11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

Alex2011

补锅匠在国米日子也越来越不好过了

colinfirth

Eduardo fails to track Igor Denisov, and Zenit get the upper hand in important victory
November 1, 2011


The starting line-ups - key man Denisov highlight in blue

After such an exciting first game between these two sides, the return match was something of a disappointment.

The match essentially revolved around a single key battle in the centre of the pitch. Zenit are usually 4-3-3 with one midfielder in the holding role, whilst Shakhtar generally line up 4-2-3-1. As in the first game, the midfield triangles were set to match each other.

Mircua Lucescu sprung a slight surprise in his side, though, with the use of Eduardo in the centre of the pitch, in support of Luiz Adriano. Eduardo has usually been used either on the flank or as the centre-forward – this was the first time he’d been used as a central player in the attacking band of three, with Willian and Alex Teixeira in the wide positions.

This changed that midfield battle. Eduardo is not used to tracking central midfielders, and therefore constantly failed to get goalside of Igor Denisov, Zenit’s deepest midfielder. It was unclear whether Lucescu had asked Eduardo not to track his man and stay in a position where he could launch quick attacks, or if he was simply not following orders. Either way, he played much higher up the pitch than Jadson in the first game.

In a game that took a long time to get going, the obvious result was that Denisov was always in space, and was allowed to dictate the game. He completed the most passes of any player – 62. The next highest player was his midfield colleague Konstantin Zyryanov on 50.

What made his freedom particularly obvious was that he didn’t just sit in position and knock passes from side to side – he sprinted forward to get into goalscoring positions – the Arouca role. Zenit play a wonderfully fluid midfield where Zyryanov and Roman Shirokov take it in turns to drop deep and cover Denisov’s forward runs (look at the midfielder’s average positions – right on top of each other) so he was able to make it to the edge of the box to attempt five shots. All came in the first half – as Zenit went ahead in the 45th minute, he was asked to be more conservative after the break.



His tendency to move forward also meant that he played more passes in the final third than any other player – 28. And he created two chances for teammates, too. All this is rather surprising for a side’s deepest midfielder.



It’s notable that his shots and chances created all came from a centre-right position. It might well be the case that this was because Eduardo tended to stray to (his) right of the pitch, and therefore Denisov had more space to exploit by moving to the right himself.

If it was calculated gamble by Lucescu, to get Eduardo into space, it didn’t work; he barely created anything on the break as Shakhtar were particularly poor. Instead, Denisov took advantage to control the game – the only surprise was that his influence didn’t result in a goal or an assist – Zenit deserved to win by a greater scoreline.

colinfirth

502楼的参考译文

colinfirth

zm关注本赛季泽尼特的比赛，至少已经是第二次了。

偶对本组欧冠积分排名第一的阿波尔的比赛更感兴趣些

Alex2011

两队上一场欧冠比赛还是10天前多一点的时间，即10月20日，泽尼特客场2-2逼平了顿涅矿工

这场比赛的zm战术分析，在本贴的471楼

乔治六世

The APOEL miracle continues…
November 2, 2011


APOEL's starting line-up in their home win over Porto

The clear outsider in a very strong group coming into the tournament, APOEL now find themselves top of Group G after a 2-1 win over Porto.

There was an element of fortune to their victory over Porto last night. Having deservedly got themselves into a 1-0 lead, they were content to sit on that slender advantage going into the final minutes. A rash challenge and a Hulk penalty later, they look like they’d blown their chance. But APOEL showed character to get up the pitch and score a 90th minute to clinch the win.

Coach Ivan Jovanovic prefers a 4-2-3-1 shape, and in simple terms there is relatively little unusual about the side.

Defence

The back four is as you would expect – the full-backs are converted wingers but not overly attack-minded. With APOEL tending to play quickly on the break, there was often no need for overlapping runs to stretch the play – the front four were left to create chances themselves.

Midfield

The midfield duo were interesting – unlike, say, Uruguay, they didn’t remain particularly close together throughout the game, and pivoted across the pitch to a great extent. When the play went down one flank, the holder on that side would move out a long way towards the wing to assist the play. The other covered in the centre. This isn’t particularly unusual, but it was notable how the movement was always out to the flank, not forward towards the strikers.



Wingers

The wide players were crucial to APOEL’s good attacking moves – but not in the traditional sense. They would start relatively deep, and pull the Porto full-backs towards them, high up the pitch out of position. This created space for their front two to move into down the flanks, and then the ball was played past the wingers, they’d turn and sprint to provide support.

Attack

The movement from Ailton upfront was extremely impressive. He spent the time working the channels (and with the full-backs high up the pitch, the flanks), almost never picking up the ball in the centre. He has a great burst of pace and a good first touch, making him perfect for nipping in ahead of centre-backs and spinning in behind. He tended to pick up the ball in deep positions on the right flank, and then when moving to the left he tried to get on the end of balls over the top.

The reason for that difference was probably because the attacking central midfielder, Ivan Trickovski, tended to move towards the left. Therefore Ailton didn’t need to come short for the ball and could make runs in behind. Trickovski, incidentally, is able to play on either flank or through the middle – having played two games from the right in the Champions League this season, here he started in the middle and then switched with Manduca at half-time.

Ailton can’t be depended on for link-up play – he received 32 passes, but then only attempted 16, of which 8 were completed. In other words, when he gets the ball he only passes 50% of the time, and only keeps a move going 25% of the time. He’s a bit El-Hadji Diouf at the World Cup in 2002. In winning (and scoring) the penalty, however, he did his job upfront well.



The movement of the front two across the pitch, with the wingers moving forward, meant triangles down the flanks formed naturally. Porto struggled to get men over to stop these moves – the central midfielders couldn’t get out in time, whilst the wide forwards stayed up the pitch. None of the Porto backline had a good game individually.

The away side did form a good offside trap, catching APOEL offside ten times. Early on the forwards seemed to be moving too early, but the ball could have arrived much quicker from the centre of midfield – often the passer took an extra touch and allowed the defence to step up. A little more speed in these attacks, and APOEL could have got in behind much more.



Overall strategy

APOEL’s position are the top of the group is down to their attacking efficiency. They average the least possession (43%) in a very counter-attacking group, and average just eight shots a game, compared to Porto’s 22, Zenit’s 20 and Shakhtar’s 14. They don’t attack much, but they attack well.

They were guilty of being too conservative in the second half against Porto, though. They were clearly threatening Porto with pace in behind the defence, and the switch to a more conservative style meant the away side could throw men forward without fear of being exposed on the break. The decision to remove Ailton – who may have been tired – for centre-back Sanel Jahic on 77 minutes was a particularly negative move, and one sensed that APOEL would regret that change. They did – for a brief moment – before the late goal.

As far as weaknesses go, the way to get at APOEL would probably be to try and flood the centre of the pitch, forming a 3 v 2 against the two holding midfielders – Trickovski doesn’t look as if he wants to do much defensive work. That said, Zenit would be the perfect side to create triangles around those two players with their fluid midfield trio, and they too lost 2-1 in Nicosia. The return fixture between the sides, in St Petersburg, takes place in three weeks.

乔治六世

506楼参考译文

colinfirth

Inter 2-1 Lille: both sides poor, and vulnerable in different ways
November 2, 2011


The starting line-ups

Inter overcame Lille in a match lacking in quality.

Claudio Ranieri stuck with the 4-3-1-2 he used in the weekend defeat to Juventus, but there were changes in defence, midfield and attack. Walter Samuel, Thiago Motta and Diego Milito all returned.

Rudi Garcia played a flexible 4-2-3-1 that changed throughout the game, and seemed to become a 4-4-2 in the second half. In the first half, Joe Cole started centrally but drifted to the right, Eden Hazard was on the left and Moussa Sow was a right-sided forward.

Inter created chances without playing particularly well, whilst Lille frequently got into promising positions on the flanks but failed to turn these situations into goals.

Lille weaknesses

Early on, Lille were extremely vulnerable to balls being hit over their defence for Diego Milito to run onto – the Argentine hit the bar through this approach after a couple of minutes, and a similar ball was played to him soon after. Mauro Zarate also tried to get on the end of a ball from this approach, though Mickael Landreau started to sweep rather more keenly after the first few minutes.

Lille were also sometimes unable to deal with Inter’s full-backs getting forward. With a 3 v 4 disadvantage in the centre of midfield, Hazard and Sow were brought inside to help out, leaving Javier Zanetti and Cristian Chivu free. Zanetti set up the second goal in the second half, with a cross for Milito.

Debuchy free

Inter, in traditional fashion, couldn’t cope with opposition full-backs moving forward. Stephane Lichsteiner exposed them at the weekend in this respect, and Mathieu Debuchy did something similar here. Time and time again, the ball was played out to him, Esteban Cambiasso couldn’t quite get out in time, and Debuchy had time to cross. With Franck Beria at left-back less comfortable on the ball, almost all Lille’s crosses came from the right, as shown below. The majority came from Debuchy, most of which were unsuccessful.



It was a shame that only one Lille full-back was comfortable at crossing – as Schalke showed last year, bringing both forward and constantly switching the play from side to side is very effective against an ageing 4-3-1-2 (and that’s what it was: the oldest Champions League starting XI in history for Inter tonight). Schalke constantly moved the ball laterally across the pitch, which Lille rarely did here.



Lille strategy

Lille could have been a little braver with their positioning, seeking to quickly hit Inter on the break. More of an aggressive 4-2-1-3, for example, might have been a better strategy. Hazard and Sow could have played high up and pinned the full-backs into their own half, looking for balls in behind to run onto. Cole would have been the link man, looking to play slide passes.

It would largely have left defending to six men, but then Inter’s play is predictable, overly dependent upon Sneijder for creativity – and it’s debatable whether his level of performance lives up to his reputation as a creator – and above all, narrow (if you nullify the full-backs). It wouldn’t have been unreasonable to expect six defensive players to cope with Milito, Sneijder and Zarate, plus the sporadic runs from three conservative midfielders.

Lille may have actually dominated possession more than is ideal – by doing so they let Lucio and Walter Samuel retreat to a comfortable position on the edge of their own box. Playing quickly and exposing their lack of pace is probably a more promising approach – it won’t give you much possession, but it should bring chances. (Of course, you need a strategy in possession too – but Lille had that, by playing out to Debuchy.)

Counter-attacking was less of an option when 1-0 down, and to be fair to Lille, their pressing after half time was very good. They got back into the game having replaced three of the four attacking players, and Garcia deserves some praise for seeing that Tulio De Melo was a better target man for crosses than Ireneuz Jelen, but his goal was primarily because of poor defending.

Conclusion

A poor game between two sides struggling for confidence. Lille seemed to have a slightly more cohesive gameplan but couldn’t execute it well enough in the final third, whilst Inter still look exactly what they are – a very old side who have no real ideology, having been coached by five different managers in the last 18 months.

Lille probably won’t qualify, Inter probably will – but it’s difficult to see either side having a real impact upon the tournament.

colinfirth

508楼参考译文
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国际米兰2-1里尔战术分析：两队均无状态，弱点各有不同  
由 谢联替补 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


双方首发阵容

在一场乏善可陈的比赛中，国际米兰击败了里尔。

拉涅利坚持使用了他在周末负于尤文的比赛中使用的4321阵型，但三条线的人员都有所变化。萨穆埃尔、莫塔和米利托均重返首发。

鲁迪-加西亚还以4231应对，但其阵型颇为灵活，在下半场则切换为了442。上半场，乔科尔首发出任前腰，但经常游弋到右路，阿扎尔居左，而索乌的角色则是名身居右路的前锋。

尽管踢得不算好，国际还是创造了不少机会，而里尔虽然在边路屡屡占得先机，却无法抓住空档取得进球。

里尔的弱点

比赛伊始，里尔对对手过顶身后球找米利托这一点的防守有些弱不禁风，依托既定战术，阿根廷前锋开场两分钟便一脚劲射轰在门梁上，其后很快便接到了另一次类似传球。萨拉特也试图从此战术上尝到甜头。不过比赛进行了一段时间后，朗德罗开始大胆地出击解围。

里尔对国米边后卫的插上同样无能为力。由于在中场中路3对4的人数劣势，阿扎尔和索乌不得不经常靠向中路来施以援手，这给了萨内蒂和齐伍不少空间。下半场萨内蒂助攻了第二球，他的传中让米利托一蹴而就。

被放空的德比希

同样，国际在对手边卫前压时一如既往得应对得很差。上周末，利希施泰纳便让他们的这一缺点大白于天下，而昨晚，马蒂厄-德比希也完成了相似的任务。一次又一次，球交到他的脚下时，坎比亚索还远在天边，这使得德比西有充分的时间完成传中。由于左路的贝利亚在拿球时没有这么随心所欲，因此如下图所示，里尔几乎所有的传中都来自右路。这其中大部分出自德比西，尽管成功率不敢恭维。



很遗憾，对里尔来说，只有一位边后卫能够从容传中。因为去年沙尔克04就曾向我们演示过，攻击（国米）这套老迈的4312阵型卓有成效的方式之一，便是将两边卫同时前提并且在两边之间不断转移（记住一件事：今夜国际的首发十一人是欧冠历史上最高龄的阵容）。当时的沙尔克一刻不停地横向转移球，而今夜的里尔甚少做到这一点。



里尔的策略

里尔的布阵本可以更大胆一些，争取在反击中以速度打击国际。颇具侵略性的4213阵型便是个不错的备选项。阿扎尔和索乌应该大幅前压，将对方的边卫钉在后半场，并寻找机会打对方身后。乔科尔可以作为组织者，寻机送出威胁传球。

这样做的风险是只留六名球员进行防守，而好处则是使国际的进攻变得很容易预测：他们将过分依赖斯内德的创造力，而这位名声响亮的传球大师本场的表现似乎有些名不副实；除此之外，如果边卫受到压制，则国际的整体阵型会变得狭窄。用六名防守队员来应付米利托、斯内德和萨拉特算不上是不敬之举，哪怕他们身后那三位略显保守的后腰会贡献零星的跑动支持。

里尔其实已经取得了有些过分的控球优势，他们对球权的掌控让卢西奥和萨穆埃尔可以后退到本方禁区边缘较为舒服的防守位置。实际上，快速出球，利用国际两名中卫的速度劣势做文章也许是种更有成效的战术。你不需要大量控球，但能创造更多机会。（当然，你同样需要在控球时有相关的策略，而里尔的选择便是将球交到德比西脚下。）

当一球落后时，防反不会成为首选战术。公平地说，中场休息之后里尔的压制做得很不错。他们更换了4名攻击手中的3人，并重新投入了比赛当中。加西亚用德梅洛替换耶伦充当前场支柱的举措值得表扬，前者对传中的处理胜过后者，但他的进球其实更多是拜对方混乱的防守所赐。

总结

两支同样有待重塑信心的球队联手奉献了一场糟糕的对决。里尔的赛前布置似乎更有针对性，但他们在前场40米区域对战术的执行很不到位，而国际的表现则是一如既往：一台没有战术指导思想的老爷车，在过去18个月里由五名不同的司机掌控着方向盘。

里尔应该不太可能出线了，而国米几乎铁定晋级。但就本场来说，任何一方在本届欧冠上似乎都很难兴风作浪。

Alex2011

508楼的题目很有意思的，不过三个阿根廷人岩石、大米和萨内蒂对2个进球都有不同程度贡献，还是令人很开心的。

上一主场意甲德比1-2失利，这一主场2-1胜利，总之国米缺少的是胜利

红酥手

小将萨内蒂又突破了，看来有必要看看国际的比赛了。看国际的唯一乐趣就是萨队过全场。

showfun

阿尔瓦雷斯据说最近2场比赛替补上去都不错，希望这小伙子能踢出来

Penelope

Athletic 2-2 Barcelona: Bielsa stifles Barca by telling his players to stick tightly to opponents
November 7, 2011


The vague first half line-ups - though with Athletic tracking Barcelona all over and the Barcelona players trying to shake them off, positions were very loosely-defined

Marcelo Bielsa’s tactics managed to hold Barcelona to a draw in an exciting match at the San Mamés.

Bielsa went with a 4-3-3ish shape, with Javi Martinez at centre-back, and Iker Muniain out on the right – a slight surprise, given the winger has started on the left for much of the season.

Pep Guardiola picked a 4-3-3, but with a front three featuring a deep-lying forward, a central midfielder and a wing-back, as David Villa was left out.

This was a match that could have gone either way – Barcelona had four times as many attempts as Athletic, yet needed a last minute goal to snatch a draw.

Rain

It’s impossible to consider this match without mentioning the weather. Torrential rain in the north of Spain meant that the pitch was damp at the start, and almost unplayable in parts towards the end of the game. It clearly had an impact upon short passing, and this naturally hampered Barca more.

Tactics, though, is about adapting to particular circumstances. On a pitch that didn’t suit their natural game, it’s Barcelona could have been a little more direct. Their opening goal came from an unusual route – a cross and a header, although with a considerable difference in height between the sides, and no true striker on the pitch, it’s obvious why they didn’t want to suddenly become Stoke.

Atheltic, on the other hand, had the towering figure of Fernando Llorente, who could both challenge in the air, and hold the ball up. They also had a manager who is known for soaking the training pitch when rain is expected for the upcoming matchday. They would have been prepared.

Tracking

They were also very well prepared in tactical terms. Bielsa, the ultimate advocate of a pressing game, had a specific plan. He pressed Barcelona high up the pitch at goal-kicks and forced Victor Valdes to kick the ball long, which was a bit of a problem with none of the five most attacking Barca players more than 5′9. This broke up their rhythm from the back.

In open play, the pressing was slightly more reserved high up the pitch- Llorente worked very hard trying to close down the centre-backs, but was rarely joined by another midfielder in doing so, for Bielsa wanted to retain a spare man at the back.

That might seem a sudden jump in positioning – from talking about what was happening high up the pitch, to what was happening at the back. The reason for that was simple – in defence and in midfield, Bielsa asked his players to track their man all over the pitch. Because of the switching of Barcelona players, it wasn’t always the exact same battles throughout the game: Lionel Messi and Cesc Fabregas, for example, were frequently in each others’ roles, and there was also some rotation in midfield.

It was man-marking in action, most obvious by the way the centre-backs were happy to come a long way out of the back to track Messi or Fabregas, sometimes into the midfield zone. The full-backs would come infield, and on other occasions would find themselves in extremely wide positions, particularly Andoni Iraola getting tight to Adriano. There was always either Fernando Amorebieta or Martinez sweeping up at the back, usually covering a huge amount of space, and often a considerable distance behind the rest of the back four.

It’s to Athletic’s immense credit that they rarely needed last ditch tackles, though. Andres Iniesta and Xavi Hernandez were marked closely and had little impact upon the game, whilst Messi is much less involved when used in his old right-sided role. Against both Sevilla and Athletic, the use of him on that flank has not helped Barcelona.

Athletic’s wingers did a good job on the Barca full-backs. Eric Abidal looked scared of Munian and therefore played conservatively, whilst Markel Susaeta played deeper, tracking Dani Alves and also giving him the slip in the lead up to the opener. Athletic were more direct in possession, which suited the conditions.

Changes

Guardiola gradually brought on more attacking players as the game went on. On roughly 60, 70 and 80 minutes he brought on Alexis Sanchez for Xavi (forward for midfielder), David Villa for Adriano (striker for a wing-back playing in the forward line) and then finally Thiago Alcantara for Gerard Pique (midfielder for centre-back).

Crucially, and perhaps wrongly, Guardiola never looked to change Barca’s system significantly (with the exception of the final few minutes when he threw men forward) – players simply dropped back. Man-marking means that Athletic weren’t entirely bothered about being pulled out of shape, but Barca could have tested this more. What if they’d gone with four attackers, for example, like the system they used at the start of 2010? Bielsa would have wanted to retain his spare man, and would have had to bring on a substitute, or been forced to deploy someone completely out of position.

Another solution would have been to bring the defensive players forward into attack. Pique and Javier Mascherano had opportunities to move higher up the pitch with the ball and potentially open up Athletic – although Llorente did a good job in tracking them. Still, you’d expect more rotation from the best total footballing side around, with the two centre-backs both capable of playing in midfield, and Busquets able to drop back.

The two questions for Athletic were fitness and discipline. The former wasn’t a problem and the latter only came into the equation in the final minute, when Amorebieta got his second yellow. The resulting free-kick led to the goal – via a defensive error – so it could have been a factor in the result.

Conclusion

“We’ve never played against a team who were so intense, so aggressive, and has denied us so much space,” said Guardiola after the game. He and his players didn’t really know how to react or adapt to let their technical quality shine through; they simply aren’t used to facing a side like that.

Is this the blueprint for beating Barca? Well, no – first because Athletic didn’t win (and even if they hadn’t have conceded the Messi goal, their own second came from calamitous Barca defending and was something of a fluke).
More to the point, few other sides would be able to play this way as easily as Athletic did – because this is close to the usual style Bielsa wants, they were able to adapt. Others who try and replicate it might be ripped apart.

Penelope

513参考译文
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毕尔巴鄂2-2巴塞罗那战术复盘：贝尔萨下令紧贴对手，巴萨窒息
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

上半场的大致阵型：虽然毕尔巴鄂竞技全场盯防巴塞罗那，而后者也努力摆脱前者，但场上的站位显得非常宽松

在圣玛梅斯球场一场令人兴奋的比赛中，贝尔萨的战术成功迫使巴塞罗那握手言和。

贝尔萨排出一个4-3-3式的阵型，哈维·马丁内斯打中后卫而伊克·穆尼亚因打右路——这稍有点让人惊讶，因为这名边锋本赛季多数时候都出现在左路。

瓜迪奥拉选择了4-3-3阵型，但锋线三人组是由一个站位靠后的前锋、一个中前卫和一个翼卫组成，比利亚被放在了替补席上。

这是一场可能出现两种不同结果的比赛——巴塞罗那的射门数是毕尔巴鄂的四倍之多，但直到最后一分钟才进球扳平比分。

雨势

说到这场比赛就没法不提天气。西班牙北部的瓢泼大雨使得场地在开始时就是湿漉漉一片，比赛过程中有些时候几乎没法踢。显然雨势对短传构成了影响，而这对巴萨的阻碍自然要更大些。

不过战术正是需要适应这种特殊环境。在这样一块并不适合他们自身风格的场地上，巴塞罗那本可以踢得更直接一些。他们首个进球正是来自并不常用的方式——传中、头球，不过由于两队身高存在相当差距，而巴萨在场上也没有正印中锋，他们显然不想突然变成斯托克城的踢法。

而另一方面，毕尔巴鄂有略伦特这样的高塔，他既能空中作业，也能拿得住球。他们教练赛前预计有雨时会浸润训练场的做法已是众人所知。他们对此做好了准备。

盯防

他们在战术上也同样做足了功课。贝尔萨这位极为推崇压迫式打法的教练对比赛制定了专门的策略。他要求队员在前场就对巴塞罗那施加压力，迫使巴尔德斯大脚长传——而巴塞罗那五名最具攻击性队员的身高无一超过5英尺9英寸（1米75），这就构成了一些问题。这破坏了巴萨后场的节奏。

而在运动战中，毕尔巴鄂的前场压迫则显得稍微保守一些——略伦特很努力地去阻截对方的中后卫，但很少时候会有另一名中场队员来协助他，因为贝尔萨想在后方多留一人。

这看起来像是位置上的一个突然跳跃——前面是谈前场的情形，现在则是说后场的情况。原因很简单——在中后场方面，贝尔萨要求手下的队员全场盯防其对位的球员，不过比赛过程中对位的情况也不总是固定的：比如梅西和法布雷加斯就经常互相换位，而中场也有一些轮转换位。

起到作用的是盯人，最明显的是中后卫乐于从后卫线上拉出很大距离来追截梅西或法布雷加斯，有时甚至追到中场区域。边后卫则往中间靠，但有些时候又拉得很靠边，尤其是伊劳拉紧追阿德里亚诺的时候。阿莫雷比埃塔和马丁内斯总有一人在后方扫荡，通常覆盖了很大的空间，并且经常是在其他三名后卫身后还有相当一段距离的位置上。

不过需要大赞毕尔巴鄂的是，他们很少需要搏命的铲球。伊涅斯塔和哈维被盯得很紧，他们没能对比赛产生多少作用，而梅西在的右路位置上发挥出的作用也少得多。

毕尔巴鄂的边锋有效地对付了巴萨的边后卫。阿比达尔似乎对穆尼亚因有所忌惮，踢法也就保守一些，而苏萨埃塔站位靠后一些，盯防阿尔维斯，并趁后者不备时发动进攻使本队首开纪录。毕尔巴鄂在控球时打法更为直接，这正适合场上的情况。

改变

随着比赛的推进，瓜迪奥拉逐渐换上了更多的进攻型球员。大概在60、70和80分钟时他分别用桑切斯、比利亚和蒂亚戈换下了哈维（前锋换中场）、阿德里亚诺（前锋换打边锋的翼卫）和皮克（中场换中卫）。

关键的，兴许也是错误的一点在于，瓜迪奥拉一直都没有对巴萨的阵型作出大的调整（最后几分钟除外，他把队员们推上前线）——队员站位显得靠后了。采取盯人防守意味着毕尔巴鄂对于被打乱阵型并不完全在意，但巴萨本可在这方面下更大的功夫。如果他们踢四前锋，就像2010年初用过的那种阵型会是怎样？贝尔萨会，就需要换上一个替补，或者不得不将场上某一个人摆到完全不同的位置上去。

另一个解决方案是让后防队员参与到进攻中。皮克和马斯切拉诺有机会带球压上，并可能打开毕尔巴鄂的防线——尽管略伦特在阻截他们方面干得不错。此外，由于两名中后卫都有能力在中场活动，而布斯克茨也能够后撤，你能预期这支最好的全攻全守球队会有更多的轮转换位。

毕尔巴鄂存在的两个不安因素是体力和纪律性。前者并未构成麻烦，而后者直到最后一分钟才爆发，阿莫雷比埃塔犯规得到第二张黄牌。而此次犯规造成的任意球带来了进球——防守失误导致——因此这是对比赛结果构成影响的一个因素。

结论

“我们从未遇到过如此高强度、如此有攻击性、压缩了我们如此多空间的对手”，瓜迪奥拉赛后说道。他和自己手下的球员并不知道如何应对或调整以使他们的技术优势发挥出来，他们面对那样的球队显得相当不适应。

这是击败巴萨的蓝图吗？呃，不——首先毕尔巴鄂没赢（就算他们没被梅西的进球扳平，他们的第二个进球也是来自巴萨一次灾难性的防守，多少有些侥幸）。

其次更重要的是，其他球队很少能够轻易地打出这种风格——因为这接近于贝尔萨通常要求的风格，他们能够适应。其他队要是邯郸学步的话则可能遭遇惨败。

Alex2011

巴萨这场平局来得及时啦，必须对不给力前场人员要作调整了

蓝白年代

这场球好看 只是结果对我这个萨迷有点煎熬啊

colinfirth

这场球好看 只是结果对我这个萨迷有点煎熬啊
蓝白年代 发表于 2011-11-7 11:38

纠结啦

Hawkwalking

咦，这次不小心和ZM的写手想到一起去了。

“疯子今天用了一个看似最疯却最实用最应该用的阵型--人盯人。

这个是近几年来接近失传的牛皮阵，原来因以巴萨这种将控球能力发挥的日渐完美的球队为代表的，逐渐将人盯人的阵型弊端兜现无遗，但今天在圣马梅斯这片泥塘中，却是最该用的阵型，尤其是对巴塞罗那来说。

用严密复杂的近乎变态的传切将对手传晕掉，是本单位的核心专长，但在球掉草坪上溅起一片泥水花的圣马梅斯，本单位的优势不在。再加上对中场的重视度不够，造成球队整场没有很好的中场优势。同时就地反抢因为球出不去，传不到位而伴随对方的人盯人而没有了空间。当小白同学浪费了三个，尤其是第二个绝佳机会的时候，基本上连俺这个看录像的人都不再有想法了。

还是那句话：本赛季的各种不胜都是非常有价值的，只要能从中吸取教训，哪怕是本赛季RP衰的只能不停的吸取教训，那也是为将来炼成金刚不坏之体打下了坚实的基础。且毕竟本赛季赛事才过三分之一不到。”

elite

咦，这次不小心和ZM的写手想到一起去了。

“疯子今天用了一个看似最疯却最实用最应该用的阵型--人盯人。

这个是近几年来接近失传的牛皮阵，原来因以巴萨这种将控球能力发挥的日渐完美的球队为代表的，逐渐将人盯人 ...
Hawkwalking 发表于 2011-11-8 14:28

说得好！

colinfirth

Bosnia 0-0 Portugal: both sides play defensively on a very poor pitchNovember 11, 2011

The starting line-ups

A largely uneventful game, and all square going into the second leg the Estadio da Luz on Tuesday.

Safet Susic had various selection problems at the back, meaning that captain Emir Spahic was the only first-choice member of the back four playing. Further forward, the side was as expected.
No major surprises from Paulo Bento either – 4-3-3, with Miguel Veloso in the holding role behind old Sporting teammate Joao Moutinho, and Raul Meireles.
Susic’s concern about the back four may have contributed to his decision to play cautious football in the first two-thirds of this match, although for long periods they simply poor on the ball.
Bosnia tactics
Bosnia played in a similar fashion to in Paris, when they were unlucky not to win. The most interesting feature of their side is the way Haris Medunjanin drops very deep to become a left-sided centre-back in a three, which pushes the full-backs forward (particularly the left-back, Sejad Salihovic) – and both are really midfielders anyway.
Higher up the pitch, left-winger Senad Lulic plays high up and wide, and on the other flank, Miralem Pjanic looks to come inside into the middle to become an extra playmaker. Usually, the combination of a natural wide player and a ‘false’ playmaker on the flanks works well and gives a nice balance, but it did make Bosnia lopsided, because Salihovic attacked much more than Adnan Zahirovic, who was understandably told to stay in position up against Cristiano Ronaldo, who played high up on the left.
Therefore, little went down Bosnia’s right – they couldn’t get the ball to Pjanic, and he increasingly came infield towards the end of the first half, frustrated at seeing little of the ball, but rather contributing the lopsidedness by leaving his position. His creativity was also stifled as he had to help double up on Ronaldo. Zvjezdan Misimovic also struggled to get into the game, with Portugal’s three central midfielders sitting deep, and in the first half it was difficult to see how Bosnia were trying to score a goal. Edin Dzeko was followed out from the back by Pepe and Bruno Alves, with the other covering, and Veloso sometimes dropping in.
Portugal tactics
Portugal complained about the state of the pitch before the game, and it seemed to be a factor in their gameplan. They rarely looked to play through midfield – although they do lack a number ten anyway – and played an extraordinary number of long balls, for which Helder Postiga challenged.
Their best opportunities came from direct play – when Postiga fired over after Moutinho had headed down for him after a free-kick, and when Ronaldo got in down the left after a big diagonal from his Real Madrid teammate Pepe. Meireles and Moutinho were given some license to get forward into advanced positions, but the attacking basically came from the front three.
Final 25 minutes
The line-ups for the final 25 minutes

Bento made straight swaps – Hugo Almeida for Postiga, then Ruben Micael on for Raul Meireles, but Susic made dramatic changes to give Bosnia more attacking threat.
He decided to bring on a second striker, Vedad Ibisevic, which meant taking off Medunjanin. To make up for this, there were various changes. Darko Maletic came on for left-back Salihovic but went to right-back. Previous right-back Zahirovic went into midfield in place of Medunjanin, whilst the left-back gap was filled by Lulic dropping back, and Misimovic going out to the left of midfield. It was more like a 4-4-2.
This pushed Bosnia up the pitch, and the simple addition of a second striker meant a more obvious goalscoring threat. Alves and Pepe now both had to mark, but both (especially Alves) switched off and let Ibisevic have two good goalscoring chances.
A more subtle result from the change was that Misimovic and Pjanic, now both playing deeper as narrow wide midfielders in a four, could actually get the ball and they had more opportunities to play good passes. Those zones are where the 4-3-3 is vulnerable when the wingers play high up the pitch (as Ronaldo and Nani did), because the full-backs don’t want to come that high up the pitch. Therefore, it helped Bosnia that their two most creative players ended up in those positions, even if it probably wasn’t Susic’s intention. Bosnia were the dominant side late on, but poor finishing let them down.
Portugal threatened on the break through Ronaldo, but they faded as the game went on, and Almeida contributed nothing more than Postiga.
Conclusion
A game of various stages – Portugal were better in the first half, the game was even for the third quarter, then Bosnia were on top late on. For that, Susic deserves credit, and you can understand why he was cautious early on given his problems at the back.
Portugal had no link between the midfield trio, which is comprised of three fairly similar players, and the forward three. That made direct football their best best bet, but Ronaldo’s shooting was poor and neither striker was good enough to handle two centre-backs without support from a midfield runner.
Tuesday night’s game should be more open.

colinfirth

521楼参考译文

colinfirth

Turkey 0-3 Croatia: Bilic shows how to play a 4-4-2 against a 4-3-3November 12, 2011

The starting line-ups

A superb display from Croatia put them in a commanding position going into Tuesday’s second leg.

Guus Hiddink played a 4-3-3 system, with Giray Kacar brought in at the back. Kazim Kazim was injured, so Burak Yilmaz continued upfront, with support from Arda Turan and Hamit Altintop.
Slaven Bilic used 4-4-2, with Mario Mandzukic and Ivica Olic upfront. Luka Modric was in the middle with Ivan Rakitic tucked in on the left, whilst Vedran Corluka was on the left and Domagoj Vida right.
Croatia raced into a second minute lead and always looked in control, wrapping up the game (and probably the tie) with the third goal through Corluka on 50 minutes.
Formations match-up
This was a contrast of systems, a classic battle between a 4-3-3 and a 4-4-2. Whilst formation doesn’t completely dictate the style of football being played, it’s clear that different formations are more suited to different approaches (or vice-versa). The difference between a 4-4-2 and a 4-5-1 / 4-3-3 is summed up nicely by Sir Alex Ferguson.
“The idea behind the 4-5-1 is that you can control the midfield and keep possession of the ball – that’s always your aim when you use that formation,” he says. “I believe the team that has possession of the ball has more opportunities to win the match. As for the 4-4-2, there is more emphasis in that formation placed on playing the ball forward and usually you use the two traditional wingers.”
This game was the perfect case study – the 4-3-3 dominated possession (70% compared to 30%) but the 4-4-2 was more direct and created more goalscoring chances (13 shots, 9 on target, 3 goals compared to 2, 0, 0) according to UEFA.
Croatia tactics
So, how did Croatia do it? For the first five minutes, they pressed heavily at the top of the pitch, with both Olic and Mandzukic working tirelessly to close down the centre-backs and the deepest Turkey midfielder, Selcuk Inan. Mandzukic would often drop deep onto Inan to prevent him getting the ball, and then when Croatia won the ball, he’d sprint forward to join Olic whilst Inan would be attracted to the ball.
The early goal was crucial, because it meant Turkey had to attack and leave spaces at the back for Croatia breaks. Those attacks from the away side were very quick, generally coming down the flanks – Croatia would leave one player in front of the defence, usually Tomislav Dujmovic, but the rest would break forward immediately. Rakitic and Darijo Srna were the key players, able to pick up the ball in space and run at the Turkey full-backs – both of whom had very poor games.
Two banks of four
Croatia were on top for the first ten minutes, but then Turkey started to make the most of their numerical advantage in the middle, and the passing from the away side was poor. Olic and Mandzukic stopped pressing and instead dropped alongside Inan, making it difficult for Turkey to play out from the back to Inan, and equally difficult for Inan to play the ball forward when he did get possession.
Defensively, Croatia did nothing special, defending deep with two banks of four. Turkey had the right idea with the ball, being patient and logical with their passing – trying to drag the Croatian wide midfielders inside to deal with the 3 v 2, then getting their full-backs forward on the overlap.
Turkey lacked penetration, though, with a midfield offering little creativity. Croatia often looked slightly open in that they left a lot of space between the defence and midfield – but this was partly as a result of Turkey having no-one coming into that zone. Altintop, perhaps, could have drifted inside to try and open things up, but more often than not it was Yilmaz dropping deep to offer a threat in that area, which just contributed to Turkey playing infront of Croatia, rather than going through them.
Srna attacks
Srna started the game very poorly, but went onto become a key player down the right,. He was the best Croatian player at turning defence into attack quickly with direct running, and was also very clever at winning free-kicks, which he delivered with great accuracy himself. He provided the cross for Mandzukic’s second before half-time, then won and took the free-kick for Corluka’s header at the start second half.
Bilic deserves great credit for playing Srna there and having faith in the inexperienced Vida behind him – another manager may have dropped Srna to his favoured position of right-back, but then he wouldn’t have been such a force going forward.
Substitions
The game changed little as the game went on. Hiddink brought on winger Gokhan Tore to play on the right for the second half, managing to get rid of the terrible Gokhan Gonul, whose poor defending against Corluka for the first goal was arguably the key incident of the game. Altintop dropped to a right-sided central midfield position, with Sabri Sarioglu going back to right back.
Later, he brought on Mehmet Topal for Inan to try to circulate the ball quicker from midfield, and Umut Bulut for Yilmaz for a more direct option upfront, but Turkey barely created a chance.
Bilic introduced Danijel Pranjic for Rakitic to help shield the defence, then replaced the two strikers when they tired – but all substitutions came after 80 minutes – he wanted to change as little as possible.
Conclusion
Bilic knew how well his tactics had worked. “We deserved to win by even more goals,” he said. “It was fantastic. I want to congratulate all my players – they played the whole match without making any mistakes. It was really amazing.” “Turkey did not create a single chance, which is quite remarkable since they had the home advantage,” added Olic.
Hiddink took the blame for the defeat. “I am responsible for the results. The players have to execute things properly, but I take full responsibility…if you come out in the first minute, badly-organised and outplayed very easily, then it’s already a difficult game. We gave them the favour of two counter attacks, which was the killer.”
Bilic showed how to play away from home with a 4-4-2 – he ordered his players to sit deep, then break quickly down the flanks through the wide players, and also paid attention to Turkey’s spare midfielder, Inan, and dropped one or both strikers close to him. The work rate of the front two, the directness of Srna and the discipline of Dujmovic were also vital.
Turkey were dreadful, though – so much possession and hardly a sniff of a chance. The lack of creativity and thrust from the centre of midfield was amazing, and Tuesday’s return game will surely be Hiddink’s last as a manager.

colinfirth

522楼参考译文
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土耳其0-3克罗地亚之赛后观察：比利奇示范用4-4-2对抗4-3-3

土耳其（4-3-3）：德米雷尔/巴尔塔、挨格门、卡查尔、古努尔/伊南、埃姆雷、萨里奥格鲁/大阿尔滕托普、图兰、伊尔马兹

克罗地亚（4-4-2）：普莱蒂科萨/乔尔卢卡、西穆尼奇、施尔登菲尔德、维达/拉基蒂奇、莫德里奇、杜伊莫维奇、斯尔纳/奥利奇、曼季茹基奇

首回合克罗地亚的华丽表现，使得他们在下周二的第二回合比赛中占据主动。

这场比赛，希丁克摆出了4-3-3的阵型，卡查尔镇守后防线。而由于卡齐姆因伤缺阵，所以伊尔马兹继续顶在最前面，在他身后有图兰和大阿尔滕托普的支援。

另一边，斯拉文-比利奇使用的阵型是4-4-2，马里奥-曼季茹基奇和奥利奇在锋线上搭档。而莫德里奇坐镇中场，而拉基蒂奇被放到左中场，与此同时，乔尔卢卡和多马戈伊-维达分别担任左右边卫。

克罗地亚迅速进入状态，第二分钟就取得领先并且看上去一直控制着比赛节奏，而乔尔卢卡在第50分钟攻进的第三个进球更是宣布比赛（其实也是两回合附加赛）的结束。

阵型对比

这是一场体系的对比，一场经典的4-3-3与4-4-2的战役。虽然阵型不完全决定着球队比赛的风格，但是可以明显看出，不同阵型更适合于不同的战术（或者反之亦然）。弗格森爵士精确地总结了4-4-2和4-5-1或者4-3-3之间的区别。

“4-5-1阵型的关键就是控制中场并且保持控球权，而且这也正是使用这个阵型的目所在。”他说道。“我相信控球率更高的球队有更大获胜几率。至于4-4-2阵型，则是更强调将球往前推进，所以你需要使用两个传统边锋。”

这场比赛是一个极好的范例：根据欧足联的数据，使用4-3-3的土耳其掌握了大多数的控球时间（控球率70%：30%），但是使用4-4-2的克罗地亚的进攻更加直接并有更多进球机会（射门13：2，中框9：0，进球3：0）。

克罗地亚的战术

那么，克罗地亚是怎么做到的？在开场的前五分钟内，他们在前场不停逼抢对手，奥利奇和曼季茹基奇更是不知疲倦地奔跑逼抢土耳其的中后卫以及他们的后腰塞尔丘克-伊南。曼季茹基奇经常跑到了对手腹地去阻止伊南拿球，然后当克罗地亚赢下球权后，他就和搭档奥利奇一起狂奔着向对手球门发起冲击，而伊南却顾此失彼，把注意力放在抢球上了。

这么早的进球是决定性的，因为这个丢球意味这土耳其必须大举压上，同时他们后场留下的空当就会被克罗地亚利用来打反击。客场作战的克罗地亚一般地从两翼发动高速的进攻，他们通常只会留下杜伊莫维奇一个中场在防线身前，其他中前场队员都立即进攻到前面去。拉基蒂奇和斯尔纳都是关键球员，他们不仅在前场狭小的空间里控制住球，并且不停地冲击土耳其两个边后卫。重压之下，土耳其的两个边后卫表现得极其糟糕。

八人防线

在前十分钟，克罗地亚一直占据场面优势，但之后土耳其人开始利用他们中场的人数优势，以及客队克罗地亚糟糕的传球抢回优势。奥利奇和曼季茹基奇适当回收，停止逼抢土耳其的后防，转而开始盯防后腰伊南，削弱伊南在中场调度的作用，因为不仅后防难于将球传递给他，而且即使当他得球后同样不能轻松将球往前场传递。

在防守上，克罗地亚没有什么特别的布置，只是将阵型拖后，中场和后防形成两条四人防线。而土耳其在控制球权方面处理得非常正确，通过耐心并且合理的传球来把克罗地亚的两个边前卫吸引到中路来协助两名克罗地亚中场处理2打3的局面，从而让土耳其的两个边后卫得到插上的空间。

但是由于土耳其中场缺乏创造力，所以并没有几次进攻可以穿透对手的防线。克罗地亚中场与后防之间常常看上去有些许的空虚，不过在一定程度上，这也是土耳其从来没有人能渗透进入到这个区域的结果。大阿尔滕托普或许应该尝试进入这些空当来开启局面，但是土耳其的进攻多半只是伊尔马兹回撤到这个区域来虚张声势一般地威胁一下对手防线，结果只能是面对着克罗地亚球员勉强出脚，未曾有过突破防线的机会。

斯尔纳的攻击

斯尔纳开场时并不在状态，不过调整之后就是右路的关键球员。他是克罗地亚队中最擅于快速转守为攻的球员，向前插上及其坚决。同时他还是一名擅于博取任意球的传球大师，并且他的任意球技术相当精湛。半场结束前曼季茹基奇的进球就是来自于他的传球，而下半场开始不久乔尔卢卡的头球进球更是来自于他搏到并亲自主罚的任意球。

在使用斯尔纳出任右中场以及信任经验不足的维达担当右边卫上，比利奇理应受到称赞。因为其他教练都会把斯尔纳放到他自己最喜欢的右边卫的位置上，但是这样他就不能为球队提供强大的攻击力。

换人

比赛时间在变化，比赛局势却依旧。古努尔表现糟糕，土耳其的首个丢球——可以说是这场比赛的关键所在——就是因为他面对乔尔卢卡的糟糕防守所致的，下半场开始，希丁克就用边锋托雷换下他。因此大阿尔滕托普回到右后腰的位置，萨里奥格鲁则后撤到右边卫。

之后，希丁克还用托普尔换下伊南，试图改变能使球快速通过中场。还有用布鲁特换下伊尔马兹，这样令球队有一个更直接的传球目标，虽然如此，土耳其仍然破门乏术。

比利奇用普兰尼奇换下拉基蒂奇以加强对防线的保护，然后就是将两名已经精疲力尽的前锋换下，但是这些换人都在80分钟以后，因为他并不想作出太多改变。

总结

比利奇知道他这比赛的战术非常奏效。“这场比赛我们可以赢得更多。”他说道。“这比赛踢得非常棒。我想恭喜我的所有球员，因为他们全场比赛没有犯下任何错误，这太让人惊喜了。”而奥利奇补充说：“土耳其占有主场优势，但是整场比赛他们却连一个机会都没有，这是一项非凡的成就。”

希丁克承担了输球的责任。“我为输球的结果负责。队员们应该更好地执行赛前的安排，但我应该负全责……如果从比赛的第一分钟开始，我们的组织很糟糕，而且很容易被击败，那么这就会是一场艰苦的比赛。我们轻易地送给了他们两个反击机会，这是非常致命的。”

比利奇展示了在客场如何使用4-4-2：他要求队员位置要靠后，然后将球抢断下来后迅速传到两翼发动进攻，与此同时，将注意力放在土耳其无人对位的中场伊南，他将一个或者两个前锋放在他身边对他进行骚扰。两名前锋的工作效率、斯尔纳的快速插上以及杜伊莫维奇坚持防守位置都是赢球的最基本要素。

土耳其的表现糟糕透了，如此高的控球率却换不来一次机会。创造力以及中场中的冲击能力的缺乏令人十分诧异，而且这样的结果，几乎可以说星期二的第二回合比赛将肯定是希丁克作为土耳其教练的最后一战。

colinfirth

Spain continue to dominate possession but need more penetration
November 14, 2011

A criticism of Spain days after an unfortunate 1-0 defeat to England is always likely to come across as a wild knee-jerk reaction, but Spain’s problems against decent sides have been evident for over a year now.

They were handed an extremely easy qualification group for Euro 2012 where they had few problems, but in friendlies with larger nations they’ve struggled. Since the World Cup, they’ve drawn 1-1 with Mexico, lost 4-1 to Argentina, lost 4-0 to Portugal, lost 2-1 to Italy and lost 1-0 to England. They went 2-0 down to Chile and came back to win 3-2 in the 91st minute. Granted, they’ve beaten the USA, Colombia and Venezuela (and won their qualification group at a canter), but the graph below shows how poor their results have been against sides in the top 40 according to the FIFA rankings, the type of side they’re likely to encounter at Euro 2012.


The relative strength of Spain's opponents since the World Cup - the higher the bar, the higher their world ranking (as of now). Green bars indicate a Spain victory, red indicates a defeat, orange indicates a draw. The countries above the dotted line indicates they're in the top 40 in the FIFA rankings.

Using this (admittedly arbitrary) cut-off point, their record is P7 W2 D1 L4 F7 A14. This, for the World Champions and a side some consider one of the best of all-time, is an awful run. Spain take friendlies seriously and Vicente Del Bosque has hardly been putting out weakened sides – he’s rotated here and there, tried some new options, but Spain have so much strength in depth that even their second XI would contain world class players.


The starting line-ups for the England game. The midfield three was fluid - Busquets often ended up ahead of Alonso.

Selection

Del Bosque’s selection for the England game was concerning. He started with David Villa upfront, Andres Iniesta on the left and David Silva on the right. Using two wide players who like to come into the centre of the pitch has often looked bad for Spain under Del Bosque – they come inside, flood the centre of the pitch and make Spain too predictable, too narrow, and ultimately too easy to defend against.

That was the situation in the opening day defeat to Switzerland at the World Cup, when Spain were dreadful because of the sheer lack of width. This photo summed it up – the four attacking players all within a ten-yard square, no attacking threat at all from the flanks, and Switzerland able to defend very narrow and keep a clean sheet.

A slight change of shape was crucial to Spain’s World Cup win. Del Bosque realised he needed width, and after Jesus Navas had a good impact against the Swiss, Silva didn’t play another minute in the competition, with Iniesta the only wide player coming inside’ and a more direct player on the other flank – either Navas, Villa (played wide-left when Fernando Torres was upfront) or Pedro Rodriguez, who came in for the final two games. Spain now had more variety in their attack – one wide player contributed to the midfield dominance, the other provided forward runs and penetration, and stretched the opposition defence, creating gaps for the other players to play through.

Silva was the unfortunate victim of that Switzerland game. “When I was the only casualty of the defeat against Switzerland I thought it might be a state of fitness, but after criticism of my performances (it seems) the coach does not trust me,” he said recently. “Before that game I felt confident. I played regularly and had a place in the team, but after losing to Switzerland everything began to change. I was a victim of the poor debut that we had in the World Cup.”

His sudden disappearance was harsh on him individually, but it made sense for the sake of the side. Considering that the other man Del Bosque could have dropped, Iniesta, went onto have a key impact throughout the tournament, it’s hard to say that the manager’s decision was incorrect.

The first few minutes of the game against England saw the expected pattern – Silva and Iniesta coming inside, and England able to contain them comfortably by defending narrow.

Silva false nine


Midway through the first half, David Silva became a false nine

Midway through the first half, Del Bosque switched system and pushed Silva forward to be a false nine, Villa to the left and Iniesta to the right. Clearly, there’s a desire to try to create an appropriate replacement for Lionel Messi in a very Barcelona-centric national team, but false nines have yet to have success at international level.

Argentina tried Messi in that role at the Copa America but fell back on the safety of a traditional nine later on, whilst Brazil wanted Pato (maybe not a false nine, but certainly not a traditional nine) as a lone striker but then turned to Fred when things went badly.

In theory, Silva as a false nine and a forward, Villa, on the left should have eased Spain’s problems with the two wide players coming into the middle, but in some ways it made it worse. With England sitting deep, Villa didn’t feel comfortable going in behind the right-back and instead cut into the middle of the pitch quickly. Iniesta also drifted in, and Silva naturally dropped deep.

Therefore, instead of having a striker looking for balls over the top and two wide players coming in, you had the striker and the wide players all drifting into a similar position. Spain had complete dominance of possession against England but barely created a chance in the first half.

Need for width

On the subject of a lack of width, two side points. First, the need for a more naturally wide player is even more paramount than at the World Cup, because there is less attacking threat from full-back. The left-back position is up for grabs – Jordi Alba fared well here but has a long way to go before becoming the force that the underrated Joan Capdevilla was, a player who could cross the ball very well.

On the other flank, Carles Puyol’s fitness concerns means that Sergio Ramos is often having to play as a centre-back, as he did here, which means Alvaro Arbeloa – a decent functional full-back rather than a buccaneering one – plays at right-back.


Pedro's theoretical role for Spain

Second, Pedro Rodriguez was injured and not with the squad, which is a big problem for Spain. His importance to Spain’s system has been completely overlooked – as the only natural top-class wide forward Spain have, there is no real replacement when he’s out, a major issue considering he was the man who came in and completed the side during the World Cup. If Del Bosque wants to try to replicate a Barcelona-style system, Pedro is crucial. No other player understands Pep Guardiola’s system better than Pedro. “When I didn’t know which positions to take up last season,” Villa said, “I just watched Pedro and copied him.”

The qualities of other players can be replaced through injury – even far better players like Iniesta or Xavi – but Pedro’s attributes are largely unique within the Spain squad.

Fabregas

The other ‘outsider’ who turned out to be crucial at the World Cup was Cesc Fabregas, despite the fact he didn’t start a game. He brought driving runs from the centre of midfield which proved crucial in the quarter-final win over Paraguay and the final win against Holland. This is another quality that Spain lack elsewhere, and another potential answer to the problem of no penetration.

Fabregas has started his Barcelona career superbly, often playing just off the ‘false nine’ Messi. Their relationship is brilliant, and Fabregas has perfected what Tom Williams outlined as the ‘false ten’ role after last summer’s World Cup – providing the direct runs to exploit the space created by a false nine.

His appearance for the second half made sense, then – until you realised that he was replacing Silva and being asked to play the false nine role himself. There, Del Bosque appears to have completely missed what Fabregas brings to Spain – playing as a false nine you’re generally starting high up and coming towards the ball, when Spain need Fabregas going towards goal.


Fabregas' natural role

He can play as a false nine, but it’s not his best role, and he was at his most threatening when he dropped deeper and could then drive towards goal. In the final two minutes he had two shots - one after a cut-back from Torres that deflected into the arms of Joe Hart, the other from a low cross from Villa that Fabregas dragged past the far post when he should have scored. It was a terrible finish, but no other Spain player would have got into the position to miss it.

After Pedro and Fabregas, the third and final crucial player who ‘gives Spain something different’ is Fernando Llorente, who didn’t appear. When Spain wanted to go more direct, they introduced Torres – but the answer is surely Llorente, who was excellent against Portugal in the World Cup by providing an aerial threat upfront, and has done the same thing since – most obviously against Scotland.

Sid Lowe has (at the World Cup) very reasonably defended Torres’ place in the Spain side by saying he often plays ‘the Heskey role’ but Torres has been out of form for two years, and if you’re looking for a Heskey figure, it’s Llorente rather than Torres.

Conclusion

Football in 2011 is largely based around possession play in the midfield, and Spain have the best selection of midfielders in the world and also the most blatant commitment to passing football. That will not change based upon the results of a few friendlies. “We know that’s our way of playing, regardless of the score,” says Xabi Alonso, probably their most intelligent and articulate footballer. ”It’s very well defined, we have the right players and the right mentality…success convinced us that it is the right way forward. The past doesn’t count in terms of results but in terms of approach it does. It doesn’t mean we’ll win in the future but we know how we’ll try to win.”

Yet such a fierce commitment to a footballing ideology can hamper efficiency, and Del Bosque needs variety in the attacking positions. No-one is calling for Spain to abandon their philosophy and play like Stoke, but passing quality must be combined with penetration and direct running. That’s why they won the World Cup – because they had great quality in build-up play and combined it with some immediacy in the final third with the use of Pedro, Fabregas or Llorente.

Del Bosque can’t have forgotten the Switzerland game, and it’s not unreasonable to suggest that he simply has too many great passers that he feels deserve a chance. If Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets are the first choice three in the middle, it leaves other ‘passers’ Silva, Iniesta, Juan Mata and Santi Cazorla battling for the three places ahead. But in stylistic terms, as outlined above, it should probably only be one place they’re battling for…the other two spots must be freed up for more direct players. The more pure ‘passers’ they play, the more the opposition will sit deep and narrow, and the more Spain will need (a) driving midfield runs, (b) wing play or (c) a strong centre-forward to get the breakthrough.

colinfirth

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