【10-11 ZM专贴】280L：替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

Alex2011

Man Utd 2-1 Man City: Rooney wondergoal 曼联2-1胜曼城：鲁尼绝妙世界波 February 12, 2011 City started well but United grew into the contest, and Wayne Rooney’s astonishing overhead kick settled the game. 曼城开场打得不错，但是曼联逐渐融入了比赛，纳尼打入领先球，而且最终由鲁尼打入一记惊艳的倒钩球，锁定了这场德比的胜利。 The starting line-ups 双方首发阵容 Sir Alex Ferguson went with his 4-5-1 system, dropping Dimitar Berbatov to play Rooney upfront alone. Rio Ferdinand and Jonny Evans were out so Chris Smalling started. Michael Carrick was the central midfielder left out. 弗格森爵士采用4-5-1阵型，射手王迪米塔·贝尔巴托夫坐在替补席，而让鲁尼担当单前锋重任。里奥· 费迪南德和约翰尼 · 埃文斯没有进入大名单，所以克里斯·斯麦林首发。中场麦克尔· 卡里克坐在替补席。 Roberto Mancini left out Edin Dzeko to play Carlos Tevez alone upfront. James Milner played in Nigel de Jong’s position, and Aleksandar Kolarov started on the left. Joleon Lescott was chosen over Kolo Toure. 罗伯托·曼奇尼，将艾丁·哲科放在替补席，由卡洛斯·特维斯担任单前锋。詹姆斯·米尔纳出现在奈杰尔·德荣的位置上，而亚历山大·科拉罗夫则出现在左前卫位置上。乔莱安·莱斯科特首发，而克洛·图雷坐在替补席。 City were the better side in the opening 20 minutes, completing 99 passes compared to United’s 80. They also created the best chance in that period, through a brilliant neat passing move, but David Silva poked wide. 曼城开场20分钟里占据上风，完成了99次传球，而曼联只有80次。曼城人还在这段期间中通过华丽清晰的传递而有序推进至曼联禁区，创造了全场最佳破门良机，然而可惜的是，大卫·席尔瓦在门前右侧的打门，却堪堪与球门失之交臂。 United start sluggishly 上半场曼联冷劲慢发 United’s passing was poor – they misplaced passes even when under little pressure at the back. Here, the absence of Ferdinand was felt – in addition to United having a much better defensive record when he is in the side, he also offers reliable, solid distribution from the back. The fault was not with Smalling, who had a good game, but Vidic feels the need to bring the ball out of defence more, and his passing range is not particularly impressive. 曼联的传球质量不佳 — 他们甚至在稍有压力情况下，后卫就会传球失误。列位瞧瞧，左路缺乏费迪南德的窘境感到了吗？！ — 当他在场时，曼联额外就有了更好防守记录，他还能从后防位置上为中前场提供可靠的、稳固的传球。斯麦林本场表现很好，他与人的合作上缺陷，不是他的错，但维迪奇却多次感到非要把球踢出去，才会对后防无碍，而且，维迪奇的传球范围，并不是特别令人印象深刻。 He is a superb defender, however. He and Vincent Kompany have probably been the division’s best two centre-backs this season, and according to OPTA’s stats, neither lost a challenge in this game. 然而无论如何，他维迪奇，是一位巨星后卫。维迪奇和文森特·孔帕尼，恐怕是本赛季英超2个最佳中后卫了，而且根据OPTA统计，本场比赛他们没有丢失挑战本色。 United were better when they let Paul Scholes have the ball, and as in the meeting between these two sides at Eastlands last season, he was the difference early on. City’s distribution from the centre of midfield from Gareth Barry, James Milner and Yaya Toure was short, calm and reliable – nothing wrong with that – but Scholes’ long crossfield balls constantly changed the point of attack and made it more difficult for City to get into the right positions. The distance of his passes on the chalkboard is notable. 当曼联人让保罗·斯科尔斯持球时，他们局势改观了，这在上赛季在曼城主场双方遭遇时已经证明，生姜头早就是与众不同。曼城阵中，来自中场的传球 - 加雷思·巴里、 詹姆斯·米尔纳和亚亚·图雷 - 都是短传、舒适波澜不惊和有效可及 - 无懈可击 - 但是斯科尔斯的长传转移球，却不断改变着攻击点，给曼城人在右侧位置上制造着困难（/使曼城人难以出现在正确位置上？）。在下图所示的战术演示板上，斯科尔斯的传递距离，是显而易见的，非常可观：总共62次传球，成功53次。 by Guardian Chalkboards City’s midfield acted as a three, with Toure starting highest up but sometimes becoming the deepest player if Milner or Barry moved forward. This worked nicely, because Silva always moved inside and Milner overlapped to provide width – playing more passes from the right flank than Silva, despite their starting positions. 曼城中场由图雷、米尔纳和巴里三人组担纲：图雷起初时最靠前，但有时如果米尔纳或者巴里向前时，他则拖在最后。这样效果很好，因为右前卫席尔瓦总是向里深入，而当米尔纳重叠补入这个位置时则可以提供宽度 — 不管他们的起始位置如何，这时这位右肋则可以比席尔瓦提供更多的传球（参见下面的题板，席尔瓦和米尔纳传球图示和数据，传球成功率：席尔瓦43/60、米尔纳35/44）。 by Guardian Chalkboards United’s wingers played different roles – Nani generally stayed on the touchline but Ryan Giggs came inside and saw more of the ball. Nani became increasingly frustrated at his lack of service, however, and started to wander. The goal came when both wingers were more narrow than usual, with Giggs playing in Nani to finish well in the 41st minute. 曼联边翼们则扮演着不同的角色 — 纳尼总靠近边路游弋，而瑞恩·吉格斯向里走而且多时看着球跑。然而，当纳尼缺少支援时，就变得越来越沮丧，于是开始游荡了。当这两个边锋比往常更靠近，随着吉格斯传球发挥，纳尼接球在第41分钟时完成了曼联第一个进球任务。 Second half 下半场 Mancini’s first change came soon after the break. Shaun Wright-Phillips (who had only played 130 minutes so far this season) replaced Kolarov, with Silva moving to the left – although as Silva comes inside so much, this didn’t affect his positioning much. Mancini could have taken off Pablo Zabaleta, who lost Nani for the first goal, and put Kolarov to left-back, but he seems to trust Zabaleta more than Kolarov defensively. 曼奇尼的第一次换人是在中场休息后不久。 邵恩赖特-菲利普斯（SWP）（本赛季至今仅上场踢了总计130分钟时间），取代克罗拉夫上场了，与席尔瓦一起打左路 — 虽然席尔瓦如此一来更多向里切，但这不会过多影响他的位置感。曼奇尼也许可以换下巴勃罗萨巴莱塔而把科拉罗夫置于左后卫上，因为红魔的第一个进球则是因为萨巴莱塔失去对纳尼的防守，但曼奇尼似乎更信任前者而不是后者的防御能力。 His second change was forced on him – Milner went off through injury – but Mancini took this as the opportunity to go towards more of a 4-4-2 shape, with Dzeko joining Tevez, and Toure deeper in midfield. The two subs combined for the City equaliser, a fortunate goal that deflected in off Silva’s back. Nevertheless, Wright-Phillips’ pace and directness did give City another dimension, stretching the United defence, so we should put that substitution down as a good move from Mancini. 曼奇尼第二次换人，则是他受到了压力 - 因为米尔纳受伤不得不下场 - 但是他抓住这次机会改打442阵型，让新援高中锋哲科与特维斯打前锋，图雷中场拖后。这两次换人的结合效果，为曼城带来扳平的机会和结果，一个幸运进球，是打在席尔瓦身上折射入网的。不过，赖特-菲利普斯的边路冲击和下底传球，的确开辟了曼城的另一走廊，抻开了曼联的防线，所以我们应该将这样的换人，看作是曼奇尼临场指挥上的一步好棋。 Ferguson responded with a similar change – going to 4-4-2 with Anderson off and Dimitar Berbatov on. Having gone from six central midfielders at the start to just four by the end, the game opened up significantly and a third goal seemed to be on the cards. 弗格森此时针锋相对地也对阵容做了相应调整 - 换下安德森换上贝巴改打4-4-2战术。从首发时6个CM到结束时4个CM一路演进，本场比赛显著地上演了开放大战，那么第三个进球似乎就要来到。 Rooney’s winner, from a deflected Nani cross, was astonishing, and a fitting winner in any game. 鲁尼的进球，来自纳尼的偏斜向底、长距离的横传球助攻，这绝对是惊艳的绝杀球，而且，这种最后阶段的禁区内万军丛中倒钩打门进球，对于任何一场比赛而言，都是再合适不过的完美进球了。 Conclusion 结论 Nothing too exciting tactically – both started at 4-5-1 to keep it tight, then switched to 4-4-2 to try and provide more goalscoring threat. In that respect, the game was rather like the Manchester United v Valencia game at the Mestalla earlier this season – where United also got a late winner. 战术上趋于保守，不太令人兴奋 - 双方开始都排出4-5-1阵型，保持紧密防守姿态，接下来转向4-4-2阵型试图加强进攻并获得进球威胁机会。在这一点上，本场比赛很像本赛季初期曼联对阵瓦伦西亚那场比赛 - 在梅斯塔拉球场，曼联同样赢得了像今天一样晚到的胜利。 The game was also notable for the identity of the forwards – the smaller, pacier Rooney and Tevez preferred over Berbatov and Dzeko from the start. The false nine is no longer an abstract concept, it has become an established role in modern football- especially in big games like this. 这场比赛，对于前锋角色认知而言，也有显著的意义 — 象双方首发时，分别选择了小前锋鲁尼和特维斯，而不是中锋贝尔巴托夫和哲科。伪九号，不再是一个抽象的概念，它在现代足球已成为一个稳固确立的角色 - 特别是在这样的重大关键的德比战中。

Alex2011

280楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Sweden 5-0 Finland: Ibrahimovic off the bench to score a hattrick as Finland are demolished
June 8, 2011


The starting line-ups. Ibrahimovic came on after 25 minutes and took the place of Toivonen, with Elmander dropping deeper

Sweden kept up their excellent record in 2012 qualifying with a convincing win over neighbours Finland.

Zlatan Ibrahimovic hadn’t fully recovered from injury, so started on the bench – but came on after 25 minutes when Ola Toivonen picked up a knock. Erik Hamren only made one change from the 4-1 win over Moldova, as Emir Bajrami replaced Tobias Hysen on the left.

Mixu Paatelainen dropped Veli Lampi and Jukka Raitala after the narrow 1-0 win over San Marino, bringing in Roman Eremenko and Joona Toivio. He also left out goalkeeper Lucas Hradecky, with Anssi Jaakkola coming in.

Sweden were dominant for the entire game – Finland were not awful with the ball and created some decent chances, but were shambolic defensively, and 5-0 wasn’t harsh on the away side.

Finland attempt to play

Finland tried to play good football, but the difference in quality meant an open game didn’t suit them. They tried to play out from the back, they wanted to keep a reasonably high line, and they attempted to make the pitch as wide as possible when in possession, but all these factors helped Sweden break quickly when they won the ball.

Sweden were allowed to control the game from deep in midfield, as Anders Svensson and Kim Kallstrom played calm, short passes towards the attacking players, taking it in turn to move forward a little on the ball. Generally, Roman Eremenko stayed deep and kept an eye on Toivonen (and Johan Elmander, who dropped into that position once Ibrahimovic replaced Toivonen), whilst Mika Vayrynen played higher up, ready to track either Kallstrom or Svensson. This meant one of them was always free, however, and with little help from the front two, Finland were always likely to lose the numbers game in midfield.

Sweden threat

Despite Finland’s vulnerability, Sweden took a while to start causing Jaakkola consistent problems. They went ahead through a fortunate goal – Kallstrom’s free-kick (like Tranquilo Barnetta’s against England at the weekend) missed everyone in the box, and went all the way in. Finland had consistent problems with the Lyon player’s set-piece delivery, though – they later conceded their fourth goal when Ibrahimovic nodded in another Kallstrom free-kick.

It was Ibrahimovic’s introduction that really spurred Sweden on – he lifted the crowd and played higher up the pitch than Elmander. His movement was also better -he was more willing to play on the shoulder, to move into the channels. Kallstrom’s through ball to him was finished confidently moments after he came on. His second, and Sweden’s third, was scored when Sweden took advantage of sloppy Finland play at the back – again, they passed the ball out from a goal kick, but the passes were slow, predictable and dangerous, and they paid the price.

Finland tactics

Finland were sometimes a threat with the ball. They had two promising tactics – first, one of their forwards dropped deep and tempted Daniel Majstorovic out. He dived into tackles and Finland had the chance to move into the space behind him.

The second approach was a product of their width – they got the ball out wide and then flashed crosses across the goal from near the byline – good centres were put in by Toivio from the right and Perparim Hetemaj from the left, and also by substitute Mika Ääritalo after the break. The movement from the forwards wasn’t good enough, though – Mikael Forssell often seemed a couple of yards behind play.

Second half

Two substitutions at half time smacked of rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic for Finland, with Ääritalo and Markus Halsti both coming on – though Finland remained in roughly the same shape.

And it was roughly the same pattern of play – Ibrahimovic’s header was followed by Emir Bajrami’s late goal on the break, but the game was over by half time.

Conclusion

The two most talented players on the pitch did the damage here – Ibrahimovic got three goals and one assist, Kallstrom got one goal and two assists. Sweden did nothing spectacular but played confidently and professionally.

The tactical interest came from Finland’s failings – Paatelainen should be admired for his commitment to playing open, expansive football, but it’s probably not the right approach when you’re away from home against such a superior side. Finland played too wide – they needed their wider players to tuck in and help win the ball back – and their forwards were guilty of not doing enough without the ball, which meant that (a) they lost the numbers game in midfield and (b) there was no pressure on the ball when the defence was trying to play high up the pitch.

Alex2011

278楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Belgium 1-1 Turkey: a possession-based game finishes all square
June 6, 2011


The starting line-ups

Two goals in the first quarter of the game gave Belgium and Turkey a point apiece.

Georges Leekens shuffled his pack, bringing both Eden Hazard and Marvin Ogunjimi back into the side, amongst others, and used a 4-2-3-1 system.

Guus Hiddink’s formation was more of a 4-1-2-3, with Selçuk Şahin deep ahead of his own back four. Kazim Kazim (aka Colin Kazim-Richards) surprisingly played as the lone striker, though he frequently came towards play as something of a false nine.

The game went through phases, with both sides playing very short patient football. With Hiddink a Dutchman, this was something of a Low Countries derby in terms of the ideology of the two managers, and that was reflected in the style of football on the pitch.

Belgium approach

The hosts went ahead very early on, when Ogunjimi fired in a shot at the second time of asking, following a cross from the flank. That wasn’t particularly typical of Belgium’s approach, however, as they generally brought their wide players inside quickly, with both Hazard and Nacer Chadli running with the ball.

A more common tactic in the final third was to play the ball into the channels for Ogunjimi – in particular, threaded balls down the outside of Serdar Kesimal threatened, as Ogunjimi looked to play on the shoulder and get on the end of through-balls.

The wide players narrowing meant that Belgium had three sources of creativity from central positions, but it also made their attacks slightly predictable. This was not a problem with the wide players themselves, more an issue with the lack of attacking threat from full-back. Toby Alderweireld and Jan Vertonghen are both centre-backs rather than full-backs (in fact, they are partners at the heart of Ajax’s back four) and whilst they’re both good enough on the ball to be comfortable when played wide, they still don’t have the natural tendency to skip down the line and provide overlaps.

The benefit of playing four centre-backs was the extra height from corners, and with Volkan Demirel flapping at the ball nervously early on, this appeared to be a promising area for Belgium.

Despite Turkey left-back Caglar Birinci enduring an extremely nervous opening to the game on his debut, Hazard didn’t take advantage of this weakness – his natural game is to come inside, when he might have been better off exposing Birinci.

Turkey approach

Turkey took a while to get going – in fact they only really got a grip on the game after they scored on 22 minutes, a goal which came against the run of play.

Hiddink’s side were able to get a grip on the game when they realised that both Emre and Selcuk Inan could get time on the ball when they moved into deep positions, because Belgium’s double pivot wasn’t willing to move so high up the pitch to close them down. When Turkey’s two ball players started to set the tempo and play some more ambitious balls forward, they looked much more dangerous.

The reluctance of Timmy Simons and Steven Defour to move forward was partly because Turkey’s wide attackers didn’t stay on the flanks – they came inside and posed a threat between the lines. Turkey were at their best when those two combined – as they did for the goal – and Belgium found it difficult to cope with those players running with the ball inside.

Turkey sometimes attempted to hit long balls to Kazim, which were unsuccessful because (a) he isn’t really a target man and (b) Belgium had plenty of aerial power at the back. Kazim was more useful when he dropped deep, which forced Vincent Kompany out of the back (he sometimes struggles when coming up the pitch) and created space in the Turkey defence.

Hiddink wanted his players to press reasonably intensively, but Belgium’s players were all very good on the ball, and generally kept possession well.

Second half

The major change in the second half was the introduction of Dries Mertens, in place of the quiet Hazard. Mertens didn’t really do anything different to Hazard in terms of style, but he was certainly more effective – drawing defenders towards him, having a couple of efforts from range, and also winning the penalty that was wasted by Axwel Witsel.

Thomas Vermaelen had replaced his old Ajax teammate Vertonghen at left-back – again, pretty much a straight swap.

Belgium were a little more willing to close Turkey down in the midfield zone after the break, with Defour playing a little higher up the pitch and playing more aggressively, and Simon playing more of a covering role, rather than as part of a double pivot. This meant Belgium pressed better, and after Turkey enjoyed a good spell of dominance either side of half time, Belgium reasserted themselves on the game late on, and but for the missed penalty, would have been rewarded with the win.

Hiddink waited very late to introduce the two Mehmets, Ekici and Topal – as a whole, there was little tactical excitement after the break.

Conclusion

A decent game that was all about control through possession – both sides were very patient with the ball, although neither actually scored when they were dominating the game – Belgium’s first goal came before the game had settled down, whilst Turkey’s came before they’d really imposed themselves in midfield.

Both sides lacked something in the final third – Leekens was braver with an earlier use of his bench. It would have been interesting to see Hiddink introduce his substitutes earlier – with Belgium using a powerful but slightly static back four, removing Kazim for another attacking midfielder and playing without a true striker would have been an interesting option.

Alex2011

267楼的另一参考译文，来自球迷一家
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巴萨威武－－巴萨3:1曼联战术分析
译者：netfish513 发表日期：2011-5-29 13:39:00

巴萨前场三叉戟各进一球，帮助巴萨在温布利3:1战胜曼联。

爵爷排出了他的理想11人：小豌豆突前，小胖靠后，吉格斯和卡里克坐镇中场。不过最让人惊讶的是贝巴连板凳都没坐上。

赛前普约尔的意外受伤使得马斯和皮克搭档中卫，阿比达尔居左。

整场比赛走势和09年那场决赛基本相似，曼联拥有一个好的开局，不过随后还是被巴萨控制了比赛。
　　
双方首发：



巴萨的控制
　　
关于巴萨对于比赛的主导权，可以从两个方面来解读，第一方面：巴萨是地球上最好的球队，可以说是前无古人，当他们控制了比赛时，没有球队能够阻止他们。这种解释似乎可以让每一个人接受：既然如此，巴萨的胜利理所当然，曼联也输球也并不丢人。

不过从另一个方面来想，曼联输得也太过于窝囊，1:3的比分尚可接受，不过4:22的射门次数，以及1:12的门框内射门次数着实说不过去。我们姑且不论爵爷的战术是对或者错，不过如果你非要说爵爷的战术至始至终都发挥了作用，那么我无话可说。



关于小豌豆的首发
　　
赛前人们议论最多的是爵爷是会让小豌豆首发还是多派上一名中场加强防守，爵爷冒险选择了前者，当然，后果是由卡里克和吉格斯组成的中场在比赛中被全面压制。而鲁尼被指派去盯防布斯克茨，不过考虑到他同时还被要求在球队得球时跑到空位，对小胖来说，这显然是一个困难的任务。布斯克茨组织了巴萨的多次进攻，并且很轻松就可以将球传给空位的队友。

小豌豆并没有发挥出他的速度优势，开场后他频频陷入了巴萨的越位陷阱。巴萨不怕造越位失误，事实上，这是巴萨核心战术中的一种，即便是这条临时拼凑的，以前总共只在一起踢过60分钟的后防线，他们也有足够的信心让小豌豆有来无回。





曼联的早期压迫

不过，在比赛的开始阶段，小豌豆还是帮助曼联实现了对巴萨的压迫，这得益于普约尔的缺阵，不论是阿比达尔还是马斯，他们的传球能力都比普约尔逊色一筹，球在他们脚下的时候威胁并不太大。开局阶段，曼联很快进入了比赛，两次从梅西脚下断球后都将球传到了危险区域。前几分钟，朴智星表现出色，而阿尔维斯则稍显紧张。

三板斧过后，瓦伦和三肺开始后撤，并向中路靠拢以支援中场。赛前我们担心的小白可能会获得过多的自由度的问题，被瓦伦移到中路的防守部分解决。当然，这也给了巴萨的边后卫空间，这使得他们逐渐的掌控了比赛。

巴萨控球时，曼联收缩得过于靠后，这使得伊涅斯塔在他最喜欢的中后卫和边后卫之间的位置可以舒舒服服的传球组织进攻。





三条线之间的空间
　　
过于靠后的收缩防线给了梅西太多的空间。很明显，曼联的策略是允许维迪奇或费迪南德位置前提以便防守梅西，不过这并不总是奏效-梅西飘忽的跑位常造成他们的困扰。

正是这种空间造成了第一个进球，哈维在中场如入无人之境，而本该在左路的埃弗拉被梅西带出了防守位置，无人防守的佩刀一蹴而就。
　　　　
这个进球凸显了曼联的问题，在无球状态时，他们很难保持住防守阵型，这点在中场表现得尤其明显。吉格斯、朴智星和瓦伦西亚发现他们很难进入比赛，而卡里克更凄惨，他面临着哈维、伊涅斯塔以及梅西三人的轮番攻击--要知道，这三人可是去年世界足球先生的前三名。曼联的中场摇摇欲坠，爵爷本该多排上一名中场球员。
　　
面对巴萨的咄咄逼人，曼联选择了后撤而不是加强中场的拼抢，这在早期起到了一定的作用。当阿比达尔掷边线球被曼联断球后，鲁尼和卡里克吉格斯完成了一次漂亮的配合，小胖的射门应声入网。







下半场
　　
下半场开始之后，吉格斯和朴智星进行了换位，三肺移到了中路，不过这种安排似乎有点问题，曼联需要加强中场的防守不错，不过我们不要忘了在曼联同阿森纳的比赛中，正是朴智星移到中路之后的失位导致了拉姆塞的进球。同样，我们来看曼联的第二个失球，梅西带球突破之前，他好像就已经放弃了对他的防守。同时曼联的两个中卫也没有像安排的那样快速上提防守，所以，第二个失球在所难免。
　　
换位带来的另一个效应是让吉格斯直接暴露在阿尔维斯面前，下半场开始后的前十分钟，阿尔维斯就已经完成了两次经典的突破，一次完成了射门，另一次把球传给了梅西。爵爷看到了中场的薄弱，妄图改变的想法是对的，不过将朴智星和吉格斯对换位置显然不能解决问题。坐在板凳上的弗莱彻、安德森和斯科尔斯本可以是更好的选择。







最后阶段
　　
直到第69分钟爵爷才做出了调整，不过那是被迫的，因为法比奥受伤了，爵爷不得不换上了纳尼，而让瓦伦去踢右后卫。顺便提一下，爵爷赛前应该会想到法比奥有可能会受伤下场，因为在他之前首发的16场比赛中他曾有10次因伤被换下，同时他的双胞胎兄弟也好不到哪里去，9场比赛8次被换下。考虑到这点，爵爷至少应该在板凳上放一名替补，不过不可思议的，奥谢竟然连18人的大名单都没有进入。

不过这次换人于事无补，随后比利亚完成了锦上添花的一球，巴萨3:1领先，之后胜券在握的巴萨玩起了控球，曼联已无力回天。



结论：
　　
“我们没能控制住梅西”在赛后的新闻发布会上，爵爷承认到：“那确实很难做到。我们没能掌控住中场，我们没有安排盯人，我们试图按照我们惯常的套路踢球。不过，今天晚上，我得承认，我们做得不好。”
　　
瓜迪奥拉则对球队的表现很满意：“我们控制住了比赛，卡里克和吉格斯都被我们压制，我们踢了一场高质量的比赛。要知道，这是欧冠的决赛，我们有过艰难时刻，不过相比于两年前的罗马，这次我们更轻松，我们创造出了更多的机会，进了更多的球。”
　　
“我们拥有很多好球员，不过我要说，梅西是我曾见过的最好的一个，而且很有可能我将来再也见不到如此出色的球员，正因为有了他，我们才上了一个台阶。”
　　
正如两位主教练所说的那样，决定了这场比赛的有两个因素：一是曼联没能同巴萨在中场展开肉搏。二是梅西无解。
　　
原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011 ... -league-final-2011/

Penelope

瑞士队很牛鼻啊！

10世界杯上，是给新科世界冠军西班牙队带来唯一败仗的队伍，

这一次又使卡佩罗执教的英格兰陷入了沉思。

Alex2011

10世界杯后，媒体和业内对卡佩罗质疑从未停歇过，达格利世是不是要走上台来？

Penelope

273楼参考译文
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战平瑞士一役带来的更多是问题，而不是答案
由 jessicaje 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccerJune 5, 2011

被攻入两球之后打出了一次漂亮的反击，但是从英格兰2-2战平瑞士一战之中我们还是不会得到太多积极的结论。

上半场阵型

1. 阿什利杨不排入首发是个错误

很难理解为什么要忽略阿什利杨。他可能是是英格兰过去三场比赛中表现最好的了，战术上也很重要，因为他有很强的延边路移动的能力。英格兰对阵威尔士那场比赛，采用了4-3-3阵型，效果不错，原因就在于杨和鲁尼能够进入到中间位置，彼此之间、与中场球员之间、以及和前方的达伦本特都可以建立联系。

对阵瑞士，进攻端缺乏明确目标。米尔纳在侧翼来来回回，沃尔科特想法很直接，但是他们都不太擅长传中。同时，中场部分，从威尔谢尔到兰帕德的跑动几乎没有，直至英格兰0-1落后，之后威尔谢尔前插赢得点球。几乎没有人在瑞士主教练希斯菲尔德经常提及的“红区”里。

杨下半场替补登场之后，英格兰表现的改善显而易见。他在中路活动，和达伦本特配合，也会通过对角线跑动和两翼球员互动，他扮演的是一个“中路飞翼”的角色。又一次，英格兰表现好的方面他占了一大块，应该被认作是队伍中关键先生。

2. 英格兰还是无法保住控球权

本场比赛，英格兰控球权为52%，占了大多数，但是考虑到这场比赛他们是主场，同时对方习惯打防守反击，英格兰控球率应该比实际数字高得多才对。

控球率并不意味着胜利，但是，卡佩罗常常以球员疲劳为借口，这时候最直接的解决办法就是牢牢控制住皮球，多控制一点时间，少花点时间追逐对手。卡佩罗使用了三中场，理论上讲，这种安排应该让控球变得更容易才对，但是实际上他们的心理不在状态，不够耐心。

下半场阵型

3. 无球时英格兰缺乏有效战略

英格兰有时候压上，有时候站开一段距离。这场比赛里，他们逼得不紧，但又总是做些不必要的铲球，禁区附近给对方任意球，然后被进球得分。即便是费迪南德也领了张黄牌，他已经65场比赛连一个警告都没吃到过了。

人们很容易就认为英格兰在有节奏地比赛——有时候施以压力，有时候有所放松——但是个别时间点上球队的表现彼此矛盾，这就让这种善意的解读说不通了。据推测，卡佩罗想采用巴萨式的压迫，但是由于身体条件上的不足，英格兰需要另一条路径。

4. 乔哈特的主要问题在于他的分球能力

被攻入两球，很尴尬，但是责任可以有几个人共同承担——第一球本应该被防守球员头球解围，而第二个球明显是人墙中的米尔纳的责任。

哈特更明显的弱点在于他用脚处理球的能力——脚下球不断处于被对方进攻队员抢下危险之中，即便是他可以自在地传球的时候，他也没有将球精准传送到一个队友处的能力。过去，能踢好球被认为是守门员能力的加成，但是现在这就是必要条件了。总体上看，我们不可以因为英格兰糟糕的传球而指责哈特，但是就像巴萨流畅传递的起点是守门员一样，而英格兰控球方面缺乏想象力的起点也是守门员。

5. 4-3-3是英格兰的默认阵型吗？

世界杯预选赛和世界杯决赛阶段英格兰踢的是4-4-2还是4-2-3-1，这个问题是有争议的，但是这些体系明显和这场比赛卡佩罗排出的4-3-3阵容不同。

当然，问题是，这个阵容并没有发挥很好的作用，卡佩罗不得不重回4-2-3-1，阿什利杨被安排在中锋位置上。从这个意义上讲，卡佩罗可能从头来过——再加上世界杯的结果和表现也不完全是个悲剧，可见英格兰去年暑假尴尬出局之后这一年多的时间里也没有什么进步。

Penelope

More questions than answers for Capello after Switzerland draw
June 5, 2011


The first half formation

Two poor goals conceded and then a decent fightback, but it’s hard to draw many positive conclusions from England’s 2-2 draw with Switzerland.

1. Leaving out Ashley Young was a mistake

It’s difficult to see the logic in omitting Young. He had probably been England’s best performer over the last three games, and tactically was important because of his ability to move off the flank. England were good against Wales in the 4-3-3 system because Young and Wayne Rooney were able to come inside into central positions and provide connections with each other, the midfield players, and Darren Bent upfront.

Against Switzerland, there was no clear objective to the attacking play. James Milner scurried up and down the wing and Theo Walcott was direct, but neither are particularly good crossers. Meanwhile, midfield runs from Jack Wilshere and Frank Lampard were rare until England went 1-0 down, when Wilshere moved forward to win the penalty. There was no-one in the ‘red zone’ Swiss coach Ottmar Hitzfeld often speaks of.

It was notable how much England improved when Young came on in the second half. He played centrally and combined with Darren Bent, but also with the two wide players by making diagonal runs to the flanks – as a ‘central winger’. He was again crucial in what England did well, and should be regarded as one of the side’s key players.

2. England still can’t retain possession

England had 52% of possession against Switzerland. A majority, but considering this was at home against a side often content to sit back and play defensively, England should have been enjoying much more of the ball.

Possession doesn’t equal victory, but when Capello’s main excuse is tiredness, the obvious solution is to try to hang onto the ball for longer, and spend less time chasing. Capello’s use of three central midfielders should, in theory, make it easier to keep the ball, but the mentality is still not there – England aren’t patient enough.


The second half formation

3. England don’t have a cohesive strategy without the ball

Sometimes England press, sometimes they stand off. In this game, they stood off and then dived into tackles unnecessarily, conceding free-kicks around the box. Even Rio Ferdinand managed to pick up a booking, having gone 65 games without a caution.

It would be tempting to conclude that England play in phases – sometimes pressuring the ball, sometimes dropping off – but there is an inconsistency within the side at individual moments that makes this generous interpretation impossible. Capello supposedly wants Barcelona-style pressing, but with fitness levels poor, England needed a different approach.

4. Joe Hart’s main problem is his distribution

Two embarrassing goals conceded, but the blame can be shared – the first should probably have been headed away, the second was clearly the fault of James Milner in the wall.

Hart’s more obvious weakness is with the ball at his feet – constantly in danger of his kicks being charged down by opposing strikers, and even when he is free to play a pass, he simply doesn’t have the ability to pinpoint a teammate in space. Being a good ball player used to be regarded as a bonus for a goalkeeper, but these days it is a must. One can’t blame Hart for England’s poor passing as a whole, but just as Barcelona’s slick passing starts from their keeper, England’s lack of imagination in possession starts from theirs.

5. Is 4-3-3 now England’s default formation?

Whether England played 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1 throughout the World Cup qualifying and World Cup tournament itself is debatable, but that/those system(s) are clearly different to the 4-3-3 Capello has used against Wales and Switzerland.

The problem was, of course, that it didn’t work very well here, and Capello had to revert to a 4-2-3-1 with Ashley Young as a central attacker. In that sense, Capello might be back to square one – and whilst the result and performance wasn’t a complete disaster, England are no better off a year on from the embarrassing World Cup exit last summer.

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Penelope

271楼参考译文：占位

Penelope

Portugal 1-0 Norway: Portugal attack, Norway sit back, and Postiga gets the breakthrough
June 5, 2011


The starting line-ups

Helder Postiga’s well-taken goal gave Portugal an important victory.

Paulo Bento was without Ricardo Carvalho through injury, so Pepe was partnered by Bruno Alves. Joao Pereira came in at right-back, and the midfield trio was the three Ms.

Egil Olsen played his usual 4-5-1 system, with the expected XI. John Carew was upfront, and Vadim Demidov came in at the back for his first start in the Euro 2012 qualifying campaign.

The game was simultaneously extremely predictable and quite exciting. The two sides have vastly different styles of football – Portugal have skilled technical players, but a classic problem with potency upfront, and a secondary problem with creativity from midfield. On the other hand, Olsen always favours men behind the ball, before launching quick breaks with direct passes forward.

Shapes

Portugal used a 4-3-3 system, with two wingers coming inside, and attacking full-backs. Raul Meireles played deep in midfield and had time on the ball to distribute intelligently forward, whilst Cristiano Ronaldo played slightly narrower than Nani on the opposite side.

Olsen’s system is never quite a pure 4-5-1, because he likes to use one wide midfielder (Morten Gamst Pedersen) and one player who is a winger-cum-second striker (Erik Huseklepp). Huseklepp plays higher up the pitch and makes diagonal runs inside, so Bjorn Helge Riise had to move out to the right to cover that flank when Portugal broke quickly. This was a slight worry, with Ronaldo and Fabio Coentrao down Portugal’s left.

Battles

With Norway content to drop deep and favouring a zonal system of defence, the game was not so much about individual battles according to the formations. It was more about two factors – (a) whether Portugal had the creativity to break down Norway and (b) whether Norway’s transitions were good enough to cause a threat on the break.

With Norway defending quite deep and narrow, Portugal were keen to get the ball wide quickly. Ronaldo looked to come inside and shoot but was quickly surrounded by players, and Nani was more involved early on down the right. The 3 v 3 battle in the centre made things congested in that zone and Portugal rarely looked like creating chances from that part of the pitch, although the long-range ability of Meireles and Carlos Martins (plus the two wingers coming inside) meant Norway had to close down quickly. Carew played left-of-centre up against Pepe, so the Real Madrid player was unable to bring the ball out of the back, as he often does to create an extra man in midfield.

Norway breaks

Despite spending most of the game on the edge of their own box, Norway had a couple of great chances in the first half when they stormed forward quickly. Carew was barely involved in the game, and Pedersen didn’t play particularly well, but Huseklepp was a threat down the right – he had a good early chance on the counter, and also combined well with Bjorn Helge Riise, who played a very energetic game and made good ‘underlapping’ runs inside Huseklepp.

With Carew marshalled well by Pepe, diagonal ball were the key for Norway in getting up the pitch, and they were fortunate to have Henning Hauger free ahead of their back four – he was usually in space, and had time on the ball (plus a clear vision of what was ahead of him) to sweep passes wide.

Portugal variation

It was mainly Portugal with the ball, however. Whilst their general strategy means that the typical deep-and-narrow defensive approach should work well against them (as sides play against Arsenal and Barcelona, for example) Portugal are comfortable crossing from wide areas – and it was their willingness to centre the ball that paid dividends.

In Postiga, Portugal have a forward who can get himself on the end of crosses (and also one who is comfortable coming deep, but with the Norweigan defenders letting him go free and a lack of ‘llegada’ from the Portuguese midfielders, this wasn’t so useful). They also have Ronaldo, who can come inside as a second striker and has a superb leap, and this meant that they could knock the ball out to Nani, an excellent crosser, and have two good targets in the centre. Nani didn’t have a great game overall, but his low cross for Postiga just after half time put Portugal into the lead.

1-0

The situation at 1-0 was slightly odd, because Olsen was concerned about the head-to-head situation in the group (this is used as the decider for teams level on points, rather than goal difference, and Norway won the previous meeting between the sides 1-0) and so Norway didn’t really push forward much at 1-0.

In fact, the tactics for both sides remained the same until the final whistle. Substitutions were like-for-like, and Norway continued to sit back in their own half and wait for Portugal to come onto them – which they didn’t always do. Portugal’s midfielders sat deeper and Norway couldn’t counter, so their build-up play was a little less basic. The introduction of Mohammed Abdellaoue for Carew also meant hitting the ball long quickly wasn’t such an option.

The Norweigan full-backs got forward a couple of times, and the away side won their first corner in stoppage time, but the scoreline never looked likely to change after Postiga’s goal.

Conclusion

We knew what to expect here, and we got it. A game very similar to the first meeting between the sides produced another narrow home win.

Bento’s side played well, but the midfield zone still doesn’t feel right. With Meireles, Moutinho and Martins, there are three decent users of the ball – but not enough attacking threat, nor a true holding player to prevent opposition counter-attacks down the centre. It’s the same problem ZM identified before last summer’s World Cup – “on the Venn diagram of what they (the midfielders) bring to the side, there’s too much crossover.” As if to prove the point, Meireles was playing as Portugal’s most attack-minded midfielder when that article was written, and here played as the deepest of the three…

Norway were classic Norway, and we discovered little that we didn’t know before this game. They’ll have been disappointed to have conceded a goal from a cross, as they are generally very good at penalty box defending. Still, along with Portugal and Denmark they are on ten points and joint top of Group H, and arguably have the best run of remaining fixtures of those three sides, so remain in a very strong position.

Penelope

269楼参考译文
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[翻译团]意大利杯决赛战术分析：棋逢对手莱帅封神，再杀巴勒莫国米捧杯
由 omarstone 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

国际米兰3-1巴勒莫：斯内德-埃托奥双剑合璧，两破巴勒莫

首发阵容

莱昂纳多赢得了自己作为教练的第一个冠军，也使国际米兰获得了意大利杯的殊荣。

韦斯利-斯内德回到首发，长友佑都任右后卫，克里斯坦-齐沃任左后卫。

德里奥-罗西使用了4-3-2-1阵型，利维拉尼没有首发，阿克夸赫站司职后腰。

控球率上，巴勒莫占优，比赛的大部分时间都在国米半场展开，而且，巴勒莫本该制造出很多机会。但是，他们缺少前锋的一锤定音，相反国米则继续依靠他们犀利的反击—一如上个赛季的冠军杯决赛。

序幕：国米的先手

巴勒莫果然排出他们的圣诞树阵型，但是莱昂纳多的布阵则有点奇怪。本来普遍的猜测是4-3-1-2，但是，意大利人出其不意地选择了4-4-1-1，埃托奥位于左翼，韦斯利-斯内德自由人，帕齐尼单箭头居前。这是个好消息，因为这使得对手在阵型上的博弈更加精彩有趣。

国米未打破僵局时，他们的地面进攻并不好。长友佑都尝试从萨内蒂覆盖的右侧下底，但是另一侧的齐沃不能快速的压上让埃托奥可以内切到禁区内。中场，斯内德通常能进入衔接中前场的区域，但是却很少能拿到球。莫塔和斯坦科维奇都是控球高手，但是他们将更多的精力投入到如何保护后场上，因为巴勒莫双前腰的协作显然比他们各自为战有更大的威胁。同时，突前的帕齐尼显得孤立无援，可想而知，长传冲吊是不太现实的。

开幕：战场厮杀

帕斯托雷和伊利西奇并没有在开场就完全融入比赛。当卢西奥和拉诺齐亚压上助攻，国米防线洞开时，巴勒莫曾有一个绝好的机会—这本该给帕斯托雷制造出机会，但是他的控球出现了失误。

场上曾出现两次有趣的对抗，但两次都是国米获得了最终的胜利。第一次发生在国米的左后方：马蒂亚-卡萨尼想通过压上助攻来提升巴勒莫的进攻宽度，但是埃托奥的出现打翻了他的如意算盘。

第二次是阿克夸赫和斯内德的对决。年轻的加纳人让斯内德闲庭信步般地游走于中前场之间，很难看出这是为什么，因为这个区域内巴勒莫安置了好几名球员（如果不是，国米就该使用4-3-1-2阵型了），阿克夸赫没必要来覆盖这个区域。他本应该卡住斯内德的位置，但是他选择了逼抢，进而是铲球失误，紧接着，斯内德传给了已经埋伏在禁区的埃托奥，后者极度自信地完成了最后一击。

高潮：易边再战


双方换人后的下半场阵容

果然，罗西在下半场要求自己的球员压上，而且立刻收到了效果：比分被改写之后，边后卫将更多的精力放在了进攻端（而且打得更开），而且在第54分钟时候，罗西用另一个前锋米科利换下了阿克夸赫。

这当然是吹响进攻号角的提示，而且球队也确实需要重新安排一些战术。为了弥补缺少一个真正的后腰球员的损失，安东尼奥-诺切里诺和吉乌里奥-米格里亚西奥稍稍后移，伊利西奇扯到左侧拖后一点的位置。米科利打左中，帕斯托雷来到了右中的位置，阿贝尔-赫尔南德斯继续突前。

这意味着巴勒莫已经在前场堆砌了四名球员，这会使空间变得狭窄—但是，这也没问题，因为空间来自边后卫，这样可以保持进攻球员的地区足够开阔以压缩国米。巴勒莫打出了几次漂亮的进攻—伊利西奇得到了更多的持球机会，因为他没有被人盯防，帕斯托雷的过人也十分巧妙。他们还需要一个杀手-可以一锤定音，不过可惜，赫尔南德斯忘带了射门靴，而且国米的后防化解了这些进攻。

尾声：跌宕起伏

莱昂纳多发现卡萨尼的右路下底很有威胁以及埃托奥回防后撤不积极，所以，他用格兰-潘多夫替换掉了帕齐尼，从而将埃托奥顶在了最前方。这有两个好处—一来潘多夫可以在左侧防区投入更多的精力；二来随着巴勒莫的压上，埃托奥的速度会在中路形成一个很大的威胁。埃托奥占据着两名中卫之前很好的位置，斯内德一直都在尝试在右肋部给他塞球—一些传球被换上场的莫里斯-卡罗齐耶里断掉。但是，荷兰人（在阿克夸赫下场后，得到了更多的空间）最终第二次助攻了埃托奥，而且是几乎一样的配合使国米取得了两球的领先。

这本已经终结了比赛，但是稍后却掀起了高潮。穆尼奥斯通过角球打进了一个头球，但是随后他的被罚出场致使巴勒莫在少一人的情况下，后场出现漏洞，替补上场的迭戈-米利托在补时阶段将比分定格在3-1。

画外：结论

一场有趣的比赛—巴勒莫在中场表现更好，而且他们的地面进攻更有效率，但是场上国米却有一个最致命的杀手，埃托奥两个教科书般的进球终结了比赛。

公平地说，两个教练的指挥已经很出色了，罗西的球队确实通过简洁的传球频繁地制造着机会，但是却缺少禁区内的一锤定音。同时，莱昂纳多出其不意的阵容设计使斯内德-埃托奥这对组合完成了第一个进球，而且他下半场的精彩换人也着实可圈可点。

这是一次精彩的战术对决！

Penelope

Inter 3-1 Palermo: Sneijder-Eto’o combination twice opens up Palermo
May 30, 2011


The starting line-ups

Leonardo won his first trophy as a coach, as Inter lifted the Coppa Italia.

Wesley Sneijder was fit to start for Inter, with Yuto Nagatomo at right-back, and Cristian Chivu on the opposite side.
Delio Rossi used his 4-3-2-1 system. Fabio Liverani was left out, and Afriyie Acquah played the holding role.

Palermo had the majority of possession, spent most of the game in the Inter half, and probably had more chances. They lacked a cutting edge, however, and Inter were ruthless with their quick breaks – a little like in the Champions League final last season.

Inter tactics

Palermo’s Christmas tree shape was largely as expected, but Leonardo’s formation was a slight surprise. A 4-3-1-2 was expected, but instead the Brazilian chose a 4-4-1-1 system, with Samuel Eto’o high up on the left, Wesley Sneijder in a free role, and Giampaolo Pazzini alone upfront. This was welcome news, as it made the match-up between formations more interesting.

Inter’s attacking build-up play was poor when they didn’t break quickly. Nagatomo tried to get forward down the right, covered by Javier Zanetti, but on the other side Chivu wasn’t quick enough to overlap to allow Eto’o inside. In the centre, Sneijder often got into space between the lines but passes rarely came his way – Thiago Motta and Dejan Stankovic are both good ball-players, but were more concerned about protecting their back four from Palermo’s double trequartista threat than playing football themselves. Meanwhile, Pazzini was isolated upfront, and hopeful lobbed balls towards him in the air were predictably unsuccessful.Battlegrounds

Partly because of that, Javier Pastore and Josip Ilicic weren’t particularly involved in the early stages of the match, although there was one occasion when Inter’s defence was opened up when both Lucio and Andrea Ranocchia got dragged up the pitch – this should have put Pastore in, but his control was poor.

There were two interesting battlegrounds on the pitch, and both were eventually won by Inter. The first was in Palermo’s left-back zone, where Mattia Cassani wanted to attack and provide width for Palermo, but was troubled by the presence of Eto’o.

The second was Acquah against Sneijder. The young Ghanaian allowed Sneijder to go free between the lines and got sucked into the midfield battle ahead of him – it’s difficult to see why, because Palermo had numbers in that zone (more so that if Inter had played 4-3-1-2, certainly) and Acquah had no need to get involved. He could have stayed goalside of Sneijder, but moved up the pitch, missed a tackle, and then Sneijder sent the ball through to Eto’o, who came inside and finished with typical confidence.

Second half


The line-ups midway through the second half, after some substitutions

Rossi really pushed his side forward in the second period. It was immediately obvious that the two full-backs were even more attack-minded (and even wider) than before the break, and on 54 minutes Palermo brought on another forward, Fabrizio Miccoli – with Acquah sacrificed.

This was obviously a very attack-minded move, and some reorganisation was necessary. Antonio Nocerino and Giulio Migliaccio played a little deeper to compensate for the absence of a true holding player, and Ilicic also dropped back a little to the right. Miccoli played left-of-centre, Pastore came to an inside-right position, and Abel Hernandez continued to play upfront.

This meant that Palermo now had a front four playing very narrow – but this was OK, because the width was coming from the full-backs, keeping the active playing zone large enough to stretch Inter. And Palermo played some fantastic football – Ilicic saw more of the ball because he wasn’t really being picked up by anyone, and Pastore kept beating players cleverly. All that was needed was a finish, but Hernandez’s shots were poor, and Inter got some last-ditch blocks in.

Closing stages

Leonardo saw Cassani as a threat down the right, and Eto’o was reluctant to drop back and defend too much, so Goran Pandev replaced Pazzini, with Eto’o going upfront. This had two benefits – first, Pandev was more defensively aware on the left flank, and second, with Palermo pushing forward and playing high up the pitch, Eto’o’s pace was an obvious danger in a central role. He took up good positions outside the two centre-backs, and Sneijder kept trying to play him in down the centre-right channel – a few balls were cut out by substitute Moris Carrozzieri, but the Dutchman (now enjoying even more space after Acquah’s departure) eventually played another ball to Eto’o, and that same combination doubled the lead.

That should have been game over, but there was a flurry of activity very late on. Ezequiel Munoz scored a hilariously free header from a corner, then was sent-off and left a hole at the back, and substitute Diego Milito pounced to make it 3-1 in stoppage time.

Conclusion

An entertaining game – Palermo were better in midfield and their build-up play was very good, but Inter had the most deadly player on the pitch, and Samuel Eto’o scored two stereotypical goals to settle the game.

It’s fair to say that both managers performed well here. Rossi’s side were frequently creating chances by playing neatly in midfield, but were lacking in the penalty box, whilst Leonardo’s surprise starting line-up made the Sneijder-Eto’o combination possible for the first goal, and his substitutions also worked nicely in the second half.

A good tactical battle.

Alex2011

267楼的参考译文
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温布利决战战术分析：爵爷失策中场失势，红魔难阻犀利梅西
Rivaldinho (38级) 2011-05-29 09:40


双方首发阵容

MVP组合的三粒进球帮助瓜迪奥拉的球队在温布利获得胜利。

弗格森排出的是他近期的“大赛专用首发11人”，埃尔南德斯突前鲁尼居后，吉格斯和卡里克出任中场。最大的意外是贝巴连大名单都没进。

瓜迪奥拉得以让阿比达尔首发出任左后卫，但是普约尔没有出现在中卫位置，马斯切拉诺取而代之。

比赛整体走势和2009年决赛并不完全一样，曼联开局踢得非常好，但是比赛其余时间都处于劣势。


巴萨的优势

对待这场比赛的态度有两种，第一种很明显，巴萨显然是世界最佳球队，也许是史上最佳之一，他们只要找到感觉就无可匹敌。这种想法几乎适用所有人：巴萨乐于赢得赞誉，而曼联也不难接受失利，毕竟对手更胜一筹，中立球迷则能够为见证如此精彩的比赛而感到高兴。

另外一方面曼联和巴萨的差距也许不该像本场这么大，1-3不算丢人，但是射门数（22-4）和射正数（12-1）诠释了瓜迪奥拉的球队优势有多大。很难说曼联的战术真正使得他们与巴萨相抗衡，就算开局还不错，巴萨才是比赛的主宰。

埃尔南德斯首发

比赛的战术关键点是埃尔南德斯到底是首发突前还是让位给另外一名中场。弗格森选择让他出战，但是不可避免的反应就是卡里克和吉格斯在中场被人压制。鲁尼的任务是盯梢布斯克斯，考虑到曼联有球时鲁尼还得找寻空间，这个任务有点难，但是布斯克斯还是发起了巴萨的很多次进攻，他能够轻松找到身处空当的进攻线队友。

埃尔南德斯尽管有快马的美誉，但是他并没有对巴萨防线形成持续威胁，他在比赛初期老是落入越位陷阱。巴萨的这项工作应当得到肯定，事实上巴萨只要踢出常态，他们激进的越位战术便是几个关键战术点之一。这也是他们胆敢如此压上面对埃尔南德斯的理由，但是这个四人组此战之前合作的时间只有60分钟。

曼联初期的压迫


曼联初期很有威胁，他们多次打到左路试图攻击阿尔维斯身后

不过说起来埃尔南德斯倒是帮到了曼联这场比赛的压迫，巴萨防线没有普约尔给了弗格森的球队可乘之机，他传球比阿比达尔或者马斯切拉诺更好，所以这两人要是拿球没啥好怕的。曼联可以迅速归位，他们还有几次第一时间抢断梅西发动长传和斜长传打到巴萨身后。阿尔维斯在开局阶段面对朴智星也有些紧张。

无球时瓦伦西亚和朴智星都回撤内收，这在曼联近来的比赛里很管用。潜在的问题是瓦伦西亚有紧逼伊涅斯塔的部分责任在身，这给了巴萨边后卫拿球的时间，部分原因也在于随着比赛推进巴萨能控住球，球员自由度得以提升。

另外巴萨拿球时曼联的防线回收，所以伊涅斯塔拿球后送向两肋边后卫的直塞不过是造了几个门球。

中后场之间的空间

防线收缩意味着梅西在两条线之间有了更多的时间。曼联的战术从一开始就允许维迪奇和里奥上抢梅西，但这并非永远奏效，梅西跑位聪明，制造了麻烦。

第一个球便来源于阵线之间的空间，首先哈维空出来了，然后梅西吸走了埃弗拉，为佩德罗创造了打入首球的空间。


巴萨几乎所有机会都来自禁区前沿

这边总结了曼联无球时的失败，因为他们太容易被扯散队形了，尽管这往往发生在中场而非直接在防线。吉格斯、朴智星和瓦伦西亚都力不从心，卡里克常常要面对哈维和伊涅斯塔二人，梅西还在他的身后。这是金球奖前三名的球员，卡里克渴望援助，在这个区域曼联还需要一个人！

好在曼联扳平了比分，倒不是说中场运转有多好，而是他们在比赛初期做得很好的压迫再度奏效，他们迅速赢回球权，鲁尼和卡里克、吉格斯打了个两个二过一，然后打入精彩一球。

下半场

中场休息过后吉格斯和朴智星被告知暂时互换位置，他们上半场其实也有换位。这样做的用意很奇怪，是的，曼联中路需要能量，但是要记得当初就是朴智星跟防拉姆塞不力导致球队负于阿森纳，看看梅西的进球回放，他在梅西拿球前就把人跟丢了。然后又要提到前文内容，中卫理应上抢，但是他们反应太慢。

吉格斯换位的另外一个不良效应是阿尔维斯活了，他下半场头10分钟两次插入曼联腹地，一次范德萨扑出了他的射门，还有一次梅西的射门被补门后卫挡出。弗格森知道中场要变，但是吉格斯和朴智星互换似乎不是答案。看看在板凳席上的三名中场：弗莱彻、安德森和斯科尔斯，他还是有选择的。

最后时刻

弗格森直到60分钟才做出一次换人，那是被迫的，法比奥大概是抽筋了，纳尼出战，瓦伦西亚打右后卫。其实法比奥因身体原因离场不算少见，他这赛季首发16次被换下10次，他的双胞胎兄弟拉斐尔首发10次被换下9次，这里头有些是战术换人，有些是因伤被动换人。但是被动换人的次数还不少，所以弗格森没把奥谢放入18人名单也是让人奇怪的地方。

换人几乎没有效果，因为比利亚马上就打入精彩一球把比分变为3-1，大局已定。曼联两球落后也没能制造什么威胁，而巴萨，尤其是梅西，乐于控球而非扩大优势。


10号梅西突破来去自如

结论

“我们从未真正控制梅西。”弗格森赛后承认。“但是很多人都这么说。在中场压迫上我们从未真正做到位。我们试图踢出自己平时的路子。比如让我们人盯人就很尴尬了，我们想踢出常态，我们做得不够好，我们承认。”

瓜迪奥拉则对自己的球队很满意。“我们压迫次数很多，我们压制了卡里克和吉格斯，展现了球队的实力。欧冠决赛总有麻烦，这回比在罗马麻烦更少，我们机会更多，进得也更多。梅西是我见过最好的球员，也许未来也是如此。我们有好球员，但是没有他，我不觉得我们能完成质的飞跃。”

就像两位主帅指出的那样：两个因素：首先，曼联没能钳制巴萨中场，其次，梅西太NB了。

Alex2011

Barcelona 3-1 Manchester United: Barcelona are European Champions
May 29, 2011


The starting line-ups

Goals from each of Barcelona’s front three gave Pep Guardiola’s side victory at Wembley.

Sir Alex Ferguson named his recent ‘big game’ XI – which meant Javier Hernandez upfront with Wayne Rooney behind, and Ryan Giggs and Michael Carrick in the centre of midfield. The biggest surprise was Dimitar Berbatov not even being on the bench.

Guardiola was able to call on Eric Abidal at left-back, but not Carles Puyol at centre-back, so Javier Mascherano started in defence after all.

The overall pattern was not completely different from the 2009 final. United enjoyed a good opening few minutes, but were then the poorer side for the rest of the contest.

Barca dominance

There are two ways to consider the game. The first is the obvious approach – Barcelona are clearly the best side in the world, arguably one of the best of all time, and when they are on top of their game, they are unstoppable. It’s an approach that suits everyone – Barca are happy to take the plaudits, United can take the defeat easier knowing they’ve been beaten by a superb side, and the neutral can take pleasure from witnessing such a marvellous performance.

On the other hand, United probably shouldn’t have been dominated to such a large extent. Losing 3-1 is far from shameful, but the overall shots figure (22-4 to Barcelona) and the shots on target figure (12-1 to Barcelona) demonstrate quite how superior Guardiola’s side were. Tactics is not a case of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ depending solely upon the approach, but it’s difficult to argue that United’s tactics helped them compete in this game at all, even when starting from the earlier viewpoint – that Barca are by far the best around.

Hernandez starts

The key decision before the game was whether Hernandez would play upfront, or be dropped in favour of another midfielder. The choice to play him was an attacking move from Ferguson, but the inevitable knock-on effect was that Carrick and Giggs were overwhelmed in the centre of midfield. Wayne Rooney was given the job of tracking Sergio Busquets – a difficult task considering Rooney wanted to be in space when United won the ball – but Busquets started many of Barcelona’s attacks, and was able to find more attack-minded teammates in space very easily.

Hernandez isn’t the consistent threat over the top he should be considering his speed (though he’s obviously had a fantastic first season in terms of goalscoring) and he found himself frequently offside early in the game. Credit should go to Barcelona for that – in fact, in a game where Barcelona were largely able to play their ‘natural’ game, their aggressive offside trap was one of the few key tactical features. It takes a lot of confidence to be able to play so high up the pitch against Hernandez, especially with a back four that had played as a unit for just 60 minutes before this match.

United early pressure


United looked dangerous early on, and much of their good play came down the left, trying to get in behind Alves

All this said, Hernandez did help press Barcelona early on in this match – and Ferguson’s side were helped by the fact that Barca were without Puyol at the back – he’s a better passer than Abidal or Mascherano, and so it wasn’t a disaster if either of them had time on the ball. United settled quickly, won the first couple of tackles against Messi and played long balls, sometimes diagonal, into dangerous areas. Daniel Alves started nervously and Park Ji-Sung was a threat in the opening minutes.

Out of possession, Valencia and Park dropped deep and played narrow, helping United out in the centre of the pitch. The potential problem with Iniesta identified in the preview was part-solved by Valencia playing close to him. This then gave the Barcelona full-backs time on the ball, however, and it was partly because of that freedom that Barca were able to grow into the match and keep possession.

United’s defence dropped deep when Barca kept the ball, and so when it was played forward to Andres Iniesta, his favoured through-balls between centre-back and full-back trickled out of play for goal-kicks.

Space between the lines

The defence playing deep meant that Messi enjoyed too much time on the ball between the lines. It was obvious from the first minute that United’s strategy was to allow Nemanja Vidic and Rio Ferdinand to move forward to confront Messi, but this didn’t always work, and Messi got into intelligent positions to cause them problems.

The first goal came about because of space between the lines in two ways – first Xavi Hernandez became free there, and then Messi being unoccupied dragged Patrice Evra towards him, opening up space for Pedro Rodriguez to fire home.


Almost all Barcelona's chances came from passes played to a position on the edge of the 'D'

That summed up United’s failings without the ball, because they were too easily dragged out of shape – although usually in the midfield, rather than at the back. Giggs, Park and Valencia all found it difficult to compete, and Carrick was faced with Xavi and Iniesta coming past him, and Messi in behind him. That’s 3rd, 2nd and 1st in last year’s World Footballer of the Year award forming a triangle around him – he desperately needed help, and United needed another body in that zone.

And yet they managed to get back in it, though it was after the pressing that had worked early on, rather than good work in the midfield. They boxed in Barca when Abidal took a throw in the left-back position, won the ball quickly and then Rooney played an excellent double one-two with Carrick and Giggs, and finished superbly.

Second half

After the break, Giggs and Park were told to switch positions permanently, though they’d sometimes swapped in the first half. The wisdom of this was questionable – yes, United needed more energy in the middle, but Park was guilty of switching off for Aaron Ramsey’s goal recently when pushed into the centre, and when watching the replay for Messi’s goal here, he seemed to have given up off before Messi had struck the ball. That said, as mentioned earlier, it was the centre-backs’ job to come up towards Messi, and they were slow to do so.

The other effect of the switch was Giggs becoming exposed to Alves’ runs, and twice in the first ten minutes of the second half, Alves was through on goal after one of his classic darts down the right – once he shot at Edwin van der Sar, the other time he squared for Messi. Ferguson knew something different was needed in midfield, but switching Park and Giggs was unlikely to be the answer. With three central midfielders on the bench – Darren Fletcher, Anderson and Paul Scholes – he did have options.

Final stages


Messi dribbled past opponents easily in the 'number ten' position

Ferguson waited until the 69th minute to make a change, and that was enforced, as Fabio da Silva was struggling, possibly with cramp. Nani came on, Antonio Valencia went to right-back. Incidentally, it’s not uncommon for Fabio to depart because of fitness problems. He’s started 16 games this season and been removed 10 times, whilst his twin brother Rafael has been taken off in 8 of his last 9 games. These figures include tactical substitutions as well as changes because of injury, but a decent number have been fitness-related, and therefore it was a surprise that Ferguson named no full-back on the bench, with John O’Shea left out of the 18 altogether.

The substitution had little impact on the game, because David Villa soon curled a brilliant shot into the net to put Barcelona 3-1 up, and that settled it. United rarely threatened at two goals down, and Barcelona – particularly Messi – were keen to keep the ball rather than extend the lead.

Conclusion

“We never really controlled Messi,” Ferguson admitted after the game. “But many people have said that. We never really closed the midfield well enough to counter them. We tried to play as near to the way we normally play. For instance, it’s alien to us to try to man-mark players. We tried to play as normally as we can. It wasn’t good enough on the night, we acknowledge that.”

Guardiola was pleased with his side. “We pressed the ball a lot, we were on top of Carrick and Giggs and that shows the quality of our team. You’ll always have problems in the Champions League final but we had less problems than in Rome – we had more chances and we made more of them.

Lionel Messi is the best player I’ve seen, the best I will ever see probably. We have good players but without him I don’t think we’d be able to make that decisive leap.”

As both managers touched upon, there were two key factors – first, United didn’t get to grips with Barca in midfield, and second, Messi was sublime.

Alex2011

264楼参考译文，来自球迷一家
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山雨欲来风满楼-巴萨vs曼联战术前瞻
译者：netfish513 发表日期：2011-5-28 15:19:00

作为年度压轴大戏，赛前关于这场比赛技战术方面的讨论铺天盖地。事实上，当巴萨和曼联再次会师决赛的那一刻起，这场比赛就成了人们热议的焦点，人们尤其关心的是：双方的首发会是哪些人？曼联能否阻击巴萨？很多现役球员都被问及他们对这场比赛的看法，威尔谢尔和小法都提出了让人惊讶的战术细节，尤其是小法，他还形象的将他的想法画在了一块黑板之上。

提到两年前的那场比赛，人们或许有些过于夸大了巴萨的优势。的确，对于那场比赛，就连球员们自己都觉得他们表现不好，赛前斯科尔斯就说“这次至少我们会试一试”，不过考虑到他是在那场比赛０：２落后时才被换上，他说这话似乎还可以理解。不过，如果你重新回看那场比赛，你会发现那场比赛的上半场曼联创造出了更好的机会。



赛前球队方面的消息
　　
曼联方面没有什么大的伤病，不过弗莱彻和安德森的健康状况稍有问题，爵爷可能会二选其一。

巴萨方面，阿比达尔还没有完全从手术后恢复，稳妥起见，瓜迪奥拉很可能让普约尔移到左路，而让皮克和马斯切拉诺搭档中后卫。


双方最有可能的首发

最大的变数
　　
首发中最不确定的因素是赫尔南德斯。爵爷是否会让最近表现出色的小豌豆首发？抑或撤下小豌豆而派上一名中场球员加强防守？--大多数人可能更倾向于前者。
　
不过，先别忙着做出决定。支持小豌豆首发的人认为他的速度在面对巴萨的高位防线时可以发挥作用--要知道他可是去年世界杯跑的最快的球员，而且在去年墨西哥对阵的西班牙的国际比赛中小豌豆面对普约尔和另外一名巴萨球员时就曾干过这事。
　
不过，尽管属于速度型球员，小豌豆却很少以这样的方式进球。最近的一个是上次面对切尔西的时候他攻入的那球--不过那却主要归咎于路易斯的失误，而不是赫尔南德斯的速度。事实上，小豌豆大部分的进球都是接到传球后门前机敏的近距离射门。曼联并不擅长于控球，他们不像利物浦，只需要将球交给托雷斯，然后让他利用速度去突破射门就ok，把球打到边路，然后传中才是曼联基本的套路。
　
除此之外，在对手占主导的比赛中，小豌豆的作用并不是那么突出。拿最近的同阿森纳的比赛来说，曼联的控球率只有45%，小豌豆在前场只完成了4次传球，同时他无球状态时对球队的帮助也不大。在那场比赛中他甚至没有一次射门。同样糟糕的表现在斯坦福桥也曾上演。
　　
因此，爵爷必须三思，小豌豆上还是不上。当然，如果首发，他对巴萨的防线会是巨大的威胁，甚至可能会取得进球。不过考虑到巴萨强大中场的现实，爵爷必须还要权衡再三。
　
其实小豌豆最大的作用在于牵制对方的防线，使得他们不敢过于压上，从而拉开巴萨后防和中场的距离，使得鲁尼有更多的活动空间。不过巴萨有布茨克斯，比赛中他会对鲁尼如影随形。
　
考虑到巴萨的控制比09年时更加的炉火纯青，多派上一名中场球员似乎是更稳妥的做法。曼联中场拥有破坏力，不过到时可能不能发挥用场，因为你很难靠近巴萨的控球队员实施拦截。他们需要做的是移动、移动再移动。如果只靠卡里克和吉格斯两个人的话估计有点困难，那么，派上第三名中场球员就很有必要。
　
不过，考虑到安德森和弗莱彻的健康问题，他们可能只能踢50分钟。不过50分钟够了，在这段时间内，爵爷会要求他们中的一人不惜体力的奔跑、拦截，然后在他精疲力竭之后换下。之后，老谋深算的爵爷会在最后25分钟换上赫尔南德斯，就像这两年阿森纳对巴萨时所做的那样--去年最后时刻沃尔科特的速度对巴萨后防的威胁让人印象深刻--小豌豆也会发挥同样的作用。

那么，方案2来了：



压迫

2009年那场比赛，曼联开场阶段的压迫让瓜迪奥拉措手不及，他们中场快速断球，迫使巴萨犯错，这次，他们可能会重复上次的打法。不过这次曼联得小心，这只巴萨的中场目前已经接近无解，还没有那只球队在面对布茨克斯、哈维和伊涅斯塔时能占得便宜，何况梅西还经常回撤支援。

此外，曼联采取压迫战术的话，防线必须上提，这对维迪奇来说是个问题，这个赛季他暴露出来速度以及转身方面的不足。费迪南德倒是覆盖面广，不过他面对的是巴萨近乎本能的跑位和传球。尤其是当梅西拖后到中场，佩德罗和比利亚从边后卫身后斜线跑位至维迪奇的防守区域（就像在国王杯打皇马时佩德罗被吹掉的那个球），这种打法威胁极大。曼联的防线提得越高，他们越是要小心。

曼联边锋和巴萨边后卫的对决

不出预料的话，朴智星和瓦伦西亚将会出现在曼联的边路-三肺位置会稍微靠后，主要负责盯防阿尔维斯，而瓦伦则会靠前，就像他们对阵切尔西时一样。瓦伦将成为曼联最重要的一个进攻点，因为他面对的是巴萨最薄弱的左路。
　　
瓜迪奥拉需要考虑的是给多少进攻的自由度给他的边后卫。在同皇马的系列赛的开始阶段，阿隆索曾尝试斜线传球给边锋以撕破巴萨的后防。瓜迪奥拉应该已经注意到了这种打法--一旦边后卫压上助攻，曼联的边锋或者前场球员将会乘虚而入造成威胁，特别是鲁尼，在同切尔西的比赛中，面对阿什利科尔的频频压上就这么干过。因此，谨慎起见，瓜迪可能会要求两个边后卫留在后场，这样也可以使得后卫和前锋之间保持足够的距离以便给前场三人组留出足够的空间。
　
不过还有一种可能就是在需要时将阵型由4-3-3变为3-4-3，当边后卫压上助攻时，布茨克斯撤到后卫位置，同时前场两名球员也后撤帮助防守，在对阵4-4-2或者4-4-1-1时，瓜迪奥拉经常这样干。这样，边后卫就可放心压上助攻而无后顾之忧。

伊涅斯塔
　
他将是比赛的关键先生。2009年那场比赛他表现惊艳，赛后鲁尼称赞他是世界上最好的球员。
　　
在比赛中，伊涅斯塔和卡里克对位，这将会是一个很舒服的位置。在这里没有冒犯卡里克的意思，不过如果他被布置为曼联最拖后的一个中场球员的话，那么他的任务将会是尽量拖后保持和后卫线的距离以免梅西获得更多的空间，并且尽可能的拦截所有传给梅西的球。与此同时，他还要负责盯防伊涅斯塔，这对他来说，很难。想象一下，如果伊涅斯塔后撤或者移到左路（此时曼联的左后卫正忙着对付巴萨的右边锋），后果会很严重：小白将获得大把的空间以及控球时间。
　　
如果小白移到左路，那么巴萨的阵型将变为4-2-4，上个赛季这曾是他们的Ｂ计划，虽然并不常用。同样，如果后撤，小白也可以摆脱吉格斯的防守而获得空间，他会给曼联的中场带来大麻烦。



最后，总结一下：毫无疑问，巴萨将掌握控球权，他们需要的是恰到好处的传球以及前锋踩准步点的一剑封喉。而曼联方面需要做到的则是快速的由守转攻，尽快摆脱巴萨前场的围抢而将球传到前场。

Alex2011

上楼对Pedro和villa首发位置，没有预测对，不过认为他俩是要换位。
其实，梅西下半场换到右路，才是对曼联的最大威胁。
事实证明，范德萨对球门右侧防守几乎是投降，2次决赛在这个位置丢了4球，其中本次是3球。
梅西和比利亚在这个位置打进球后，庆祝都是发飙了。
为什么？攻破老范防守大门太难了！
这一次打了20多次射门，优势这么明显，才打进了三个，换另外一个角度，则并不是必进球。
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
264楼参考译文，来自goalhi

巴塞罗那v曼彻斯特联队：战术前瞻
phyth (9级) 2011-05-28 07:25


双方的“首选”阵容

在决赛之前，关于这场比赛的各种战术讨论铺天盖地。

没错，当大家确定2009年的决赛将会再次发生的时候，所有的讨论都是关于两队会采取怎样的战术——具体来说，曼联会采取怎样的战术来阻截巴塞罗那。甚至现役球员们也被问及他们的战术猜想，比如杰克-威尔希尔还有法布雷加斯令人吃惊地给大家展示非常细致的战术想法——后者甚至在一块干净的小黑板上将他的想法画了出来。

这些讨论中一个共同的主题——也许我们不能称之为失误——是对曼联在2009年的失势进行了夸大。你甚至不清楚是不是有的球员他们自己都忘了那场比赛的上半场是怎么一回事。比如，保罗-斯科尔斯说过这次曼联“将会至少去放开尝试一下”——这和他们在罗马的表现并不符合——不过考虑到斯科尔斯只在场上踢了最后二十分钟，而且巴萨正在处于2-0的领先状态，在那个阶段他们在做的基本上就是护球倒脚，我们也可以理解他这番话。不过，ZM之前对那场比赛的分析值得一读，或者你可以重新看一遍那场比赛的录像来为这场比赛做准备。在2009年的上半场，曼联拥有更好的机会而且传球数和巴塞罗那差不多。

球队新闻

曼联没有球员受到重伤，但达伦-弗莱彻和安德森两人的状态现在是话题的焦点，也许这样佛格森爵士将会把他们放在考虑范围之外。

佩普-瓜迪奥拉希望埃里克-阿比达尔会踢左后卫的位置，但是这位刚刚从手术恢复过来法国后卫也许无法在球场上全力奔跑。这样的话，卡莱斯-普约尔更像是填补左后方空当的人，他原本的中后卫位置将可能交给马斯切拉诺。

重要决策

大家一致认为主要做出关于首发决定的将会是佛格森。他应该继续使用最近在重大比赛中有关键表现的埃尔南德斯，还是用一名中场选手替换他的位置以组织一套更加防守性的体系？当然大家更希望看到的是让埃尔南德斯首发出场。

这一决定比许多人想象中的要更加复杂。一条很明显的论点是埃尔南德斯闪电般的速度——在去年夏天的世界杯里他是速度最快的球员———而他的速度将会让巴塞罗那高度压上的防线措不及防。事实上，去年埃尔南德斯在国家级的比赛里在面对普约尔和其他巴萨球员的时候做过非常类似的事情。

但就一名快速的球员来说，埃尔南德斯并没有以这种方式获得很多进球。最近在联赛里和切尔西的交锋中他射入了一枚开场进球，但这次进球的主要原因是大卫-路易兹的失误而不是埃尔南德斯的速度本身。他大部分进球都是离球门很近的抢点式射门，其中经常是来自传中。将球分边然后倒入中路是曼联最天然的打法，而他们并不是很习惯使用直塞来创造机会——特别可以比较一下利物浦如何毫不掩饰地利用托雷斯的速度将球塞如边后卫和中后卫之间的通道。

另外，埃尔南德斯在类似这场决赛的比赛里并没有太大作用，也就是当对手控制了绝大部分球权的比赛。在最近酋长球场面对阿森纳的时候，曼联只有45%的控球而埃尔南德斯在运动战里只完成了四脚传球，于是我们怀疑他在脚下无球的时候不能对球队做出太多贡献。在那场比赛里，他一次射门也没有，同样的情况也在斯坦福桥的联赛比赛里发生。如果他首发的话，他还会是曼联队里最大的威胁，但是佛格森需要均衡考虑这种威胁和中场的地位，因为中场将可能变得更加开放而给巴萨留出空间，这样曼联将会在将球向前转移的时候感到吃力。

但是，埃尔南德斯的作用，即使在他不碰球的情况下，是迫使对方防线后撤，这样便可以在防线和中场之间打开空隙，为鲁尼制造更多的空间。切尔西因为没有一个真正的后腰，他们对此毫无办法，但是巴萨拥有布斯科思，而他将会拦在鲁尼的前面阻挡着去球门的方向。


另一种阵容。瓜迪奥拉可以让普约尔成为左后卫然后让马斯切拉诺当中后卫，而他的边锋可以随便换边。佛格森也许会选择采用第三名中场，而且他在右边后卫的位置上选择奥谢（或者拉斐尔）。

如果考虑到巴塞罗那比2009年更加注重控球率，那么添加额外一名中场球员的打法则看起来更为强大。曼联拥有破坏型的选手，但是他们并不需要他——大部分情况下你很难接近巴萨球员去进行拦截。你真正需要的是流动性，而吉格斯和卡里克的搭配在这方面值得质疑，不过锋线上的三四名球员充沛的精力将会对此有所帮助。

当然，第三名可能的中场在状态上令人值得担心。安德森和弗莱彻也许都只能坚持50分钟。但是佛格森很可能会接受这个事实，然后让他们之中一位在场上就踢这么久，并且告诉他们疯狂的进行逼抢和压迫，反正他们知道他们也无法打满全场，而不需要担心疲劳的问题。那么接下来，就像阿森纳在过去两年中两次做到的，在最后25分钟全力出击——值得注意的是去年瓦尔科特的速度在酋长球场给巴塞罗那制造了相当的麻烦，而埃尔南德斯也许可以制造同样的效果。

压迫

在2009年，曼联一开场就对巴塞罗那进行了压迫而吃了瓜迪奥拉一惊。他们快速地赢得球权从而逼迫巴萨犯错，这次他们也可以做出类似的尝试。但曼联必须很注意他们的行为，因为如果对巴萨的防线进行四对四的压迫的话，他们的中场将会为布斯科思，哈维和伊涅斯塔敞开并让他们获得控制权，而且不要忘记了梅西的后撤，在逻辑上，没有关于这点的万全之策。

同时这也意味着如果高位压上的话，会有更多的问题出现在维迪奇身上，他这个赛季一直在面对快速的对手的时候感到痛苦，当有球员快速超过他的时候他很难快速地转过身来。虽说里奥-斐迪南德的掩护非常聪明但是巴塞罗那在前场的跑位同时是出于本能但也在战术上充满机智。一种具体的打法是让梅西后撤然后给佩德罗和比利亚制造内切的机会，他们往往切入边后卫的身后进入维迪奇负责的空间范围之内（有点像佩德罗在国王杯决赛被吹掉的那粒进球）。这样曼联越是向前压迫，巴塞罗那的三叉戟将越有效率。

曼联的边前卫 v 巴塞罗那边后卫

这也许是场上在战术层面最有趣的对位，而且很可能在这个区域里，需要做出重大的决定的是瓜迪奥拉而不是佛格森——这不光是选择谁当左后卫的问题。

不出意外的话，朴智星和瓦伦西亚将会是曼联的两名边卫。朴智星会在左路稍微靠内侧的区域跟踪达尼-阿尔维斯的活动，而瓦伦西亚将会更加拉边一点并且更加靠前，就像最近对阵切尔西那场一样。瓦伦西亚将会寻找一对一的战斗机会，并且考虑到他的对手是巴萨最弱的一环，他也许会是曼联最重要的进攻球员。

瓜迪奥拉要做的决定是他的边后卫们有多少的进攻自由。在最近他们和皇马一系列的比赛中，一开始阿隆索很明显地尝试用对角线的长传球去利用巴萨边后卫身后的空间，好让他们的边卫可以快速插上。瓜迪奥拉可能担心这种事情对他产生的威胁——同时来自对方边卫和移向边路的双前锋（鲁尼最近在面对切尔西的时候经常利用阿什利-科尔身后的空间），于是他命令两名边后卫待在后场。但同时，他也需要边后卫压上所制造的宽度，这样巴萨的三名前锋才可以往里收缩来彼此连接。

这些都会由巴萨是否会采用4-3-3到3-4-3（布斯科思后撤至防线）的阵型变化来决定。这样做很符合逻辑——瓜迪奥拉只在面对4-4-2或者4-4-1-1体系的时候要求他的球员采用这样的变化。这种时候对方很明显的有两名前锋，而布斯科思的后撤将会帮助巴萨从对方原本‘自然’的压迫中解脱出来。这场比赛很可能就是这种情况。这样的话他们将可以让两名边后卫大胆地压上到前场而不用担心边路身后的空间被过度暴露出来。

伊涅斯塔

这场比赛的关键球员是伊涅斯塔。2009年他表现绝对顶级——鲁尼在赛后称他为“世界上最好的球员”。

伊涅斯塔在场上处于不错的面对卡里克的位置。不是看不起卡里克，但是如果他是曼联最靠后的中场，那他将会肩负压缩后场和中场两条防线的任务，以防梅西得到更多的空间，并且可能爵爷也会吩咐他去尝试拦截任何传给梅西的球。这样，虽然卡里克在场上很自然的应该去逼抢伊涅斯塔，但他很可能无法办到。那么会发生什么呢？如果伊涅斯塔后撤的话？如果他往左移动？假设曼联的右后卫会专心对付巴萨的左边锋，那伊涅斯塔将很可能无人盯防并且享有充足的时间来控球。

如果他往左移动，这甚至可以允许巴萨将阵型转变成上赛季的类似4-2-4的第二套战术方案，虽说这只是偶尔发生的方案。这样的话哈维将会更加后撤而远离吉格斯，并且会给曼联在中场带来真正的问题。

巴塞罗那肯定会有统治性的控球，于是对于双方来说，如何创造机会取决于不同的事情。巴塞罗那需要精确的尝试直塞球，而他们的前锋必须有良好的跑位；而曼联需要在攻防转换的时候行动迅速果断，绕开巴萨的第一轮反抢，将他们过于靠前的防线暴露在反击之中。

Alex2011

曼联这一次抓住了巴萨左后卫上的弱点，扳平了比分。但是整体不给力，于事无补啊

不过看看赛前的预测，也挺有意思的。
-----------------------------------------------

Barcelona v Manchester United: tactical preview
May 27, 2011


Both side's "first choice" line-up

There’s certainly been no shortage of tactical debate ahead of this game.

Indeed, ever since a repeat of the 2009 final was confirmed, all the talk has been about how the sides will play – more specifically, how Manchester United can stop Barcelona. Even current players have been asked for their tactical thoughts, with the likes Jack Wilshere and Cesc Fabregas outlining surprisingly detailed tactical ideas – the latter showed off a neat chalkboard to demonstrate his ideas visually.

The one common theme – it’s probably not appropriate to call it a mistake – is an exaggeration of how much United were dominated in 2009. Indeed, you wonder if some of the players themselves have forgotten how even the first half of that game was. Paul Scholes, for example, said that this time United “intend to at least give it a go” – which doesn’t do justice to their performance in Rome – although considering Scholes only came on for the final twenty minutes, when Barcelona were 2-0 up and played keep-ball, it’s perhaps understandable. Still, it’s worth reading ZM’s analysis of that game, or even rewatching the game as preparation for this one. In the first half in 2009, United had better chances and almost an identical number of completed passes.

Team news

Manchester United have no major injury doubts, but the fitness of Darren Fletcher and Anderson are both talking points, and may dissuade Sir Alex Ferguson from using either.

Pep Guardiola would like to use Eric Abidal at left-back, but the French defender is probably not yet up to full speed after recovering from his operation. Therefore, Carles Puyol seems likely to play at left-back, with Javier Mascherano at centre-back.

The big decision

Everyone agrees that the main decision at the start will come from Ferguson. Should he continue to use Javier Hernandez, a key part of Ferguson’s recent ‘big game’ side, or drop the Mexican in order to use another central midfielder, and go for more of a defensive system? Hernandez starting would certainly be the popular move.

The decision is perhaps more complicated than many think. The obvious argument is that Hernandez’s lightning pace – he was the quickest player at the World Cup last summer – will catch out Barcelona’s high line. In fact, Hernandez has done something very similar last year at international level against Carles Puyol and other Barca players.

For such a pacey player, however, Hernandez hasn’t scored a great number of goals in this fashion. There was the recent opener in the league clash against Chelsea, but the primary cause of that goal was David Luiz’s mistake rather than Hernandez’s pace itself. Most of his goals have been poacher’s strikes from close range, often after crosses. Getting the ball wide and then centring it remains United’s natural approach, and they are simply not used to playing through balls – not when compared to, say, how Liverpool used Fernando Torres’ pace so blatantly with balls into the channels.

Besides, Hernandez hasn’t been particularly influential in games that are likely to take the same pattern as this one – ie with the opposition dominating possession. Against Arsenal at the Emirates recently, United only had 45% of possession and Hernandez only completed four passes in open play, and there’s a suspicion that he doesn’t contribute an awful lot when he doesn’t have the ball. He didn’t have a shot in that game, and the same was true in the league game at Stamford Bridge. He would still be a huge threat and probably United’s best chance of a goal if he started, but Ferguson has to balance that threat against the fact that the midfield would be more open, and United might struggle to get the ball forward.

What Hernandez does, however (even without touching the ball) is force the opposition defence to play deeper, which then opens up the gap between the lines of defence and midfield, and creates more space for Wayne Rooney. But whereas Chelsea, for example, were clueless at times without a true holding player, Barca have Sergio Busquets who will stay goalside of Rooney.


The alternative line-ups. Guardiola could play Puyol at left-back and bring in Mascherano in the centre, and can play his wingers on either side. Ferguson may opt for a third central midfielder, and also has the option of O'Shea (or Rafael) at right-back

The case for playing another central midfielder looks stronger when you consider that Barcelona are far more possession-orientated than they were in 2009. United have a destroyer, but then they don’t need one – often you can’t get close enough to Barca to get a tackle in. What you do need is mobility, and it’s questionable whether there’s enough of that from Ryan Giggs and Michael Carrick in a duo, though the energy of the front three/four makes up for that to a certain extent.

Of course, the fitness worries of the candidates for the potential third central midfield position come into play here. Anderson and Fletcher might only be able to last 50 minutes. But Ferguson must be tempted to accept that, play either of them for that amount of time and tell them to close down and press like mad, safe in the knowledge they won’t have to play the full game, so tiring it not a problem. Then, as Arsenal have done twice in two years, really go for it in the final 25 minutes – it was notable how much Theo Walcott’s pace troubled Barcelona at the Emirates last year, and Hernandez might have the same effect.

Pressing

Manchester United pressed Barcelona from the start in 2009, surprising Guardiola. They won the ball back quickly and forced Barca into mistakes, and they might try and do something similar here. United must be careful, though, because there is no logical solution for pressing Barcelona 4 v 4 without leaving the midfield open for Sergio Busquets, Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta to dominate, not to mention Lionel Messi dropping deep.

It also means playing high up the pitch, which might be a problem for Nemanja Vidic, who has struggled with pace this season and doesn’t like having to turn quickly when a player is sprinting past him. Rio Ferdinand covers very intelligently but Barcelona’s movement upfront is both instinctive and very clever tactically. A particular approach is for Messi to drop deep and then for Pedro and David Villa to make diagonal runs in behind the full-backs and into the space Vidic is occupying (a little like Pedro’s disallowed goal in the Copa del Rey final) and the higher up the pitch United play, the more likely this is to be effective for Barcelona’s front three.

Manchester United wingers v Barcelona full-backs

This is probably the most interesting match-up on the pitch in terms of tactics, and it’s arguably the one area where Guardiola, not Ferguson, has the real decision to make – even after he’s decided on a left-back.

It would be a huge surprise if Park Ji-Sung and Antonio Valencia were not United’s wide players – Park will play a little tucked in on the left and track Dani Alves, whilst Valencia will stay wider and higher up on the right, as against Chelsea recently. Valencia will look to get into 1 v 1 battles, and is probably United’s most important attacking player considering he’ll be up against Barcelona’s weakest position.

Guardiola’s decision is about how much attacking freedom he wants to give his full-backs. At the start of the recent mini-series against Real, it was obvious that Xabi Alonso tried to exploit their attacking tendencies by hitting diagonal balls in behind them for the wingers to get onto. Guardiola might be wary of this threat – both from the wingers and the front two moving into wide positions (Rooney enjoyed getting into the space behind Ashley Cole against Chelsea recently) and tell them to stay back. Then again, he wants width from that position in order for the front three can narrow and link up.

Much of this might depend on whether Barcelona shift from their 4-3-3 to a 3-4-3, with Busquets dropping into the back. This seems logical - Guardiola only generally asks his players to do this against 4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1 systems, where there’s a clear front two and Busquets moving deep helps Barca get out of the ‘natural’ press of the opposition, which will probably be the case here. That would obviously allows the full-backs to move higher up the pitch without fear of leaving the wide areas exposed.

Iniesta

The key man in this game is Iniesta. He was superb in 2009 – Rooney called him ‘the best player in the world’ after that match.

Iniesta is in the nice position of being up against Michael Carrick. No offence intended to Carrick, but if he is deployed as United’s deepest midfielder, he’ll be asked to keep it tight between the lines to prevent Messi getting space, and possibly told to try and intercept any passes intended for the Barcelona No 10 too. Therefore, whilst Carrick would naturally be closing down Iniesta, he might not be able to. What happens if Iniesta moves deeper? Or moves to the left? Assuming United’s right-back is focused on dealing with Barcelona’s left-winger, it’s difficult to see how Iniesta wouldn’t go free and be allowed too much time on the ball.

If he moves left, it might even allow Barca to shift to something like their 4-2-4ish ‘plan B’ from last season, although sporadically rather than permanently. This would also mean Xavi would move deeper and get space away from Giggs, and could cause United real problems in the centre of the pitch.

Barcelona will surely dominate possession, and therefore creating chances depends on different things for either side. Barcelona need to play through-balls accurately and the forwards must time their runs well, whilst United need to be quick and decisive at transitions between defence and attack, to bypass Barcelona’s initial and expose their defence high up the pitch.

北极海

ZM的分析非常到位，感谢90兄

和两年前的决赛相比，两队都发生了很多变化，两年前弗莱彻的停赛对曼联造成了很大的影响
而今年的决赛虽然弗莱彻没有停赛的限制，却由于长期的伤病而很难获得首发的机会

还有35个小时45分钟比赛就将来到，气氛越来越紧张了...

Alex2011

261楼参考译文
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无人料理布斯克斯：回顾09年欧冠决赛10大战术点（下）
phyth (9级) 2011-05-26 21:49

继续我们上次对2009年冠军联赛在巴塞罗那和曼彻斯特联队之间的决赛的分析。我们主要的课题是讨论曼联的战术——因为他们输掉了上次的决赛，所以这次他们需要纠正自己的错误。


当梅西为巴萨顶入第二枚进球时候双方的阵型。

6. 无人处理塞尔吉奥-布斯克斯

吉格斯在上次的交锋中担当了中路进攻型中场的角色，或者我们也可以说，是一个后撤的前锋——在中场之前却明显在克里斯蒂阿诺-罗纳尔多的身后。他的任务是连接中前场的运动，基本上相当于一个正统10号——而曼联的防守任务则基本上交给了两条分别由四人组成的后场和中场，吉格斯则负责对对方中后卫施加压力。

但这种打法忽视了布斯克斯的存在。吉格斯甚至没有尝试去逼抢他，导致布斯克斯能够轻松自如地控球。两个赛季之前，当布斯克斯刚刚显露头角的时候，他还只是丫丫-图雷的替补而不是常规的一线队员，所以我们并不了解他在巴萨的传球游戏中的重要地位。现在他的角色大家都了如指掌——曼联不会再犯同样的错误。假设哈维尔-埃尔南德兹在场，那么韦恩-鲁尼将必须在无球的时候负责看守布斯克斯。

7. 曼联没有利用巴塞罗那在左后卫位置的弱点。

2009年的时候希尔维尼奥草草地进入了决赛以填补左后卫的位置。他那时已经35岁，不复当年之勇，并且在决赛之后离队加入了曼城。曼联应该在那时针对他展开进攻，利用他缓慢的步伐和他老化的防守能力。但他们做的，确是让朴智星在右路活动。朴智星可能是曼联四位进攻球员（罗纳尔多、吉格斯和鲁尼）中能力最弱的，而且当时他的进攻威胁可能并没有现在这么高。

希尔维尼奥早就不在巴萨了。那么这件事情还有关系吗？尽管巴萨在两年内签下了两名左后卫，马克思韦尔和阿德里阿诺，左后卫还是巴萨最弱的一环。不管谁在那个位置，他们都有相应的缺点——阿比达尔还没有完全恢复，普约尔并不擅长这个位置，马克思韦尔和阿德里阿诺则根本不是最优秀的球员。两周前安东尼奥-瓦伦西亚在场上完全压制住了阿什利-科尔，现在也应该使用类似的方法来应对巴萨——让他们进行一对一的战斗，曼联将可能会赢取胜利。

8. 伊涅斯塔给曼联制造了相当大的麻烦

我们都清楚迈克-卡里克不是一个经典的破坏型球员，所以他时常会在面对创造性中场的时候屡露窘态。但即使他向来表现如此，面对伊涅斯塔的时候，他的应对之策却显得更要糟糕。伊涅斯塔能够不停在卡里克身边取得突破的空间和机会而没有一丝来自他的阻碍。

今年会有什么不一样吗？我们不知道。回望2009年的决赛，很多对位性质的一对一较量都不复存在，但卡里克和伊涅斯塔是一对还在场的对位组合。卡里克也许需要更加紧绷起他的神经——但这样也许会给梅西造成更多的空间和机会，这样一名中后卫则需要向前压上而丢掉自己的位置。

9. 弗格森的最大失误是他的换人选择

如果弗格森的开场战术不算糟糕的话，他的换人策略则一塌糊涂。他的战术选择即便在那个时候也是非常天真的——曼联需要一粒进球，于是他换下中场球员，而换上更多的前锋。第一次换人是在中场的时候，特维兹换下了安德森，这个时候吉格斯后撤和卡里克一起负责覆盖中场后部的区域。令人担心的是，曼联的中场马上就被巴萨牢牢地控制住了（我们要考虑吉格斯和卡里克的组合很有可能会是周六的首发）。

当贝尔巴托夫换下朴智星的时候，事情则变得更为糟糕——在那个时刻，曼联已经在中场奋力挣扎，而这次换人则对曼联的流动性造成了难以想象的麻烦。在周六的比赛里，第一粒进球将是至关重要的，如果巴萨获得了全场的第一次进球，曼联将不能再放弃中场——巴萨会通过传球带领他们走向胜利。

10. 巴萨球队并没有像现在这样高度整合

巴萨的队伍比起2009年基本没有什么变化，但他们和当初获得三冠王的队伍在品质上则有了新的发展和变化。现在他们可能是配合更加严密的一支队伍。在2009的决赛中，他们拥有的是由于禁赛而临时组建的后卫线，而三叉戟也不是在他们习惯的位置上，他们的队伍里还有亨利和埃托奥，两个人比起佩德罗和比利亚都是更加个人主义的前锋。中场的三人也许是他们一贯整合的搭配，但那个时候布斯克斯还不是巴萨的先发球员，所以他们那时的配合一定赶不上现在的水平。

简而言之，巴塞罗那现在变得更加难以击败。他们现在拥有更好的控球能力——场均73.3%的控球率，而在2009年，这个数据还是65.6%。在2009年决赛的时候巴萨只拥有51%的控球率——而这次，他们的控球时间超过60%应该是件非常正常的事情。他们在无球状态下的整体运作比以前则更加出色，我们可以从他们的防守数据中看出来。现在他们的风格更加集体主义，拥有着更加明确的巴塞罗那的个性——而在我们观看2009年决赛的时候，他们有点不太那么像我们认识的巴塞罗那。那么结论是什么呢？曼彻斯特联队不能只是简单的去纠正他们在2009年犯下的错而自然而然地获得比赛的控制权——他们这次面对的是一只非常不同的猛兽。

Alex2011

Lessons from the 2009 final (part two)
May 26, 2011


The line-ups at the time of Barcelona's second goal - Berbatov and Tevez had come on for Anderson and Park

A continuation of the earlier conclusions from the 2009 Champions League final between Barcelona and Manchester United.

The majority of points are, of course, related to Manchester United’s tactics – since they lost that final, and have to put things right this time around.

6. Sergio Busquets wasn’t ‘occupied’

Ryan Giggs was asked to play as a central attacking midfielder, or perhaps a deep forward – playing ahead of the midfield line but clearly behind Cristiano Ronaldo. His job was to link the play, almost as a number ten – and United generally defended with two banks of four, with Giggs given the task of helping press the opposition centre-backs.

That ignored Busquets, however. Giggs didn’t even attempt to close him down, and Busquets had too much time on the ball. Two seasons ago, with Busquets in his debut season, a back-up for Yaya Toure and not a regular in the first team, we didn’t understand how crucial he is to Barcelona’s passing game. Now, it’s perfectly clear – and United can’t make the same mistake again. Assuming Javier Hernandez plays, Wayne Rooney must be given the job of picking Busquets up when not in possession.

7. Manchester United didn’t exploit Barcelona’s weakness at left-back

Sylvinho was drafted into the side to play left-back in 2009. He was 35, his best days long gone, and was allowed to leave for Manchester City after the final. United should have attacked him, tested his lack of pace and his defensive qualities, but instead they played Park Ji-Sung on the right. Park was probably the weakest of United’s four attacking players (Ronaldo, Giggs, Rooney) and was arguably less of an attacking threat then than he is now.

Is this relevant this year? Sylvinho is long gone, but despite signing two left-backs in two years, Maxwell and Adriano, it’s still Barcelona’s weakest position. Whoever plays there will have a weakness – Eric Abidal will not be 100% fit, Carles Puyol will be out of position, Maxwell and Adriano are simply not particularly great players. Antonio Valencia dominated Ashley Cole a couple of weeks ago and should be used in a similar way here – get him in 1 v 1 battles, and United might prosper.

8. United had serious problems with Andres Iniesta

We all know that Michael Carrick is not a classic destroyer and often struggles when coming up against creative midfielders. However, even by his standards, he found it very difficult to cope with Iniesta, who was constantly able to glide past Carrick very easily.

It’s difficult to know what will change here. Look at the individual battles in the 2009 final, and relatively few are set for a re-match here – but Carrick v Iniesta is one of them. Carrick probably needs to get tighter – but that will mean Messi potentially going free, and one of the centre-backs having to play higher up.

9. Ferguson’s biggest mistake was with his substitutions

If Ferguson’s starting tactics weren’t shocking, his use of his bench was. He opted for an approach that, frankly, seemed remarkably naive even at the time – he needed a goal, so withdrew midfielders and threw on extra attackers. The first move was at half time – Carlos Tevez came on for Anderson, with Ryan Giggs dropping into a deep midfield position alongside Michael Carrick. Worryingly, for United (considering Giggs-Carrick is likely to be the starting midfield duo on Saturday), they were immediately overrun in midfield.

Things got even worse when Park gave way to Berbatov – United were already struggling for energy in midfield, and it’s difficult to think of a worse possible substitution if we’re talking about mobility. The first goal will be all-important on Saturday, but if Barcelona score it, United can’t afford to concede the midfield again – Barca will just pass their way to victory.

10. Barcelona were not as cohesive as they are now

This is largely the same side as in 2009, and whilst they may not be regarded as having the same quality as they did when the won the treble, they are probably a tighter unit. In the 2009 final, the backline was makeshift because of suspension, the forward trio were playing in slightly unusual positions, and also had Thierry Henry and Samuel Eto’o: great players but probably more individualistic than Pedro Rodriguez or David Villa. The midfield three were the only truly cohesive part of the side – and even then, Busquets wasn’t a regular. Therefore, that trio didn’t have the experience of playing together it does now.

Put simply, Barcelona are much more difficult to play against. They hold onto the ball better – an average of 73.3% possession per game this season, compared to to 65.6% in 2009. They only had 51% of possession in the 2009 final – it would be a surprise if that figure wasn’t above 60% here, at the very least. They also work better as a unit without the ball, and their defensive record is much better. There is simply more of a collective feel, more of a defined identity about Barcelona – watch the 2009 final and they just don’t seem so…Barcelona.

The outcome? Manchester United can’t just correct any mistakes from 2009 and automatically be in control – they’re up against a different beast altogether.

Alex2011

伪9号梅西制造混乱：回顾09年欧冠决赛10大战术点(上)
2011-05-26 / phyth


首发阵容

既然这个赛季的冠军联赛决赛和2009如出一辙，那么我们就值得在周六的比赛之前复习一遍两队之前的交锋。

以下是从上次交锋中得到的五点结论——另外五点将会在下次和比赛前瞻一起发布。

1. 曼彻斯特联队在比赛早期出色地向前压迫

“我没有想到曼联压得这么上，”佩普-瓜迪奥拉赛后提到。“他们在前场用4人来压迫我们的4人防线，给我们的第一传带来了很多问题。”压迫的效果非常好——曼联逼迫维克托 -巴尔德斯在第15秒的时候犯错从而赢得了一个界外球。在接下来的10分钟内他们几乎一直在巴塞罗那的半场，并且尝试了五次射门。

巴萨的进球有战术上的原因——埃托奥在右路首发，而梅西位居中央——但更主要的要怪罪到个人失误上。迈克-卡里克让伊涅斯塔带球超过了他，维迪奇被轻松得晃倒，埃德文-范德萨的扑救也让人失望。曼联在这场比赛中的开场表现非常强大，但是他们因为个人失误——而非战术失误——而落后。

2. 巴塞罗那没有进行强烈的前压

现在我们都习惯了巴萨在对方半场的高位前压，但这场比赛里曼联的中后卫们有充足的时间来控制足球。埃托奥和蒂埃里-亨利的经常性主动后撤让巴萨在无球状态下更像是4-1-4-1的阵型。这种阵型现在很难看到，只是当他们在受到持续压迫的状态下才会发生。

这次的比赛应该不会出现类似的情况——佩德罗和大卫-比利亚在无球状态下更加勤奋，而费迪南德和维迪奇将会更早快地感受到压迫和干扰。

3. 迈克-卡里克在有球时处理得相对不错

尽管人们认为他在罗马的表现如同噩梦一般，但卡里克其实是唯一一个在尝试让曼联全队运转良好的球员。好吧，他有几个直塞力度过大，他有些对角线长传力度不够，但是最主要的问题不在卡里克身上——问题在于在曼联在前场失去了创造力，所以卡里克被迫成为了队中的主司令塔。

现在卡里克的球队任务更加简单。他的传球距离越来越短，因为找他要求的边路球员在场上的位置产生了变化。2009年的时候，韦恩-鲁尼和（下半场的时候）克里斯蒂亚诺-罗纳尔多在边路的时候，他们更喜欢去要直塞到他们奔跑方向前面的球。现在，安东尼奥和朴智星的位置则是更加经典的中场边路，而不是前锋，卡里克只需要完成传脚下球的任务。哪怕是在被逼迫的情况下，他应该也没有问题完成这种简单的动作。

4. 中路的梅西在2009年是意料之外——而现在，这是常态

正如之前提到的，这一点和第一个进球有一定的关系。同时也导致梅西顶入哈维传给他的那一球。令人惊奇的是梅西的伪9号位给曼联制造了如此的混乱，而且他们也完全没有对这种局势产生应对的策略。比如，在上半场的后期，梅西后撤到稍微中间偏右的位置，而埃弗拉则向前跑位对梅西进行逼抢，以为梅西还是一名右边锋。这其实是一名中后卫应该做的事情，或者也可以由一名中场球员来执行。

梅西的中路位置现在已经完全建立——上个赛季他经常在伪9号位置活动，而这个赛季他的默认角色则是传统的10号位。这并不说明他可以很容易被制止，因为大家还不清楚应该如何去防他，是应该使用一名中场球员，还是一名防线球员，还是完全采用区域防守——不管怎样，曼联都不会像2009年一样混乱了。

5. 达尼-阿尔维斯当时不在场上

在对切尔西的比赛中吃牌停赛之后，阿尔维斯只能在观众席上观看当年的决赛。卡莱斯-普约尔被迫代替他作为右后卫，从而理所当然的踢得比阿尔维斯更具防守性。

我们可以从两个方向来看这件事情。一方面，曼联对他在边线附近从后方向前进行的充满活力的奔跑并不适应。他们将会让自己的左方边路球员（可能会是朴智星）密切注意阿尔维斯可能制造的危险。另一方面，巴塞罗那在边路有相当的回撤——特别是鲁尼在09年被看守得相对安静，而让罗纳尔多在中路则成为了曼联的主要威胁。瓜迪奥拉吩咐过他的边后卫在对付皇家马德里的时候留守后方，用以防止长距离的斜传来抓住巴萨的空荡。考虑到这一战术（或者不是战术而只是意外）在2009年面对曼联的时候效果不错，也许瓜迪奥拉还会采用同样的策略。

Alex2011

Lessons from the 2009 final (part one)
May 25, 2011


The starting line-ups

As this season’s Champions League final is a repeat of the final from 2009, it’s well worth taking a look at that contest before Saturday night’s game.

The footage, if you’re interested, is available on YouTube here (with the following parts on the links down the right-hand side).

Here are five conclusions from that match – five more (plus the usual preview) to come.

1. Manchester United pressed excellently early on

“I didn’t expect Manchester (United) to press up so high up,” Pep Guardiola said after the game. “They pressed 4 v 4 and caused us problems for the first pass.” This worked really well – United forced Victor Valdes into a mistake within the first 15 seconds of the match, won a throw, and then spent almost the entire first ten minutes in the Barcelona half, attempting five shots in that time.

There was a tactical factor to the Barca goal – the surprise of Samuel Eto’o starting on the right, and Lionel Messi in the centre – but it was more down to individual mistakes. Michael Carrick let Andres Iniesta drift past him, Nemanja Vidic was turned far too easily, and Edwin van der Sar will have been disappointed with his effort for the goal. United started the match very strongly, and they went behind due to individual – not tactical – errors.

2. Barcelona didn’t press intensely

We’re used to Barca closing down high up the pitch these days, but in this match Manchester United’s centre-backs were given a fair amount of time on the ball. Eto’o and Thierry Henry dropped back and Barcelona often looked willingly like 4-1-4-1 without the ball, which is relatively rare these days – it only happens when they’re under sustained pressure.

It’s unlikely to be a similar situation in this game – Pedro Rodriguez and David Villa work much harder without the ball, and Rio Ferdinand and Nemanja Vidic will come under pressure much more quickly.

3. Michael Carrick played reasonably well on the ball

Often remembered as having a nightmare in Rome, Carrick was the only player who was really attempting to get United playing. OK, a couple of his through-balls were overhit, a couple of his long diagonals were underhit, but the problem wasn’t really Carrick, as such – the problem was that there was no creativity from higher up the pitch, so Carrick had to act as the main playmaker.

Nowadays, Carrick plays a much simpler game. His passes are shorter because he plays with wide players who like the ball in different positions – with Wayne Rooney and (in the second half of the 2009 final) Cristiano Ronaldo on the flanks in 2009, they wanted to run onto the ball in advanced positions. Now, with Antonio Valencia and Park Ji-Sung more classic wide midfielders rather than forwards, Carrick can do his job by playing simple balls into feet. Even when under pressure, he should be able to do that fine.

4. Messi in the centre was the surprise in 2009 – now, it’s the norm

This played its part in the first goal, as outlined earlier, and in the second, when Messi headed in Xavi Hernandez’s cross. It’s amazing how confused United were about Messi’s false nine positioning, and how they don’t react to the situation at all. Late in the first half, for example, Messi drops into a deep slightly right-of-centre position, and Patrice Evra comes high up the pitch to close him down – as if he was still used to Messi playing as a right-sided forward. It should have been the domain of one of the centre-backs, or one of the central midfielders.

Messi’s central positioning is now established – he played there for much of last season, and this campaign the number ten position is his default role. That doesn’t mean he’ll be easy to stop, and there are still question marks about whether it’ll be a midfielder picking him up, a defender picking him up, or a purely zonal system – but it won’t be as chaotic as in 2009.

5. Daniel Alves wasn’t playing

Suspended after being booked in the semi-final against Chelsea, Alves watched on from the stands. Carles Puyol was forced to play at right-back instead, and naturally played a much more defensive role than Alves would have.

There’s two ways to look at this. On one hand, United aren’t used to his energetic runs from deep positions down the touchlines, and will need to make sure their left-winger (probably Park Ji-Sung) is alert to the danger. On the other, Barcelona were down the flanks – Rooney was quiet, in particular, and Ronaldo in his centre-forward position was the main danger. Guardiola instructed his full-backs to sit deep against Real Madrid to prevent the diagonal balls catching Barca out, and considering that (possibly accidental) tactic also worked well against United in 2009, he might opt for the same strategy here.

Alex2011

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