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【10-11 ZM专贴】280L:替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

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151#
发表于 2011-4-13 14:34:26 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-13 17:25 编辑

Manchester United 2-1 Chelsea: Ancelotti changes formation but still loses the tie
April 12, 2011

The starting line-ups

Goals from Javier Hernandez and Park Ji-Sung saw United progress to the semi-finals.

Sir Alex Ferguson made two changes from his first leg line-up. Nani replaced Antonio Valencia – he played on the left, with Park Ji-Sung on the right. Rafael was not fit enough to play, so John O’Shea came in at right-back.

Carlo Ancelotti chose Florent Malouda, Nicolas Anelka and Alex ahead of Yuri Zhirkov, Didier Drogba and Jose Bosingwa.

By the end of the game, Chelsea looked well beaten with only ten men – and there was only one minute in the second half when they briefly looked like causing Manchester United real problems, before Park responded immediately. The first half was much more even, however, and it was a very good tactical battle.

Ancelotti changes formation

Ancelotti decided to go with a Christmas tree formation for this match – reminiscent of the shape he used when his Milan side overcame Manchester United back in 2007/08. He used a 4-3-3 away at Old Trafford last season, and the defensive base of the side was similar here – the difference was the roles of Frank Lampard and Nicolas Anelka – their job was to put pressure on Michael Carrick and Ryan Giggs respectively, to prevent those two controlling the match, as they had in the first leg.

That side of the match worked very well in the first few minutes, in terms of Chelsea’s shape without the ball. The new system also solved their main problem in possession in the first match – the yawning gap between the midfield and attack – here, Frank Lampard and Nicolas Anelka were providing the link.

Few clear chances

Chelsea had two main problems when it came to trying to score. First, Torres simply wasn’t playing well – he’s out of form, lacking confidence and sharpness. This will undoubtedly be covered elsewhere. The second problem was slightly more complex. With Chelsea packing five bodies in the centre of the pitch, Nani and Park had to come inside to help out Giggs and Carrick, making United very narrow. That then opened up space for Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic to get forward, but their delivery was extremely poor – and even then, Chelsea would have been better with Drogba trying to get on the end of crosses, rather than Torres.

That said, Anelka poked a couple of efforts narrowly wide in the opening stages. He had a free role to drift around the pitch, and whilst he provided relatively little in the way of creativity, he was more of a force in the game than Lampard. This was another shape that didn’t suit Lampard – he was used too high up the pitch, received passes with his back to goal rather than coming onto the ball, and it’s difficult to remember any meaningful contribution from him. He may even have preferred Malouda’s role, breaking from deep – the Frenchman was more of a threat with his dribbles past John O’Shea down the left, though this meant Rooney had space to wander into down Chelsea’s left.


Rooney played more passes than any other Manchester United player

United strategy

United were more patient – when they won the ball in midfield they played sideways passes, slowed the game and controlled possession. With Chelsea playing a narrow midfield three, switching play was a key part of United’s game, either allowing the wingers to take on the full-backs, or playing in the full-backs, who had no direct opponents. See Rooney and Giggs’ chalkboards, and how many long, square passes they played.

When United had the chance to counter, they did – Hernandez, Rooney, Park and Nani all had the pace to break at speed, and it seemed this would be the most likely avenue for a breakthrough. It was a goal following a set piece that got them in front, however, as Giggs passed for Hernandez’s tap-in.

Second half

Ancelotti sacrificed Torres at half time, and brought on Drogba. Chelsea were immediately more of a threat – Drogba worked the back four excellently with good lateral movement. He worked the channels nicely, was more comfortable receiving the ball with his back to goal, and Chelsea could play longer balls. His chest control and finish for the goal was exceptional (not entirely dissimilar from his crucial goal at Old Trafford last season), and it was noticeable that Essien bypassed the four players between himself and Drogba for the assist – as if he’d given up on the chance of creativity from that zone. Essien played a more attack-minded role in the second half, breaking forward to join the forwards, rather than merely holding.

By that stage, Chelsea had been reduced to ten men after Ramires’ clumsy challenge, and had also brought on Saloman Kalou for Anelka. With a man less, they played a broad, fluid 4-3-2 system that actually competed quite well considering the numerical disadvantage.

Latter stages

Chelsea were unable to put as much pressure on Carrick and Giggs, though, and United controlled the game for much of the second half. After an initial spell of pressure, Chelsea were too keen to sit back later on – they’re not used to pressing, and may not have the physical capability to do so either.


Ryan Giggs frequently switched the angle of attack, and also provided both assists

United responded immediately to Drogba’s goal with Park’s strike, and saw the game out relatively comfortably. Their shape without the ball was excellent throughout the game, and it was telling that Ferguson made just one change – Nani off and the more defensively aware Valencia on – he wanted to change as a little as possible.

Conclusion

Manchester United were well-drilled and comfortable in their system, whilst Chelsea were ramshackle and lacking any kind of creative spark. Ancelotti’s switch to a 4-3-2-1 helped Chelsea in their two main areas of weakness in the first leg – it put pressure upon United’s central midfielders, and helped them play easier forward balls. However, Chelsea continue to lack a creator.

Chelsea found success last season by brutally overpowering opponents with a combination of speed and strength, but in European knockout stages when patience and a bit of guile is needed, Ancelotti’s formula has been extremely unsuccessful. It’s strange that his side features so little creativity - at Milan he often managed to cram Andrea Pirlo, Clarence Seedorf, Manuel Rui Costa and Kaka into the same side, and there was a danger of fielding too many playmakers. Having reached three European Cup finals with Milan, he knows more than anyone else about the formula for success in Europe – but doesn’t quite know what to do with his current set of players. He reverted to his favourite shape, the Christmas tree – but it looks like his season is over before Easter.

Chelsea’s midfield could have done with a player like Giggs, who set up all three goals in the tie. United’s strategy throughout the game was fantastically simple – give the ball to the midfielders, get it out wide, then cross the ball. That strategy – or variations upon it – has worked consistently for decades for Manchester United, and in combination with their ability to counter-attack, they remain a very good side.
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152#
发表于 2011-4-13 14:39:39 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-13 23:12 编辑

151楼的参考译文
-----------------------
2011-04-13 / 余文乐


The starting line-ups

埃尔南德斯和朴智星的进球成功帮助曼联进军半决赛。


和第一回合相比,弗格森在首发阵容上作出了两个调整。纳尼代替了瓦伦西亚成为首发。但爵爷在右路用的是朴智星,纳尼打左边。奥谢取代了伤势尚未痊愈的拉斐尔出现在右后卫的位置上。

安切洛蒂用马卢达阿内尔卡和阿莱士顶替了第一回合的日尔科夫,德罗巴和博辛瓦。

在比赛的最后,10人应战的切尔西看起来被完胜了。他们曾有一分钟燃起了希望,但在短暂领先之后,马上就被朴智星的进球扳平了。双方在上半场更加均势,这是一场不错的战术对抗。

安切洛蒂改变阵式

安切洛蒂决定使用圣诞树阵型出战,这是他带领AC米兰在0708战胜曼联时采用的阵型。上赛季,他曾经在老特拉福德用过433的阵式,球队的防守部署和现在差不多。唯一不同的就是兰帕德和阿内尔卡,他们压迫卡里克和吉格斯,防止他们像第一回合那样拿球进攻。

这个阵容在开场阶段运作得非常好,尤其是在在对方控球的时候。这个新阵型也解决了第一回合是他们在控球上的主要问题。对于中场和前锋之前的空间问题,兰帕德和阿内尔卡提供了很好的连接。

没有太好的机会

在试图取得进球的时候,切尔西有两个主要的问题。首先,托雷斯表现不好,他没有状态,缺乏自信,毫无锐利感。毫无疑问这不是以前的他。第二个问题稍微有点复杂。切尔西在中间堆了五个人,纳尼和朴智星需要内收去帮助吉格斯和卡里克,这使得曼联整个队形收缩得很厉害。这就为阿什利科尔和伊万诺维奇创造了前插的机会,但他们的传中极其糟糕。而且,接应下底传中的话,德罗巴比托雷斯更有威胁。

阿内尔卡在开场阶段有几次很接近的射门。他在角色很自由,可以全场游动,但他的创造力有限。兰帕德表现还不如他。兰帕德不太适应这个阵型,他太靠前了。他经常背身拿球而不是向前迎球,他没有什么让人难忘的表现。他可能更加喜欢马卢达的角色,后插上的法国人用他的盘带突破奥谢下底传中,这为切尔西带来了更多的威胁,尽管这意味着鲁尼有空间可以在切尔西的左路游走。

曼联的战术

曼联更加的耐心,当他们赢得球权以后,他们向两边转移球,放慢节奏并保持控球。因为切尔西在中场中路堆了三个人,转移球成为了曼联的关键。他们既可以让边锋攻击对方的边后卫,或者让没人直接盯防的边后卫助攻。看看鲁尼和吉格斯的战术板,他们送出了多少的长传和对角传球。

当曼联有机会反击的时候,他们毫不犹豫。埃尔南德斯、鲁尼、朴智星和纳尼都有速度去突破,看起来这是最有可能打破僵局的途径。但曼联的进球来自一个定位球,吉格斯的传中,埃尔南德斯抢点。


Rooney played more passes than any other Manchester United player

下半场

安切洛蒂在半场的时候忍痛用德罗巴换下托雷斯。切尔西马上更具威胁了。德罗巴用出色的横向移动去扰乱对手后防四人组。他给队友提供了好的传球线路,也更加适应背身拿球,同时,切尔西也可以放长传了。他的胸部停球破门非常精彩(和上赛季在老特拉福德的争议进球有点相似),而埃辛的传球穿过四人找到德罗巴也值得称道,尽管他之前好像已经放弃了在那个区域创造机会了。埃辛在下半场更具进攻性,前插去加强进攻而不仅仅是留守在后面。

在这个阶段,切尔西已经因为拉米雷斯的铲球下场而10人应战,也用卡卢换下了阿内尔卡。在少一个人的情况下,他们这个拉阔的流动的432阵型其实运作得相当不错。

最后的阶段

切尔西无法继续给卡里克和吉格斯施加足够的压力,而曼联在下半场更多地控制了比赛。在最初的一段压迫之后,切尔西合作地后撤了,他们不习惯压迫,也许也有体力的问题吧。

朴智星的射门使得曼联丢球以后能够马上扳平,后来他们就没有受到太多的考验了。在无球时,他们的阵型保持得很好,这是贯穿全场的优点。弗格森只换了一个人,防守更好的瓦伦西亚换下了纳尼。他要尽可能的保持场上的稳定。


Ryan Giggs frequently switched the angle of attack, and also provided both assists

总结

曼联球员在他们的战术体系中游刃有余,而切尔西则缺少任何创造的火花。安切洛蒂换成4321有效地改善了第一回合中的两个主要弱点,他们压迫曼联的中前卫的同时也使自己更加容易把球传向前场。但是,切尔西依然缺乏创造力。

切尔西上个赛季成功地利用速度和力量的结合,野蛮地战胜对手。但在欧战的淘汰赛阶段,耐心和一点的狡诈是需要的。安切洛蒂的战略极其失败。他的球队如此缺乏创造力让人奇怪。在米兰的时候,他经常把皮尔洛西多夫鲁伊科斯塔和卡卡放在同一阵容中,甚至有组织者太多的问题。三次带领米兰杀入欧冠决赛的他比其他人更加懂得如何在欧战取得成功。现在他并不很清晰知道该如何用他手下的球员。他回归了自己最喜欢的圣诞树阵型。但是他的赛季在复活节前就结束了。

切尔西的中场如果有吉格斯就好了,后者创造了两回合全部三个进球。曼联的全场的战术非常简单,把球给中场,传到边路,然后传中。这个战术曼联已经用了十几年了,再加上他们反击的能力。他们依然是一支很好的球队。


比赛集锦:http://v.goalhi.com/v46229.html
原文链接:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/04/12/manchester-united-2-1-chelsea-tactics/

[ 此帖被余文乐在2011-04-13 16:17修改 ]  



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153#
发表于 2011-4-13 14:40:12 | 只看该作者
看149楼,红蓝大战的预测,对于蓝军还很靠谱,但对老奸巨猾已臻化境的弗爵爷来说,有点班门弄斧味道,但是往往还不靠谱
Penelope 发表于 2011-4-13 14:33


要揣摩老头的首发及阵型布置真的很难,像今天凌晨将朴智星拉到右路专门扼制科尔和马卢达的边路突破,不是那么容易想到的
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154#
发表于 2011-4-13 14:58:37 | 只看该作者
要揣摩老头的首发及阵型布置真的很难,像今天凌晨将朴智星拉到右路专门扼制科尔和马卢达的边路突破,不是那么容易想到的
北极海 发表于 2011-4-13 14:40


而且,鲁尼的频繁长传转移,准确率之高,也是曼联实现移形换位、连消带打和奇袭的关键保证。

纳尼在左路和中路的单突,不仅可缓解蓝军施加强大的压力,而使得拉米雷斯连续吃牌,畏手畏脚且下场,成了比赛的真正转折点。

朴智星和吉格斯攻守端做的都很出色,尤其后者多次反抢拦截成功
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155#
发表于 2011-4-13 15:11:47 | 只看该作者
想想吉格斯这种后腰要是到了英格兰队,或者到了阿根廷队,将是多么大一笔财富
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156#
发表于 2011-4-13 15:33:33 | 只看该作者
38岁的球员,在欧冠强强对话中送出本队两回合全部助攻,还能贡献单场超过11公里的跑动...
我只能说这样的球员成精了,伟大的王老吉!!
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157#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-13 15:37:15 | 只看该作者
时麦林几次出现镜头中,还是没有机会脱去外套。费迪南德也真神了
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158#
发表于 2011-4-13 22:37:38 | 只看该作者
切尔西的问题是赛季中买入托雷斯。一是托雷斯伤后身体状态始终没有恢复;二是切尔西没人能给托雷斯送出直传球,使得本来是曼联中卫克星的托雷斯失去了杀伤力;三是托雷斯打单箭头的时候无人接应从后插上的兰帕德。

用托雷斯打单箭头、德罗巴打单箭头、托雷斯搭配德罗巴打双中锋是三种完全不同的体系,赛季中要强行改变自己的战术体系或者一下子搞出两套新战术体系来,恐怕谁也做不到。所以也不能全怪安切洛蒂。

阿布就是太想拿欧冠,搞得心态失衡了,其实5000万的高价除了曼城没人出得起,还不如等赛季结束再收购,这样起码有一个磨合调整期。这样硬来,本赛季效果未必好,还可能把托雷斯的信心给打掉了,影响下个赛季。
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159#
发表于 2011-4-13 22:52:38 | 只看该作者
切尔西的问题是赛季中买入托雷斯。一是托雷斯伤后身体状态始终没有恢复;二是切尔西没人能给托雷斯送出直传球,使得本来是曼联中卫克星的托雷斯失去了杀伤力;三是托雷斯打单箭头的时候无人接应从后插上的兰帕德。

...
mcruz11 发表于 2011-4-13 22:37


切尔西打法是不是太刚性,而缺少一丝弹性

曼联至少还有个纳尼可以单突的
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160#
发表于 2011-4-13 23:26:56 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-14 13:34 编辑

Guardiola uses Mascherano at centre-back in 1-0 win over ShakhtarApril 13, 2011

Javier Mascherano

There were no major surprises in Barcelona’s 1-0 win over Shakhtar on Tuesday night. 5-1 up from the first leg, they were fairly comfortable in Ukraine, keeping possession for long periods and winning the game with a Lionel Messi goal shortly before half time.

That is, until you consider Barcelona’s line-up, where Javier Mascherano started as a right-sided centre-back, alongside Gerard Pique.

Barcelona have had a problem at centre-back in the last couple of months. Carles Puyol’s long-term injury problems coupled with Eric Abidal’s serious illness mean they’re very short at the back, especially having let go two centre-backs last summer – Rafael Marquez and Dmytro Chygrynskiy. Neither of them featured much last season, but in terms of pure numbers, Barcelona are very light there. Only Pique, Gabriel Milito and Andreu Fontas are fit, and recognised centre-backs.

With Milito terribly slow and Fontas extremely inexperienced, Guardiola’s solution in recent weeks has been to pair Pique and Sergio Busquets at the back. Busquets is more of a holding midfielder than a centre-back, but he has played at the back in a three-man defence in the past, and has adjusted reasonably well to playing as part of a back four.

The first leg of this tie caused Busquets and Pique problems, however. Neither are particularly quick – a big issue considering Barcelona always press, and therefore play a high defensive line. The pace of Puyol or Abidal was sorely missed. Shakhtar created numerous good chances by simply playing the ball over the defence for Luiz Adriano to run onto, and would have gone ahead were it not for some wasteful finishing.

Therefore, for the second leg, Busquets returned to his holding midfield position, switching places with Mascherano. At 5′8, Mascherano is hardly the commanding figure you’d expect for a defender, so the only logical explanation for Guardiola deploying him there is for his pace. This might also seem strange – Mascherano has never appeared a particularly quick player, but then in the central midfield zone, we rarely see him tested for speed. On a similar note, we never really saw that Busquets lacked pace until he was used at centre-back, where it was more obvious.

How did he do? Largely as you would expect – he was good with his tackles on the floor, but largely struggled in aerial challenges, as his mixed ‘tackles’ chalkboard shows:


Mascherano's tackles

He was more comfortable when doing what comes naturally – moving up the pitch and intercepting short passes into feet:



However, in a way, that slightly contradicts the apparently purpose of him playing at centre-back. If he’s constantly coming up the pitch towards play, Pique will still have to cover for him, and the Spaniard’s lack of pace will again be exposed. Mascherano’s performance was solid, but perhaps not quite the solution Barcelona need.

Pique praised Mascherano for his display, saying, “Mascherano is a very fast and intelligent player. He has the quality to adapt to any position”, whilst Dani Alves said simply, “Mascherano was superb at centre-back.”

Guardiola explained his decision after the match. ”I wanted his speed at the back, and also his experience”, he said. It’s an option we have until the end of the year, and also in the future. He is very disciplined.”

It remains to be seen whether Mascherano will play there in Barcelona’s run-in. First and foremost, he is suspended for the weekend’s Clasico – but with three more games against Real Madrid probably coming up, his new-found versatility may be useful.
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161#
发表于 2011-4-13 23:29:48 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-15 07:07 编辑

160楼参考译文
-------------------
瓜帅的怪招:马斯切拉诺变身中后卫
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer


Javier Mascherano

周二晚上巴塞罗那1-0战胜顿涅茨克矿工的比赛波澜不惊。首回合5-1后,巴萨在乌克兰的客场踢得很舒服,长时间控制皮球,并依靠梅西在上半场快结束前的一个进球获得胜利。

当你注意到巴萨的阵容会发现,马斯切拉诺踢的是右中卫,与皮克搭档首发。

在过去的几个月里,巴萨在中卫人选上遇到了麻烦。普约尔的长期伤病,以及阿比达尔的突发重病让巴萨陷入中卫荒,而他们在去年夏天才刚放走了马奎斯和齐格林斯基两名中卫,他俩上赛季出场机会都很少。而从纯人数上来说,这块儿是巴萨的短板,只有皮克、米利托和丰塔斯是身体状况良好的正牌中卫。

米利托速度很慢,丰塔斯又缺乏经验,瓜迪奥拉最近的对策是让皮克和布斯克茨搭档中卫。布斯克茨更适合踢后腰而不是后卫,但他过去也在类似三中卫的防守阵型中踢过,并已经很顺利地调整自己去踢中卫。

然而在首回合比赛中这对搭档就出了漏子。他俩速度都不是很快,这对于习惯压迫对方,后卫线压得很靠前的巴萨来说是个大问题。普约尔和阿比达尔的速度此时就显得很珍贵了。矿工简简单单地把球挑传给阿德里亚诺去接,就制造了不少良机,要不是临门一脚欠火候,早就能获得领先。

因此在次回合,布斯克茨与马斯切拉诺换位,回到了后腰的位置。马诺身高172,他的身板踢中卫并不能起到人们所期待的“一夫当关”的效果,瓜迪奥拉把他放在那儿的唯一靠谱解释就是他的速度。这看上去有些奇怪——马诺好像从来不是以速度见长,但那是他踢中场的话我们也很少能看见他受到速度方面的考验。类似的是,我们也从未留意到布斯克茨吃速度不够快的亏,直到他去踢中卫时,他的速度劣势才显而易见。

他踢得如何?如你所料 — 他的地面铲断很出色,但空中对抗很吃亏,如下图所示:




他在做自己老本行时自如得多 — 上前,拦截短传,把球抢到脚下:



但某种意义上,那与要求他踢中卫显然的目的是不符的。如果他不断地的上前,皮克还是得给他补位,西班牙人的速度缺陷将再次暴露。马斯切拉诺的表现很可靠,但也许并不是巴萨需要的那种解决方案。

皮克称赞马斯切拉诺的表现说,“马斯切拉诺是个非常快,非常聪明的队友,他能适应任何位置。”而阿尔维斯说得很简单,“马斯切拉诺踢中卫棒极了。”

瓜迪奥拉在赛后解释他的布阵时说,“在后防我需要他的速度和经验,这是我们本赛季末,以至于未来的一种选择。他很有战术素养。”

在接下来巴萨本赛季的冲刺阶段中,马斯切拉诺能否继续踢中卫还有待观察。目前首要的是,他因停赛不能在国家德比中出场,但在接下来可能面对皇马的三场比赛中,他最近在中卫的位置上所展现出的新才能有可能会派上用场。

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 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-14 14:07:13 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-4-14 14:09 编辑

Tottenham 0-1 Real Madrid: chalkboards
April 13, 2011

Real Madrid’s four-goal lead from the first leg was never really threatened in this match.

Spurs started reasonably brightly, getting the ball out wide to Gareth Bale, and they had a few penalty shouts throughout the game. They competed reasonably well in midfield, but lacked spark from their front two – Rafael van der Vaart was quiet, and Roman Pavlyuchenko was disappointing.

Real were always in command – their goal came from a goalkeeping error, and aside from that they rarely looked to break forward. With a four or five goal advantage, and the first of four Clasicos coming up at the weekend, there was no chance of them working harder than they needed to.

In the absence of a real contest at White Hart Lane, a full match analysis is a little unnecessary, but here are some chalkboards from the game, courtesy, as always, of TotalFootball.

Van der Vaart found it difficult to find space ‘in the hole’ against his former side. Xabi Alonso did a good job of tracking him across the pitch, and the Dutchman had to move deeper. The passes he received were frequently in deep positions (and to the right, when he moved out to the wing when Jermain Defoe replaced Aaron Lennon).



Mesut Ozil picked up the ball in more ‘classic’ central playmaking positions, but also scampered to the flanks – as he loves to do, in order to create 2 v 1 situations with his wingers. He covers the whole width of the pitch in his efforts to get the ball.



Real’s main focus in this match was keeping possession, in order to slow the tempo of the match. The key man in this was Sami Khedira, who had an excellent game. Aside from three through balls into the opposition penalty area, and a long ball from his own box which was more of a clearance than a pass, he didn’t concede possession once – he controlled the midfield zone excellently.



There was an interesting contrast between Emmanuel Adebayor and Roman Pavlyuchenko. The former Arsenal man was much more mobile and moved into wide positions to collect the ball. He was happy to hold the ball up and play a backwards pass, whereas Pavlyuchenko wanted to keep moves going forward – summing up the approach of the two sides, and their vastly different situations in this game.



Spurs created the majority of their chances by getting the ball wide and playing the ball across the penalty box…




…whereas Real Madrid tried to work the ball into positions on the edge of the ‘D’:

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163#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-14 14:12:29 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-4-15 17:40 编辑

163楼参考译文
----------------
热刺0-1皇马chalkboard观察

作者:迪生  发表日期:2011-4-14 11:16:00

  在这场比赛中,皇马首回合确立的4球领先优势,自始至终没有受到威胁。
  
  热刺开局打得相当不错,他们将球传向边路的贝尔,整场比赛下来,完成了几次在禁区里的射门。他们在中场对抗出色,但两名锋线球员缺乏火花,范德法特很安静,帕夫柳琴科令人失望。
  
  皇马一直掌控局势,他们的进球出自一次门将失误,除此之外,他们很少顾着向前推进。有四五球的领先优势在手,周末还将迎来四场世纪大战中的头一场,那他们不可能超出所必需地卖力。
  
  白鹿巷没有上演真正的对决,所以对比赛做完整分析有些多余,不过这有一些本场比赛的chalkboard分析图表,同往常一样,这得感谢totalfootball.com的好意。
  
  面对老东家时,范德法特发现自己很难在“洞区域”找到空间,阿隆索四面出击,把他跟得很好,因此范德法特不得不回撤,频频在拖后位置接队友的传球(还有右路,迪福换下伦农后他移到边路)
  
  
  
  厄齐尓的接球位置更像一个经典的中路组织者,但也会飞奔到边路——他喜欢这么做,这样做可以和边锋一起形成2打1。他努力拿球,覆盖了整个球场宽度。
  
  
  
  为了放缓比赛节奏,皇马将注意力主要放在控球上。这方面的关键球员是赫迪拉,他踢得极其出色。除了三次向对方禁区输送的直传,还有一次在本方禁区完成的、更像解围的长传,他一次也没有让出控球,无与伦比地控制着中场地带。
  
  
  
  阿德巴约和帕夫柳琴科之间的比较很有意思。前阿森纳中锋更为机动,会移到边路拿球,他很愿意控住球、然后回传,而帕夫柳琴科不停地往前移动——这概括出了两队的踢法和截然不同的各自局势。
  
  
  
  热刺的大部分机会是用通过将球运送到边路,然后传向禁区……
  
  
  
  相反,皇马试图将球输送到“区域”的边缘
  
  

原文地址 http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011 ... eal-madrid-tactics/
中英对照 http://www.leyee.org/viewthread.php?tid=104&extra=
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164#
发表于 2011-4-14 23:50:43 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2011-4-14 23:57 编辑

116楼的参考译文
------------------
国米2-5沙尔克战术分析:防守有多差,比分就有多大
2011-04-07 / 吴老二脑血栓



沙尔克大胜国际米兰,使得自己的一只脚已经踏入了欧冠半决赛的门槛上。

鉴于球队上周对阵ac米兰时4-2-3-1阵型的差劲表现莱奥纳多将阵型改为了4-3-1-2。德扬-斯坦科维奇换掉了戈兰-潘德夫,而迭戈-米利托则搭档萨穆埃尔-埃托奥出任双前锋。

拉尔夫-朗尼克则采取了4-4-1-1风格的阵型。基里亚科斯-帕帕多布罗斯在中场担任着单防守后腰的工作,而胡拉多则被给予前插进攻的自由。而劳尔则处于单前锋埃杜的身后担任影锋。

比赛的开场无比精彩,斯坦科维奇在中场开球圈附近的一脚惊人的吊射帮助国际米兰在开场仅仅40秒不到便取得了领先。

沙尔克占优

尽管这粒进球帮助国米领先,但是沙尔克04毫无疑问地在上半场的大部分时间里都占有着优势。国米较为狭窄的阵型并不能控制住沙尔克的两名边卫,特别是主队左路的低迷发挥。沙尔克右边卫内田笃人大量的前插让国米的盯防颇为难办,而他与杰佛森-法尔范的多次二过一配合更是让右路的进攻风生水起。

而国米似乎颇为愿意让内田笃人——或是其他的沙尔克球员——在球场靠边位置持球进行进攻,因为国米的三名中场在速度上不占优势,可以通过收缩阵型来压紧空间。然而这是一个严重的错误,因为两名中卫克里斯蒂安-齐沃与安德烈-拉诺基亚本场的状态都极为糟糕,而沙尔克边路持续不断的传中球砸入禁区则会增加他俩犯错的可能性。之后不久沙尔克便利用角球机会扳平了比分。

中场拉锯战

国际米兰也许在球场中部有着更多的人数优势,但他们并没有很好地凝和成一个整体,并常常被沙尔克的传球调动地四处奔跑。蒂亚戈-莫塔在中场的站位最为靠后并承担着看防住胡拉多的责任,但他外侧的两名中场球员斯坦科维奇与坎比亚索,并不清楚他们在攻防中的具体职责(之前有提到)。在持球进攻时,是应当留在中场让边后卫上前套边,还是向两边拉开阵型增加进攻空间,他们并不清楚自己应选择的进攻方式。而随着这二人的火力全关,国米的进攻方式便十分容易地被预判了 ——韦斯利-斯内德将是国米进攻的唯一出球点。


国米的进攻组织基本都是通过中路偏左区域发起的,能是谁,斯内德呗。

这对于斯内德的要求甚高,因为他在开场的大部分时间里都被帕帕多普洛斯进行了弹力贴身盯防。而斯内德的应对方式是稍稍后撤,以摆脱他的盯防者并从靠近中线的位置来拿球进攻,并采取过顶球的方式送出长传。有几脚传球十分精彩,其中一次便策动了米利托帮助国米2-1领先的那颗进球,将球妙传给了远门柱端无人盯防的坎比亚索。

而考虑到两支球队的阵型以及比赛战术,将比分扳成2-2的那颗进球则真可谓奇葩一朵。国米已经选择压缩了中场空间的打法,而沙尔克则主要依靠从两条边路起球并尝试着去进行边路压制。因此,沙尔克依靠中路一次直塞空当而攻入的这颗进球着实让人意外。他们很好地利用了莫塔尝试压上进攻后的空当——巴西人一直在尝试着利用前方斯内德通过跑动拉扯开帕帕多普洛斯后的中路空间,可是作为站位最为靠后的中场,而球队又正2-1领先,莫塔也许更应该选择留守后防稳固防守,也许他并不能获得进攻球权,可沙尔克也不会那么轻松地用中路直塞撕开了国米的防线再次扳平比分。

要点拾遗

在这些进球过程中所蕴含的战术要素里,还有些其他需要注意的地方。劳尔在防守端极其卖力,从前方果断后撤至中场区域并对国米的中场球员尤其是莫塔进行施压,这使得沙尔克在中场区域的人数上不落下风。而回撤的劳尔也为沙尔克提供了一种不同的传球选择,相反地,国米方面的两名前锋却总是停留在较深的位置等着传球。

沙尔克防得很出色,保持着出色的防守阵线并在上半场便造了国米多达6次的越位。他们的两名边后卫具有着较高的自由度,出色地压制了内侧对方的进攻球员并使得球队在防守对方的边路进攻时始终保持着多一人的状态——特别是内田笃人很好地帮助了己方中卫进行协防。

下半场

到了下半场,沙尔克在短短的如同上了咒语般的十分钟里疯狂地连进两球迅速地将比分扩大为2-4获得了领先。这两颗进球单纯地来自现代足球中最经典的元素——移动,速度以及快速出球。第三颗进球由劳尔打入,通过一些漂亮的传球完全撕开了国米在中路的密集防守,而第四颗则源于右路的一次突破——有效地利用了齐沃身后的空间,就像ac米兰在上周末成功做到的那样—— 之后拉诺基亚英勇地铲球破坏,却闹出了个乌龙。


沙尔克能够持续地向右侧内田笃人的空当处转移球

齐沃本晚的表现堪称灾难,迟一步的拦截让他最终吃到了第二张黄牌变身红宝石战士下场。这是他4天里吃到的第二张红牌,而且老实说他的停赛也许对于国米来说还是件幸事。莱昂纳多被迫派上伊万-科尔多巴来担任另一名中卫,换下本因斯坦科维奇受伤而被替换上场的侯赛因-哈尔贾。这次换人在本场比赛中相对不是那么重要了,而且国米也很难去实现逆转,但换下哈尔贾的确是一个奇怪的决定,毕竟当时国米众大多已经体力耗尽,可哈尔贾可算是还能跑能跳的新鲜血液。

而国米后防上的一些更为滑稽的防守使得埃杜攻下了球队的第五粒进球——但是沙尔克在防守上做得也不算出色,留给了埃托奥足够的空间去尽情冲刺——可是他与米利托差劲的最后一击让国米的反击再三令人失望。
随后朗尼克简单地用替补换下了跑累了的队员,比分定格在2-5。

总结

一场滑稽的比赛,需要质疑莱昂纳多的问题太多了。沙尔克智取梅阿查,主要因为国米犯下了不计其数的个人失误并且在较早的阶段便耗完了体力。他们的进攻思路同样过于明显而且几乎全部都要依靠斯内德的力量去完成组织。

而另一方面,朗尼克的应敌之策应当受到夸赞。他赛前便详细研究了国米对于斯奈德的依赖程度并因此派上了帕帕多普洛斯并命令他对荷兰人进行紧贴防守。他同样很

原文地址:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/04/06/inter-2-5-schalke-awful-defending-produces-an-incredible-scoreline/
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165#
发表于 2011-4-17 12:59:42 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-17 13:01 编辑

Man City 1-0 Man United: Toure dominates the game in midfield and scores the winning goal
April 16, 2011


The starting line-ups

Manchester City won the derby to progress to the FA Cup final next month.

Roberto Mancini chose to leave out Edin Dzeko despite Carlos Tevez’s absence – he went with Mario Balotelli upfront, supported by Yaya Toure, with Adam Johnson and David Silva on the flanks.

Sir Alex Ferguson left out Ryan Giggs and Javier Hernandez. He used three ‘wingers’ – though Park Ji-Sung played in the centre. Dimitar Berbatov started alone upfront.

The start of the game saw very obvious battles across the pitch – with similar systems, there was a 3 v 3 battle in the centre of midfield, and both sides found it difficult in the centre of the park early on.

Early stages

Unlike the notoriously boring 0-0 between the sides earlier in the season, however, the start to this game was frantic. City were closing down all over the pitch in the early stages, meaning the tempo of the game was high and neither side settled quickly. There were no chances in the opening ten minutes.

It was very interesting – especially after how keen United were to play at a slow tempo in the recent contests against Chelsea – that as soon as the tempo of the game dropped, around the 10-15 minute mark, United had their best two chances of the first half. Both fell to Dimitar Berbatov – one produced a fine save from Joe Hart, the other was somehow sliced over the bar from barely five yards out.

Both midfield trios rotated throughout the match – at points it was possible to find Nigel de Jong and Paul Scholes as the most advanced midfielders, and this movement in the centre of the pitch also created a more dynamic game than the cagey battle many may have expected.

Wide areas

The most interesting individual battles were on the flanks. David Silva came into central positions, John O’Shea followed, and Aleksandr Kolarov tried to get down the line and provide an overlap – Valencia usually tracked him well, but switched off very obviously at one point. On the other flank, Johnson played narrower than usual – as always, he came inside with the ball, but was not a great threat.

Nani seemed to have the beating of Pablo Zabaleta, but his path to come inside was often blocked – the Portuguese winger is slightly more predictable on the left – though he’s two-footed, this quality seems better used from the right where he’s happy to go either way – when on the left he’s intent on coming inside and shooting, for some reason. Valencia was quiet.

Mancini was seen waving his side higher up the pitch, and around the half hour mark City really started to put pressure on United. They dominated the latter stages of the opening period, pinning United into their own third of the pitch. The lack of pace upfront for United made this high line possible, and City’s forward players – Silva and Balotelli in particular – favoured the positivity City played with at this point.

Second half

City’s high tempo continued in the second half, and much like in United’s league game at Stamford Bridge recently, their calm, patient style was simply overpowered at times, particularly by Toure, who was the game’s finest performer. It was symbolic that he intercepted a pass between Carrick and Scholes for the goal – those two players epitomise United’s passing approach, but Toure’s drive and energy defeated them throughout the 90 minutes. When out of possession he remained close to Scholes, who had been a key figure in recent meetings between these two with his diagonal passes. Those weren’t successful today, and City simply executed their gameplan better in this contest.

Hernandez came on for Valencia and United went 4-4-2, but then Scholes’ dismissal gave Ferguson a real problem – after all, it was that area of the pitch where they were losing the battle. Ferguson (via his assistants) brought on Anderson to provide some energy in the midfield, but sacrificed Berbatov. It was the logical move at the time – Berbatov had endured a difficult afternoon and missed United’s best two chances – but it was a blow for United upfront.

11 v 10

With Hernandez upfront alone, City were able to drop deep and defend very narrow (see Patrick Vieira on for Silva). United were a bit of given time on the flanks, and switched the ball from Park on the left out to Nani on the right, but with Hernandez upfront, they had no aerial route. United had the wrong striker on at the wrong time here, with the hold-up qualities of the tall Berbatov when City were playing a high line, and then the pace of the tiny Hernandez when City dropped deep. That, of course, was also clever strategy from Mancini.

After the red card, United looked very flat – and City were relatively comfortable.

Conclusion

Another game involving Manchester United where the game was all about tempo – when the game looked like it had settled down they took charge, but City upped the speed and dominated the majority of the match.

Credit should go to Mancini in that regard – his City side have often looked to sit very deep against the bigger sides and have played exclusively on the counter-attack (see the games against Chelsea and Arsenal), but here Mancini knew that United were prone to being ‘bullied’ (in a legal way) in midfield, and the sheer strength of Toure, Balotelli, de Jong and Kompany was City’s standout quality today.

Ferguson will rue Berbatov’s missed chances, Carrick’s terrible error and Scholes’ moment of madness. Overall, however, his side simply didn’t stamp their authority upon the game – aside from a brief spell in the first half, the nature of the game played into City’s hands, and the win was deserved.
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166#
发表于 2011-4-17 13:02:35 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-17 15:53 编辑

165楼的参考译文
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曼城1-0曼联战术分析:曼乔开窍,图雷霸气
2011-04-17 / Rivaldinho


曼城赢得了德比,从而晋级下个月的足总杯决赛。
虽然特维斯缺阵,曼奇尼还是把哲科按在了板凳上,他使用巴洛特利突前,亚亚-图雷在其身后支援,亚当-约翰逊和大卫-席尔瓦各居两翼。
弗格森把吉格斯和小豌豆排除在了主力之外,他使用了三位“边路”球员,不过朴智星居中,贝巴首发单前锋。
比赛开局阶段两队的对位非常明显,双方阵容雷同,中场都有3人,早期两边都很难在中间打开局面。
初期
和本赛季先前两队无聊的0-0不同,这场比赛的开局非常狂野,曼城开局阶段展开了全场紧逼,比赛的节奏异常地快,两队都无法快速进入轨道。开局10分钟,双方都没有机会。
曼联在近期与切尔西的比赛里都倾向于踢慢节奏的比赛,所以非常有趣的便是10~15分钟左右比赛节奏降下来之后,曼联获得了他们上半场最好的机会,两次都是贝巴,一次被哈特非常精彩地扑掉了,另外一侧则略略高出横梁。
两队的三中场全场比赛都在流转,有些时候德容和斯科尔斯会变成最突前的二人,这样一来比赛也变得更具流动性,而不是如大家所料的那般死气沉沉。
边路区域
最有趣的个体对决来自边路。席尔瓦会收到中间,奥谢也会跟着他,这时科拉罗夫会试图插上覆盖这一路的空间,瓦伦西亚通常会紧紧跟着他,但也有一次非常明显地被对方甩脱了。另外一边亚当-约翰逊的位置也不如平时那么接近边路,不过和往常一样,他时常会带球内切,但是威胁不大。
纳尼看起来可以吃掉萨巴莱塔,但是他的内切线路常常受阻,葡萄牙人在左路的时候行动更好预测一些,虽然他双足都很出色,不过在右路的时候这个优点看起来更有发挥的余地,在那里他走内线和外线都游刃有余,在左路的时候他更倾向于内切射门。而在另外一边瓦伦西亚碌碌无为。
我们看到曼奇尼挥手示意球队压上,在比赛进行到30分钟左右时曼城真的开始向曼联施压了。他们控制了之后的比赛,把曼联压在了本方的30米区域。曼联前场缺乏速度让曼城的防线上提成为可能,而曼城的攻击手——尤其是席尔瓦和巴洛特利——在这样积极的战术中更如鱼得水。
下半场
下半场曼城的快节奏继续,和曼联先前在斯坦福桥的比赛很像,虽然他们踢得很耐心,很冷静,但还是会被对手的强势压倒,尤其是亚亚-图雷,他是本场比赛表现最好的球员。他断抢卡里克和斯科尔斯进球只是本场比赛的缩影,此二人是曼联传接体系的枢纽,但是图雷凭借自己的能量全场90分钟都压制了他们。没有球权时他会压迫斯科尔斯,后者在双方近来的交锋中作用巨大,众所周知他的长传犀利。不过今天可不管用了,曼城更好地执行了自己的战术计划。
此后小豌豆出战换下瓦伦西亚,曼联变阵4-4-2,但是斯科尔斯的下场给弗格森制造了真正的麻烦,他们在这一区域的战斗以完败收场。弗格森之后(通过自己的助手)遣上了安德森,为中场输入新力量,但是这也牺牲了贝巴。贝巴这个下午非常难熬,他错失了本队两次最佳机会,但是真的把他换下去也是曼联的损失。
11 v 10
随着埃尔南德斯单兵突前,曼城开始收缩防守,他们也用维埃拉换下了席尔瓦。曼联在边路有了更多发挥的空间,朴智星和纳尼在两边总能拿到球,但是前面放着小豌豆空中毫无威胁。曼联在错误的时间遣上了错误的前锋,曼城防线压上时在场的是能控球的贝巴,曼城收缩防守时上场的又成了速度快个子小的埃尔南德斯。当然这也算是曼奇尼的聪明策略了。
吃到红牌后曼联难以振作,曼城则踢得得心应手。
结论
这又是一场关乎节奏的比赛,比赛慢下来的时候他们可以掌控之,但是曼城一旦提速,就控制了比赛的大部分时间。
从这方面讲我们应该为曼奇尼喝彩,在对阵强队时他的曼城总是收得很深,期待依靠反击杀伤对手,但是这次曼奇尼知道本方可以在中场压倒曼联,图雷、巴洛特利、德容和孔帕尼的力量是曼城今天最大的优势所在。
弗格森可以把失利归咎于贝巴的挥霍机会、卡里克的愚蠢失误和斯科尔斯的疯狂犯规,不过他的球队没能找到比赛节奏,除了上半场那一小段时间,其余时刻比赛的主导权在曼城的手中,他们的表现配得上这场胜利。
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167#
发表于 2011-4-17 13:03:58 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-17 15:30 编辑

Real Madrid v Barcelona: tactical previewApril 16, 2011

Possible starting line-ups

Barcelona have an eight-point gap going into the second of five Clasicos this season.

No-one needs reminding what happened in the previous fixture between these two sides. The 5-0 was a truly historic result, and the heaviest defeat of Jose Mourinho’s managerial career. Mourinho has a reputation for learning from his mistakes, though – his Inter side were outplayed by Barcelona at the Camp Nou in early 2009/10, but he returned in the semi-final to record an unlikely victory. With another Barcelona v Mourinho semi final coming up in the next few weeks, he has an even better chance to replicate last season’s heroics in the European Cup, but first and foremost, Real will be much better prepared for this contest.

Pep Guardiola is well used to these kind of fixtures. His Barcelona side have gone to the Bernabeu in the past two seasons and recorded convincing victories – a 2-6 in 2008/09 and a 0-2 in 2009/10. If Mourinho’s objective is to correct previous errors, Guardiola’s is to keep things exactly the same.

Team news

Real are without Pedro Leon, Fernando Gago, Esteban Granero and Lassana Diarra. None of these players are first teamers, and really the only relevant player there is Diarra. Many felt he should have been used as an additional holding player in the first game, to deny Barcelona space between the lines. Mourinho’s half time substitution, where he brought Diarra on for Mesut Ozil, was damage limitation and a recognition that the starting XI had been wrong.

Barcelona’s problems are more serious – Eric Abidal and Carles Puyol have been unavailable for the last few matches, and though Puyol returns to the squad for this game, there are doubts he’ll be risked – especially with more important games to come. Javier Mascherano was used as a surprise centre-back in the midweek win over Shakhtar, but he is suspended for this game – meaning Barcelona really are struggling at the back and holding midfield. Sergio Busquets will have to be used as a centre-back alongside Gerard Pique, presumably with Seydou Keita playing in central midfield, in the deep position. Upfront, Bojan is injured.

There has been some suggestions both sides might field weakened teams for this contest, but it seems unlikely.

Mourinho’s decisions

Mourinho has a few dilemmas for this match, and always has a surprise up his sleeve. However, he’ll probably consider this match the least important of the four upcoming contests, and so any shock moves might be held in reserve for later on in the series.

It’s worth outlining two possible changes he could make to his usual system, however, both of which seem to have been trialled in recent Real games. It’s worth considering that Mourinho often tries something in a less important game as preparation for one of the big ones – in last season’s Coppa Italia semi final away leg at Fiorentina, he went ultra-defensive for the last twenty minutes of the tie, despite the fact Inter were completely in control anyway. That seemed bizarre at the time, but it served as great preparation for his second leg tactics against Barcelona a fortnight later.

First, the use of Alvaro Arbeloa and Marcelo in tandem down the left in the midweek win over Tottenham could turn out to be a strategy to combat Dani Alves’ runs down the right. There is a precedent for this too – Valencia dealt excellently with Alves at the Nou Camp by playing two left-backs together late last year, and Mourinho himself made a very late change in last season’s semi-final second leg by swapping the “injured” forward Goran Pandev for Cristian Chivu, more of a defender, on the left.

Second, Mourinho used centre-back Pepe as a holding midfielder in last weekend’s win over Athletic Bilbao. Pepe is not entirely out of position there – for Portugal, Carlos Quieroz often used him in that role – but it’s the first time Mourinho had done so. Real so obviously struggled in the 5-0 with Lionel Messi in space between the lines (remember, he didn’t score but assisted two identical goals for David Villa with through balls), and besides, if not playing Diarra, a holder, was a mistake in that game, Mourinho might turn to Pepe for extra protection ahead of the back four.

But never mind who to play, Mourinho has to think about how to play. Playing a high defensive line at the Camp Nou failed miserably, and although there has been a notable improvement in how Real press – see the games against Spurs – they’d surely come off second best in high tempo pressing contest. A deep defensive line and a counter-attacking strategy is much more likely here.

Guardiola decisions

With Puyol, Abidal and Mascherano all out, it’s difficult to see what decisions Guardiola has in terms of selection, particularly now that Busquets and Keita will be played out of their natural roles. Guardiola may have considered playing Andres Iniesta as part of the front three, but that’s no longer an option. His biggest issue is probably the fitness of Puyol, and whether to use him.

That said, there is the issue of mentality. Barcelona have a commanding lead in La Liga (the 5-0 is effectively a half point for the head-to-head battle too, assuming no turnaround in that scoreline here) and therefore they don’t need to win. Barcelona are not a side who would play for the draw as such, but they are the best side in the world at keeping possession, and therefore it wouldn’t be a surprise to see them focus even more than usual on ball retention. Guardiola wouldn’t say it to the media or to the players, but he’d surely take a boring 0-0, safe in the knowledge that Real would then have to make up nine points in the space of six games.

Key battles

There are hundreds of factors at play in these four contest, but for the sake of brevity, let’s stick to three. The main man in this fixture the last two seasons has been Xavi Hernandez. Four assists in the 2-6 and two more in the 0-2, where Real completely failed to pick him up. Ozil seemed to have the responsibility for marking him in the 5-0, but this failed miserably as Xavi simply moved higher up the pitch – where he scored the first goal. ‘How do you stop Xavi?” is not a problem there is a definitive answer to, but Real simply can’t give him the freedom he enjoyed last year.

The other pressing concern is, of course, Messi. He now frequently takes up a very deep position – pretty much as a classic enganche – before dribbling or running off the ball and ending up as a striker. He loves space between the lines, and whilst even under pressure he’s a huge threat, Real surely must cope between in that zone. This is why Diarra’s absence is important, and why Pepe in a holding midfield role is a possibility. Neither Sami Khedira nor Xabi Alonso are classic holders, and that cost Real earlier in the season.

Perhaps the most important issue, however, is Barcelona’s vulnerability to pace upfront. Guardiola has been desperately shuffling his troops recently to avoid Busquets and Pique’s lack of speed being exposed, and this week commented that Real Madrid are the world’s best counter-attacking side. This broad issue could dictate a huge number of decisions from either manager, ranging from how high up the pitch Barcelona will play, to where Mourinho should play Cristiano Ronaldo – could his pace be best utilised as the main striker at some point in the four-game series?
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168#
发表于 2011-4-17 13:08:19 | 只看该作者
167楼的西甲德比的战术前瞻中,对双方阵容预测,都有不靠谱的地方
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169#
发表于 2011-4-17 13:10:08 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-17 13:13 编辑

Real Madrid 1-1 Barcelona: Real fight back impressively, but gap remains eight points
皇马1-1巴萨:皇马扳平比分令人印象深刻,然而与领头羊巴萨的差距仍然是8分
April 17, 2011


The starting line-ups

A penalty each from the two Pichichi contenders saw honours even at the Bernabeu.

Jose Mourinho left out Mesut Ozil and brought in Pepe to give extra grit in the centre of midfield. Raul Albiol started at centre-back, and Karim Benzema got the nod upfront.

Pep Guardiola welcomed back Carles Puyol, allowing Sergio Busquets forward into his natural position. Elsewhere, it was as expected.

The first half was a bit of a non-event – the game started at a very high tempo, but for long periods there wasn’t a lot of good football played. Barcelona’s short passes were often misplaced early on, whilst Real’s longer balls were also wayward.

Pepe

The key tactical factor was Mourinho’s use of Pepe ahead of the back four. This always seemed likely to be a tactic at one stage in this four game series, but it was a slight surprise that it was used for this game, where Real Madrid pretty much had to pick up three points.

Pepe had a very good game – he was possibly the best player on the pitch. He didn’t man-mark Lionel Messi, he simply kept a sensible distance between the back four and the other two midfielders, and denied Barcelona space in that zone. He also provided the raw physical power that Xabi Alonso and Sami Khedira lack, and put in some fierce tackles throughout the game. Messi still got space, of course – it’s impossible to completely stop him – but nothing like the time on the ball he enjoyed in the 5-0.

Approaches

Barcelona’s formation was nothing unexpected, though their strategy was slightly different to usual. First, since they didn’t absolutely need the win, the focus on possession was even more obvious at points in the first half. They kept the ball when often they would have looked to play the killer pass, and through balls came even later than usual in their attacks. This was also partly because Real pressed in the midfield – moves often went back to the defence, across to the opposite flank, and then re-entered the midfield.

There was also less obvious pressing from the front three – David Villa and Pedro Rodriguez seemed to drop deeper than usual and sometimes left Messi as the highest player up in a 4-1-4-1 in the defensive phase of play. Again, this owed something to Real’s strategy with the ball, which was to bypass the first press by playing long, direct passes, especially out to the flanks – Villa and Pedro rarely had to pressure Marcelo and Sergio Ramos.

Real’s strategy with the ball didn’t seem particularly effective as they created few goalscoring chances in the first period, but Ronaldo was an obvious threat and won a couple of free-kicks on the edge of the box in dangerous positions. Angel di Maria was less visible on the left, but Sami Khedira offered another option through the centre with storming runs forward. He lacked the creativity of Ozil, but in the early stages his energy was more useful than Ozil’s creativity would have been.

Ozil also put pressure on Barcelona when they had the ball deep in midfield – Real didn’t press particularly well as a unit, but Mourinho seemed happy just to make Barcelona work quicker in the centre of midfield, and the side was much more compact than at the Camp Nou.

Real were also a constant threat from set-pieces. The difference in height was obvious (an average of three inches per player, according to one source) and Barcelona looked a little desperate at times when the ball came into the box.

Second half

The key event of the game came eight minutes after the break, when Raul Albiol was dismissed for pulling down Villa in the box – a penalty, converted by Messi, followed. Though the individual defending can be criticised, the fact that Villa got in behind the defence was no coincidence. Balls chipped over the top of the defence for him was Barcelona’s main route of attack throughout the game – this pass had come from Busquets in his own half, though usually it came from further forward, when Real lost one of of Xavi, Iniesta or Messi.

Barcelona were casual after the goal – maybe too focused upon keeping possession and not determined enough to get the second goal.

Mourinho changes


The formations from 67 minutes onwards, with Real down to ten men

Huge credit must go to Mourinho for the changes that got Real back in the game. Playing Barcelona is hard enough with eleven, so going down to ten men and being subject to Barcelona’s keep-ball session is not a situation many sides come out of well, but Real effectively ‘won’ the 10 v 11 game, which is extremely impressive.

Mourinho’s first move was odd – Ozil on for Benzema, as Real looked to steady the ship having gone a goal and a man down. It was nearly 15 minutes after the goal when Mourinho brought out the ‘ten man strategy’ he had prepared for. He got rid of Alonso, who wasn’t mobile enough for the plans, and di Maria, who had contributed little. On came Emmanuel Adebyor, who provided a focal point for the attacks, plus Alvaro Arbeloa.

Arbeloa may have seemed a strange choice to get Real back in the game, but it worked very nicely. He went to right-back, Sergio Ramos came inside, and Pepe could return to his central midfield role, having been forced to drop in at centre-back after Albiol’s dismissal. He continued to stamp his authority on the game, and along with Khedira provided tremendous energy in the centre of the pitch, meaning Real weren’t completely dominated despite having a man less.

Ronaldo moved to the left and Ozil went to the right. The German was the star man after his introduction – he provided quality on the ball, played intelligent passes and was effectively the link player Real had missed early on. He also worked very hard, and it was his pressure on the edge of the Barcelona box that won the ball and resulted in Dani Alves fouling Marcelo for the penalty. Marcelo continued to get forward even after Albiol’s dismissal, and Real stretched Barcelona admirably for the final 15 minutes.

Conclusion

Neither side played particularly well here. Barcelona lacked their usual fluency – neither Xavi nor Iniesta had great games, Pedro was quiet, and Villa is clearly lacking confidence in front of goal – that’s ten games without scoring for him.

Real’s use of Pepe worked excellently, and they upset Barcelona in midfield with a physical battle. Admittedly, this meant that (without Ozil) they weren’t as much of a goalscoring threat as they would have liked, but there was surely always a plan to keep it tight early, then introduce another attacking player as the game went on. They essentially managed to do that despite going down to ten, by squeezing every last drop of energy from Pepe and Khedira in the centre.

Ultimately, however, this was a great result for Barcelona. A five point gap (with the mental blow of losing to Real) would have made things interesting, but eight points – plus a bonus ‘half point’ for the head-to-head record – means this is probably the day we can close the book on the title race in Spain.
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170#
发表于 2011-4-17 13:14:03 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-17 15:32 编辑

169楼参考译文
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2011-04-17 / Rivaldinho



两队王牌各自射入一粒点球,国家德比以平局收场。

穆里尼奥把厄齐尔留在了替补席上,佩佩前提支援中场。阿尔比奥尔出任首发中卫,本泽马突前。

瓜迪奥拉迎来了伤愈的普约尔,布斯克斯可以重新回到后腰位置,其余位置依旧如常。

上半场几乎没有什么事件,比赛节奏很快,但是很长一段时间大家都没踢出想要的足球,巴萨的短传一开始老失误,皇马的长传又总是过头。

佩佩

穆里尼奥这边的战术要素是对佩佩的使用,本场他出现在后防线前起到了屏障作用。事先我就认为这在四场“系列赛”中有很大的可能出现,可是在第一场就这么用还是让人惊讶,毕竟这一场皇马必须拿3分的比赛。

佩佩踢得非常好,他也许是本场最佳。他没有人盯人防守梅西,他与防线和两个中场队友之间保持了合理的距离,不让巴萨在那一区域获得空间。他也提供了阿隆索和赫迪拉所不具备的身体力量,在比赛里做出了几次凶猛的铲断。梅西还是有空间,当然了你没法完全阻止他,但是和5-0那场比起来他可没那么多控球时间了。

策略

巴萨的阵型毫无意外,不过他们的战术和平时略有不同。首先,他们不是非赢不可,上半场他们控球意图比平时更明显,他们进攻中的真传比以外来得要晚一些。这一部分也要归功于皇马中场的压迫,于是皮球不停地送到后场,再分向两边,然后再送向中场。

前场三人组的压迫强度则更小了,比利亚和佩德罗比以往站得更深,有些时候梅西倒成了最突前的球员,无球防守阶段的阵型类似4-1-4-1。皇马有球时的策略也因此收到了影响,他们往往用长传来通过巴萨的第一道压迫,这样一来两边就被忽略,比利亚和佩德罗都不怎么需要压迫马塞洛和拉莫斯。

皇马有球时的策略看起来不是特别有效,他们上半场就每创造什么机会,不过C罗的威胁还是显而易见的,他在禁区边缘的威胁区域赢得了几次任意球。迪马里亚在左路略显隐身,不过赫迪拉利用中路后插上给球队提供了另外一种选择,他缺乏厄齐尔的创造力,但是比赛初期他的活力比厄齐尔的创造力更重要。

厄齐尔也能在中场防守时向巴萨施压,皇马作为整体压迫并不是特别好,但是穆里尼奥乐于让巴萨在中场以更快的速度忙碌,他的球队在协作性上比在诺坎普时好得多了。

皇马的定位球一直很有威胁,高度上的优势显而易见(根据某报道平均身高差了3英寸),巴萨有几次对于吊进禁区的球有些绝望。

下半场

比赛的关键点在下半场第8分钟来临,阿尔比奥尔因为在禁区内侵犯比利亚而被罚下,梅西点球一蹴而就。这个球的个人防守是有问题,但是比利亚杀到皇马防线背后不是巧合。这场比赛身后球找比利亚是巴萨的主要攻击手段,这次传球来自后场的布斯克斯,一般情况下这种传球都是中前场送出的,那便是当皇马漏掉哈维、伊涅斯塔或者梅西的时候。

巴萨进球后踢得很悠闲,也许他们太纠结于控球而不是下定决心打入第二球了。

穆里尼奥换人


67分钟之后的阵型图

皇马能死而复生,穆里尼奥的换人必须得到赞扬。以11人对阵巴萨尚且很难,何况10人作战。很多球队都苦于无法摆脱巴萨的控球迷局,但是皇马赢得了这场10对11的比赛,这令人印象深刻。

穆里尼奥的第一次换人很奇怪,厄齐尔换下本泽马,一球落后一人罚下,皇马看起来要先稳住阵脚。在失球后15分钟时穆里尼奥才真正祭出自己准备的10人作战方案,机动力无法满足现有战术的阿隆索下场了,碌碌无为的迪马里亚下场了,能够作为进攻支点的阿德巴约出战,一起上场的还有阿贝罗阿。

这时候用阿贝罗阿看起来有些奇怪,但是效果却很好,他踢右后卫,拉莫斯踢中后卫,佩佩可以继续上去踢他的后腰,在阿尔比奥尔被罚下后他被迫踢了一阵后卫。他可以继续在比赛里大展拳脚,他和赫迪拉为中场注入了巨大的能量,因此皇马虽然少一人,却没被完全压倒。

C罗拉到左路,厄齐尔站在右路。德国人上场后星光闪耀,他提供了控球质量和传球只会,他有效地串联起了球队,这是皇马先前所没有的。他也踢得很卖力,正是他的压迫导致巴萨在禁区边缘丢球,阿尔维斯被迫放倒马塞洛送出点球。在阿尔比奥尔被罚下后马塞洛还是继续前插,皇马在最后15分钟有效地扯开了巴萨的防守。

结论

没有哪一队踢得特别好,巴萨缺乏以往的流畅度,哈维和伊涅斯塔都发挥平平,佩德罗很安静,比利亚在门前缺乏信心,他已经10场没进球了。

皇马对佩佩的使用非常棒,他们用身体优势在中场阻挠了巴萨。诚然,没有厄齐尔他们的进攻威胁不足,但是起初保持拉锯之后再遣上进攻球员也是常用的计划。他们10人作战依旧做到了这一点,靠的就是佩佩和赫迪拉在中路源源不断的能量释放。

然而对于巴萨来说这也是个好结果,如果差距缩小到5分,事情就很有趣了,现在是8分,还有交锋记录中的那半分,这意味着西甲冠军争夺战也许可以宣告终结了。
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171#
发表于 2011-4-17 15:34:05 | 只看该作者
170楼的参考译文的题目,有点不淡定,与原文标题意思不相干
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172#
发表于 2011-4-17 16:18:36 | 只看该作者
皇马与巴萨西甲次回合的德比战的数据统计

Real Madrid                                                      Barcelona

13(6) Shots (on Goal) 11(6)
22 Fouls 14
8 Corner Kicks 0
1 Offsides 5
24% Time of Possession 76%
2 Yellow Cards 5
1 Red Cards 0
5 Saves 5
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173#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-18 08:53:56 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-4-18 08:56 编辑

Arsenal 1-1 Liverpool: amazing late drama
April 17, 2011


The starting line-ups

Robin van Persie broke the record for the latest-ever Premier League goal…then Dirk Kuyt broke it again.

Alex Song was only fit enough for the bench, so Arsene Wenger played Abou Diaby and Jack Wilshere in the centre of midfield. Theo Walcott came in for Andrei Arshavin.

Kenny Dalglish named his expected side, although he had to make two like-for-like changes because of injury during the game – both Fabio Aurelio and Jamie Carragher were forced off.

Amongst the crazy few final moments, the main tactical story from this game was simple – Arsenal struggled to break down a disciplined Liverpool defence.

Early stages

The game started relatively even, but when Arsenal settled down into a good rhythm, they started to dominate possession and pushed Liverpool back deep into their own half. Theo Walcott and Emmanuel Eboue caused problems down the right, and Arsenal looked dangerous.

Liverpool were essentially losing the numbers game in midfield. Against Manchester City last week, Luis Suarez was given license to stay high up the pitch and look for space in between the lines. City were poor that day and Liverpool could afford to do without an extra man in the midfield zone, but here Arsenal’s possession game was causing too many problems in the centre of the pitch.

Midfield battle

The home side’s 3 v 2 advantage was a problem in itself for Liverpool, but it especially harmed their chances of pressing properly – with Cesc Fabregas playing close to the midfield, if Jay Spearing and Lucas Leiva came up to the pitch, they’d simply be bypassed by Arsenal’s midfield triangle. As a result, they had to sit deep, offering little attacking threat in open play.

Liverpool could have lived with this, content to soak up pressure before playing on the counter-attack, but Dalglish couldn’t really justify giving Suarez such freedom, since he was having a poor game when he got the ball – he moved into decent positions, but his passing was wayward and he seemed unlikely to create chances.

Therefore, midway through the first half, Dalglish instructed the Uruguyan to move from his support striker role to a left-sided position, pushing Raul Meireles infield and switching to more of a 4-5-1. This gave Liverpool more bodies in the centre, allowed them to close down, and though Arsenal continued to dominate the ball, they looked less dangerous.

Until then, Liverpool had survived because of excellent performances from the four defenders, plus good work from Lucas, who patrolled the zone in front of the back four, and also helped double up against Arsenal’s wingers (particularly Walcott). Arsenal’s delivery from wide areas into the box was poor, as the chalkboard below shows.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Second half

After half time, Liverpool seemed to be content with the draw. Carroll’s departure through injury resulted in Dalglish sending on Jonjo Shelvey and pushing Kuyt upfront as the lone striker – Liverpool seemed to want to shut up shop.
Wenger’s changes were numerous – Nicklas Bendtner, Andrei Arshavin and Alex Song all came on, and Arsenal’s attackers switched positions to give Liverpool a different threat, but they still found it difficult to play through Liverpool’s defence, who sat very deep.

From the chalkboards, it’s interesting how rare it was that Liverpool actually needed to cut out an attack in their own penalty area. The chalkboards below shows that no interceptions and only four tackles (all of which happened in the first half) took place in the penalty area, and for a side that sat quite deep, Liverpool’s interceptions are surprisingly high up the pitch.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

This indicates that Liverpool pressed quite well in the midfield zone, and that Arsenal’s use of the ball around the penalty box was poor. Fabregas, despite winning the penalty, didn’t inspire Arsenal enough in the centre of the pitch, and his passing was not as good as it usually is. Fabregas’ role in the team means that he’s often the one trying the ‘killer’ pass and therefore it’s entirely acceptable that a lot of red arrows will show up in his passing chalkboard – but even so, he gave the ball away too cheaply in this match.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

The late penalties owed little to tactics, and much to tiredness and poor decision making.

Conclusion

Arsenal narrowly avoided a third consecutive home game without scoring, and essentially relied on a clumsy tackle from Spearing for the goal. It’s easy to continue to blame Arsenal’s problems at the back for their (relative) woes, but the attacking band of three has to take responsibility for the lack of goals in recent weeks. The final ball from Fabregas, Nasri and Walcott was continually disappointing here, and the truth is that Arsenal aren’t doing the things you usually associate with Arsenal – the passing is sloppy, the attacks are too slow, the movement upfront isn’t good.

Liverpool’s attacking performance was a little disappointing following the game against Manchester City – Suarez and Carroll rarely combined, and with the two banks of four sitting deep, it was difficult for Liverpool to get midfield runners up to join them. The defensive performance was very good, however, and Liverpool’s record this season against the clubs above them in the table is very impressive.
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174#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-18 08:57:35 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-4-18 15:09 编辑

173楼参考译文
---------------------

阿森纳1-1利物浦战术分析:最后时刻的高潮

2011-04-18 / 余文乐



范佩西打破了英超历史上最迟进球的纪录,然后,库伊特再破一次。

宋刚伤愈状态还没恢复,所以温格用迪亚比和威尔谢尔搭档中路。沃尔科特取代阿尔沙文首发出场。

达格利什排出了他能排出的最好阵容了。但是因为伤病,他被迫用掉了两个换人名额,奥雷里奥和卡拉格都因伤被迫提前离场。

除了那段最后的疯狂,这场比赛的主要战术看点其实很简单。阿森纳难以打破利物浦那个训练有素的防守体系。

开局阶段

比赛开端相对均势,但当阿森纳找到他们的节奏以后,他们开始主导控球然后把利物浦压到了自己的半场。沃尔科特和埃布埃在右路给对手创造了很多麻烦,阿森纳是个危险的对手。

利物浦在中场处于人数上的劣势。上周对着曼城的时候,苏亚雷斯被允许留在前场自由的寻找空间。曼城表现糟糕,利物浦可以承受中场少一人的压力。但今天阿森纳的中路传球创造了太多的威胁。

中场争夺

主队中场人数3v2的优势本身对于利物浦来说就是一个问题,但更大的影响是由此引发的中场压迫问题。由于法布雷加斯更接近中场,如果斯比灵和卢卡斯去压迫他的话,他们可以简单的被阿森纳的三人中场互传通过。结果他们不能不保持后撤,这样,他们在运动战中能够提供的进攻元素就很少了。

利物浦本来可以靠着引蛇出洞然后打反击创造机会,但达格利什无法给苏亚雷斯太多的自由。因为他得球后的表现并不好,他跑位的确不错,但是他的传球很糟糕,看起来他也不愿意给队友创造机会。

因此在上半场中段,达格利什让苏亚雷斯后撤到左中场的位置,把梅勒莱斯移回中路,阵型改成451.这让利物浦在中场有更多的人手可以进行压迫,这样,尽管阿森纳依然主宰了控球,他们也没多少威胁。

利物浦一直保持不失球是因为他们后卫们的出色表现,当然还有卢卡斯。他在后防线前的扫荡很出色,也会帮助队友夹击阿森纳的边锋(尤其是沃尔科特)。阿森纳的传中很糟糕,就像下面小白板显示的那样。



下半场

半场之后,利物浦的表现看起来对平局还比较满意。卡罗尔的因伤离开导致达格利什用谢尔威换下他,然后把库伊特推到了单箭头的位置,利物浦要死守了。

温格的变招很多,本特纳,阿尔沙文和宋依次上场了。阿森纳进攻球员的互相换位来给利物浦了不同的威胁,但是他们依然难以打开利物浦那后撤的防线。

从小白板可以看出一个有趣的现象,利物浦在自己禁区内解围的次数非常少。下面的战术板显示利物浦在本方禁区内没有断球,只有四次铲断(几乎全在上半场)。对于一个后撤如此之深的球队,利物浦的断球地点惊人的靠前。



这意味着利物浦在中场的压迫做得非常好,而阿森纳在禁区内的处理球非常糟糕。尽管赢得了一个点球,但是法布雷加斯在中路没有给阿森纳带来太多的灵感,他的传球也不如以往那么好。法布雷加斯在球队中的角色意味着他要经常的尝试送出致命的直塞,因此小白板中红箭头多是可以接受的。但即便如此,他在比赛还是太轻易的丢球了。



最后的点球对于战术分析的意义不大,原因主要是疲劳和糟糕的防守判断。

总结

阿森纳勉强地避免了连续三个主场0进球,实际上那还要多亏靠斯比灵那个愚蠢的铲球。继续责难阿森纳的后防是容易的,但是他们的三人进攻组合应该对最近几周的进球荒负责。法布雷加斯纳斯里沃尔科特们的最后一传依然让人失望。阿森纳打的不是人们印象中的阿森纳足球。他们的传球很马虎,进攻速度很慢,向前移动糟糕。

相比之前对阵曼城的比赛,利物浦的进攻表现有一点让人失望。苏亚雷斯和卡罗尔之间的联系很少,而由于两边中场都后撤得很深,他们的帮手也少。然而他们在防守端得表现非常出色,利物浦本赛季对阵排名比他们高的球队战绩相当出色。
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175#
发表于 2011-4-22 09:03:16 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-22 09:07 编辑

Napoli 1-2 Udinese: Guidolin without Di Natale and Sanchez, but masterminds great victory
April 19, 2011


The starting line-ups

Two fantastic goals gave Udinese an important win over Napoli.

Francesco Guidolin had numerous absentees, most notably his two star forwards, Antonio Di Natale and Alexis Sanchez. He had to play Kwadwo Asamoah just off German Denis, the former Napoli player.

Walter Mazzarri played his usual 3-4-2-1 system – Hassan Yebda continued over Walter Gargano in midfield, and Victor Ruiz started at the back.

This game was highly anticipated for various reasons. Primarily, because Napoli and Udinese are the two sides punching above their weight in Serie A this season – 2nd and 4th coming into this round of fixtures – but because these are the two most tactically interesting sides in the league – whilst much of Serie A is fixated on playing slow, narrow football (leading the the popularity of 4-3-1-2 amongst the top clubs), these two are doing something different. Both have used a back three with wing-backs throughout the campaign, and can be considered Europe’s best three-at-the-back teams this season.

There was a widespread belief that Udinese were set to switch to a four-man defence for this game. In theory, this made sense – three at the back against Napoli’s front three would have been dangerous, and besides, Udinese’s injury problems meant a change of shape may have been necessary anyway. However, Guidolin put out a complicated system that was at times both a back three and a back four, and this contributed heavily to the victory.

Background

First, it’s important to consider that there is often an element of lopsidedness to Udinese anyway. The recent game against Roma, for example, saw Pablo Armero on the left playing much deeper than Mauricio Isla on the right, because they had different marking responsibilities - with Roma’s Mirko Vucinic playing to the left.

Vucinic’s positioning for Roma is actually not dissimilar to Ezequiel Lavezzi’s for Napoli – they both like to stretch the play and move close to the touchline without the ball, before drifting into the centre to provide a goal threat. Therefore, Udinese’s system was always likely to be slightly similar to in the Roma game – just a version adapted slightly to meet the demands of Napoli’s peculiar formation.

Udinese essentially did three things very well. First, they retained a spare man at the back. Second, they contained Napoil’s wing-backs. Third, they won the midfield battle whilst also giving Napoli a threat at the back.

Numbers at the back

The suggestion that Udinese would go with a back four was because they wanted a spare man at the back, rather than 3 v 3. It would be simple, therefore, to play a very narrow back four and pick up Napoli’s tridente that way – Mehdi Benatia up against Lavezzi, Giovanni Pasquale keeping an eye on Marek Hamsik (who plays more centrally) and 2 v 1 against Edinson Cavani.

This often doesn’t work very well, however, because whilst the full-backs can tuck in and form a clear defensive shield against the three, this opens up space down the flanks for Napoli’s wing-backs – who then force the wide midfielders to get into extremely defensive positions, sometimes forming a back six. See the game against Roma, where the Giallorossi wide players switched off and the wing-backs had far too much space to scamper into, or the game against Genoa, where Genoa’s carrileros had to become auxiliary full-backs as there was no-one else to track the Napoli wing-backs, leaving the centre of the pitch bare.


When Pasquale dropped back and the two central midfielders followed suit, Udinese often looked like a 4-4-1-1

Therefore, Guidolin had a different plan. The key was the use of Gokhan Inler, who played deep ahead of his own defence and picked up Hamsik. The Slovakian played as a central playmaker, and took too long to realise that he was going to have to take up different positions to escape his man. This meant that Udinese would have had 5 v 3 at the back (extending that zone to include Inler and Hamsik) – not needed – so instead, Giovanni Pasquale could play higher up the pitch and occupy Christian Maggio. At the back, Udinese’s back three played to the right of centre, with Benatia on Lavezzi and Maurizio Domizzi on Cavani. Cristian Zapata was the spare man. When Napoli’s build-up play was laboured, Pasquale could drop in as the left-back and Udinese would form two banks of four to give extra strength to the defence – but this formation only happened when Napoli held on to possession for a long period – in other words, when Napoli were camped behind the ball and weren’t going to be prone to late runs from the wing-backs, as they could see the whole ‘picture’ of play.

Pasquale was pinning back Maggio, whilst Isla was doing an even better job against Andrea Dossena higher up the pitch. It was 2 v 2 in the centre of midfield, whilst Asamoah dropped goalside of Michele Pazienza to make up the numbers in midfield – before then sprinting forward to form a more traditional front two when Udinese won the ball – exactly as Sanchez had against Inter, which was the key feature of that game.

Essentially, Napoli had nowhere to go. Udinese had a spare man at the back, they were tracking the runs of Napoli’s wing-backs with wing-backs of their own – something Napoli really aren’t used to – and when Asamoah dropped in, they also had a numerical advantage in the centre of the pitch. They were set up excellently to stop Napoli, and were on course for a clean sheet until Domizzi’s stupid 87th red card.

None of this explains why Udinese won the game – their gameplan was based around defence. For goals, they had to rely on a tremendous strike from Inler to get in front, and then when Napoli left more spaces at the back, a quick break down the flank resulted in the second.

<video>

Conclusion

This was rather clever from Guidolin – it confused Mazzarri and Napoli’s players, along with journalists who didn’t know whether this was a back three or a back four.

“We’ve won a complicated match under precarious circumstances. The team could feel the coach’s trust and believed in the win. I really believed my boys could take this kind of match and they followed me” Guidolin said.

“I asked the team to play by trying to win the numbers game in the midfield, and to hit our opponents with the midfielders’ movement. I lined up Asamoah first, then Armero, in a slightly advanced position, behind the first striker. During the week we’ve been trying the 4-men defence.”

What could Napoli have done differently? Mazzarri has been a master of keeping his broad system but changing small aspects of his side this season, most frequently by pushing Hugo Campagnaro forward from his right-sided centre-back position if Napoli had a surplus at the back (and therefore a shortfall elsewhere). This seems to be happening less readily in recent months, however, almost used only when Napoli desperately need to get back in the game. Compare this to the opening day draw with Fiorentina (where Napoli went ahead after a couple of minutes and were never behind in the game) – it happened instinctively there, and it’s a shame that Mazzarri has been a little more cautious in this respect than he might have been.
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