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11-12 ZM专贴(拜仁1-1蓝军:客队赢得点球大战)

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976#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-4 23:35:29 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-9 11:42 编辑

975楼参考译文
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2012-05-06 / ffail

下图列出了每场比赛平均控球率(X轴)与平均射门次数(Y轴)的关系,这些数据来自英超、意甲、西甲、法甲与德甲的98只球队。



所有数据取自优秀的足球网站:WhoScored。

正如你们所预料的,两者之间有明显的正相关关系:控球率越高,射门次数也越多。没错,这听起来确实像废话。

但出于两点因素,这张图变得有趣起来。首先,五大联赛之间的区别非常明显;其次,有几只球队不符合上述的规律,而且控球较多的球队也各有各的特点。

那些显著高于平均线上的球队显然对球的利用更“高效”,在控球相同的情况下他们拥有更多的射门次数。而在回归方程直线以下的球队更“低效”,他们控球很多射门却很少。

显然,所谓“效率”高低并不意味这球队表现的优劣,因为射门往往并不是控球的唯一目的。当一方领先时,控球被视作防守策略以用来消耗时间,消磨体力,瓦解对手进攻意图。我并不想给球队排座次,这里只想列出各种不同球队风格。

下图虽然和上图一样,但所有球队都按照各自联赛标上了不同颜色。



最有趣的一组是英超联赛,因为大多数球队风格相当直接。只有一个小黑点出现在靠近右下角的地方,斯旺西在英超中踢球独树一帜,这也就是为什么有那么多人在讨论这种富有耐心的传球方式。

下图标注了不同联赛的平均线,从中我们可以看到不同联赛之间的区别。



那具体到每只球队个体身上呢?确实有一些球队明显高于或低于我们的预期。最“高效”的球队用3%控球率就能带来一脚射门,而最“低效”的球队则需要5%。

“高效”球队有:

1、曼城—淡蓝色点

2、皇马—灰色点

3、热刺—淡绿色点(前三名差距很小)

4、切尔西—蓝色点

5、尤文图斯—黑白条纹点

同样,QPR(横条纹点)与西布朗(竖条纹点)场均射门也高过相应的平均控球率。



“低效”球队包括:

1、 阿雅克肖—深蓝色点

2、 科隆—绿色点

3、 斯旺西—橙色点

4、 伊维恩—紫色点

5、 毕尔巴鄂竞技—红白条纹点

还有一些球队控球率显著偏高,包括拜仁慕尼黑(红点)与巴萨(红蓝条纹点)。

需要再次说明的是,这篇文章并不是断言哪一种风格更好,仅仅是为了写出不同风格之间显著差距。斯旺西控球率高于曼城,但射门要少六次。曼联射门与巴萨一样多,但控球率要低12%。

总的来说,控球越多射门越多,但也并不总是这样
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977#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:13:28 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-9 11:36 编辑

Chelsea 2-1 Liverpool: Chelsea lift the trophy
May 5, 2012


The starting line-ups

Chelsea won their fourth FA Cup in the last six years.

Roberto Di Matteo went for his usual 4-2-3-1 system with no real surprises – Didier Drogba was upfront and Saloman Kalou got the nod on the left.

Kenny Dalglish left out Andy Carroll and went for a 4-3-3 system with Luis Suarez upfront alone. There was also no place for Jamie Carragher at the back.

This was basically two completely separate games – Liverpool before Carroll, and Liverpool with Carroll.

Opening

The game started extremely cautiously, with neither side committing players forward and instead playing short, simple passes in midfield and across the backline. With the two midfields closely matched, no players in this zone got time and space on the ball to pick a good pass. The one slight exception was Jay Spearing, because while Liverpool used Jordan Henderson and Steven Gerrard to press John Obi Mikel and Frank Lampard, Chelsea focused upon getting back into shape. Spearing’s passes were generally short and sideways, which is his job in that position, though as the man with most time he could have been a little more incisive – his one attempted penetrative pass was to no-one, drifting out of play for a goal kick.

The game needed an early goal, and Chelsea pounced with what is now their standard route of attack under Di Matteo – the ball played out to Ramires on the run. Their strategy was highly based around counter-attacking, and this was only exaggerated once they went ahead. There were no particularly interesting features of their overall play, though it was interesting to watch Juan Mata’s movement and positioning – he drifted laterally into pockets of space either side Spearing and in behind Gerrard or Henderson, causing Liverpool problems in exactly the same way he did in the league meeting at Stamford Bridge.

But with Chelsea now sitting deep and content to soak up pressure, this was no longer a real formation battle, in terms of one trying to outmanoeuvre the other in midfield. Instead, it was all about Liverpool trying to break down a resilient Chelsea defence.

Liverpool approach

Frankly, Liverpool were terrible for 45 minutes. The obvious analysis is that Suarez was isolated, but this in itself isn’t necessarily a problem. In fact, Suarez is one of the best ‘isolated’ forwards around – he was superb in the Copa America when Diego Forlan dropped deep and left him upfront alone. But he likes to work the channels – he’s clearly not a target man like Drogba.

Therefore, Liverpool had to be more intelligent to get him into his favoured positions. They needed to either play the ball forward quickly before Chelsea had got back into shape, or drag the full-backs out and increase the space between Chelsea’s centre-backs and full-backs. The latter was something they did excellently in the semi-final against Everton, with Leighton Baines moving up the pitch to Jordan Henderson in deep positions, and Suarez taking on Sylvain Distin in a one-against-one battle he clearly won. But he never got the opportunity to do that against Terry, with Bellamy playing an odd, anarchic role that saw him drifting into the centre of the pitch. Chelsea could stay narrow, and Suarez was barely noticeable.

Therefore, most of Liverpool’s play went down the left. Here they were fielding two ‘linear’ players, Stewart Downing and Jose Enrique, and their play was too slow and predictable – and without a target man, crosses weren’t particularly useful. (This has been an incongruous part of Liverpool’s play this season – there’s often been no obvious correlation between the use of wide players on their natural side to cross, and the use of Carroll to get on the end of crosses). Neither Downing nor Enrique are in great form, and the major threat in the first half came when Daniel Agger moved forward to briefly overload Chelsea in that part of the pitch.

Dalglish moved to more of a 4-4-1-1 system towards the end of the first half, with Henderson moving right and Bellamy permanently in the middle.

Carroll


From 55 minutes

It would be a little unfair to criticise Dalglish’s tactics from the start (the line-up would have fared better in a more evenly-balanced game when Chelsea were attacking more, which may have been the case had Liverpool not conceded an extremely sloppy early goal), it’s fair to question why he didn’t immediately introduce another forward for the second half. Liverpool were awful in the opening period, and with Chelsea parking the bus, the obvious man to bring on was Carroll.

He eventually arrived, but after 55 minutes rather than 45. During that ten minutes Chelsea scored again, and it was ten minutes less of heavy Liverpool pressure. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but a quick straw poll of Liverpool fans at half-time would surely have produced a consensus that Carroll should have been introduced straight away.

Spearing was the man to depart, with Gerrard and Henderson now the midfield duo. Neither had a particularly great game, but they were more purposeful on the ball, with more diagonal passes than Spearing played, helping Liverpool move the ball much quicker into wide zones.

Of course, there was nothing subtle about the effect Carroll had – he won aerial balls, got on the end of crosses and provided a central pivot Liverpool could play around. He also showed great awareness to nod the ball down to onrushing teammates. Bringing on a big man to thump the ball towards is the most primitive tactic in football, but it worked excellently and Liverpool were inches away from equalising.

A 2-2 would have been Liverpool’s most unlikely comeback since Istanbul in 2005, when Liverpool radically changed shape to turn the game. But Rafael Benitez made his changes at half-time during that game – even if Carroll’s goal had been awarded, it was still a mistake for Dalglish not to make his changes at half-time too, to give Liverpool as much time as possible with more of a goal threat.

Conclusion

Quite a standard game – Chelsea counter-attack early and go ahead, then spent the rest of the game defending with Liverpool struggling to break them down. Then Liverpool have a target for longer balls, and Chelsea struggle to deal with the constant pressure. It was as simple as that.
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978#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:15:23 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-7 11:07 编辑

977楼参考译文
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2012-05-06 / maryantonia

这是切尔西在过去六年里第四次举起足总杯。

与预料中的一样,迪马特奥排出了惯用的4-2-3-1,德罗巴突前,卡劳占据了左路。

达格利什把卡罗尔放在替补席,排出4-3-3,苏亚雷斯单箭头,后防线上也没有了卡拉格的位置。

比赛基本上就是两个完全不同的故事——没有卡罗尔的利物浦和派上卡罗尔的利物浦。

开场阶段

双方一开始都会很小心翼翼,没人向前冲,只是在中场进行简单的传递,时不时还会退到后防线。由于双方的中场势均力敌,这个区域的球员们都没有足够的时间和空间来送出漂亮的传球。唯一有些许希望的人是斯皮灵,因为当红军派上亨德森和杰拉德来压迫米克尔和兰帕德时,蓝军会专注于保持阵型的完整性。斯皮灵的传球主要是在边路的短传,这也是他的任务所在,不过大部分时间他的传球都不够犀利——他确实有一次传出了很具有穿透性的球,结果没有人接应,直接出了底线变成了对方的球门球。

比赛需要有人来打破僵局,而切尔西上演了自从迪马特奥上任之后的拿手好戏——皮球传给了跑动中的拉米雷斯。蓝军的策略高度依赖于防守反击,而且一旦他们领先,就会更加变本加厉。切尔西整体的打法并没有什么特别耐人寻味之处,不过胡安-马塔的跑动和卡位很值得一看——他在斯皮灵的两边,也就是杰拉德和亨德森的身后横向游曳,正如切尔西在联赛中主场迎战利物浦的那场比赛一样,给红军造成了很大 麻烦。

不过目前切尔西退守很深,乐意承担对方进攻的压力,这就不再是一方在中场区域压制另一方的那种阵型上的对抗了。取而代之的是,利物浦全力进攻想要打破切尔西韧性十足的防线。

利物浦的战术

坦白来说,利物浦在上半场表现很差。最明显之处就是苏亚雷斯被完全孤立了,不过这本身并不是什么问题。实际上,苏亚雷斯是最擅长“孤军作战”的前锋之一——美洲杯的时候,弗兰退守得很深,只留下苏亚雷斯一人突前,而他表现得非常出色。

因此,利物浦必须要打得更聪明些,让苏亚雷斯位于他最喜欢的位置。红军要么应该赶在切尔西阵型回缩之前快速推进,要么就该让边后卫前插,来增加蓝军中卫和边后卫之间的空隙。第二种战术他们在半决赛对阵埃弗顿的时候使用得非常得心应手,当时拜恩斯前移跟着退守很深的亨德森,于是苏亚雷斯就直接跟迪斯汀一对一,过掉对方对他来说易如反掌。不过特里并没有迪斯汀那么好对付,而贝拉米又看起来有点不知所措,经常看到他游移到球场中路。切尔西可以收缩得很窄,这样苏亚雷斯的位置就暴露无遗。

因此,利物浦大部分的进攻都沿着左路前进。这个位置他们有两位“直线型”球员——唐宁和何塞-恩里克,而两人的移动太慢又太容易被预料到了——没有柱式中锋的接应,传中几乎起不到任何作用(本赛季的利物浦一直存在这方面的问题——边路球员和位置和卡罗尔作为传中接应点的使用一直无法协调)。唐宁和恩里克的状态都一般,上半场主要的威胁是当阿格前插的时候,这样红军就在这个区域对蓝军形成了人数上的压制。

达格利什在上半场快结束的时候把阵型调整成了4-4-1-1,他让亨德森去了边路,这样贝拉米就可以一直留在中路了。

卡罗尔

抨击达格利什开场的排兵布阵并不公平(如果切尔西攻击得再猛烈一些的话,双方的首发会更加势均力敌些,这样的话,利物浦可能也不会那么早就失球),不过,应当质疑的是,他为什么不在下半场一开始就立即派上另一名前锋。利物浦的开场打得并不好,而且切尔西已经在门前停上了大巴,显然应该换上卡罗尔。

卡罗尔最终上场了,不过是在55分钟的时候,而不是45分钟。而在这10分钟里,切尔西又进了一球,而且还少受了10分钟利物浦的压迫。事后诸葛亮谁都会,但如果半场的时候在利物浦的球迷中进行一个快速的民意测验,估计大部分都认为应该立即换上卡罗尔。
下场的是斯皮灵,现在是杰拉德和亨德森双后腰。两人的表现也都一般,不过他们的传球更具有目的性,比斯皮灵送出了更多的对角线斜传,增快了球队在边路的推进。

当然,卡罗尔的作用显而易见——他争顶时具有优势,是边路传中的落点,还给球队提供了前场进攻的枢纽。卡罗尔的头球摆渡很轻易地就能找到跑动中的队友。派上高中锋来推动进攻是足球中最原始的战术了,但是却非常有效,而且利物浦只差一步就能扳平比分。
如果比分是2-2的话,也许就成为了利物浦自从2005年伊斯坦布尔之夜以来最令人难以置信的逆转,那场比赛中红军也是依靠变阵而扭转了败局。不过贝尼特斯在中场的时候就变阵了——就算卡罗尔的进球有效,这场比赛的责任也在达格利什,他应该早一点换人,这样红军就有更多的时间来制造威胁。

结论

非常标准的一场比赛——切尔西早期的反击取得领先,然后派重兵防守,利物浦则无法攻破对方的防线。然后红军的换人让长传有了目标,而切尔西则苦苦挣扎在对方的强势压迫之下。整个过程非常简单易懂。
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979#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:17:50 | 只看该作者
Mancini’s switch puts City close to the title
May 6, 2012


City's two midfield formats

It turned out to be the key substitution of the Premier League season. Samir Nasri off, Nigel De Jong on, and Yaya Toure higher up the pitch.

It wasn’t necessarily an attacking substitution or a defensive substitution – it changed the way City attacked, but there was no change in the emphasis upon attack or defence. There were still four players primarily to attack, and six to defend, with the full-backs pushing forward in both formations. There was a change of roles in midfield, with Gareth Barry becoming the shuttling player to move forward from the midfield duo, having previously been the deeper of the two holders.

The move worked excellently, with Toure getting the two crucial goals, but it was still a cautious change in the manner City attacked. Mancini felt the need to have two deep midfielders to protect Toure’s move into a number ten role, when many other coaches would have been happy with Barry holding and Toure free to drive forward and link up with the front four. That’s the way Jose Mourinho played late on with Inter during the 2009/10 campaign when his side desperately needed a goal – he moved from a system of two holders behind Wesley Sneijder in a 4-2-3-1, to a formation that was essentially a 4-1-1-4, with a huge split in the midfield and a clear separation of responsibilities between one holder and the number ten.

In that respect, Toure could have been deployed higher up, even without the introduction of De Jong to guard the defence. The frustrating thing about City’s play in the first half was that the two central midfielders sat so deep and didn’t break forward, presumably as Mancini wanted protection against Newcastle’s counter-attacks. But with Newcastle playing a straight 4-4-2 and Yohan Cabaye breaking from midfield rather than playing as an outright number ten, there could have been more fluidity. One incident in the first half demonstrated how City were suffering from that lack of drive – Pablo Zabaleta pulled the ball back, but with Toure and Aguero both in the six-yard box, the ball rolled harmlessly across edge of the box. Toure’s deployment higher up was probably needed sooner, so while Mancini deserves great credit for pushing Toure forward, it’s not inaccurate to say that it was a cautious way of doing so.

One of the key parts of Mancini’s substitution was the removal of Nasri, who was coming inside and eating into the space Toure should have been breaking into. The most natural move would have seen Nasri replaced with a wide player (Adam Johnson) to stretch the play and allow Toure forward. Mancini’s change actually achieved increased forward runs from the wing, in a sense, as Barry was shuttling forward – for Toure’s first goal that was particularly noticeable, to the left of the pitch.

But once City went ahead, the increased defensive protection was perfect for the task. City could sit with two holders ahead of the back four, and with Newcastle now coming onto them for the first time in the game, Toure’s drive high up the pitch was a threat on the break. He had a fine chance with a one-on-one he wasted, then scored the second goal to secure the three points. His versatility within the midfield zone proved crucial.
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980#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:19:21 | 只看该作者
979楼参考译文
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981#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:21:14 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-7 10:25 编辑

Inter 4-2 Milan: Inter build up play down the left, then spread it to the right

May 7, 2012


Inter formation

This was a rather eventful Milan derby – not only were there six goals (including three penalties), but the result confirmed Juventus as Serie A champions.

The game was frantic, open and often lacking any kind of shape or structure, which was completely unexpected when the line-ups were announced – it set to be a battle of two narrow, functional 4-3-1-2s.

But thankfully, it wasn’t a boring, attritional contest, mainly thanks to the fact that Inter coach Andrea Stramaccioni instead used a 4-4-1-1 system that had width and fluidity. Inter did what so many teams haven’t against Milan this year – they exploited the fact that Milan are narrow and static without the ball, and lack pace throughout the side. Stramaccioni was brave enough to concede the battle in midfield and didn’t try to win the numbers game there (Milan dominated this zone and therefore possession, with 56%). But Inter’s build-up play was superior, and they were by far the better side.

Inter’s 4-4-1-1 wasn’t a straight, boxy 4-4-1-1. It had many nuances – first, on the left Ricky Alvarez came inside into a number ten position, while Wesley Sneijder drifted from a number ten position to the left wing. Those two were essentially making the reverse movement, and although a couple of times they found themselves in the same position, they combined well.

On the other side, Javier Zanetti was the right-sided midfield player but played very narrow, more as a central midfielder, which allowed Maicon forward on the overlap. In the centre, Esteban Cambiasso sat deep in midfield, while Fredy Guarin shuttled forward to his left.


Inter build-up...

This meant that Alvarez, Sneijder and Guarin naturally formed a triangle to the left of the pitch, and were joined by Yuto Nagatomo, who could move forward without any opponent tracking his run. This ‘square’ (see right) formed the basis of almost all Inter’s attacks in the first half, and Milan generally only looked to close Inter down in this position with two players (highlighted) – right-back Ignazio Abate, then right-sided central midfielder Antonio Nocerino. Kevin-Prince Boateng didn’t get involved, while Mark van Bommel stayed goalside of Sneijder and prevented him turning, but if Sneijder played backwards passes or sideways balls out to the flank, van Bommel was powerless to stop him. Inter formed a 4 v 2 out on the left.


...then spread...

Milan’s narrow three-man midfield had to shuttle across to that side of the pitch. Not only did this not really help the situation in the right-back zone, it also left them exposed on the opposite side of the pitch. Therefore, Inter could work the ball out to the right with two quick passes (left) – the first to Zanetti, who came inside to offer a short option, then he’d turn the ball onto Maicon on the overlap.

This was a very simple move, but almost all Inter’s good moments (with the exception of chances created from set-pieces), came from build-up play on the left with the initial ‘square’, or after play was quickly transferred from that zone over to Maicon.

These moments included:

11 mins – ending with Nagatomo’s shot

15 mins – ending with Guarin’s shot

17 mins – ending with Maicon cross

20 mins – ending with Sneijder shot, and a corner

26 mins – ending with Nagatomo getting to the byline to win a corner

32 mins – ending with Guatin crosseing and winning a corner

41 mins – ending with van Bommel fouling Sneijder


...then cover

Considering Milan were so poor at defending set-pieces throughout the game, this continual pressure resulting in set-pieces was very important.

There was one final part of Inter’s approach – Boateng didn’t do much defending but when he saw Maicon moving forward, he’d move out to the left to try to exploit the space on that side of the pitch. However, either Zanetti or Cambiasso would move across to cover (right), and Milan weren’t vulnerable on the break.
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982#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:25:17 | 只看该作者
981楼参考译文
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983#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:27:42 | 只看该作者
国米多次换帅后,本赛季能拿到下赛季欧冠资格吗
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984#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 10:28:21 | 只看该作者
大米两次米兰德比,都有进球,本次还是帽子戏法,可喜可贺
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985#
发表于 2012-5-7 11:58:07 | 只看该作者
975楼参考译文
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ZM:控球与射门之不得不说的故事 2012-05-06 / ffail

下图列出了每场比赛平均控球率(X轴)与平均射门次数(Y轴)的关系,这些数据来自英超、意甲、西甲、法甲与德甲的98只球队。
http://i1 ...
Alex2011 发表于 2012-5-4 23:35


图片都挂了,我想看图,能否上传到风暴?
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986#
发表于 2012-5-7 16:45:17 | 只看该作者
大米真棒!!!
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987#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-7 17:34:22 | 只看该作者
图片都挂了,我想看图,能否上传到风暴?
续梦 发表于 2012-5-7 11:58


975楼有原文,可看原图

再不行话,就点击题目链接,可直接到原文出处看图的
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988#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-9 11:54:20 | 只看该作者
英超37轮最后一场比赛,红军4-1大胜蓝军;

主队上半场还罚丢一个点球,否则上半场比分就变成4-0!

客队唯一进球来自拉米雷斯,这个巴西中场真不耐,比凯塔好使!

蓝军两场不败巴萨,其实他的功劳最大!一助攻导致蓝军主场1-0领先且取胜,一进球导致客战巴萨0-2颓势走向大逆转之路,金子般进球

足总杯决赛,他又是先拔头筹,为蓝军本赛季第一冠立下头功!

托雷斯、德罗巴在他面前都是浮云的
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989#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-9 11:56:41 | 只看该作者
蓝军这场失利,意味着下赛季只好去欧联赛了
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990#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-9 12:12:22 | 只看该作者
四月至今,拉米雷斯出战的蓝军10场比赛中,取得2负2平6胜好成绩,

个人打进4球、奉献1助攻:

5-1客胜热刺有1进球;

1-0胜巴萨有1助攻;

2-2客平为蓝军打进第1粒客场进球,这个进球使得巴萨2球领先优势化为乌有,因为客观上造成比分变成巴萨2-1后梅西罚点球不进的巨大心理压力;

2-1胜红军时打进领先球,帮助蓝军捧起足总杯!

1-4客负红军时为蓝军打进遮羞球
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991#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-9 12:16:08 | 只看该作者
大马在红军时不时良好表现表现,有时还真让人难以取舍

肿么回到国家队时,短板就放大了呢?
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992#
发表于 2012-5-9 12:44:28 | 只看该作者
其实人们最想看到的是控球和胜利之间的关系图,控球和进球次之,与射门的关系再靠后。
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993#
发表于 2012-5-9 12:49:45 | 只看该作者
蓝军这场失利,意味着下赛季只好去欧联赛了
Alex2011 发表于 2012-5-9 11:56

不,还有欧冠夺冠这一根稻草。

这根稻草就是为本场蓝军的对手发明的。

这场红军要不挥霍机会,打对方个8:1一点问题没有。估计意大利教练在想:看来劳资还是蹲坑有前途。
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994#
发表于 2012-5-9 18:31:34 | 只看该作者
切尔西RP大爆发加09年巴萨还债,加上球员铆足了劲,再加上大雨,西班牙德比,总之一句话,天时地利人和,他才淘汰了巴萨,真打,他怎么可能是巴萨对手。迪马不蹲吭的话,小心被拜仁屠杀。
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995#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:03:20 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-5-11 00:06 编辑

Atletico Madrid 3-0 Athletic Bilbao: Falcao wins the Europa League again

May 9, 2012


The starting line-ups

Atletico Madrid lifted the UEFA Cup for the second time in three years.

Diego Simeone named his expected line-up – Tiago was suspended, so Mario Suarez and Gabi played in the centre of midfield. None of the starting XI started the 2010 final.

Marcelo Bielsa’s line-up was also as expected – Fernando Amorebieta was declared fit to start, although he had a poor game, caught out for all three goals.

This was a pretty basic encounter – Athletic dominated possession, but Atletico took an early lead, then were content to sit deep.

Falcao

For the second year in a row, the Colombian striker was the key player in the Europa League final. Last year he won the competition for Porto with a fine header, but here he showed more all-round ability and constantly worked the channels well, having the beating of both Fernando Amorebieta and Javi Martinez and receiving the ball in a position where he could drive directly at goal.

His stunning seventh minute strike was crucial because it set the tone for the rest of the game – until then Atletico Madrid had been pressing high up and contesting quite an open game in midfield. After that, they were able to retreat into their own half and soak up pressure, a strategy that wouldn’t have been as viable at 0-0. His second goal, a brilliant Puskassed dragback-and-fire from close range, furthered Simeone’s belief that Atletico were able to win by simply counter-attacking.

Numbers game

So what of the tactical battle? This was fairly obvious – Atletico Madrid were 4-2-3-1, Athletic Bilbao were 4-3-3. There was a 3 v 3 in midfield, clear battles on the flanks, then each side had a spare man at the back. Atletico could match Athletic all over the pitch and be content with a safety net in defence, and Athletic struggled to play their way through.

Bielsa’s side had one clear possibility to get a man past his opponent – the Ander Iturraspe versus Diego battle deep in midfield. In the semi-final against Sporting, Iturraspe did very well to shuttle past the two attacking midfielders and catch the opposition number ten out (which actually resulted in Sa Pinto replacing his number ten to bring in a more defensive option who could track Iturraspe). Diego isn’t the best player defensively, wasn’t sure whether to press the second Athletic centre-back or drop goalside of Iturraspe, and his awareness without the ball could have been tested more – but Athletic were surprisingly unwilling to bring Iturraspe forward.

Athletic movement

Athletic’s main strategy was to bring their wingers inside at the start of the game – particularly Iker Muniain, who tried to become the extra man in the middle. But their movement was a little too rushed, too frantic and involved too many players moving into the same zone. They weren’t stretching the play, with Markel Susaeta taking up very ‘obvious’ positions in the centre of the pitch.

There were very few runs like those depicted in diagrams 5 and 6 here – the wingers were always moving central. The full-backs were meant to get forward and stretch the play, but the long diagonals were often wayward, and both Adrian Lopez and Arda Turan did their defensive jobs well.

Atletico tactics

Simeone’s side set out in a fairly standard shape without the ball, with two banks of four featuring two very central, very deep holding players. It was rare to find either Suarez or Gabi out of position, and Athletic continually had to try and play around them as they were unable to go through them – and with their reluctance to go wide, this made things tricky.


Line-ups after Bielsa's half-time changes

The Atletico full-backs tucked in narrow, and the wingers tracked the full-backs, then broke forward quickly to support Falcao. Adrian on the right did a good job in becoming a second striker on the few occasions that Atletico got into the final third. Turan played deeper and contributed more to build-up play, combining nicely with Diego. Atletico also did well to initially press Bielsa’s sides at the start of moves, breaking up their build-up play from the back.

Bielsa’s first and second changes

Athletic needed to change their gameplan, and despite the fact that Athletic didn’t get back into the game in terms of goals, Bielsa’s first change worked well. He made two substitutions – the first was a straight swap, with Iturraspe (who didn’t offer forward drive and was too slow on the ball) replaced with Inigo Perez.

The second change was more important – Jon Aurtenetxe departed, with the highly versatile Oscar De Marcos going to left-back. Muniain moved to the centre of midfield in De Marcos’ previous role, and Ibai Gomez was on down the left. This demonstrated that Bielsa thought Athletic were far too vertical in the centre of midfield when attacking, with both Herrera and De Marcos driving directly towards goal.

Muniain, who plays as a central winger when in the middle of the pitch, was allowed to drift wide to the channels and create overloads with the wingers, who also stayed wider in the second half and stretched the play (of course, it also helped that Gomez does this more naturally than Muniain; Susaeta simply change his role).

Within a minute Muniain had moved wide and forced a corner, although this was on a mini-break and thereafter with Atletico sitting deep, this was less of a possibility as Muniain was making runs in front of the Atletico side, where they could watch him closely. Simeone didn’t bother to change his system, as Athletic were using roughly the same formation.


Line-ups after Bielsa's third change


Bielsa’s third change

His next move was more desperate – the hard-working but technically limited Gaizka Toquero replaced Herrera, which meant Muniain moving deeper and playing as the ‘second’ midfielder in a two, while Toquero went upfront alongside Llorente.

Consequently, Atletico were robbed of their spare man, so Suarez became the game’s key player – dropping in to become an additional centre-back to create a 3 v 2 at the back when Athletic got the ball wide, but then moving forward into midfield to make a 3 v 2 in midfield when Atletico had spells of possession, helping the slow the tempo of the game. He made a lot of clearances, and if Falcao was the star of the first half, Suarez was the star of the second – though the glory went to Diego, with an excellent third on the counter.

Conclusion

Often the tactics play a big part in the scoreline – here, the scoreline played a big part in the tactics. Atletico’s approach changed dramatically but fluently once they had gone 1-0 up, as if that had been part of their gameplan all along and had been drilled on how to adjust. Ultimately Athletic couldn’t find a way through. Bielsa’s sides never score enough goals for their dominance of possession, and tonight was a great example of how easier it is to break down a disorganised, recovering defence, rather than one with structure and balance.

Simeone’s happiness with his formation and shape were summed up by the fact he didn’t use the bench until the 88th minute, when Atletico were already 3-0 up.

The final word must be on Falcao – tonight was a masterclass in how to play the lone striker role in a counter-attacking side – he was ruthless in the penalty box, but also clever with his movement and the manner with which he received the ball, always on the run towards goal.
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996#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:06:57 | 只看该作者
995楼参考译文
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997#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:09:07 | 只看该作者
题目很有意思的,当然也反映了主旨内容

法尔考上赛季就是欧联杯最佳射手,本赛季决赛时又打进2球为马竞三年内再夺欧联杯冠军立下汗马功劳的

看来马竞引入他也不亏啦!
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998#
发表于 2012-5-18 15:33:33 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-5-18 15:35 编辑

Wigan stay up after a switch to 3-4-3
May 16, 2012

The surprise package in the second half of Premier League season was the only side who switched to a back three on a permanent basis.

Background

It seems odd to trace Roberto Martinez’s successful experiment with a three-man defence back to an eight-goal defeat, but that’s where we’re going to start. On the final day of the 2009/10 season, Wigan travelled to Stamford Bridge, where Chelsea needed a win to make sure of the Premier League title. Chelsea won 8-0.


Wigan's formation v Arsenal away (2-1 win)

But that didn’t quite tell the story of the match. For the first half hour, Wigan actually dominated. They played an unusual 3-3-1-3ish formation, with Martinez taking the opportunity to experiment at a stage when Wigan had nothing to play for. They conceded an early goal, a slightly fortunate Nicolas Anelka strike following a set-piece – but from then on they were the better side for a good 20-minute spell. Chelsea, who were relentless and powerful at that point – but actually lacking in shape and discipline – found it very difficult to cope with the fact Wigan were playing three players in very wide positions with the ball, and by stretching the play as wide as possible, Wigan dominated possession.

What went wrong? Well, Wigan went down to ten men. Gary Caldwell was sent off for denying a clear goalscoring opportunity, and Wigan could no longer play with their brave starting formation. The entire point of them playing that match was no longer there, and they ended up losing the second half 6-0 with a ramshackle formation and a half-hearted attitude.

An interesting feature of Martinez’s post-match press conferences is his insistence on looking at a short, 10-15 minute spell when Wigan were the better side – even if it was at the end of a heavy defeat – and taking positives from it. At one stage this season, his confidence that these spells could be replicated over the course of 90 minutes bordered on the insane, considering his side was playing terribly for the majority of games. But this tendency to look beyond the result and see patterns of play in a set period of time is very interesting, especially when looking back at this fine first half performance (with eleven players) in an eight-goal thrashing.

Return to three at the back

Martinez returned to the three-man defence on the 11th February this year, for the home game with Bolton. Before that, Wigan had picked up 16 points from 24 games. From then, they won 27 points from 14 games. The turnaround was extraordinary, and while Wigan have made late comebacks something of a habit, their formation clearly played a crucial part in this season’s turnaround.


Formation v Newcastle at home (4-0 win)

Here are Martinez’s thoughts on the 3-4-3:

“When you play a 4-3-3, you rely a lot on the full-backs to get high up the pitch. You shouldn’t look at a system as away to win a football match, it is the players that play the system. Maynor [Figueroa], Gary [Caldwell] and Antolin [Alcaraz] have been so solid with a back three, and it allows [other] players to be high up the pitch, like the wing-backs. They aren’t full-backs that need to get deep and then forward to give us an extra man, they are in positions where they can do both a little bit better, and we can be a little bit more solid.

“The difference is the width that we get…before, we had to compromise a little bit, when you want to be very attack-minded, the full-backs have to push on, so you leave two players at the back. Now you’re still pushing the wing-backs on, but you’ve still got three players at the back, plus probably a midfielder. In the West Brom game, as Paul Scharner will tell you, we were attacking with seven, eight, nine players and they were surprised it, and that’s what the system gives you, without being weak at the back.

“It suits our players. When you’ve got a Jean Beausejour who is a specialist in that position, you take advantage of that. The back three gives you that. Then there’s the energy we’ve got in midfield, players who can play between lines like Shaun Maloney and Jordi Gomez. It’s so difficult to play against…there’s a few clubs playing it around Europe now, Napoli are one: they play it with Cavani, Hamsik and Lavezzi…this is the advantage of this system – it goes where the danger is…it’s not in defensive lines, it’s not working as a unit of four, it’s not man-marking.”

Back three characteristics

The most interesting part of the formation is, naturally, the back three. Other Premier League sides have experimented with a back three, but generally only in one-off games, and often for defensive reasons.
Martinez has been more committed to the shape, and it’s been interesting how ‘logical’ the statistics of his three centre-backs have been – Antolin Alcaraz, the right-sided centre-back, and the left-sided Maynor Figueroa, play as the ‘proactive’ defenders, happy to track a man, and willing to come up into midfield to make an interception. Gary Caldwell, who plays in the centre of the three, is effectively the spare man and does the dirty work in the penalty box.

Therefore, using the statistics in this piece for WhoScored, there is a big difference between the performance of the ‘outside’ centre-backs, and Caldwell. See the figures for tackling and intercepting, compared to clearances, blocks and aerial duels won:


These statistics take into account a period when Wigan played a back four, with Alcaraz a centre-back and Figueroa a left-back. But, regardless, the separation of duties works very naturally.

Defensive version

The interesting thing about the shape is that Martinez has made it work in two very different guises. There is the extremely defensive, counter-attacking shape (that is effectively more like 5-4-1, with the wide players dropping back a line), that Wigan played in the 2-1 win at Arsenal. That’s not unnatural – at the last World Cup, for example, we saw the usefulness of a three/five-man defence for minnows against stronger sides – if you’re going to sit deep in your own third of the pitch and not compete in an open game, the ‘formation battle’ isn’t so crucial. Instead, if you’re focusing on getting men behind the ball, you may as well employ an extra centre-back to deal with aerial balls into the box.

In the Arsenal game, Wigan sat very deep in front of their own penalty area. They had a 3 v 1 against Robin van Persie, and one of the centre-backs, usually Figueroa, would follow him into deep positions. Caldwell would shuffle across, Wigan would defend with a 2 v 0, with no Arsenal player looking to make a run into Figueroa’s space. The wing-backs became permanent full-backs and picked up the Arsenal wingers, while the wingers dropped back and tracked the Arsenal full-backs.

The interesting player was Victor Moses – although he generally stayed goalside of Bacary Sagna, he sprinted past the Frenchman as soon as possession was won, always providing the out-ball and launching Wigan breaks. The only ‘problem’ for Wigan was in the midfield, where they had a 2 v 3, but since they weren’t looking to have possession, this wasn’t a huge problem. James McArthur and James McCarthy picked up Arsenal’s two more attacking midfielders, while Franco Di Santo dropped back to become an extra midfielder, pressuring Alex Song.

Attacking version

Against Newcastle it was more attacking. Newcastle were playing a 4-3-3 shape, so Wigan only had 3 v 3 at the back. Faced with either playing 5 v 3 with the wing-backs dropping deep, or 3 v 3 with them pushing on, they went for the brave option. With Alan Pardew’s side looking to play quite a reactive game and letting Wigan have the ball, Martinez instructed his wing-backs to get forward and create 2 v 1 situations with the wingers down the flanks – Newcastle were caught understaffed at the back, conceding two goals in the opening 15 minutes.

The most interesting feature of the play, and a small example that sums up the benefit of the 3-4-3 shape, was that Newcastle didn’t know how to press the 3-4-3 with their 4-3-3. The problem was this – Ali Al-Habsi would look to play the ball out to his three centre-backs, so Wigan could get the ball down and play. Newcastle wanted to stop them building from the back, so Hatem Ben Arfa and Demba Ba in the wide positions looked to close down Wigan’s ‘outside’ centre-backs. But this then left the Wigan wing-backs free, and Al-Habsi could knock balls out to the flank, where the wing-backs would then move forward to create those 2 v 1 situations. If the Newcastle full-backs came out to the Wigan wing-backs, then the Wigan wingers would be free.


Newcastle were unable to press Wigan's 3-4-3 with a 4-3-3


Newcastle’s spare man was in the centre of midfield, and they could have been cleverer with how the three shifted across the pitch to close down the Wigan wing-backs, but they still would have been vulnerable to quick balls out to the flanks anyway. In the end, Pardew decided the only way Newcastle could press Wigan (at 2-0 down, and needing the ball) was to switch to a 3-4-3 himself. Newcastle hadn’t played that way before, and haven’t played that way since. Martinez had forced the overachievers of the season to play in an alien way, and that in itself was a victory.

Flexibility

Martinez has also shown great ability to vary the shape within games, able to play 4-3-3 or 3-4-3. Emmerson Boyce can play right-wing-back or right-back, Maynor Figueroa can play left-centre-back or left-wing-back, Jean Beausejour can play left-wing-back or left midfield. “At Anfield we played the two separate systems,” says Martinez. “And no-one would have been able to see the difference [in terms of standard of play].”

When asked if he thinks a sweeper should always play behind two other centre-backs in a back three, Martinez says, “If you play against a front two, you can do that. But if you play against a one and a one, then the sweeper plays in front, because obviously you can’t be three-versus-one at the back.”

Individuals have played their part. Moses’ rise into a top-level player has been crucial, Figueroa’s passing ability means he’s almost been like an extra midfielder when needed, and the signing of Jean Beausejour is one of the underrated transfer decisions of the season. He’s a natural crosser, knows this (rough) system well having been a wing-back in Marcelo Bielsa’s Chile side, and has provided more assists than any other Wigan played despite only joining in January.

But the key has been the system, and the manager who implemented it. Amongst more in-depth tactical analysis of the 3-4-3, there’s a lot to be said for simply ‘doing something different’ if you’re a weaker side in a league – give the opposition a new challenge, make them uncomfortable and ideally make them change, as Newcastle were forced to.

“In a year’s time, there will be a lot of teams playing a 3-4-3, believe me,” Martinez says. “And we’ll have to be able to change, to adapt to it. And that is why it’s so important that players are flexible tactically.”
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999#
发表于 2012-5-18 15:36:57 | 只看该作者
998楼参考译文
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1000#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-19 18:06:12 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-19 18:10 编辑

Bayern v Chelsea – European Cup final preview
May 18, 2012


Probable starting line-ups

If Chelsea did an ‘Inter 2010′ in the semi-final against Barcelona, they need to repeat the trick here – Inter went onto beat Bayern in the final that year.

Jose Mourinho’s side played extremely defensively in the final two years ago, essentially continuing the strategy they’d used at the Nou Camp a few weeks earlier, despite the fact they were playing a much more attacking game in Serie A at the time. Will Chelsea do the same?

Broadly the same approach makes sense. No-one plays quite like Barcelona, but in terms of ball retention, Bayern are the closest thing. Barca lead the way in terms of average possession and pass completion rate across Europe’s major five leagues, but Bayern are second in both categories. Though they’ve always been a side with fine passers, they’ve become even more about retention since the final two years ago – then, they mixed possession play with direct play down the flanks from Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben. Those two are still in the side, of course, but tend to find themselves trying to break down packed, deep defences more frequently.

Selection

Both sides are without key men through suspension. Jupp Heynckes is without defenders Holger Badstuber and David Alaba, plus holding midfielder Luiz Gustavo. The line-up shown above is highly probable, as when Bayern played their final league match of the season (against relegated Cologne, with the title out of reach), Heynckes went for that XI despite having Alaba and Badstuber – regular first-teamers – available. It seemed to be warm-up for this final.

That said, he does have options – two of them. The first would be to play Philipp Lahm at left-back instead of Diego Contento, bringing Rafinha into the side, though it’s difficult to predict Chelsea’s wingers to match full-backs against wingers they’d be suited to. The second potential surprise would be to play Daniel van Buyten – injured for a long spell this season – at centre-back, allowing Antoliy Tymoshchuk into his preferred position as a holding midfielder, and meaning Toni Kroos could move forward into the attacking midfield role.

Chelsea have John Terry, Branislav Ivanovic, Ramires and Raul Meireles all suspended. Assuming David Luiz and Gary Cahill are fit to start in the centre of defence, Roberto Di Matteo essentially has to pick between Michael Essien and Florent Malouda – albeit not as a straight choice in the same position. The thinking is this – in the league he’s generally played a 4-2-3-1, with Frank Lampard deep alongside John Obi Mikel, and Juan Mata as the number ten. Malouda and Salomon Kalou would be the wingers.


Chelsea's 4-5-1 against Barcelona was interesting when you look at their average positions - note both (a) the tightness of the three central midfielders and (b) the fact that Drogba's touches came in a deeper position than the two wingers, as his game involved linking play before the ball was played out wide

But against Barcelona Chelsea were more like a 4-3-3 (or 4-5-1, really) with three holding midfielders. That would mean Essien playing the Raul Meireles role as one of the three central midfielders, with Lampard possibly becoming the most advanced of the triangle. This would push Mata wide, where he played against Barcelona, probably in place of Malouda – who is a fitness doubt anyway. Fernando Torres and Daniel Sturridge are highly unlikely to start – Torres and Didier Drogba never start together, while the increased defensive awareness needed in Di Matteo’s system (compared to that of Andre Villas-Boas) means Sturridge has fallen out of favour dramatically.

General gameplans

There isn’t too much to say here. This is highly unlikely to be a possession battle – Bayern will dominate the ball, while Chelsea will focus upon organisation and counter-attacking quickly down the flanks. It’s difficult to see that Chelsea would be any better off by attempting to dominate the play. Around 60-65% Bayern possession is probable while the game is 0-0.

Battlegrounds

1. Schweinsteiger and Kroos

In Heynckes’ ideal world, he wouldn’t be fielding these two together – he’d have Gustavo anchoring the midfield, leaving Schweinsteiger to venture forward. This combination has only started together three times this season (once was that ‘test’ game with Cologne), and on paper it’s not quite a natural partnership. These are both playmakers, both passers, and while both are intelligent enough to make this work, there are questions.
First, which one will sit deeper? Or will they play as a true double pivot, like Schweinsteiger did with Sami Khedira at the World Cup, allowing each to go forward at different times? It will also be interesting to see how much they look to get beyond Muller.

The potential spanner in the works is Juan Mata – who might play as the number ten, or might play out wide and drift into central positions. Then there’s the further question of whether he drops back goalside of these two players if he’s the number ten, or whether he stays higher up and, like Wesley Sneijder two years ago, combines with the primary forward on the break.

However, the clear positive of the partnership is the increased passing ability. Retention will be better, but more crucially Bayern will possess two players able to slide intricate through balls into the attackers. Chelsea might need to instruct Lampard to press them, though this would obviously leave more space between the lines.

2. Muller positioning

The knock-on effect is that Thomas Muller is highly likely to start in the number ten position. Heynckes has gradually moved away from using him there in the past couple of months, using Kroos instead – he plays deeper and acts as a link player, whereas Muller is more of a forward. There’s a danger Bayern can become a broken team when Muller plays.
However, the last time Muller played high up in the Champions League, away at Marseille, he spent long periods of time drifting to the right of the pitch, where Arjen Robben was positioning. That could happen here, and just by the probable positions of Lampard and Mikel, he’s likely to get more space to the right of the pitch anyway. A trio of Muller, Robben and Lahm could be extremely dangerous.

On a less tactical note, Muller missed two golden chances in the 2010 final before Milito’s second goal, and will be desperate to have an impact here.

3. Chelsea defensive line

This is where Chelsea have to be careful. They could defend deep and narrow against Barcelona because Barcelona don’t have a natural number nine, nor do they like putting crosses into the box from wide positions. But this situation is different – first, Bayern do have a number nine in Mario Gomez. In combination with Chelsea missing both Terry and Ivanovic, his aerial power could be crucial and therefore Chelsea can’t drop too deep.

Second, Bayern have proper wingers on either side who will take advantage of being able to get up to full speed before taking on the full-backs. The caveat, of course, is that both Ribery and Robben play as inverted wingers and naturally want to come inside onto their stronger foot. Therefore, Chelsea will want to show them down the line, but not so much that they have time to cross – as both can do so, even with their weaker foot. It’s a complex equation for what should be a very simple problem – the basic conclusion is that Chelsea’s full-backs need to play well.

4. Drogba

Drogba is made for this game – as a cup final specialist, in a side defending deep and likely to play direct, and probably up against Tymoshchuk, not a natural centre-back. There’s something brilliantly unsubtle about Drogba’s game – whereas Chelsea spent months trying to supply Torres with the intricate, clever through-balls, now they can just lump the ball in Drogba’s general direction. That’s an exaggeration, and they won’t be hoofing it, but Drogba’s superb first-half strike against Tottenham in the FA Cup semi-final showed that this approach can work. Against Barcelona in the Nou Camp, Chelsea’s most frequent passing combination was Petr Cech to Drogba.

How can Bayern be more secure? Maybe Heynckes will want his full-backs being more cautious, only going forward one at a time in order to keep a 3 v 1 at the back, but ultra-direct play will probably take them out of the equation anyway. The probable solution is for Bayern to play with a high line – they’ll be slightly more confident about coping with Drogba’s pace than his aerial power, so will look to push him up away from goal.



5. Chelsea transitions

This is absolutely key. Di Matteo will have studied Dortmund’s 5-2 German Cup final victory over Bayern last weekend, and noted how efficient and dangerous they were on the break. The formula was simple – Dortmund’s attacking midfielder Shinji Kagawa make himself available for the out-ball, then the Dortmund wingers Kevin Grosskreutz and Jakub Blaszczykowski immediately sped past the Bayern full-backs, taking advantage of a moment’s hesistation from Lahm and Alaba when Bayern lost the ball. Quickly, 3 v 2 and 4 v 3 situations emerged on the break.

The absence of Ramires is a huge blow in this respect, but Malouda and Kalou have the discipline and energy required to form a second bank of four, then burst towards goal. But it’s important that Chelsea have a clear line of service to them – Lampard has been brilliant playing balls out to Ramires from deep in recent weeks and will need to do the same here, and if Mata plays as the number ten, he has to be intelligent with his movement like Kagawa was, moving deep into the channels and finding space, then laying the ball off quickly for the wingers speeding past him.


Perhaps there’s a wider context here. Real Madrid beat Barcelona to La Liga, with transition-based play overcoming tiki-taka. Dortmund’s victory over Bayern was something similar, as was Atletico’s win over Athletic in the Europa League final. Such results are hardly indicative of a seismic shift, but a win for Chelsea would be yet another victory for reactive football.
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