【10-11 ZM专贴】280L：替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

Alex2011

Juventus 0-1 Milan: leaders win poor game
March 5, 2011

The starting line-ups

Rino Gattuso’s scrappy goal settled a game lacking in creativity.
Gigi Delneri made various changes, with Gianluigi Buffon, Armand Traore, Luca Toni and Frederik Sorensen all coming into the side, in the usual 4-4-2.
Max Allegri was without Pato, so Antonio Cassano started alongside Zlatan Ibrahimovic, with Kevin-Prince Boateng just behind.
Many big Serie A games this season have been underwhelming because they’ve been slow, cagey and defensive. The surprise here was that the match was quite open from the start – but that didn’t translate into an entertaining contest. Neither side played good football in the final third, and the messy nature of the winning goal summed up the match.

Melo on Boateng
Milan had their usual problem – evident recently against Tottenham – when their trequartista is marked out of the game, they struggle to get the ball forward to their strikers and therefore become a broken team. Boateng has generally played very well for Milan since joining them last summer, but Felipe Melo did a good job on him (Melo seems to be at his best when tracking a specific man – he did a similarly good job on Wesley Sneijder last month), and Milan were too slow in possession.
With Melo staying goalside of Boateng, Juve’s wide players had to come inside to help out Claudio Marchisio, for otherwise he would be subject to a 1 v 3 situation in the centre of the park against Milan’s three central midfielders. They generally did this quite well, though the knock-on effect was that the Milan full-backs were free to overlap.

Full-backs poor on ball
There was little technical quality from full-back, though, and what the game needed was some drive from that position, some purposeful running or a player willing to take on opponents. Neither of Milan’s pair did this, and Juventus’ weren’t much better (they also had no direct opponent when in possession) – Sorensen was often having to keep an eye on Cassano, who moved out to his side, whilst Traore got forward but his final ball was generally poor. Luca Toni and Alessandro Matri did little of note, but then they had no service. Playing those two in a 4-4-2 and then failing to cross accurately is a disaster.
Milos Krasic was Juventus’ most promising attacking player, but Milan were very quick to get bodies around him, and often crowded him out when in possession. Mark van Bommel did his usual job of breaking up play ahead of his own defence – committing an amazing number of fouls and stopping quick Juve breaks.
At the other end, it was notable how tightly Juventus’ defenders stuck to the Milan strikers – tracking them all over the pitch. Giorgio Chiellini on Ibrahimovic was the most obvious case here, and it’s likely he felt able to do this because (with Melo tracking Boateng), there were no midfield runners looking to exploit that space.

Second half
The only change for the start of the second half was Boateng off and Robinho on, which created a more fluid front three for Milan, with Robinho playing high up the pitch in close contact with the front two.
The second period was no improvement on the first, though there was least a goal. It came from an unlikely source – Gattuso – and the surprise element probably caught Juventus out – especially as the centre-backs had been so willing to vacate their natural position in the first half. Buffon still should have done better with the shot, though.
Substitutions barely affected the game – Alessandro del Piero and Vincenzo Iaquinta came on, but Milan retained possession well – van Bommel was important here, often free in the centre of the pitch – and they saw the game out.

Conclusion
Both sides were extremely disappointing. Both had numerical advantages in different areas of the pitch, but neither side could take advantage of these situations enough to consistently offer a goalscoring threat. In particular, the full-backs offered little going forward, and the quality of those four players is simply extremely poor for a game of his magnitude.
Juve have now lost three league games in a row, and haven’t scored in any of them – has Delneri’s 4-4-2 has become too predictable and too easy to play against? It’s notable that Juventus have only scored more than two goals in a game once in 2011, and that was the only game they’ve started with a significantly different shape – a 4-1-4-1 against Cagliari.
That’s a very basic analysis and Juventus’ problems are more complex than that, but having lost seven of their last 11, it is ‘back to basics’ time.

Alex2011

Man City 1-0 Wigan: City start strongly, but half-time change in mentality nearly costs them
March 5, 2011

The starting line-ups (Silva and Balotelli switched throughout)

David Silva scored the only goal of the game in a slow contest.

Roberto Mancini left Edin Dzeko on the bench. Nigel de Jong was also a substitute, so Patrick Vieira played in midfield, whilst Pablo Zabaleta started rather than Aleksandar Kolarov at left-back.
Roberto Martinez left out Charles N’Zogbia, playing Tom Cleverley on the left, and Victor Moses on the right. Adrian Lopez replaced Steve Gohouri at right-back.
The first half was strange – City dominated and should have been more than one goal up by half-time – and yet they relied on a terrible error from Ali Al-Habsi for their goal. Wigan were content to sit back and play on the break, which they did reasonably well, but were often let down by one of their front four making the wrong decision with the ball.

City tactics
City were an attack-minded 4-2-3-1, with Yaya Toure the closest support to Carlos Tevez for most of the game. In theory, the two wide players dropped back into midfield to form two banks of four when Wigan attacked, but because the away side only did so on the counter, it was rare that City actually had to take up that defensive shape.
Instead, the two City wide players were free to take up attacking positions for most of the game – although neither stayed on the flanks. They both drifted inside and frequently swapped positions – both seemed to prefer playing on the left, up against Lopez, who also made a mistake for the goal. Mario Balotelli caused early problems with a shot very similar to his recent goal against Fulham, whilst David Silva started from a narrow position and looked to work one-twos with the other City players, frequently finding himself in goalscoring positions, but only occasionally shooting.

Lack of fluency
On twelve minutes (12:44, to be precise) – five seconds of football summed up why City aren’t cohesive in their system yet. Tevez dropped deeper than the attacking band of three to pick up the ball, but then when he looked for one of them to make a forward run, all three moved towards the ball in unison. That epitomises why City often dominate games but score fewer goals than that dominance would indicate – they need more drive from midfield runners, especially if they have a false nine able to create space in the opposition defence.
Mancini may have regretted playing Zabaleta at left-back in the first half, because City needed their full-backs stretching the play and expanding the active playing zone when they had long spells of possession. Zabaleta is a good player but his speciality is not getting down the touchline, especially when used on the left. Still, despite that problem, City managed to create chances.
Wigan also created chances on the break in the first half. With Silva and Balotelli slow to get behind the ball, often City defended with only six players, which left them vulnerable to cut backs from wide positions, and players arriving late in the box. City also committed a high number of fouls when Wigan looked to get the ball forward quickly, which resulted in bookings for Micah Richards and Gareth Barry. Other than that, the midfield battle was fairly tame.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Second half
The game changed completely at the start of the second half. Mancini instructed Yaya Toure to move from an attacking midfield position to a holding role alongside Patrick Vieira – similar to the change in position Toure made at half-time in the 0-0 draw away at Arsenal. City were much more cautious in the second half, and as a result had to endure long spells of Wigan pressure – unthinkable in the first period.
Wigan were more attacking. There was more emphasis upon ball retention rather than playing merely on the counter-attack, although obviously this was also a reaction to City’s strategy. As a result, they got more men forward – particularly the full-backs, and had a couple of good efforts on goal.

Changes
Mancini again changed his system when City looked rocky, reverting to the system with Toure just off Tevez in a 4-2-3-1. City couldn’t completely snap out of the more defensive mindset, however. In general this season, they’ve been able to switch to a deeper approach midway through the game, but have struggled when asked to move up the pitch in order to be more offensive.
N’Zogbia was introduced down the right for Wigan and was an immediate threat, so Mancini brought on Kolarov for Balotelli, to sit ahead of Zabaleta.
The final twenty minutes of the game lacked any urgency or creativity, with so many substitutions (and changes in strategy) killing momentum. City seemed to have brought the game to a close when they brought on de Jong for Silva and packed the midfield – but Wigan did have late chances, and will feel they should have picked up a point.

Conclusion
In basic terms, job done for Manchester City – but they laboured to victory having started positively. Mancini was too cautious after half time and invited pressure unnecessarily. They won a very high percentage of their duels throughout the match, though:

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

If this game was at the beginning of the season, Martinez would have been pleased with the performance – but the time has come where Wigan need to be picking up points. They may have been outplayed for much of the game, but they should have scored at least once, and they goal they conceded was a horrendous goalscoring mistake.

Alex2011

Liverpool 3-1 Manchester United: Kuyt x 3
March 6, 2011

The starting line-ups

Dirk Kuyt scored all three goals in a comfortable victory for Liverpool.
Andy Carroll was fit enough only for the bench, so Kuyt and Luis Suarez played upfront. Daniel Agger was out, and Kenny Dalglish moved to four at the back, after last weekend’s poor performance with a back three at West Ham.
Sir Alex Ferguson surprisingly named a 4-4-2 shape. Darren Fletcher dropped to the bench, Ryan Giggs came in and Nani switched flanks. Wes Brown replaced the suspended Nemanja Vidic.
Dirk Kuyt’s goals may have been remarkably simple, but he fully deserved to be the hero because of his excellent all-round display that was the main reason Liverpool played so well.

Early exchanges
Liverpool started much better – their movement was fantastic, their passing was slick. Steven Gerrard played a reserved role in the central midfield zone, just ahead of Lucas, but the four players ahead of those two had the license to move around the pitch, rotating positions and constantly catching United’s defence out.
Kuyt was the man who instigated many of these good moves with his movement to the flanks. His discipline and ability to ‘play a position well’ have been most obvious when playing out on the right in a Liverpool shirt, but since Kenny Dalglish took charge in January, Kuyt’s lone striker performances have been very good – at home to Stoke and away at Chelsea he was also one of the key players.

Kuyt opens up space
United’s two centre-backs – particularly Chris Smalling – were too keen to track Kuyt into deep positions, which opened up space at the heart of the defence. This space was exploited by plenty of runners – most notably Suarez, who played in the hole and ran directly towards goal, but also Raul Meireles from the right, who cut in and found himself in centre-forward positions.
At one point Smalling was seen encouraging his defence to move higher up the pitch, but United’s high line actually made them more vulnerable to the combination of Kuyt’s movement and runners from midfield. Ferguson famously got the better of Roma’s revolutionary 4-6-0 (with Francesco Totti pioneering the false nine role) by using his defence very deep – that might’ve been the answer here, with Kuyt dragging the defenders all over the pitch. His movement was usually towards the flanks:

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Midfield battle
United weren’t set up to cope with midfield runners. The combination of Michael Carrick and Paul Scholes has rarely been used this season – having been exposed to Chelsea’s power in the second half in midweek, here they lacked energy. Darren Fletcher was on the bench having been used on the right at Stamford Bridge – there are still questions over whether he can do two ‘big’ matches in a short space of time given the energetic nature of his game, but he might have been useful here.
Indeed, United’s shape didn’t work as a whole. With Suarez playing in a deep role, Liverpool found it too easy to manoeuvre the ball through midfield towards their forwards. When Scholes and Carrick dropped deeper, they opened up space for Lucas and Gerrard. Until this week, Ferguson has been extremely committed to using 4-5-1 in ‘big’ games – it’s surprising that he has used 4-4-2 in two of his toughest away fixtures of the season.

United flat
United had much less movement from their forward four. Nani and Ryan Giggs often stayed wide and didn’t combine with the front two, though when they came inside, they were dealt with by Gerrard and Lucas. That opened up space for Carrick and Scholes – but their natural inclination is to hit balls to the flanks, which were now deserted. It was difficult to know how United should have gone about improving their game – more movement from the strikers would have been a start, but overall Liverpool coped well with everything United had to offer.
Individual battles were less important than the contrasting quality of movement and interplay. Meireles against Evra was an interesting duel, however – the Portuguese midfielder isn’t at his best out on that flank, but twice this season he’s subdued Evra and prevented him from overlapping and stretching the play.

Changes
Liverpool dealt admirably with the injury to Fabio Aurelio, which resulted in a complete reshuffle of their back four.
United were forced to bring on Javier Hernandez because of Nani’s injury, meaning Giggs went to the right and Rooney came to the left. Both those players wanted to come inside – Glen Johnson, now at left-back, was happy with Giggs coming onto his stronger foot, but Jamie Carragher, now at right-back, showed Rooney inside for shots too often.

Second half
Hernandez threatened with his movement inside the box – his outpaced Sotirios Kyrgiakos to a cross having pulled wide in opening minutes of the second half, and popped up for a late consolation goal. United had a decent spell just after half time, but in truth they were poor for much of the game – lacking creativity and confidence.
Liverpool sat back in two banks of four and soaked up pressure. That’s something they’ve done well all season – even when they were playing badly under Hodgson, a good defensive performance earned them a deserved win over Chelsea, and another should have resulted in a win on the opening day against Arsenal. They remain well-drilled when penned into their own third, and their biggest worry was how many free-kicks they conceded in and around the box. Liverpool’s tackling in their own half was actually quite poor – see Lucas’ tackling chalkboard below – but their defensive shape was excellent.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

After Kuyt’s third goal, the game was essentially over, and the subsequent substitutions had little impact.

Conclusion
Better movement and interplay from Liverpool’s front players was the key here. Kuyt v Berbatov was an interesting comparison – and not just in terms of work rate. Kuyt’s pure energy was combined with intelligent movement to provide a better focal point for Liverpool’s attacks. The goals may have simple, but the Dutchman’s all-round performance was superb.

Alex2011

Barcelona v Arsenal: tactical preview
March 8, 2011


Possible starting line-ups

In terms of injuries, this is a strangely similar situation to the second leg at the Nou Camp last year.

Barcelona went into that game with Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol unavailable (the same as today) – whilst Arsenal were without Alex Song, and had various attacking players out injured, or half-fit. The surprise inclusion of Robin van Persie in the travelling squad, and the likelihood that Cesc Fabregas will start after a recovering from a short injury means the similarity may apply slightly less to Arsenal. They are in a stronger position than last year.
That also applies to the tie as whole, of course. Arsenal went to the Nou Camp needing to score last year – here they would be content with a 0-0. Not that anyone expects that scoreline, though, and even Arsene Wenger said yesterday that “It is a little bit of an illusion to go to Barcelona and think they will not score at all.” Arsenal will need goals.
With so many injuries, the tactical element of the build-up is dictated by replacements and how that will affect the sides’ way of playing.

Barcelona selection
The absence of both Barcelona’s first-choice centre-backs means a mini-crisis for Pep Guardiola. Last year’s combination at the back was Rafael Marquez and Gabriel Milito, but today he looks set to turn to Eric Abidal and Sergio Busuqets. Abidal has been excellent in recent weeks in Puyol’s absence, and with Arsenal missing Theo Walcott, Guardiola won’t be as worried about not having Abidal’s pace at left-back (although, in fairness, Maxwell did well in the first leg).
Busquets has filled in admirably at the back when called upon in the past few months. Often this has been as part of a back three – see last week’s win over Valencia – but he can also play in the centre of the back four. In fact, if Arsenal start van Persie, Busquets might be the perfect man to deal with him. The Dutchman will look to wander into deep positions, and Busquets will happily track him into his more natural deep midfield position. The pace of Abidal would deal with onrushing Arsenal midfielders.
Perhaps the more crucial effect is that Javier Mascherano will start as the holding midfielder. Having looked completely unsuited to Barca’s football at the start of the season, the ex-Liverpool player has played well in recent weeks. He will have a big job here – he must break up counter-attacks without picking up a booking (that completely destroys his game) and his distribution must be tidy. Busquets may step out from the back to provide a better passing option from midfield.

Arsenal selection
The absence of Alex Song – and Wenger’s statement that he won’t use Jack Wilshere as the deepest midfielder – means a choice between Abou Diaby and Denilson. Diaby would bring physicality, but his understanding with Wilshere is highly questionable. Denilson played well against Barcelona last year – his introduction in the first leg last year really helped Arsenal because he was able to retain possession – and this might be the right kind of game for him.
Fabregas looks likely to start, but van Persie is more doubtful. The choice to replace him would be between Marouane Chamakh and Nicklas Bendtner. Chamakh started the season well but has suffered from a severe loss of confidence recently – something that Bendtner is unlikely to encounter – and the Dane did fairly well at the Nou Camp last year, opening the scoring and leading the line well. He seems a more likely bet.
Unusually for Wenger, his choice of wide players may be heavily dictated by Barcelona’s full-backs. Samir Nasri did a superb job against Dani Alves in the first game – that was emphasised by the fact that when Arshavin came on and played on the left (with Nasri moving inside) Alves was suddenly much more of a force, and Arshavin’s defensive clumsiness resulted in him handballing inside the penalty area when trying to track the Brazilian. Therefore, Nasri is probably the man to start on the left.
Arshavin is very rarely deployed on the right – but in last year’s first leg at the Emirates he was, in order for Arsenal to use his technical ability without exposing him to Alves. Arsenal might be better off with Eboue on the right, however – he provides energy and pace on the break, as well as more defensive discipline.

Strategy
The tactical factors for the game are almost entirely the same as outlined in the preview for the first leg of this tie. How high Arsenal defend is a crucial factor – the high line worked well in the first game, despite conceding a couple of chances to Barcelona through runs in behind the defence. It wouldn’t be a surprise to see Arsenal defend slightly deeper, and again selection and fitness will be an issue – if Arsenal are nursing half-fit players, they won’t be able to press relentlessly.

Arsenal learnt their first leg lesson – how to press – their second leg task is how to stop Lionel Messi. The truth is that it’s impossible to stop him completely, but Arsenal played into his hands last year with their 4-3-3 system – Messi simply drifted from side to side to evade Denilson, and constantly found space.
In that review, ZM noted that a 4-2-3-1 shape would have helped Arsenal – “But the real issue must be Wenger’s decision to play a 4-1-4-1 shape, with Denilson stranded in front of the defence…with Diaby pushed forward alongside Nasri, Arsenal’s defence was left exposed. Diaby’s natural game is not as a holding midfielder, but if he had played there in a 4-2-3-1 Arsenal would have been tighter in front of their defence, and given less space to Barcelona where they really like to play.”

Arsenal using a 4-2-3-1 this season means that they’re already in a better position to stop Messi.

Alex2011

Barcelona 3-1 Arsenal: Barca press and progress
March 9, 2011

The starting line-ups

Arsenal didn’t manage a single shot, as Barcelona go through to the quarter-finals.
Pep Guardiola chose Eric Abidal and Sergio Busquets at centre-back, as expected, though there was a surprise at left-back, where Adriano started over Maxwell.
Both Cesc Fabregas and Robin van Persie were fit to start. Arsene Wenger decided to play Tomas Rosicky on the right, and Abou Diaby got the nod over Denilson.
The game was very strange – neither side played as well as they can. Arsenal could barely string more than four passes together, and whilst Barcelona dominated the game, they were tremendously wasteful when they got into the penalty area.
Despite appearing extremely comfortable in the final ten minutes, Barca were somehow only a Nicklas Bendtner shot away from being dumped out, in what would have been one of the unlikeliest progressions in European Cup history.

Arsenal stand off
Arsenal played very differently without the ball, compared to the first leg. In London they pressed relentlessly at the start of the game, but here they stood off more, and focused on getting into a good shape.
The fitness of van Persie an Fabregas may have contributed to this tactic (Fabregas, in particular, was clearly not fully fit) – but Wenger probably also accepted that it’s not possible to press for 90 minutes away at the Nou Camp, and so Arsenal stood off.

Barcelona strategy
Barcelona’s tactics were not markedly different from their standard approach. The full-backs hugged the touchlines and were very advanced – often pushing Rosicky and Samir Nasri back into a back six – and the three forwards took it in turns to come towards the ball and then spin in behind. Arsenal still defended relatively high, but they were deeper than at the Emirates, and therefore were less prone to the ball over the top.
Messi was a threat throughout, and often received the ball in space, but was guilty of trying to do too much – he overran the ball when entering the penalty area on more than one occasion. Take the Arsenal back four against the Barcelona front three, and Arsenal were doing OK – the problem came, of course, from the movement of Barcelona players from deeper positions. Daniel Alves played an especially advanced role and was always on for a diagonal pass when Xavi got the ball in central midfield.

Barca pressing

Barcelona's pressing meant they won the ball high up the pitch
(courtesy TotalFootball iPhone app)

The key feature of the game was something we all know Barcelona do well – pressing. Their energy and bravery in winning the ball back high up the pitch is now very well established, but tonight was a particularly good case study. The constant harrying meant that Arsenal were simply unable to work the ball up the pitch, and almost the entire game was spent in their own half of the pitch.

Fabregas’ backheel was a ludicrous decision, but Barca’s pressing can take some of the credit. Not just because there was a player closing down and intercepting at that moment, but because the pressure for 45 minutes had created the backheel. A backheel is something that you try on the edge of the opposition box, when you’re under pressure and need to do something ‘clever’ to get past an opponent. Fabregas is far from a stupid player, but Barcelona were pressuring so much that he felt he had to do something ‘clever’ merely to complete a pass on the edge of his own penalty area.

Second half
It’s not often a side scores a goal despite not having a shot in the entire match, but Busquets’ mistimed header from a corner gave Arsenal an unlikely lead in the tie. Three minutes later, the situation changed again with van Persie’s red card, and from then on, Arsenal could only dream of winning a corner kick.
The sending off alone can not explain the Barcelona victory (20 shots to none is a ridiculous statistic) but it’s fair to say Arsenal’s strategy was compromised. Having dominated the final twenty minutes of both first legs in the past year, Arsenal’s plan may have been to wait until the final quarter of the game and then push on, especially as Barcelona had pressed so much.

Arsenal clueless
Instead, they were barely able to play football. Sky Sports’ commentator Martin Tyler summed it up inadvertently when he suggested that when Manuel Almunia had the ball in his arms, he was attempting to kick the ball downfield at an angle, so there was a chance a Barcelona player would head it out for a throw. What a miserable state to be in – a side famed for their slick passing football reduced to trying to win a throw on the half way line from a goalkeeper’s clearance. The chalkboard on the left shows how few passes Arsenal played in attacking positions.


Arsenal's passing

Barcelona simply passed and passed and tired Arsenal. Xavi broke through for the second to round off a fantastic move, and Pedro won a penalty that Messi converted. Barcelona should have had more, but Almunia was making some good saves.

Changes
It was surprising that Wenger didn’t introduce Bendtner until the 77th minute – Arsenal clearly needed someone who could win the ball in the air from long balls, and also someone who could hold it up. The late chance was a bonus and came out of nothing, other than Wilshere’s determined closing down. He was Arsenal’s best player in each of the two legs.
Guardiola’s changes came after 80 minutes, and didn’t significantly alter the game.

Conclusion
Barcelona being good at pressing is hardly a revelation, and it hardly takes a genius to identify it as a crucial factor in this game – but it was the key feature. Arsenal couldn’t get the ball up the pitch, and Barcelona won possession in positions very close to the opposition goal.

Zero attempts on goal suggests that Arsenal ‘parked the bus’ – even Inter managed one shot in their semi-final last year – but they didn’t, they were simply unable to get past the first burst of closing down.

北极海

专等LZ的ZM转帖，尤其是贴图

90哥太给力了！

pedro

81# 北极海

这场比赛双方有一些球员，还是令人失望，不堪大用

pedro

Tottenham 0-0 Milan: Spurs hang on
March 9, 2011

The starting line-ups

Milan had the majority of possession in both matches, but failed to score in 180 minutes of football.
Harry Redknapp made one change from the first game, with Luka Modric returning in place of Wilson Palacios. Gareth Bale was only fit enough for the bench.
Max Allegri named a surprisingly attacking side, even when considering this was a game Milan needed to win. Clarence Seedorf and Kevin-Prince Boateng were in a midfield three alongside Mathieu Flamini, with Robinho in the hole.
This was another strange second leg. Tottenham have the glory, and in defensive terms they played excellently. It was Milan who dominated the game, though, by outnumbering Spurs in midfield, and in that sense, Allegri probably got his tactics spot on – he simply needed more inspiration in the final third.

Two phases
Spurs’ approach had two separate phases, and it’s important to differentiate between the first period – where they tried to play football but were outplayed – and the second period, where they accepted that Milan were going to dominate possession and instead ‘parked the bus’ deep in their own half.
That may seem an unnecessary distinction, but in strategic terms it is crucial – their initial tactic failed, their plan B worked well.

Milan start strongly
Milan were a completely different side from the first leg – in personnel, and consequently in style too. They were far more comfortable in the midfield, with Rino Gattuso suspended and Thiago Silva back in his preferred position at centre-back. Seedorf surprisingly played as a deep-lying regista – the Andrea Pirlo role – and was the game’s best player, completing 20 more passes than any other midfielder. With Boateng shuttling on the left and Flamini also providing energy on the right, Milan were much more positive and creative in midfield.
Spurs couldn’t compete in that zone because they had a simple numerical disadvantage. That wasn’t a problem in the first leg for three separate reasons – (a) because they were using two holding players, (b) because they were sitting back behind the ball anyway, and (c) because Milan were so ponderous and slow on the ball in the first leg. With Spurs having less of a strong spine here, with Modric alongside Sandro, and with Milan quicker at getting the ball forward, the away side dominated.
Despite all this, Sandro was actually having a great game, as his tackling and intercepting chalkboards show.

Sandro's tackles and interceptions - courtesy TotalFootball iPhone app

Midfield battle
The problem, though was that Milan had 4 v 3 in the centre of midfield. Sandro was broadly picking up Robinho, Modric kept an eye on Flamini, and Rafael van der Vaart played around Seedorf. That left Boateng free, and he drove Milan forward for much of the first half. He also got back and doubled up with Jankulovski against Lennon. In fact, Jankulovski and Boateng worked well together at both ends of the pitch, as the Czech constantly overlapped and stretched the play early on.

Crouch failed to hold up the ball, and gave away too many free-kicks

Tottenham failed to provide much of a goal threat. This was partly because of their own faults – their transitions from defence to attack were poor and it’s difficult to remember too many promising breaks, but also because Milan were able to keep a high line. Peter Crouch was a threat whenever he got into the penalty area, but with Milan’s centre-backs keeping him high up the pitch, Crouch was only able to move forward into the box when Spurs’ wingers got into the final 20 yards.
When that happened, Crouch won everything at the back post, but it happened rarely, and so he was instead left to challenge for headers 40 yards from goal – where he frequently conceded free-kicks.

Second half
Spurs played deeper after the break, and started to look as if they were playing for a 0-0. This approach seems to suit their back four – Michael Dawson, in particular, who is a great penalty box defender but often struggles when the ball is played over his head.
This meant Milan’s movement was less effective upfront – they had less space to work in when they got into the final third. Tottenham’s lines were closer together, and Robinho faded from the game. Milan then had the problem they encountered in the first leg – with no ‘link’ player, they couldn’t connect their midfield and attack.
Tottenham sitting deep meant that Seedorf had more time on the ball, though, and he continued to impress in possession.

Milan fade
However, both Boateng and Jankulovski departed midway through the second half, and Milan were less of a threat. Alexander Merkel came on and played one excellent direct forward ball, but otherwise overhit his passes and Milan’s play became sloppy.

Seedorf was the game's best player

On the other hand, Redknapp’s changes worked well. Bale came on – he didn’t provide much attacking threat, but as a converted left-back, was comfortable playing deep and helping out defensively. Jermaine Jenas provided energy in the second half, which helped Spurs compete in the midfield zone.
Milan were unimpressive late on. A couple of quick passing moves saw both Pato and Robinho go close, but Spurs sat deep and narrow – and Milan didn’t have any width to go around them.

Conclusion
Over the course of the two legs Milan had far more possession, but Spurs defended resiliently throughout. The opening to this game suggested that Redknapp wanted to take the game to Milan, but late on the policy of sitting back was the correct one. The poor transitions meant there was no counter-attacking threat from the home side, but good performances from the two centre-backs and Sandro kept the clean sheet in tact – and that was always going to be enough to win the game.
Milan were excellent in midfield but not good enough in the final third. The one consolation is that in Seedorf, they’ve found a short-term replacement for Pirlo in that deep-lying playmaker role.

pedro

巴萨3-1枪手、矿工3-0罗马、沙尔克3-1、热刺0-0米兰

说明什么，前三支队伍，都是“宜将胜勇追穷寇、不可沽名学霸王”，换言之，就是借主场之利痛打落水狗

而热刺呢，典型实用主义，一看米兰来势汹汹，则用犀利的防守频频化解危机。

范德法特，还真不咋的。客场之战，换下他后，热刺进球了；这一次，主场换下他后，热刺的门前危机反而减少了。丫就是机会主义者，本色难改。皇马清理他，是对的，尽管他能打乱战。

反过来，米兰，若弃用伊布，至少下半场换下他，换上小组赛中主场力挽狂澜反超比分的因扎吉，或许就有戏。丫的运气差太多了

Alex2011

Statistics: FC Barcelona 3 – 1 Arsenal FC
Posted at: 11:00 on Thursday, March 10, 2011 Category: Matches, Statistics Written by: Stevenson



Arsenal were overrun by a rampant FC Barcelona in the Camp Nou on Tuesday. The final 3-1 scoreline, frankly flattering to the London side, only tells part of the story of this match. The statistics available through Total Football paint another picture of the Barcelona’s dominance in this game. Read on for the gory details!

Overall passing

Simply put, Barcelona pressed and passed Arsenal out of this match; Guardiola’s post match comment about the Arsenal players’ inability to string together more than three passes was not far off the mark. Barcelona completed 792 out of 895 attempted passes, compared to 214 out of 307 for their opponents.





Barcelona dominates the midfield

In the first match in London, Barcelona’s midfield came up against spirited opposition from Fabragas and Wilshere. In this match, there was no competition. Xavi completed 121 out of 138 attempted asses, while Iniesta completed 97 out of 108. In contrast, Fabregas only attempted 31 passes in the entire match, completing 21 of them. Wilshere was only marginally better with 27 out of 34 passes completed.









A more direct attack

One of the criticisms levelled at the Barcelona attack in the first match was about the lack of incision in its attack. And while our MVP strike force may still lack the sharpness it had in October, the team in general was much more focused on penetrating the Arsenal area than it was two weeks ago. The slide below indicates the areas where Messi received passes, graphically showing how he played this match higher on the pitch.



The draw for the next round in this competition will be on Friday, March 18. Bring on the next opponent!

Read more: http://www.totalbarca.com/2011/matches/statistics-fc-barcelona-3-1-arsenal-fc/#ixzz1GE1qEYLi

Alex2011

Schalke 3-1 Valencia: Schalke surprisingly go through after open second leg
March 10, 2011

The starting line-ups

Valencia had plenty of chances, but Schalke were more clinical.
Felix Magath made two changes from the first leg, both enforced. Sergio Escudero replaced the suspended Lukas Schmitz at left-back, whilst Mario Gavranovic came in for Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, who was out with a knee injury.
Having played a fluid system in the first leg that had no set shape, Unai Emery selected a standard 4-2-3-1 system here. The major news was that Artiz Aduriz started upfront, with Roberto Soldado on the bench.
Like all the second legs this week, this was a very open game – the tie was in the balance, but both wanted to attack.

Formations
Schalke went in with a system best defined as a 4-4-2, but there was a complex nature to the system when attacks developed. Jurado would immediately come in from the left and take up a central playmaking role, allowing Raul to move forward to become a second central striker. To solve the problem with width on the left, Peer Kluge would move towards that side of the pitch. On the other flank, Jefferson Farfan stayed much wider, and turned out to be the game’s key player.

Valencia played an attack-minded 4-2-3-1 system. They tended to press at times and sit back on other occasions – when they did defend aggressively, they often looked like 4-2-4. The wingers helped push back the Schalke defence, and Juan Mata often got a lot of space in between the lines – he played a couple of great passes.

Patterns of play
Schalke sent many crosses into the box - almost one every two minutes - mostly from the right

Partly because Valencia seemed to defend in different ways at different times, the game went through many phases. Schalke started well and focused on keeping possession of the ball in non-threatening areas before working it down the right – but then Valencia upped their game and dominated the rest of the first half. Valencia were obviously more comfortable on the ball in midfield, and when one of Schalke’s forwards was slow to get back into the midfield zone, Valencia took the most of their extra man in midfield.

There was a lack of creativity in open play, however. The goals came from set-pieces (Ricardo Costa stayed up in the area after a corner to head in, and Farfan curled in a free-kick). Jeremy Mathieu started brightly (as he had in the first game) but none of the full-backs had a consistent impact on the game.

Second half
Valencia should have scored numerous second half goals – Schalke tried to defend higher up the pitch, but Aduriz got chances on the break from balls over the top. His finishing was poor.
At the other end, having spent the game chucking crosses into the box from the right, Schalke went ahead with a scrappy goal after ball from the left. Vicente Guaita flapped at the cross, Gavranovic squeezed the ball in. Four of the first five goals in the tie had come from left-wing crosses – which was a surprise, as neither side had particularly looked to work down that side of the pitch.

Substitutions
Magath’s strategy at 2-1 was interesting – he kept both his forwards on to provide an attacking threat, and made changes in the midfield. Kyriakos Papadopoulos replaced Joel Matip in the holding role – Papadopoulos can play as a centre-back and played slightly deeper than Matip. Julien Draxler came on, and kept hold of the ball excellently.
Valencia frequently lost possession when their attackers tried to dribble past defenders on the edge of the box

Emery made three changes in ten minutes and Valencia went all-out-attack. They found spaces in the midfield and created some decent chances, but the more they pushed forward, the more Schalke got chances on the break. Gavranovic chipped the ball onto the bar from 40 yards, and eventually Farfan sealed the win. On the balance of play Valencia deserved something, but they simply missed too many chances.

Conclusion
The game was summed up by a fantastic analysis/rant from Emery after the final whistle.
“Maybe there have been games in the league where we didn’t deserve to win and that good luck deserted us this time. With everything in our favour we’ve ended up losing. It’s incomprehensible. At 1-0 up we had the game under control, with chances to hit them on the counter-attack, and then they go and equalise.
Then, in the second half, without creating much, they go 2-1 up. Then we have four chances and we don’t take any. We’ve been knocked out unjustly, we’ve missed an opportunity with everything in our favour. It was a game where we had more chances and we lost. I went back into the dressing room so disappointed that I couldn’t say anything to the players, but I have nothing to blame them for.”

Chalkboards from Total Football iPhone app

pedro

Man Utd 2-0 Arsenal: United counter excellently
曼联2-0阿森纳：红魔出色的反击
March 12, 2011


The starting line-ups 首发阵容

Both sides had their chances, but Manchester United were more clinical. 双方各自均有破门机会，但是红魔更具临门一击性。

Sir Alex Ferguson had an injury crisis in midfield, so used Rafael and Fabio da Silva on either flank, with John O’Shea alongside Darron Gibson in midfield. 弗格森爵士在用人上遭遇中场伤病危机，故此派出拉斐尔和法比奥分别打两翼，奥谢和吉布森坐镇中央。

Arsene Wenger was without Cesc Fabregas, so Denilson came into the side and Abou Diaby played further forward. Kieran Gibbs started at left-back, and Andrei Arshavin replaced Tomas Rosicky. 温格在小法缺阵时只好让德尼尔森填补这个位置，而迪亚比靠前一些。吉布斯出任左后卫，阿尔萨文代替了罗西基。

The pattern of the first half was fairly simple – Arsenal dominated possession and territory, whilst Manchester United looked to play on the break. 上半场对局相对简单明了 - 枪手在控球和地盘上具有主导地位，而红魔看起来是在反击上做文章。

Twins on the wing 双胞胎打拼两翼
In that respect, despite Manchester United’s highly unusual team selection, this was a battle we’ve seen many times before. United have overcome Arsenal in each of the previous two campaigns by playing almost exclusively on the counter-attack – think of Cristiano Ronaldo’s goal on the break at the Emirates in the 2008/09 Champions League final, or Wayne Rooney’s similarly devastating goal in the Premier League last year.
Rooney tended to take more of a back seat role in United’s breaks here, however. He dropped deep into midfield when Manchester United were without the ball, generally picking up Denilson so United weren’t outnumbered in the centre of midfield. When United won the ball, the two twins would scamper down the flanks and form a front three with Javier Hernandez, and United sometimes looked like a 4-2-1-3. This is rather like how Benfica play when Jorge Jesus fields Carlos Martins as an additional holding player, and when Javier Saviola drops off into deep positions – see the game against Schalke. Interestingly, one of the wide runners in that game was also a converted full-back, Fabio Coentrao.
The use of full-backs in wide positions also benefited Manchester United defensively. Not simply because their natural defensive qualities provided a shield ahead of their back four, but because they had the energy and positional awareness to track back and cover the wide zones. This afforded United’s full-backs license to stick to their respective men when they came inside – Patrice Evra stuck tightly to Samir Nasri and got a couple of hard tackles in, whilst Wes Brown did a similar job on Andrei Arshavin.

Arsenal strategy 枪手的对策
Arsenal played very nicely in the first half. Their movement was excellent, their passing crisp, but they suffered their old problem of not being able to create genuine goalscoring chances. Robin van Persie played right-of-centre and pulled Nemanja Vidic out of the defence – the Serb is superb when in the penalty box, but when dragged up the pitch he becomes vulnerable to pace and players going past him. Diaby provided that running, but was a little too clumsy and ponderous on the ball.
Another possible area of creativity came down Arsenal’s left. Gibbs frequently got time on the ball but his crossing was poor. Arsenal’s best chances came from a corner kick that van Persie headed wide, and from a Nasri shot that nearly caught Edwin van der Sar by surprise. Their ‘prettier’ moves came to nothing.

Second half 下半场

The line-ups for the start of the second half

Ferguson made a change for the second half, giving Antonio Valencia his comeback, with the goalscorer Fabio departing. This meant Rooney on the left, Rafael into the centre and United going 4-1-4-1, with John O’Shea ahead of the back four. Considering how well they’d played in the first half, it was a surprise to see Ferguson change his shape, but if anything he was simply playing a more extreme version of the initial strategy.
United immediately sat deeper. Their central midfielders were sometimes in amongst Arsenal’s midfielders in the first half, but here they were firmly behind play. O’Shea occupied the space between the lines and denied Arsenal time on the ball in that area.
The home side extended their advantage with another direct attack. Van der Sar passed to Valencia, who ran 50 yards with the ball, and a couple of seconds later Rooney headed home. It was not a ‘classic’ counter-attack, not one dependent on pace – but United took advantage of Arsenal being slow to get back, and Valencia’s run was more direct than anything Arsenal offered all game – he had the time on the ball Arsenal’s players weren’t afforded.

Changes 换人
Wenger’s changes were attack-minded. The deepest midfielder, Denilson, was replaced by a striker, in Marouane Chamakh. Wenger hasn’t been afraid to gamble this way in recent weeks – against Everton and against Barcelona he made a similar change and turned the game around on both occasions. It allowed van Persie to play in a permanently deeper role where he threatened straight away, winning a free-kick, but after that O’Shea played closer to him (almost a third centre-back at times) and Arsenal’s best chances came when they crossed the ball – Chamakh and substitute Tomas Rosicky should have scored from right-wing crosses.
Arsenal looked better when Denilson and Diaby were both withdrawn. There’s a time and a place for Denilson’s solid, reliable passing, but it’s when Arsenal are ahead and want to slow the game down, keeping possession. He wasn’t needed in the second half. Diaby continued to be cumbersome with the ball, and the return of Aaron Ramsey saw a Ramsey-Wilshere partnership in midfield – which might be something we see more frequently in years to come. Those two offered direct forward passing from midfield, and Arsenal had several half-chances (and better) – the finishing simply wasn’t there. Chamakh was introduced to get on the end of moves, but with one goal since November (and that was against Leyton Orient) he hardly provides the potency the rest of the team lacked.
Johan Djourou’s late injury meant Arsenal played the final ten minutes with ten men, which effectively ended the game – a shame, as it was an interesting contest throughout.

Conclusion 总结
On first glance United’s starting line-up was bizarre – seven defenders – but Ferguson managed to assemble them into a cohesive side with a clear gameplan – sit relatively deep, and use the pace of Hernandez and the da Silva twins on the break. It worked: Arsenal were always going to dominate possession, but United produced chances and could have had more than two goals, although the same could be said of Arsenal’s none.
The positioning of the twins was interesting. Brazilian full-backs are stereotypically attacking and therefore can often convert to playing as wingers with little problem, but it’s not always as simple as that. When Dani Alves has played as a winger, for example, he’s looked poor because his game is about making unspotted off the ball runs from deep.
However, Rafael and Fabio both adapted very well. They showed the expected energy and pace, but also good decision-making in the final third and a habit of getting into goalscoring positions. As Tom Williams has mentioned, there might well be a case for fielding pacey (young?) full-backs on the flanks in certain situations – it certainly worked for United here.

elite

枪手连遭2次重创，联赛还能拼吗

pedro

足总杯：怪阵奇效，曼联2-0淘汰阿森纳  
由 harbuzi 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区 http://bbs.goalhi.com/yingchao

弗格森大胆地在首发阵容中排出7名后卫的怪异阵容，最终被证明起到了好效果。依靠本场改打边前卫的巴西小将法比奥的进球和鲁尼的锦上添花，曼联2-0击败阿森纳，晋级足总杯四强。值得一提的是，去年9月受重伤的瓦伦西亚完成复出，而去年2月受重伤的拉姆塞也完成伤愈后代表阿森纳的首秀。不过比赛最后时刻，阿森纳中卫朱鲁受伤被担架抬出场外。这样，阿森纳在最近2周内，连续失掉3座杯赛奖杯的夺冠可能。不过也意味着他们将可以把全部精力放到联赛冠军的争夺中。

弗格森在首发阵容的中场放入了法比奥，拉斐尔和奥谢三名原本踢后卫的球员，吉布森与他们搭档，布朗右后卫，埃尔南德斯和鲁尼双前锋。阿森纳继续缺少受伤的法布雷加斯，阿穆尼亚顶替受伤的什琴斯尼，不过范佩西首发出场，另外吉布斯也得到机会，顶替克里希首发。

开场后双方各有机会，不过阿森纳稍稍占据控球优势。但第28分钟，先进球的却是曼联：反击中鲁尼左路送出精彩挑传，埃尔南德斯小角度直接头球攻门被范德萨扑出，高速插上的法比奥抢先将球捅入空门。上半场曼联带着1-0的结果进入更衣室。

下半场开始前，因伤休战已经半年的瓦伦西亚换下进球的法比奥，完成复出后的首次出场，拉斐尔在其后的比赛里被解放到接近自由人的位置。4分钟后，正是相当活跃的拉斐尔右路传中制造了第二个进球：埃尔南德斯的射门被朱鲁挡出，鲁尼小角度头球扩大比分，2-0。此后比赛变成了全场做出11次扑救的范德萨的表演，他多次化解了阿森纳的射门，力保球门不失。第71分钟，查马克的头球吊射击中横梁弹出。随后，拉姆塞换下迪亚比，自去年2月以来第一次回到阿森纳的比赛中。第89分钟，朱鲁解围对方传球时不慎肩膀脱臼，被担架抬出场外。赛后被确认为肩膀脱臼，他的赛季已经提前报销。

Penelope

Roma 2-0 Lazio: Totti the hero but Pizarro the architect
March 13, 2011

The starting line-ups

Francesco Totti scored a free-kick and a penalty to record Roma’s fifth successive Rome Derby victory.
Vincenzo Montella recalled Totti as the central forward in Roma’s old fluid ’strikerless’ 4-2-3-1 shape. Marco Cassetti was out, so Nicolas Burdisso played at right-back.
Eddy Reja made just one change from last week’s win over Palermo. Stephan Lichsteiner replaced Lionel Scaloni at right-back.
Roma started strongly and finished strongly, though for the majority the game was slightly scrappy and lacked any rhythm. At no point did Lazio assert themselves and dominate, however, so Roma were deserving of the three points – even if it took set-pieces for them to break the deadlock.

Totti false nine
Playing Totti as the ’striker’ made Roma fluid, flexible and exciting in the opening minutes. He came deep and often ended up close to the two holding players, whilst the attacking band of three moved forward and became the highest players up the pitch. Mirko Vucinic stayed wide on the left and looked to take on Lichsteiner, but he rarely got the better of that duel. Menez was quiet.
Lazio responded to Totti’s movement by keeping their defence deep. Totti was rarely followed across the pitch in open play, which meant his runs didn’t really create much space for his teammates – that explained why Roma were flexible without being dangerous or looking threatening in front of goal.

Pizarro dictates
The main man was David Pizarro, who was always available for a pass and dictated play at the start. Roma had been instructed to work their left flank (particularly looking to play in Vucinic) and Pizarro played a couple of excellent balls out to that flank, with John Arne Riise getting forward on the overlap. Pizarro also came close to a goal, with a thumping 30-yard drive that hit the bar.
Lazio were poor in the first half. Their gameplan was to play on the break, but their transitions from defence to attack were terrible. It wasn’t clear what Hernanes was doing – he didn’t provide much of a defensive presence, which contributed to Roma overrunning Lazio in the centre, nor was he in a position to start quick breaks. His positioning didn’t seem to make any sense.
That said, Lazio’s two best moments came from Hernanes – although tellingly, it was when he drifted into positions away from the centre, on the flanks. First he picked up the ball in space on the left and drove a cross-shot past the far post, then in the second half his right-wing cross found Sergio Floccari who couldn’t find the net from a header. Lazio’s two wingers were quiet, although they did a good job defensively against Roma’s full-backs.
An interesting feature of the game was how Lazio pressed Roma at goal kicks – Hernanes would move forward, and he and Floccari would occupy Roma’s two centre-backs. This meant Julio Sergio was unable to play out from the back, and with Roma lacking a proper central striker (Marco Borriello, for example) long goal kicks weren’t much use. Totti’s strategy for challenging in the air was simply to charge at his marker and then turn his back at the last moment, frequently giving away free-kicks. The game lacked tempo before the break.

Second half
Unlike previous Rome Derbies, there were no personnel changes at half time. However, Lazio changed their style of football – playing higher up the pitch, being more positive and competing in midfield. Neither side really got a hold of the ball in this period – Roma couldn’t make it stick upfront, and because they had been forced deeper, their onrushing midfielders had further to run to get to Totti. At the other end, Floccari had one headed chance but was otherwise dealt with well by Juan and Philippe Mexes.
The breakthrough came from the star man, Pizarro. He not only kept Roma moves flowing by playing simple passes from side to side, he also broke forward and dribbled at the heart of the Lazio defence, catching his opponents by surprise. One of these runs saw him fouled on the edge of the box, and Totti smashed the free-kick in.
Reja responded by switching his formation to an attack-minded 4-2-4ish shape, and Hernanes was one of the men to depart – as happened in the first derby of the season. However, the end of the game because more of a fight than a football game. Lazio had two men dismissed (and it could have been more), whilst Totti and substitute Fabio Simplicio kept the ball in the corner for much of the final ten minutes. Amongst all this, Simplicio won a penalty which was converted by Totti for the second goal.

Conclusion
It was a welcome return for the formation Roma played with such success for the majority of last season, and the opening to the game suggested they’d put on a real show. However, they lacked individual spark from their two wide men, Vucinic and Menez, and therefore turned to Pizarro through the centre for their openings. It was fitting that he won the free-kick that broke the deadlock, though (as in the crazy comeback against Bayern earlier this season) it’s always Totti who manages to grab the headlines.
Lazio were very disappointing – they made poor decisions with the ball, couldn’t involve Floccari in their play, and Hernanes was as quiet as he was in the first Rome derby of the season.

thewall

Sevilla 1-1 Barcelona: Sevilla recover from poor first half to hold Barcelona to a draw
塞维利亚1-1巴萨：主队下半场回勇与上半场的沉寂判若两队因而逼平曾经恐怖的巴萨
March 14, 2011

The line-ups after Bojan replaced Pedro through injury

Barcelona failed to win for only the fourth time this season in La Liga.
Having favoured a 4-3-1-2 formation in recent weeks, Gregorio Manzano returned to a 4-2-3-1 system here. Didier Zokora came into the centre of midfield, and Diego Capel started over Diego Perotti on the right, so Jesus Navas was on the left.
Pep Guardiola welcomed back Gerard Pique, which meant Sergio Busquets returned to midfield, and Javier Mascherano dropped to the bench. Pedro Rodriguez started, but was injured in the first few minutes, and was replaced by Bojan.
Praising Sevilla’s tactics blindly on the sole basis that they picked up a point here would be foolish – they endured plenty of nervous moments and could have lost heavily. Barcelona hit the bar twice, had a goal controversially disallowed, and also had a shot cleared off the line. Regardless, the different strategy used by Manzano in the two halves was certainly a point of interest, and Sevilla were very good after the break.

Pressing… 压迫。。。

Sevilla started the match reasonably well. They kept a high line and pressed in the midfield, with 3 v 3 in the centre, the wingers tracking the full-backs, and the centre-backs remaining in position, letting Lionel Messi drift into the midfield zone.
The more obvious their relaxed attitude to Messi was, the more he started to wander, to the point where he was playing extremely deep – deeper than a number ten, at the tip of a fairly compact diamond rather than as a forward. He often became involved in build-up play, though when Xavi Hernandez or Andres Iniesta got the ball in space, Messi would sprint forward from a deep position to attempt to reach balls over the top.

…but not for long。。。但是好景不长

This became increasingly easy when Sevilla’s pressing dropped alarmingly around the 20 minutes mark. There was no pressure on the ball in midfield, but the original high defensive line was still in tact. This meant that Barcelona found it simple to put through the defence – Messi had two chances from chips over the top (one he miscontrolled, the other he headed against the bar) and Dani Alves burst through with one of his classic runs to square for Bojan for the opener.
Sevilla offered so little threat in the first half that it’s barely possible to comment on their attacking tactics. Ivan Rakitic was the closest support to Alvaro Negredo upfront, but even he spent most of the half in his own third of the pitch. The wingers were too concerned with the threat of Barca’s full-backs to venture forward.
Just before half time, Messi collided with Javi Varas and seemed to be seriously hurt, but was able to continue in the second half.

Second half 下半场

The second half line-ups

The second period of was a completely different contest. Sevilla made a change – taking off the deepest midfielder, Zokora, and introducing Freddie Kanoute in the deep role he’s mastered in recent months. That gave the Sevilla midfield a different tilt – Rakitic dropped in alongside Gary Medel, who played solidly ahead of the back four.
More important than a change in personnel was the change in mentality, however. Sevilla actually attacked in the second half, and Barcelona seemed surprised by the contrast – they looked sluggish at the start of the second period. Messi was clearly not 100% fit following his knock in the first half, and pulled out of a tackle in the lead-up to Sevilla’s goal. Kanoute also played a key part with good link-up play between the lines – the goal wouldn’t have happened in the first half – and Navas nodded in to complete an excellent move.

Barcelona push forward 梅西推进巴萨前场攻击力
After that, Barcelona stepped it up, but (as against Arsenal in midweek) they were wasteful in the final third. Adriano’s crossing from the left was terrible, whilst David Villa’s movement was poor on the right. 比利亚这一晚的跑动不给力

Despite his injury, Messi was the main man – going on a couple of tremendous runs before being halted at the last moment. Sevilla sat deeper as the second half went on, and played on the counter-attack. It was fairly successful strategy – Barcelona couldn’t play through them, and at the other end they had chances on the break. The more attacking approach also limited the percentage of possession Barca had in the second period – it dropped from 75% in the first half to 67% in the second. 尽管梅西受了伤，但是他仍是巴萨攻击线最主要的那个人

Battle 赛维利亚肉搏战
Another key factor was Sevilla’s physicality. Messi’s injury was simply a 50-50 challenge with the goalkeeper, but in the second half Sevilla were fired up and made hard tackles on various players. Barca were unquestionably unsettled by these tactics, and even the normally calm Xavi squared up to Medel. The final 20 minutes of the game was fast-paced and played in a fierce manner.
Guardiola only made one change in the second half – very late on, with Seydou Keita replacing the disappointing Villa. There was no obvious ‘plan B’ from Guardiola in terms of formation or strategy – he remained confident Barcelona could unlock Sevilla, though it might have been interesting to see Ibrahim Afellay on to provide another option on the ball.
Manzano also kept the same formation and strategy – although Sevilla didn’t turn down chances to break at speed, they were happy with a draw. Perotti replaced Capel, which meant Navas went to the right, and Perotti’s fresh legs were welcome against the threat of Alves.

Conclusion 结论
Barcelona have played worse than this and still picked up wins this season. Their problem at the moment, amazingly, is in front of goal. They have scored only one goal in each of their last three La Liga matches, and have started to overplay and become wasteful when they get into the penalty area. Villa hasn’t looked sharp enough in recent matches, and the loss of Pedro – who offers great movement in from the flanks – would be a big blow.
Sevilla’s first half approach was completely different from their second half approach. Attacking Barcelona after the break caused them difficulties, although it was arguably the ’surprise’ aspect rather than the tactic itself which caught Barca out at the start of the second period.

thewall

我靠，zm这篇文章中网友评论中第一个发言就是

mourinhosucks on March 14, 2011 at 11:20 am
bojan is still rubbish.

pedro

Bayern 2-3 Inter: Pandev snatches the win
March 16, 2011

The starting line-ups

Inter progress on away goals after Goran Pandev’s late winner.

Louis van Gaal changed his two centre-backs from the first game, but it was a familiar 4-2-3-1 for Bayern.
Having started with a Christmas tree shape in the first leg, Leonardo switched to more of a 4-2-3-1ish shape here. Wesley Sneijder was used in a wide-left role, Goran Pandev started from the right but sometimes became a second striker, and Dejan Stankovic linked the holding midfielders and the attackers.
Neither side conclusively won the tactical battle – both sides had chances, and Bayern probably should have wrapped up the game in an excellent 20 minute spell either side of half time. Inter were far better than in the first leg, however, particularly in terms of ball retention.
Inter shape
Their formation was a major reason for the improvement. In the first game, Stankovic and Sneidjer played just behind Samuel Eto’o, but struggled to receive passes from the three holding players – Inter were a broken team. Here, with Stankovic playing the link role, Inter worked the ball forward gradually. With Sneijder and Pandev both coming into the centre of the pitch, the attackers combined nicely, and some quick passing created Eto’o’s early goal.
Inter were also much improved without the ball. In the first leg, Sneijder and Stankovic usually closed down the Bayern holders, which left Philipp Lahm and Danijel Pranjic free to scamper down the touchlines and launch attacks from the flanks. Here, Sneidjer and Pandev pressured both the holders and the full-backs in turn, and the presence of Stankovic higher up the pitch mean he could also move towards Bastian Schweinsteiger.
Thiago Motta patrolled the centre of the pitch well, and his passing chalkboard covers the middle third of the pitch almost perfectly

Against Thomas Muller, Inter had 2 v 1, rather than the unnecessary 3 v 1 in the first leg. Thiago Motta tracked him, and Esteban Cambiasso played slightly further forward, to either side. Upfront, Eto’o’s pace caused Bayern to defend deeper than usual, but when Inter didn’t have possession, the Cameroon striker often dropped off and moved towards Luis Gustavo.
Bayern take command
Bayern took a while to settle down into their passing rhythm, but eventually started to put together some excellent attacks. Their main strategy was to get the ball wide to Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery, who both got the better of their respective full-backs. The opening goal was amazingly similar to Mario Gomez’s winner in the first leg – Robben came inside, Julio Cesar spilled the shot, and Gomez turned in the rebound. Again, Inter didn’t defend well enough against Robben’s favourite movement (to come inside and shoot) – in particular, Andrea Rannochia was doubling up on the outside rather than the inside for the goal.
Robben was the catalyst for many Bayern attacks. He wandered away from his left-sided position without the ball, and moved into the centre of the pitch where he combined well with Ribery. Bayern had further chances, many from direct attacks rather than their usual possession play – Ribery missed a one-on-one with Julio Cesar, but Muller scored a second to make it 3-1 on aggregate.
Second half
After some fierce Bayern pressure, Inter increasingly dominated midway through the second period. Having largely sat back early on, they forced the issue more after the break – Motta and Cambiasso played higher up the pitch, and when this threatened to leave a huge space between the lines, the defence responded in turn.
Inter only had three shots on target in the game - all three found the net

Substitutions played a big part. Stankovic (seemingly injured) departed for Coutinho, who played on the left. Sneijder went into the centre of the pitch – and from that position, scored the equaliser. Robben’s departure robbed Bayern of pace on the break, which might have been vital as Inter’s defence played increasingly high up the pitch.
It was hard to tell what Bayern’s strategy was late in the game. Were they trying to play on the break and get another goal, trying to keep possession and kill the game, or sitting back and letting Inter have the ball, keeping their defensive shape? Whichever it was, it didn’t work very well.
Inter should be praised for their commitment to passing football, however. They continued to get the ball to Sneijder and Coutinho, and although it’s hard to say a goal was coming, they had persistent pressure in the final twenty minutes – and with Bayern’s weakness at the back, it was likely Inter would get one last chance. It fell to Pandev, who finished coolly to send the defending champions through.
Conclusion
Bayern should have won the game with their chances midway through the game. “Yet again, we’ve brought it on ourselves, and not for the first time this season”, van Gaal said. “We’ve learned nothing from our mistakes, and that’s a shame. We created so many chances, but we failed to put them away. We didn’t keep it as tight in the second half.”
Leonardo focused on his side’s mental strength. “This game cannot be explained, only experienced”, he said. We won and it was a victory all from the heart. We organised well, scoring after three minutes, but there was a period when everything went Bayern’s way and we lost our balance…tonight was all about heart.”
Tactically, this wasn’t a resounding win for Leonardo – but the change in strategy was a huge improvement from the first leg, so he deserves some credit.

Chalkboards from Total Football app

pedro

Real Madrid 3-0 Lyon: comfortable Real victory
March 16, 2011

The starting line-ups

Real Madrid finally managed to get past Lyon, and into the quarter-finals of the European Cup.
Jose Mourinho made one change from the first leg – Marcelo replaced Alvaro Arbeloa.
Claude Puel brought Lisandro into the side upfront, and had Jimmy Briand on the flank in place of the suspended Michel Bastos. The remainder of the side was unchanged.
After a strong start from Real, the game settled down into a tense but exciting contest. Lyon were looking to play solely on the counter-attack, and sat back with two banks of four, waiting to spring breaks.

Real dominate
Real had the majority of possession early on, but this dominance gradually decreased through the first half. Lyon defended relatively deep when the home side’s attacks continued, and Real struggled to draw men out of position and create space for midfield runners. Mesut Ozil looked to break through the defence in the first few minutes, but then drifted from side to side between the lines. When Real did play balls over the defence, they were caught offside as Lyon’s defence stepped up as a unit very well.
There was no obvious strategy with the ball for Real. Cristiano Ronaldo was played in as often as possible, of course, but aside from one blast which was well tipped over by Hugo Lloris, he didn’t threaten too much. It might well have been the case that, like Lyon, Real were also looking to play predominantly on the break, but with Lyon rarely committing more than four players forward, there were few opportunities to exploit space.

Lyon counter
Lyon broke intelligently down the flanks, taking advantage of the fact Ronaldo and Angel di Maria rarely offered their full-backs protection. They looked to play the ball quickly to the wings (though the balls out wide were often inaccurate) and when possible the full-backs got down the line to create 2 v 1 situations. A few balls were put into the box, and Lyon won a couple of corners. Lisandro often dropped off the front into deeper positions, however, and wasn’t in a great position to get on the end of the crosses.
Another key element to the game was its physicality. Ricardo Carvalho, Pepe, Marcelo and Dejan Lovren all made had tackles, and there were plenty of aerial collisions throughout the first half too.

Marcelo fires Real ahead
The key feature of the first game was how much Real missed the Marcelo – Ronaldo partnership down the left. Arbeloa didn’t offer the overlapping attacking threat down the touchline, and therefore Ronaldo was poor in that game. He had little space to work in, and was often up against two Lyon players.
Lyon often crossed the ball, but Lisandro (and Gomis, in the second half) rarely got to the ball first

It was fitting, then, that Marcelo and Ronaldo combined to break the deadlock – the full-back exchanged passes with the winger and finished after a mazy dribble. It also summed up the fact that Real needed something special to break the deadlock, as Lyon had defended excellently until that point.

Second half
Bafetimbi Gomis came on for Briand at half time, which meant Lisandro Lopez moving across to a high, narrow left-sided position, trying to combine with Gomis, but also occupying Sergio Ramos.
The Real Madrid full-backs stayed at home in the second half anyway, keeping the back four intact, and leaving the attacking to the front four players, with sporadic help from Sami Khedira.

Real wrap it up
The longer the game went on, the more Lyon pushed forward. The more they pushed forward, the more spaces they left at the back – and Real’s counter-attacking became more obvious and more effective. Benzema got the second when confusion in the Lyon defence left him free and through on goal, and Angel Di Maria added the third from a not dissimilar situation.
Lyon had gone 4-2-4ish, with Yoann Gourcuff off and Jeremy Pied on, but Real were comfortable in the second half. Mourinho used his substitutions to rest tired legs.

Conclusion
The start of the game was a tight ‘chess match’ with both looking to play on the break. Both were aware of the other’s intention, however, so few players were committed forward for fear of being hit with a direct attack.
In the second half, Lyon were forced to leave spaces at the back, which played into Real’s hands. That is still when Real are at their most fluent – using the pace and movement of their front four. Ozil was quiet here, which meant Real lacked creativity in tight situations, but the wide players combined nicely with Benzema.
Mourinho still has a 100% record at home with Real, in all competitions.

pedro

94楼中文翻译参考

皇马3-0里昂：一场落入皇马节奏的胜利

皇马终于战胜了他们的苦主里昂，打进了欧冠的1/4决赛。

和首回合相比，穆里尼奥在首发阵容上做出的唯一变化是用马塞洛替换了阿韦罗亚。

而普埃尔则用利桑德罗突前，边路选择了白里安取代巴斯托斯，其他的首发球员和首回合的完全相同。

开场之后皇马攻势很猛，随后比赛就进入了一种紧张但是非常刺激的状态。里昂的进攻手段完全依赖于反击，同时设置了中场和后防的两条4人防线，等待反击的机会。

首发阵容

皇马主导了比赛

开场之后皇马控球率很高，但是这种控球上的优势在上半场后段逐渐减小了。里昂的防线收的很靠后，用于克制皇马的进攻，而同时皇马也很难将里昂的球员吸引出来，从而使得中场球员获得足够的空间。厄齐尔在开场的几分钟有过好几次突破对方防线的机会，但是之后他经常在两个边路活动。当皇马尝试突破对手的防线的时候，他们通常会掉入里昂的越位陷阱之中。

皇马在控球时候的策略似乎并不明晰。C罗当然是一如既往的异常活跃并且有着充分的控球时间，但是除了有一次射门被洛里斯很漂亮的扑出之外，他对里昂的球门威胁不大。和里昂一样，皇马也试图在上半场就控制住比赛，但是考虑到里昂很少在进攻端投入四名以上的球员，皇马就很难在对手的半场找到突破口了。

里昂的反击

考虑到C罗和迪玛利亚很少为他们的边后卫提供保护和协防，里昂主要以两个边路为突破口。他们将球快速的输送到两个边路（尽管他们往边路的传球精度欠佳）并且在边后卫上前的情况下创造二过一的机会。他们确实有不少次往禁区里的长传，而且里昂也获得了不少角球的机会。同时，利桑德罗经常回撤到较为纵深的位置试图创造机会，然而他通常并不处在很好的接球位置上。

马塞洛首开纪录

回顾双方首回合的比赛，特点之一就是皇马在左路缺少了马塞洛和C罗的配合。阿韦罗亚在左路无法提供压上助攻的能力，因此那场比赛C罗表现很差。他很少有拿球和突破的空间，而且大多数时间被两名里昂球员所盯防。

而在马塞洛上场之后，双方精妙的配合再次打破了场上的僵局，他俩之间的一脚传递和马塞洛完美的突破给皇马带来了第一个进球。事实上，直到这一个进球之前，里昂的防守都做的非常出色，因此皇马确实需要巨星们的灵光一现来打破这个僵局。

里昂经常尝试传中，但是利桑德罗(下半场戈米)很少抢到第一点

下半场

中场戈米替换下了布里昂，这就意味着利桑德罗的位置将会左倾，尝试和戈米配合，并且会和拉莫斯对位。但是在下半场皇马的边后卫很少压上助攻，使得后防线的完整体系得以很好的保持。进攻的任务则被交给了前场的四人组，同时赫迪拉会偶尔提供一些帮助。

皇马拿下比赛

这场比赛越临近结束，里昂越倾向于压上，而这样做的后果就是他们后方留给皇马的空间会越大。因此皇马的反击就显得越来越有效。里昂后防的失误使得本泽马没有被盯死并且让他打进了第二球，很类似的，迪玛利亚打进了第三球。

里昂在比赛的后期变为4-2-4，换下古尔库夫换上了派德，但是皇马在下半场没有受到什么实质性的威胁。穆里尼奥的换人也主要是为了让主力们得到必要的休整。

总结

本场比赛的开局就是一场非常紧张的棋局，两支队伍都希望通过反击取得优势。然而，双方都深知对手有这个想法，因此两支队伍都不敢在进攻端投入过多的兵力，防止被对方直接打反击。

而在下半场，里昂不得不压上，这使得比赛进入了皇马的节奏。皇马最擅长的仍然是利用前场四人组的速度和跑位来创造空间和进球机会。本场比赛厄齐尔相对来说较为沉寂，因此皇马在被对手盯防较紧的时候缺乏了一些创造力，但是边路球员仍然和本泽马的配合良好。

本场比赛之后，魔力鸟延续了他的伯纳乌全胜记录。

译者：derekhh
接稿时间：2011-03-17
完成时间：2011-03-18
招工链接：http://bbs.goalhi.com/1992659.html
原帖地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/16/real-madrid-3-0-lyon-comfortable-real-victory/

pedro

93楼中文翻译参考

拜仁2-3国际米兰战术复盘：这就是杀不死比赛的后果  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer
http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/16/bayern-2-3-inter-tactics/

国际米兰队靠潘德夫的绝杀以客场进球优势晋级。

相比第一回合，范加尔更换了两名中后卫，但拜仁的阵型仍是让人熟悉的4-2-3-1。

在第一回合采用“圣诞树”作为首发阵型后，莱昂纳多本场改用了更接近于4-2-3-1的阵型。斯内德被放在左中场位置上；潘德夫的先发位置在右路，但有时更像是二中锋；斯坦科维奇担负连接后腰和攻击线球员的职责。

没有一方在战术上完全压倒对手——双方都有机会，而拜仁本能通过半场前后20分钟的上佳表现来提前解决战斗。不过，国米的表现比第一回合要好得多，尤其是在控球方面。

国米阵型

国米表现改观的主要原因在于阵型。第一回合的比赛里，斯坦科维奇和斯内德在埃托奥身后活动，但都难以接到三个后腰的传球——国米的队形被割裂了。本场比赛斯坦科维奇担当连接的职责，国米能把球逐步传递到前场。斯内德和潘德夫都往中间靠，前场球员之间有了很好的配合，几次快速传递造就出了埃托奥早早的进球。

而在无球时国米也有了很大改进。第一回合里，斯内德和斯坦科维奇经常被拜仁的两名后腰阻截，这让拉姆和普兰尼奇可以沿边线插上发动攻势。本场比赛斯内德和潘德夫轮番给对方的后腰和边后卫同时施加压力，而斯坦科维奇站位靠上使得他也可以冲击施魏因施泰格。

在对穆勒的防守上，国米是2防1，而不是第一回合中没有必要的3防1。莫塔盯他，坎比亚索站位稍前，靠边。锋线上，埃托奥的速度使得拜仁后卫线站位比平常更靠后，不过国米没有球权的时候，喀麦隆通常回撤，朝古斯塔沃的方向移动。

莫塔很好地扫荡了中路，他的传球也几近完美地覆盖了整个中场地带。

拜仁占优

拜仁调整传接节奏花了一些时候，不过一进入节奏他们就开始串联起一系列漂亮的攻势。他们的主要方针是把球分边给罗本和里贝里，两人对付各自一侧的边后卫。第一个进球和戈麦斯首回合的制胜一球如出一辙——罗本内切（打门），塞萨尔挡出射门，戈麦斯补射得手。国米又一次未能很好地防住罗本的习惯动作（内切射门）——特别是拉诺基亚在外围参与包夹而不是在里边。

罗本是拜仁多次攻势的催化剂。他无球时离开左路的位置，移动到中路与里贝里很好地配合。拜仁有更好的机会，多是来自直接（传球发动）的攻势而不是他们通常的控球组织——里贝里面对塞萨尔错失了单刀，但穆勒将球打进，把总比分改写为3-1。

下半场

经历了拜仁一阵暴风骤雨般的攻势后，国米在下半场中段逐渐占据了优势。早前他们大都退守后方，半场过后他们更多地向对方施压——莫塔和坎比亚索的站位更靠前，而当中场和后卫线之间的空当扩大到构成威胁的时候，后卫线也相应地作出反应（压上）。

国米只有3次射正——全部射进。

换人起到了很大作用。斯坦科维奇（似乎受伤）被换下，库迪尼奥上场出现在左路。斯内德移到中路——他正是在这个位置上打进扳平一球。罗本的下场让拜仁损失了反击时的速度，在国米防线越发压上的情况下，这或许成为了关键的转折点。

很难说清拜仁在比赛末段的策略是什么。他们是想通过反击再进一球，是想通过控球杀死比赛，还是退到后场保持防守队形，而让国米拿球？不管他们想的是什么，策略没有收到很好的效果。

不过应该赞扬国米坚持传球的做法。他们持续将球交给斯内德和库迪尼奥，虽然难说进球就会到来，他们在最后20分钟里不断给对方施压——由于拜仁后防的缺陷，国米有可能得到最后一次机会。机会最终降临到潘德夫头上，他冷静地将球打入，帮助卫冕冠军晋级。

结论

拜仁在整场比赛中本有数次机会拿下比赛。“但又是这样，我们搞砸了，这赛季不是第一次了”，范加尔说道。“我们没有从自己的失误吸取教训，这是个耻辱。我们创造了很多机会，但我们未能把握住。我们没能在下半场保持同样的强度。”

莱昂纳多则把重点放在队伍的精神力上。“这场比赛无法解释，只能体会”，他如是说。“我们赢了，这是意志的胜利。我们组织得很好，比赛三分钟就进球了，但有段时间进入了拜仁的节奏，而我们失去了自身的平衡……今晚意志是决定因素。”

就战术而言，这场比赛说不上是莱昂纳多的完胜——但策略的调整相对第一回合有了很大改观，因此他值得赞誉。

Alex2011

Wales 0-2 England: Lampard and Bent seal the victory early on
March 26, 2011

The starting line-ups

England recorded a comfortable victory over Wales at the Millennium Stadium.
Gary Speed sent Wales out in a broad 4-5-1 system. Craig Bellamy started on the right, with Andy King on the left. Aaron Ramsey, in his first game as captain, lined up behind Steve Morison.
Fabio Capello named a surprising starting XI. Ashley Young was given a game on the wing, with Wayne Rooney also out wide, off Darren Bent. Michael Dawson partnered returning captain John Terry at the back.
England effectively won the game in the first 20 minutes – that silenced the crowd, and probably ruined Wales’ gameplan too.

England positive with the ball…
England’s ball retention was very good throughout the match, especially as the game was played on a poor surface. The use of three central midfielders (something Capello had experimented with in friendlies, but had yet to try in a competitive game) worked very well, and England always had options in possession.
Rooney and Young were given free-ish roles (though defended the wide areas without the ball) – allowed to stay wide, or come inside and link play – Rooney tended to start higher up the pitch but ended up dropping deeper as moves progressed, whilst Young focused on breaking forward into the channels, getting in behind the full-backs and drawing the centre-backs out of position. He was responsible for ‘creating’ both the goals – being brought down for the penalty, and then crossing for Bent for the second.
Wales didn’t help themselves in the way they defended – the full-backs (particularly Danny Collins at left-back) came too high up the pitch and were also too wide, making it too easy for England to play balls between defenders. Glen Johnson’s pass for the second goal, for example, was excellent – but Wales were opened up with two passes from the halfway line to the six-yard box. Better defensive positioning wouldn’t have allowed that.
…and proactive without
England were equally impressive when defending – they pressed effectively, and made it impossible for Wales to play the ball forward in the first half. The layouts of the two midfielders meant that each player had an individual opponent to pick up, and therefore England closed down easily – Scott Parker marked Ramsey, with Frank Lampard and Jack Wilshere closing down higher up. Wales only had a man in space at the back, and that’s where most of their passing took place early on.
With Wales struggling to get the ball forward, Ramsey increasingly came deep, dropping between his two fellow central midfielders, and picking up possession in space. With Parker not tracking him and staying in the holding position, this meant Wales briefly had a 3 v 2 situation deep in their midfield, but it didn’t really solve their problems for two reasons – (a) because Ramsey was the ‘link’ player and therefore Morison became even more isolated, and (b) because Ramsey’s passing was poor early on, and he frequently gave the ball away. The midfield trio lacked fluidity – if another midfielder had moved forward when Ramsey dropped deep, they might have opened up England. Instead, Wales played in front of them.
Wales rarely threaten
Parker was England’s best player, showing discipline and restraint in the deep-lying role – something England haven’t had for a long time. It also allowed Wilshere and Lampard forward – they dovetailed in going forward and linking up with the front three, and both looked more comfortable than their England appearances this season in a midfield four.
Wales’ problems in getting the ball forward weren’t helped by Morison’s poor game. His first touch was terrible, meaning he rarely (if ever) held the ball up, so Wales never got up the pitch. The home side’s brightest moments came when Bellamy and King didn’t look to play in Morison, and instead played the ball to each other – particularly after they switched wings. Three times in a 15-minute spell either side of the break, Bellamy dribbled from the left flank into the centre, then played a clever pass to King in behind Ashley Cole – but the moves didn’t produce clear-cut chances.
The second half was almost completely uneventful – aside from various substitutions (which didn’t really alter the flow of the game, though David Vaughan showed some good moments and probably should have started) and lots of bookings.
Wales came into the game more and got into the England third of the pitch (this may have been caused primarily by England’s pressing becoming less intense), but lacked penetration. England had opportunities to counter but their transitions were poor – lazy, perhaps – and they didn’t really look to get a third.
Conclusion
Wales were poor, but England did their job very well. In possession they were assured and moved the ball forward nicely, whilst they also pressed well with the ‘new’ formation – something they wouldn’t have been able to do as well in a 4-4-2, as they would have been passed around in the centre of midfield.
The most encouraging performance came from Parker, who gave England balance in midfield and protection ahead of the back four.
Wales lacked quality in the final third – with no Bale and Ramsey not at 100%, they barely tested Joe Hart.

pedro

Brazil encouraging, but not yet cohesive
巴西队很给力，但是尚未凝聚好
March 29, 2011

Brazil's overall formation 巴西队的总体阵型

Whereas his predecessor Dunga had a very consistent, specific shape in his latter days as Brazil manager, Mano Menezes has switched between systems. He started off with a 4-2-1-3 against the USA, then moved to a 4-4-2 against France recently. 前任邓加，在担任巴西主教练的后期，其执教都有非常一致的、 特定的阵型，而现任主教练马诺梅内塞斯却尝试着不同阵型的切换。他起初用4-2-1-3阵法对阵美国队，然后最近对阵法国队时又变换为一个4-4-2阵型。

In this game, he was hampered by various withdrawals through injury (particularly attacking players) and therefore sent out a side in a strange 4-3-3ish system, which dominated possession but lacked fluency in the final third of the pitch. 在伦敦对垒苏格兰这场比赛中，梅内塞斯由于一些进攻球员受伤无法上场而使其排兵布阵受到了制约，所以祭出了一个奇怪的4-3-3阵型，那么在比赛中，巴西队在控球上占据优势，但是在最终第三线这个环节上缺乏流畅的终结劲。

Tactically, the back four was fairly unremarkable – recalls to Lucio and Julio Cesar meant that, along with Andre Santos and Thiago Silva, the defence had a distinctly Dunga-esque feel to it, though Dani Alves is now first-choice at right-back ahead of Maicon.

Ahead of them, Lucas was the primary holding midfielder. He played slightly right-of-centre and generally remained in his position, doing what he does for Liverpool – intercepting, closing down, playing the ball calmly from side to side, and rarely joining attacks. He was assisted by Ramires, who played to the left of Lucas (rather than to the right, as is usual), and played an energetic role.

Ramires’ role differed from his old ’shuttling’ role, however – rather than forced to cover an entire flank by himself, he had Neymar wide on the left, so instead played a box-to-box role, getting himself into the penalty area. Neymar’s role was not unlike Robinho’s old role, starting from the left but coming inside very quickly, with and without the ball. Upfront, Leandro Damiao was a ‘prima punta’ – holding the ball up, winning headers.

The confusion came from the roles of Elano and Jadson, who both played attacking, rightish roles in midfield. Elano started off looking like a central playmaker but actually dropped deeper and formed midfield three, whilst Jadson was half a No 10, half a winger. It was difficult to see what he was trying to do, and he contributed little to the game. The two got in each others’ way a couple of times and meant Brazil didn’t stretch the play enough with the ball.

Defensive shape 防守阵容

Brazil's defensive shape 防守时的阵型

Brazil’s defensive shape was interesting, because they morphed into a side that defended with two banks of four on the rare occasions they came under sustained pressure from Scotland. Strangely, Ramires moved out to defend the left flank, Lucas moved left-of-centre, with Elano dropping into the right-centre channel and Jadson defending the right.

This meant that Brazil’s right side was far weaker than their left – both because (a) Lucas and Ramires are simply much stronger defensively than Elano and Jadson and (b) the former two were already in a deep position and could shuffle across easily, whereas the latter duo had the retreat 20-30 yards to take up their defensive positions.
Upfront, Neymar stayed in a wide-left role, pinning back Scotland’s right-back (which made Brazil even more secure down that side).

Substitutions 换人
The most encouraging factor in terms of Brazil’s shape was that there was a stark improvement after the break, in two main respects. First, Neymar continued to be a force in the game but stayed much wider and expanded the active playing zone, which increased the gaps in Scotland’s defence and made them easier to play through.
Second, Jadson made lateral runs from the right flank into the centre of the pitch, which took Scotland’s left-back inside and opened up space for Alves, who was much more prominent in the second half – he should have had an assist, had Ramires not blazed over the crossbar from 12 yards.

The introduction of Lucas (Rodrigues Moura da Silva, of Sao Paulo) in the second half also gave Brazil drive and dribbling from the centre of the pitch – he was highly impressive, and it’s a shame he didn’t start over Jadson.

What went right? 得劲的地方

Leandro Damião had a promising debut. He is something approaching an ‘old-fashioned’ number nine, someone who can provide a central physical presence whilst Brazil’s more creative players play around him.

Brazil as their attacking moves developed 进攻时推进阵型

Ramires was also good (aside from his shooting) – he provided bursts of energy from the centre of midfield, which partially compensated that Brazil had no ‘number ten’ in the side, as he linked midfield and attack.

Neymar was fantastic – the best player on the pitch by far – and looks to be suited to a wide-left role with the freedom to come inside.

Brazil’s pressing was also very effective, although Scotland were poor in possession. Against stronger opposition there may be a problem with either (a) space between the lines or (b) space in behind the defence, as Lucio and Thiago Silva were reluctant to come too far up the pitch.

What went wrong? 不得劲的地方

The Elano/Jadson confusion was the main problem – they simply played too close together and were too predictable.

On a related note, Brazil didn’t take advantage of Daniel Alves’ runs often enough. Part of the problem was Jadson – in the first half he stayed too wide, and Alves missed having a Lionel Messi / Pedro Rodriguez character to move inside and open up space, though the situation improved in the second half – after Alves could be seen shouting at Jadson to move out of his way.

In a more complex manner, Alves was rarely making runs on the blind side, as he loves to do at Barcelona. There, Barcelona often build up play in the left-centre channel with Andres Iniesta, and Alves charges down the opposite flank. However, Brazil’s ‘equivalent’ of Iniesta was either Elano or Jadson (or both) – who were down the right. Therefore, Scotland’s attention was already on that side of the pitch, and Alves was in full view.

There also remains a slight problem down the left (a hangover from the Dunga era) – to allow Neymar to come inside, Brazil need someone able to consistently overlap down the left. Andre Santos did reasonably well, but there still wasn’t quite the understanding down that wing – perhaps that will come with time.

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pedro

98楼战术评论说，巴西队左翼进攻还有一些小问题，这是从邓加时代就遗留下来的问题。当内马尔向中间走时，还需要其他队员来填补这一空缺以保持左翼贯底的持续性。安德烈 · 多斯桑托斯表现相当不错，但是仍然有理解不到位地方。也许随着时间推移，这个问题会得到解决的

---------------------------

另附，98楼的全文译文，是转贴的

巴西战术报告(胜苏格兰赛后)：前景光明，默契不足
由 forzakaka 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

邓加时代的后期，巴西的阵容变得相对稳定且具有针对性。而现在，梅内塞斯却趋向于在几种阵型中变化。对阵美国时他采用了4-2-1-3，最近对阵法国时又变成了4-4-2。

Brazil's overall formation

在这场比赛中，伤病的困扰，特别是进攻球员的伤病，使得他推出了一套注重控球，但在禁区前沿缺乏流畅性的怪异的4-3-3阵型。

后防4人并不令人惊讶，重招门将塞萨尔和中后卫卢西奥，再加上其搭档蒂亚戈-席尔瓦和左侧的安德雷-桑托斯，让人依稀能够感觉到邓加的印记，唯一的不同时丹尼尔-阿尔维斯顶替麦孔成为了右路的第一选择。

在他们前方，第一后腰是卢卡斯，他在中路略靠右侧做着在利物浦时相同的工作：拦截，盯人，冷静的过渡后场传球，并很少参与前场进攻。卢卡斯的搭档是拉米雷斯，他通常出现在卢卡斯的左侧，扮演着一个充满活力的角色。

拉米雷斯的任务不同于往常上下穿插的工作，由于左翼内马尔的存在，他不必去覆盖整条左边路，而是充当了一个中场自由人，并且适时插入禁区。内马尔的任务也和之前罗比尼奥的没有太大区别，不管是有球还是无球，他都需要经常从左路迅速的内切。最前方，莱昂德罗-达米奥则是桥头堡，负责拿球过渡和争抢头球。

疑问来自于埃拉诺和贾德森的角色分配，他俩都是中场右侧的进攻球员。埃拉诺开场时看起来像是中场组织核心，但之后却后退成为了中场三人组的一员。而贾德森则既像10号，又像边锋，很难明白他的职责是什么，结果导致他有些游离于比赛之外。他们两人的跑位多次出现了冲突，这也说明当巴西控球时，他们的进攻并没有很好的展开。

防守站位

巴西的防守站位很有意思，在遭受到来自苏格兰的持续性进攻压力时，他们会压缩到后场，组成两排每排四人的防守阵型。奇怪的是，拉米雷斯会移至左翼进行防守，卢卡斯在中间左侧，埃拉诺和贾德森则分别在中间右侧和右翼防守。


Brazil's defensive shape

这意味的巴西的右边路变得十分脆弱，因为卢卡斯和拉米雷斯的防守能力都远强于埃拉诺和贾德森，并且前两者的位置本来就是处于中路要害的，可以轻松的进行横移，而后两者则需要后退二三十码才能到达自己的防守位置。

在前方，内马尔则呆在左侧，以搅乱苏格兰的右边防守（这样就使得巴西的左侧防守变得更加的轻松）。

替补

关于巴西的打法，最让人满意的地方是在半场休息后他们的表现有了明显的提升。主要是在两方面，首先是内马尔持续着强势的表现，他的位置更靠近边路，活动范围也更大，这就导致了苏格兰防守阵型中的空当被拉开，让巴西能够更加容易的进攻。

其次，贾德森从右翼到中路的横向跑动明显增加，让苏格兰的左后卫跟随其至中路，这就为身后的阿尔维斯拉开了巨大的空当，而后者在下半场的表现也明显提高了不少。阿尔维斯本该有一次助攻进账的，但拉米雷斯在12码的位置却没能把握住机会。

来自圣保罗的小卢卡斯下半场替补出场后亦为巴西的中场中路提供了活力和盘带。他的表现实在令人印象深刻，没有让他取代贾德森进入首发是一个不小的遗憾。

出彩点

莱昂德罗-达米奥的处子秀十分出色。他的风格近似于古典的9号前锋，能够用强壮的身体卡住位置，让身后的创造性球员们围绕他而组织进攻。

Brazil as their attacking moves developed

拉米雷斯除了射门外整体表现同样也不赖。他在中场中路的爆发力和能量将中场和锋线连接了起来，并一定程度上弥补了巴西10号球员的缺失。

内马尔实在无与伦比，是这场比赛得最佳球员。他很适合在左路带球并内切射门的角色。

尽管苏格兰在控球率上完全处于下风，但巴西的压迫性打法仍然很有效。然而在面对更强对手时这种打法将会遇到一些问题：或者中场和后卫之间的距离太大，或者防线身后出现空当，因为卢西奥和蒂亚戈-席尔瓦都不愿意压得太过靠上。

问题

埃拉诺与贾德森的位置重叠是主要问题。他们的站位太过接近，而且太容易预测。

与上一点相关的是，他们没有充分利用阿尔维斯的进攻特点。一部分的原因要归结在贾德森身上，上半时他始终待在右路外侧，而不是像梅西或佩德罗那样经常内切为阿尔维斯拉开空挡。好在下半场这个问题有所改观，想必阿尔维斯在中场休息时也告诉了雅德森，让后者从他的进攻路线上闪开。

阿尔维斯在无球一侧的偷下并不像在巴塞罗那时那样频繁。在巴塞罗那时，伊涅斯塔通常在中路偏左处带球，而阿尔维斯则迅速沿右翼插上等候机会。而巴西类似伊涅斯塔的球员则是出现在右侧的埃拉诺或者贾德森（或者他们两人）。因此，苏格兰的防守焦点本来就集中在这一侧，阿尔维斯也因此完全暴露在了他们的视野之中。

左路同样有些小问题，是在邓加时代就有的。内马尔内切后，巴西仍然需要有人在左路套边下底拉开空间。安德雷-桑托斯做得不错，但这一侧的配合还是欠缺默契。或许随着时间的推移这个问题也会随之消失。

Alex2011

Milan 3-0 Inter: Pato goals put Milan in charge
April 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

Two goals from Alexandre Pato and another from Antonio Cassano sent Milan five points clear of Inter.

Max Allegri started Pato and Robinho upfront in Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s absence. Clarence Seedorf played on the left of midfield, and Gianluca Zambrotta got a surprise start at left-back.
Leonardo chose to play 4-2-1-3 rather than 4-3-1-2. Javier Zanetti played at left-back, and both Cristian Chivu and Andrea Ranocchia were fit to start – Lucio was suspended.
The game got off to a sensational start – Pato scored the opener after just 44 seconds, and Milan were immediately in charge.

Midfield battle
The key to the game was the midfield battle, where Milan had a 4 v 3 advantage. As a result, they dominated possession and all four players played their roles well – Mark van Bommel sat, Rino Gattuso shuttled and doubled up against Samuel Eto’o, Clarence Seedorf was the most ‘free’ player and carried the ball well, whilst Kevin-Prince Boateng drove forward and connected the midfield and attack. Boateng also provided an aerial presence for long goal-kicks forward, which was quite useful – as Inter’s forwards occupied Milan’s defenders, Christian Abbiati couldn’t play out from the back, and neither could he play long to Robinho or Pato, who lack height and aerial prowess.
There were some interesting duels in the midfield. Gattuso started playing high up, putting pressure on Thiago Motta when he moved forward with the ball, but Gattuso soon dropped deeper and spent more time moving out towards Eto’o, who wasn’t very effective in wide positions as a result. Mark van Bommel tracked Wesley Sneijder well, though was happy to let him drift into deeper positions unoccupied. On the other hand, when Milan had possession in the early stages, Sneidjer dropped deep and let van Bommel have time on the ball – but later on moved forward to mark him, and Milan weren’t able to use van Bommel as a pivot.
With both defences defending relatively deep (Milan more so than Inter, who moved higher up the pitch as the game went on), the midfield zone was stretched and very open. Inter were essentially overpowered in this zone, and Leonardo really needed an extra body in midfield to help Inter compete. He decided to start with Goran Pandev on the right – he may have regretted not using Dejan Stankovic, because that would have given him more flexibility to move between systems. The use of Sneijder and three forwards meant he was tied to 4-2-1-3.

Milan's midfield diamond worked very well. Here is their movement (black arrows) and usual passing style (white arrows) in more detail

Inter defence
Despite Milan’s obvious midfield advantage, they were at their most threatening when they played quick, direct football, rather than working the ball gradually forward. With Inter behind from the first minute and therefore pushing both Maicon and Javier Zanetti up the pitch straight away, they often had 2 v 2 at the back.
Ranocchia and Chivu simply couldn’t deal with the pace of Pato and Robinho, who started from the channels and made diagonal runs into the centre of the pitch, in behind the defence. Really, Inter needed an extra man at the back, or at least a full-back playing a more conservative role, and in a position to cover when Milan broke quickly.
It was the first time Ranocchia and Chivu had started together at the back, and there was clearly no understanding between the two. Chivu was the most vulnerable. He became drawn up the pitch too easily, and then didn’t have the pace to turn and recover his position. Ranocchia and Zanetti had to cover on separate occasions when Pato went through in the first half.
It should also be noted that Milan’s midfield advantage meant there was often no Inter pressure on the ball for passes over the top. Pato was also guilty of not using his pace enough – turning back into play rather than motoring towards goal.
Inter had their chances, though. Both came from wide areas (where they naturally were more of a threat than Milan). Motta’s header from a corner was brilliantly saved by Christian Abbiati, whilst Eto’o somehow shot wide at the far post after a Pandev cross.

Second half
The game was decided soon after half time. Inevitably, the key moment involved Chivu being caught out for pace in behind – Pato got the ball in Milan’s centre-left channel, was through on goal, but cut across the pitch and was tripped by Chivu. The Romanian was sent off, and Ivan Cordoba replaced Pandev as Inter went 4-2-1-2ish.
Milan made very good use of their extra man (in stark contrast to how they failed to adapt (under Leonardo) when Jose Mourinho’s Inter went down to ten men in this fixture last year). They suddenly had their full-backs completely free, and spread the ball from flank to flank, stretching the play and making Inter’s ten men work harder. The goal came when Ignazio Abate (the poorest player in the first Milan derby of the season, but very good here) motored forward and crossed for Pato’s second.
That was essentially game over. Milan continued to be a threat with balls over the top, and Robinho should have taken advantage of these situations. His replacement, Antonio Cassano, won and scored a penalty in stoppage time, before being sent off.

Conclusion
A clear tactical victory for Allegri – or perhaps, more of a defeat for Leonardo. Inter were exposed in two different ways – they were outnumbered and outbattled in midfield, whilst also amazingly vulnerable at the back to balls over the top. Inter didn’t do well enough without the ball – the wide forwards, in particular, didn’t help out enough – which has echoes of Milan under Leonardo last year, particularly away at Manchester United.
Milan may have been helped by Ibrahimovic’s absence. Though he was the key man in the fixture earlier in the season (and his pace was a threat, winning the penalty in that game), Milan enjoyed having too very mobile players who played in the channels, rather with a more static focal point for the attack. Their two experienced Dutchman also had great games in the centre – van Bommel broke things up and distributed the ball wide, whilst Seedorf played intelligent balls higher up.