11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

pedro

从客场2-0到2-1是个小转折，但到吃点球比分变成3-1时，教练和队员都乱了方寸

比如由拉维奇去禁区争头球，就是件滑稽事情

pedro

Where do Premier League sides attack from?
March 15, 2012

In an individual match, it’s easy to see that a side have a bias towards one particular flank. In Monday’s 2-1 win over Newcastle, Arsenal constantly attacked down the right, with Theo Walcott staying wide on that flank, and Alex-Oxlade Chamberlain moving inside from the left.

That was surprising when you looked at the opposition, because Newcastle were likely to be more secure down their left (where Jonas Gutierrez protects his full-back well) than down the right, where the ill-disciplined Hatem Ben Arfa was reluctantly fielded.

But the bias towards the right, while exaggerated in that game, is actually typical of Arsenal this season, and in the last couple of years. This season, they play 37% down the right, 30% down the left, and 33% through the middle of the pitch. Both their goals on Monday came after right-wing crosses, and Alan Pardew – a coach who likes statistics and analysing the opposition before matches – would have been aware of that threat. Stopping the danger, of course, is a different matter.

With that in mind, a look at the route of attack for each Premier League team over the course of the season, with stats from WhoScored, is interesting. If balance is more important than symmetry, sides have plenty of freedom to attack down one flank much more than the other, and there are plenty of variations between teams.

Here’s a graph showing the percentage of attacking play down the left, through the middle and down the right for each Premier League club:



Clearly, the graph is difficult to read with so many lines close to each other, and the obvious conclusion is that a lot of sides attack in the same way – when they get the ball in the centre, they spread the play to the flanks and drive forward from there.

However, there are some obvious exceptions to this pattern, and some sides stand out. Here are six sides whose approach is of interest, highlighted in different colours:



Orange: Wolves, who attack more down the left than any team.

Grey: Stoke, who attack down the right more than any team.

Black: Fulham, the only side to attack more down the middle than down either flank.

Blue: Everton, who attack down the centre the least of any team.

Pink: Arsenal, rising steadily to the right

Green: Blackburn, rising steadily to the left

To show these six sides more clearly, here they are without the other 14 sides, with the red dotted line denoting the average of all twenty sides:



All of these examples have their reasons. Wolves’ main threat in attack is left-winger Matt Jarvis (despite a disappointing season compared to 2010/11), so they usually play down that flank. They don’t really have a permanent right-winger – no single player has started there more than six times this season.

Stoke’s right-sided is slightly more surprising, because Matthew Etherington has enjoyed a better campaign than Jermaine Pennant, and generally stays wide on the left. In fact, the right of the Stoke side is the one area of the team where places are up for grabs, so it’s surprising so much of their play is focused down that flank.

Fulham’s central tendencies have an obvious cause – the wide players generally come inside into the centre of the pitch, because few are natural wingers. Brian Ruiz, Clint Dempsey and Moussa Dembele are obvious examples, and even Damien Duff has been fielded more frequently on the right than the left, despite being left-footed. Fulham’s style in this respect hasn’t changed too much from their days under Roy Hodgson in 2009/10, despite changing coach twice since then.

Everton’s reluctance to play down the centre owes much to playing so many passes down the left. Despite being a left-back, Leighton Baines is one of their more creative, technically-gifted players, and playing through him is a key part of their approach. The return of Steven Pienaar also maximises this effect.

Arsenal’s right-sided bias was mentioned earlier, though it would be interesting to see how this has changed based upon which full-backs they’ve had available – their play down the flanks suffered significantly when they had to play centre-backs out of position there.

Blackburn’s left-sided bias can be attributed to Junior Hoilett, their best attacking performer this season. Like Wolves, Blackburn don’t have a permanent right-sided player, with no-one starting more than eight games this season on the flank.

Finally, it’s worth considering whether league position is related to attacking approach. This graph shows the top seven sides in green, the bottom five in red, and the eight other sides in orange (using the clear splits in the league table to form the three groupings):



It’s notable that the sides in green are all broadly in the centre of the spectrum.

In fact, the three sides closest to the average (35%-29%-36%) are Chelsea, Manchester United and Manchester City. It’s dangerous to form too many conclusions based upon a small sample size, but this might indicate that the best sides offer a threat from all three angles, and are less predictable than the likes of Wolves and Stoke.

pedro

852楼参考译文

pedro

Athletic Bilbao 2-1 Manchester United: same as the first leg
March 15, 2012


The starting line-ups

Athletic produced another excellent display, and again should have won the game by more than one goal.

Marcelo Bielsa was able to bring back Fernando Amorebieta after suspension, in place of Mikel San Jose. The rest of the side was unchanged from the first leg.

Sir Alex Ferguson surprisingly left out both Danny Welbeck and Javier Hernandez. Michael Carrick came into the centre of midfield, and Tom Cleverley started on the right.

This game went remarkably similar to the first leg – Athletic dominated, wasted chances, then United got a late goal to make the scoreline close.

Ferguson tactics

Athletic were obviously going to play the same way as the first game, and the focus here was on what United would do. After all, they needed to win the game and also needed to score two goals – neither of which they accomplished.
The decision to leave out both Welbeck and Hernandez was an odd one, and not merely because they needed to score. Granted, neither has been in good form recently, but Athletic play a very high defensive line, and therefore are vulnerable to pace in behind. With United uncomfortable with the pressing in midfield, they might have liked the option to play longer balls in behind the defence – Rooney had a half-chance through this route within the first minute, but that was a rare sight of goal.

The selection of Ryan Giggs was also surprising – he’s simply not mobile enough for a game of this intensity, and didn’t do enough without the ball. Arguably United’s major mistake in the first leg was letting Ander Iturraspe have so much time on the ball (he was Rooney’s man in the first leg), and Giggs was passive defensively. He did make some good runs in behind the defence, but passes rarely found him.

The selection of Cleverley on the flank was odd, even considering the lack of options on the wing. Park and he were in each other’s roles, although it did make sense to have Park in the centre for mobility alongside Carrick.

Man-marking in midfield

Both central midfield duos looked to mark each other – often Park Ji-Sung up against Ander Herrera, and Michael Carrick with Oscar De Marcos. This created a frantic midfield zone based around movement, tracking and rotation of positions – Athletic were more comfortable with this, and fared better.

To give United some credit, they realised the challenge they were facing and did attempt to be more proactive than the first leg by closing down. When Giggs did get goalside of Iturraspe, all the players in the midfield zone were marked, which meant it was up to the centre-backs to bring the ball out of defence. Javi Martinez did this excellently, and created the chance for Iker Muniain’s shot off the post. Jonny Evans tried to do the same, but Athletic shut him down well.

Elsewhere, Athletic did the same as in the first leg. Quick passing, one-twos – and a bit of cultured route one with Fernando Llorente’s goal. They also got the full-backs forward more than in the first leg, with both Jon Aurtenetxe and Andoni Iraolo doing that run typical of a Bielsa side – the full-backs taking advantage of the wingers stretching play and creating gaps in the middle, by charging straight towards goal from wide. Iraola nearly scored a goal of the season contender in the second half.

Athletic’s intensity was terrific and they showed an ability to calm their passing and see out the game late in the second half. It’s difficult to say too much more – if you missed the game, try to watch it somehow.

Conclusion

Athletic dominated over two legs, but they probably won the tie in the first match. It put United in a position where they had to attack here, and Athletic barely let them get into the final third.

This should act as something of a wake-up call to United (and perhaps English football in general) – Athletic looked light years ahead of United in terms of their attitude when they didn’t have possession, and moved the ball so much quicker.

This will win Athletic a lot of fans, many of whom will be wondering why they are down in 7th in La Liga. There are two main answers to that question: first, they took a while to adjust to Bielsa’s methods and didn’t win any of their first six league games. Second, they have been wildly inconsistent, putting together consecutive wins only once all season. It’s difficult to play at this intensity every match, and they are more suited to cup competitions where they can put maximum effort into a few games. That’s why they’re doing well in the Europa League and in the final of the Copa del Rey, but those successes will probably come at the expense of league form.

pedro

854楼参考译文
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毕尔巴鄂2-1曼联战术分析：弗格森用人成疑，巴斯克人再度统治
2012-03-17 / maryantonia

毕尔巴鄂又奉献了一场精彩的比赛，而且应该不止只赢一个球。

贝尔萨这次可以派上之前停赛的阿莫雷比埃塔了，用他换下了圣何塞。跟第一回合相比，阵容再没有其他的变化了。

而弗格森爵士却没有派上维尔贝克和小豌豆，这让人非常惊讶。于是卡里克来到了中场中路，克莱弗利出现在右路。

这场比赛跟第一回合惊人地相似——毕尔巴鄂完全占据了主动，浪费了太多了机会，而曼联在很晚的时候才得以追回一球，缩小了一点比分差距。

弗格森爵士的战术

毕尔巴鄂竞技显然会采取跟首回合相同的战术，焦点在于曼联这次将会如何应对。毕竟，他们需要赢下比赛，还需要打进两个球——结果他们一样都没完成。

不让维尔贝克和小豌豆首发实在让人费解，倒不仅仅是因为需要他们来进球。诚然，他俩最近的状态都不太好，但是毕尔巴鄂竞技打的是高位防守，对身后的速度相当忌惮。曼联并不擅长中场的压迫，他们可能会选择通过长传来越过对方的防线——鲁尼在开场第一分钟就几乎得手，但是那脚射门差的太远。

选择吉格斯也很令人吃惊——简单地说他的移动不足以应对这么高强度的比赛，而且无球状态下做的也不够好。可以说，曼联在首回合最大的错误就是让伊图拉斯佩有太多的拿球时间（第一回合里他跟鲁尼互相对抗），而吉格斯的防守相当被动。虽然他在对方后防线身后的跑动颇有亮点，但队友的传球很难能到他的脚下。

就算考虑到边路可用的人并不多，选择克莱弗利也不很常见。他其实是跟朴智星互换了角色，不过位于中路的朴智星在卡里克身边游曳还是很有用的。

中场的对抗

两边中路双人组互相对位——通常来说朴智星上前应对埃雷拉，卡里克则是德马科斯。这在中路造成了一块争斗相当激烈的区域，相互之间不停地移动、追逐以及换位——毕尔巴鄂这边看起来更得心应手，表现得也更好。

曼联的表现也是有亮点的，他们认识到了自己将要面对的挑战，所以试图通过贴身紧逼而表现的比首回合更加积极主动。当吉格斯确实在伊图拉斯佩身边得到了进球机会时，中场区域所有的球员都被盯死，这意味着只能靠中后卫把球从后防线上传出来。哈维-马丁内斯在这方面做得非常出色，他为穆尼亚因创造出了一次很好的机会，但是后者击中了门柱。埃文斯也试图这么做，但是毕尔巴鄂竞技的队员完全把他冻结了。

别的方面毕尔巴鄂竞技做得跟首回合基本一样。迅速的传球和精妙二过一——略伦特的进球就来自于这种熟稔的配合。他们的边后卫比第一回合压得更靠前，奥尔特内切和伊劳拉的表现一看就是贝尔萨的球员——边后卫利用边锋的扯动，在中场创造出空档，从两边直接攻向球门。伊劳拉在下半场几乎打进了赛季首球。

毕尔巴鄂的紧逼非常恐怖，下半时后半段他们也表现出了减缓节奏控制住比赛。百闻不如一见——如果你错过了这场比赛，一定要找机会补看。

结论

在两个回合中，毕尔巴鄂都统治了比赛。也许他们在首回合就赢下了这次对抗。客场胜利让曼联处于必须要在这里进攻的地步，但毕尔巴鄂竞技却几乎没有让对方进入过自己的腹地。

应该给曼联敲响警钟了（或许整个英国足球界都该清醒过来）——毕尔巴鄂竞技已经甩开了曼联几条街，光从他们无球状态下的态度就看得出来，而且他们运球的速度要快很多。

这给毕尔巴鄂竞技带来更多的拥护者，不过他们中的许多人会纳闷为啥这支队伍只排在西甲的第七位。答案主要有两点：首先，球队颇花费了一段时间去适应贝尔萨的战术，前六场比赛都没有取胜。其次，他们的表现有些不稳定，整个赛季只连胜过一次。每场比赛都保持这样的高强度很难，他们更适合打杯赛，因为只有几场比赛需要全力以赴。这也是他们在欧联杯和国王杯中表现出色的原因，不过这些成功的代价就是相对平淡的联赛状态。

Alex2011

Fenerbahce 2-2 Galatasaray: Fenerbahce score two great goals, then go too defensive
March 18, 2012


The starting line-ups

Galatasaray are close to the title after an impressive comeback in the Kıtalar Arası Derbi.

Fenerbahce coach Aykut Kocaman has named an XI similar to this all season – ten of the positions featured his most-used individual in that role. The exception was Moussa Sow, who only arrived from Lille in January, but has been a regular upfront since. Miroslav Stoch has shared the left-wing position with Caner Erkin, while Serdar Kesimal competes with Fabio Bilica and Bekir Irtegun for a place at centre-back, but this was a typical Fenerbahce XI.

Fatih Terim also called on a familiar XI for Galatasaray. This is representative of his usual side, with some slight exceptions – Necati Ates, like Sow, is a January signing and has edged out Milan Baros. Engin Baytar has only become a regular since the departure of Colin Kazim-Richards, while on the left Albert Riera has started more games, but Emre Colak has been preferred in recent weeks.

This was an odd game – Galatasaray played better for the vast majority, but after Fenerbahce went 2-0 up with two extraordinary goals, it was they who were in the stronger position.

Formations

The two sides used different formations, which resulted in an interesting tactical battle. Fenerbahce used a 4-2-3-1 with the wide players forming a second bank of four without the ball, while Galatasaray were a rough 4-4-2. The game was open and exciting, with a quick – but not over-fiery – feel. Both sides were fluid, got their full-backs forward well, and wanted to win the game.

Fenerbahce go ahead

The home side’s shape actually looked quite poor early on, but they found themselves 2-0 up midway through the first half. Sow lacked support, often had to fend for himself with long balls hit down the centre of the pitch, but held the ball up well and made some clever runs into the left-hand channel. His overhead kick was a superb finish.

An interesting battle was going on in the centre of midfield – although Galatasaray were 4-4-2, their central midfielders rarely sat side-by-side. Usually, they had Felipe Melo sitting watching Alex, and Selcuk Inan playing higher up the pitch and pressing the two Fenerbahce holders. Melo didn’t play the deeper role well though, and Alex easily moved away form him to the left, most obviously for the second goal he thumped into the top corner from 25 yards.

Galatasaray get into the game

That meant Galatasaray had to come out and press, which can be difficult when you’re playing 4-4-2 and have two strikers doing little without the ball. The danger with pressing with a 4-4-2 against a 4-2-3-1 is that your two holders will get sucked into a battle with the opposition holders, and leave their number ten free. That would have happened, but Galatasaray were brave in pushing left-sided centre-back Semih Kaya high up onto Alex – a couple of times Semih looked uncomfortable, but managed to get a tactical foul in, to stop Fenerbahce breaks.

The home side rather went into a good lead too early, so no longer had to attack and got dominated. When they did go forward, however, they did so intelligently. With neither Johan Elmander nor Ates dropping into the midfield, Fenerbahce had 3 v 2 in that zone. Inevitably, the Galatasaray wide players got sucked inside to help out, and then Fenerbahce could bring their full-backs forward into play.

2-1

Galatasaray were actually doing something similar at the other end. They tended to play very good combinations in central zones, with Inan moving forward into the hole and Colak drifting in quickly from the left flank, which meant those two, Ates and Elmander formed a tight square – and this eventually resulted in Elmander’s goal.

Before the goal, they’d been building up play in the middle then switching the ball outside to a full-back. Hakan Balta and Emmanuel Eboue got forward (Stoch didn’t track back well, but was a threat on the break with his pace), and Engin Baytar stayed wide on the right and often popped up unnoticed on the overlap.

But this was basically a classic 4-2-3-1 v 4-4-2 battle. The 4-2-3-1 had a numerical advantage in midfield, got players into space between the lines, and had a central attacking playmaker in Alex. But the 4-4-2 could take advantage of the 4-2-3-1’s lack of protection for their full-backs, and the lack of a spare man at the back – that proved crucial for the goal.

Second half


The line-ups from around 65 mins - changes (of personnel or position) highlighted

The second half centred around one substitution on 63 minutes: Kocaman’s decision to take off Stoch and introduce another holding midfielder, Selcuk Sahin. Terim also made a couple of changes – straight swaps with Baros and Aydim Yilmaz on.

But Fenerbahce’s change meant a change of system – Sahin went to the central midfield zone, so there was suddenly a gap on the left. It took a while to sort out who was now playing there, and Eboue took advantage of that immediately by storming forward unchecked and flashing a cross across the box.

When Kocaman’s instructions were understood, it was now obvious that Sow was being asked to play out on the left and block Eboue, with Alex moving forward to become a false nine, in a shape that was 4-1-4-1, or 4-3-3 – but basically with ten men behind the ball, and Alex upfront alone.

Galatasaray dominate

This was a mistake – Alex couldn’t hang onto the ball and Fenerbahce couldn’t get up the pitch, which was a particularly frustrating situation as Sow had been holding the ball up so well. Galatasaray no longer had to worry about Alex between the lines, could leave 2 v 1 at the back, and focus their other eight players on attacking. It was relentless pressure in the second half.

Kocaman used this system for 15 minutes, then realised his error and removed Alex to bring on Issiar Dia, more of a physical presence. But even then, they couldn’t relieve the pressure and Galatasaray eventually got an equaliser after a set-piece.

With the situation in the league – the away side nine points clear at the top with three to play – Galatasaray were now happy with a point, while Fenerbahce clearly weren’t. Terim brought on Riera for Elmander – a winger for a forward, while Kocaman did the opposite – Mehmet Topuz off, Henri Ntsama on. Galatasaray now played more defensively, but still managed to hit the bar seconds before full-time.

Conclusion

Two stages here – first the simple formation battle, where the two sides had different areas of strength, and knew how to work this to their advantage in attacking zones.

Then, the 15 minute period when Alex struggled alone upfront, which allowed Galatasaray to pile on the pressure, something Fenerbahce never recovered from, and Terim’s side effectively won the title tonight.

Alex2011

856楼参考译文

Alex2011

Panathinaikos 0-1 Olympiakos: match abandoned with Olympiakos on top
March 19, 2012


The starting line-ups

Olympiakos are closer to the league title after this game was abandoned because of crowd trouble ten minutes from full-time.

Panathinaikos coach Jesualdo Ferreira played Konstantinos Katsouranis as his highest midfielder, with Cedic Kante and Josu Sarriegi the centre-back pairing – the first time they’d started together all season.

Ernesto Valverde went for a defensive-minded midfield trio, which meant no Ariel Ibagaza, and instead three more functional, hard-working players. Kevin Mirallas, excellent in the reverse meeting on the left wing, played upfront.
This was a poor game, lacking in imagination and excitement. There were simply three battle zones: the 3 v 3 in midfield, the 2 v 1s at the back, and the 1 v 1s on the flanks.

Midfield zone

The major problem was the six players in the centre of midfield, none of whom offered anything like creativity or artistry on the ball. They cancelled each other out, with Olympiakos playing a simple triangle in that zone, and Panathinaikos playing a slightly more lopsided version with Vitolo sitting deep and Simao ahead to his left.

The two most attacking players in this zone were Jean Makoun and Katsouranis, but neither threatened to get forward and influence the game in the final third on the ball. Makoun’s main activity came in the first minute with a good late run into the box, but thereafter remained in position, leaving the attacking to the front three. Katsouranis was, in theory, the home side’s player who should have been linking the midfield and attack, but neither Simao nor Vitolo were good enough to play the initial first pass into him, so he had to come deeper and deeper to get the ball, making Panathinaikos a broken team, and meaning the triangles played in front of one another.

Upfront

One of the few interesting aspects of the game was the identity of the forwards. Panathinaikos seemed to play a fluid system, with both Quincy Owusu-Abeyie and Lazaros Christodoulopoulos taking turns upfront, while Olympiakos played Mirallas as a lone striker, and Djamel Abdoun coming in from the left.

In a sense they were playing in a similar fashion – one natural wide midfielder (Kazim and Zeca) on the right, then a forward on the left moving into a central position, and a centre-forward spending his time drifting to the flanks. In the previous derby, Olympiakos did well by getting Rafik Djebbour into the right-hand channel, and Mirallas did the same – often tracked closely by Kante, who also marked him on the rare occasions the Belgian moved across to the other flank. Neither centre-back duo was consistently beaten by the forwards.

Flanks

So, with nothing happening in the midfield and relatively little upfront, we had to look to the individual battles on the wing. Neither Kazim nor Zeca did anything on the ball and both were removed. It was more interesting on the other flank, where there was a forward high up against a full-back. Owusu-Abeyie was a threat because of his sheer speed, but Francois Modesto played him intelligently, staying deep and rarely venturing forward.

The battle between Abdoun and Panathinaikos’ right-back essentially decided the game, though this was complicated by the fact that Panathinaikos took off Stergos Marinos and brought on Loukas Vyntra at half-time. Vyntra tried to get down the flank, but one mistake cost him the game – he lost the ball, Jose Holevas and Abdoun stormed into the space, and Abdoun scored after Sarriegi was brought out from the back to the right.

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In a simple game, it was settled as simply as that.

Conclusion

This game will be remembered for the violence and postponement, which may have long-lasting consequences – but even if the fans had sat peacefully in the stands for 90 minutes, no-one would have remembered the game anyway.

This was a match lacking in quality, movement and creativity – a lack of drive and ambition in the midfield zone meant a static, cagey game that was lucky it saw a single goal.

Alex2011

858楼参考译文

Alex2011

Manchester City 2-1 Chelsea: Mancini gets one substitution wrong, then two right
March 21, 2012


The starting line-ups

Carlos Tevez and Edin Dzeko helped turn a 0-1 into a 2-1.

Manchester City were without Vincent Kompany and Joleon Lescott, so Micah Richards moved into the middle. Mario Balotelli continues to start ahead of Edin Dzeko in big games, while James Milner was left out with Samir Nasri preferred.

Roberto Di Matteo played Fernando Torres upfront, Ramires on the right and John Obi Mikel in the holding role. John Terry was out.

Early battle

Chelsea lined up in the 4-2-3-1 shape that Di Matteo prefers, with Raul Meireles in support of Torres, and Frank Lampard much deeper. This system changes the role of the wide players significantly: it forces them to form a second bank of four without the ball (whereas in the 4-3-3 they stayed much higher up, especially as Andre Villas-Boas wanted them to press).

This was significant: Juan Mata often got caught too high up the pitch when Pablo Zabaleta made forward runs past him, and when City switched the play out wide they often looked dangerous, particularly after their wide players had come inside and made Chelsea narrow. Ramires, on the other side, is naturally both more disciplined and happy tracking back, and Gael Clichy caused fewer problems.

City dominate but fail to score

City dominated possession in the first half and should probably have had a goal to show for it, but they struggled to create clear-cut chances. Their closest efforts, Samir Nasri’s lob onto the bar and Balotelli’s effort just wide, came with attacks straight down the middle of the pitch.

Indeed, they were very focussed on playing through the middle, with the two wide players coming inside. Often one of the forwards would move out to the left flank, but when they stayed in the middle and one dropped deep, it meant a 3 v 2 situation with Nasri, David Silva and either Sergio Aguero or Balotelli forming a triangle around Lampard and Mikel.

There were further problems when Yaya Toure burst forward into this space – Meireles generally watched de Jong – and it was surprising that City didn’t create more from this zone.

At the other end, Torres generally played up against Richards (probably to combine with Mata towards that side) and drifted wide to the flanks. One area where Chelsea did look promising was when Meireles drifted away from de Jong (who often had to cover too much ground with Yaya Toure high up the pitch, so got drawn to runners) but his end product was poor.

Second half


City's system at the start of the second half

Chelsea made two changes during the second half – Michael Essien on for Meireles, with Lampard up higher, then at 1-0 Didier Drogba came on for Torres, presumably to help Chelsea hold the ball up when under pressure.

But this was all about City’s substitutions. At half-time Mancini took the curious decision to remove Balotelli and bring on Gareth Barry. This meant Aguero and Yaya Toure moving higher, and the intention was probably to get the latter into more dangerous positions, and more specifically to get him permanently into that zone between the lines Chelsea were vulnerable in.

It didn’t really work, though – City didn’t play any worse than they had at the end of the first half, but Chelsea’s fortunate goal meant City simply lacked attackers with the opposition getting ten outfield players behind the ball. They now had too many central midfielders.

Key changes

Mancini inevitably had to bring on another forward, and revert to the system he used at the start of the match, with Toure alongside one holder (though this time it was Barry, not De Jong).

The first forward summoned was Carlos Tevez. Whereas in the first half Aguero and Balotelli played as a front two, switching positions, Tevez was put firmly between the lines to pick up balls in that zone. He played the role brilliantly – whereas Toure’s natural instinct is to drive towards goal, this often isn’t possible when the opposition are playing deep and getting men around the player in possession. Tevez was useful because of his close control and one-touch passing in tight areas – he continually found space between the lines and kept City’s play flowing – Nasri and Silva’s runs looked better when they had Tevez on the same wavelength.

But City still couldn’t breakthrough – Chelsea were playing very, very deep – the defence sat on the edge of the box, the midfield barely crossed the halfway line at 0-1. Aguero, Tevez, Nasri and Silva were playing decent but very intricate football, and City really needed a more static central striker for the other players to work around. Edin Dzeko came on for Silva, Aguero went right-ish, and now City had much more of an all-round threat. Suddenly, they were working the ball wide and getting crosses into Dzeko – they were rarely successful, but they were attacking from different angles, stretching the play, making Chelsea work harder across the pitch. Dzeko’s presence won the corner that resulted in the first goal (a very indirect contribution to the goal, granted, but he was having an impact).

Notably, both Dzeko and Tevez could play with their back to goal – that helped for the Nasri winner, as Tevez’s awareness and touch were excellent when playing the one-two.

Conclusion

Let’s not pretend that this was a tactical masterclass from Mancini – he got his first change broadly wrong, and the second and third substitutions were the obvious choices. Instead, this simply showed what a great range of options City have – Tevez and Dzeko are not merely established forwards, they also offer completely different methods of attack to the other forwards.

This was the sign of a good side – not because of the usual cliches about squeezing out results in a tight game, but because City showed they had flexibility upfront and can deal with different challenges by responding with a fresh approach in the final third.

Alex2011

860楼参考译文
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曼城2-1切尔西战术分析:前场灵活组合，曼乔换人制胜
2012-03-23 / baiy07

特维斯和哲科帮助球队完成了从0-1到2-1的逆转。

曼城无法派上孔帕尼和莱斯科特，因此理查兹移到了中路。巴洛特利继续在重大比赛中挤掉哲科首发，而纳斯里代替米尔纳出现在左路。
迪马特奥让托雷斯突前，拉米雷斯在右侧，米克尔在后腰位置。特里则不在名单。

比赛初期的争夺

切尔西打的是迪马特奥喜欢的4-2-3-1阵型，梅雷莱斯支援托雷斯，兰帕德位置靠后。这个体系显著改变了边路球员的角色：这迫使他们在无球时回撤形成中场四人组（而在4-3-3中他们通常待在前面，尤其以为博阿斯希望他们靠前压迫）。

这种变化是显著的：当萨巴莱塔压上并超过他的时候，马塔经常处于一个很靠前的位置。而且当曼城转移到边路进攻时看起来很有杀伤力，尤其是当他们的边路球员内切之后，迫使切尔西的阵型变窄。另一边的拉米雷斯本来就更有战术纪律性和回追能力，因此克里希并没有造成那么大的威胁。

曼城统治比赛但没能进球

曼城在上半场占据控球优势，而且应该打进一个球，但他们并没能创造出绝对的机会。他们最好的机会是纳斯里那脚打中横梁的射门以及巴洛特利稍稍偏出的射门，都是通过球场中路的进攻创造的。

事实上，他们也专注于从中路渗透，伴随着两个边路球员内切。经常有一个前锋拉到左路，但当他们在中路配合并且有一名前锋回撤时，意味着形成了纳斯里-席尔瓦-阿奎罗或巴洛特利对阵兰帕德-米克尔的3V2形势。

当亚亚图雷后插上到这个区域时，威胁就更大了，因为梅勒莱斯通常盯梢德容。令人惊讶的是曼城没有从这个区域制造出更多的机会。
在另一端，托雷斯通常和理查兹对抗（可能是为了和这边的马塔配合）并且在边路带球。让切尔西看上去有希望的一点是梅勒莱斯可以在远离德容的位置带球（因为亚亚图雷压得很靠上，德容不得不覆盖更大的区域，因此疲于奔命），但他的临门一脚太差。



下半场

下半场切尔西换了两个人---埃辛替下梅雷莱斯，兰帕德压上，1-0之后德罗巴替下托雷斯，大概想使切尔西在承受压力的同时能在前场拿住球。

但这场比赛的关键在于曼城的换人。半场的时候曼奇尼奇怪地用巴里换下巴洛特利。这意味着阿奎罗和亚亚图雷站位更靠前，目的可能是让后者进入更危险的区域，具体来说就是让他嵌入切尔西两条线的中间，这是他们防守脆弱的区域。
然而这其实没有真正奏效——曼城也没有比上半场最后时刻踢得更差，但切尔西幸运的进球意味着曼城仅仅是缺乏攻击手，而对方则有十个人在球路上防守。现在曼城在场上有太多中前卫了。

关键的调整

曼奇尼必然得派上另一个前锋，回到他在开球时所采用的体系，亚亚图雷搭档另一个后腰（虽然现在是巴里，而不是德容）。

第一个被派上的前锋是特维斯。上半场阿奎罗和巴洛特利打双前锋，二者经常换位，但特维斯被固定在两条线之间的区域处理球。他聪明地完成了任务——鉴于图雷习惯于插上寻求进球，这个任务在对手回撤很深且密集防守时是不太可能完成的。特维斯的细腻控球和密集空间下的一脚出球发挥了作用——他不断地在对手的两条线间寻找空间，来保持曼城的进攻流畅——当和他们节奏相同的特维斯在场时，纳斯里和席尔瓦的跑位看上去更好了。

但曼城仍然没有突破对手——切尔西回撤的非常非常深——0-1的情况下，他们的防线退到了禁区线边缘，中场球员很少过半场。阿奎罗、特维斯、纳斯里和席尔瓦踢得合理，但却很复杂，而曼城真正需要的是一个跑位不多的中锋，让其他队友能围绕他进攻。因此哲科替下席尔瓦，阿奎罗来到右路，现在曼城有了更多的全方位的威胁。很快，他们就开始利用边路并且传中找哲科——他们很少成功，但他们用一个不同的方式来攻击对手了，丰富了进攻手段，迫使切尔西在场上更为卖力。哲科的存在赢得了那个把比分扳平的角球(这对进球的贡献很不直接，但坦白讲，哲科对比赛产生了影响)。

值得注意的是，哲科和特维斯都能背身拿球——这对纳斯里的制胜球产生了帮助。特维斯出色的意识和脚感使他们完成了那个二过一。

结论

咱也别假装这是一场曼奇尼战术运用的代表作了——他的第一个换人彻底错了，第二个和第三个换人是显然的选择。相反，这仅仅表明了曼城有太多的比赛方式可供选择——特维斯和哲科不只是纯粹的前锋，他们也能够为其他前锋提供完全不同的进攻方式。

这是好球队的一个标志——不是因为他们在重大比赛中习惯性地拿下了分数，而是由于曼城表明他们有灵活的前场配置，并且能够在余下的三分之一赛程中见招拆招应对不同的挑战。

Alex2011

下半场用巴里换下巴洛特利，将丫丫土雷和昆更靠前了，但是问题又来了，进攻不力了，这个换人是败笔

丢球后，曼奇尼用特维斯换下后腰德容，再上哲科替下席尔瓦，才是反超比分关键

貌似zm是介么说的

Alex2011

萨巴莱塔远射制造点球，昆罚进，扳平比分

特维斯助攻纳斯里绝杀，曼城2-1反超比分

三个阿根廷球员，帮助曼奇尼临场纠错，取得关键一役胜利

Alex2011

野兽复出，意味着席尔瓦地位下降，如果野兽在后面比赛中能扮演好关键角色，曼城争冠还是有希望的

Alex2011

野兽复出，
帮助曼城取得一场重要战役胜利，
也帮助曼城保住了本赛季主场全胜的战绩，
这场胜利使得曼奇尼时代蓝月亮军团创造了俱乐部历史上最好的连胜纪录。

Hawkwalking

萨巴莱塔远射制造点球，昆罚进，扳平比分

特维斯助攻纳斯里绝杀，曼城2-1反超比分

三个阿根廷球员，帮助曼奇尼临场纠错，取得关键一役胜利
Alex2011 发表于 2012-3-23 17:04

小萨那是大禁区边顺势瞎抡一脚，不远。

野兽在助攻前死活找不到它在那哪儿。

昆踢着右锋感觉好别扭。

但在需要一剑封喉的时候，哥几个都不含糊。本场比那个丫丫强，那家伙习惯性的在攻坚战中浪费球权，这个级别的比赛，他是废物。

Alex2011

小萨那是大禁区边顺势瞎抡一脚，不远。

野兽在助攻前死活找不到它在那哪儿。

昆踢着右锋感觉好别扭。

但在需要一剑封喉的时候，哥几个都不含糊。本场比那个丫丫强，那家伙习惯性的在攻坚战中浪费球权，这个级别 ...
Hawkwalking 发表于 2012-3-23 17:13

曼城下赛季要在欧冠上有所突破的话

强势球员是不可或缺的

Hawkwalking

曼城下赛季要在欧冠上有所突破的话

强势球员是不可或缺的
Alex2011 发表于 2012-3-23 17:21

私以为要不他们再买一个冠军级的球员，要不教练的水准再上一个档次，目前他们的整体水准差那么一口气。

当然，俺纯粹胡说，俺看过的曼城比赛不超过三场。

Alex2011

Milan 0-0 Barcelona: lots of little battles
March 29, 2012


The starting line-ups

Both sides created chances, neither found the net.

Max Allegri was without various players, most notably centre-back Thiago Silva. However, Robinho was fit to start upfront.

Pep Guardiola named Carles Puyol at left-back, and used Seydou Keita in midfield with Cesc Fabregas only on the bench.

A brief summary of the tactical battle? Milan often did well to crowd out Barca’s attacks, but Barca should have stretched them more. There wasn’t a key battle, nor an overall tactical theme – but instead plenty of small areas of interest.

Barcelona shape

Guardiola used 3-4-3 in the previous fixture between the sides – it didn’t work that well overall, despite Barcelona getting the win. But it remained the logical shape to use – Milan play with two upfront and one behind, so using three at the back in conjunction with a diamond midfield means a 3 v 2, extended to a 4 v 3, and therefore always the presence of a spare man, which Guardiola generally likes.

This was more like the 4-3-3 system Guardiola has generally favoured throughout his time in charge at Barca, although it was perhaps a hybrid of the two systems. Daniel Alves was filling in as the right-sided defender without the ball, but with Puyol staying deep and central in the left-back position, and dropping in to help the two centre-backs, it’s impossible to say that Alves and Puyol were playing the same role.



It was roughly 4-3-3 without the ball, then 3-4-3 with it – Alves becoming the only true wide attacker, with Seydou Keita or Andres Iniesta drifting to the opposite side sporadically.

In all, Barcelona basically kept a spare man at the back with the use of Puyol in a lopsided back three, despite playing with a back four…

Robinho

The game’s weakest player was Robinho, both in terms of his tactical role and his contribution to the match in general. His role was crucial to the shape of the game – did he track Alves, or stay high up and try to exploit the space in behind? He did neither particularly well – sometimes coming back, more often staying high up – but in central positions. Javier Mascherano came out to meet him, leaving Gerard Pique and Puyol against Zlatan Ibrahimovic.

Interestingly, there was a similar problem in the group stage game at the Camp Nou, when Antonio Cassano played in the position Robinho occupied tonight. ZM said then: “It wasn’t quite clear what Cassano’s role in the side was – a deep-lying forward, yes, but what is that player meant to do when his side has no possession and barely gets into the opposition half? He could have come wider, or deeper, to drag Mascherano further out of position and to instigate an attack. Alternatively, Urby Emmanuelson could have been fielded from the start (which was expected amongst the Italian media before the game) to provide pace down the flank. Barca should have been tested more on the break.”

The same applies here – and Emmanuelson again seemed a good bet for that role. He can track Alves, then try to burst in behind. Allegri might consider this in the return leg.

Robinho was the first man to be substituted, but it was Stephan El Shaarawy who replaced him.

Pressing and sitting

Allegri said before the game that Milan wouldn’t be submissive. This was half-true. Milan did press very well at times, particularly when Barcelona tried to play out from the back at goal-kicks. Robinho’s early miss came after Clarence Seedorf intercepted an underhit Sergio Busquets pass when the whole side moved up to pressure Barca’s defensive players. Also, Ibrahimovic’s first half chance came after Massimo Ambrosini got tight to Xavi Hernandez and made a good tackle. It was noticeable how much Barcelona were out of position when they lost the ball in deep positions – their preferred shape with and without the ball was very different, so they weren’t in a good position when they were dispossessed in their own half.

On the other hand, once Barca got into a passing rhythm in midfield, Milan reverted to a system of sitting deep and narrow on the edge of the box, defending with 4+3+1, with Kevin-Prince Boateng moving back to flatten the diamond and help out in midfield. Their shape was generally good, though they were often too narrow and let Alves have too much space on the right, which goes back to the Robinho problem.



Barcelona’s pressing wasn’t as good as usual. They seemed a little confused about when and when not to press, and who had the responsibility of moving with each Milan player. They press much better when (the out-of-form) Pedro Rodriguez is in the side – he sets the tempo for the rest of the side.

Physicality and midfield battle

One of the main features of the game was the physicality. This was obvious from the number – and type – of fouls committed. Milan broke up counter-attacks cynically in their own half, with Alessandro Nesta literally holding his hands up to acknowledge he was doing this. Barca, more subtly, foul consistently high up the pitch and stop breaks before they’ve even begun.

Of course, Milan are a side based around strength and steel in the centre of the pitch and Guardiola was guilty of over-compensating for this. The selection of Keita was an indication that he wanted to compete in this respect, but Barca would have been better off playing to their strengths with Andres Iniesta in the centre of midfield, and a true wide midfielder on the left.

Iniesta doesn’t like playing in the front three and his narrowness made Barca too predictable, always going down the centre and right, while Xavi had a good game but is more comfortable as the second function midfielder (ie between Busquets and Iniesta from bottom to top) than in a more advanced role. He received the ball too often with his back to goal, and couldn’t see the pitch ahead of him. Keita, the man this debate revolves around, did little wrong personally.

Both sides were both keen not to be outnumbered in the centre of midfield. Barcelona are used to dominating this zone with possession, and Milan do the same with numbers – four central midfielders. Therefore, both coaches crammed players into this zone, and with little width, there were only two corners in the entire game.

It was also interesting that Philippe Mexes and Javier Mascherano both came forward quickly from the defence to get tight to forwards dropping deep into the midfield zone.

Minimal changes

There were substitutions, but only one significantly changed the tactical battle. That was when Cristian Tello replaced Iniesta. This was a good move from Guardiola – Iniesta was quiet and Barcelona needed to stretch the play on both flanks. Tello did that – he’s a natural wide forward and stayed up high. Whereas Iniesta got short passes into feet, the balls to Tello were longer, indicating how he was stretching the play, and he had a couple of late chances.



Conclusion

0-0 is always an interesting first leg result. Does it favour the side playing the second leg at home, or the side who know a score draw in the second leg will take them through?

Both coaches can learn lessons from this game ahead of next week’s re-match: Barcelona must stretch the play on both sides, Milan must use their second striker more effectively.

Barca remain favourites.

Alex2011

869楼参考译文
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AC米兰0-0巴塞罗那战术分析：巴萨未能拉开宽度，米兰压迫回撤得当
2012-03-29 / baiy07

双方都创造出了机会，但都无法破门。

阿莱格里失去了很多球员，最重要的是中卫蒂亚戈-席尔瓦。然而罗比尼奥可以出战。

瓜迪奥拉安排普约尔打左后卫，在中场派上了凯塔，法布雷加斯坐了板凳。

简单总结一下本场的战术对决：米兰在密集防守巴萨的进攻方面做得很好，而巴萨应该更多地拉开宽度。本场没有关键的对决，也没有总体的战术框架——但有很多小点值得注意。

巴塞罗那的阵型

瓜迪奥拉在双方上一次交锋中使用了3-4-3——尽管巴萨当时赢了球，但这个阵型总体来说运转的不好。然而这仍然是逻辑上该使用的阵型——米兰踢双前锋，一个前腰在他们身后，所以使用三后卫配搭菱形中场意味着一个3V2，扩展后是4V3的局面，因此总是会有一个多出来的球员，这是瓜迪奥拉通常喜欢看到的。

这更像是4-3-3的体系，一个瓜迪奥拉在执掌巴萨的历程中通常喜欢使用的阵型，尽管这可能是两种体系的混合版。阿尔维斯在无球时是一个右后卫，但由于普约尔经常回撤并且往中路靠来帮助两个中卫，阿尔维斯和普约尔的角色不可能是相同的。



这大概是无球时的4-3-3和有球时的3-4-3——阿尔维斯成为了唯一一个真正的边路攻击手，而凯塔和伊涅斯塔偶尔在另一边带球。

总之，尽管打的是四后卫，但由于普约尔成为了非平衡的三中卫的一员，巴塞罗那在后卫线上基本能始终保持多一个人。

罗比尼奥

比赛中踢得最差的球员是罗比尼奥，不管是从他的战术角色来说还是他对比赛的贡献来讲。他的角色对比赛的发展很重要——他是否跟防阿尔维斯？抑或顶在前面试图利用阿尔维斯身后的空间？他两个都没做好——有时回撤，更多时候待在前面——但是在中路位置。马斯切拉诺拉出来对付他，让皮克和普约尔对付伊布。

有意思的是，小组赛在诺坎普的那一场也有同样的问题，当时是卡萨诺踢罗比尼奥今天的位置。ZM当时评论道：“卡萨诺在阵型中的作用并不是很明显——他无疑是一个后撤的前锋，但当米兰不掌握球权并且很少攻入对方半场时他到底该做什么呢？他本来可以来到边路，或者回撤，来把马斯切拉诺带离防区，并伺机发动进攻。另一种选择，埃玛纽尔森可以首发（这也是意大利媒体赛前预测的）来在边路提供快节奏。巴萨本来应该受到更多的来自对方反击的考验”。

上面的话在这里同样适用——埃玛纽尔森看上去又是这个角色的理想人选。他可以跟防阿尔维斯，然后试图利用他身后的空间发动进攻。阿莱格里可能在次回合考虑到这一点。

罗比尼奥是第一个被换下的，但是艾尔沙拉维替补出场。

压迫和回收

阿莱格里赛前说米兰不会任由对方摆布。他说对了一半。米兰有时确实压迫的很好，尤其是巴萨在开门球时试图通过后卫将球传出去的时候。罗比尼奥开始阶段错失的那次机会来自西多夫断下了布斯克茨的传球，当时全队都压上试图压迫巴萨的防守球员。伊布上半场的那次机会也来自安布罗西尼紧逼哈维，并做出了漂亮的拦截。值得注意的是当巴萨在后场丢球时他们并不在防守位置上——他们有球和无球时倾向使用的阵型是不同的，所以当他们在本方半场丢球时，球员并不在很好的防守位置。

另一方面，一旦巴萨在中场进入了传球的节奏，米兰就转换成了回撤很深并且在禁区边沿压缩空间的体系。他们采用4+3+1防守，博阿滕此时也回来使得菱形变平并帮助中场防守。通常这个阵型挺好，虽然有时他们踢得太窄了，以至于让阿尔维斯在右路有了大把的空间，这又回到了罗比尼奥的那个问题。




巴塞罗那的压迫不像往常那么好。他们看上去有点不清楚到底什么时候该压迫、什么时候不该压迫，以及谁应该跟防米兰的某个球员。当（不在状态的）佩德罗在场时他们压迫的更好——他让其余队友找到了节奏。

拼抢以及中场争夺

比赛的重要特征之一是拼抢。这显然可以从犯规的数量——以及类型上看出来。米兰在本方半场破坏对方反击，内斯塔往往还双手上举表明他在嘲讽对手。巴萨则不露声色地在前场犯规，把对手反击扼杀在摇篮之中。

当然，米兰是在中场使用身体更多的一方，瓜迪奥拉过分高估了对手这一点。选择凯塔出场表明他希望在这方面和对手抗衡，但巴萨如果采用伊涅斯塔踢中场中路、外加一个纯粹的中场左路球员，从而远离身体流的话可能会踢得更好。

伊涅斯塔不喜欢作为前场的三人之一比赛，而且他踢得狭窄的倾向让巴萨易于预测，他总是向右侧内切来到中路。哈维虽然踢了一场好比赛，但他更倾向于作为第二号的中场（例如介于布斯克茨和伊涅斯塔中间），而不是一个更靠前的角色。他经常背身接球，不能纵观他身前的空间。凯塔作为这场辩论的核心人物，基本没有犯什么错误。

双方都渴望在中场不要被对方占据了人数优势。巴塞罗那以往依靠控球统治这片区域，而米兰用人数同样做到了这一点——四个中场中路球员。因此双方教练共同塞满了这片区域，不打边路，全场比赛只有两个角球。

同样有趣的是梅克斯和马斯切拉诺都会快速地跟出来，紧逼对方那个回撤到中场拿球的前锋。

微小的调整

比赛中有替补出场，但只有一个显著地改变了战术对决。这就是特略换下伊涅斯塔。瓜迪奥拉的这步棋走得很俊——伊涅斯塔显得安静，巴萨需要拉开两翼的宽度。特略做到了这一点——他是个天生的边锋并且顶在前面。伊涅斯塔更多采用短传，而给特略的球都是长距离传球，这显示他是怎样拉开宽度的，而且他最后也有几次机会。



结论

0-0永远是一个有趣的首回合结果。这对第二回合踢主场的球队有好处吗？抑或只需一个有进球的平局就可以晋级的哪一方？
在下周的比赛前，双方主帅都可以从本场比赛中学到很多：巴塞罗那必须在两边拉开球场宽度，米兰必须更高效地使用它们的二前锋。

巴萨仍然是晋级热门。

Alex2011

zm的技术评论认为，巴萨仍有优势，利好在先的

老农民

楼主这个标题，汗一记.................


AC是真心不错啊，制造了两三次绝杀机会，可惜了。



巴萨后防不稳， 进攻只靠梅西，法布雷加斯是受伤了吗？？


如果以这样的状况持续下去，不用碰拜仁，皇马， 连AC，车仔就能把巴萨给办了。

老农民

今年皇马联赛，欧冠双冠无悬念了，

感觉半决赛皇马VS拜仁，会是进球大战，非常非常精彩。

rolex

皇马、拜仁、曼联、德国、荷兰这种类型的队，碰到巴萨、西班牙国家队机会很渺茫。

真正打巴萨、西班牙还得看米兰、国米、意大利这种队。

这么多年的大赛，西班牙最艰难的一场就是08欧锦赛打意大利（联合会杯不算大赛）。

Penelope

Juventus 3-0 Napoli: 3-5-2 v 3-4-3
http://www.zonalmarking.net/2012/04/01/juventus-3-0-napoli-3-5-2-v-3-4-3/
April 1, 2012


The starting line-ups

Juventus were by far the better side – they move two points behind leaders Milan.

Antonio Conte, as expected, moved to 3-5-2 with Paolo De Ceglie the left wing-back. There was a surprise upfront, where Alessandro Matri was left out, and Marco Borriello partnered Mirko Vucinic.

Walter Mazzarri’s first XI is always easy to predict, and there were no surprises in the usual 3-4-3 shape.

The reverse fixture was goal-crazy (although a fascinating tactical battle too) – this was much tighter, and  less interesting than it should have been. It’s rare to get a formation battle like this – although Conte has generally played a three-man defence against a three-man defence – having done so twice against Udinese, and now twice against Napoli.

Battlegrounds

Perhaps the players were prepared for the situation, because the battle in the first half was lacking in excitement. We had a very straightforward situation – see below-right. Napoli had a spare man at the back, there was a 2 v 2 in the middle, and a wing-back battle on the flanks.

The only issue was the battle at the other end, although this was the same  situation as in the first meeting between the sides. Marek Hamsik dropped back and played around Andrea Pirlo (opposition coaches have worked out that you simply can’t leave Pirlo free) rather than playing high up in a natural front three. Therefore, rather than a 3 v 3 at the back and Pirlo free (which would have made goals more likely, at either end), both sides had a spare man at the back, and it was even in midfield.

Movement

So where were the attacking moves going to come from? A decent bet would have been down the flanks, but none of the four wing-backs significantly got the better of their opponent. Stephane Lichtsteiner was more conservative than usual despite one good early cross for Borriello at the near post, and Christian Maggio didn’t last long before being replaced by Andrea Dossena, with Juan Zuniga moving to the other side.

Instead, the focus turned to how one side could outfox the other at the back, and try and void their opponent’s spare man. In theory, Napoli could have done this (especially on the break) with Hamsik moving past Pirlo and high up the pitch. But their transitions were poor – they usually intercept the ball on the edge of their own third and motor forward brilliantly, but here they barely constructed a break in the entire game. Therefore, Hamsik was playing as a midfielder, and Juve remained comfortable.


The four battlezones

At the other end, Napoli’s man-marking system meant their back three was being dragged around. In theory, Paolo Cannavaro was the spare man behind Hugo Campagnaro and Salvatore Aronica, but the movement of Borriello and Vucinic was decent (even if their all-round game and workrate without the ball was poor). Therefore, The Napoli defenders weren’t quite sure of who was picking up who, with Cannavaro often being drawn high up the pitch and leaving a big gap between the two remaining centre-backs. Other times, Aronica was drawn into the centre as Vucinic drifted laterally, but Arturo Vidal was often too deep to take advantage of this – he should have been motoring past Walter Gargano more.

Set-piece goal, Napoli respond poorly

The crucial goal was always going to be the opening goal, and Juve got it after half-time, thanks to a free-kick. The way the goal went in – off Cannavaro – was comical and fortunate, but Napoli had conceded far too many free-kicks within their own third, especially when you consider their previous problems in this area (and Pirlo’s brilliance).

Mazzarri then had to move to a more attacking approach, and he brought on Goran Pandev for Gokhan Inler. Hamsik moved a little deeper, but Napoli now seemed more like a front four than a front three, and they pressed Juve 4 v 4 high up the pitch at goal-kicks. This left Gargano on his own against Vidal and Claudio Marchisio, and when the Uruguyan picked up a booking soon after this change, you wondered how much Juve would attempt to attack towards him on the break, and how much longer he would remain on the pitch.

As it happens, Juve didn’t look to break too much – they focused on keeping the ball (which is, of course, also where their midfield advantage came into play). Mazzarri then brought on Blerim Džemaili for Hamsik and reverted to something more like the 3-4-3, albeit with Džemaili playing much higher up than Inler had been (his position was essentially between Inler’s and Hamsik’s, the two departed players).

Still, he was too high up the pitch to do much defensively, and Marchisio and Vidal promptly combined for a quick attack at the Napoli defence and Vidal fired in. Substitute Fabio Quagliarella rounded it off with a good third.

Conclusion

This was very tight and tense in the first half, and it seemed as if a clever change from either coach (probably Conte, the man more likely to switch formation midway through the season) would decide the game. It didn’t take that – Conte’s decision not to change his forwards at half-time was odd – and it was a set-piece that helped get the breakthrough. The use of Borriello (and three centre-backs) helped the set-piece threat, not that there was any great design behind the goal.

Juve were much the better side, however. They had more strength and more guile, and Napoli’s counter-attacking threat was never apparent.