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【10-11 ZM专贴】280L:替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

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201#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:48:18 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-27 11:50 编辑

Schalke 0-2 Manchester United: Schalke torn apart by United’s passing and movement
April 26, 2011


The starting line-ups

Manchester United were superior throughout the 90 minutes and could have won by a much greater margin.
Ralf Rangnick was without Benedikt Höwedes at the back, which meant Joel Matip had to play at centre-back. Other than that, it was the expected team in the expected formation.

Sir Alex Ferguson omitted Nani to play Antonio Valencia on the right, and played Fabio behind him. The side was the same as the XI that started against Chelsea, with the exception of one Brazilian twin in for the other.

Manchester United dominated the game from start to finish – better at the back, always in charge in midfield, and creative in the final third. The only poor aspect of their performance was their finishing – though credit is due to Manuel Neuer for a fine first half performance. He was only holding back the tide, however, and United’s goals duly arrived midway through the second period.

With little change in the pattern of play throughout the game (with the slight exception of when Rangnick replaced Alexander Baumjohann with Peer Kluge towards the beginning of the second half and Schalke briefly competed in midfield) there’s no real reason to review the game chronologically. Instead, here’s a look at what Schalke did badly, and what United did well.

Schalke errors

(a) Not compact enough

This was Schalke’s biggest problem. The concept of being ‘compact’ from back to front is widely established in top-level modern football. It doesn’t matter whether a team presses high up the pitch or uses a deep defensive line – the gap from the defence to attack shouldn’t be stretched. Arrigo Sacchi famously wanted a distance of no more than 25 metres in this respect, and Rafael Benitez – a self-confessed Sacchi disciple – is another who encourages his sides to be compact.

This idea seemed to completely escape Schalke in this match, however, as Kyriakos Papadopoulos would often become stranded in front of his own defence, with a huge distance between Schalke’s back five and the rest of the side. The three attacking midfielders tended to jog back, meaning United found gaps between the lines and were able to play.

(b) Allowing Carrick to play

Michael Carrick is a player who divides opinion, but it’s widely established that there’s a huge difference in his performance level when he’s left free, and when he’s closed down in possession. Carrick has a good passing range but needs time and space to pick his passes, and Schalke stood off him, allowing him (and Giggs) to dictate play in the midfield zone.


Carrick's passes

In previous games Raul had been very good at dropping onto the opposition holding midfielder and preventing them from passing, but Carrick moved slightly higher up the pitch into a position Raul didn’t want to drop into. He completed more passes than any other player, and also covered the furthest distance.

(c) Using only one holder

This was a good advert for the use of a ‘double pivot’ in midfield. Jurado was slack in his defensive duties – he didn’t drop in alongside Papadopoulos quickly enough (and nor did he press higher up the pitch). This meant that Wayne Rooney could move from side to side and drag Papadopoulos around the pitch, opening up space for midfield runners.

(d) Not patient enough in possession

Against Inter, Schalke could play the ball out wide to their full-backs, who were in space and could bring the ball forward. Here, they didn’t have the luxury of ‘free’ players, and so had to try to move up the pitch as a unit. Their passing meant that this wasn’t possible, though – they played forward passes too quickly and couldn’t retain the ball up top.

What Manchester United did well

(a) Pinning back the Schalke full-backs

It’s the usual Manchester United strategy in Europe, but Park and Valencia had excellent games defensively. Atsuto Uchida and Hans Sarpei tried to get forward to stretch the play and provide width, but were rarely in the game and Schalke had to try play forward passes, which were frequently unsuccessful.

(b) Exploiting space between the lines

Schalke were bad in this respect, but United still had to take advantage. Rooney’s movement dragged his marker around and this opened up space in front of the defence for Giggs and Park Ji-Sung to run into. Park spent much of the game coming inside, similar to his movement at the start of the season, whilst Giggs’ bursts forward were reserved but well-timed – particularly in the case of his goal, but he also had other goalscoring chances.

(c) Getting behind the ball quickly

A basic tenet of their game, but United’s (new?) 4-4-1-1 shape was particularly obvious here. The defence sat quite deep, Carrick and Giggs occupied space rather than individual players in front, and the wide players tracked the full-backs. With Rooney dropping in to pressure Schalke in the middle of the pitch, United were disciplined in the rare spells Schalke held onto the ball.

(d) Intelligent passing from midfield

Again, Schalke helped United hugely by standing off, but United used the ball intelligently. Carrick was clearly the main man – his passing was reliable, but also varied. He played short sideways passes, incisive forward balls, and long diagonals out to the flanks. Rooney was also impressive with his passing – he moved away from Papadopoulos to get time on the ball, and then moved play from flank to flank.

Conclusion

Schalke terrible or United fantastic? With such a one-sided performance it’s often hard to tell, but if we’re focusing on tactics – which, of course, we are – it has to be marked down as Schalke being woeful. It’s rare to see a top-level side leaving such huge space between the lines, even rarer to see such little defensive effort from half the outfield players. Losing 0-2 flattered Schalke.

That might seem harsh on United – and the obvious question would be, “If Schalke are so bad, how come Valencia and Inter didn’t carve them apart?” To which the answer is, “They did.” Inter scored two goals in the first leg as well (the Italians were just desperately awful at the back and managed to concede five goals), whilst Valencia created constant opportunities and managed to waste them – much like United did in the first half here. As Unai Emery said after that game, “We had four chances and we don’t take any. We’ve been knocked out unjustly, we’ve missed an opportunity with everything in our favour. It was a game where we had more chances and we lost.” It’s a long way back for Schalke.
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202#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:51:03 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-28 13:43 编辑

201楼参考译文

----------------------------

2011-04-27 / 余文乐



曼联全场压制对手,他们本可以以更大的比分获胜的。

朗尼克手下缺少了霍维德斯,所以马蒂普不得不出现在了中卫的位置上。除此之外,沙尔克基本是最强阵容出战。

弗格森爵士没有用纳尼,他让瓦伦西亚和法比奥搭档右路。这个阵容和对阵切尔西的首发完全一样,只是右后卫位置上用法比奥代替了拉斐尔(译注:视觉上完全没有区别=。=)

曼联从一开始就掌控了比赛,直到终场。他们后防稳健,中场牢牢控制,前场创造力丰富。唯一不足的地方就是临门一脚,虽然主要原因是诺伊尔上半场的神级发挥。然而,他无法改变趋势,曼联的进球还是在下半场的中段适时的到来了。

这场比赛的形势基本没有变化(除了克林格换下鲍姆约翰之后中场的短暂均势),我们没有理由继续按时间顺序去分析这场比赛。这次,我们分别看看沙尔克的不足和曼联的长处。

沙尔克的错误

(a) 阵型不够紧凑

这是沙尔克最大的问题。阵型“紧凑”这个概念在现在的顶级足球已经很普遍了。这个与球队阵型前压还是收缩防守没有关系,攻防两线的距离不要被拉大就可以了萨基曾有名言,他说这个距离不能超过25米。而公认的萨基粉丝贝尼特斯也另一个保持阵型紧凑的提倡者。

然而这次比赛沙尔克完全没有这个概念。因为帕帕多普洛斯经常会在防线手足无措,后防五人组和其他球员的距离非常的大。那3名前腰喜欢散着步回防,这让曼联在两线之间找到空间并加以利用。

(b) 对卡里克放任自由

卡里克是一个充满争议的球员。让他自由发挥和让他在压迫下发挥,表现有着非常大的不同。卡里克的传球覆盖范围很大,但他需要时间和空间去完成传球,而沙尔克完全不逼抢的战略让他和吉格斯能够在中场指点江山。

在先前的比赛中,劳尔会后撤去逼抢对手的后腰,让他们不能舒服的出球。但卡里克稍微向前压了一点,而劳尔并不愿意后撤如此之深。他完成了全队最多的传球,而且也覆盖了最远的距离。

(c) 单后腰

这是双后腰战术的最佳广告。胡拉多经常不能及时回到帕帕多普洛斯旁边放手(也不在前场逼抢)。这让鲁尼带着帕帕多普洛斯在两条边线上来回移动,为后上的中场扯开空间。

(d) 没有耐心保持控球

对国米的时候,沙尔克能够把传给空位的边后卫,往前推进拉开宽度。但这场比赛,他们没有这种‘空位’的球员,所以必须尝试整体推进。但是他们的传球让这种尝试无法实现。他们太快就送出直传,而没有尽可能的保持控球。

曼联的成功之处

(a) 压制沙尔克的边后卫

这是曼联欧战时的常规战术,但朴智星和瓦伦西亚在防守端的表现真的非常好。内田笃人和萨尔佩尝试向前助攻为队友的进攻提供宽度,但这场无法施展,沙尔克只能尝试通过直传寻找机会,但是通常是不成功的。

(b) 利用对手两线之间的空间

虽然沙尔克自己表现糟糕,但是曼联还是需要加以利用才能获利。鲁尼的移动使得他的盯防者到处跑,这让吉格斯和朴智星有机会上前助攻。朴智星大部分时间都在内切,这很像他在赛季初时候的安排。而吉格斯的前插选择很谨慎的但是他的时机把握得非常的好,尤其是他的那个进球。但他也有其他的进球机会。

(c) 及时回防

这是他们的一个基本原则,但是他们的(新)4411阵型已经初现端倪。防线撤得比较后。卡里克和吉格斯共同覆盖空间而不是各自为战。边路球员跟对手的边后卫。鲁尼后撤,在中场压迫对手,曼联在沙尔克仅有的控球时间表现了良好的战术纪律。

(d) 中场聪明的传球

沙尔克的不压迫方针给了曼联巨大的帮助,但曼联用球也非常聪明。卡里克是关键,他的传球非常可靠,但同样是多变的。他短传,他直塞,他大脚转移。鲁尼的传球同样让人印象深刻-他摆脱帕帕多普洛斯的防守并得到拿球的时间,然后把皮球转移到两边。



结论

是沙尔克太糟糕还是曼联太劲爆?这么一边倒的比赛通常都是很难判断的,但如果我们把焦点放在战术上(当然我们就是这样的=。=),必须是沙尔克太糟糕。很少会见到顶级水平的比赛会在两线之间有这么巨大的空间,更加难以看到的是半数球员都如此不愿防守。只输两球真是太幸运了。

这对曼联来说可能有点不公平,但问题也很直白:“如果沙尔克真的那么差,为什么巴伦西亚和国际米兰都没能做到撕开他们的防线?”答案是:“他们做到了。”国际米兰在第一回合同样打进了两个进球(意大利球队是在后防极其失策而丢掉五个球的)。而巴伦西亚创造了无数的机会然后又把他们浪费掉了,这很像上半场的曼联。就像埃梅里上半场所说的那样:“我们有四个机会但我们一个都没抓住。我们被淘汰很冤枉,我们错过了一个完美的机会。那场比赛我们有着更多的机会但是我们输了” 沙尔克要追平的话,真的很难了。
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203#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-27 12:03:52 | 只看该作者
曼联这两个进球都是中路的突破所致,而不是之前边路传中,中路抢点所致,沙尔克防了曼联这一招,却防不了这最致命的一招。在这一点上,曼联像极了巴萨,仅仅是这一点上,曼联推进速度极快。

但是曼联本场从后场长传到前场,鲜有成功的
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204#
发表于 2011-4-27 12:25:21 | 只看该作者
ZM对卡里克的评论还是比较到位的

卡里克一直令人非常矛盾,出彩的时候他是一个很好的中场屏障+节拍器,不逊布斯克茨

但也是一个定时炸弹,而且他的位置一旦引爆,造成失分的可能很大

而且不是一次两次了
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205#
发表于 2011-4-27 12:35:25 | 只看该作者
纳尼都做替补,曼联把鲁尼、小豌豆、吉格斯、朴智星用到极至。那个25号也不错,双胞胎都上了吗,看直播没有分清楚。

因为曼联光开花不结果,以至于下半场开始10分钟左右没有怎么好好看,第一个进球时,偶还错过了第一时间
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206#
发表于 2011-4-27 12:43:15 | 只看该作者
纳尼都做替补,曼联把鲁尼、小豌豆、吉格斯、朴智星用到极至。那个25号也不错,双胞胎都上了吗,看直播没有分清楚。

因为曼联光开花不结果,以至于下半场开始10分钟左右没有怎么好好看,第一个进球时,偶还错过了第 ...
pedro 发表于 2011-4-27 12:35


拉斐尔的伤还没有好利索,这场没有出场
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207#
发表于 2011-4-28 06:23:03 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2011-4-28 06:25 编辑

Real Madrid v Barcelona: tactical preview
April 27, 2011


Probable line-ups for this game

The third Clasico in twelve days presents the two managers with more selection problems.

Team news

There are some crucial absentees for this match. Barcelona captain Carles Puyol is back, but with Maxwell, Adriano and Eric Abidal all unavailable, Barcelona are without a recognised left-back. This means that, after being desperate for so long to get Puyol back in the side for his pace at centre-back, Pep Guardiola is probably going to have to use him at left-back, with Javier Mascherano in the centre of defence.

Andres Iniesta is also out – another big blow for Barcelona, and one that prevents Guardiola dropping one of his forwards to give Iniesta a place in the front three, which was a possibility. Seydou Keita will probably come into the side on the left side of the midfield triangle.

Jose Mourinho is also without two key players. Sami Khedira, who has been excellent in recent weeks, will miss out through injury, whilst Ricardo Carvalho is suspended after picking up a booking against Tottenham. Lassana Diarra is the natural replacement for Khedira, whilst Raul Albiol should come into the side at centre-back, with Sergio Ramos alongside him, and Alvaro Arbeloa at right-back.

Selection decisions

Injury problems mean there are fewer choices for both managers. Guardiola may have considered pushing Iniesta forward and using Mascherano and Sergio Busquets together in midfield, whilst Mourinho would have had a decision to make at the back about Ramos, able to play at either right-back or centre-back.


The starting line-ups in the recent league game

With Guardiola’s first XI very likely to be the one on the right, it is Mourinho who must make a decision about which forwards to play. His shape has varied in the previous two Clasicos, but he’ll essentially use three central midfielders and three attackers. Karim Benzema started the recent league meeting, but in the Copa del Rey Cristiano Ronaldo started as the main forward, with Angel di Maria on the left and Mesut Ozil on the right. That trio seems likely to start again here, and whilst there have been rumours that Ozil will be deployed at some point as a ‘false nine’, Ronaldo is the more natural striker, and has both pace over the top to threaten Barca’s backline, as well as the aerial power that was their downfall in the Copa del Rey final.

Overall strategies

Mourinho used completely different tactics in the recent league and cup meetings. In the league, his side sat behind the ball and soaked up pressure throughout the game, whilst in the cup he used Xabi Alonso deeper in a 4-1-4-1, and told Pepe and Khedira to get into the faces of Iniesta, Busquets and Xavi. It remains to be seen which approach he’ll use here, but the latter seems more appropriate for this game at the Bernabeu. Why? First, Real rested players at the weekend, so should be in a fit condition to press Barcelona throughout the game. Second, Mourinho’s strategy at the same stage of this competition last year (with Inter) was to attack at home, and then defend away. If he’s going for a mix-and-match strategy throughout this contest, it’s surely going to be easier to press effectively at home than at the Camp Nou.

For Barcelona – well, it’s Barcelona, they play the same way all the time, don’t they? Well, not really. And especially not when Guardiola knows he’s got a battle on his hands. He’s constantly adapted his shape for tricky away games over the past year. A quick recap reveals that he played Dani Alves as a right-winger and Carles Puyol at right-back away at Real last season, he switched to a three-man defence at Atletico, did the same at Valencia, and used Iniesta in the front three at Villarreal. He may have another plan here. A back three is highly unlikely since he has no-one who could reasonably play as a left wing-back, so any changes will be more incremental. With Iniesta out and the midfield looking more secure than usual, Guardiola may push Dani Alves even higher up the pitch, as he did against Sevilla, or switch the way the front three operates.

Key areas


The starting line-ups in the recent cup game

It seems silly to question Lionel Messi’s performances in any way, but in the Copa del Rey final, Barcelona struggled upfront (with David Villa and Pedro Rodriguez out of form) as Messi dropped so deep into the midfield. This was the knock-on effect of Real’s pressing, of course – Xavi and Iniesta didn’t have time on the ball to create, so Messi had to come very short to pick up the ball. He’s more than handy with the ball at his feet, but he’s also Barca’s main goal threat, and Guardiola may want him to play higher up the pitch.

Puyol is not used to playing at full-back, but he’s not alien to it either – in fact, at the Bernabeu last year Guardiola deliberately started him at right-back, and then switched him to left-back at half time. The major worry for Barcelona is still the centre-back pairing, both in terms of pace and in the air. Real will try and expose Barcelona at the back as often as possible.

Pepe is arguably the key player. He was excellent in the holding role in the league, and then equally impressive when pushed further forward in the cup. The physical nature of him and Diarra will attempt to overpower Barcelona in the centre – so Keita may actually come in handy.

Barcelona looked better in the cup final when they played with more width – particularly when Pedro started in wide positions and then moved inside to meet through balls. Barcelona usually stretch the opposition defence well, but when Messi drops deep the 4-3-3 can become more of a 4-3-1-2 and Barcelona suddenly look very narrow if Pedro and Villa make the same run inside. Pedro is more intelligent with his movement than Villa, and must give Barcelona options when they have the ball.

Finally, transitions from defence to attack might be vital. European first legs are generally very tight – but this year, that hasn’t particularly been the case. As mentioned earlier, Mourinho attacked Barca at home in last year’s semi-final, and the 3-1 Inter win was a very open game. Both sides can be prone to counter-attacks – Barca at the back, Real when Alonso is left stranded in front of his defence, and therefore quick breaks will be in the minds of both managers.

Other links

ZM preview for Betfair
ZM article on Guardiola / Mourinho for ITV
Sid Lowe on Xavi and Xabi for the Guardian
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208#
发表于 2011-4-28 06:26:08 | 只看该作者
207楼的战术预测,对双方首发阵容,挺靠谱的
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209#
发表于 2011-4-28 18:30:02 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:17 编辑

Real Madrid 0-2 Barcelona: two goals for Messi
April 28, 2011


The starting line-ups

Lionel Messi scored a poacher’s strike and then a superb solo effort to give Barcelona a major advantage in the tie.
Jose Mourinho named his expected side – Lassana Diarra was in for Sami Khedira, whilst Raul Albiol came in for the suspended Ricardo Carvalho.

Pep Guardiola also chose the side expected in the preview. Carles Puyol returned from injury to fill in at left-back, whilst Seydou Keita replaced the injured Andres Iniesta.

The game was scrappy, dirty and not particularly pleasing on the eye. For much of the contest, the objective of both sides seemed to be to get opposition players sent off, rather than actually try to score a goal. Tactically, it wasn’t fascinating for long periods.

Real without ball

The main question before the game was how Real would play without the ball. In the league they sat back deep and let Barcelona have possession, then in the cup they pushed up, pressed and got in Barcelona’s faces. Having played much better in the cup final – a game they won – it seemed the latter would be their approach here.

They were much more conservative, however, sitting relatively deep and concentrating on nullifying Xavi. Pepe, probably the best player across the previous two contests, continued to track him across the pitch. Cristiano Ronaldo was visibly annoyed with Real’s tactics – at one point desperately trying to close down three Barcelona players, with no help from his teammate. Real were letting Barcelona play.

Barcelona possession

So, with Barcelona enjoying around 65% of possession in the first half, the game’s major issue in the was this – how could Barcelona transform their dominance of the ball into goals. They essentially had three problems to try and get around here. First, Xavi was being man-marked. Second, Iniesta wasn’t playing. Third, since Barcelona were only dangerous in the cup final when they played with width, David Villa and Pedro Rodriguez stayed very wide, making them less of a direct goal threat, whilst Messi was very deep.

Barcelona were essentially playing no centre-forward, and with Real packing the area in front of the defence with three holding midfielders, shots from long-range and interplay through the centre of the pitch were also unlikely to result in a goal. Therefore, there were three ways Barcelona stood a chance of scoring – (a) with a wide forward cutting in – as Villa did when he flashed an early shot past the post, (b) with midfield runners – what Xavi did when he had the best chance of the first half, and (c) Messi beating players to get into the box himself. That didn’t happen in the first half, but it would have a very obvious impact later on.

For their part, Real rarely threatened in the first period, aside from one moment when Valdes struggled to hold onto a long-range Ronaldo shot.


Xabi Alonso's passing was disappointing

Second half

Mourinho made a change at half time, bringing Emmanuel Adebayor on for Mesut Ozil – who completed just two passes in the first half – and pushing Ronaldo to the right of midfield. This change has been questioned in the immediate aftermath of the game, specifically the decision to bring on Adebayor over Karim Benzema and Gonzalo Higuain, but it made perfect sense – Adebayor had a very big impact in the previous two Clasicos from the bench. He was the logical choice.

Unfortunately, Real couldn’t really take advantage of his strengths. He won a long ball after 40 seconds of the first half, but generally had no support to get on the end of flick-ons. Real’s expected approach – get the ball wide, then hang up crosses (something that worked so well in the cup final) broke down before it even begun, because Xabi Alonso exerted little influence on the game, and his long balls to the flank were often wayward, as the chalkboard on the right shows.

Red card

The key moment of the game was Pepe’s red card. It meant that Real were forced to switch to a 4-4-1 shape, and had three direct consequences.

First, obviously, it meant Barcelona enjoyed even greater dominance of the ball, now with an extra man in midfield. The game was even more about Barcelona’s conversion of possession to chances.

Second, it meant that Xavi was no longer being man-marked, and he was free to move up the pitch into more attacking positions – he provided the ball out wide for substitute Ibrahim Afellay for the first goal.

Third, it meant that Alonso had to move forward slightly into a 4-4-1 and Real were now much more vulnerable between the lines, meaning Messi got more space and more time on the ball, eventually scoring both goals. It’s particularly obvious on the second goal that there is a huge gap between the two Real banks of four. Making tactical criticisms of such a wonderful goal is probably unfair, but an extra man in that zone may have stopped Messi, or at least forced his run wider before one of the defenders truly stopped him.

No Mourinho changes?

By this time, Mourinho had been sent to the stands, and it was surprising that he (or one of his coaches) didn’t choose to make a substitution after Pepe’s dismissal. There are two strands to this criticism – there’s the obvious fact that Real were now without one of their key players, someone who was widely recognised as playing an important role in stopping Xavi, and Real now faced a problem in midfield. There’s also the more simple argument that with Barcelona keeping the ball and tiring Real, some simple fresh legs may have been useful. Afellay demonstrated that on the other side.


These are the passes received (rather than played) by Lionel Messi - it's interesting how deep they are, and how rarely he picks up the ball in the final 25 yards of the pitch

Admittedly, Mourinho’s options from the bench were limited, but he could have removed one of his three forwards, put on Esteban Granero as a third central midfielder, and played no-one on the right of midfield – Carles Puyol wasn’t a huge attacking threat from left-back. That’s no criticism of Puyol (who had a great game) – merely a recognition that leaving him free at left-back would have been preferable to giving Xavi and Messi more time on the ball. It’s easy to be wise in hindsight, but making no substitutions whatsoever after the goal was a surprising decision from Mourinho, and he rather gave Guardiola and Barcelona time to assess the situation before pouncing.

Other factors

Three other points of note.

Puyol and Keita were drafted into the side as something of an emergency, but in a tough, physical game like this, their strength came in handy. Puyol and Keita are much more physically imposing players than Adriano and Iniesta, and though there was less technical quality from those positions, it didn’t turn out too badly.

Barcelona sat deeper than usual at the back, which caused Real problems. Alonso was unable to hit balls over the top of into wide positions, whilst when Ronaldo (in the first half) and Adebayor (in the second) played high up against the defence, there was a big gap between them and the midfield. On a related note, Dani Alves was very conservative.

The quality of Real’s set-pieces was dreadful. Alonso’s balls into the box were often weighted wrongly, whilst Ronaldo’s shots were usually wasteful. This seemed like Real’s best chance of scoring a goal, yet they constantly produced little.

Conclusion

There were two stages here. First, Real let Barcelona have possession, but relatively few chances were created. The second phase came after the red card to Pepe – which must go down as the turning point in the game. It freed up space for Xavi and Messi, Barcelona’s two best players, Mourinho didn’t respond, and Barcelona eventually scored two crucial goals.
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210#
发表于 2011-4-28 18:34:26 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:29 编辑

209楼参考译文
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皇家马德里0-2巴塞罗那:佩佩染红成转折 梅西两球助巴萨  
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


两队首发阵容

梅西先偷袭打进一球,接着又漂亮地以一己之力,帮助巴萨在两队的竞争中获得巨大优势。

穆里尼奥排出了我们所预期的阵型——拉斯·迪亚拉替换赫迪拉,阿尔比奥尔替换禁赛的卡瓦略。

瓜迪奥拉也排出了与前瞻里预测一致的首发。普约尔伤愈复出并任左后卫,而凯塔替换受伤的伊涅斯塔。

比赛火药味儿浓重,踢得比较脏,并不十分好看。在大部分时间里,两队的目标似乎是要将对手弄下场,而不是真正努力地去进球。从战术上说,如此长期发展下去可没什么吸引人的。

得不到球权的皇马

比赛开始前的主要问题是,皇马在无球时应该怎么办。联赛那场他们让后卫收缩,将控球权拱手让给巴萨,而在国王杯那场他们阵型提前,积极逼抢,直面巴萨进行对抗。在国王杯决赛中他们踢得要好多了——他们也赢得了这场比赛——看上去后者应该是他们本场的策略。

然而他们收缩靠后,集中精力以限制哈维的做法比上次更加保守。可能是前两场参赛球员里表现最好的佩佩,继续在场上紧盯哈维。C罗明显对皇马的策略表示不满——没有队友支援的他,一度绝望地试图破坏巴萨三名队员间的传递。皇马是在放手让巴萨去踢。

巴萨控球流

如此以来,巴萨在上半场有几乎65%的控球率,比赛中的主要问题于是变成了:巴萨如何能将他们的场面优势转化成进球。他们有3个基本难题要努力寻求解答:1、哈维被盯死;2、伊涅斯塔不在场上;3、国王杯中巴萨利用宽度时才变得有威胁,那时比利亚和佩德罗站位很靠边,使得他们对球门威胁减小,而梅西回撤得非常深。

巴萨本质上踢的无锋阵型,当皇马在后防线前筑起三后腰时,通过远射和中路渗透都不太可能获得进球。因此巴萨有3种方法可以试试,有一定的得分机会:1、边锋内切,就像比利亚开场不久擦门柱而出的那次射门;2、中场球员插上,就像哈维那次上半场最好机会的攻门;3、梅西自己过人突入禁区。这在上半场并未出现,然而在接下来的比赛中它会有明显的影响。

而在皇马这边,他们在上半场很少威胁到巴萨球门,除了那次巴尔德斯勉强扑下C罗的远射。

下半场

穆里尼奥下半场有一个换人,用阿德巴约换下厄齐尔——他上半场只传了两次球——并让C罗转移到右路。赛后人们立即质疑这次换人,特别是换上阿德巴约而不是本泽马或伊瓜因的决定,但它却是非常有道理的——在前两次国家德比中,阿德巴约的替补上场起到了很大的作用。他是个合理的选择。

但不幸的是,皇马并未真正发挥他的力量。下半场开场40秒他就接到一记长传,但没有支援的队友可让他头球摆渡一下。皇马预期的战术——分边、传中(这在国王杯那场里非常有效)在还没开始前就被破坏了,因为阿隆索没能在比赛中发挥作用,他的分边长传不够坚定,做得不力,如图所示。


阿隆索传球很糟糕

红牌

比赛的关键是佩佩的红牌。这意味着皇马不得不转型4-4-1,于是有了如下3个直接后果。

1、显而易见,中场多一人的巴萨因此占有了更高的控球率。比赛更成了巴萨把控球变成机会的这一转变过程。

2、哈维不再会被人紧盯,他能自由地提前位置,在场上更具攻击性的位置游走——是他将球分边,让替补上场的阿费莱助攻第一球。

3、阿隆索的位置得稍稍提前,以形成4-4-1的阵型,因此皇马中场和后卫间的保护变得脆弱,使得梅西有更多的空间和拿球机会,最终他打入两球。皇马两线的四名防守队员间的巨大空当,在梅西攻入的第二球上体现得尤其明显。对这样一个美妙进球进行战术评价也许有点儿不公平,不过那个区域要是能多个人的话就能阻止梅西,或者至少迫使他向侧边移动,直到一个防守队员能真正拦截他。

穆里尼奥不换人?

此时穆里尼奥被罚上看台,令人吃惊的是他(或者教练组的一员)没有针对佩佩的罚下换人。对此的批评有两个方面的考虑,一是事实很明显,皇马现在缺少了他们的一个关键球员,一个被广泛认为是对限制哈维非常重要的队员,皇马的中场面临难关。二是一个更简单的原因,现在巴萨控球并以此消耗皇马的体力,换上体力充沛的替补会有作用,另一侧的阿费莱就证明了这一点。

确实穆里尼奥能选用的替补也有限,但他能换下三个前场之一,换上格拉内罗作为第三中场,在中场右路不设点——在左后卫位置的普约尔不是个很大的威胁。这不是在批评普约尔(他踢得很好),单单只是分析结果——放他在左后卫不管,比给哈维和梅西更多拿球的时间要好得多。事后诸葛亮总是容易的,但穆里尼奥在丢球后不换人的决定无论如何都令人意外,而且他还给了瓜迪奥拉和巴萨时间来分析局势以便猛攻。


梅西接到的传球路线图,很有趣的,这些传球位置回撤很深,而梅西很少在距离球门25码处拿球

其他因素

3个其他因素值得一提:

普约尔和凯塔本来是救急之用,然而在本场这般激烈、充满身体对抗的比赛中,他们的力量有了用武之地。普约尔和凯塔比阿德里亚诺和伊涅斯塔身体对抗上有优势得多,尽管他们在这些位置上的技术差了一些,但结果并不坏。

巴萨比往常要收缩一些,这给皇马带来麻烦。阿隆索没法儿打身后球分边,而当C罗(上半场)和阿德巴约(下半场)深入敌后时,他们和本方中场的距离太远。与此相关的是阿尔维斯本场踢得很保守。

皇马的定位球进攻质量很差,阿隆索的发球力量不合适,而C罗的射门常常无功而返。皇马并没有制造什么机会,这差不多是他们最好的了。

结论

比赛可分为两个阶段,第一个是皇马让巴萨控球,但巴萨并未制造太多机会;第二个是佩佩吃到红牌之后——他的罚下是本场的关键点。这使得巴萨最好的两个球员——哈维和梅西有了更多的空间。穆里尼奥没有做出相应的调整,巴萨最终获得两个关键进球。
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211#
发表于 2011-4-29 14:46:44 | 只看该作者
LS签名图很有趣。
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212#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:50:59 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 17:52 编辑

Porto 5-1 Villarreal: Falcao nets four as Porto take giant leap towards Dublin
April 28, 2011


The starting line-ups

Villarreal were 1-0 up at half time, but a superb second half performance from Porto puts them fully in charge of the tie.

Andre Villas Boas used his usual 4-3-3 system. Cristian Sapanaru was at right-back, and Cristian Rodriguez was wide left.

Juan Carlos Garrido named a side which seemed to be his usual 4-2-2-2 before kick off. Nilmar and Giuseppe Rossi were supported by Cani and Santi Cazorla, two wide players who come inside, and Borja Valero and Bruno Soriano, two classic deep-lying Spanish ball-playing midfielders. Jose Catala was surprisingly used at left-back over Joan Capdevila.

However, Villarreal’s formation was actually slightly different to usual, with Nilmar playing a right-sided role, filling in as the right-sided midfielder in a 4-4-1-1 without the ball. As always, Villarreal were fluid, but Cazorla usually played ‘in the hole’.

First half

The major talking point in the first half of the game was Porto’s very high defensive line, which played perfectly into the hands of Villarreal. Rossi’s pace caused Porto no end of problems, whilst Nilmar also looked dangerous on the right hand side. Villas Boas seemed to have taken a suicidal approach.

His reasoning for the high line was presumably because he wanted his side to press in midfield. Villarreal are at their best when they’re allowed time to pass the ball – particularly the two deep-lying central midfielders – and Porto wanted to put a stop to that. That meant pressing, and, in turn, a high line.

It wasn’t really working though, and it was partly related to Porto’s other tactic. Because Villarreal generally play 4-2-2-2, their wide players come narrow into the centre of the pitch, and Garrido’s side can often be caught out with runs forward from the opposition full-backs. Therefore, Villas Boas pushed his full-backs high up the pitch – often higher than the midfield three – in order to exploit this weakness.

This meant that Fernando had to play very deep in midfield – even deeper than usual – and cover the full-back areas. On occasions he dropped into form a back three, as Porto shifted to 3-4-3. Indeed, he picked up an early yellow card when he fouled Nilmar in the left-back zone, and so had to be careful with his tackling. A combination of Fernando’s deep positioning, the fact he was on a yellow card, and Villarreal’s surprising formation in midfield meant that the away side could often pass around Porto in midfield and get time on the ball to play through passes. This, of course, is something you have to prevent if playing a high line.

The major individual battle was occurring down Villarreal’s right, Porto’s left. Nilmar was playing to that side but was slack with his defensive duties, whilst Alvaro Pereira was very high up the pitch. One of those two looked likely to get the breakthrough – Pereira’s delivery was poor, and whilst Nilmar wasted an early 1 v 1 after springing the offside trap, his cross for Cani was excellent, and Villarreal were 1-0 up on the stroke of half time.

Second half

What on earth happened to turn the game around so drastically in the second half? Non-tactical factors must be considered, particularly the tiredness that has been so obvious in Villarreal’s game recently, particularly the 5-0 reverse against Valencia.

First, it was slightly surprising that Garrido didn’t change things at half time. Villarreal had looked vulnerable despite leading – particularly down the right. More energy in midfield would have been useful.

Villas Boas didn’t use a substitute but he did change things. Fernando stopped playing so deep and never dropped into the defence after the break, whilst Joao Moutinho played alongside him, forming more of a midfield duo. Porto looked more secure in front of their defence – and aside from an early Cazorla chance – they weren’t opened up as easily because there was more pressure on the ball.

Villarreal twice conceded because of their own high defensive line. We’ve noted before that Villarreal are very keen on defending along the edge of the 18-yard line, even when the positioning of the ball makes it seem a slightly strange position to take up. On occasions it works well, but for Falcao’s header (the fourth goal) and quite probably the first (the concession of a penalty) it was their downfall.

They had two further problems – both down the opposite side to their problems in the first half. They had the same issues Benfica encountered when conceding five at the Dragao earlier in the season – first, the pace and power of Hulk was unstoppable at times. He set up Falcao for the third goal after beating Catala, and was also fouled for the free-kick that resulted in the fourth.

Hulk’s movement also caused problems. With more of a Moutinho-Fernando duo, Fredy Gurain could push forward to make Porto more of a 4-2-1-3, albeit with Guarin to the right. From there, Hulk could move to the flank and drag Catala out, then Guarin could power through and get in on goal – see the third goal. It was Fernando Belluschi playing that role against Benfica, but it was the same process. Villarreal even forgot how to defend corners, and Falcao scored his fourth, and Porto’s fifth, with a header back across goal.

Conclusion

The obvious cliche – a game of two halves. Villarreal exploited Porto’s high line in the first half, but couldn’t deal with Porto’s more effective midfield pressure after half time. More specific battles – particularly involving Hulk – opened Villarreal up far too easily, whilst the away side’s obsession with the 18-yard line was also questionable.
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213#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:52:59 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 17:56 编辑

212楼参考译文
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波尔图5-1黄潜战术分析:博阿斯妙手变天
2011-04-29 / cnzcnz

比利亚雷亚尔1比0领先结束上半场,但是波尔图在下半场重新找回了进球的感觉,5个进球也让他们几乎肯定拿到了一个决赛席位。

博阿斯沿用了一直以来的433阵容。萨帕拉努出任右后卫,乌拉圭C罗(Cristian Rodriguez)打左边锋的位置。

比利亚雷亚尔主帅加里多排出了常用的4222阵型。尼尔马和罗西搭档锋线,卡尼和卡佐拉经常内切为他们提供支持。中场中路则是维罗和索利亚诺,他们踢得是经典的西班牙控球中场,位置相对靠后。左后卫的位置上卡塔拉出人意料地代替卡普德维拉出战。


两队首发阵容

不过事实上比利亚雷亚尔的阵型和平时使用的略有不同:尼尔马的位置居右,无球时回撤打右中场,于是阵型回缩成为4411。和平时一样,比利亚雷亚尔的阵型具有一定的流动性,但是卡佐拉位置一般都在中间。

上半场的战术对决

上半场比赛的一大看点是波尔图压上的后防线,而这也正中习惯防反的比利亚雷亚尔的下怀。罗西的速度给波尔图造成了无止境的难题,尼尔马在右侧也相当有威胁。博阿斯上半场的阵型看上去很失败,跟自杀没什么两样。

他之所以摆出这么一个压上的阵型可能是为了在中场向对手施压以获得主动权。看上去比利亚雷亚尔获得球权并且可以自由地进行传递时是最具威胁的,特别是由于两个习惯后撤的中场可以舒服地传球时。波尔图试图通过压缩中场空间来阻止比利亚雷亚尔的传接球。这也意味着防线必须压前---一把双刃剑。

但是这个办法并没有起到应有的效果,这要归结于波尔图的其他战术设计。因为比利亚雷亚尔通常打的是4222,他们的边路球员经常内切到中路,这也给对手两个边后卫的助攻留下来通道。所以博阿斯让他的两个边后卫尽量压上助攻,他们的位置经常比中场三人组还要靠前,当然是针对比利亚雷亚尔的这个弱点专门安排的。

这也就意味着费尔南多必须回撤得很深,比平时的位置更靠后,这样才能有效地给边后卫补位。他经常回到后卫线上组成三后卫,这样波尔图的阵型就变成了343。事实上他在第五分钟便由于侵犯尼尔马吃到了一张黄牌,这样让他下脚铲球时不得不三思而后行。费尔南多的回撤,加上他身背一张黄牌,和比利亚雷亚尔的变阵使得客队在中场获得压倒性的人数优势,可以有充足的机会进行传接配合。而这种情况,对于博阿斯来说并不是一件好事,尤其是使用后卫压上战术的时候。

绝大多数的一对一发生在比利亚雷亚尔的右路,也就是波尔图的左路。尼尔马应该出现在那个位置,但是他防守并不积极。而对面的阿尔瓦罗佩雷拉站位相当靠前。这样一来,由于他们两个都没人盯防,至少有一个人能够把握机会获得领先。佩雷拉的传中质量很糟糕,而尼尔马虽然浪费了一个反越位后的单刀球机会,但是他给卡尼的传中球质量很高,这也让比利亚雷亚尔在半场结束前收获了一个珍贵的客场进球。

下半场风云突变

中场休息的时候到底发生了什么?为什么下半场就像是换了两支球队在比赛?我们不能排除非战术原因,尤其是比利亚雷亚尔最近比赛中所表现的疲劳,例如0比5惨败给瓦伦西亚那场。

首先加里多在中场休息的时候没有做出换人调整是有些出乎我们的意料的。虽然上半场取得了领先,但是比利亚雷亚尔在右路显得比较不利。如果中场能够换上几个新鲜血液,应该会起到很好的效果。

博阿斯也没有换人,但是他却进行了调整。费尔南多回到常规的位置,而且下半场再也没有回到后防线附近。而穆蒂尼奥注意和他的衔接,两人的组合很好地完成了攻防任务。这也让波尔图的防守更加稳固,下半场45分钟对方只有卡佐拉在开始阶段获得过一次机会。由于波尔图加强了对球权的争夺,比利亚雷亚尔很难再撕开波尔图的防线。

比利亚雷亚尔有两个失球是由于他们过于靠前的后防线。我们注意到比利亚雷亚尔很注意在大禁区线附近展开防守,但是他们并不懂得变通,站位太死,尤其当球的位置靠近禁区时,依然使用如此靠前的站位极易被直塞球打穿。当然在很多情况下这样的站位能够起到应有的作用,但是我们也看到法尔考的头球(第四个进球)和第一个失球(导致点球的那个犯规)都是由于站位太靠前所致。

不仅如此,比利亚雷亚尔还有两个问题,也是上半场波尔图遇到过的。比利亚雷亚尔遇到了本菲卡在葡萄牙德比5分钟内便丢球时同样的难题:首先,浩克的速度和力量让他不可阻挡。他生吃卡塔拉之后为法尔考创造机会攻进了第三个进球,而第四个进球之前的任意球也是拜他所赐。

浩克的活动范围也让比利亚雷亚尔吃尽了苦头。由于中场穆蒂尼奥和费尔南多双人组发挥出色,瓜林可以腾出手来插上助攻,这也让波尔图的阵型更像是一个 4213,尽管瓜林的位置相对靠右。而在右边由于浩克往边路的扯动将卡塔拉吸引开,瓜林得以在无人盯防的情况下插上并且获得进球机会(见61分钟的第二个进球)。对阵本菲卡是完成这一任务的是贝卢斯奇,但是这个套路是一样的。比利亚雷亚尔甚至忘记如何防守角球,让法尔考在远点几乎无人防守的情况下攻入球队的第五球,完成了大四喜。

结论

这又是一场上下半场截然相反的比赛。比利亚雷亚尔在上半场充分利用了波尔图过于靠前的后防线,但是下半场无法应对波尔图更加有效的中场压迫。而在局部地区,特别是浩克所在的区域,比利亚雷亚尔的防线多次被轻松撕开,这也和客队过于执着在大禁区线附近布置防线有关。
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214#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:57:35 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:03 编辑

ls的参考译文题目,译者不知为啥不能尊重原文本意呢?

原文题目直译为:波尔图5-1黄潜之战术分析:法尔考探囊取物般收获大四喜、波尔图迈向都柏林一大步(一只脚大跨进都柏林),不是很好嘛?!
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215#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-29 18:31:59 | 只看该作者
210楼的参考译文题目,也有醉翁之意不在酒的之嫌
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216#
发表于 2011-4-30 12:39:30 | 只看该作者
法尔考接过大胡子的枪,不过很快就会被大俱乐部买走,大胡子运气就不好了,在没落的里昂混得不好也不坏
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217#
发表于 2011-4-30 14:16:43 | 只看该作者
法尔考,是不是FM里-10的那个妖人?
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218#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-1 11:11:58 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-5-1 11:51 编辑

Chelsea 2-1 Tottenham: late Kalou goal sees Chelsea remain in title hunt
蓝军2-1热刺之战术分析:卡劳最后时刻的绝杀进球使蓝军保持争冠希望
April 30, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chelsea turned the game around after bringing on players more suited to their system.

Carlo Ancelotti started with Fernando Torres and Didier Drogba, assisted by Florent Malouda. The natural shape with the XI that started seemed to be a diamond midfield, or possibly even a lopsided 4-4-2, but Ancelotti had other plans.

Harry Redknapp played Vedran Corluka at left-back, and Younes Kaboul at right-back. Sandro started in midfield, and Roman Pavlyuchenko upfront. Again, it seemed the usual 4-4-1-1 for Spurs, but Redknapp changed the system.

The overriding theme in this game was a lack of creativity and invention in the final third of the pitch. That may seem a strange thing to say – after all, there were three goals in this game – but none of them owed much to creativity. Sandro’s opener was a blast from distance, and Chelsea’s goals owed both to luck and errors. This was an entertaining game, but not one blessed with great technical quality.

Chelsea shape

There was some tactical interest in the way both sides shaped up, as we had two surprise formations on show. Ancelotti opted for a 4-3-3 / 4-3-2-1 hybrid, similar to the system he favoured in some of Chelsea’s crucial league games at this stage last year – at Old Trafford, for example. This suited the midfield three and Florent Malouda, but not Drogba. He was forced to play a wide-right role (though Torres sometimes switched with him in the first half) that he was completely uncomfortable in.

The way Drogba received the ball and the passes he played were very much the style of a central striker being shoved out wide, and Chelsea’s build-up play was slow, predictable and uninspiring. Drogba’s passing chalkboard shows how wayward his distribution was from the right side of the pitch.


by Guardian Chalkboards

Tottenham shape

Harry Redknapp also changed his formation for this match. He dropped Rafael van der Vaart deeper alongside Luka Modric, who played to the right, and asked Sandro to play deeper, between the lines. Indeed, Sandro’s belting strike was met only with Redknapp instructions for him to sit deeper and not go forward. It seemed harsh but was fair in the context of the game – Sandro was playing too high up and letting Malouda scamper between the lines.

It seems that Redknapp may have been expecting a diamond and instructed Sandro to pick up Lampard pre-game, but upon realising Chelsea were playing with a midfield three, needed to tell Sandro to mark space, not a man.

Two interesting formations then, but not a particularly interesting battle between the two. 4-1-4-1 v 4-3-3 – the two holding players were ‘free’ and swept up in front of the defence, whilst both sides also had a spare man at the back.

Tottenham approach

We’re used to seeing Spurs attack quickly and directly, particularly down the flanks. In this game, however, there was a different strategy on show. Spurs’ passing was short, sideways and there was a large focus upon ball retention.Van der Vaart was very deep and barely linked up with Pavlyuchenko at all, whilst Gareth Bale was keener than usual to play passes backwards and sideways. In fact, neither of those two played many successful passes in genuinely dangerous positions.


by Guardian Chalkboards

Bale was up against Branislav Ivanovic, a converted centre-back who played Bale with lots of physical power. He stuck tight to the Welshman, got tackles in quickly – and wasn’t afraid to bring Bale down either. At one point he looked like he was in danger of a second yellow (he committed four fouls on Bale), but in all he handled his man well.


by Guardian Chalkboards

Aaron Lennon, on the other side, barely featured in attacking moves – but he is good defensively and tracked Ashley Cole well.

Spurs’ main problem was the extent to which Pavlyuchenko was isolated. Again, he hardly ever linked up with another player in the final third, and his only contribution around the box was to shoot waywardly. That was partially simply poor play, but also because he had no support, and often no-one to pass to. With Mikel essentially a ‘free’ player, the Russian was often in 1 v 3 situations.


by Guardian Chalkboards

Chelsea attacking play

Having started with Drogba completely out of position, Chelsea looked better when they brought on players who were actually comfortable in the roles they were meant to play in. If we’re talking players who can play as wideish attackers in a 4-3-3 / 4-3-2-1, Saloman Kalou and Nicolas Anelka are far, far better options than Drogba. It’s unthinkable that a manager as Ancelotti would willingly choose Drogba over Kalou and Anelka in that role – compared the passing chalkboards of those two players with Drogba’s above.


by Guardian Chalkboards

The introduction of those two (and Ramires, who provided his usual energetic runs) gave Chelsea more quick, exciting attacking play. Kalou’s late goal came after a couple of slightly fortunate ricochets, but there was movement and penetration in the move, players dragging opponents out of position, and others exploiting the space. In tactical terms, that was how Chelsea grew into the game.

Shooting

Did the game come down to luck? Possibly – refereeing decisions can be scrutinized elsewhere – but it’s worth pointing out that when one side records ten shots on target and the other records just one, any fortunate goals are much more likely to be awarded to the former.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Conclusion

Each side used a ‘free’ holding player and a spare man at the back, so it’s not entirely surprising that there wasn’t great quality in the final third.

It was also because neither side used their natural shape with players in their natural positions – which is arguably what picking a starting XI comes down to.
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219#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-1 11:26:01 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-5-3 07:08 编辑

218楼的参考译文
-----------------------



在换上更加适合这个阵型的球员之后,切尔西把比分逆转了。

安切洛蒂开场排出了托雷斯和德罗巴的锋线组合,马卢达在旁协助。虽然看起来这是一个菱形中场,或者说是一个畸形的442,但安切洛蒂有其他的安排。

老雷用乔尔卢卡打左后卫,右边卫则是卡布尔。桑德罗首发,帕夫柳琴科单箭头。同样的,虽然热刺看起来像4411,但老雷的战术也有变化。

纵观全场,双方在威胁区域都缺乏创造力。这看起来很奇怪,毕竟比赛中有三个进球呢。但这些进球跟创造力都没有太多的关系。桑德罗的打开纪录的进球是一记禁区外的重炮攻门,切尔西的两个进球都跟运气和失误有关。这是一场充满娱乐性的比赛,但并不能说明有多少技术含量。

切尔西阵型

双方阵型的组织都有有趣的地方,这是两个让我们惊异的阵型。安切洛蒂选择了个433/4321的混搭阵型,这和他去年的一些联赛关键战役(例如客战曼联)很类似。中场三人组还有马卢达都很适应这个阵型,但德罗巴并不如此。他被迫去打一个右边路的角色(尽管在上半场,托雷斯有时和他换位),结果他完全不适应。

德罗巴接球和逼抢的方式很像一个被遗弃到边路的中锋,而切尔西的进攻组织缓慢,意图明显,无精打采。德罗巴的传球小白板可以看出他在右路的传中是如何的漫无目的。



热刺的阵型

老雷同样的在这场比赛改变了阵型。他把范德法特后撤,站在莫德里奇旁边。而桑德罗是两线之间拖后的中场。的确,桑德罗的大力射门为球队首开纪录。老雷要求他留守后场不助攻,听起来很苛刻,但根据比赛内容来看,这并不过分。桑德罗太靠前了,以至于马卢达可以在防线前随意搅和。

看起来老雷在赛前曾打算采用菱形中场并让桑德罗去盯防兰帕德,但意识到切尔西实际上是打一个3人中场,他要求桑德罗不要盯人,实行区域防守。

然后就有了这么两个有趣的阵容,但两者没有什么有趣的碰撞。4141对阵433,两个后腰都是‘空闲’的,他们可以防线前扫荡,而且都还有一个中卫用来补位。

热刺的进攻方式

我们通常会看到热刺的进攻快速而直接,尤其是边路的进攻。然而这场比赛完全不一样。热刺的传球都是短传和横传,他们很注意保持控球权。范德法特退得很深,和帕夫柳琴科的联系很少,而贝尔也少有的很多回传和横传。事实上,这两个球员在在对方危险区域的传球都很少。



贝尔对位的是伊万诺维奇,中卫出身的伊万更多的采取力量型的防守方式去应对贝尔。他紧紧盯住威尔士人,抢截毫不犹豫,也不介意把贝尔直接放倒。他曾经面临第二张黄牌的危险(对贝尔四次犯规),但总体来说,他把人防得很好。



另一边的列侬很少在进攻中有所作为,但他在防守阿什利科尔的时候表现出色。

热刺的主要问题是,帕夫柳琴科被孤立后的接应问题。同样,他在对方危险区域很少能找到附近的同伴,他在禁区附近的唯一贡献就是浪射。虽然这与他表现糟糕有关,但也有缺乏支援的原因,他经常没人可传。由于米克尔经常是‘空闲’的,俄罗斯人经常处于一对三的局面。



切尔西的进攻

如果我们要找适合打433或者4321中两边的锋将的话,卡卢和阿内尔卡是远远胜过德罗巴的选择。很难想像一个像安切洛蒂这样的教练会选择德罗巴而不是卡卢或者阿内尔卡担当此角色,你可以对比一下这两人和上面德罗巴的传球小白板。

开场时德罗巴完全游离在体系之外,切尔西在换上一些更加适应这个阵型的球员之后,进攻有起色。



这两人的上场给了切尔西的进攻提速了。卡卢的绝杀来源于一系列幸运的反弹球,但通过之前的移动和互传,对手被带离了防守位置,其他人可以利用留下空当。就战术角度而言,切尔西正是凭借这些手段逐渐掌控了比赛。

射门

这场比赛全是运气使然吗?可能吧(裁判的判罚不在本文讨论范围),但值得指出的是,当一支球队有10脚门框内的射门而对手还只有一次,那么谁蒙进的机会比较大呢?



总结

两队都有一个“空闲”的后腰和一个可以补位的中卫,所以双方在危险区域进攻质量很低也不奇怪了。

这也使因为他们都没有使用自己惯常的阵型惯常的阵容,这样的首发阵容是有争议的。
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220#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-1 11:28:03 | 只看该作者
托雷斯在转会蓝军后,在重量级比赛中还是没有进球,虽然上一轮好不容易破处了
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221#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-3 07:23:14 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-5-3 07:26 编辑

Arsenal 1-0 Manchester United: second half Ramsey goal gives Arsenal the points
May 1, 2011


The starting line-ups

Arsenal’s recent poor run against Manchester United came to an end, thanks to Aaron Ramsey’s cool finish.

Ramsey was only playing because Arsenal were without Cesc Fabregas through injury. Otherwise, Arsene Wenger’s side was as expected.

Sir Alex Ferguson brought Nani into the side in place of Antonio Valencia, whilst Anderson also played in the centre of midfield.

Arsenal were dominant throughout much of the match here – in possession terms that’s what we’ve come to accept from battles between these two, but whilst usually United are threatening on the counter, they were blunt today.

Arsenal system / attacks

The use of Ramsey gave Arsenal’s midfield trio a slightly different tilt. Fabregas usually plays clearly at the head, with Alex Song and Jack Wilshere deeper in a double pivot. Ramsey played deeper than Fabregas does (especially in big games), in closer proximity to his midfield colleagues. Wilshere was also slightly higher up than usual, with Alex Song in a more clearly-defined holding role. He and Wayne Rooney spent the game picking up each other.

Ramsey in a deeper role meant Arsenal retained possession very nicely. No change there, you might say, but Arsenal’s passing at the Emirates actually hasn’t been very good on various occasions this season. Ramsey was key in this, coming short to collect the ball and playing passes to the flanks – Fabregas is generally keener to play the killer forward pass.

Ramsey’s natural tendencies mean Arsenal had to vary their attacking play. Robin van Persie often drops deep with Fabregas exploiting the space he creates, but this rarely happened. Instead, Ramsey hung back, and Arsenal’s main danger came when they got the ball wide in the first half. The crossing from the full-backs was not much better than usual, but Theo Walcott sent an excellent cross in, and Arsenal worked some good situations down the flanks.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Manchester United tactics / counters

United have been brilliant on the counter-attack on their last two visits to the Emirates. In 2008/09 in the Champions League, a move involving Rooney, Park Ji-Sung and Ronaldo produced a beautiful goal on the break, whilst in 2009/10 a similar move with Rooney and Nani – with Park making an important decoy run – resulted in a similar strike. Both goals involved three players darting forward in a 4-3-3 system.

United’s formation changed for this match. Whereas Ferguson insisted on 4-5-1 / 4-3-3 in big games until recently, now he’s comfortable with his 4-4-1-1 formation, with Rooney playing as an additional midfielder without the ball, dropping on Song. This changes the way United defend in the centre of midfield – last season with a central midfield trio, they played with one player deeper than the other two. Now, they rely on a duo at the base of the midfield, Michael Carrick and Anderson.

This also changes the role of the wide players. In a 4-3-3, their main job was simply to focus on stopping Arsenal’s full-backs. In a 4-4-1-1 like this, the main task is instead to drop level with the midfield players and form a second bank of four. Arsenal’s full-backs were given all the time on the ball they liked.

This meant that the United wide players were in a deeper position at transitions, and found it more difficult to become involved in breaks. Granted, United didn’t have any problems breaking against Arsenal when they played a similar formation in the FA Cup at Old Trafford, with the Brazilian twins on the flank. The difference there was that Rooney dropped into midfield unattended, and United became a 4-2-1-3.

With Song playing deeper and more specifically told to pick up Rooney (and doing a great job, see the chalkboard below, that also demonstrates how he ’swept’ across the pitch, rather than remaining in a duo with Wilshere), United couldn’t use their number ten to distribute the ball wide for breaks. In summary, a combination of the two factors made United less of a threat – the wingers were deeper than they’ve been used to at the Emirates, and Rooney wasn’t allowed time to play as he was at Old Trafford.

by Guardian Chalkboards

United substitutions

Ferguson has successfully turned various games around this season, but here his substitutions didn’t have much of a positive impact on the match. In fact, the first substitution came one minute before Arsenal’s goal. Anderson was removed in favour of Antonio Valencia, with Nani going left and Park coming into the middle of the midfield four. Park, not used to that position by any means, stood and watched as Ramsey had space on the edge of the box to play the ball into the far corner. Carrick was the man eventually closing the Welshman down, but he had tracked Wilshere’s run into the box – someone else had to be aware of the space on the edge of the penalty area, and Park wasn’t contributing anything to United’s defence.

Dimitar Berbatov on for Hernandez made sense – Arsenal were sitting deeper, Hernandez’s pace was less of a threat and he hadn’t enjoyed the best game – but Michael Owen on for Carrick deprived United of the man who was passing to the flanks and contributing to many of United’s better moves. United ended with Park and Rooney broadly in central midfield, and were prone to breaks down the centre – Arsenal’s decision-making on the break was erratic.

Clichy

In this fixture last season, United targeted Gael Clichy (indeed, it was really the first major game where right-winger Nani announced his step up to becoming a truly dangerous player) and the Arsenal left-back struggled, especially in the air.

There seemed to be a similar strategy here – United were more threatening when they worked the ball down the right (think of Fabio’s dart forward in the first half, and the cross that Hernandez almost got on the end of in the second). Arsenal needed to make much more interceptions in their left-back zone than in their right-back zone, but Clichy had a good game.

by Guardian Chalkboards

Conclusion

Arsenal were the better side here. They kept the ball well and defended resiliently when they had to – Laurent Koscielny had a good game at the back, and Song was excellent. Song was the key tactical factor in preventing United creating – he stayed on Rooney well, whilst the use of Ramsey gave Arsenal guile and balance in midfield. His deeper role (compared to Fabregas) was less of a direct goal threat, but ironically his tendency to hang back resulted in the goal.

United were poor – the transitions from defence to attack were lacking, Rooney was quiet and Hernandez was barely involved. The use of substitutions didn’t seem to help.
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222#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-3 07:27:16 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-5-3 07:30 编辑

221楼参考译文
------------------------

阿森纳1-0曼联战术分析:司令塔拉姆塞的奇袭  
由 锈着等 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球
2011年5月1日



凭借阿隆-拉姆塞的进球,阿森纳终结了他们对阵曼联的尴尬纪录(译注:此前双方最近10场交锋中,枪手仅战胜曼联1次)。

因为赛斯克-法布雷加斯的缺阵,拉姆塞才获得了上场机会。在其他位置,温格排出了平时的主力。

弗格森用纳尼顶替了瓦伦西亚,而安德森出现在了中场位置。

阿森纳在比赛大部分时间占据着优势—和两队以前的比赛一模一样,但曼联的武器—反击,这次没有那么锋利了。

阿森纳体系/进攻

拉姆塞的上场,使得阿森纳中场三人组有了不同的分工。之前通常是法布雷加斯在最前,宋和威尔希尔在后面保护。而拉姆塞的位置比法布雷加斯更靠后(尤其在重大比赛中),更为接近另外2人。威尔希尔的位置也比原来更靠前,而宋的作用更为固定—他和鲁尼全场都在纠缠不休。

拉姆塞的后撤使阿森纳更难以失位。你可能觉得没什么变化,但阿森纳本赛季大部分主场比赛中,传球的效果并没有那么好。拉姆塞起到了关键作用。他缩短了后卫给他的传球距离,然后将球分给边路—而法布雷加斯更喜欢传直塞球。

拉姆塞的踢球习惯意味着阿森纳需要丰富他们的进攻手段。范佩西经常回撤,使法布雷加斯能充分利用他创造的空当。但是与之相反,由于拉姆塞的后撤,阿森纳的上半场主要威胁球都出自边路拿球之后的进攻。边后卫的传中还是不给力。但沃尔科特送出了一次精妙的传中,而阿森纳的边路进攻也取得了一定效果。



曼联战术/反击

曼联在最近2次做客酋长球场时,都打出了高效的反击。2008-09赛季欧冠半决赛中,鲁尼、朴智星和C罗3人配合,帮助曼联打出了精彩的反击并打入一球。而2009-10赛季鲁尼和纳尼作出了几乎一样的表演—朴智星这次的作用是吸引对方防守球员。2个进球都是在4-3-3战术下,3名球员高速前插造成的。

这场比赛,曼联作出了变阵。虽然弗格森之前一直坚持在关键比赛中使用4-5-1或4-3-3,他现在也开始用起了4-4-1-1。鲁尼无球时变成了一个中场,负责逼抢宋。这改变了曼联在中场防守的策略—上赛季中场三人组中,一个人拖在其他两人之后。而现在拖后的成了两个人:卡里克和安德森。

这也改变了边路球员的作用。在4-3-3阵型中,他们主要的职责是防守阿森纳边后卫,掐死他们的助攻。在4-4-1-1阵型中,比如这次,他们的主要任务是回撤到中场,和后腰形成在四后卫身前的第二道屏障。全场比赛,阿森纳的边后卫都可以在很舒服的位置拿到球。
也就是说曼联在攻防转换时,边路球员过于靠后,因此很难打出反击。的确,曼联在足总杯主场对阿森纳时也排出了同样的阵型。那场比赛,曼联的边前卫是巴西双胞胎,而他们的反击很有效。这场的不同之处在于,鲁尼潜入中场,无人盯防,曼联的阵型因此变成了4-2-1-3。

但是这场,宋的位置后撤,而他的任务是限制鲁尼(效果很好,同时他全场扫荡,而不仅和威尔希尔在中路搭档,见下图)。这样后者无法将球分边以组织反击。简单来说,两种原因降低了曼联的威胁:边锋比之前的比赛更加后撤,以及鲁尼无法像他在老特拉福德一样得心应手。



曼联的换人

弗格森本赛季导演了多次逆转,但这次,他的换人并没有收到很好的效果。事实上,曼联第一次换人一分钟后,阿森纳就进球了。瓦伦西亚换下了安德森,纳尼去了左路,朴智星则改打中场。朴智星一点也不适应这个位置,而他只能目送拉姆塞在禁区边缘将球推射进远角。卡里克曾试图封堵威尔士人的射门,但他此前在盯防威尔希尔—曼联应当有人注意到点球点附近的空隙,但朴智星在这次防守中,没有起到任何作用。

贝尔巴托夫换下埃尔南德斯。这个换人还是有意义的,因为随着阿森纳收缩防守,埃尔南德斯的速度无法造成很大的威胁,而这场比赛也没有给他留下美好回忆。但是欧文换下了卡里克就不一样了,后者负责把球传给边路,也是曼联几次有效进攻的发起者。最终曼联的中场成了朴智星和鲁尼,他们试图从中路打开缺口,阿森纳应对自如。

克里希

上赛季两队第二回合的比赛中,曼联主攻的是克里希一侧(这也是纳尼宣布自己进入顶尖攻击手行列的里程碑)。阿森纳的左后卫全场被爆,尤其是在空中对抗。

这场似乎也是一样—曼联在右路进攻时更有威胁(想想法比奥上半场在右路的下底传中,埃尔南德斯差一点就能接应到)。阿森纳在左路需要比右路做出更多的拦截,但克里希今天表现出色。



结论

阿森纳表现更为出色。他们的控球能力更好,丢球之后也能反抢—科斯切尔尼表现不错,而宋的表现可谓是顶尖的。宋是破坏曼联进攻组织的关键人物,他很好地防住了鲁尼,而拉姆塞使阿森纳的中场更有灵气,并且攻守平衡。和法布雷加斯相比,他的位置更靠后,这看起来似乎减小对球门的威胁,但正是因为他滞后的倾向反而为他带来了一个进球。

曼联表现糟糕——攻防转换枢纽缺失,鲁尼被限制,埃尔南德斯基本消失。换人也没有带来很大帮助。
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223#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-3 07:37:35 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-5-3 07:39 编辑

说实话,上面评论有些地方,不一定恰当。

换上贝巴,一点作用都没有。其实那阵子,曼联由鲁尼发起快攻或者参与的反击中快攻,很有威胁的,至少有2次,可是都由于只传给左路插上的埃弗拉,而流产。

上一场打沙尔克时那种中路梦幻的传切突破的感觉,到哪里去了?

还有,这场球,丢球以后,曼联中场拿球不是很好,好多次看到被阿尔沙文等抢断。曼联最后任由法比奥(双胞胎之一)这个进攻菜鸟来打左路,可笑!

没有吉格斯,鲁尼也不大淡定了

那个丢球,虽说一是因为爵爷换人时机的失误,但是守门员范德萨也有准备不足的无可奈何之感,一句话,老了
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224#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-5-3 07:40:55 | 只看该作者
换上欧文,丫差点又要制造一个点球的,就在禁区线上。哈哈
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225#
发表于 2011-5-3 08:40:23 | 只看该作者
巴伦西亚的出场没有起到应有的作用,本来希望利用他的体能和速度对克利希致命一击

另外对比上半赛季,纳尼的状态明显下降,对收官战役影响很大,两条战线的前景都很不乐观
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