【10-11 ZM专贴】280L：替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

Alex2011

Man Utd 2-1 Man City: Rooney wondergoal 曼联2-1胜曼城：鲁尼绝妙世界波 February 12, 2011 City started well but United grew into the contest, and Wayne Rooney’s astonishing overhead kick settled the game. 曼城开场打得不错，但是曼联逐渐融入了比赛，纳尼打入领先球，而且最终由鲁尼打入一记惊艳的倒钩球，锁定了这场德比的胜利。 The starting line-ups 双方首发阵容 Sir Alex Ferguson went with his 4-5-1 system, dropping Dimitar Berbatov to play Rooney upfront alone. Rio Ferdinand and Jonny Evans were out so Chris Smalling started. Michael Carrick was the central midfielder left out. 弗格森爵士采用4-5-1阵型，射手王迪米塔·贝尔巴托夫坐在替补席，而让鲁尼担当单前锋重任。里奥· 费迪南德和约翰尼 · 埃文斯没有进入大名单，所以克里斯·斯麦林首发。中场麦克尔· 卡里克坐在替补席。 Roberto Mancini left out Edin Dzeko to play Carlos Tevez alone upfront. James Milner played in Nigel de Jong’s position, and Aleksandar Kolarov started on the left. Joleon Lescott was chosen over Kolo Toure. 罗伯托·曼奇尼，将艾丁·哲科放在替补席，由卡洛斯·特维斯担任单前锋。詹姆斯·米尔纳出现在奈杰尔·德荣的位置上，而亚历山大·科拉罗夫则出现在左前卫位置上。乔莱安·莱斯科特首发，而克洛·图雷坐在替补席。 City were the better side in the opening 20 minutes, completing 99 passes compared to United’s 80. They also created the best chance in that period, through a brilliant neat passing move, but David Silva poked wide. 曼城开场20分钟里占据上风，完成了99次传球，而曼联只有80次。曼城人还在这段期间中通过华丽清晰的传递而有序推进至曼联禁区，创造了全场最佳破门良机，然而可惜的是，大卫·席尔瓦在门前右侧的打门，却堪堪与球门失之交臂。 United start sluggishly 上半场曼联冷劲慢发 United’s passing was poor – they misplaced passes even when under little pressure at the back. Here, the absence of Ferdinand was felt – in addition to United having a much better defensive record when he is in the side, he also offers reliable, solid distribution from the back. The fault was not with Smalling, who had a good game, but Vidic feels the need to bring the ball out of defence more, and his passing range is not particularly impressive. 曼联的传球质量不佳 — 他们甚至在稍有压力情况下，后卫就会传球失误。列位瞧瞧，左路缺乏费迪南德的窘境感到了吗？！ — 当他在场时，曼联额外就有了更好防守记录，他还能从后防位置上为中前场提供可靠的、稳固的传球。斯麦林本场表现很好，他与人的合作上缺陷，不是他的错，但维迪奇却多次感到非要把球踢出去，才会对后防无碍，而且，维迪奇的传球范围，并不是特别令人印象深刻。 He is a superb defender, however. He and Vincent Kompany have probably been the division’s best two centre-backs this season, and according to OPTA’s stats, neither lost a challenge in this game. 然而无论如何，他维迪奇，是一位巨星后卫。维迪奇和文森特·孔帕尼，恐怕是本赛季英超2个最佳中后卫了，而且根据OPTA统计，本场比赛他们没有丢失挑战本色。 United were better when they let Paul Scholes have the ball, and as in the meeting between these two sides at Eastlands last season, he was the difference early on. City’s distribution from the centre of midfield from Gareth Barry, James Milner and Yaya Toure was short, calm and reliable – nothing wrong with that – but Scholes’ long crossfield balls constantly changed the point of attack and made it more difficult for City to get into the right positions. The distance of his passes on the chalkboard is notable. 当曼联人让保罗·斯科尔斯持球时，他们局势改观了，这在上赛季在曼城主场双方遭遇时已经证明，生姜头早就是与众不同。曼城阵中，来自中场的传球 - 加雷思·巴里、 詹姆斯·米尔纳和亚亚·图雷 - 都是短传、舒适波澜不惊和有效可及 - 无懈可击 - 但是斯科尔斯的长传转移球，却不断改变着攻击点，给曼城人在右侧位置上制造着困难（/使曼城人难以出现在正确位置上？）。在下图所示的战术演示板上，斯科尔斯的传递距离，是显而易见的，非常可观：总共62次传球，成功53次。 by Guardian Chalkboards City’s midfield acted as a three, with Toure starting highest up but sometimes becoming the deepest player if Milner or Barry moved forward. This worked nicely, because Silva always moved inside and Milner overlapped to provide width – playing more passes from the right flank than Silva, despite their starting positions. 曼城中场由图雷、米尔纳和巴里三人组担纲：图雷起初时最靠前，但有时如果米尔纳或者巴里向前时，他则拖在最后。这样效果很好，因为右前卫席尔瓦总是向里深入，而当米尔纳重叠补入这个位置时则可以提供宽度 — 不管他们的起始位置如何，这时这位右肋则可以比席尔瓦提供更多的传球（参见下面的题板，席尔瓦和米尔纳传球图示和数据，传球成功率：席尔瓦43/60、米尔纳35/44）。 by Guardian Chalkboards United’s wingers played different roles – Nani generally stayed on the touchline but Ryan Giggs came inside and saw more of the ball. Nani became increasingly frustrated at his lack of service, however, and started to wander. The goal came when both wingers were more narrow than usual, with Giggs playing in Nani to finish well in the 41st minute. 曼联边翼们则扮演着不同的角色 — 纳尼总靠近边路游弋，而瑞恩·吉格斯向里走而且多时看着球跑。然而，当纳尼缺少支援时，就变得越来越沮丧，于是开始游荡了。当这两个边锋比往常更靠近，随着吉格斯传球发挥，纳尼接球在第41分钟时完成了曼联第一个进球任务。 Second half 下半场 Mancini’s first change came soon after the break. Shaun Wright-Phillips (who had only played 130 minutes so far this season) replaced Kolarov, with Silva moving to the left – although as Silva comes inside so much, this didn’t affect his positioning much. Mancini could have taken off Pablo Zabaleta, who lost Nani for the first goal, and put Kolarov to left-back, but he seems to trust Zabaleta more than Kolarov defensively. 曼奇尼的第一次换人是在中场休息后不久。 邵恩赖特-菲利普斯（SWP）（本赛季至今仅上场踢了总计130分钟时间），取代克罗拉夫上场了，与席尔瓦一起打左路 — 虽然席尔瓦如此一来更多向里切，但这不会过多影响他的位置感。曼奇尼也许可以换下巴勃罗萨巴莱塔而把科拉罗夫置于左后卫上，因为红魔的第一个进球则是因为萨巴莱塔失去对纳尼的防守，但曼奇尼似乎更信任前者而不是后者的防御能力。 His second change was forced on him – Milner went off through injury – but Mancini took this as the opportunity to go towards more of a 4-4-2 shape, with Dzeko joining Tevez, and Toure deeper in midfield. The two subs combined for the City equaliser, a fortunate goal that deflected in off Silva’s back. Nevertheless, Wright-Phillips’ pace and directness did give City another dimension, stretching the United defence, so we should put that substitution down as a good move from Mancini. 曼奇尼第二次换人，则是他受到了压力 - 因为米尔纳受伤不得不下场 - 但是他抓住这次机会改打442阵型，让新援高中锋哲科与特维斯打前锋，图雷中场拖后。这两次换人的结合效果，为曼城带来扳平的机会和结果，一个幸运进球，是打在席尔瓦身上折射入网的。不过，赖特-菲利普斯的边路冲击和下底传球，的确开辟了曼城的另一走廊，抻开了曼联的防线，所以我们应该将这样的换人，看作是曼奇尼临场指挥上的一步好棋。 Ferguson responded with a similar change – going to 4-4-2 with Anderson off and Dimitar Berbatov on. Having gone from six central midfielders at the start to just four by the end, the game opened up significantly and a third goal seemed to be on the cards. 弗格森此时针锋相对地也对阵容做了相应调整 - 换下安德森换上贝巴改打4-4-2战术。从首发时6个CM到结束时4个CM一路演进，本场比赛显著地上演了开放大战，那么第三个进球似乎就要来到。 Rooney’s winner, from a deflected Nani cross, was astonishing, and a fitting winner in any game. 鲁尼的进球，来自纳尼的偏斜向底、长距离的横传球助攻，这绝对是惊艳的绝杀球，而且，这种最后阶段的禁区内万军丛中倒钩打门进球，对于任何一场比赛而言，都是再合适不过的完美进球了。 Conclusion 结论 Nothing too exciting tactically – both started at 4-5-1 to keep it tight, then switched to 4-4-2 to try and provide more goalscoring threat. In that respect, the game was rather like the Manchester United v Valencia game at the Mestalla earlier this season – where United also got a late winner. 战术上趋于保守，不太令人兴奋 - 双方开始都排出4-5-1阵型，保持紧密防守姿态，接下来转向4-4-2阵型试图加强进攻并获得进球威胁机会。在这一点上，本场比赛很像本赛季初期曼联对阵瓦伦西亚那场比赛 - 在梅斯塔拉球场，曼联同样赢得了像今天一样晚到的胜利。 The game was also notable for the identity of the forwards – the smaller, pacier Rooney and Tevez preferred over Berbatov and Dzeko from the start. The false nine is no longer an abstract concept, it has become an established role in modern football- especially in big games like this. 这场比赛，对于前锋角色认知而言，也有显著的意义 — 象双方首发时，分别选择了小前锋鲁尼和特维斯，而不是中锋贝尔巴托夫和哲科。伪九号，不再是一个抽象的概念，它在现代足球已成为一个稳固确立的角色 - 特别是在这样的重大关键的德比战中。

Alex2011

从本楼起，连转6篇zm技术流帖子，有空则慢慢翻译

6篇帖子分别是：

米兰与热刺战役前瞻和赛后分析总结[3、4楼为原文；15楼是对赛后分析贴的中文翻译转贴，此处的图若不能看时，请点击中文题目（蓝色文字表示链接），则可看，下同]；

瓦伦与沙尔克赛后分析总结（5楼为原文）；

枪手和巴萨战役前瞻和赛后分析总结（5、7楼为原文；12、14楼是对赛后分析贴的中文翻译转贴）；

罗马与矿工赛后分析总结（22楼；23楼是中文翻译转贴）。

另外，16、17楼也有2篇对枪手和巴萨赛后技术分析总结，但不是zm网的；18楼是17楼的中文翻译转贴。

Alex2011

Milan 0-1 Tottenham: classic away European performance from Spurs
February 15, 2011


The starting line-ups

Tottenham kept it solid at the back, and won the game with a lightning quick break in the closing stages.
Max Allegri chose to use Thiago Silva in midfield, which meant Mario Yepes came in at the back. Clarence Seedorf was the trequartista, and Pato was left out.
Harry Redknapp couldn’t use Luka Modric from the start, so Sandro played in the centre of midfield. Niko Kranjcar was left out despite two goals in two games, with Steven Pienaar preferred.
Slightly surprisingly, Spurs dominated the start of the game. They had more possession and played most of the opening period in Milan’s half.

Crouch threat
Tottenham had one clear strategy – to work the ball to the flanks, where Milan were light both in terms of numbers and in terms of quality, and work 2 v 1s before swinging crosses in towards Peter Crouch. Crouch, who is more of an aerial threat than he’s sometimes given credit for, moved towards the back post and challenged one of Milan’s full-backs. Most frequently, Spurs worked the ball down the right and Crouch peeled off and challenge Ignazio Abate in the air.

The more impressive part of Spurs’ performance was their defensive showing, however. Knowing that Milan’s central midfield zone was not particularly creative (mostly because of the absence of Andrea Pirlo), they stood off and focused on keeping it tight between the lines of defence and attack, where Milan’s forward three players were trying to work.

Spurs defend as a team

The most obvious priority was to stop Clarence Seedorf having time on the ball. He was tracked across the pitch, generally by Wilson Palacios, who had an excellent game, and the Dutchman made almost no contribution. Milan had the classic problem with the 4-3-1-2 – if the trequartista isn’t creating, the team becomes completely disjointed and can’t get the ball forward. Milan were sluggish, slow and unambitious with their passing, which was both a result of Spurs’ tactics and helped Spurs’ tactics – Redknapp’s side had more time to get behind the ball and take up good defensive positions.

Palacios and Sandro dealt with Seedorf, whilst the Spurs wingers tracked Milan’s full-backs admirably. There was little forward drive from Mathieu Flamini or Rino Gattuso, and in all, Milan were terrible in the first half. The only notable feature of their play was how Thiago Silva dropped between the centre-backs to transform the four-man defence into a three-man defence when Spurs closed down from goal-kicks.

Second half

Allegri replaced Seedorf with Pato at half time, pushing Robinho deeper into the trequartista role rather than going 4-3-3, which seemed a more logical move. Milan’s play picked up in the second half – Flamini and Gattuso got forward more, and Robinho’s movement was better than Seedorf’s. Still, they lacked creativity in the final third, and by denying space between the lines, Spurs stifled good players remarkably easily.


The majority of Spurs' crosses came in the first 25 minutes

Despite a few substitutions, the formations and tactics changed little in the second half. Milan stayed 4-3-1-2, Spurs kept to a 4-4-1-1 shape, though Modric played deeper than Rafael van der Vaart.

Silva’s deployment in midfield meant that Milan lacked pace at the back, and they were exposed in fairly predictable circumstances – Aaron Lennon running at the back four with the ball on the break. Modric played him in at the start of the move and Crouch finished it, but it was Lennon’s pace that won this game, even though the goal was the only occasion he really demonstrated his speed on the ball. “We always knew if we got a breakaway we could get that away goal”, he said after the game.

Conclusion

Spurs impressed in the group stages because they were gung go, almost endearingly naive in the way they approached games – dodgy at the back but potent upfront. This was something quite different – controlled in defence and strategic in the way they attacked. Their central midfield duo played brilliantly – this was the first time they’d completed 90 minutes alongside one another, and their wingers did their defensive tasks flawlessly. As Steven Pienaar says, “Teamwork & collective responsibility was the key tonight“.

Spurs were excellent in the way they defended, but it was primarily due to the efforts of the midfield rather than the back four, who did nothing wrong, but didn’t have to do anything special.

Milan were atrocious in the first half, marginally better in the second but still lacking a clear goalscoring threat, and they remain vulnerable in a very obvious respect. They now have to take the game to Spurs in the second leg, and Spurs can play on the counter-attack from the outset. This is an uphill task for Allegri.

Alex2011

Milan v Tottenham: tactical preview
February 15, 2011


Tottenham's possible starting XI. If Modric is ruled out, Sandro will probably start instead

In theory, Tottenham have the perfect footballing style to cause Milan problems.
Max Allegri’s side have been vulnerable to the same two things this season. First, pace on the counter-attack. Milan are an old side, and often can’t compete with raw speed from younger legs. Second, width. Whether playing a 4-3-3 or a 4-3-1-2, Milan’s front three leave the defending to the seven players behind them. The full-backs often become exposed to tricky wingers, and allow too many crosses into the box. Cesena showed the way to beat Milan earlier this season – sit back, and break down the flanks.

Spurs selection
Few other clubs in Europe play two traditional wingers like Spurs – Aaron Lennon on the right, Gareth Bale on the left. Unfortunately, Bale has been ruled out of this one, meaning Lennon – likely to be up against Luca Antonini – has a big responsibility to provide drive and direct running from the flank.
On the other side, Bale will be a big loss considering Milan’s aforementioned problems, and taking into account his impact the last time he played at the San Siro. His replacement will be Niko Kranjcar – a completely different player, who likes to come inside and link up with others, rather than getting down the line and putting balls into the box. In a way, that might help Spurs – their ball retention away from home is often poor (granted, partly down to an admirable willingness to attack full pelt for 90 minutes), but in a two-legged tie like this, Spurs might want to keep it tight away from home in the first leg, which means possession play would work well.
On that note, the possible injury loss of Luka Modric is another big blow, meaning Spurs will be without the two stars of the victory over Inter in the group stage. The further absence of Rafael van der Vaart would be a disaster. Tom Huddlestone and Jermaine Jenas are also unavailable, meaning Harry Redknapp really is down to the bares bones here. It is likely that van der Vaart’s availability will influence whether Spurs play 4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1 – a very small difference in terms of the positioning of the relevant players (as Jermain Defoe drops off when Spurs don’t have the ball) but a larger influence upon what Spurs do with the ball in the final third.

Milan selection


Milan's possible starting line-up

Milan have their own injury problems in midfield. Andrea Pirlo, Kevin-Prince Boateng and Massimo Ambrosini are out, whilst new signing Mark van Bommel is cup-tied. Rino Gattuso and Mathieu Flamini look to be certain starters, whilst young German midfielder Alexander Merkel may get a start to complete the trio. Another option would be to move Thiago Silva forward into the deep-lying midfield role he’s taken up recently, with some success, which might work especially well if van der Vaart starts – see how David Moyes used Johnny Heitinga, a converted centre-back, to stifle his fellow Dutchman earlier this season.
Upfront, with Antonio Cassano cup-tied after playing for Sampdoria in the qualifiers, Allegri has to choose three from Clarence Seedorf, Pato, Zlatan Ibrahimovic and Robinho. Ibrahimovic will play, Seedorf looks a good bet considering the defensive-minded nature of the midfield three, and the need for a ‘link’ player, so it might be a choice between Pato and Robinho for the third spot.

Key battlegrounds
With such a potent attacking trio and three central midfielders dominating the middle of the pitch, expect Milan to have the running early on in the game. Spurs best option is probably to play on the counter-attack, despite Bale’s absence. Defoe’s pace over the top could cause problems, especially if Silva plays in midfield and Mario Yepes (35) joins Alessandro Nesta (34) at the back. Meanwhile, Peter Crouch seems to be a European specialist, causing Champions League sides far more problems than Premier League side, and with Milan vulnerable to crosses this might be a promising approach.
Wilson Palacios is a key man for Spurs, as he occupies the zone Milan’s trequartista will look to play in. Palacios has been hit and miss in recent months, but is probably more suited for that job tonight than Huddlestone or Jenas. Modric’s passing would be invaluable, but the sideways balls of Palacios and Sandro might work well – spreading the play from flank to flank.
Milan will try and get their full-backs forward to provide width, meaning Lennon and Kranjcar must be disciplined (something they’re both reasonably good at). Upfront, expect the unexpected from Robinho or Pato, whilst Ibrahimovic offers more movement than one might expect. In particular, he pulls to the right, and might relish aerial battles with Benoit Assou-Ekotto.
With Milan lacking Andrea Pirlo and their midfield not overwhelmingly creative, Spurs’ midfield can afford to stand off, sit deep and focus on keeping it tight between midfield and attack, before breaking at pace – think of their goal on the break against Aston Villa over Christmas. Redknapp is notorious for being ‘not much of a tactician’, but whilst Milan start as favourites, Spurs’ natural approach tonight might be the perfect strategy.

Alex2011

Valencia 1-1 Schalke: two left wing crosses
February 17, 2011



The starting line-ups

An open game and some wasteful finishing resulted in a stalemate at the Mestalla.
Unai Emery made surprises in his team selection, deciding to leave out his true wide players in favour of a very fluid 4-2-3-1 / 4-3-3 system. Aritz Aduriz and Roberto Soldado both started.
Felix Magath’s selection was more predictable, it was the usual 4-4-2 / 4-2-2-2, with Raul dropping off Klaas-Jan Huntelaar upfront.
Valencia started on top. They made use of having two strikers on the pitch (something they’re not always used to) by constantly sending longish, straight balls over the top of the defence – not necessarily for the two strikers to run onto and get through on goal, but to bring down and control after making diagonal runs.

Valencia shape
They were somewhat forced into this strategy, because their unusual shape meant that they lacked width. The formation is hard to explain on a diagram or in numerical form, as Mehmet Topal (the holding midfielder) and Soldado (the central striker) were the only players who remained solidly in position throughout the game.
Tino Costa played a left-of-centre playmaking role, Ever Banega drifted from side to side in deep positions, Alejandro Dominguez started on the right but sometimes ended up on the left wing, whilst Aduriz drifted from a left wing position to a striking role.
As always with Valencia, there was an understanding amongst the front players that they would take it in turns to defend the wide areas when moves broke down, regardless of their nominal starting position.




An example of Valencia's fluidity - Dominguez's passes took place on the right, the left, and in the centre

Width from full-back
The lack of width meant Jeremy Mathieu and Miguel had to provide overlapping runs from full-back, although this was somewhat complicated by the fact that the players they were supposed to be tracking, Jurado and Jefferson Farfan, often ended up in the centre of the pitch, meaning the Valencia full-backs had to provide cover at the back.
After a tentative start, Mathieu got forward in the 17th minute and swept a cross in for Soldado, who converted at the near post. Soon after, an identical chance was fashioned when Valencia played through Miguel.
Although Valencia dominated the ball and created chances, it’s debatable whether Emery’s approach was correct. The Schalke full-backs often receive no help whatsoever from the wide midfielders in a defensive sense, and therefore are prone to wingers running at them 1 v 1. Valencia probably didn’t exploit that weakness enough.
Schalke had a different approach – they always played the ball out to their wide midfielders, although they too sometimes drifted into the centre of the pitch. Raul had a good game, playing just off the front and linking play well, whilst also closing down Topal when Schalke lost the ball.

Second half
Despite the different approaches, the goals were almost similar – a left-wing cross into the striker at the near post. Of course, with Schalke’s width coming from their wide midfielders, it was one of them, Jurado, who provided the cross for Raul’s well-taken goal, in a very simple move.




Schalke's wide men lost the ball too frequently when trying to beat opponents

The tactical battle remained uneventful, with Joel Matip dropping deeper the only positional change. On 67 minutes, Emery decided to bring on two wingers – Joaquin on the right, Vicente on the left, with Dominguz and Banega departing. In theory it looked as if Valencia were going to a wide, 4-2-4 with the wingers hugging the touchline and running at the Schalke full-backs, but they too drifted inside and made Valencia’s play increasingly congested.
Schalke’s changes also looked attach-minded – Julian Draxler and Edu replaced the wide players, but in reality this was just to provide fresh legs. Both sides tried to win the game, but neither were good enough to deserve the victory.

Conclusion
An entertaining game, but neither side were particularly impressive and neither won the battle tactically. The systems were very different, but Valencia didn’t test Schalke in wide zones, whilst Schalke’s full-backs didn’t exploit their freedom enough on the break.
Schalke will be marginally happier with the scoreline.

Alex2011

Arsenal 2-1 Barcelona: Arsenal turn it around
February 17, 2011


The starting line-ups

Great goals from Robin van Persie and Andrei Arshavin gave Arsenal their first-ever victory over Barcelona.

Arsene Wenger was able to welcome back Samir Nasri from injury on the left. The rest of the side was as expected.
Pep Guardiola also named the predicted side, with Eric Abidal in Carles Puyol’s place, and Maxwell at left-back.
Crucially, Arsenal made a good start without the ball. Having been battered in the first ten minutes in this fixture last season, there was a much better attitude without the ball from the beginning this time around. The pressure on Barcelona’s midfield meant Arsenal forced Barcelona to give the ball away after 16 seconds, and though the away side had spells of clear dominance, they didn’t enjoy the ludicrous level of control they exerted a year ago.

Arsenal high line
With the increased pressure came a high defensive line, so as not to leave space between midfield and attack. The problem with this strategy is that it only takes one mistake to allow the opposition in, and the particular problem against Barcelona is that the combination of superb passers in midfield and forwards with tremendous acceleration makes it very risky, as Real Madrid found out last year.

In general, Arsenal kept a good line, although first Lionel Messi and then David Villa broke through. Messi missed, Villa scored, and Arsenal had a spell before half time when they looked nervous. Still, their pressing meant that Arsenal were in the game more, winning the ball back higher up the pitch and building attacks of their own. Only a lack of precision in the final third from Cesc Fabregas and Robin van Persie meant Arsenal didn’t turn decent breaks into goalscoring ones .


Lionel Messi picked the ball up in very deep positions (from TotalFootball iPhone app)

Arsenal positioning
Nasri and Theo Walcott played deep and formed a second bank of four, which gave them a good defensive base to work from, with Fabregas slightly further forward.
Arsenal also played more compact than usual – van Persie always drops into deep positions but was closer to his midfield than usual, making himself available for a quick forward pass. This was something Arsenal missed last season – good link-up play from the forward (van Persie was unavailable for both legs).

Barcelona dominate
Still, Barcelona had the better of the first half, after a slow start. As always, the key to their front three is fluidity and therefore trying to define the roles of Messi, Villa and Pedro is somewhat pointless, but Messi played very deep, often coming into midfield and linking play.
However, Arsenal coped quite well with him there – whereas Espanyol responded to the same threat by bringing their centre-backs up towards him and leaving space in behind, Johan Djourou and Laurent Koscielny were reserved and disciplined, leaving Messi to Alex Song and Jack Wilshere. Song was something of a worry for Arsenal after he picked up an early card.
The expected dangerman, Theo Walcott, was rather quiet. Maxwell didn’t have many problems in 1 v 1s and also received help from Andres Iniesta, whilst Walcott’s relatively deep positioning didn’t suit his game – he was getting balls played into his feet on the touchline, rather than being immediately on the defensive line and looking to use his pace in behind. That approach was something Arsenal didn’t take advantage of enough until late in the game.

Second half
Whilst never being a poor contest, the game went quiet at the beginning of the second half, with neither side taking control and no major tactical changes. The general pattern of play continued from the first half.


The formations from 76 minutes onwards

Guardiola’s decision to bring on Seydou Keita for David Villa on 67 minutes looks like a mistake in hindsight. Barcelona pushed Iniesta forward into the front three but they had less attacking threat – they sat back too much and focused on keeping possession rather than looking for further chances.
Wenger made an attacking switch – Song off, Arshavin on, and Nasri into the middle of the pitch. Those two substitutions happened at the same time, so it wasn’t either manager responding to the other, but it worked nicely for Arsenal. Whilst taking off their holding midfielder was something of a risk, the fact that Barcelona no longer had a driving, attack-minded central midfielder meant it wasn’t an issue. Song’s absence meant Iniesta would have thrived in the centre of midfield – the two were in direct competition.

Comeback
Wenger made a further change – Walcott off, Nicklas Bendtner on. Whether this had much of an impact upon the subsequent proceedings is debatable, but it is the second time in less than a month that Arsenal have brought on Arshavin and Bendtner in the final 25 minutes, and turned a 0-1 into a 2-1.

It was van Persie’s excellent finish from a tight angle that got the equaliser, and then Barca responded and the game opened up. Twenty seconds before Arshavin scored the winner, Barca outnumbered Arsenal at the other end, but couldn’t work the opening. A lightning quick break down the right through Nasri (ironically, the kind of situation Walcott was praying for all game) saw the Frenchman pull the ball back for Arshavin to bend into the net. Gerard Pique was five yards behind his defence in a poor position, whilst Alves jogged back when he could have cut out the final pass with a quick burst.

Arshavin’s introduction provided the inevitable moment of defensive calamity when up against Alves late on, but Barcelona couldn’t manufacture a clear chance at 2-1 down. At 0-1 they’d gone into their shell, and found it impossible to emerge as an attacking threat again.

Conclusion

Arsenal’s tactics were largely correct from the start. Granted, they had less possession and had to endure some nervous moments, but that’s to be expected against Barcelona. No combination of tactics can prevent Messi from creating, and Arsenal rode their luck on a couple of occasions – but the pressing was consistent, integrated, and meant Arsenal were in the game as an attacking force.

The substitutions were extremely important. Guardiola took off his goalscorer at a time when Barcelona looked likely to have chances on the break, whilst Arsenal stepped up their attacking threat with the introduction of a wide forward for a holding midfielder. That gave Arsenal the attacking impetus and more creative quality in the centre of the pitch (with a Fabregas-Nasri-Wilshere trio) and made the comeback in the final 12 minutes possible.

Alex2011

Arsenal v Barcelona: tactical preview
February 16, 2011


Possible starting line-ups

The previous tie between these two sides was a classic, fascinating technically, aesthetically and tactically.

This meeting offers Arsenal a chance to demonstrate that they’ve learned their lessons from the 6-3 aggregate defeat.
There will be significant personnel changes from last year – injury and suspension meant that neither side played anything like their first-choice XI in the second leg, when Lionel Messi ran riot with one of his finest performances in a Barcelona shirt. Robin van Persie, Jack Wilshere, David Villa and Andres Iniesta didn’t play a part in last year’s tie but all will be key here, whilst four of Arsenal’s back five will be different from the game at the Emirates.

Without the ball
Despite the change in faces, we’re likely to see familiar patterns to the game. The first half of last year’s first leg was characterised by Barcelona’s relentless pressing, something Arsenal have to try and match this time around. Sitting very deep and narrow is the best way to stifle Barcelona, but Arsenal can’t play that way – their back four isn’t good enough – they must instead defend more proactively.
Wilshere has indicated that this will be a part of Arsenal’s strategy:
“We’ve got to change our game a bit to play against Barcelona – we’ll learn from last year, but we need to get in their faces and, if you like, be a bit nasty, in a footballing sense, to get the ball back. We have to press them as a team – there’s no point just one of us going after them, so we have to close them down as a team and get the ball back from them.”
Alex Song has said similar:
“We need to press Barcelona very high from the first minute and give them no room.”
And Theo Walcott has had his say:
“Hopefully we win the ball back quicker because it’s a massive game this season, the biggest one I’m going to play in.”
Here’s an example of the contrast in pressing in last season’s tie:
Tactically, what the sides do without the ball is the key aspect of the game. More on that in ZM’s preview of the game for ITV here.
Assuming Arsenal do press Barcelona high up the pitch and play a consequently high line, we should be in for goals. The last side to try tactically aggressive defending against Barcelona was their city rivals Espanyol – they ended up getting beaten 5-1, though the game was much closer than the scoreline dictates. Villarreal tried something similar and also lost having caused problems, though in a very different system – a 4-2-2-2. Espanyol’s experience with a 4-2-3-1 is more salient here.

Barcelona tactics
Whilst Barcelona don’t change their style between games, they do change their tactics. As Sid Lowe wrote this week: “Few coaches are as tactically obsessive as Guardiola, as keen on two key points: positioning and pressure.” We broadly know what to expect in terms of pressure, but the positioning of his players will be fascinating.
In that game against Espanyol, Guardiola exploited Espanyol’s high line by instructing Lionel Messi to play very deep – not as a forward, not as a false nine, but more like a central attacking playmaker. Because the Espanyol centre-backs saw Messi as their responsibility, they kept coming out of the backline to track him – only to find Pedro and Villa running through the space, in on goal. This might be something Guardiola tries here – Arsenal’s high line has caught them out at various points in recent weeks, and if Huddersfield and Ipswich can take advantage, it’s doubtful that Barcelona will have any problems. The key for Arsenal’s centre-backs is decision-making about how far up the pitch to track Messi. The intelligence of Johan Djourou, a naturally ‘conservative’ centre-back in terms of moving up the pitch, will be important.
Another huge danger for Arsenal is Daniel Alves, who offers a tremendous attacking threat from full-back. Last season, Wenger was so concerned about his runs that he started Andrei Arshavin on the right in order to play the more defensively-aware Samir Nasri on the left. Nasri is a doubt for the game but it would be a huge boost for Wenger if he was available – in addition to his ability going forward, Arsenal will need him to put in a good stint going towards his own goal. Again, Guardiola may change the positioning of his players slightly here – in the Espanyol game, Alves played extremely high up on the right which allowed the three forwards to narrow, and combine more easily.
In terms of keeping Arsenal out, the loss of Carles Puyol is a huge blow. Not just because it means Barcelona are without their captain and a first-choice centre-back, but because it means that Eric Abidal will have to play at centre-back, exposing Maxwell to Theo Walcott’s pace. The Brazilian completely failed to cope with Walcott last year and the quicker Abidal was drafted in for the second leg. Guardiola will have considered everything possible to put Abidal at left-back – playing Gabriel Milito at centre-back, moving Sergio Busquets there – but the best option will just be to have faith in Maxwell.

Arsenal tactics
The most obvious weapon for Arsenal is the pace of Walcott. Arsenal are probably less of a counter-attacking side this season than they have been for much of Wenger’s reign, but hitting Barcelona with direct breaks – just like the second goal against Wolves at the weekend – is probably the way to go here.
Wenger is unlikely to deviate from his usual 4-2-3-1. His only change might be to use the midfield slightly deeper than usual, in turn pushing Cesc Fabregas higher up the pitch, in something that looks like a 4-4-1-1, in order to form two clear banks of four and see off early Barcelona pressure.
Being physical in the centre of the pitch might help Arsenal, as Wilshere mentioned above, but both teams should beware of referee Nicola Rizzoli, who isn’t afraid of getting his book out.
In terms of dealing with Barca’s front three, Arsenal need to make sure they always occupy the space in front of the back four. In the Nou Camp last year, Messi was fantastic, but Arsenal helped him by being so open in midfield. In that game Arsenal were playing 4-3-3 – or 4-1-2-3 – which meant just one holding player, but the shift to a double pivot in midfield creates a ’square’ that will occupy that space well. Watch Messi’s four goals, and it’s clear how poorly Arsenal tracked him.
The most fundamental part of Arsenal’s game is to be disciplined at the back – to be switched on at all times, and to communicate with one another. Barcelona constantly catch teams out with short corners, for example – two men go to the flag, two opponents go to meet them, and then Barcelona work a 3 v 2 by another player joining from the centre of the pitch in order to manufacture a crossing opportunity. That might sound simple, but it’s a small detail that could prove crucial.
In many games Arsenal can be confident they can beat opponents by technically outplaying them, but here they must make sure that they get things right in terms of strategy and organisation, and learn their lessons from last time.

Alex2011

zm上图片在这里直接显示有问题，用goolge搜一下，看能不能找到替代的

asenal2-1barca   



  





Valencia 1-1 Schalke

午时靡深蓝

LZ如果方便的话，能否贴上巴伦西亚和沙尔克的战术图，我想看下这场的。

Alex2011

LZ如果方便的话，能否贴上巴伦西亚和沙尔克的战术图，我想看下这场的。
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-2-18 11:13

zm图现时难以在此显示，俺看能不能从google搜索到替代者？

北极海

LZ如果方便的话，能否贴上巴伦西亚和沙尔克的战术图，我想看下这场的。
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-2-18 11:13

蒂诺-科斯塔给我留下很不错的印象（单就这一场）

Alex2011

zm关于枪手2-1胜巴萨的技术贴，网上已有中文翻译，来自天涯球迷一家，不妨先转贴于此
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阿森纳2:1巴萨战术分析：让世界倾听枪手的声音。

作者：netfish513    发表日期：2011-2-18 0:44:00

双方首发阵容

     范佩西和阿尔沙文两个伟大的进球帮助阿森纳历史上第一次战胜巴萨。

     阿森纳方面，纳斯里及时伤愈回归，出现在左路首发，其余位置人选和赛前预计的一样。
　　
     而瓜迪奥拉也依然是老一套，只是阿比达尔取代受伤的普约尔，马克斯维尔担任左边后卫。
　　
    阿森纳的高位防线
　　　　
　　为了给巴萨施压，阿森纳不得不采取高位防线以保证中前场不至于脱节。可这样也意味着要冒相当大的风险，尤其是巴萨的中前场拥有传球速度极快的众多天才，只要给他们一次机会就很容易被打穿防线。去年皇马对阵巴萨时的压上已经证明了这点。
　　　　
　　总体来说，阿森纳的阵型保持得不错，可即便这样，还是被梅西和比利亚打穿了两次，第一次梅西没能抓住机会，而第二次就没那么好运了，比利亚轻松将球打进。之后，巴萨控制了比赛，而阿森纳则看起来显得紧张，不过这种压力让他们更加投入比赛，拼抢更加积极。上半场他们也有几次绝好的机会，不过小法和范佩西的射门都差之毫厘，阿森纳上半场没能取得进球。　
　　
　　阿森纳的站位
　　　　
　　纳斯里和沃尔科特的位置都靠后，和宋以及威尔谢尔组成了中场双保险，而小法则稍微突前。
　　　　
　　阿森纳踢得比平时更为紧凑，范佩西经常后撤，这样更靠近中场，使得他能够更好的接到中场的快速传球。而这种衔接正是上赛季阿森纳对阵巴萨时所欠缺的（那时范佩西因伤缺阵）。
　　　　
　　巴萨的控制

　　虽然开场不占优势，不过上半场巴萨还是表现得更为出色。和往常一样，巴萨的前场三人组无处不在，这让我们对他们角色的定位显得没什么意义。不过梅西位置相当靠后，经常后撤到中场，他就是巴萨战车的润滑油。


梅西接球位置很靠后；71次接球没有一次失误（制造3次机会）
　　　　
　　阿森纳对梅西的盯防做得很不错，朱鲁和科斯切尔尼踢得保守而稳健，梅西后撤到中场时，并没有跟随，而是把他留给了宋和威尔谢尔。宋过早的吃到黄牌曾让我们为阿森纳感到担心。
　　
　　沃尔科特没有像人们期待的那样表现出色，在和马克斯维尔一对一得较量中并没有占多大的便宜，在加上伊涅斯塔的协防，使得小老虎显得默默无闻。此外他相对过深的站位也限制了他的发挥，他只能在底线附近拿球，使得他的速度优势无从展示。这种情况直到比赛接近尾声纳斯里换到右边后才得以扭转。
　　　
　　下半场
　　
　　下半场开场显得波澜不惊，双方都没做出什么战术上的变动，依然延续上半场的踢法，比赛陷入胶着，谁也占不了谁的便宜。
　　
　　事后证明，67分钟瓜迪奥拉用凯塔换下比利亚是一大败笔。换人后，巴萨将伊涅斯塔的位置前移和梅西佩德罗组成新三叉戟，不过由于他们防线过于靠后，过多专注于防守而不是进攻导致他们对前场的威胁大为下降。
　　
　　教授也做出了调整，亚历山大宋下，阿尔沙文上，纳斯里移到中场。这两次换人几乎同时发生，所以我们不能说这是教授和瓜迪奥拉针锋相对的调整，不过教授的这次换人却起到了奇效。本来阿森纳的这次换人是相当冒险的，因为换人前伊涅斯塔正好和宋对位，宋下场后，伊涅斯塔本来可以大有作为，可阴差阳错瓜迪奥拉正好换上了凯塔加强防守而将伊涅斯塔位置前移，正中教授下怀。


下半场76分钟双方换人调整后的阵容
　　
　　反击
　　
　　随后教授继续做出调整，用本特纳换下沃尔科特。虽然这次换人对此后比赛进程的影响有所争议，不过这却是一个月之内阿森纳两次在0:1落后时换上阿尔沙文和本特纳从而将比方反超为2:1。
　　
　　正是范佩西的灵光乍现小角度射门将两队拉回了同一起跑线，不过巴萨不甘心平局，予以反击，双方你来我往，比赛变得开放。巴萨在阿森纳半场一次人数占优的进攻中没能抓住机会，阿森纳断球后，小法将球精确的传到纳斯里脚下，纳斯里前面一片开阔地带（讽刺的是，沃尔科特整场都没得到这样的机会），他带球突破，面对凯塔、阿比达尔和皮克的封堵没有贸然起脚，而是冷静的将球传给中路插上的阿尔沙文，沙皇一蹴而就，将比分改为2:1。这球皮克明显失位，而阿尔维斯进球后才慢慢悠悠的赶到，他本该快速回防断下纳斯里的致命传球。
　　
　　正是阿尔沙文的上场使得阿尔维斯防守失位，从而使阿森纳获得了这千载难逢的机会。而此时巴萨再也不能组织起有威胁的进攻，也许苦果在他们换下比利亚的那一刻就已经种下。
　　　
　　结论
　　
　　从一开始，阿森纳就采用了对路的战术。即便如此，他们的控球率也低于巴萨，而且很长时间内被巴萨压制，不过这也在情理之中-因为他们面对的是巴萨。没有一种战术能够扼杀梅西的创造力。阿森纳很幸运，抓住了两次机会。可他们配得上这胜利，整场比赛他们保持了对对手持续的压力，他们用巴萨的方式击败了巴萨。
　　
　　换人是本场比赛的胜负手。在巴萨有机会扩大比分的时候瓜迪奥拉换下了进球功臣转攻为守，而教授却破釜沉舟，放手一搏，前场放上了四名攻击球员，加上中场三人组小法、纳斯里以及威尔谢尔，使得阿森纳前场攻击力大增，从而实现了最后12分钟的惊天逆转，完成了不可能完成的任务。
　　
　　这一刻，枪手向世界发出了自己的呐喊！

-----------------------------------

注：红色文字是翻译者的自己语言，与原文无关

Alex2011

这是一位网友对ls楼帖子的评论，对巴萨目前阵容的分析很到位，担忧不无道理

作者：ytmxxy
　回复日期：2011-02-18　12:47:17　   

　　其实我觉得巴萨即使最终出局，也没什么大不了的，
　　反而可以专心国内赛事。
　　还可以让高层出血本买人。
　　　　
      巴萨阵容太薄了，联赛和皇马的竞争太激烈，二线球员又不敢多上，每次看巴萨的替补席都很蛋疼，前锋线除了MVP，就没有一个进球稳定的、具杀伤力和震慑力的球员了。
　　中场给小马的时间太少，还有蒂亚戈也不敢多用，我真的很看好蒂亚戈，也希望瓜迪奥拉能多给点机会给他。
　　后防线不说了。
　　
　　虽然还是看好巴萨主场翻盘，但一线阵容太短，真担心最终会崩盘。这赛季不像08-09赛季，前场的三叉戟埃托奥、亨利、梅西，哪怕只放一个在前面，给对手都有巨大的震慑力。
　　中后场还有亚亚图雷这个全能战士，后卫还有西尔维尼奥、马克思可以救急，这赛季全靠主力阵容去搏命了。
　　4月17号对阵皇马，会是巴萨这个赛季的决胜点。
　　
　　无比怀念亚亚图雷。

马克思，是指的是已经离开巴萨的墨西哥球星马奎斯，也是个神经刀

Alex2011

再转一个对阿森纳2-1胜巴萨的zm技术贴的翻译，翻译者很注重保护原文特色
-------------------------------------------------

阿森纳2-1巴萨战术分析：一次同步换人，形势此消彼长  
由 Rivaldinho 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区 http://bbs.goalhi.com/yingchao


双方首发阵型

范佩西精彩的进球和阿尔沙文的劲射帮助他们获得了对阵巴萨的首场胜利。

温格本场比赛迎来了复出的纳斯里，其余人员均在预料之中。
瓜迪奥拉派出的阵容同样没有什么意外，阿比达尔顶替了普约尔的位置，马克思威尔出任左后卫。

严格意义上讲，阿森纳开局在无球的状况下表现很不错，上个赛季首回合交锋前10分钟他们被完全击晕，如今他们在无球时的态度更好了。他们向巴萨施压，开场16秒客队就交出了球权，虽然此后巴萨还是占据明显优势，但是他们没有像一年前那样予取予求。

阿森纳阵线压上

随着施加的压力增强，枪手的防线也跟着提前，这是为了不在各条线之间留下空档。问题在于只要犯一次错，尤其是巴塞罗那这样中前场传递出色的对手，那就会带来极大的风险。就和上赛季的皇马一样。

总体来讲，阿森纳队形保持得不错，尽管先是梅西单刀，后是比利亚进球。半场前阿森纳看起来很紧张，虽然他们的压迫可以让他们在比赛中占得一席之地，有时候在中前场就能断抢，还能组织起进攻。但是法布雷加斯和范佩西在最后30米区域脚头略欠准星意味着阿森纳没法把反击化为进球。

阿森纳的站位

本场比赛纳斯里和沃尔科特的位置偶读比较深，与中路两位队友组成了第一道防线，法布雷加斯略微突前一些。

阿森纳的衔接也比往常更紧密，范佩西经常回撤，相比平时，他离中场的队友更近了，他也可以快速向前出球。这是阿森纳上赛季想念的东西——来自锋线的串联，上赛季两回合范佩西均为出战。

巴萨统治比赛

上半场巴萨虽然慢热，却仍然是表现更好的一方。和往常一样，他们三箭头的运转关键是流动性，要确切定义梅西、比利亚和佩德罗的位置没有意义，梅西位置非常深，经常到中场来做串联工作。


梅西拿球位置非常深

阿森纳则很好地应对了这一点。西班牙人的办法是让中卫去跟防，久若和科斯切尔尼都站住原位，让宋和威尔谢尔去照顾梅西，前者在开局吃到黄牌后一度让人有些担心。

沃尔科特是预料中的危险人物，但是本场比赛却相对沉寂，1对1的状况下马克思威尔问题不大，他还有伊涅斯塔的帮助，沃尔科特本场较深的位置也不是他最喜欢的，他老是在尴尬的位置接到球，而不能直面防线发挥速度优势。直到他下场，阿森纳都没能很好地利用这个点。

下半场

下半场开局阶段比赛略微有些平淡，两支球队都没有控制比赛，也没有明显的战术变化，比赛按着上半场的路子继续发展。


76分钟之后的阵型

从马后炮的角度看，瓜迪奥拉第67分钟用凯塔换下比利亚是个错误。伊涅斯塔顶到锋线，进攻却威胁小了很多，他们回收太多，太注重控球而非寻找机会。

温格则对攻击线做出调整，宋下，阿尔沙文上，纳斯里来到中路。这两个换人同时发生，所以不存在谁拆谁的招的问题，但是阿森纳这边的换人效果好极了。拿下一个后腰固然冒险，可事实上巴萨也拿掉了一个具有攻击倾向的中场，所以问题不大。宋的下场本可以让伊涅斯塔如鱼得水，这两人在比赛里可是直接对位。

枪手的逆袭

温格进一步做出调整，沃尔科特下，本特纳上。这次换人是否对之后的进程有影响还留待讨论，但这已经是阿森纳一个月内第二次在最后25分钟遣上阿尔沙文和本特纳，然后将比分逆转为2-1——上一次是对阵埃弗顿。

范佩西极小角度的抽射扳平了比分，巴萨随即打起精神，比赛悬念再度打开。在阿尔沙文进球前20秒，巴萨曾在阿森纳的防区内以多打少，但是最后没能得逞，纳斯里右路发起反击（有些讽刺的是：这是沃尔科特全场苦苦守候而不得的机会），法国人倒三角传球给阿尔沙文，阿尔维斯还在赶回家的路上，皮克防守位置不佳，他本可以冲回来破坏最后一传，阿尔沙文劲射逆转比分。
阿尔沙文最后时刻给了阿尔维斯一次机会，但是在1-2落后之后巴萨就没有再创造出绝对机会。1-0之后他们就有所收敛，再想拿出进攻武器为时已晚。

结论

阿森纳的战术一开始就很正确。他们控球少，受到威胁的次数也有一些，但是对阵巴萨这样的局面是可以预料的。没有明确的阻止梅西创造机会的战术，阿森纳是在赌自己的运气，但是压迫是自始自终、孜孜不倦的，这意味着阿森纳在比赛中同样有攻势。

换人非常重要。瓜迪奥拉在巴萨有反击机会的时候拿下了自己的得分手，阿森纳则用一名边路攻击手换下后腰加强进攻。这给了阿森纳更强的进攻推动力以及中路的创造力（法布雷加斯-纳斯里-威尔谢尔组合），最后12分钟的逆转由此诞生。

原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/17/arsenal-2-1-barcelona-tactics/
译者：Rivaldinho

Alex2011

米兰0-1热刺观察：西多夫被冻结·米兰创造力匮乏

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原文链接：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011 ... ormance-from-spurs/
原文标题：Milan 0-1 Tottenham: classic away European performance from Spurs
译文：1-2节 牵手奥斯卡 3-4节 迪生
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　　凭借稳固的后防及比赛尾声时的惊艳一击，热刺赢得了在圣西罗的对决。
　　阿莱格里让蒂亚戈•席尔瓦担纲中场，后防线的空缺由耶佩斯顶上。西多夫出任前腰，把帕托挤到了替补席上。
　　雷德克纳普的首发阵容并未派上莫德里奇，桑德罗出现在了中场中路。而且也未派上近两场比赛攻入两球的克拉尼察，而是改由皮纳尔出战。
　　令人稍感意外的是，热刺在开场占据了主动。他们在刚开场控球率更高，把米兰压制在半场 。


首发阵容　　
　
克劳奇的威胁

　　热刺队的战术非常明晰——米兰在边路无论是人数还是个人能力都比较薄弱，热刺把球打到边路，形成2打1后传中找克劳奇。相对而言，克劳奇的空中威胁更大一些，一般是直捣对方 腹地，单挑后卫。热刺更多的从右路下底，克劳奇反向跑到左路与阿巴特对决。
　　不过，相较来说，热刺的后防线做的更成功，表现更令人印象深刻。在米兰中场尤为缺少创造力（主要原因在于皮尔洛的缺阵）的情况下，热刺后防站的很开，并且十分注意收紧与攻击线的距离，如此极大限制了米兰前场三叉戟的活动。

热刺的整体防守

　　显然重中之重是限制西多夫的拿球。
　　西多夫受到全场的紧密盯防，一般是与帕拉西奥斯对位，帕拉西奥斯全场发挥出色，迫使西多夫在场上毫无建树。米兰受制于4-3-1-2阵型的传统缺陷——即如果前腰不能提供足够的 创造力，整体便会脱节，没有向前的出球能力。米兰整场比赛节奏缓慢，传球没有进取心， 一方面是热刺战术对头，另一方面也间接帮了热刺，让对手从容布置站位，防守固若金汤。
　　帕拉西奥斯和桑德罗很好的限制了西多夫，而热刺的边锋几乎把米兰的后防打爆。这导致了弗拉米尼和加图索腾不出手对进攻有任何支援，米兰的上半场真是糟透了。主队整个上半场唯一值得一提的是蒂亚戈•席尔瓦，在热刺打到点球点的附近的时候他能从容补位，整体从四后卫转换成三中卫的防守阵型。

下半场

　　中场休息时阿莱格里用帕托换下西多夫，罗比尼奥后撤踢前腰(trequartista)，没有选择更符合逻辑的433。米兰的打法在下半场收到一些成效——弗拉米尼和加图索向前推进次数更多，罗比尼奥的跑动胜过西多夫。然而他们在前场仍然缺乏创造力，热刺通过紧缩阵线之间的空间，相当轻松地扼杀了这些出色的球星。
　　尽管做出一些换人，但阵型和战术在下半场变化很小。米兰接着打4312，而热刺坚持踢4411，虽然他们用位置更拖后的莫德里奇换下范德法特。
　　席尔瓦被用作中场，造成米兰的后防线缺乏速度，他们遭到的攻击完全在预料之中——反击中伦农带球直奔米兰防线。莫德里奇为伦农启动了这次进攻，克劳奇完成最后一击，但赢得比赛的是伦农的速度，即便这个进球是整场比赛他唯一一次真正展现出带球速度。伦农在赛后说：“我们都知道，要是能打出一次突击我们就可以拿到那个客场进球。”

结论

　　小组赛热刺之所以让人印象深刻，是因为他们踢得齐心协力，因为他们的踢法天真得讨人喜欢——后防不踏实但锋线够给力。这场比赛大不一样，防守严于控制，进攻有章有法。他们的中前卫组合踢得很聪明——这是两人协作完成的第一个90分钟，而且边锋把防守做得完美无缺。正如皮纳尔所说，“团队协力和集体责任感是今晚的关键。”
　　热刺把防守做得极其出色，不过相比四名后卫，首先应归功给中场球员，他们什么错误也没犯，倒也用不着别具一格。
　　上半场米兰很糟糕，下半场略有改观，但仍缺少清晰的能破门的攻势，而且遇上那种一目了然的情况时，他们仍然非常脆弱。现在他们必须赢下次回合比赛，而热刺可以从一开始就打起反击。对阿莱格里来说，这是艰巨任务。


热刺的大多数传中出现在前25分钟

Alex2011

Modern football reaches a pantheon as Arsenal prevails in attack vs attack
February 17, 2011

This was a match where every detailed seemed to matter just that bit more. Every pass was stressed. Every shot was scrutinised. Every contested challenge, dribble and interception was crucial. Every bounce of Lionel Messi’s hair. The timing of Theo Walcott’s runs. Refereeing decisions. Pep Guardiola’s catwalk struts down the touchline. Every unscrewing of Arsene Wenger’s bottle cap. Every inch Victor Valdes left exposed at his near post. Every substitution. Each moment of ascendancy had to be taken. Those were the margins and fortunately enough, a huge dose of Lady Luck went Arsenal’s way also.

Barcelona played Arsenal off the park for the first forty-five minutes. Or so it should have been. Lionel Messi was sensational in dropping deep and collecting possession then running at Arsenal’s back-line. But Arsenal tried it’s darnest to limit his threat and for keeping it 1-0 and sticking religiously to their gameplan, it nevertheless must go down as a fantastic first-half effort. After the break, however, Arsenal ramped up their intensity and it was Barcelona who looked like they may buckle. Granted, Pep Guardiola’s side had plenty of the possession but that was expected. The Gunners continued to play pro-actively, undeterred by their so-called superior’s level of technical ability. And for that the game must go down as the best of the modern era. Manchester United and Chelsea in the Champions League in 2008 may have been a compelling advert for the speed and power of the evolving game but this was how football should be played: with an unerring technical accuracy, tempo and tactical complexity.

But it is more significant given that Arsenal has beaten the best team of the current generation and one who is light-years ahead of the rest because of the philosophy bestowed onto them by Johan Cruyff (although their financial ethics must be questioned). Whenever anyone has played the Catalan giants, they almost certainly contest in one way; to defend deep and look to counter attack and all with an air of inevitability and fear. Only Villarreal has deferred from the modus operandi but it has only served to highlight the difficulties of facing Barcelona at their own game. “You’re always on the border of collapsing against them,” said Arsène Wenger, after last night’s 2-1 victory and it seemed like it may go that way for Arsenal as well after they made a fantastic start to the game in the first ten minutes. Somehow a good ten minutes becomes a positive thing when facing Barcelona.

Arsenal fought fire with fire and although the possession count was a superior 66%-34% to Barcelona, it was not as if The Gunners tried to concede possession to their opponents. Arsenal pressed and squeezed Barcelona. It worked but at the same time, failed to work also. Messi had a fantastic chance when he chipped wide when one-on-one with Wojcjech Szczesny and had a goal disallowed for offside. But the highly integrated, highly compact pressing from Arsenal, which at most times was never 25 metres apart from the first line of defence to the last, constantly broke up play.  Arsenal’s best play was mostly on the turnover but fortune favours the brave and as a result, they also had their fair share of possession. Jack Wilshere in particular was so impressive that he never gave the ball away in the first-half. He had a composure in front of defence beyond his years and a discipline which was crucial to the moment. The central midfield pair delegated roles accordingly, as Alex Song continued charging for the ball, knowing that he was the better tackler and Wilshere the better circulator.

Arsenal did get a bit of joy when defeating the first line of Barcelona pressing which consisted on Pedro, Messi and David Villa. The threesome tried to close the defenders down high up the pitch but if Arsenal bypassed it, they found space down the wings because it exposed Xavi and Andres Iniesta in the middle. Emmanuel Eboue galloped up and down while Samir Nasri had Dani Alves in knots at times. But by also keeping the front three high up the pitch and the keep ball that Barcelona are capable of, it sucked Walcott and Nasri, in particular, centrally and Alves himself continued bombing up and down.

Arsenal’s strategic defending

It is true Messi had a barnstormer in the first-half but he was eventually squeezed out for big periods in the second. Lethargy had a part to play but also, Barcelona cannot really be asked to defend for 90 minutes and against a team like Arsenal, it was also going to concede chances on the break. Arsenal’s tactic was as it has always been this season; strategic defending that incorporates the Dutch principles of through-marking and winning the ball back quickly. Through-marking sees the players behind the first presser looking to eliminate the next pass through tight-marking and close attention. It is highly dependent on the structure and distances between players and Arsenal’s 4-4-1-1 in the press, which was Arrigo Sacchi-esque, ensured the team could match up well numerically. Laurent Koscielny typified the strategy as he continued to nick the ball away from the Barcelona attackers.

Much was to be made of the two central defender’s style before the game and by the end, showed that their style of winning the ball back quickly, which has been the mantra of Arsenal’s defensive strategy this season, was a masterstroke. The high-line got them in to trouble on occasions but apart from a Messi miss and a lack of concentration from Gael Clichy, it worked to great effect. Villa tried to take advantage by getting in between Johan Djourou and Koscielny and in that one instance, it worked.

<Figure 1> Arsenal’s defensive outline. Arsenal squeezed the play, looking to stop Barcelona from playing their game. Their backline was adventurously high and that meant at most times, a distance of 25 metres between attack and defence.

<Figure 2> Lionel Messi’s completed passes. Arsenal’s compactness shows in Messi’s passing graph. The Argentine had a free striker role and dropped deep to collect possesion but Arsenal tried not to let him get into the final third. (Courtesy of Zonal Marking and Total Football iphone app.)

<Figure 3> Arsenal Interceptions (Courtesy of Sleepy_Nik and and Total Football iphone app.)

In the second-half, Arsenal was more effective, more tighter and this allowed the side to comeback in the fashion that they did. Robin van Persie’s goal had a bit of good fortune but the build up was just what Wenger would have wanted. Quick passing, quick interchange and dynamic movement. Clichy’s dinked pass had Gerard Pique a bit flat-footed, enough for van Persie to exploit. Andrey Arshavin’s goal was even better as an interception at the edge of their own box started a crisp counter attack which saw two great passes by Wilshere and Cesc Fabregas to free Nasri and he showed fantastic composure to tee-up Arshavin to place home.

Much was made of Guardiola’s substitution of David Villa for Seydou Keita. In one sense it was defining but you could understand his reasoning. Barcelona was losing the dynamism and potency that their possession game is famed for and as a result Villa was kept quiet. He wanted to retain control and defend via possession; however, it only served to hand some initiative to Arsenal. Wenger was spot on with his substitutions which saw Nasri just hold his position deeper with Fabregas also dropping back and Nicklas Bendtner replacing Walcott. Guardiola’s tactic, however, also showed his flaws as he wanted to make a artistic impression when the game should have been killed off –  to teach an educational lesson with their belief in keeping the ball on the floor and moving at all times.

“We made more chances and in general terms, we have had a very good game,” said Guardiola. “But Arsenal is good at playing the position and exposing the weaknesses. When they get past the first pressure line, they are very fast. For many years they have set an example in Europe.”

The return leg at Camp Nou promises to be special and judging by the last three games against each other, the first-half will be crucial. But right now, Arsenal can celebrate even though the game is only at the halfway point. They have beaten the best team in the world and in a style that never at one moment, betrayed their own. This was a game where ascendancy had to taken. Where every moment was crucial. When football reached a pantheon. When Arsenal prevailed in attack versus attack.
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Filed under: Arsenal, Match Analysis

Alex2011

Arsenal 2-1 Barcelona: Tactical Review
February 17th, 2011 by Nik Storey



Arsenal press all the right buttons as Wenger changes game brilliantly
“We want to show them that we are a different team to last year”. Few believed Arsene Wenger’s optimism as he typically commended his team’s approach before the game. But the result would be an outstanding team performance, and a 2-1 win to take to the Nou Camp in what was Arsenal’s first ever win against a Barcelona side. It is true that Arsenal rode their luck at times in the first half – and could well have been 2 or 3 down had it not been for some poor Messi finishing and a dodgy line call – but Wenger can be proud of the way his team responded in the second half, and particularly proud of his own contribution to the success.

How they lined up:



Barcelona: 3-4-3
Barcelona’s shape was lucid throughout the game, and often Busquets would drop deep as to become a third auxiliary centre half alongside Pique and Abidal (on paper this was 4-2-3-1); this was in no large part due to their fullbacks, and Alves in particular, who drove forward to support Pedro and Villa as much as they could.
Messi started central alongside Villa and Pedro in an advanced position, but it was noticeable how he tended to drop very deep in search of the ball, much in the same way he did versus Greece in the World Cup.  Iniesta started in his usual central-left position but quickly reverted to a right-side position as the half wore on, mainly due to the fact Walcott dropped in on him whenever Arsenal were without the ball. Villa was constantly probing coming in from the left to a central position, which would eventually pay dividends for him later in the game.

Arsenal: 4-2-3-1
Wenger adopted a typical 4-2-3-1 formation with Van Persie in a false 9 position, with Nasri and Walcott to the left and right respectively. Behind them, Fabregas pushed high on Busquets and Wilshere and Song formed a defensive shield ahead of the back four. Unlike Barcelona, Djourou and Koscielny stayed fairly close together, with the latter tasked with intercepting the ball at the earliest opportunity with Djourou sweeping in behind.
Nasri stayed high and left, presumably in the hope that he would pin Alves back – but all that happened was that Pique came across to cover the area vacated by Alves and Clichy was left exposed in a 3 v 1 scenario (see diagram 2).

Arsenal’s pressing game improved as the game progressed

What was noticeable from the outset was the unnaturally high line Arsenal kept, essentially matching Barcelona’s system of pressing the ball and defending from the front. Theoretically, this would have the effect of narrowing the middle third and restricting the space in which Xavi, Iniesta and Messi (who came deep on many an occasion), but Arsenal struggled to apply the system correctly in the first half. Barcelona controlled the midfield and the passing triangles were mesmeric at times with the diamond of players rotating in such a way so as to provide a different dynamic in each approach (as usual, Xavi finished top of the passing charts, and completed a staggering 95% of his passes).

Symptomatic of the issues facing Arsenal was when Messi went through on goal after 15 minutes, latching on to a lovely Villa through-ball; but as was typical of his night, he delayed and missed the target from a glorious position to score. Not long after however, Messi came deep for a pass from Pique and duly returned the favour to Villa with a precise pass from which the Spaniard coolly finished through the legs of Szelnsy.
Though Clichy had played Villa onside, the goal emanated from some poor pressing in midfield by Song tracking back from an offensive right position as Wilshere (who was supreme all evening) moved to press Iniesta; Messi’s pass was sumptuous, the ball threaded between Koscielny and Djourou whilst evading the tardy challenge of Song.
Arsenal were however defending reasonably well and were still in the game, but because there was so much space between the midfield and forward lines, they had no coherence or fluency on the counter-attack.  Van Persie was often left isolated up front, patiently holding up the ball waiting for support.  The Spanish side simply snuffled out the danger (Abidal especially played a blinder at he back) and much of the play was directed down the Arsenal left, with Alves completing nearly double the passes Maxwell. Guardiola had clearly targeted Clichy with Nasri staying far too high up the field.

Second half subtle alteration(s)

Arsenal’s tactic remained the ambition to press high up the pitch, but this time Fabregas pushed further forward and Nasri adopted some defensive duties. This and the fact that Messi was now playing a more orthodox false 9 role, meant that the bands of players were closer together meaning that the likes of Busquets who was initiating the attacking from deep with quick incisive passes in the first half, was pressured on the ball. Arsenal’s back line in tandem with Wilshere and Song, were also seemingly instructed to press the attacking midfielders as soon as the entered the Arsenal half; this paid off as Koscielny had perhaps his best game in an Arsenal shirt, restricting the space of Iniesta and Messi in particular, superbly (see image below); Though he didn’t win all his battles, the 3 tackles high up the field indicate how quick he was to every ball adding to the four interceptions he made on the night.

Fabregas receiving the ball all over the pitch (48/48).

Koscielny 6/10 tackles.




The bunching of the interceptions in the middle (se image below) indicates nicely how Arsenal coped with Barcelona’s threat from wide; Walcott doubled up with Eboue to show Maxwell and Iniesta (and later Kieta) inside; and on the right, Nasri (in the 2nd half at least) supported Clichy with the threat of Pedro and Alves. In the central zone, it was Wilshere and Fabregas in particular who dealt with the threat with Fabregas quietly outstanding – the statistics show how he was receiving the ball all over the pitch (48/48), excelling defensively and offensively.
Wilshere too was exemplary – tackling and passing with equal aplomb and justifying the lavish praise heaped upon him from Capello and others of late. Near the hour mark, Wilshere was the only player on the pitch to have a 100% pass completion record, and as the image depicts, his positional acumen when on the ball expresses an understanding of the game way beyond his years.

Wilshere completing 43/48 passes, positionally astute.

Arsenal total interceptions: 20


Diagrams via the Total Football application.

Wenger substitutions change the game

Arshavin replaced the cautioned Song on 67 minutes and Bendtner replaced Walcott 10 minutes later (pulling Nasri back to a more central position).
It was Arshavin who having found space down the left hand side, released Clichy who played an exquisite (and it was exquisite) first time pass with his weaker foot into the path of Van Persie; In turn the Dutchman beat the keeper with fantastic precision using a similar technique to Maicon at the World Cup v North Korea, having a cursory glance over to Bendtner in order to deceive Valdes in goal.
With Nasri, Fabregas and Wilshere now controlling the game in midfield for the first time in the match Arsenal were encouraged by the home crowd to go for the win. It was now Barcelona’s turn to look slightly disjointed and Messi’s options on the ball were becoming more limited (Keita had replaced Villa on 67 minutes, leaving Pedro slightly isolated); It was his poor control and resulting misplaced pass that enabled Koscielny to intercept and start the swift counter-attacking move that led to the winning goal. Bendtner found Wilshere – who’s first time pass to Fabregas was a gem – and the latter released Nasri who sprinted down the Barcelona left and pulled the ball back to the oncoming Arshavin; The Russian calmly setting himself for a lovely right foot finish into the bottom corner.

In Summary

Arsenal’s first half performance, though vastly improved since the last visit of Barcelona, was lacking in efficiency and their pressing game didn’t have the desired effect. The lack of support for Van Persie meant he was only able to test Valdes from distance. Wenger changed the midfield dynamic slightly for the second half and the result was a mature performance from the whole team, with leaders emerging in the form of Koscielny, Fabregas and Wilshere. Barcelona were still able to keep possession of the ball but were forced into non-threatening areas. Crucially, the introduction of Arshavin completed the turnaround, as he played a key role in the equaliser and finished astutely for the winner.

Alex2011

Arsenal 2-1 Barcelona: Tactical Review
阿森纳2-1巴萨：战术复盘
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原文链接：http://backpagefootball.com/featured/arsenal-2-1-barcelona-tactical-review/
February 17th, 2011
by Sleepy_Nik
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译者：rhapsodia
2011年2月17日，星期四



阿森纳做了所有正确的事，随着温格聪明地改变了比赛

“我们要表现出我们是和去年不同的一支队伍”。当温格在赛前对其球队打法作出表态的时候，很少人会相信这番话。然而结果证明了球队表现是出色的，他们将带着2-1的比分去诺坎普，这也是阿森纳首次战胜巴塞罗那。虽然阿森纳在上半场的确有点运气——如果不是梅西射门欠缺准星，还有边裁一次不明确的判罚，可能已经落后两球或三球——但温格可以对其球队在下半场回应的方式感到骄傲，尤其是为他自己在这逆转过程中作出的贡献感到骄傲。

双方阵型：


巴塞罗那：3-4-3

整场比赛巴塞罗那的阵型都相当清晰，通常布斯克茨会后撤，就像是在皮克和阿比达尔旁边的第三名中后卫一样（纸面上是4-2-3-1）；这主要是由于他们的边后卫，尤其是阿尔维斯，都尽可能压上以支援佩德罗和比利亚。

梅西先发打的是中锋位置，与比利亚和佩德罗一道突在前面，不过他明显地经常回收得很深来拿球，正如世界杯上对希腊队时他所扮演的角色那样。伊涅斯塔出现在他通常担任的左中场位置上，不过随着比赛进行很快就换到右边，主要是由于阿森纳没有控球的时候沃尔科特会撤回来防他。比利亚不断尝试从左路跑到中路，过些时候也收到了效果。

阿森纳：4-2-3-1

温格采用的是典型4-2-3-1阵型，范佩西出任伪9号，纳斯里和沃尔科特分居左右。他们后边是法布雷加斯，他压上去对位布斯克茨，而宋是四名后卫身前的屏障。与巴塞罗那不同的是，朱鲁和科斯切尔尼保持相当靠近的站位，后者负责先行上抢而前者在后边扫荡。

纳斯里留在前场左路，或许是希望他能把阿尔维斯压回去——但场上的情况是，皮克过来补阿尔维斯留下的空当，而克里希面对1打3的局面（见下图）。


随着比赛进行，阿森纳的表现有了改善

自比赛伊始就引入注目的一点是，阿森纳队不寻常地保持阵线压上，几乎与巴塞罗那对球压迫和前场抢截的打法相一致。理论上说，这会压缩中场空间，限制哈维、伊涅斯塔和梅西（经常回撤）的发挥余地，但这种打法阿森纳队在上半场运用得很吃力。巴塞罗那队控制了中场，不时做出精妙的三角传球，球员在菱形站位上轮转以给出不同的线路（哈维一如既往地高居传球榜首位，传球准确率达到惊人的95%）。

阿森纳所面临问题的症结在15分钟后暴露出来：梅西心领神会地接到比利亚的直塞球，但动作慢一拍错失了破门良机，正是他当晚表现出的一个典型问题。但不久后，梅西回撤接皮克传球，随即投桃报李，给比利亚送出一记精准直塞。西班牙射手冷静地穿了斯泽斯尼一个裆破门得分。

虽然是克里希拖在后面使得比利亚不越位，但进球源于宋从前场右方回撤后在中场不成功的压迫防守，而威尔谢尔跑去盯防伊涅斯塔。梅西的传球精妙绝伦，穿过了科斯切尔尼和朱鲁，也避开了宋迟到一步的追抢。

不过阿森纳还是防守得相当好，也还有机会，但由于中场和前锋线之间的距离拉得太大，他们反击缺乏协调和流畅度。范佩西通常被孤立在前线，耐着性子持球等待支援。巴萨化解掉了危险情况（尤其是阿比达尔有着上佳表现），而他们多数进攻是从阿森纳的左路发动，阿尔维斯送出的传球几乎是麦克斯维尔的两倍。

下半场的微调

阿森纳的战术仍旧保持了压上的雄心，不过这次法布雷加斯压得更靠上，而纳斯里承担了一些防守任务。这种布置，加上梅西现时更多地担任典型伪9号角色的事实，就意味着两队球员站位更靠近，这样，上半场在本方后方通过快速精准传球发动进攻的布斯克茨持球时的压力便会加大。阿森纳后卫线与前边的威尔谢尔和宋，也似乎都得到了指示，一旦（对方的）中场攻击手进入阿森纳的半场，就上前施压。这种布置收到了成效，科斯切尔尼可能打出了加盟阿森纳以来最好的一场比赛，出色地限制了伊涅斯塔，还有尤其是梅西的空间（见下图）。虽然他不是每次拦截都成功，但3次在前场的拦截展示出他对来球的反应有多快，这也让他在当晚做出了4次抢断。


法布雷加斯的接球地点遍布全场（接球48次成功48次）


科斯切尔尼拦截10次成功6次

抢断的发生聚集在中路（见下图）很好地展现了阿森纳是怎样应对巴塞罗那的边路威胁的。沃尔科特和埃布埃一起迫使麦克斯维尔和伊涅斯塔往里走，而在右路，纳斯里（至少在下半场）支援克里希应对佩德罗和阿尔维斯的威胁。威尔谢尔和法布雷加斯把持中路——尤其是后者，不动声色却相当出色，统计数据显示出的接球地点遍布全场（接球48次成功48次），攻防两端皆锐利。

威尔谢尔的表现也堪称典范——不论是抢球还是传球都同样自信，证明了卡佩罗等人近来对他大加赞赏不是虚辞。比赛过去近一小时后，威尔谢尔是场上唯一保持传球成功率100%的球员，而正如图所示，他持球时对位置的敏感性表现出了超越年龄的比赛阅读能力。


威尔谢尔传球48次成功43次，跑位机敏


阿森纳队全场抢断数：20

温格的换人改变了比赛

阿尔沙文在第67分钟换下有黄牌在身的宋，10分钟后本特纳又替下沃尔科特（纳斯里拉回到更靠中的位置）。

阿尔沙文左路下底，克里希用他不擅长的那只脚踢出了灵光闪现的一传，在朝本特纳瞄了一眼以骗过站在球门线上的巴尔德斯后，范佩西用麦孔在世界上打进朝鲜队一球的同样方式击败了守门员。

现在纳斯里、法布雷加斯和威尔谢尔开始控制住了比赛，主场观众也鼓舞阿森纳队追逐胜利。此时反而是巴塞罗那队显得有点脱节，梅西出球的选择也变得更有限（凯塔在第67分钟换下比利亚，这让佩德罗显得有点孤单）；而正是他一次误传被科斯切尔尼截下，让阿森纳队有了迅速反击的机会，并由此打进制胜一球。本特纳传给威尔谢尔，后者随即传给法布雷加斯——这一传相当关键；法布雷加斯将球直传给从左路直插到巴塞罗那禁区的纳斯里，后者将球回做给后插上的阿尔沙文；俄罗斯人冷静地用右脚将球打进。

结论

阿森纳的上半场表现虽然比起去年作客巴塞罗那时有了很大改观，但缺乏效率，他们的传接也没达到期望的效果。范佩西缺少支援，这意味着他只能用远射考验巴尔德斯。温格下半场对中场运作只作微调，换来的却是整支队伍的成熟表现，还涌现出了像科斯切尔尼、法布雷加斯和威尔谢尔这样有大将风范的队员。巴塞罗那仍有能力保持控球，但被逼到了没有威胁的区域。关键是，阿尔沙文的上场（助球队）完成了逆转，他在扳平一球上发挥了重要作用，之后又机敏地打进了制胜一球。

Alex2011

阿森纳2-1巴塞罗那 - 视频精华集锦+英文解说

Alex2011

阿森纳 2-1 巴塞罗那 视频精华带法语解说

Alex2011

阿森纳 2-1 巴塞罗那 视频集锦带德语解说（？）

Alex2011

Roma 2-3 Shakhtar: Shakhtar counter-attacking unlocks a disjointed Roma side
February 18, 2011


The starting line-ups

An impressive display from Shakhtar gave them a clear advantage going into the second leg.
Claudio Ranieri omitted Marco Borriello, with Rodrigo Taddei playing on the left. Philippe Mexes and Nicolas Burdisso started at centre-back, so Marco Cassetti moved out to the right-back spot.
Mircea Lucescu played his usual 4-2-3-1 formation, with few surprises in personnel.
Roma’s shape was once again difficult to define. In the defensive phase it looked like a standard 4-4-2, with Jeremy Menez covering the right and Taddei on the left – presumably, Ranieri wanted to play with width when defending (rather than the 4-3-1-2 he’s often preferred this season) in order to occupy Shakhtar’s flying full-backs. When Roma had the ball, the shape was more fluid – Menez came inside, whilst Mirko Vucinic moved to the left and Francesco Totti dropped deep.

Shakhatar brave
Shakhtar were particularly impressive in how confident they were defensively. Usually, especially with the counter-attacking style Lucescu prefers, a 4-2-3-1 quickly becomes a 4-4-1-1 in the defensive phase – see Germany at the World Cup. From there, two solid banks of four break up play, before the wingers join the front two to attack with speed.
Here, however, Lucescu was often happy to defend with six players – the back four, and the two holding midfielders. The two wingers, Douglas Costa and Willian, would occupy the Roma full-backs and track them if necessary, but they would rarely drop in to form a second ‘four’ in the first half. That made for an open, entertaining game with plenty of goalscoring chances.

Open contest
With the game so open, it’s difficult to narrow the contest down to one particular area that decided the result. Shakhtar’s goals came (a) from a huge deflection, (b) from a long-range belter and (c) following an inexplicable error from John Arne Riise. That’s not to say that they did not deserve the win, but it’s not as if they were constantly exposing a clear Roma weakness.


Jeremy Menez usually picked up the ball on the right

The away side’s strategy was all about counter-attacking, however, and the second goal – a brilliant strike from Douglas Costa – epitomised their approach. They won the ball on the edge of their own box, and then played slightly risky quick passes from midfield to attack, trying to get past Roma’s pressing quickly. With four players staying high up the pitch, often 4 v 4 against Roma’s backline (with Daniele De Rossi sometimes a fifth man) they used pace and trickery on the break, and despite spending most of the game in their own half, were the greater goalscoring threat.
At the back, Shakhtar had problems with the Roma full-backs overlapping in the first half (since their wingers were high up the pitch) and also with Totti dropping into deep positions. However, they defended very narrow and packed the centre of the pitch, making it difficult for Roma to play through them. The two holding midfielders never ventured forward, and instead formed a ’square’ that Roma couldn’t penetrate.

Second half
In the second half Shakhtar were more defensive – the wingers did form a second bank of four after the break, and this was the main reason there was only one goal in the second period, compared to four in the first. The game was simply much tighter.
Ranieri didn’t look to change things in terms of formation. He needed a little more width, but the introduction of Borriello for Vucinic had the opposite effect, and in truth his problem was the same as Milan’s against Tottenham, or Inter’s against Juventus – Roma don’t have any wingers, which makes them easy to play against.

Conclusion
Shakhtar played very well – they defended cleverly by packing the centre of the pitch and taking advantage of Roma’s lack of width. On the break, they were always a threat – the first and third goals owed a lot to luck, but the second was superb.
Roma were again disappointing – a lack of drive from midfield, and a lack of width (despite a lot of fluidity amongst the front players) were the main problems. The lack of urgency from the whole side points to deeper problems at the club than merely tactics.

Alex2011

罗马2-3矿工: 缺乏宽度的罗马遇上防反高手

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原文标题: Roma 2-3 Shakhtar: Shakhtar counter-attacking unlocks a disjointed Roma side
原文连接: http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/18/roma-2-3-shakhtar-tactics/
译者: cnzcnz
翻译时间：2011.02.19
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顿涅兹克矿工在第一回合的出色表现为他们在主场的第二回合比赛赢得了一个非常有利的位置。

罗马的首发阵容中, 拉涅利把博列洛摁在了板凳上, 塔代伊居左, 梅克斯和布尔迪索搭档中后卫, 卡塞蒂出任右后卫。
矿工这边，卢塞斯库一如既往地使用了4231阵型, 人员配置也和之前几场无甚差别。
罗马的阵型还是比较流动而模糊的。 防守时更像一个442, 梅内和塔代伊各管一边. 拉涅利的想法是防守的时候注意宽度(取代了本赛季更常见的4312), 很显然这是忌惮矿工两个边路强大的助攻能力. 当罗马控球进攻的时候, 他们的阵型更具流动性, 梅内适当内切, 武奇尼奇往左边路靠, 托蒂则适当回收以便组织进攻。


首发阵容

矿工的压迫

本场比赛矿工的防守很有亮点. 一般来说4231在防守反击的时候会转变成4411, 正如南非世界杯上的德国队一样. 中场和后卫组成两道稳固的四人防线, 两个能上能下的边路随时准备快速插上反击。

而矿工的阵型并不完全墨守成规, 他们的主要防守成员只有6个人: 四个后卫加上两个后腰. 而他们的两个边前卫道格拉斯·科斯塔和威廉经常主动上前压迫罗马的两个边后卫, 罗马边后卫前插的时候科斯塔和威廉也会跟回来盯人. 但在上半场他们很少把自己局限在和后腰平行的位置来组成第一道四人防线. 这样就使得比赛变得开放, 也更具观赏性。

开放的比赛

在这么一场开放的比赛中, 并不存在一个决定比赛的时刻. 矿工的三个进球分别来自于(1)亚德森射门打在防守队员身上造成变线飞入球网; (2) 道格拉斯·科斯塔的一脚精妙远射;(3)里瑟的意外失误. 这并不是说矿工侥幸获胜, 但他们的进球并不是源于自己的强大进攻压力造成罗马防守的顾此失彼而获得的.

矿工打的基本就是防守反击, 他们的第二个进球---科斯塔的精彩远射就是他们战术的一个缩影. 他们在本方禁区边上得球, 然后快速传球通过中场(虽然有些冒险, 容易丢球), 把罗马的中场防守线甩在了身后. 由于威廉和科斯塔经常留在前场, 就与路易斯·阿德里亚诺以及亚德森组成了4人进攻组合, 直接面对罗马的后卫线(德罗西时不时回收以协助防守). 矿工的进攻快速而有效, 个人突破也很给力, 所以尽管他们大部分时间都缩在本方半场, 但是却获得了更多的进球机会。

防守的时候, 矿工遇到了一些困难. 罗马的边后卫压上进攻的时候造成了不少威胁 (矿工的两个边前卫经常顶在前面回不来), 托蒂的回撤也给他们带来了一些麻烦. 但是他们的篱笆扎得很紧, 中路基本上堵得水泄不通, 使得罗马很难顺利通过他们的防线来制造麻烦. 矿工的两个后腰从来不压上进攻, 与后卫形成了一个罗马无法穿透的”铁四角”。


梅内经常在右路拿球

下半场比赛

在下半场比赛中, 两球领先的矿工回收得更加明显: 他们的两个边路回撤与后腰形成第一条防守线. 比赛不再像上半场那么开放, 这也是为什么下半场两边只收获了一个进球。

下半场比赛中拉涅利并没有变阵。 其实他的球队需要更多地拉开宽度, 但是用博列洛换下武奇尼奇适得其反, 他们的问题和米兰对阵热刺以及国米对阵尤文的时候是一样的: 罗马缺乏边路好手, 使得他们的进攻更容易对付, 只需要在中路囤积防守, 扎紧篱笆就行了.

结论

矿工打得很好, 他们很好地利用了罗马缺乏宽度的特点,在中路屯了两个后腰, 堵死了罗马的进攻路线. 他们的反击也颇有威胁, 虽然第一和第三个进球带有很多侥幸的成分, 但是第二个球非常精彩。

罗马的表现比较让人失望: 中场比较沉寂, 宽度也没有拉开(虽然前场球员之间的流动性很强). 他们的问题是更深层次的, 而不是仅仅战术层面的。

Penelope

How do you stop Lionel Messi?
February 15, 2011



Even the most extensive database on earth can find no solution. Try typing into Google, “How to stop Messi” and while it produces 2,660,000 search results, none come anywhere close to answering the million pound question. When Arsenal faced Barcelona in the Champions League last season, they resisted the calls to treat Lionel Messi with special dispensation but instead, they considered him the same as everyone else and the results were disastrous. Messi was instrumental in the first leg as Arsène Wenger’s side survived an onslaught in the first twenty minutes but in the second leg at Camp Nou, delivered what he so promised at the Emirates as he ran amok to complete a devastating  twenty-one minute hat-trick.

He’s not omnipotent although his mother tells us he is just angelic. Nor is he a mutant although his minute stature is because of a hormone defect he had as a youngster which enables humans to grow. And he certainly isn’t a holographic character, which, essentially some have described him as. (Theo Walcott and Arsène Wenger, “Messi’s like a PlayStation”). He is simply a human being. An extraordinary one at that, however, and one so ahead of his peers at this current moment that there was no doubt he was to be crowned FIFA’s world player of the year despite Xavi’s most mesmeric efforts. This season, Messi has scored an amazing 40 goals in 34 games, a feat which Cristiano Ronaldo is doing his darnest to try and make look as insignificant as possible. (Currently Ronaldo has 34 goals in 36 games and the rivalry should prove to be the most defining of a generation since Johan Cruyff and Franz Beckenbaur).

When Arsenal faces Barcelona in Wednesday’s clash at The Emirates, the immediate question will be whether or not they should man-mark Messi and the answer will almost certainly be “no.” Wenger will put faith in his team’s ability to squeeze Messi out of the game through their improving structural pressing. It is tactic that is to be admired and it is only one of the two ways to approach Barcelona.

Man marking

The supposed problem with marking Lionel Messi is that invariably you neglect the other individuals that make Barcelona brilliant. And there are a lot of those. But it is also a risk that it may be worth taking as it strips Pep Guardiola’s side of their most spontaneous player and that is more easier, in theory, to defend against. Taking Messi out of the game, some argue, leaves you essentially facing Spain, a weak argument perhaps given that there are massive structural differences not to mention changes in personnel but it serves to highlight the dynamism Messi gives. Wenger was virtually implying that very point in the 4-1 defeat last season although he knew that if he did state it pointedly, questions will be fired back at why he didn’t detail a man to follow the Argentinian. But can you really mark Messi out of a game because his impact goes beyond what he does on the ball? Sticking close to him creates space elsewhere for others to exploit and also leaves you with one man short in another area of the pitch while his movement is always proactive, always finding ways to be useful in one way or another. Chelsea did that successfully in 2009 as Jose Bosingwa followed him from left-back but it was with an ultra-defensive approach Arsenal is not willing to take.

That was two years ago and it shows just how far tactically Barcelona have come to stop such instances occurring again. Messi has now almost exclusively played a free role, last season behind the forward, this season as the central forward. If Arsenal have plans for any such individuals, positioning will almost always complicate them.

On the right

With Barcelona’s formation, there is bound to be some interchangeability with Messi swapping with Pedro at some point in the game, and the right-winger shifting into David Villa’s position as he takes up the striking role. On the right, Messi will look to drift infield by initially starting on the right. Dani Alves will bomb forward regardless, nevertheless, his central tendencies will open up space for the Brazilian right-back. Barcelona’s keep ball means there is a constant movement of players and while it would seem like Messi is drifting into a congested area, it will certainly make space for someone else. If anything, it will give Barcelona a spare man centrally – a tactic Chelsea used well in their 2-0 win over Arsenal earlier this season as Florent Malouda occupied Alex Song, affording Ashley Cole the space to get forward. Arsenal’s wide men will almost certainly have to track back but there is still much onus on Song and Jack Wilshere to shuffle right and left. One can envisage a similar scenario for the pair to contend with while even moving centrally alerts the two centre-backs of a player entering their zone and one will at some point have to cover him.

<figure 1>1.Messi cuts in from a right-wing position therefore creating the space for Alves to run into. 2. By occupying his place in the centre it gives Barca a man advantage but also engages either the full-back to push out of position, a centre-back to push out or a midfielder to watch him. If Messi plays on the rihjt, it’s not an undesirable position because it means Arsenal can double up and squeeze him out the gmae but here he tries to ensure a man advantage. 3. The space that Koscielny vacates is spotted by Villa who looks to make a darting run behind.

False Nine

Messi, however, is likely to play as a false nine. It is a tactical trend which Arsenal have been at the forefront in recent times and with Robin van Persie being able to combine dropping off with the timing of runs off the shoulder of the defender, have a striker for Barcelona to worry about. Nevertheless, it’s Messi which is the focus and his deployment in the position has scratched many-a-heads. Opposition are unsure of whether to stick tight or stay back and at most times, are left to do neither. Central defenders hate marking space, at that is particularly true of Johan Djourou and Laurent Koscielny, who prefer to win the ball back quickly. As they don’t fancy marking space, they invariably push up and that creates space behind. With Barcelona using two wide forwards, Pedro and Villa will look to take advantage, not to mention the effervescent Alves and the wily thinking of Xavi.

As mentioned, Koscielny and Djourou like to get tight, which at first seems tactical suicide, but if they do get it right, it could be a master stroke. The best option is still to play deep against a false nine and against Barcelona in general. They seldom look to do the orthodox even if their spectacular is made to look mightily easy. Inter did that last season in the most defensive of approaches although their first leg 3-1 win serves as a protocol. The kept their three strikers up the pitch and defended in a unit that shifted left and right (similar to Arsenal’s). But Barcelona are not oblvious to the ploy of defending deep, so instead of looking  to play into opponents hands by playing an orthodox forward who will play as the same line as them, they look to drag the defenders out by playing with the space in front. Arsenal will have to patient as it will be the greatest test the youngsters have faced mentally.

There is another salient point and that is how Messi has adapted to the centre-forward position. It is not an inhibiting role although it puts him closer to defenders as it may have seemed for Wayne Rooney. He is still encouraged to find space but in a sense he’s liberated as he’s playing higher up and is more ambiguous than before.

<figure 2>1.Messi drops off into a  false nine position thereby committing one of the centre-backs to follow him. 2. The effect is two-fold on the defence. Djourou is then made to shuffle across to help cover the space and likewise is the right-back as he doesn’t want to create a too big a gap between he and Djourou. Either way, Villa looks to take advantage of the extra space by hugging the touchline or looking to get behind.

Arsenal pressing

Arsenal will stay true to their word and look to press up the pitch. It will be crucial, then to form an effective wall that frustrates Barcelona’s passers. Sergio Busquets is the best one touch passer in the world but Arsenal should not worry about him. Stopping Xavi and Andres Iniesta from getting to the supply line will be key. It may be more effective then, for Arsenal to drop Cesc Fabregas back to make a five man midfield rather than press as a 4-2-4 as they have this season. Last season at the Camp Nou, the tactic failed because The Gunners pressed with a 4-1-4-1, taking out the rest with one pass and exposing Denilson; this season, the adoption of the Dutch principles of through-marking should help Arsenal stay compact and squeeze the space. This will stop Messi because as Alves says and in some ways displayed by Argentina’s abject failure in the World Cup, it’s the team that must be stopped first. “I believe the secret to marking Messi is to not worry about marking him,” says Alves. “Because he doesn’t play alone and has a team by his side. That’s the key to marking Messi.”

<此处为视频，但无法显示>

Villarreal pressing in 1-1 draw last season. Pep Guardiola: “In the game, we were unable to score a decisive second goal. We struggled to get past Villarreal’s first line of pressure in the pitch and that made the match an end to end affair.”

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原文出处链接，可点击题目

Penelope

如何阻止梅西？

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原帖：http://arsenalcolumn.co.uk/?p=8175
译者：Gerhardt

发布时间：2011年2月16日
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就算是世界上最详尽的数据库也给不出一个解决方案。要是你在Google里输入“怎么阻止梅西”，虽然它会给你2,660,000个搜索结果，可没一条能回答上这个价值上百万英镑的问题。上个赛季阿森纳在冠军联赛对阵巴塞罗那的时候，面对那些说要针对梅西作特殊布署的呼声，阿森纳不为所动，把梅西和对方其他队员同等对待，结果不堪入目。梅西在首回合内作用平平，温格的球队也抵抗住了对手，没有在头二十分钟就惨招屠杀。但回到了诺坎普的第二回合，梅西把自己在酋长球场所欠奉的全都一并奉上，他就好像杀红了眼一样，在二十一分钟内摧枯拉朽般完成了帽子戏法。

虽然梅西的母亲跟我们说他就和天使一样，可他到底不是无所不能的。他也不是什么基因突变的产物，虽然他小巧的身板是因为他小时候得了某种荷尔蒙（与发育有关）缺陷(少年时代缺乏一种生长激素，这样的译法更好些)。他也不是什么电玩游戏里的人物，虽然有人还真这么形容过他(沃尔科特和温格都说“梅西就像是PS游戏里走出来的”)。梅西只是一个凡人。但他出类拔萃，如今他远远超同时代的对手，以至于他荣膺FIFA金球奖时都听不到什么质疑之声，哪怕这一年里哈维的表现也令人着迷。本赛季梅西已经在34场比赛里打入了惊人的40粒进球，这一数据面前，C罗正咬牙切齿地追赶着梅西，拼了命地想要盖过他的风头。(目前C罗在36场比赛里打入了34球，而这一对夙敌将成为继克鲁伊夫和贝肯鲍尔之后，最能够代表一整个时代的绝代双骄了。)(这样译法似乎更好些：他俩的竞争应该属于，自克鲁伊夫和贝肯拜尔这对棋逢对手的顶尖高手较量以后，又一个时代中的最重要代表了)

周三阿森纳将在酋长球场迎战巴塞罗那，第一个问题就是他们会不会对梅西进行盯人防守，而答案几乎肯定是“不”。温格相信他的球队有能力通过结构性的压迫打法而让梅西在比赛中消失。这是一个令人敬佩的战术，这也是仅有的两个能对付巴萨的办法之一。

人盯人防守

对梅西实施盯人防守所造成的潜在问题就是你会忽视巴萨的其他球员，而让巴萨显得实力超群的正是这些球员，而且他们为数众多。但或许盯人防守也值得冒险一把，因为这样就把瓜迪奥拉手下最活跃的一名球员隔离开来，而且理论上这也是更简单的一种防守方式。有人会说，你要让梅西从比赛中消失，那你接着要面对的就是一支西班牙国家队。这其实没多大道理，因为这两支队伍结构上差别非常大，更不要说人员配置上的不同，但这一说法也至少突出了梅西带来的联动性。实质上温格用上赛季的那次1-4输球证明了这一点，而他也知道如果他当时直接挑明这一点，马上就有人会质问他为什么没有派专人盯防梅西。可是你就真的能把梅西盯防到让他从比赛中消失吗？因为梅西的作用不仅仅在于他有球时的威胁。死死盯住梅西的话，不但会在其他地方产生空档而给对方其他球员以可趁之机，而且还会让你在球场上其他地方少一个人，而梅西总是会抢先主动地去跑位，他总能找到办法体现出自己的作用。切尔西在2009年那次对梅西的人盯人很成功，当时博辛瓦从左后卫的位置上死死跟住梅西，但与之配套的是切尔西那种极端防守的打法，而阿森纳是不愿这样去踢的。

而且那也已经是两年前的事了，这两年里我们都看到了巴塞罗那在战术上做了哪些发展来避免这种场面再次发生。梅西现在踢的几乎是一个前场自由人的角色，上个赛季他在中锋身后，这个赛季他踢中锋位置。就算阿森纳有计划怎么去对付这样的球员，场上的防守站位也够他们头疼的了。

右路

巴萨的这套阵容在场上肯定会时不时的发生换位，梅西换到佩德罗的右边锋位置上去，佩德罗则转移到比利亚的位置，而比利亚移到中锋的位置。换到了右路之后，梅西会从右边路寻求往中路内切。虽然阿尔维斯会雷打不动地向前进攻，但是有了梅西的内切，巴西右边卫向前插的时候就有了空档。巴萨式的控球意味着他们的球员会不停跑位，乍看之下梅西内切后是跑入了拥挤的中路，但这同时也肯定会为中路其他队友拉开空位。这样巴萨在中路就会有多一人的优势——切尔西在本赛季2比0战胜阿森纳的比赛中就很好的贯彻了这一战术，当时马卢达内切吸引了宋，为阿什利-科尔的插上拉开了空档。阿森纳的边路球员肯定要跟着回追，但对于宋和威尔希尔来说，要左补右补的，负担还是太重了。我们可以想象这两名后腰马上要面临类似的场面了。而就算他们呆在中路，对于进入防守区域的对方球员，一名中后卫还是会提高警惕去防他，而另一名中后卫也不得不去提供掩护。

<图1> 1.梅西从右边锋的位置内切，这就给阿尔维斯拉开了前插的空档。2. 梅西向中路移动，让巴萨在局部有了多一人的优势，而阿森纳这边要么边后卫被拉出位置，要么一名中后卫出来防他，要么一名中场球员要回来防梅西。而如果梅西呆在右路，这对阿森纳来说还不算太难办，因为这样阿森纳就可以派双人把他盯死。但这样巴萨还是能确保有一个人数优势。3.科斯切尔尼被拉出位置后造成空位，而比利亚则会利用这个空档跑到他身后去。

　　
伪九号

梅西还是更可能踢伪九号的位置。阿森纳近来是这种战术潮流的先锋代表，范佩西有能力在向中场后撤的同时还能看准时机摆脱防守队员突然插上。这样一名前锋会给巴塞罗那带来些麻烦。但是比赛的焦点毕竟还是在梅西身上，而梅西到底会被如何安排，这让每个人都会抓破脑袋。对手不确定是该紧紧盯住他，还是收缩防守，而大多数时候，对手这两样都没做到。中后卫一般都不喜欢钉在没人的空位上防守，而朱鲁和科斯切尔尼则尤其如此，他们都喜欢尽早把球抢回来。因为不喜欢钉住空位，他们总是会选择向前压上，这也在他们身后造成了空档。而巴萨的两名边锋佩德罗和比利亚则就会利用这一点，更不要说活跃异常的阿尔维斯和老谋深算的哈维了。
　
就如我们所说，科斯切尔尼和朱鲁喜欢贴上来防守，这种方式看起来就像是自寻死路，但如果他们真做的足够好，就可能是一步妙招。尽管如此，面对一个伪九号，最好的选择还是退后防守，通常来说这也是对付巴萨的方法。因为即使巴萨踢出的那些华丽场面看起来是那么轻松自如，他们走的也都是寻常路。国际米兰上赛季用最极端的防守方式成功地做到了这一点，当然他们是靠首回合的3比1取胜才有资本这么做的。他们让三名前锋留在前场，球队在防守的时候作为一个整体左右来回移动（和阿森纳的战术很相像）。但巴萨对于这种收缩防守是不会这样健忘的，所以他们将不会像传统前锋那样站在对方防线上，巴萨会让锋线和对方防线保持距离，并试着把防守队员从位置上吸引出来。阿森纳必须要耐心对待，这将会是小伙子们精神上面临的最大考验。

还有一点值得指出，那就是梅西会在中锋位置上怎么踢。虽然位置上他离后卫们更近了，但和鲁尼不同，梅西并没有在这个角色所束缚。梅西仍然要去发掘空档，但从某种意义上，因为他的位置更靠前也更难以琢磨，这个位置把梅西解放了。

<图2> 1.梅西从伪九号的位置上后撤，而吸引了一名中卫跟着他出来。2.这在防守上有双重意义。朱鲁必须要横向移过去来补这个空位，同时右后卫也得要跟着向中路横移，因为他不希望自己和朱鲁之间有太大的空档。这样，比利亚既可以利用这个多出来的空间在边路大展手脚，也可以找机会打他们的身后。
　　
阿森纳的压迫

阿森纳会说话算话，在中前场压迫上来。而至关重要的，则是是铸起一道让巴萨的传球手们头疼的移动墙。布斯克茨是世界上一脚传球功力最好的球员，但是阿森纳不应该担心他的问题。不让哈维和伊涅斯塔传输出炮弹，才是关键。对阿森纳来说，最有效的方法可能是让法布雷加斯拖后，从而形成一个五人中场，而不是像这个赛季中他们所使用的4-2-4压迫阵型。上赛季在诺坎普，阿森纳的战术没能成功，因为枪手们用了4-1-4-1的阵型来打压迫，把其他的点都拔掉了，但是把德尼尔森一个人暴露给了对手。这个赛季，阿森纳采用了荷兰式的全场盯防，这应该让阿森纳保持紧凑并压缩空间。这样应该能阻止梅西，因为阿尔维斯说过，对付梅西就首先要阻止他们整支球队，而阿根廷在世界杯上凄惨的失利也反应了这一点。“我相信对付梅西的秘密并不在于盯住梅西，因为他不是一个人在踢球，他身边有着一整支球队，”阿尔维斯说道，“那才是对付梅西的关键。”

比利亚雷亚尔在上赛季1比1逼平巴萨的比赛中实施了压迫打法。瓜迪奥拉赛后说：“比赛中我们没法攻入决定性的第二球。我们挣扎着想要通过比利亚雷亚尔的第一道压迫线，这也最终成为了一场从球场一端到另一端的比赛。（注:此视频是译者加上去的，但并非原出处的视频案例）