哥伦比亚边路球员时刻跟住对方边后卫，鉴于萨巴莱塔攻击力有限，而萨内蒂处在“逆边”（尽管他在这里踢得非常舒服），这两个位置的插上次数比第一场有所下降。

阿根廷最好的一次进球机会来自于和首场如出一辙的战术——梅西回撤，将球塞给正好处在马里奥-耶佩斯和帕布罗-阿梅罗之间的拉维奇。拉维奇的跑位照旧不错，可惜机会再次断送在了他的临门一脚上。另一侧，特维斯依然未能适应边路的位置——整季都担任伪九号的他看起来更习惯于背身拿球后再向前推进——而梅西的技术特点也是如此，于是，拉维奇就成了阿根廷唯一的冲击力来源。

哥伦比亚的反击

整场比赛里，哥伦比亚的反击一直都颇具威胁，尤其是当边前卫内收，边后卫插上的时候——截止至目前，阿梅罗和胡安-祖尼加在哥伦比亚的两场比赛中均发挥得十分出色。阿根廷的防线在速度面前显得极为脆弱——而且，由于阿根廷在大部分时间里都是进攻一方，加布里埃尔-米利托和尼古拉斯-布尔迪索的站位相当靠前，在身后留下了大片的空间。一旦阿根廷失去球权，两人的第一反应便是迅速撤向球门，而马斯切拉诺则会因此被置于只能独当一面的困境之中。本届杯赛开幕至今，阿根廷还没有在运动战中失球其实是一个相当诡异的现象。

下半场，巴蒂斯塔试图作出调整，先是用费尔南多-加戈和塞尔吉奥-阿奎罗换下对位的坎比亚索和拉维奇，继而又派冈萨洛-伊瓜因上场顶替巴内加，使阵型更接近于四二一三。然而，阿根廷的表现并未有任何实质性的提升，小组赛最后一场，巴蒂斯塔必须让一切有所改变。

结论

又（为什么是又）一场无趣的比赛——值得一提的战术现象多来自哥伦比亚一方。他们在球至中场时的施压策略收效很好，此外，其中后卫从不轻易离开自己位置的策略让阿根廷鲜有撕破其防守的机会。

与首场比赛相比，阿根廷队几乎没有任何变化，一切问题照旧存在。