设为首页收藏本站

 找回密码
 注册

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

楼主: Alex2011
打印 上一主题 下一主题

【10-11 ZM专贴】280L:替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

[复制链接]
51#
发表于 2011-2-28 22:23:07 | 只看该作者
央视陶伟的现场解说个人感觉比上面这个说得到位。。小猪那种情况未必是主动的选择。莱万多夫斯基和格罗斯克罗伊茨中路靠得多也并不都是为了进攻,对位防守任务很重。拜仁中卫的协调能力不行。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

52#
发表于 2011-2-28 22:31:45 | 只看该作者
点头,陶伟说的很好~
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

53#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 11:59:27 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 12:01 编辑
央视陶伟的现场解说个人感觉比上面这个说得到位。。小猪那种情况未必是主动的选择。莱万多夫斯基和格罗斯克罗伊茨中路靠得多也并不都是为了进攻,对位防守任务很重。拜仁中卫的协调能力不行。 ...
红酥手 发表于 2011-2-28 22:23


请说说,多特蒙德2个年轻中场吧

戈策和Nuri Sahin,后者是土耳其人,goal网上的技术评级比戈策高得多,但是,俺对后者没多大印象
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

54#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 12:25:10 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 13:23 编辑

Milan 3-0 Napoli: Napoli don’t turn upFebruary 28, 2011

The starting line-ups

Milan recorded a comfortable victory over a hugely disappointing Napoli side.

Max Allegri gave Marek Jankulovski a rare start at left-back. Upfront, he used the Robinho-Pato-Ibrahimovic trio.

Walter Mazzarri played his usual XI with one exception – Ezequiel Lavezzi was unavailable, so Giuseppe Mascara started instead.

Napoli were extremely poor throughout the game. Their passing was very sloppy, they lacked drive or creativity from the centre of midfield, and Edinson Cavani couldn’t get into the game. Milan were below par in the first half, but stepped it up in the second and never looked likely to give up the lead once Zlatan Ibrahimovic scored a penalty in the 48th minute.
那不勒斯整场比赛表现糟糕。他们的传球很草率,中场中路缺乏驱动里或创造力,而且埃丹松卡瓦尼迟迟不能进入比赛状态。米兰上半场没有破门,但在下半场加强了攻势,当伊布在第 48 分钟点球命中后,米兰领先优势则一发不可收拾。


Formations
The initial tactical match-up was interesting. As usual, Napoli used 3-4-2-1 as their ‘base’ formation, but varied it slightly to suit the opponents. Today, this meant that Walter Gargano was used higher up the pitch than usual, and Napoli often looked like a 3-3-3-1. Michele Pazienza played to the right and picked up Robinho, whilst Gargano tried to put pressure upon Milan’s three deep central midfielders.
For their part, Milan’s system was a cross between a 4-3-1-2 and a 4-3-3. Ibrahimovic was central but Pato started from the right, looking to come inside. Robinho drifted between a trequartista position and a leftish role – he would have preferred to remain central, but Pazienza’s presence made him look wide for space.

Napoli waste possession
Napoli did have the right idea from the start – they tried to switch play from flank to flank, hoping to use the pace of their wing-backs, and exploit Milan at full-back, as Spurs did so well recently. The moves broke down from the very beginning, however – a Napoli free-kick in midfield resulted in the concession of possession when they tried to play a crossfield ball, and Milan suddenly stormed forward. That set the tone for the match.
Napoli often looked down their right when they got the ball – Milan were weaker on that side of the pitch with Robinho inside, and Jankulovski was seen as the weak link at left-back. The Czech did well when called upon, however, and with Napoli having little joy down the flanks, they looked unable to create chances. In the centre, they were outnumbered as Milan’s three central midfielders sat deep without the ball, and Rino Gattuso and Matthieu Flamini should be commended for excellent, energetic performances – they shut down the wing-backs but also got back into position quickly when the ball was on the opposite flank.
Milan dominated possession (partly because of the numerical advantage in the centre, partly because Napoli have the ball to them so readily) but created little in the final third. Neither Pato nor Robinho’s attempted tricks came off, and the full-backs were reasonably conservative.

Second half
With that lack of creativity, it was rather fitting that Milan’s opener came from the penalty spot, rather than open play. Again, Napoli handed the chance to Milan – literally this time, as Salvatore Aronica needlessly used his arm when challenging Pato on the byline. Ibrahimovic thumped it home.
Napoli then spent ten minutes doing nothing when out of possession. Their natural game is to sit back, soak up pressure and sometimes switch to a 5-4-1 – but when behind, Milan simply kept the ball and didn’t commit themselves. It took a while before Napoli realised they had to try and close down, and press higher up the pitch – but it didn’t come naturally to them, and Milan passed around them in the centre of midfield.

Milan extend advantage
It became clear that Napoli didn’t really have a plan B – Juan Zuniga replaced Mascara and provided energy, but the shape was still the same. The away side couldn’t get the ball forward to Cavani, the dangerman, and it was also apparent that they lacked Lavezzi’s ability to stretch the play – in that respect, the wide forward does a similar job to Theo Walcott for Arsenal: even when he’s not playing well himself, he opens up spaces in the opposition for his teammates to work in.
Allegri took off Robinho and brought on Kevin-Prince Boateng, who provided drive from midfield – summed up by his late run for the second goal. Napoli then pushed forward more, but Pato got a third on the counter. Allegri replaced both his full-backs with fitness levels in mind, but Napoli were never a threat. Paolo Cannavaro’s header that dropped wide was their only meaningful attempt in the game.

Conclusion
Rarely can the concept of ‘big game experience’ have been such an obvious difference between two sides in a match. Milan’s veterans were up to the challenge, Napoli’s players simply looked nervous – nothing else can explain their poor use of the ball.
Napoli’s form this season against the other sides in the top 5 (Udinese, Lazio, Milan, Inter) is played five, lost five – you can’t challenge for the title with a record like that.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

55#
发表于 2011-3-1 12:30:22 | 只看该作者
请说说,多特蒙德2个年轻中场吧

戈策和Nuri Sahin,后者是土耳其人,goal网上的技术评级比戈策高得多,但是,俺对后者没多大印象
Alex2011 发表于 2011-3-1 11:59


比赛没看没有发言权

看了一些评论,说格策和沙欣的发挥都非常不错
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

56#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 12:59:23 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 13:04 编辑

那不勒斯客场0-3输给米兰,是不是欧联杯的失利还没缓过神来?

拉维奇停赛,以及范博梅尔出战,对双方进攻或者防守,都有很大影响呢?

这场比赛,伊布和帕托搭档,以及与罗比尼奥(后被博阿滕替换),组成前场三叉戟,看来是米兰后半程发力取胜的关键呢?

因为进球分别是伊布(点球)、博阿滕和帕托

当然扬库洛夫斯基出战也令人惊奇,那个点球赢得就是他禁区抢点施压造成的
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

57#
发表于 2011-3-1 22:02:00 | 只看该作者
列位怎么看,小猪和范博梅尔在最近一场各自的比赛中得与失呢?
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

58#
发表于 2011-3-2 11:29:24 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 elite 于 2011-3-2 11:33 编辑

Chelsea 2-1 Man Utd: second half turnaround
March 1, 2011

The starting line-ups

A game of two halves – Frank Lampard’s penalty gave Chelsea the three points.
Carlo Ancelotti continued to leave Didier Drogba on the bench, favouring Nicolas Anelka and Fernando Torres. David Luiz started at the back. The rest of the side was as expected.
Sir Alex Ferguson named an unchanged side for the first time in over two years, so Dimitar Berbatov was on the bench once again.
Both sides played 4-4-2, and the game was open and exciting throughout – generally fast-paced and with lots of clear individual battles across the pitch.

United shape
United’s strategy was shaped by last season’s performance at Stamford Bridge, a game they dominated despite losing, and a game where Ferguson ‘won’ the tactical battle. As is becoming mandatory against Chelsea, Ashley Cole was pinned back by a player specifically looking to stop him (Darren Fletcher, last year it was Antonio Valencia), which meant Nani played on the left.
Ferguson played a lopsided shape last season to counter Chelsea’s diamond, but safe in the knowledge that Chelsea were going to play only two central midfielders here, he could do the same. United played very narrow without the ball, inviting Chelsea into wide areas.

Chelsea shape
For their part, Chelsea were the ‘most’ 4-4-2 they’ve been in recent weeks, with Florent Malouda playing deeper than he has in other matches. They lacked width, though – Malouda still comes inside, as does Ramires on the other side, and therefore Chelsea were unable to take advantage of the space being offered to them on the flanks. With Fletcher occupying Cole, and Ivanovic being allowed time on the ball (because he very rarely is able to harm sides with the ball at his feet, as the fixture last year showed) Chelsea looked clueless when they constructed attacks.

Midfield battle
United rarely use Paul Scholes and Michael Carrick in a midfield ‘two’ (usually one of them are paired with a more hard-working player – Fletcher or Anderson) but the use of both worked well here – they kept the ball well, moved play from side to side, and dictated the play. United threatened much more in open play in the first half.
Chelsea’s only problem against Copenhagen last week (in an otherwise easy victory) was that, as neither Essien nor Lampard are natural holders, there were too much space between the lines. Wayne Rooney started to drop more and more into that space, and Lampard standing off him (even if only briefly) gave him the space to fire into the net to open the scoring, after a sustained spell of pressure.
Chelsea did have their chances – but it was notable that they were generally from set-pieces, furthering the idea that they lacked purpose in open play. Torres had a goal disallowed early on following a corner, and Ivanovic failed to convert the rebound after Lampard fired in a free-kick.

Second half
Chelsea equalised quickly in the second half – and it was (indirectly) from a set-piece. The corner had broken down and therefore stats will show the goal as coming from open play – but the presence of first Ivanovic and then Luiz, who finished excellently, was clearly crucial in getting the goal.
What turned the game? There was little tactical change, but Chelsea showed more strength and determination in the second half. That’s a subjective judgement and difficult to ‘prove’ in empirical terms, but the fact that their tackle completion rate improved – 15 from 30 in the first half, 20 from 34 in the second – hints that something changed:

by Guardian Chalkboards

Striking substitutions
The introduction of Didier Drogba also helped. Chelsea had the pace of Anelka and Torres upfront, but with no real playmaker, they struggled to provide the clever through balls those two need. With Drogba, more of a launch in his general direction can work, and he held the ball up, helping Chelsea move higher up the pitch.
Sir Alex Ferguson also brought on his replacement striker, Berbatov, in place of Hernandez. Berbatov and Drogba are not particularly similar players, but they were being turned to for similar reasons – to hold onto the ball, something Hernandez and Rooney were clearly not able to do:

by Guardian Chalkboards

Chelsea go ahead
Yuri Zhirkov’s introduction, in place of Malouda, was probably because he likes to to go down the line, stretch the play and cross the ball – particularly helpful now Drogba was on. He didn’t do that too often, but did end up winning the decisive penalty.
Ferguson’s approach in the second half was strange. He brought on Ryan Giggs for Scholes, and asked Giggs to play that same position, in the centre of midfield. It would have been more ‘natural’ for Ferguson to move Nani to the right, ask Giggs to play on the left, and bring Fletcher in the centre, but presumably he was too scared of letting Cole off the leash at 1-1. He ended up doing it at 2-1 anyway, but by this point United looked completely disjointed – they impressed with their patient passing in the first half, but that was of little use when they needed a goal. Their only attempt after going behind was a wayward Fletcher shot from long range.

Conclusion
United were excellent in the first half, but were rather overpowered by Chelsea in the second – almost as if they were surprised at Chelsea’s increased tempo and aggression. The Scholes-Carrick partnership was excellent when United were in control of the game in the first half, but maybe their struggles in the second indicates why Ferguson doesn’t play that combination very often.
Chelsea showed they do have togetherness, team spirit and all the other characteristics that have been questioned in recent weeks, and in Drogba and Zhirkov they had two very good substitutes to throw on. In open play they lacked creativity, but managed to get goals from a corner and a penalty. Michael Essien was excellent – he’s still not quite the all-action combative player of a couple of seasons ago, but he played very intelligently with the ball in this game.

by Guardian Chalkboards (表示有flash,点题目链接可在原文上看)
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

59#
发表于 2011-3-2 11:50:43 | 只看该作者
车仔也该发力了, 否则英超也太没看头了点。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

60#
发表于 2011-3-2 12:13:02 | 只看该作者
蓝军直接打出12连胜豪取英超冠军也不是完全没可能

而且在欧冠他们也很有希望

巴萨碰车子,也就是五五开的球!
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

61#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-2 12:52:57 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-2 12:55 编辑

蓝军攻势很猛,射门20比8,射正7比2

另外,红魔显然受了情绪影响,虽然吃亏很多

对于领先心里上准备不足?还是被逼扳平时受了刺激?

其实上半场红魔进球后不久,蓝军就有机会扳平的
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

62#
发表于 2011-3-2 17:59:44 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2011-3-2 18:02 编辑

58楼的参考译文

切尔西2-1曼联战术分析:蓝军精神属性回涨

Chelsea 2-1 Man Utd: second half turnaround

March 1, 2011


双方首发阵容

比赛被分成了两部分,兰帕德的点球最终帮助切尔西全取三分。

安切洛蒂继续将德罗巴放在板凳上,首发锋线为阿内尔卡和托雷斯,鲁伊斯首发出战,其余的阵容都在预料之中。
弗格森两年内第一次延续自己的首发,贝巴仍旧是替补。
两队都排出了4-4-2阵型,比赛非常开放,节奏飞快,充斥了大量单兵对决。

曼联的策略

曼联的策略机遇两队上赛季在斯坦福桥的比赛。那场比赛曼联控制了比赛却输了球,弗格森在战术上其实是占得上风的。对阵切尔西时你必须派人特别看防科尔,去年完成这项任务的是瓦伦西亚,今年是弗莱彻,这意味着纳尼要移到左路去。

上赛季弗格森排出了一个不规则的阵型去对抗切尔西的菱形中场。本场比赛他明白切尔西只有两位中场中路球员,自己亦可以这样做。曼联在无球时阵型非常狭窄,他们就是想把切尔西引向边路。

切尔西的策略

从切尔西自身的角度来讲,这是他们近几周最“4-4-2”的一场比赛,马卢达的位置比平时要略微深一些。他们缺乏宽度,马卢达还是要往中间靠,拉米雷斯也是如此。在科尔被弗莱彻盯梢的状况下只有伊万诺维奇能在边路拿拿球,不过伊万在脚下有球的情况下杀伤力很一般,去年的比赛就证明了这一点,切尔西在发动进攻的时候看起来没什么头绪。

中场争夺

曼联很少让斯科尔斯与卡里克在中场搭档,一般情况下他们搭配的都是更勤奋的某位球员,弗莱彻或者安德森,不过这两人凑在一起效果还不错,他们很好地控制球,很好地转移分边,很好地控制了节奏。在上半场的运动战中曼联威胁更大。

切尔西上周对阵哥本哈根虽然青涩取胜,但唯一的问题就在于埃辛和兰帕德都不是纯粹的后腰,后防与中场之间留的空太多了。鲁尼越来越多地回撤到那个区域,兰帕德就盯了他半秒钟而已,小胖在禁区外从容起脚破门得分,鲁尼毫无压力,蓝军压力很大。
切尔西也有自己的机会,但是基本都是来自定位球,他们在运动战缺乏明确的目的性。托雷斯初期有一次进球被判无效,伊万也没能将兰帕德主罚的任意球送进球网。

下半场

下半场切尔西迅速扳平比分,其实这次得分时间接来自定位球。角球被破坏,转入运动战,先是伊万抢到点,后是鲁伊斯完美抽射,此二人出现在对方禁区对于这粒进球至关重要。

什么改变了比赛?其实战术上的改变很少,但是切尔西在下半场更强势,更坚定了。这厮客观事实,不是主观评判,事实就是切尔西的对抗成功率提升了,上半场30次对抗赢得15次,下半场34次对抗他们赢得了20次,这暗示他们确实有所改变。



锋线换枪

德罗巴的出战同样起到了作用。切尔西在前场有阿内尔卡和托雷斯的速度,但是没有真正的组织者,他们没法互相之间提供需要的直塞球。德罗巴上场后前场有了支点,他能控住球,帮助切尔西完成推进。

弗格森也换上了前锋,贝尔巴托夫换下了埃尔南德斯。贝巴和德罗巴是完全不同类型的球员,但是他们上场都是出于同样的目的——控住球,这是埃尔南德斯和鲁尼不如贝巴的地方。



切尔西取得领先

日尔科夫之所以替下马卢达,大概是因为前者更喜欢拉边下底传中,在德罗巴出战的情况下这点尤其有用。日尔科夫并没有一直这么做,但正是他为球队获得了决定性的点球。

弗格森在下半场的策略很奇怪,他用吉格斯换下斯科尔斯,让吉格斯在中场踢相同的位置。更“合理”的做法应该是把纳尼调到右路,让吉格斯踢左路,把弗莱彻拉回中间。想来在1-1的情况下他还是忌惮科尔会脱缰奔袭。直到1-2落后他还是坚持这么做,但是这样一来曼联看起来完全脱节了,他们上半场耐心的传球令人印象深刻,但是在需要进球的时候这样做就没意义了。落后之后他们唯一的一次射门尝试就是弗莱彻离谱的远射。

结论

曼联上半场表现出色,但是下半场却被切尔西翻盘,看起来切尔西的突然提速让他们很不适应。在曼联上半场控制比赛的时间段内斯科尔斯与卡里克的组合表现很出色,可是此二人下半场的挣扎告诉了我们为何弗格森不经常使用这个组合。

切尔西展现了他们的团结、团队精神和过去几周被质疑的所有精神力属性,德罗巴和日尔科夫的上场作用很大。在运动战切尔西依旧缺乏创造力,他们的进球源于角球和点球。埃辛非常出色,他已经不是过去几年的全能超人的,但是本场比赛他有球状态下踢得很聪明。



原文地址:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/01/chelsea-2-1-man-utd-tactics/

译者:Rivaldinho




回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

63#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 11:20:32 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-3 11:35 编辑

Valencia 0-1 Barcelona: both sides try different systems, but both switch back to the usual
March 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

Lionel Messi had an off-day…and yet still scored the winner as Barcelona temporarily move ten points clear at the top.
Unai Emery had been trying Juan Mata as a number nine all week in training, and used him that position here, as Valencia went into the the game with no real striker. There was a reshuffle at the back, and two full-backs were used in tandem down the left flank.
Pep Guardiola left out Pedro from his starting XI. The shape wasn’t clear until the game actually started, but it turned out that Sergio Busquets was playing as an extra centre-back in a back three.
The first half was a bit  like Barcelona’s recent defeat at the Emirates. Their opponents seemed to be coping very well, and yet Barcelona still managed to manufacture chances – here, Lionel Messi missed two one-on-ones. As such, it’s difficult to say which manager had the upper hand, but for the third consecutive game between these two sides, it was an intriguing tactical battle.

Valencia formation
The headline here is perhaps slightly misleading, for Valencia’s basic shape was the same as usual, a 4-2-3-1. However, one cannot overlook the fact that Mata is a completely different type of player to Roberto Soldado, the man who usually plays upfront. Soldado is a classic central striker: strong, good in the air and a lethal finisher. Mata is very much a number ten, someone who plays between the lines and creates chances for others, and therefore whilst the formation was the same, the system was different.
Mata came short and linked play, but with Barcelona playing three at the back, they were relatively untroubled by Mata’s movement towards the ball – one defender could come out from the backline (Busquets, Gerard Pique and Eric Abidal are all happy to step up), and no notable space would be created.

Barcelona formation
Barcelona’s formation was a clear departure from their usual 4-3-3. Sergio Busquets played at centre-back, something he’s done before to good effect before. This was slightly different, though – previously he’s played as part of a back four, where nothing changes tactically, or as part of a 3-4-3 (for example, against Atletico). Since Barca often move to that system in games when they play a 4-3-3 anyway, with Busquets dropping in and the wing-backs moving on, that’s also a relatively comfortable shift.
In this game, Guardiola decided to use Javier Mascherano ahead of the back four, and omitted Pedro. This meant that Barcelona played with just a front two, which not only limited their attacking options, it also changed how the wing-backs operated compared to the 3-4-3. Against Atletico, Dani Alves and Maxwell caused such damage because Barcelona’s front three narrowed, in turn forcing the opposition back four to narrow, and opened up space on the flanks. From there, Alves and Maxwell could get forward unchecked – or they’d force the opposition wide players to move into a back six.

Battlegrounds
That happened here a couple of times early on – before Valencia realised that, up against a front two, they didn’t need to be so easily manipulated. Their centre-backs dealt with Messi and David Villa, whilst the full-backs were relatively free. They defended in lopsided way, however – with two left-backs down the left (the same tactic Emery used with some success at the Nou Camp), Jeremy Mathieu dropped in and picked up Alves, with Jordi Alba moving narrow. This meant that when Barca’s wing-backs got forward, Valencia were defending 5 v 4 – far better than 4 v 4 or 6 v 4, as they had a spare man at the back, whilst being able to compete in midfield.
The opposite side was their biggest worry. With Pablo Hernandez not tracking back nearly as much as Mathieu, and coming inside to join the attack (possibly trying to exploit any space created by Mata’s runs), Adriano had a lot of freedom down the left. Time and time again, Barca got the ball out to him 1 v 1 against Marius Stankevicius in the first half, but he couldn’t take advantage of the time and space. It might have been worth Barca playing someone else to the left of the pitch – Villa, Andres Iniesta or Abidal – to help out, and even if that dragged another Valencia player over to that side, it could have created space in the centre, where Iniesta and Xavi Hernandez were both quiet.
Aside from formations and positioning, the game was played at a quick tempo, with both sides pressing and subsequently using high lines. The game was essentially one huge midfield battle, and it seemed a goal would come as soon as one side exploited the other’s high line. The best chances came this way – Messi’s early miss, and Alba’s ‘goal’ that was disallowed for a narrow offside decision. From Barcelona’s point of view, the use of a (narrow) front two effectively restricted them to creating chances that way, especially with Alves tracked on the right and Adriano’s lack of a final ball from the left.

Second half
The line-ups after Barcelona's formation change on 63 minutes

Emery decided to change things at half time. He removed Joaquin (who had been playing, unusually, in the centre behind a main forward (another ‘central winger’)) and brought on Soldado, with Mata dropping into his number ten role. That was an admission that Valencia’s strategy hadn’t really worked upfront – Mata wasn’t creating space or causing the Barcelona centre-backs many problems.
The game continued in vaguely the same pattern, though with Soldado on, Valencia were more of a goal threat. A couple of decent chances came and went, with the Valencia full-backs supporting the attack well.

Barca change shape
That threat from full-back (as well as the obvious desire for more attacking threat at 0-0) prompted Guardiola to turn to the bench, and Pedro. He replaced Mascherano, and Barca moved back to their usual 4-3-3, with Messi in the centre deeper than Villa and Pedro on the flanks.
Barcelona looked much more comfortable with this shape – they had 2 v 1 rather than 3 v 1 at the back, they weren’t subject to being outnumbered 2 v 1 down the flanks, and they played with more natural width upfront, which is such a crucial part of their game. It also meant the sides were more naturally ‘matched’ in individual battles across the pitch, which made Barcelona’s pressing easier and more effective.

Goal
Crucially, the two players who had moved backwards, Alves and Adriano, remained an attacking threat. Alves continued to be tracked by Mathieu, but Adriano still had that freedom down the left, and finally produced a good ball for Messi, who squeezed a shot in on 77 minutes.
Emery threw on all the attacking players he could find for the final ten minutes, but Guardiola introduced Maxwell and Seydou Keita to keep things tight, and Barcelona were comfortable at 0-1.

Conclusion
A fascinating tactical contest, though it’s fair to say that neither side’s initial shape worked particularly well for them. Valencia’s false nine didn’t do much against a back three (which in itself is an interesting development) whilst Barca lacked width.
By the very nature of the result, it must be said that Guardiola’s tactical shift worked better. The real debate is whether it was a great move to start off with the 3-5-2 and move to the 4-3-3, or whether he simply should have gone with the 4-3-3 from the outset.
A final point – Barcelona had “only” 61% of possession in this game, their joint lowest figure of the season – the other game was also against Valencia. That suggests Emery’s tactics coped well in midfield (certainly, Xavi and Iniesta weren’t very prominent), but is also an indication that Valencia have good ball-playing midfielders, and a reflection on the fact that their full-backs were often ‘free’ until Barcelona made the tactical change.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

64#
发表于 2011-3-3 11:24:11 | 只看该作者
不知道这场球蒂诺和巴内加的表现怎么样
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

65#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 11:33:11 | 只看该作者
不知道这场球蒂诺和巴内加的表现怎么样
北极海 发表于 2011-3-3 11:24


基本算看了下半场,上半场俺是迷迷糊糊的,没怎么看

但下半场也有点眯眯瞪瞪

感觉双方都在高速攻防转换中,即使加时阶段,

巴萨进球后也没有过去的那种后场过多倒球的表演,就是前阵子客战枪手那种

有一个镜头,是梅西进球后不久吧,蒂诺还与梅西在禁区附近因摩擦发生口角,可见紧张程度
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

66#
发表于 2011-3-3 12:02:37 | 只看该作者
90哥一定要注意身体,欧战快接近白热化程度了,后续重量级的比赛不断

体能要跟上,劳逸结合
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

67#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 12:03:47 | 只看该作者
90哥一定要注意身体,欧战快接近白热化程度了,后续重量级的比赛不断

体能要跟上,劳逸结合
北极海 发表于 2011-3-3 12:02


多谢了

五点钟看球,是有点迷糊
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

68#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 18:36:21 | 只看该作者
63楼参考译文
------------------------
瓦伦西亚0-1巴塞罗那战术分析:瓜秃爱美丽,变阵大斗法  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·西甲专区 http://bbs.goalhi.com/xijia



梅西今天状态不佳……但仍然踢进了制胜一球,巴塞罗那现在暂时以10分的优势高居榜首。

埃梅里整个星期的训练里都在尝试把马塔用作9号,本场比赛也正是把他放在了这个位置上,而瓦伦西亚的先发阵容里没有实际意义上的中锋。后防线也进行重组,两名边后卫一前一后出现在左边路。

瓜迪奥拉把佩德罗拿出了放在板凳上。直到比赛真开始了,阵型才显得清晰起来,布斯克茨成为三后卫里居中的一个。

上半场有点像巴塞罗那近来败走酋长球场的那场。他们的对手看起来应对得相当好,不过巴塞罗那还是制造出了机会——梅西错失了两次单刀的机会。不过,还是很难说哪一边的教练占了上风,尽管两队近来已是三次交手,这场比赛仍是一场难以捉摸的战术对决。

瓦伦西亚的阵型

题目或许有点误导作用,因为瓦伦西亚的基本阵型还是一贯的4-2-3-1。不过,无法忽视的事实是,马塔与通常出任中锋的索尔达多是完全不同类型的球员。索尔达多是典型的中锋:强壮,制空力强,临门一脚好。马塔很大程度是个10号,在前锋和中场两线之间活动,为他人创造机会,因而尽管阵型一样,打法不同。

马塔回收起连接作用,但在巴塞罗那起用三中卫的情况下,马塔的接应相对而言没起到太大作用——一名后卫可以从后卫线上压出来(布斯克茨、皮克和阿比达尔都乐于这么做),也没留下太多的空间。

巴塞罗那的阵型

巴塞罗那的阵型与他们通常的4-3-3明显不同。布斯克茨出现在中后卫位置上,之前他踢这个位置收到了不错的效果。不过这次稍有不同——之前他是作为四后卫体系的补充,战术上没有什么改变;或者是3-4-3的一部分(比如对阵马德里竞技的比赛):巴萨踢4-3-3的时候也常切换到这种打法,布斯克茨后撤而两名翼卫压上,他们相对而言也比较适应这种切换。

瓜迪奥拉决定在这场比赛起用马斯切拉诺出任后腰,拿掉了佩德罗。这意味着巴塞罗那只有两个前锋,不但限制了进攻时的选择,也改变了翼卫的运作方式,与3-4-3时相当不同。对阵马德里竞技时,阿尔维斯和麦克斯维尔能制造杀伤是因为巴塞罗那前场三箭齐发,迫使对方四名后卫往中间收缩,而在边路留出了空间。于是,阿尔维斯和麦克斯维尔就能不受阻碍地向前推进——或者他们迫使对方两名边路球员退防到后卫线,形成六后卫。

战场

这种情形在比赛初期发生了几次——之后瓦伦西亚队意识到,面对双前锋他们无需如此轻易地被人操控。他们的两名中后卫对付梅西和比利亚,而边后卫可以相对自由地活动。不过他们防守用的是一种不对称的方式——两名左后卫镇守左路(埃梅里做客诺坎普时采取了相同策略并获得了一定成功),马蒂厄盯防阿尔维斯,阿尔巴则往里靠。这意味着当巴萨的边后卫压上时,瓦伦西亚防守是5打4——比4打4或6打4要好得多,因为这样他们在后方有一个人可以空出来,此外在中场也有竞争力。

另外一边则是他们的最大隐患。由于埃尔南德斯不像马蒂厄一样经常回防,而是内收参与进攻(或许是尝试利用马塔扯动制造出的空间),阿德里亚诺在左路插上有很大的空间。上半场巴萨有好几次把球交给他,让他与斯坦科维休斯一对一,但他未能利用好时间和空间。或许巴萨值得一试的是让其他人到左路——比利亚、伊涅斯塔或阿比达尔——去协助进攻,就算这会把另一名瓦伦西亚的球员吸引到边路来,也能给中路创造出空间——中路的哈维和伊涅斯塔比较沉寂。

除了阵型和站位以外,比赛以高节奏进行,两边都采取压迫式打法,从而双方阵线都压得很靠上。比赛基本上是一场中场的大斗法,每当一方利用对方阵线压上发动攻势,进球似乎都要到来。最好的机会也是这么创造出来的:梅西在比赛早段错失单刀,阿尔巴的“进球”被判越位,也只有毫厘之差。从巴塞罗那方面来看,(站位靠近的)双前锋的使用事实上限制了他们利用这种方式创造机会,尤其是阿尔维斯在右路受到限制,而阿德里亚诺在左路又缺乏有效的出球。

下半场

埃梅里在半场休息时决定作出调整。他换下华金(他近来通常在中路,中锋身后活动,又一个“中路边锋”)换上索尔达多,马塔回收到他10号的位置上。这等于承认了瓦伦西亚在前场的策略并未真正奏效——马塔没有创造出空间,或者给巴塞罗那的中后卫们制造很多麻烦。

虽然索尔达多上场了,比赛差不多以一种相同的模式进行,瓦伦西亚对对方球门的威胁更大了。在瓦伦西亚两名边后卫对进攻的有力支援之下,几次不错的机会被创造出来了,但都没有把握住。



巴萨变阵

边后卫的威胁(以及0-0之下明显要求更多进攻的欲望)促使瓜迪奥拉作出人员调动,派上了佩德罗。他替下马斯切拉诺,巴萨回到他们惯常的4-3-3阵型,梅西在中间偏后,比利亚和佩德罗在两边。

巴塞罗那看上去踢这种阵型要舒服得多——他们在后场是2打1而不是3打1,在边路也不会陷入1打2的人数劣势,而这是他们比赛的关键环节。这也同样意味着两队在场地上的人员会更自然地形成对位的局势,使得巴塞罗那的压迫更容易也更有效。

进球

关键的是,两位后移的球员,阿尔维斯和阿德里亚诺,仍保持了攻击威胁。阿尔维斯继续受到马蒂厄盯防,但阿德里亚诺依旧有在左路插上的自由,最终在77分钟给梅西传了个好球,后者破门得分。

埃梅里在最后十分钟里排出了所有他能找出来的进攻球员,但瓜迪奥拉换上了麦克斯维尔和凯塔收紧防线,巴塞罗那也乐于接受1-0的结果。

结论

一场精彩的战术对决,虽然公平来说,双方的先发阵型都不是特别奏效。瓦伦西亚的伪9号在对方三后卫面前并没有太多作为(本身而言是个有趣的进展),尽管巴萨亦因此在边路缺少活力。

就结果的本质而言,必须说瓜迪奥拉的战术变动更加奏效。真正值得讨论的是,先发用3-5-2然后转到4-3-3是否明智,还是从一开始就该用4-3-3。

最后一点——巴塞罗那本场的控球率“仅仅”有61%,他们本赛季以来的最低记录——另一场低控球率的比赛也是对阵瓦伦西亚。这表明埃梅里的战术在中场所起的效果不错(当然,哈维和伊涅斯塔的表现不是很突出),但也表明瓦伦西亚有不错的控球型中场,同时反映出的一个事实是,他们的边后卫通常是“自由”的,直到巴塞罗那作出战术调整。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

69#
发表于 2011-3-3 20:51:21 | 只看该作者
爱美丽是个被低估的教练,很有想法,战术能力也很不错。
这场比赛也很有趣,瓜和爱美丽都想算计对方,结果比赛一打发觉对方都变阵了
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

70#
发表于 2011-3-3 21:40:13 | 只看该作者
爱美丽本场上帕布罗(就是那什么埃尔南德斯- -)、马塔、华金和马丢的四前场一是因为前锋的确没什么人可用(阿杜里斯在医院呆着,热狗没进大名单,伊斯科毕竟还嫩),二是也怵巴萨的攻击力,前场上四个中场加强防守。后卫线上左路马丢和阿尔巴攻守两方面都比较默契,不过右路斯坦科维休斯被爆得比较厉害(米盖也没进大名单,马杜罗受伤,所以这也就是我蝠现在能上的人了)。全是中场的前场再加上拦截一级棒的小巴和蒂诺,瓦伦整个就是在跟巴萨中场缠斗,因此控球率高不足为奇,但是同时自己也进不了球(不要指望马塔,马塔加冕空门不进帝好多年了- -)。下半场懒得说了,反正美丽姐总喜欢下半场换人,估计是上半场尝到点甜头想做掉巴萨怎么的(上半场好像二三十分钟的时候瓦伦控球率都还是高于巴萨的= =)……要说美丽姐多有能力,我不觉得,瓦伦本赛季跟上赛季的重要区别在于斗志强大很多,很多绝杀和逆转。随便乱写的,大家随便乱看吧= =
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

71#
发表于 2011-3-3 22:32:31 | 只看该作者
有一点没有想到,爱美丽这场球愣是没让马塔打到最擅长的左路去(我只是看ZM的图来说)

既然巴萨上手打三后卫,完全可以让马塔在达尼的身后找找机会





估计还是比赛没看的缘故,有点不是很理解
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

72#
发表于 2011-3-3 23:46:07 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 午时靡深蓝 于 2011-3-3 23:51 编辑
爱美丽本场上帕布罗(就是那什么埃尔南德斯- -)、马塔、华金和马丢的四前场一是因为前锋的确没什么人可用(阿杜里斯在医院呆着,热狗没进大名单,伊斯科毕竟还嫩),二是也怵巴萨的攻击力,前场上四个中场加强防守 ...
Dominguez 发表于 2011-3-3 21:40

我觉得爱美丽把手头这些人用成这样也算可以了,比我床弗洛雷斯强出百倍去了。
轮子我看上半场差不多就是6中场大战巴萨,本来如果小巴和蒂诺一起上的话,身后还摆个阿尔贝尔达或者托帕尔,这次干脆也不用纯防守后腰了,放6个灵活小个死缠巴萨。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

73#
发表于 2011-3-3 23:48:18 | 只看该作者
有一点没有想到,爱美丽这场球愣是没让马塔打到最擅长的左路去(我只是看ZM的图来说)

既然巴萨上手打三后卫,完全可以让马塔在达尼的身后找找机会





估计还是比赛没看的缘故,有点不是很理解 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-3-3 22:32

爱美丽的确试图在阿尔维斯身后找机会,不过不是马塔,是左路的马蒂厄和阿尔巴轮流攻击A2和皮克的结合部
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

74#
发表于 2011-3-4 15:23:40 | 只看该作者
梅西在对阵瓦伦时错失2次单刀,有点像对阵阿森纳那场
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

75#
发表于 2011-3-4 15:25:52 | 只看该作者
布茨克斯在瓜教手里可当多面手,看看他同一场比赛中出任中卫和后腰的触球镜头
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 注册

本版积分规则

小黑屋|手机版|Archiver|阿根廷风暴 ( 沪ICP备05003678号   

GMT+8, 2024-5-12 03:29 , Processed in 0.109375 second(s), 18 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X3.2

© 2001-2013 Comsenz Inc.

快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表