【10-11 ZM专贴】280L：替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

弗爵爷

此贴各楼转载的内容技术含量较高，LZ的钻研精神令人感动

如果大家有时间，还是推荐看一看，能看英语原文更好些，翻译多少有些出入

不但能锻炼英语阅读能力，也能得到一些技战术方面的资料

虽然【ZM】的理解也不是都很准确，但比国内媒体的分析相对专业一些

Penelope

此贴各楼转载的内容技术含量较高，LZ的钻研精神令人感动

如果大家有时间，还是推荐看一看，能看英语原文更好些，翻译多少有些出入

不但能锻炼英语阅读能力，也能得到一些技战术方面的资料

虽然【ZM】的理解也不是 ...
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-2-20 00:19

多谢版主鼓励

Alex2011

下面转的这个帖子，对枪手2-1巴萨那场比赛技术统计做的很细致

Statistics: Arsenal FC 2 – 1 FC Barcelona

Posted at: 13:33 on Saturday, February 19, 2011 Category: Analysis, Matches Written by: Stevenson



Thanks to the wonder of Opta Sports, we now have near real-time feedback on player and team performances during Champions League matches. The iPhone application Total Football packages this information in a way that allows mere mortals to make sense of it. So what do the stats say about Wednesday’s clash with Arsenal? Read on for some interesting conclusions.

If you saw the game the way I did, you will have taken two big things out of it on Wednesday: First, Barcelona dominated possession, especially in the first half, but failed to make that possession count. Second, our attack had a collective bad day at the office. Both these conclusions are largely supported in the Opta match data on passing, attacking and overall player influence.

Passing in the midfield


Xavi: passing king!


Busquets: total passes


Iniesta: total passes

The graphic depictions of the passing in our midfield paint an amazing picture of Barcelona’s game. The slides featured here demonstrate not only the efficiency of our passing, but they also tell the story of just how we were able to dominate possession against a team like Arsenal who thrive on it themselves. Xavi completed 114 out of 121 passes on Wednesday; Sergio Busquets 96 out of 107. In contrast, Cesc Fabragas completed 45 out of 56 passes, and Jack Wilshere 43 out of 48.


Wilshere: total passes


Fabregas: total passes

What Barcelona did with their possession is quite another story. There were moments in the game when it felt like we were protecting a 3-goal lead, rather than teetering on the brink of defeat. If you look at the passing chart for Messi in particular, you’ll see that many of his passes went to players who were behind him on the field. While this per se is not that unusual, it does point to a lack of incision in our attack, and in our possession of the ball in general.

Messi: total passes

Barcelona’s anemic attack


Messi: total shots


Villa: total shots


Pedro: total shots

Despite our domination of possession, and Villa’s opener on 26 minutes, it was clear that our attack collectively was not going to produce a sparkling performance. The stats for total shots tell one part of this story: in 90 minutes we had eight shots on goal; only two of those shots were on target. More revealing are the passing statistics for a few key players. Villa, in general, had an excellent match, but he wasn’t very involved in the buildup. Pedro was more involved with his teammates, but many of his passes were back-passes that merely kept the ball in circulation. The slide showing where Messi received his passes also shows just how deep he was playing.

Villa: total passes


Pedro: total passes


Messi: passes received

The final image below charts player influence during the second half, a period in which Arsenal came back into the game. Our attacking trio during this crucial period had largely faded from view, either because of fatigue or disinterest.


Player influence second half

Digging into these statistics is fascinating. Do you see anything in the data from this game that is revealing? If so, be sure to share your insights in the comments. And watch out for a similar write-up after the return leg of this tie in two weeks.

Read more: http://www.totalbarca.com/2011/matches/statistics-arsenal-fc-vs-fc-barcelona/#ixzz1ETctoOie

Alex2011

9# 午时靡深蓝

转贴，中文版的，图若不能看，可点击链接
-------------------------------------------

战术板——巴伦西亚1-1 沙尔克：两个左翼传中，一场平手僵局  由 吴老二脑血栓 发表在GoalHi足球·德意志城堡 http://bbs.goalhi.com/dejia

巴伦西亚 1-1 沙尔克：两个左翼传中，一场平手僵局

2011年 2月17号

两队首发阵型

一场大开大合的比赛与多次被浪费的机会构成了梅斯塔利亚球场中的这场僵局。

埃梅里在他的阵容选择上令人惊讶，决定在他所中意的非常灵活的4-2-3-1/4-3-3 阵型中放弃了他的几名擅长拉开宽度的边翼，而阿里兹.阿杜里斯与罗伯托.索尔达多携手首发出场。

而菲利斯.马加特的排兵布阵则更加中规中矩，他采取了常用的4-4-2/4-2-2-2，劳尔站位拖后而亨特拉尔突前。

巴伦西亚的开场表现可谓顶级。他们充分利用了两名前锋在球场上的功效（这并不是他们往常都能做到的），通过后方不断的送出过顶直长传威胁着对方的后防——两名前锋未必需要球球都跑位接球并突入射门，但通过不断的斜线跑位拉扯击溃了对方的阵型，控制住了比赛。

巴伦西亚之阵

某种程度上说，巴伦西亚也算被迫该打直长传战术，因为这非常规的阵型意味着他们缺乏宽度。他们采取的阵型很难用示意图或者数字来解释，而后腰梅尔莫特托帕尔以及中锋索尔达多算是巴伦西亚全队仅有的两个整场球都位置固定的球员了。

蒂诺科斯塔在中场靠左位置扮演着进攻组织者的角色，而巴内加则在靠后位置不断在两个边路之间移动，“热狗”多明戈斯原本位置靠右，却时常出现在左翼活动进攻，同时阿德里斯会从左边锋位置活动至中路变为前锋。

巴伦西亚前场球员的表现就如他们往常一样，每当进攻被沙尔克破坏的时候，无论被安排打的是什么位置，他们都会立刻组织反抢来防守住大片空当区域。

巴伦西亚灵活阵型的一个好典型——多明戈斯传球均匀遍布全场，无论在左路，右路还是中路。

边卫带来的进攻宽度

缺乏边路攻击手这就意味着杰瑞米马修以及米格尔必须在边卫位置提供大量的前插跑位，然而在面对着盯防胡拉多以及杰弗森法尔范的任务时，前插或多或少变得有些困难，沙尔克的两名边前卫经常向球场中部移动，这意味着巴伦西亚的两名边卫不得不跟随盯防来为中卫提供掩护。

在开场短暂的试探后马修开始前插进攻，第17分钟他果断前插铲传，将球传至中路插入至近点的索尔达多推射破门。而不久之后，一次同样的机会在右路由米格尔传出，可惜没有化为进球。

尽管巴伦西亚垄断了球权并创造了数次机会，但爱美丽老师的决策是否正确则有待商榷。沙尔克04的边后卫们基本上得不到边路中场球员（芳芳与胡拉多）任何的支援防守与帮助，这也意味着边前卫可以轻松地得到与他们1对1的机会。巴伦西亚也许并未对破矿的这个弱点采取针对措施。

沙尔克则采取了一个不同的策略——他们总是将交给边路的中场球员发起进攻，尽管那哥俩总是太爱内切至中路活动了。劳尔本场表现出色，从前方后撤进行组织并很好地串联起了进攻，而在沙尔克没有球权的时候，则紧跟着对方后腰托帕尔。

下半场

尽管两队战术相异，进球却是无比相似——左翼传中至近点前锋射门得分。当然，由于沙尔克边路球员所带来的宽度，传中助攻劳尔打入精彩进球的左边中场胡拉多用一个十分简单的动作便完成了这次进攻。

当沙尔克的边路球员尝试突破对手的防守时成功率太低丢球过于频繁。

之后双方的战术仍未发生多少变化，在位置调整上只有沙尔克04的乔尔马蒂普站位更加靠后而已。而到了第67分钟，爱美丽决定派上两名边路攻击手——华金打右边锋，维森特打左边锋，而多明戈斯和巴内加则被换下。理论上说巴伦西亚似乎阵型拉的更宽了，他们打起了4-2-4，两名边翼拉至边线活动冲击着沙尔克的边卫。可是他们的边前卫内切的次数过多使得巴伦西亚的前场进攻一下拥挤滞涩起来。

沙尔克的调整似乎同样纠结——朱利安德拉克斯勒以及埃杜换下两名边路球员，可实际效果上只是单纯给边路换上了新鲜血液，并无其他起色。两边的队伍都尝试去赢得这场比赛，可表现上又都没出色到可以获取胜利。

总结

一场令人愉快的比赛，但两支队伍都不算特别的出彩，也并没有一方在技战术上压倒了对手。两边的阵型体系差异很大，但巴伦西亚并未从边路有效地考验沙尔克的防守，而沙尔克的边后卫们也并未在上半场有效地发挥他们在场上的自由度。

客场作战的沙尔克04将会对比分栏上的数字表示小幸福。

原文地址：

http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/17/valencia-1-1-schalke-tactics/

pedro

Lyon 1-1 Real Madrid: all square in tight game
February 22, 2011

The starting line-ups

Karim Benzema scored on his return to Lyon, but Bafetimbi Gomis netted a late equaliser.
Claude Puel fielded a 4-2-3-1 system, making just one change from the weekend game. Jimmy Briand’s spectacular bicycle kick against Nancy wasn’t enough to keep him in the side, so Brazilian Michel Bastos played instead.
The only minor surprise from Jose Mourinho was at left-back. Marcelo was left out, Alvaro Arbeloa started.
Real were slightly subdued throughout the contest, and the game was static for periods, with neither side really wanting to take the initiative and both preferring to wait for counter-attacking opportunities.

The game was never ‘poor’, but for spells it wasn’t interesting tactically. It was 4-2-3-1 v 4-2-3-1, the game had no overall pattern, both goals had an element of fortune to them, and neither manager conclusively out-tacticed the other. The points to take from this game were minor.
Arbeloa-Ronaldo combination misfires
The combination of Arbeloa and Cristiano Ronaldo down the left  didn’t work particularly well. It was widely assumed that Mourinho omitted Marcelo because he wanted someone more defensively secure in this match, but the defensive nature of Arbeloa actually invited pressure and made Real slower and more predictable with the ball.
It’s questionable whether a side can successfully function with two wrong-footed players on the same wing. The tactical trend of last season was to play ‘inverted’ wingers, but these were almost always used in conjunction with attacking full-backs. It’s a two-way system – the winger coming inside creates space for the overlapping full-back, and the overlapping full-back stretches the play to open up play for the winger.
Real tried to play through Ronaldo, so Lyon made plenty of interceptions in their right-back zone

When you have a winger looking to come inside and shoot (as Ronaldo inevitably does) in conjunction with a wrong-footed full-back who doesn’t stretch the play, you become quite easy to play against. Ronaldo showed a couple of good moments with stepovers, but his only three attempts on goal came from free-kicks. He offers more than simply goalscoring, but despite being a winger, he is Real’s main goal threat and was stifled here. Marcelo overlapping is a key part of Ronaldo’s game.
Real still tried to play down that flank, meaning Lyon generally won the ball in their right-back position. On the other side, Angel di Maria was tucked in, and also wanted to come inside onto his stronger foot.
Lyon defend well, attack poorly
Lyon had less possession but were more of a threat in the first half. They were often wasteful in the final third, with Bastos and Gomis both wasting promising chances. They were better when Bastos switched to the left of the pitch, where he teamed up with the left-back Aly Cissokho in fast attacks – on the other side, Anthony Reveillere remained in position against Ronaldo.
Lyon coped well in the centre of the pitch – they let Real have the ball in their own half, but then pressed when Real attempted to play it into the front four. There was little drive from Real’s six defensive players and hence no ’surprise’ element for Lyon when defending. Mesut Ozil had a very quiet game – he only influenced the play when he dropped deep or moved to the flanks – the chalkboard of his passing shows an almost perfect ‘wall’ (broken by one solitary pass and two corners) across the final third, that he couldn’t penetrate.
Mesut Ozil barely influenced the game in or around the penalty area

However, Lyon didn’t create much from the middle of the pitch when they won the ball, with Xabi Alonso and Sami Khedira remaining in position.
Second half
Real were better in the second half when they raised the tempo and moved the ball more quickly into dangerous positions. Lyon looked more nervous when their back four was put into action immediately, rather than having the shield of a midfield four as well.
Both managers changed the game from the bench. Benzema’s strike was his first action after coming off the substitutes bench, whilst Puel introduced three new men, all attacking players, which gave Lyon a renewed attacking threat and pushed them forward for the late goal. Mourinho had replaced Ozil with Marcelo, who played on the left of a midfield three along with Lassana Diarra and Alonso.
Conclusion
A draw was probably a fair result. Neither side played particularly well – Lyon didn’t make the most of their opportunities when they got the ball into the final third, whilst Real simply didn’t get the ball into the final third, with Ronaldo blunted, Ozil quiet, and di Maria fairly average.
Still, it is advantage to Real – 11 of the last 14 sides who drew the first leg of a Champions League knockout tie 1-1 away from home eventually progressed, according to Opta.

Alex2011

Copenhagen 0-2 Chelsea: 4-4-2 v 4-4-2

February 23, 2011

The starting line-ups

Chelsea eased past a disappointing Copenhagen side with two goals from Nicolas Anelka.

Ståle Solbakken changed his side from the formation that had served him well in the group stages – using two strikers with Jesper Gronkjaer played out on the left, rather than just off the frontman.
Carlo Ancelotti left out Didier Drogba and brought in Anelka and Fernando Torres.
Copenhagen put up a good fight in the group stages, drawing at home to Barcelona and progressing ahead of Rubin Kazan and Panathinaikos, becoming the first Danish side ever to qualify for this phase of the European Cup.
Therefore, Solbakken’s decision to move to a 4-4-2 was surprising, and frankly, the wrong choice. Copenhagen are not a great side, but they are far better than they showed here. There were various reasons why Copenhagen’s tactics were wrong for this match.

1) It meant the formations were ‘matched’
Both sides played 4-4-2, which created a series of individual battles across the pitch. Chelsea are simply a better team than Copenhagen – not one of the Copenhagen players would get into the Chelsea side, and therefore when the contest was reduced to 1 v 1 battles, Chelsea were obviously on top. Copenhagen needed to dominate a particular area of the pitch in order to cause Chelsea problems, preferably the midfield zone, if not, at the back.

2) It meant an open game
On a similar note, as observed numerous times on ZM before, 2 v 2 battle in the centre of midfield (rather than 3 v 3 or 3 v 2) creates a free-flowing, open game. That generally favours the better technical side, which was always likely to be Chelsea.

3) Chelsea got away without a true holding player
Chelsea’s move to a more obvious 4-4-2 system means they’re now playing a formation they’re unfamiliar with. They are used to three – or even four – central midfielders, always with a holding player like Claude Makelele or Jon Obi Mikel sweeping up behind the two more advanced midfielders. Frank Lampard and Mikel Essien didn’t really gel as a duo in a 4-4-2, and frequently got caught too high up the pitch, leaving space between the lines. If Gronkjaer had been playing as a central playmaker rather than as a winger, he would have thrived in that space – or alternatively, he would have forced Essien or Lampard to drop deeper, opening up space for one of Copenhagen’s holding players.

4) Dame N’Doye played off another striker, meaning his pace in behind wasn’t an option
As Chelsea’s season-turning defeat to Sunderland at Stamford Bridge showed, Chelsea are vulnerable to pace in behind the defence, especially when Branislav Ivanovic is paired with John Terry. In N’Doye, Copenhagen have a player with explosive pace and power - see how he dominated the game against the (admittedly outrageously slow) Gilberto Silva in the group phase. In this game, however, he was forced to come deep and collect the ball, leaving Cesar Santin upfront. Santin is also a quick player but lacks the strength N’Doye has, and was removed at half-time. The one time N’Doye ran past the Chelsea defence with the ball, he was brought down by Terry, showing how much the Chelsea backline may have struggled with him further up the pitch.
Copenhagen were more of a goal threat after the half-time switch to their 'old' system

5) The energetic start exposed Copenhagen’s poor fitness levels
Having not played a competitive game for around three months, Copenhagen’s frantic pressing at the start of the game was a huge surprise – the players clearly tired towards the end of the game as a result.

Chelsea
None of this should take away from a good Chelsea performance – you can only beat the side put in front of you – but Chelsea won the game easily without having to do anything special.
Their shape was more of a 4-4-2 than we saw at the weekend, with the two strikers staying in central positions and Malouda slightly deeper (although still more advanced than Ramires, who tucked in).
The victory should be treated with caution when assessing the formation – the central midfield duo didn’t look particularly comfortable without the ball, but they both got forward to good effect, as the chalkboard shows.

Lampard and Essien's passing

Anelka and Torres’ relationship was a little more positive – they combined well a couple of times and both had plenty of attempts on goal:

Torres and Anelka's shooting

Conclusion
Solbakken’s half-time decision to remove Santin, bring on Martin Vingaard and push Jesper Gronkjaer forward into his central position was an admission that he got his tactics wrong from the start. Copenhagen were better in the second half, but the fatigue from their pressing set in early.
Chelsea are now in a commanding position. Their display was professional rather than spectacular – they got the two goals and then were happy with that scoreline. The Torres-Anelka combination was encouraging, and will surely get another run out in Chelsea’s next game – against Manchester United.

Alex2011

Inter 0-1 Bayern: Gomez nicks it at the end
February 23, 2011

The line-ups for most of the first half - though Gustavo and Pranjic started the other way around, and strangely switched within the first five minutes

Mario Gomez struck very late to give Bayern a crucial first leg lead.
Leonardo was without Diego Milito (injured) and Giampaolo Pazzini (cup-tied). He played Dejan Stankovic and Wesley Sneijder off Samuel Eto’o.
Louis van Gaal played the same XI that started the weekend game against Mainz, though had to make a change towards the end of the first half when Danijel Pranjic got injured. Breno replaced him, with Holger Bastuber going to left-back.
The game was surprisingly open, with a chance for Andrea Ranocchia in the opening minute, following a set-piece. Dead ball opportunities provided the most obvious openings for the home side, with their other good chance in the opening period falling to Eto’o, after Lucio had stayed up for a corner and played the ball across the box.

Bayern superior
Bayern were the better side, however, shading possession and creating more chances. Inter were perhaps surprised by how Bayern have changed in the nine months since the sides met in the European Cup final. Then, Bayern were a counter-attacking side, who played almost exclusively through Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery down the flanks. This season (partly because of the absence of those two) they’ve become more possession-orientated, and that showed here.
Inter immediately dropped very, very deep when they lost the ball – deeper than their manager wanted, as Leonardo was visibly encouraging his side to move higher up the pitch. As a result, Bayern had plenty of time on the ball – in particular, the full-backs had no direct opponent, much like in the first half against Roma, the last time they played in Italy. Philipp Lahm and Pranjic didn’t do anything great on the ball, but they did force Inter’s outside midfielders to come to meet them, opening space in the midfield. The full-back also helped work 2 v 1 situations with Robben and Ribery.

Central midfield battle
The situation with Inter’s two attacking midfielders was interesting. Sneijder pulled out to the left, Stankovic played deeper and to the right. Bayern’s two deep central midfielders didn’t necessarily track them – they instead made sure they kept the distance between themselves and the Bayern back four tight. Bayern’s full-backs played very narrow to help crowd out Inter’s attacking trio – so it was usually 6 v 3 in a very tight area. Inter’s problem was that they usually only attacked with three players – there was little drive from midfield, and the full-backs had Bayern’s wingers to deal with. Inter were the definition of a broken side.

Schweinsteiger had time on the ball, and knocked plenty of passes out to Lahm at right-back

Second half
Inter were more positive in the second half. They played higher up and didn’t let their defence drop so deep. They were still vulnerable to 2 v 1 situations down the flanks, however, and Bayern created a golden chance from a cross in the 47th minute, that Muller headed wide.
It became increasingly clear what Inter’s problem was when they didn’t have possession – Sneijder and Stankovic weren’t doing anything. The Bayern full-backs were free, whilst their holding players found it easy to move from side to side into space. In this respect, it wasn’t dissimilar from the way Leonardo exited the competition last season, when his Milan side crashed out to Manchester United, mainly because Ronaldinho and Pato did absolutely nothing when their side didn’t have possession. Leonardo’s commitment to attacking football is admirable, but it might well cost him dear again – and it’s especially unsustainable when the ‘attacking’ football doesn’t produce any goals.
Substitutions changed the game little. Houssine Kharja replaced Ranocchia because of injury, with Zanetti going to left-back and Cristian Chivu moving into the centre – but that was the second and final change of the game – and both were because of injury. Neither side changed their system or their overall strategy, both managers were content.
If you were to break the game down into nine ten-minute sections,  Inter’s most positive part of the game was probably in the final ten minutes. Such is football, that was when Bayern scored – Robben was allowed inside onto his stronger foot, and his swerving drive wasn’t held by Julio Cesar – Gomez pounced to get the goal that he didn’t deserve, but his team certainly did.

Conclusion
A surprisingly open game. Bayern were by far the better side here – they were organised without the ball, dominated possession, and manufactured better chances by working the ball down the flanks. The only surprise was that their goal took so long to come.
It has been a disastrous European Cup round for Italian clubs so far – all three clubs at home, all losing. More specifically, all three sides have been vulnerable to width and pace, and Italian football seems an era behind the rest of Europe this season.

Alex2011

Marseille 0-0 Manchester United (UEFA Champions League): MATCH REVIEW

by Gene Um on Feb 24, 2011 5:40 AM GMT in 2010-2011 Champions League



They say absence makes the heart grow fonder. For 73 agonizing minutes, my heart yearned for a certain copper top to appear in order to spice things up. Then he suddenly did. Midfield maestro Paul Scholes came on for 17 minutes and injected passing wizardry into a lifeless Manchester United attack, but the brief encounter was not enough. United were held to a goalless draw at Stade Velodrome in the first leg of their UEFA Champions League match by hosts Olympique de Marseille. Manager Sir Alex Ferguson surprised many by starting Darron Gibson over Scholes, but the 23 year-old failed to yield much influence on this European night. The match contained shifts in momentum throughout, but neither side appeared to be a genuine threat. United will welcome Marseille to Old Trafford in three weeks time for the return leg in a favorable position, but still with plenty of work to be done in order to advance to the quarter-finals of Champions League play. The lack of an away goal may be somewhat worrisome, especially when considering United's recent fortunes in similar predicaments.

OPENING LINEUPS AND FORMATIONS:
Manchester United played in a '4-3-3' shape. Dimitar Berbatov lead the attacking line in the center. Wayne Rooney played on the left flank, and often drifted towards the center. Nani played on the right flank and stayed closer to his touchline than Rooney did on his. Michael Carrick played deep in the central midfield, just ahead of the center-backs in a holding position, and also as a double pivot when United were in possession. Darren Fletcher was also employed in the center of the pitch in a box-to-box role, and also slightly left-center. Gibson was the third central midfielder, playing slightly higher up the pitch than Fletcher and generally farther to the right. Patrice Evra played left-back, and made many forward over-lapping runs in support of Rooney when the latter tucked inside. Right-back John O'Shea was a bit more conservative than Evra and stayed back in his own half more. The center-back pairing was captain Nemanja Vidic and Chris Smalling, the latter deputizing for the injured Rio Ferdinand.
Gibson might have been inserted into the line-up over Scholes in order to provide a bit more energy and pace. Despite the Northern Irishman's inclusion, the '4-3-3' shape that United used was intended to be attack-minded in nature. Only Carrick played deep, and Gibson had the freedom to join the attack. Often a '4-3-3' shape includes two double pivots, which can resemble a '4-2-3-1,' but that wasn't the case for United at tonight's start.
Marseille typically play with a '4-3-3' shape, but their lineup resembled more of a '4-2-3-1' shape. In the central midfield, Charles Kabore and Edouard Cisse were used as holding players, with the former often providing cover for left-back Gabriel Heinze when in defense. The two holding players freed up Lucho into the attack higher up the pitch, and the Argentinean was free to act as a play-maker and link player to the attack. Rod Fanni played right-back, and was joined in the defense by the center-back pairing of Stephane M'Bia and Souleymane Diawara. In the attack, Brandao was the central striker, and he was flanked by Andre Ayew on the left and Loic Remy on the right. These three attackers were fluid in nature and interchaning often, especially Brandao and Ayew. It all looked a bit like this:

Further tactical breakdown after the jump...



1ST HALF:

* The opening 20 minutes was more free-flowing than most had anticipated. United started well and the freedom that Fletcher and Gibson had to join the attack displayed an away side that was initially attack-minded.
* Evra was really bombing forward in the opening moments of the match, and the Frenchman seemed invigorated by being back on native soil. Once again, Rooney gave his manager tactical flexibility as he was tasked out wide left due to the limited selection of wide players for United at the moment. But he kept drifting towards the center of the pitch, where he is clearly more comfortable. In the attacking half of the pitch for Marseille, Remy was tucking in central and didn't occupy the touchline much. This all provided acres of space down the entire left touchline for Evra to occupy and exploit. It was a class performance for Evra, both defensively and an in attack.
* On the opposite side of the pitch, O'Shea was more reserved, but he did pick times to join the attack. O'Shea was often dragged toward the center of the pitch by Ayew's movement. Both Brandao and Ayew were interchangeable on that side of the pitch, and in general, Smalling and O'Shea did well to communicate in handling this fluidity from the Marseille attackers. I remember two separate occasions where Smalling got dragged out too far by the movement of Brandao and Lucho, but in general the young defender was very solid. Another masterful performance for Ferdinand's deputy.
* Nani had a clear pace advantage on Heinze, and the Marseille left-back required the cover services of Kabore for help. It had initially looked like Nani was going to abuse the former United defender throughout the evening, but Kabore's help and Nani's wastefulness at times made the match one to forget the Portuguese winger. In the past, teams have tried to have the left attacking player provide help to their left-back in order to deal with Nani, but typically with unsuccessful results. Marseille had their left-attacking player high up the pitch in attack, and had one of their two holding midfielders provide inside cover on Nani leaving few chances for the United winger to exploit Heinze's lack of pace in one-on-one situations. This also forced Nani to retreat back much more often to help in defense than he typically does.
* About 20-25 minutes into the match, Marseille began to grow into it. Their tempo really picked up and they began to increase their pressure on United at this point. It was a game-changer. The pressing was high up the pitch, and United struggled to consistently deal with it. Fletcher had a string of poor passes from this point and until the half, which resulted from him not being able to adequately cope with the increased pressure. Carrick kept the passes simple and tried to ping the ball around, but at times he needed to provide a more positive pass since Fletcher was struggling to deal with the pressure. Gibson at this point needed to come deeper and provide a link to help relieve pressure, but he was very liberal with his freedom and stayed closer to the attack, rather than linking play. Gibson wasn't poor on the ball when he had it, he was just poorly positioned and didn't have the tactical awareness to adjust. The main result of this pressure was that Marseille was winning the ball back in United's half of the pitch, thus in a dangerous position. Fortunately for United, Lucho wasn't much of a factor at this point and the rest of the attackers couldn't come up with enough creativity, vision, or skill to unlock the United defense. Despite being on their heels for the remainder of the half, the Red Devils were never threatened much.
* At this point, it would have been very nice to have Scholes on the pitch. Because Carrick wasn't hitting the incisive pass to relieve pressure, as was his role to an extent (unfairly or not) by being paired with Fletcher and Gibson, the attackers weren't being given service. The only times that United appeared to threaten in minutes 20-45 were on counter-attacks, but Scholes would have been serviced better with his trademark long diagonal passes to the flanks. At this point of the match, Marseille's vulnerability on the counter-attack was the space behind Heinze, where Nani would have had time and space to exploit him one-on-one. Unfortunately, he wasn't provided enough service. Same goes for Berbatov as a chain-of-effect result. Berba needed the link-up play with Rooney or crosses from Nani. At this point, I was screaming like a mad man for Scholes.
* Ayew was the only the attacking player who worried me at all, as his quickness was somewhat troublesome for O'Shea. Maybe Rafael would have been better suited for this match-up?
* With all the movement between Brandao and Ayew on United's right side (Marseille's left), Vidic was often the free defender to sweep up any mess. He did this well. He picked up on a few sneaky runs into the box by Lucho when Smalling occupied Brandao or Ayew, and Vida even tracked a few diagonal runs by Remy when Evra was higher up the pitch into the attack. The Serbian was extremely well positioned throughout the evening, and was strong in tackle as always. Another fantastic match from our skipper; Vidic deserves to be PFA and FWA player of the Year at this point.

Alex2011

续ls

2ND HALF:

* No substitutions (bring on Scholes!!!) or formation changes at half.
* More of the same to begin the half. Marseille continued to pressure, and clearly were feeding off the energy of their frenzied supporters. In what's starting to become a concerning pattern, our central midfield failed to cope with the pressure. I'm sure Fergie and his staff addressed this at half, but there's not much you can do if you simply don't have the skill and football brain to deal with it. Fletcher is a lightning rod for criticism, but he's a fantastic footballer if you pair him with the right partners. He's a great bulldog if he's surrounded by good and creative passers (e.g. Scholes, Carrick at times, Anderson at times, Giggs when he's central), but he can appear rubbish when paired with a struggling Carrick and an inexperienced Gibson.
* For about a 25 minute stretch to start the 2nd half, United were getting completely overrun and it progressively got worse. The midfield at this point was hopeless, and they couldn't involve the attack, let alone relieve pressure for their own defense. Marseille completely bossed the game at this point, but never had the ability to unlock the solid back four of our defense. However, no matter how rubbish the side, if you give them enough chances, the probability of one lucky strike or bounce goes up significantly. This was the threat to United at this point. It both felt like (to me at least) a goal was coming, but it also felt that it wasn't.
* Berbatov was drifting more to the left this half to link up with Rooney. This allowed M'Bia to provide cover for Heinze on counter-attacks directed towards Nani, and Marseille's left-back Heinze. This was needed because as Marseille grew more confident and had more of the possession, Kabore was getting forward a bit more. Therefore, the only threat was space on a counter-attack for Nani when Kabore was high up the pitch. This bit of space was United's most threatening channel but..... we didn't have the center-midfielder on the pitch who was able to provide the service on a consistent basis (Scholes likely agrees).

* Benoit Cheyrou subbed in for Cisse, and the substitute played higher up the pitch than the man he replaced. Marseille manager Didier Dechamps may have decided to chase the goal at home with this positive substitution. Kabore slid centrally into a strict holding role. Now cover was there for Heinze again by Kabore as the latter was clearly  instructed to support his back four defenders.
* Not long after, Fergie made his one and only tactical move by bringing on Scholes in the 73rd minute. United shifted their shape to a very postive '4-4-2,' but it more resembled a '4-2-4.' Scholes and Carrick played deep and United now had two double pivots to help relieve pressure. Nani switched sides to the left flank, and Fletcher moved out to the right flank. Rooney moved up top to pair with Berbatov, and both strikers often came deep towards Scholes and Carrick looking to link play with the two central midfielders. It looked like this about the 75 minute mark:

* Bringing on Scholes and shifting United's shape completely shifted the match's momentum in United's favor again. Scholes' direct approach began to expose Marseille. Carrick came to life as well at this point and linked well with Scholes, and together they were able to work the ball into the attack. United went from playing for a 0-0 draw with Marseille having run of play, to looking for a winner and the crucial away goal. The attack came alive, and play really opened up for both sides in the closing minutes.
* Deschamps possibly sensed an openness to the game, and maybe along with his desire to win at home, he made a positive substitution and brought on French international Mathieu Valbuena. Cheyrou moved a bit deeper, and Marseille now had two midfield creators in Lucho and Valbuena.
* The match opened up, United looked much improved, but neither side could come up with a moment of brilliance to unlock the stalemate. A goalless 0-0 draw seemed deserving for both sides.

MISC THOUGHTS:

* Man of the Match: I want to give it to Sir Alex Ferguson but for Marseille's sake. I've said it before... I respect the hell out of Fergie and I believe he's the greatest football manager that has ever roamed the Earth; and he knows more about football in his left pinkie fingernail than I'll ever know. But he really should have started Scholes, especially with there being rumblings that Scholes is unhappy with playing time. If it comes to light that Scholes was somewhat injured, then I understand. Otherwise, Fergie really hurt his squad tonight by not having his midfield maestro out there. As for the players, I give it to Vidic, Smalling, and Evra.... all were superb. I can't distinguish one over another.
* I keep trying not to get overly excited about Smalling, but he has been superb filling in for Ferdinand. Jonny Evans played well last year, but hasn't so much this year. This is the reason I'm trying to curtail my excitement for the young lad. But what a big time performance on a big time stage. The derby and this match show signs that he's going to be a terrific footballer. He really is Rio 2.0 in his ability to read the game, intercept passes, and ignite the attack from the back with his composure on the ball.
* Rooney wasn't brilliant by any means, even if I argue he didn't have the chance to be often enough due to poor service from the midfield. But a blue-collar effort from him tonight, he defended well on the left flank and did decently well to play as a true winger.
* Nani was our biggest threat... but also our biggest disappointment tonight. This was Nani from season's prior, not the world-class winger we've been witness to for much of the current season.
* I can't blame Berba for much because he got no service as well. The one time I can remember where he maybe should have done better was a break late in the game, where Scholes showed disgust that Berba didn't lay one off for him to strike on goal.... and instead passed to Nani.
* I'm curious to know if Rafael is now second-choice to O'Shea or if the Brazilian defender is just banged up a bit. Perhaps both?
* The fact that we're this poor in the midfield without Scholes is alarming. Very alarming. Hopefully reinforcements come in the summer. Even if our main point of attack is always going to be from our wide players, we still need central midfielders that can create in order to actually service our wingers, and also provide another point of attack centrally if teams attempt to shut down attacking channels on the flanks. Ando being out magnifies this problem, both for quality and depth. If I understood Deschamps' quotes correctly prior to the match, then I agree with him that we lack a bit of "fantasy."
* Passing certainly appears to be important; midfield passing, or lack of it, shows correlation to goal-scoring as evidenced by the statistical analysis done by Graham MacAree, of SB Nation's Chelsea FC blog. Keep the ball and you have more scoring chances; lose the ball in dangerous areas (midfield, defense) and you tend to give up goals. United might be another great case study for that.
* Getting back to the point of United being vulnerable to teams that press up the pitch against us. Obviously, no team is completely comfortable with it, United is no exception. However, we seem to be extremely vulnerable to it and I suspect this explains why we don't play as well away from Old Trafford. Teams are likely to employ this tactic more at home where players can feed off their supporters; no team can press for a full 90 minutes, not even Barcelona. At Old Trafford, teams are less likely to press us and are wiling to invite pressure and attack on the counter. I suspect this somewhat explains the stark contrast in our home and away form.
* I'm confident that we'll prevail at Old Trafford, but I'll be a nervous mess at Old Trafford if Marseille bag a goal. I hope lack of away goals don't come back to bite us in the ass.... again.
* We're certainly in a advantageous position with Marseille, and in hindsight, 0-0 may prove to be a positive result considering the injuries the club is dealing with.
* I know what you readers are thinking.... that I'm into gingers. I'm really not, I prefer brunettes, but I've had a recent affection for blondes after a holiday in Sweden/Denmark this past Autumn.

Alex2011

Marseille 0-0 Manchester United: stalemate
February 24, 2011

The starting line-ups

A lack of goalmouth action resulted in the only goalless game of the Champions League second round first legs.
Mathieu Valbuena was only fit enough for the bench, and Andre-Pierre Gignac was out completely, so Didier Deschamps used a patched-up 4-2-3-1 with Brandao as the lone forward.
Sir Alex Ferguson fielded Wayne Rooney on the left of a 4-1-4-1, with Darron Gibson surprisingly starting over Paul Scholes in the centre of midfield.
The game was by far the poorest of the eight Champions League games that have been played over the past ten days – neither side were intent on scoring, and both seemed to settle for a 0-0 at a fairly early stage.

With similar formations, there was relatively little to choose between the sides in tactical terms. Michael Carrick broadly picked up Lucho Gonzalez, whilst United’s two more advanced midfielders did battle with Marseille’s double pivot. Neither side conclusively won the midfield battle – the sides attempted a similar number of passes (449-497) and had a similar pass completion rate (81%-80%). The ball spent most of the time in the middle of the pitch, but none of the six players in that zone dominated the game to any real extent – Carrick was disappointing despite having a fair amount of time on the ball, but Gibson’s passing was more incisive.
With such a stalemate, a full-scale match analysis would be rather unnecessary, so instead here are some chalkboards, courtesy of the fantastic TotalFootball app.
Wayne Rooney's passing

Wayne Rooney reverted to a disciplined left-wing role, rather than the lone striking role he’s played recently when Ferguson has gone 4-5-1 away in Europe. From that position his passing was generally sound, although he often lost the ball when attempting over-ambitious passes.
Both sides' interceptions

Both sides intercepted the ball reasonably high up the pitch – barely any interceptions happened in the final third – demonstrating how rare it was for the ball to actually be played into attacking positions.
Manchester United's crosses

Marseille coped well with United’s crossing (which generally came from the right wing) – none of the 14 crosses from open play were successful, it took a corner to provide a completed ball into the box.
Marseille's passes in the attacking third

Marseille’s passing was focused down their left – the vast majority of balls played into the final third came down that flank.
Paul Scholes' passing

Paul Scholes’ late introduction provided the assured passing United had missed until then – he completed 96% of his passes, the only exception being when he tried a ‘key’ pass into the opposition penalty box.

Alex2011

国米0-1拜仁战术分析：这是最好的10分钟，也是最坏的10分钟  

由 cnzcnz 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer


马里奥-戈麦斯在第90分钟终于送出绝杀，帮助拜仁在两回合比赛中抢到先手。
莱昂纳多手里缺少前锋，去年决赛梅开二度的迭戈-米利托和冬季引进的帕奇尼都因伤或者因为参赛资格的原因无法上场。 他派出了斯坦科维奇和施奈德两名攻击型中场队员，协助单前锋埃托奥。

事实上的首发阵容：范加尔貌似排出一个迷魂阵：比赛前5分钟古斯塔沃打左后卫，普兰尼奇打后腰；5分钟后两人互换

范加尔派出了上周和美因茨奇葩比赛一样的首发阵容，不过比赛尚未过半就因为普兰尼奇的受伤不得不提前做出调整。布雷诺替换上场打中卫，巴德施图贝尔又回到左后卫的位置上。
比赛从开始就丝毫不显沉闷，双方都大开大合你来我往。拉诺基亚一分钟不到便觅得一次破门良机，可惜射歪。界外球和定位球成了国米的一大威胁，而劳模埃托奥一刻不停地给拜仁带来麻烦。开场阶段卢西奥在前场接应角球之后给埃托奥送出一记漂亮的传球，埃托奥的射门也颇具威胁。

拜仁的优势
但是随着比赛的进行，拜仁获得了更多的控球权， 进攻球员的灵光闪现也使他们逐渐占据了场上的主动。在国米看来，这支拜仁和9个月前的手下败将颇有不同。去年的拜仁更多是以反击为主，主要的进攻手段是罗本和里贝里在边路的突击。而这个赛季由于两人频繁而又长期的缺阵，拜仁的打法变得更加注重控球权，这如他们今天所表现的。 (译者注：从控球时间来说上赛季的拜仁并不劣于现在的这支球队，而且上赛季拜仁的打法和防守反击相去甚远，尤其在决赛。ZM说这赛季不那么依赖罗贝利的发挥了是对的，不过到最后还是要靠罗本的神仙球……)
随后的比赛，国际米兰在拜仁的压力之下回收得非常非常深，以至于莱昂纳多拼命地挥手要求队员们向前压上。于是拜仁获得了更多的控球时间，尤其是他们的两个边后卫由于鲜有对手的威胁，频频压上， 正如他们与罗马客场比赛时一样。拉姆和普兰尼奇虽然没有传出特别有威胁的球，也没有尝试射门，但是他们的位置使得国米的后腰不得不往边路走来防守他们，这就给中路的施魏因施泰格和古斯塔沃创造了空间，他们也频频带球向前，或传球或射门，给国米制造了不小的麻烦。除此之外，拜仁的两个边后卫也经常与罗本里贝里做二过一配合，以图制造传中机会。


施魏因施泰格拿球机会很多, 而且频频给右路插上的拉姆输送火力


中场的争夺
国米的两个攻击型中场的情况很令人寻味。斯内德一般在左路活动，位置靠前； 斯坦科维奇的位置居右，而且站位更胜。拜仁的两个后腰并没有对他们进行盯人防守，而是努力地站好位置：施魏因施泰格和古斯塔沃始终保持合适的距离，与后卫线的距离也控制得很好。拜仁的防守阵型于是变得很紧密。拜仁的两个边后卫也经常往肋部靠，来协助防守国米的三名主要进攻球员。这样一来就在小范围形成了6打3的局面(译者注：6打1也没用, 要不是克拉夫特, 埃托奥早进球了……). 国米的问题是他们太顾忌拜仁的攻击力，在后场投入的兵力太多，前场只留下3名队员。国米后腰很少参与到进攻当中来，而他们的两个边后卫齐沃忙于对付罗本，麦孔也基本和里贝里兑子 (译者注: 这样就让卢西奥的插上进攻显得更为重要)。 国米的阵型于是变得非常破碎。


下半场比赛
国米的进攻在下半场颇有起色。他们把阵型向前顶了不少，后防线也适当压上。不过他们的边后卫还是经常遭遇1防2的情况，拜仁也在47分钟创造出了一次黄金机会，罗本的传球被无人盯防的穆勒顶偏。
到这个时候，国米的问题已经很清楚了：他们在失去控球权的时候,，斯内德和斯坦科维奇几乎消失。拜仁的边后卫无人看防，而且他们的后腰也没有得到太多的限制，可以自由地参与组织进攻。从这一方面来看，莱昂纳多完全没有吸取上赛季的教训，这和上赛季AC米兰输给曼联的方式几乎如出一辙：米兰失去控球权à小罗和帕托无所事事à球队最终失利。莱昂纳多致力于攻势足球的决心是令人钦佩的，但是他这种坚持的代价未免过高了一些。当这种所谓的”攻势足球”不能产生进球的时候，它也就难以为继了。
双方的换人并没有改变局面。哈贾拉换下了膝盖受伤的拉诺基亚，齐沃去顶拉诺基亚的中卫位置，萨内蒂于是移到了左后卫盯防罗本，哈贾拉打起了熟悉的后腰位置。但谁都没有想到这居然是全场比赛的最后一次换人，而两次换人居然全部都是由伤病引起的被动换人。莱昂纳多和范加尔都没有对球队的战术体系进行变动，也许大家对0比0的比分都很满意。
如果把比赛割裂成10分钟的片段，国米最有威胁的时段应该最后10分钟。但是这就是足球，在国米表现最好的时候，拜仁进球了。罗本再一次放出了天下皆知的大招：内切---射门---神仙球。他射出的诡异弧线让塞萨尔罕见地发生了扑球脱手这样的失误，戈麦斯终于不负众望补射中的。戈麦斯本场比赛的平淡表现可能让人觉得这个进球有点拣皮夹的嫌疑，但是整场表现出色的拜仁，确实应该得到一个进球的回报。

结论
这场比赛的开放程度在欧冠淘汰赛中是不多见的。拜仁的表现更为出色，他们阵型组织的很好，占据了55%的控球时间, 通过边路配合创造了更多的得分机会。从整场比赛来看，他们直到90分钟才获得领先有些出乎我们的意料。
刚刚结束的八分之一决赛第一回合的比赛对于意甲球队来说可以说是一场恶梦。三支主场作战的球队无一幸免。而且三支球队都被宽度和速度所击败，似乎从战术角度来说，意大利球队已经开始落伍了。
原帖地址:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/23/inter-0-1-bayern-tactics/

Alex2011

哥本哈根0-2切尔西：442阵型的对决  

由 trueblueseu 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer



        凭借阿内尔卡的两粒入球，切尔西轻松击败沮丧的哥本哈根人。

        索尔贝肯改变了在小组赛阶段运转良好的阵型（哥本哈根小组赛阵型分析在此：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/11/25/rubin-1-0-copenhagen-tactics/）——两名球员搭档锋线，格伦夏尔不再埋伏在他们身后（活跃在中路的边锋：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/12/03/introducing-the-central-winger/），而是改在左翼活动。
        安切洛蒂把德罗巴摁在了板凳上，托雷斯和阿内尔卡联袂出阵。
       哥本哈根在小组赛阶段表现出色，他们主场逼平巴萨并力压喀山鲁宾和帕纳辛纳科斯出线，成为史上首支晋级欧冠淘汰赛阶段的丹麦球队。
        因此，索尔贝肯变阵为442的举动相当令人吃惊，说老实话，这是个糟糕的决定。哥本哈根并不是顶尖球队，但周中的比赛远远不能体现他们的最好水平。有很多原因可以说明哥本哈根的战术为何失策，下面我们逐一分析。

1、442阵型意味着比赛简化成了个人PK
       由于两支球队都踢442阵型，比赛中自然会有很多的球员个人对位，而切尔西就是要比哥本哈根强——任何一名哥本哈根的球员都无法在蓝军阵中立足，因此当比赛简化为球员间的1VS1对抗时，切尔西取得了巨大的优势。哥本哈根需要在局部区域取得人数优势，这样才能找到切尔西的漏洞，如果可以主导中场自然很完美，若能找到对方防线的弱点也不赖。
2、这意味着比赛相当开放
        ZM曾分析过很多场类似的比赛，我们发现，和3VS3或3VS2的中场PK比起来，2VS2的中场对抗会导致比赛更加快速、更加开放。作为技术更加出色的一方，切尔西自然更欢迎这样的比赛。
3、切尔西得以摆脱没有控球型中场的窘境
       切尔西在本场比赛中变阵为更加典型的442，这意味着他们在一个球员并不熟悉的体系中运转。他们早已习惯了3名，甚至是4名中场中路球员的组合——两名球员稍稍突前，担任控球型后腰的马克莱莱或米克尔负责扫荡后方。兰帕德和埃辛并未在442阵型的中场中路奏出完美的二重唱，很多时候他们俩压得过于靠上，导致后防和中场间出现大片空当。如果格伦夏尔不是去踢边锋，而是出任中场组织者的话，他本可以在这片区域兴风作浪——此外，这种安排还可能会导致兰帕德或埃辛的后撤，这样一来本方的控球型后腰就有了发挥的空间。
4、恩多耶和锋线队友各自为战，利用速度打身后的战术无从发挥
        蓝军本赛季的转折点是在斯坦福桥惨败于桑德兰，那场比赛证明蓝军容易被对方利用速度打身后，特别是当特里和伊万搭档时更是如此。哥本哈根的恩多耶拥有出色的爆发力和力量，看看他在小组赛是如何肆无忌惮地完爆吉尔伯托-席尔瓦的吧（恩多耶的完美发挥：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/10/01/panathinaikos-2-0-copenhagen-tactics/）。可在这场比赛中，他不得不频繁回撤拿球，这导致桑廷在锋线上孤单影只。桑廷同样是以速度见长的球员，但他不具备恩多耶那样的力量，发挥受限的他中场休息时就被换下。下半场恩多耶曾突破了对方防线一次，无奈的特里只能选择将他放倒，这表明如果恩多耶的位置更加靠前，切尔西的防线本该遇到更大的考验。


下半场哥本哈根换回了自己熟悉的阵型，表现大有起色

5、过于积极的开场暴露了哥本哈根的体能弱点
       哥本哈根在最近3个月里都没有正式比赛可踢，因此开场时他们的疯狂压迫着实让人吃了一惊——但恶果是显而易见的，他们的球员在比赛末段明显体力不支。

切尔西

        尽管哥本哈根表现不佳，切尔西的精彩表现也不该被掩盖——通常来说要拿下这个对手需要付出艰辛的努力，但切尔西做到了兵不血刃地带走胜利。
       和周末的足总杯比起来（坑爹的点球：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/19/chelsea-1-1-everton-aet-everton-through-after-shoot-out/），他们在这场比赛中的阵型更接近一个典型的442，两名前锋在中路游动。马卢达的位置稍稍靠后，但仍要比右路回撤更深的拉米雷斯更靠近锋线。
        尽管轻松获胜，切尔西仍要注意到阵型中的问题——两名中路球员在无球状态下有些无所适从，好在他们压上的效果非常明显——正如下面的战术板所示。


兰帕德和埃辛的传球统计

阿内尔卡和托雷斯的搭档则擦出了更多的火花——他们曾几次踢出精妙的配合，两人都获得了不少得分良机。

托雷斯和阿内尔卡的射门统计

结论

       索尔贝肯意识到了自己布阵的失误，于是他在中场休息时用文加德换下桑廷，并将格伦夏尔挪回了中路。哥本哈根在下半场的表现大有改观，但开场的压迫式防守导致他们很快就体力不支。
        切尔西主导了整场比赛，他们的表现如教科书般标准，并未出什么奇招异式。他们收获了两个进球，对这个比分也心满意足，托雷斯-阿内尔卡的搭配同样相当来电，我们可以期待他们下周和曼联的恶战了。

原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/23/copenhagen-0-2-chelsea-4-4-2-v-4-4-2/
译者：trueblueseu
完工日期：2011年2月24日

北极海

这个贴真不错

虽然比赛来不及一场一场细看，但在阵型图和文字解析的帮助下还是能大概了解16强赛的大体技战术组织

在没看比赛的情况下，【ZM】的分析是看集锦或看国内媒体的评论所无法替代的

感谢90兄

pedro

38# 北极海

版主客气了

不好意思

成了二道贩子

呵呵

pedro

里昂1-1皇家马德里战术分析：阿贝罗亚难配C罗 激烈有余机会寥寥  
由 dfich 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

里昂1-1皇家马德里：全场激烈的比赛

2011/2/22

首发阵容

卡里姆·本泽马在回归里昂之战中进球，但巴菲蒂比·戈米斯在比赛结束前攻入了扳平的一球。

克劳德·普埃尔排出了一个4-2-3-1的阵型，和上周末的比赛只做出了一处改变。吉米·布莱德对阵南锡的华丽倒钩不足以保证他首发出场，所以巴西人米歇尔·巴斯托斯取而代之。

来自穆里尼奥的阵容小意外出现在左后卫位置上。马塞洛被弃用，阿尔瓦罗·阿贝罗亚首发出场。

比赛自始至终皇马都有点受到压制，而且有段时间比赛处于安静的状态，因为两边都不想真正接过主动权并且都等着防守反击的机会。

这比赛绝不“难看”，但好一段时间在战术上相当乏味。这是一场4-2-3-1之间的对话，比赛没有一个总体的规律，两个进球都有运气的成分在里面，而且没有一位教练在战术上决定性地超过另一位。这场比赛可以得到的要点很少。

阿贝罗亚-罗纳尔多组合失灵

阿贝罗亚和克里斯蒂亚诺·罗纳尔多在左路的组合没有取得特别的优势。广泛认为穆里尼奥弃用马塞洛是因为他想要有个防守更安全的人在场上，但是实际上阿贝罗亚天生的防守属性招致了压力，并使得皇马速度变慢，球路更容易被预判。

两位逆足球员在同一翼的情况下，边路能否运转正常值得我们发问。上赛季的战术趋势是打逆足边锋，但是这些差不多总是和进攻型边后卫结合在一起使用。这是个双向的体系——边锋内切为插上的边卫创造空间，插上的边卫带走防守为边锋赢得机会。

皇马尝试走C罗这边,所以里昂在他们的右边区域创造了大量的抢断

当你有一个寻求内切射门（如同C罗必然要做的）的边锋再搭配一个逆足又插上不彻底的边卫，你就会变得容易对付。罗纳尔多展现了数次精彩的单车绝技，但他仅有的三次射门尝试都是来自于任意球。他对球队的贡献并不只是进球，但尽管作为一名边锋，他是皇马主要的对球门制造威胁的人，而本场却被扼杀。马塞洛的套边插上对C罗比赛中的发挥至关重要。

皇马仍旧尝试打边路，意味着里昂基本上在右后方位置得球。另外一边，安格尔·迪玛利亚内收，而且也想要内切用惯用脚打门。

里昂防守上佳，进攻不给力

里昂控球率比皇马低但上半场更具威胁。他们数次浪费禁区内的机会，比如巴斯托斯和戈米斯都错过了绝佳机会。巴斯托斯转到球场左路的时候里昂表现更好，他在快攻中可以和左后卫阿里·西索科配合——另一边，安东尼·雷维埃守住位置对抗罗纳尔多。

里昂很好地处理了中场——他们让皇马在本方半场得球，但接着在皇马试图把球交给前场四人组的时候紧逼。皇马的六位防守球员很少有推进，因此对里昂而言防守的时候就没有“意外”的因素了。门苏·厄齐尔踢了一场很安静的比赛——他只有在纵深穿插或移到侧翼的时候对比赛稍有影响——战术板上他的传球数据展现了一道围绕禁区完美的“墙”（被一记单个的传球和两个角球所破坏），说明他无法渗透。

门苏·厄齐尔很少有禁区内或附近影响比赛的时刻

然而，里昂在中场赢得球权的时候并没有制造出多少机会，因为哈维·阿隆索和塞米·赫迪拉坚守了位置。

下半场

皇马下半场打得有起色，他们提升了速度，加快了向危险区域转移球的频率。相比有中场四人的护卫时，里昂的后卫四人组直接面对冲击的时候显得更加紧张。

双方教练都用板凳队员改变了比赛。本泽马的进球来自于他离开板凳席上场后第一次触球，而普埃尔换上了三个新人，都是进攻队员，使得里昂增加了新的进攻威胁，推动他们取得了后来的进球。穆里尼奥用马塞洛换下了厄齐尔，前者踢起了中场左路，搭档拉斯·迪亚拉和阿隆索。

结论

平局或许是一个公平的结果。没有哪一边踢得特别好——里昂禁区内得球时没有抓住大部分机会，而皇马在C罗迟钝、厄齐尔安静和迪玛利亚发挥平平的情况下连禁区内拿球的机会都很少。

形势依然对皇马有利——根据Opta，冠军联赛之前14支首回合客场1-1打平的球队中，11支回到主场最终晋级。

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/22/lyon-1-1-real-madrid-tactics/

译者：dfich
完工：2011/2/24

午时靡深蓝

车子和哥本哈根这场我不是很同意ZM的看法啊，两队阵型完全不一样，不是442VS442这么简单，车子接近433，中场没有宽度，而哥本哈根接近菱形442，只不过中场克劳德米尔跑动范围非常大，攻如前腰，守如后腰而已。

Alex2011

41# 午时靡深蓝

这是每日邮报上一张阵型图，看法与zm也有差异

午时靡深蓝

呵呵，LZ的ZM专贴还是很好的，值得借鉴
不过上面每日邮报的图太不专业了，马赛那里错的离谱

Alex2011

43# 午时靡深蓝

对了，每日邮报那个图貌似是预测图

北极海

43# 午时靡深蓝

对了，每日邮报那个图貌似是预测图
Alex2011 发表于 2011-2-25 11:48

肯定是预测图

连首发名单都与实际不符，位置上不符的更多

pedro

Birmingham 2-1 Arsenal: Martins scores late tap-in to win the cup
伯明翰2-1阿森纳:马丁斯最后时刻绝杀得分为主队赢得英格兰联赛杯
February 27, 2011

The starting line-ups

Birmingham blunted Arsenal, and took their chances to record a huge Carling Cup final shock.
Alec McLeish chose to field a 4-5-1 system from the start, despite favouring 4-4-2 in the league recently. Keith Fahey started on the left, Sebastian Larsson on the right, with Nikola Zigic alone upfront.
With Theo Walcott and Cesc Fabregas out, Arsene Wenger’s only decision was between Tomas Rosicky and Nicklas Bendtner. He chose Rosicky to play in the middle, with Samir Nasri moving out to the right.
The game hadn’t settled down before Birmingham threatened – Lee Bowyer darted through the defence and was brought down by Wojciech Szczesny – but was wrongly flagged offside and Arsenal breathed a sigh of relief.

Birmingham cautious 伯明翰小心谨慎
That was a rare occasion Birmingham threatened in open play in the first half. Their game early on was about settling in, competing in the midfield and keeping it tight. The use of three central midfielders meant they weren’t outnumbered in the centre of the pitch, and this was the zone where McLeish’s side did their best work.
On paper Barry Ferguson was the deepest of the three midfielders, picking up Rosicky. Ahead, Lee Bowyer and Craig Gardner broadly picked up Alex Song and Jack Wilshere, but as Arsenal’s midfield rotated, with Rosicky sometimes coming deep and Song and Wilshere taking it in turns to go forward, Birmingham’s midfield trio was happy to do the same – sometimes Garnder became the deepest midfielder, occasionally it was Bowyer.

Narrowness 中场密集防守
In addition, Birmingham’s wide players played very narrow, meaning they often looked as if they were using five central midfielders. By packing the centre of the pitch, Birmingham forced Arsenal into misplaced passes and Wenger’s side never really got that aspect of their game going, despite a good surface. Arsenal’s full-backs were forced narrow when out of possession in response to Birmingham’s lack of width, which meant that Gael Clichy and Bacary Sagna’s first movement when Arsenal won possession was often a run straight out towards the touchlines to stretch the play.
That was the extent of Birmingham’s tactics early on – stopping Arsenal. There was no obvious strategy in terms of goalscoring, other than launching balls towards Zigic. Still, that tactic worked perfectly – the Serb forced a corner after Arsenal gave the ball away cheaply, and from the resulting corner nodded the ball in.

Arsenal sloppy 阿森纳中前场脱节且乏力
Arsenal didn’t get going upfront in the first half. Rosicky was quiet, and failed to provide a link between midfield and attack. That was partly his poor performance and partly Birmingham’s doing, by crowding him in the centre, but when the wide players pushed forward to make it a 4-2-1-3, Arsenal had problems getting the ball forward. None of their attacking four had a particularly good game individually – Wilshere was probably the standout player in the first half – but Robin van Persie’s equaliser was a brilliant strike out of nothing, and it was 1-1 at half time.

Second half 下半场
The general pattern of play continued in the second half, though Arsenal seemed to defend higher, to get Zigic away from the penalty box as much as possible.
McLeish showed more intent to get a goal, however. He brought on Jean Beausejour for Craig Gardner, with Fahey coming inside. This offered slightly more width in attack, though it’s difficult to remember Beausejour doing anything notable on the ball.
Arsenal gradually started to play and had a good spell of pressure around the hour mark, forcing Ben Foster into some great saves – Rosicky got involved and Nasri was more prominent, and those two looked much brighter. Arsenal’s passing was better, they kept the ball for longer, and did more in the final third. It seemed to be only a matter of time before they went ahead.

Changes 换人是关键、高下分明
Substitutions were crucial, however. Wenger replaced van Persie, who was injured scoring the goal and didn’t seem to recover from the knock, and brought on Nicklas Bendtner. Soon after, Arshavin made way for Marouane Chamakh. These changes meant Arsenal were less comfortable on the ball, though. Bendtner and Chamakh are not as good passers as van Persie and Arshavin, and Arsenal were less threatening and assured in possession.
Those changes might have convinced McLeish that he could throw on another striker. Fahey was removed, Obafemi Martins was brought on upfront. With Arsenal having moved high up the pitch in response to Zigic’s threat, Martins’ pace behind was set to provide them with another problem – and it did, but only after he’d put his side 2-1 up. A disastrous cock-up at the back was responsible, with Laurent Kosicelny and Szczesny to blame, handing Martins an open goal.
Arsenal chucked the ball forward late on, but it was Birmingham’s day.

Conclusion
McLeish’s tactics in the centre of the pitch worked well for the majority of the game. Statistics show that Arsenal had more possession, more shots, more shots on target – but that was to be expected, and probably would have happened whatever tactics Birmingham used. The difference in class between the two sides on paper was minimised, and only briefly in the second half were Birmingham significantly under pressure.
McLeish also deserves credit for steadily increasing his attacking threat – a winger and a striker on for two midfielders takes guts (especially considering that the performance in the midfield was why they were doing so well), and whilst the winning goal was a disappointing way for a final to be won (or lost, if you like), Birmingham deserved a bit of luck after the early offside/penalty incident.

pedro

Bayern 1-3 Dortmund: Schweinsteiger tries to play deep, but Dortmund don’t let him play
拜仁1-3多特蒙德:小猪拿球活动区域靠后,但是多特蒙德却让他不能如愿以偿
February 27, 2011

The starting line-ups 双方首发阵型

Dortmund ended Bayern’s faint hopes of winning the Bundesliga with an impressive victory.

Louis van Gaal kept the same XI that started the midweek win over Inter. Luis Gustavo played at left-back, whilst Danijel Pranjic was in the centre of midfield.
Jurgen Klopp made one outfield change, welcoming back Neven Subotic in place of Felipe Santana, and also gave a debut to Mitchell Langerak in goal.
The first 20 minutes of this game were probably the most exciting of the European season so far, given the importance of the game. Dortmund went ahead on nine minutes when Lucas Barrios sidefooted home after Bastian Schweinsteiger was caught in possession, Bayern quickly equalised when Gustavo turned in a corner, then Nuri Sahin curled a wonderful shot into the corner to make it 1-2 after 18 minutes.

Open game 开放的比赛
The frantic start to the  game was helped by both sides’ commitment to attacking football. Often games like this are cagey early on, with both sides sitting back, playing on the counter and waiting for the other to make the first move. The openness made for a fantastic contest, with both sides playing high up the pitch.
Tactically, we had two 4-2-3-1s up against each other, a relatively common feature of European (and in particular, German) football this season. The two shapes were very different in practice, however. Bayern’s was based around width, with Arjen Robben hugging the touchline without the ball, and Frank Ribery staying reasonably wide and drifting deeper to collect the ball.
Dortmund’s two wide players played much narrower, coming inside early and attempting to combine with Barrios. They frequently got plenty of men into the box, and played a more direct form of football compared to Bayern’s patient passing game.

Schweinsteiger deep 小猪位置靠后
The defining feature of the game was the role of Schweinsteiger, who played very deep and dropped between the centre-backs both in and out of possession. We’re relatively accustomed to seeing holding midfielders drop between the centre-backs to provide a passing option at goal-kicks, which gets out of the natural press of a 4-4-2 / 4-2-3-1 quite easily. Schweinsteiger frequently simply looked like a third centre-back, though – within the first five minutes he found himself caught under a cross, and Robert Lewandowski sneaked in behind and volleyed over.
It’s not clear why he played in such a deep position. The average position diagram below shows that, in the first half, he was often level with his centre-backs. This could have been simply to provide an extra man at the back (Bayern’s centre-back partnership is far from established) or it could have been so he got more time on the ball. The former isn’t his strength, however, and the latter didn’t happen because Dortmund put a particular emphasis on closing him down when he  got the ball. The first goal came when Bayern played the ball to Schweinsteiger, and Lewandowski and Kevin Grosskreutz immediately closed him down. Schweinsteiger completely missed the ball with his passing foot and the ball hit his standing leg – rebounding to Grosskreutz, who set up Barrios.


Schweinsteiger's average position (No 31) - image courtesy of http://www.bundesliga.de/en/

Dortmund pressure 多特蒙德的压迫
That incident really summed up the game – Dortmund were putting pressure on Schweinsteiger which contributed to his poor display, but he still made basic errors. He was beaten in the air seemingly every time Barrios came in front of him – he only won 5 out of 14 challenges in the game, which for a central midfielder isn’t too bad, but for an auxiliary centre-back is a big problem.
Towards the end of the first half Schweinsteiger again found himself as the deepest defender when Bayern were facing a long free-kick from the Dortmund half – Schweinsteiger booted the ball against one of his teammates and then had to atone for the area by blocking the resulting shot with his face. This was a long way from the calm, intelligent passer we’d become used to.

Bayern keep ball deep 拜仁中场控球位置靠后
Schweinsteiger playing so deep meant that Bayern held the ball in non-threatening positions for too long. Often this isn’t a problem for them (and has become a key part of their game) but they were behind for 78 minutes of this game, and therefore needed to be playing the ball higher up the pitch. They finished with 70% of possession but too much of that was in deep positions – Schweinsteiger only completed two passes in the entire game to Thomas Mueller, for example. When Bayern had Mark van Bommel playing deep and Schweinsteiger had more license to go forward, those two would combine frequently.
Schweinsteiger’s deep role also meant that Bayern often found themselves outnumbered in midfield. When Muller moved forward he was picked up by the Dortmund centre-backs, leaving Pranjic on his own in the centre of midfield. When Barcelona used Sergio Busquets as a third centre-back against Atletico this season, they had Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta commanding the centre of midfield – Pranjic was hardly likely to do the same here, and whilst that problem wasn’t translated to the raw possession statistic, the nature of the possession wasn’t suitable for a game Bayern were losing from the 18th minute onwards.

Conclusion 结论
From the sake of tactical innovation, it’s a shame Schweinsteiger played so poorly here. The modern ‘centre-half’ or ’sweeper’ will possibly be the next craze in football, but any manager watching Bayern’s use of Schweinsteiger here will be put off from trying it themselves.
None of this should detract from Dortmund’s performance. They were simply the better team – more organised without the ball, more direct with the ball, and fully deserving of the win. It wasn’t an overwhelmingly tactical win from their point of view, though – in this game, and in this season, they are simply a far better side than Bayern.

pedro

46楼的参考译文
-------------------------------
联赛杯决赛战术分析：比换人，温格负于麦卡利什
由 Rivaldinho 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区
February 27, 2011

双方首发阵型

伯明翰抓住机会击溃了阿森纳，出人意料地夺得了联赛杯的冠军！
尽管最近在联赛中时常使用4-4-2，可麦卡利什本场还是排出了4-5-1阵型，法耶居左，拉尔森居右，日基奇突前。
沃尔科特和法布雷加斯的缺阵让温格不得不在罗西基和本特纳之间做出抉择，教授选择将罗西基放在中路，纳斯里就移到了右路。
比赛刚开始伯明翰就制造了一次威胁，鲍耶穿越防线被什琴斯尼放倒，但是越位旗语错误地出现，阿森纳应该感到庆幸。

伯明翰小心谨慎
上半场伯明翰在运动战中鲜有威胁，他们一开始的目标就是稳住阵脚，在中场展开争夺，保持阵型的紧密。在现有阵型下伯明翰中场人数并不吃亏，这也是他们表现最出色的区域。
从纸面上看巴里-弗格森是拖在最后的中场，他负责盯防罗西基。鲍耶和加德纳分别跟防宋河威尔谢尔，但是阿森纳的中场经常轮转，罗西基有时候会回撤，宋和威尔谢尔会轮流前插，伯明翰的中场三人组也很乐意跟着一起转，有时候加德纳会撤得最深，有时候则是鲍耶。

内收塞满，看你怎么传
另外伯明翰的边路球员收得很紧，有时候他们看上去有5个中路中场，在中场塞满之后，伯明翰迫使阿森纳传球失误，枪手场面上占优，却一直没能解决这个问题。伯明翰如此的占位还意味着枪手的边后卫无球时也必须内收，这样一来一旦得回球权，他们做的第一件事就是跑向边线拉开空间。
阻止枪手进攻——这就是伯明翰比赛初期的战略目标。他们并没有太多进攻策略，无非就是冲吊日基奇，但是这个战术很好用，塞尔维亚人逼迫枪手送出角球，随后在角球进攻中头球破门。

阿森纳不给力
上半场阿森纳的进攻不给力。罗西基碌碌无为，没能串联起中场和锋线。他的糟糕表现是一部分原因，还有一部分原因要归功于伯明翰对他的围抢。当阿森纳的边路球员插上形成4-2-1-3阵型时，他们的推进就会出现问题。进攻四人组没有谁表现得特别好——威尔谢尔也许是上半场最突出的——范佩西那次进球是无中生有的华丽一击，半场时双方战成1-1平。

下半场枪手入戏
下半场比赛还是如此，阿森纳防线压得很靠山，这样也能尽可能地让日基奇远离禁区。
麦卡利什看起来很想再进一个，他用博塞儒尔换下了加德纳。这给球队进攻带来了更多的宽度，虽然博塞儒尔也没有做什么太惊天动地的事情。
60分钟过后，阿森纳逐渐开始找到节奏，向伯明翰施压，他们迫使福斯特做出了数次精彩扑救，罗西基开始融入进攻，纳斯里更具威胁，这两位看起来比上半时好多了。阿森纳的传球越来越好，他们可以长时间控球，就算在30米进攻区域也是如此。看起来他们再度进球只是时间问题。

变招，亦是杀招
换人是关键的，温格用本特纳换下了范佩西，他在进球后就受了伤，看上去一直没恢复，不久之后查马克换下了阿尔沙文。这两次换人让阿森纳的控球能力有所损失，和范佩西与阿尔沙文相比起来，本特纳和查马克都不是好的传球手，阿森纳的威胁顿时减弱。
也许是这两次换人让麦卡利什坚定了再换上一名前锋的决心。法耶下场，马丁斯出战。枪手为了对付日基奇而设置的防线压上战术却为马丁斯制造了发挥速度的空间，这一点在2-1领先之后尤为明显。那是一次致命的后防失误，科斯切尔尼和什琴斯尼都要负责，马丁斯面对空门一蹴而就。
阿森纳在最后时刻频繁把球送往前方，但是这一天终究属于伯明翰。

结论
比赛大部分时间，麦卡利什在中场中路的战术都很好用，数据显示阿森纳控球更多，射门更多，射正更多，但这都是在预料之中的，不管伯明翰用什么战术都是如此。两队在纸面上的差距已经被缩小到了最低限度，伯明翰也只有在下半场明显感受到了压力。
麦卡利什还应当为最后时刻加强进攻而得到褒奖，他用一名边锋和一名前锋换下了两名表现出色的中场，最后的失球防守固然让阿森纳感到失望，但是考虑都伯明翰在比赛初期就被漏判一次点球，这点运气的弥补也是应得的。

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/27/birmingham-2-1-arsenal-tactics/
译者：Rivaldinho

pedro

拜仁主场输球，小猪的表现以及位置，成了zm评论的焦点问题

centre - half or sweeper，具体如何定位呢？

文章中，还将巴萨的布茨克斯作为范例，来分析小猪角色

pedro

47楼的参考译文
----------------------------
拜仁1-3多特蒙德战术分析：小猪意欲坐镇后方，多特让其弄巧成拙  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer
http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/27/bayern-1-3-dortmund-tactics/



多特蒙德用一场漂亮的胜利终结了拜仁联赛夺冠的微弱希望。

范加尔沿用了周中战胜国米的原班十一人。古斯塔沃踢左后卫，普兰济奇则出现在中场中路。

克洛普作出了一个改动，苏博蒂奇取代桑塔纳重回首发，其他人选都和预期一样。

比赛前20分钟可能是本赛季欧洲联赛迄今为止最让人兴奋的20分钟，由于比赛的重要性。多特蒙德在第9分钟取得领先，施魏因施泰格被断球，随后巴里奥斯推射破门；拜仁很快还以颜色，通过角球由古斯塔沃攻入；之后第18分钟沙欣一脚弧线球直挂死角，2-1。

开放的比赛

双方对攻势足球的执着造就了比赛的疯狂开局。通常这样的比赛双方在开局阶段都会谨小慎微：固守后方，伺机反击，等对方先行动。而本场比赛双方都把阵线压上，开放的场面成就了精彩的比赛。

从阵型上看，双方用的都是4-2-3-1，这是本赛季欧洲足球一个相对常见的场面（尤其是德甲）。不过在实际操作上双方相当不同。拜仁的战术构建在场地的宽度上，罗本无球时贴在边线上，里贝里也相当靠边，回收到更靠后的地方接球。

多特蒙德的两名边路球员则靠里得多，他们早早地进入中路，尝试与巴里奥斯配合。多特蒙德频频以多人冲击禁区，相对于拜仁耐心的倒脚，他们的踢法更为直接。

施魏因施泰格回撤

比赛的关键因素在于施魏因施泰格的角色，他回收得很深，无论有球还是无球都后撤到了两名中后卫之间的位置上。相对而言，更经常看到后腰回收到中卫之间的场面是接应门将传球，给守门员开门球时多一个传球路线的选择，这样可以很容易地摆脱4-4-2或4-2-3-1阵型的压迫。不过施魏因施泰格频频扮演第三中卫的角色——前5分钟内，一次传中就越过了他，莱万多夫斯基从后边插上的凌空抽射打飞。

不清楚他为何回撤得这么靠后。下边的平均位置图显示，在上半场，他通常和中后卫处在一条水平线上。这可能只是为了给后卫线加多一个人（拜仁的中后卫组合远谈不上稳定）。抑或是这样他就有更多持球的时间。但前者不是他的强项，而后者又不成立，由于多特蒙德特别注意在他拿球的时候进行拦截。第一个进球正是发生在拜仁的球传到施魏因施泰格脚下的时候，莱万多夫斯基和格罗斯克洛伊策立即包夹抢截。施魏因施泰格的传球脚完全没打上，球打到了他的站立脚上——反弹给了格罗斯克洛伊策，后者助攻巴里奥斯破门。



多特蒙德施压

这个事件实际上是整场比赛的一个缩影：多特蒙德不断给施魏因施泰格施压，这是他本场表现不佳的原因之一，但他还是犯了低级错误。每次巴里奥斯出现在他面前时，他似乎都被打得没有脾气——整场比赛他14次拦截只成功了5次，作为中场这不算太糟，但对于一个“第三”中卫来说，这就是个大问题了。

上半场行将结束，拜仁面对来自多特蒙德半场的一次远程任意球时，施魏因施泰格又成了最靠后的一名后卫——他把球踢到了一个队友身上，随后不得不以脸挡球进行补救。这和我们印象中那位冷静、聪明的传球手判若两人。

拜仁持球靠后

施魏因施泰格站位过于靠后意味着拜仁在没有威胁的区域控球时间过长。通常这对于他们不是问题（而且已经成为他们比赛的关键一部分），但他们这场比赛落后了78分钟，因此需要将持球地点压得更靠上。他们占据了70%的控球率，但太多的控球都局限于本队后方——比方说，施魏因施泰格整场比赛只给穆勒完成了两次传球；而当拜仁拥有范博梅尔的时候，施魏因施泰格有更多权限插上，他和穆勒的配合也就频繁得多。

施魏因施泰格位置靠后意味着拜仁在中场经常面临以少打多。穆勒前移时盯他的是多特蒙德的中后卫，此时普兰济奇在中场就陷于单打独斗。巴塞罗那本赛季对阵马德里竞技时把布斯克茨当第三名中后卫用，不过他们有哈维和伊涅斯塔控制中场中路——普兰济奇不可能起到同样作用，虽然这个问题没有反映到控球率数据上，但对于18分钟起就失势的拜仁来说，如此的控球率本身并不适用。

结论

就战术创新而言，施魏因施泰格的糟糕表现让人失望。现代“中前卫”或“清道夫”或许会成为足球的下一波狂潮，但看过拜仁对施魏因施泰格如此使用的教练会打消仿效的念头。

不过这丝毫不会掩盖多特蒙德的表现。他们就是表现更好的一队——无球时更有组织，有球时更加直接，完全配得上一场胜利。不过这并非一场压倒性的战术胜利——单就这场比赛来说的话；而就这个赛季来说，他们比拜仁要好得多。