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11-12 ZM专贴(拜仁1-1蓝军:客队赢得点球大战)

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1#
发表于 2011-8-8 09:22:47 | 只看该作者 回帖奖励 |正序浏览 |阅读模式
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-21 07:39 编辑

ZM文章,大多讨论比赛双方战术运用,段落内容可分为:双方教练排兵布阵、教练中场休息后对阵容所作调整、上下半场各方球员执行力和效果、双方教练指挥用兵的得与失小结等固有几个模块,那么不妨认为,这就是对教练用兵的技术分析帖。因此,借此作为2011-12新赛季几大联赛教头谋略策划和战术运用的讨论贴的引物,不失为一种学习和提高的可行途径。

涉及范围主要是,欧足联(UEFA)下辖的各成员国俱乐部中几大联赛,例如英超、西甲、意甲、德甲、法甲、葡超、荷甲等,以及欧足联直管的欧冠、欧联杯、欧洲超级杯赛事,与之有关的国际足联(FIFA)直管世俱杯等赛事。也要涉及到,间插在这些欧洲俱乐部赛事中的fFIFA比赛日的赛事,即国家队赛事,如12欧洲杯预选赛,14世界杯预选赛南美赛区和欧洲赛区的赛事。当然,重点和焦点还是在欧洲五大联赛、欧冠、欧联杯等赛事上。

英超教练,大多还是会关注曼联弗格森、利物浦达格利什、枪手温格、热刺老雷、曼城曼奇尼、切尔西新教练博阿斯等,他们之间捉对厮杀时斗法,肯定是全世界眼球焦点之一了。

西甲教练方面,皇马穆里尼奥和巴萨瓜迪奥之间斗智斗勇,仍然是重头戏。俺们作为阿迷,当然要关注几位阿根廷教练执教尤其比赛上用兵,如西班牙人的少帅波切蒂诺、毕尔巴鄂的贝尔萨、桑坦德竞技的库珀,在面对皇马和巴萨时,是如何阻击2强唱二人转的。除此之外,马拉加的佩莱格里尼、马竞的曼萨诺、瓦伦西亚的艾梅里、马洛卡的劳德鲁普、黄潜的卡里多、塞维利亚的马塞利诺等,也在关注之列。

意甲教练方面,米兰教练阿莱格里尼和国米新教练加斯佩里尼两位尼姑之间争风吃醋,当然是意甲教头中的主角大戏了。罗马的恩里克、尤文的孔蒂、拉齐奥的雷亚、那不勒斯的马扎里、乌鸡的奎多林、帕尔玛的科隆巴、巴勒莫的罗西、热那亚的玛莱萨尼、卡塔尼亚的蒙特拉等,也在关注中。

德甲教练方面,自然是拜仁、多特蒙德、勒沃库森、美因茨、沙尔克、霍芬海姆、纽伦堡、门兴等教练多受关注。

法甲教练方面,巴黎圣日曼的新任教头莱昂拉多,自然少不了眼球关注;马塞、里昂、波尔多、尼斯、洛里昂、圣蒂埃安等教练也要受关注。

葡超教练方面,就关注波尔图和本菲卡的吧。

内容方面,除了主要转贴上述这些教练用兵的技战术分析zm文章和中文翻译外,可配发相关比赛的视频集锦,也适当补充一些其他来源的相关评论,使之内容也在多元化方面有所丰富,以防一家之言,有失偏颇。

说明,就到这里了。

下面,先从昨晚英格兰足总社区盾杯曼彻斯特德比战说起吧,两位教头也算老对手了,其用兵之道的讨论自然首当其冲。
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1018#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-21 23:21:12 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-21 23:24 编辑

还是那句话,换下穆勒是海因克斯最大败笔,除此之外,拜仁都比切尔西踢得要好的

刚换下不几分钟,拜仁就丢了球

正如当年佩克尔曼换下罗曼一样,想守住1-0微弱优势,却被拖入了最不想罚点球但却难以逃脱的境地
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1017#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-21 07:37:45 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-21 23:18 编辑

1016楼参考译文

---------------

ZM欧冠决赛战术分析:黄沙百战穿金甲,破得楼兰始还家

由 maryantonia 发表在虎扑足球·切尔西专区

May 20, 2012

首发阵容

120分钟的不分胜负带来了残酷的点球大战,切尔西最终捧得大耳朵杯。
海因克斯排出的阵容与人们预计的一样:孔滕托出任左后卫,季莫什丘克出任中卫,克罗斯后撤,托马斯-穆勒首发承担攻击任务。
迪马特奥的首发名单里则出现了一个让人惊讶的名字——瑞恩-伯特兰德得到了欧冠首秀的机会,他占据了中场左翼的位置,而马卢达则留在替补席里。
技战术方面的争斗并没有真的按照切尔西想要的方式来进行——不过点球大战的结果倒是如他们所愿。

控球
跟想象中的一样,拜仁控球占了上风,但是他们上半场的优势比赛前预测的60-65%要稍微低一些。奇怪的是,如果这个数字上升的话,切尔西的攻击才会更加危险——但拜仁并没有在向对方后场的前进中投入大量兵力,也没有施加太大的压力,因此切尔西也没有太多的反击空间。不过,拜仁应该得到表扬的是他们的边后卫都很注意防守,因此德罗巴直到比赛后期才表现出了自己的威力。
中场的争斗
如果一方退守很深,让另一方进攻的话,这样的比赛一般不太会出现“中场的争斗”——因为退守的一方会任由对方掌控比赛,只是集中精力于寻找对方防线后的空间。
然而,这场比赛有些微的不同。迪马特奥使用的是4-2-3-1,而不是对阵巴塞罗那时候的4-3-3(不过,考虑到切尔西多数时间内处于无球状态,实际的阵型分别是4-4-1-1和4-5-1),这一点很关键。梅莱勒斯的缺阵让迪马特奥手中防守为主的三中场只剩下两人:兰帕德和米克尔。胡安-马塔的位置更靠前,他位于10号位置,只能承担一部分的防守任务。
马塔并没有致力于防守拜仁的中场球员,这有两个原因。首先,克罗斯和施魏因施泰格的流畅性让他有些吃力——如果他贴近其中一位,那么这个人就会卡住自己的位置,让另一位前插——于是马塔经常发现自己无法在正确的时间卡住正确的人选。其次,迪马特奥可能告诉马塔要留在空档里,也就是留在他能够接到球随即发起反击的位置,有点像上周末德国杯决赛中香川真司所做的那样。然而,马塔发现很难完成这个任务,而且拜仁的边卫也一直留在很深的位置,这让切尔西的边锋无法发起快速反击,因此蓝军的攻防转换并不是非常有效。

穆勒
穆勒是全场比赛的关键人物。正如前瞻中提到的那样,穆勒在作为10号球员的时候,他倾向于游移到右边。这大概也是为什么迪马特奥在左边翼选择了侧重于防守的球员,这是为了给阿什利-科尔更多的保护,尤其是在穆勒想要越过他的时候。
但是尽管穆勒位于中路偏右,他并不需要真的移到右边锋的位置,因为他已经找到了可以发挥作用的空间。由于兰帕德的位置比米克尔稍微靠前一点点,这也就形成了切尔西阵中最大的空间,对穆勒来说再完美不过了,于是他选择持续地在兰帕德身后拿球。

于是,切尔西同时遇到了两个难题:1. 中场深处的两名球员之一有些冒进地前插;2. 穆勒得到了空间,这时蓝军就显得特别脆弱。比如说上半场有一次,米克尔被穆勒拖离了位置,他留下的空间就失去了保护,因此施魏因施泰格得以迅速前压,在中间偏左的位置得到了一次机会。
伯特兰德的另一个任务是帮助科尔防守罗本,他完成的不错。荷兰人在120分钟之内大概完成了15脚射门,比切尔西全队加起来还要多,但是大部分都来自于他失去平衡或者被一堆切尔西球员围剿的时候。切尔西封堵射门的能力令人瞠目结舌——他们挡住了拜仁43次射门中的一半,这也部分归功于蓝军防线收缩得很狭窄。

攻防转换
不过,切尔西在进攻意识方面其实并没有找对路——马塔很难发起反击,德罗巴则双拳难敌四手,当他游移到边路试图利用自己强于拉姆的空中优势时,右路的长传又没有什么准头。切尔西一直到最后时刻才赢得了一次角球,因此也没能在定位球上创造出机会,而切赫的长传又往往被德罗巴身前的季莫什丘克得到,而博阿滕在补位上也做的很好。
比赛并没有什么技战术方面的进展——在拜仁进球之前,场上唯一的一次换人是切尔西方面用马卢达替下伯特兰德,这看起来应该是出于体力方面的考虑,切尔西的阵型并没有发生变化。
进球
但是穆勒变得越来越关键。除了插入对方阵型的空档之外,他还持续地出现在远门柱处找科尔的麻烦。在他进球之前的大概20分钟内,穆勒有五次出现在相同的位置,而且还让米克尔在切尔西左后方的位置因情急之下的铲球而吃了一张黄牌。从战术角度来看,穆勒是本场比赛的关键人物,他本来应该是赢球的一方。
双方主帅都在拜仁1-0领先之后做出了换人。迪马特奥打算孤注一掷——他用托雷斯换下了卡劳,这时的切尔西已经抛弃了阵型,打算在最后时刻用双前锋放手一搏,这种做法有些绝望,但也非常容易理解。蓝军看起来进球丢球的可能性都很大,但是在他们全场获得的唯一一个角球里,德罗巴以一记精彩的头球让球队起死回生。
海因克斯对切尔西的调整也做出了反应,他又派上了一位防守球员——范比滕替下了穆勒,给拜仁的后防线增加了空中优势。跟切尔西的换人一样,这也只是在最后的五分钟给最需要的区域加大了兵力。
加时赛
只是,比赛在五分钟后并没有结束——切尔西唯一的一次角球机会让德罗巴扳平比分,也把比赛拖入了加时。

因此,两位主教练现在就必须要把阵型调整一下了。对海因克斯来说要容易些:季莫什丘克可以前移至克罗斯的位置,这样克罗斯就可以前移至穆勒之前的位置,这样拜仁的阵型就跟开场时候差不多了。然而,没有了穆勒聪明的跑位,他们攻击的威力小了许多。
迪马特奥的情况要艰难些——他想保持一样的阵型,但是场上却有两名前锋。不过,他并没有让德罗巴或者托雷斯去右边锋的位置(或者换上埃辛去右路),而是让两位前锋通过换位而轮流防守右翼。然而,这个方法让切尔西的右路看起来有些别扭,而且德罗巴对里贝里的那次有些笨拙的铲球还被判了点球,结果罗本却没能将球罚进。
切尔西差点就为迪马特奥拒绝派上防守型球员而付出代价——海因克斯在拜仁进球后决定换人加强防守,而切尔西扳平时迪马特奥却继续让两名前锋都留在场上。他一定曾经想过要换下德罗巴——然而最后还是科特迪瓦前锋打入了制胜的点球。

结论
尽管输掉了比赛,但拜仁却是战术方面的赢家。他们两位拖后中场的流动性持续地创造着好机会,而穆勒的跑位则一直让切尔西头疼不已却无计可施。迪马特奥的球队在防守巴萨的时候表现得更好(即使瓜迪奥拉的球队也创造了机会),这可能是因为他们在那场比赛中多了一名后腰,并非是今晚比赛的防守人选表现得不够好。
确实,切尔西的最后一道防线无与伦比——刚刚伤愈复出的大卫-鲁伊兹和加里-卡希尔表现得都非常出色,而阿什利-科尔对威胁的嗅觉和快速反应则再一次发挥得淋漓尽致。站在球门前的切赫也送上了星级发挥,尽管米克尔并不能覆盖住防线之前的全部空间,但他的任务也完成得勇敢刚绝。
正如欧联杯决赛、足总杯决赛还有德国杯决赛中一样,反应更出色的球队最终获胜。
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1016#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-21 07:33:56 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-21 07:36 编辑

Bayern 1-1 Chelsea: Chelsea win it on penalties
May 20, 2012


The starting line-ups

Chelsea lifted the European Cup after a tight match was decided on penalties.

Jupp Heynckes named his expected line-up: Diego Contento came into the side at left-back, Antoliy Tymoshchuk played at centre-back, with Toni Kroos deep in midfield, allowing Thomas Muller a start in the attacking role.

Roberto Di Matteo’s line-up featured one surprise name – Ryan Bertrand was given his Champions League debut on the left side of midfield, meaning Florent Malouda was only on the bench.

The tactical battle didn’t really go Chelsea’s way – but the penalty shoot-out did.

Possession

As expected, Bayern saw more of the ball, although their first half domination was very slightly less than the 60-65% predicted in the preview. In a strange way, Chelsea’s attacks might have been more dangerous had that figure increased – Bayern weren’t committing huge numbers forward into the final third or piling on the pressure, and therefore Chelsea didn’t have many spaces to break into. Credit should go to Bayern for this, though – the full-backs were reserved and Didier Drogba wasn’t a huge force upon the game until late on.

Midfield battle

Often, games where one side sits deep and allows the opposition onto them don’t really have a ‘midfield battle’ – one side is letting the other dictate the play, and focus upon getting men behind the ball.

This was slightly different, however. Di Matteo’s decision to go with a 4-2-3-1, rather than the 4-3-3 he used against Barcelona (although really, this was 4-4-1-1 and 4-5-1 respectively, considering that Chelsea spent the majority of the time without the ball) was crucial. Instead of having three defensive-minded midfielders, the absence of Raul Meireles meant he only had two: Frank Lampard and John Obi Mikel. Juan Mata was higher up, in a natural number ten position, and only half-heartedly helped out defensively.

There were two reasons that Mata didn’t concentrate on getting goalside of Bayern’s midfielders. First, the fluidity of Kroos and Bastian Schweinsteiger caused him problems – when Mata dropped onto one, that man would stay in position and allow the other forward – Mata often found himself unable to occupy the right player at the right time. Second, Di Matteo probably told Mata to stay in space, in positions where he could receive the ball and prompt breaks, a little like Shinji Kagawa did against Bayern last weekend in the German Cup final. Mata found this difficult, however, and with Bayern’s full-backs staying quite deep and Chelsea’s wingers not able to break past, Chelsea’s transitions weren’t very effective.



Muller

Muller was the game’s key player. As mentioned in the preview, when played as the number ten Muller tends to drift right. This was probably partly the reason Di Matteo chose to field a defensive-minded player on the left wing, in order to give Ashley Cole more protection if Muller tried to overload him.

But although Muller was right-of-centre, he didn’t have to move out to the right wing because he found a little pocket of space to work in. With Frank Lampard playing slightly higher up than Jon Obi Mikel, the biggest area of space between Chelsea’s lines was perfect for Muller, and he continually picked up the ball in behind Lampard.



Chelsea were particularly vulnerable when their two problems [(a) one of the deep midfielders bursting forward unchecked and (b) Muller getting space] combined. Once in the first half, for example, Mikel was dragged across towards Muller, which then left his zone bare, so Schweinsteiger stormed into it and had an attempt from a left-centre position.

Bertrand’s other task, to help Cole defend against Robben, broadly worked. The Dutchman may have had 15 (!) attempts on goal in the 120 minutes, more than Chelsea, but the majority came when he was off-balance, and when he had been shepherded into a pack of Chelsea players. Chelsea’s ability to block shots was unbelievable – they blocked over half of Bayern’s 43 attempts, partly as they defended so narrow.



Transitions

Nothing really went right for Chelsea in an attacking sense, though – Mata struggled to prompt counters, Drogba found himself outnumered and when he peeled away onto Philipp Lahm to try and use his aerial advantage, the delivery from the right was poor. Chelsea also failed to win a corner until the final moments, so set-pieces wasn’t a productive source of chances, while long balls from Petr Cech generally found Tymoshchuk nipping in front of Drogba and Jerome Boateng covering behind him.

The game didn’t really progress in tactical terms – the only substitution before Bayern’s goal was Malouda replacing Bertrand, which seemed partly due to fitness reasons. Chelsea’s shape didn’t alter.

Goals

But Muller increasingly became pivotal. In addition to getting space between the lines, he kept popping up at the far post, against Cole. In a 20-minute spell that culminated in his goal, Muller had five attempts from a similar position, and also got John Obi Mikel booked for a rash tackle towards Chelsea’s left-back zone. He was the game’s key player in tactical terms, and would have been a fitting matchwinner.

Both coaches changed things after Bayern went 1-0 up. Di Matteo went for broke – Torres on for Kalou, and Chelsea went with a shapeless, desperate but completely understandable two-striker approach for the final minutes. They seemed as likely to concede a goal as score one, but from their only corner of the entire match, Drogba pounced with a superb header.

Heynckes had responded to Chelsea’s change by introducing an extra defender – Daniel van Buyten came on to provide more aerial presence at the back, with Muller departing. Like Chelsea’s change, it was simply another man to help in the required zone for five minutes.

Extra time

But it wasn’t just five minutes – because Drogba’s equaliser forced extra-time from Chelsea’s only corner of the game.



Therefore, both managers now had to shuffle their players into a workable system. This was easier for Heynckes: Tymoshchuk could move forward into Kroos’ role, Kroos could move forward into Muller’s role, and Bayern were in a fairly natural formation they could have started the match with. However, without Muller’s clever positioning, they were less of a threat going forward.

Di Matteo was in a more difficult situation – he wanted to keep the same formation, but had two strikers on the pitch. Rather than assigning either Drogba or Torres to the right-sided position on a full-time basis (or bringing on Michael Essien to play there) he asked Drogba and Torres to switch positions and take it in turns to defend that side of the pitch. Chelsea didn’t look comfortable there, however, and Drogba’s clumsy tackle on Ribery resulted in a penalty, missed by Robben.

Chelsea very nearly paid for Di Matteo’s refusal to introduce a more defensive-minded player – but while Heynckes made a defensive change after Bayern’s goal, when Chelsea equalised Di Matteo kept two strikers on the pitch. He must have been tempted to replace Drogba – but the Ivorian ended up scoring the winning penalty.



Conclusion

Despite losing the tie, Bayern won the tactical battle. The fluidity of their two deep midfielders meant they kept on creating good chances, while Muller’s positioning was a continual problem and something Chelsea never responded to. Roberto Di Matteo’s side defended much better against Barcelona (even if Pep Guardiola’s side also created chances), which was probably because they played with an extra holding midfielder in that match, rather than because of the selection problems in defence tonight.

Indeed, Chelsea’s last-ditch defending was superb – David Luiz and Gary Cahill played remarkably well considering both were injury doubts, while Ashley Cole’s ability to spot danger and react to it quickly was once again highly impressive. Petr Cech also starred in goal, and while Mikel couldn’t cover the entire space in front of the defence, he did his job manfully.

Just as in the Europa League final, the FA Cup final and the German Cup final, the more reactive side emerged victorious.
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1015#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:55:47 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-5-20 08:57 编辑
偶猜一下结果吧,大概是08决赛结果吧

点球决胜,拜仁取胜

哈哈
Alex2011 发表于 2012-5-19 18:18


偶猜对了过程和结局,却木有猜对结局的取胜方向

着了历史经验主义的道,嘿嘿!

斑竹,这算不算准准赌棍级别啦
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1014#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:52:51 | 只看该作者
德罗巴拿下先生后来中超,哈哈哈,本朝联赛就引进世界足球先生了。
白与蓝之舞 发表于 2012-5-20 08:46


他下赛季还在切尔西吗?下半年表现还是未知数的
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1013#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:50:56 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-5-20 08:53 编辑

非洲刘德华,太nb了,接连去安慰罗本和小猪,这胜利者姿态作得比刘德华还刘德华,今晨他有介个资本的!

罗本,千年老二的外号该由他顶替巴拉克了! 哈哈
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1012#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:50:33 | 只看该作者
非洲刘德华,他nb了,接连去安慰罗本和小猪,这胜利者姿态作得比刘德华还刘德华,今晨他又介个资本

罗本,千年老二的外号该由他顶替巴拉克了! 哈哈
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1011#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:48:14 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-5-20 08:51 编辑

替补奥利奇罚丢点球,与当年的阿队替补坎比罚丢点球,是多么的宿命相似!
而主力小猪罚丢点球,又与当年的阿队主力阿亚拉罚丢,又是多么的宿命相似!
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1010#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:46:50 | 只看该作者
德罗巴拿下先生后来中超,哈哈哈,本朝联赛就引进世界足球先生了。
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1009#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:40:51 | 只看该作者
我真心希望德罗巴拿下先生,虽然可能性还是不大。
白与蓝之舞 发表于 2012-5-20 08:05


欧希望是切赫!
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1008#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:40:03 | 只看该作者
德国人打点球输给英国人……
白与蓝之舞 发表于 2012-5-20 07:40


也不完全是吧

守门员之战是德国人败给了切赫,不是英国人啦

拜仁三个罚丢点球者,罗本、奥利奇、小猪

但是小猪不应该啦

这也说明德国人不是不可以战胜的

欧在看到当德罗巴头球扳平比分时,就想到了06年阿德之战有关换人和点球大战!

区别很大,但是却在关键处有那么几分极其相似的地方!

海因里斯用范比藤换下穆勒那一瞬间,偶以及张嘿嘿可能都不约而同,有一种不详之感

张嘿嘿,在德罗巴刚扳平比分那一刻就说,介个换人值得商榷。。。

但欧比他却想得更多!欧想着拜仁点球大战,赢面很大的

然而,欧没想到的是,点球大战未到时,里贝里就已经为拜仁先赢得了取胜或者领先的机会,可是罗本罚丢了点球,90分钟之前里贝里曾经打进一个越位球。。。

诡异的是,里贝里赢得点球时,自己先是抽痉了,之后他娘的却一瘸一拐地下场了,难道丫知道不堪点球大战之重吗

120分钟结束,点球大战未开始时,罗本就被己队心理师所干预,可是不幸的是第1轮拜仁5个主罚者竟然木有罗本,这又是海因里斯败笔地方!

点球大战,拉姆点球罚进,不过切赫已经判断了方向,而马塔在诺伊尔门线舞影响下,罚丢了点球,1-0,拜仁领先

第二下,戈麦斯罚中,大卫路易兹也罚中,但是切赫判断方向,而诺伊尔没有;2-1

第三下,诺伊尔主罚命中,兰帕德也罚中,切赫比诺伊尔守门还是较高,尽管比分是3-2

第四下,奥利奇出场,坏了,镜头闪现在他脸上时,就有点阻抑感觉,果不其然,切赫果断用单手打掉了他南辕北辙的点球;而阿什利科尔点球果断命中,3-3!诺伊尔判断不济于事,贺炜老说他又在耍门线舞,显然心里素质不如老道的切赫!

第五下,小猪出场,压力剧增!有一个镜头很有趣的,罗本在加时赛罚点球时,他就背对罗本面对诺伊尔,不敢看的!罗本罚丢后,他还不敢看没回过头来,诺伊尔赶紧拍抱着头的他,提醒他罗本点球罚失了,让他赶紧参与防守,可见德国人心脏也不是钢铁做的,也有不能承受之重的。果然他运气不好,在切赫神勇扑救下,球打在左立柱下角弹出;

就剩下德罗巴了,之前如果罗本罚进他送给里贝里点球,那么非洲刘德华就是车子“罪人”了,是切赫挽救他,现在由他来挽救自己,他木有像今年初非洲杯上那么怂样,他罚进了点球,同样干脆利索!

是切赫战胜诺伊尔!

车子防守帮助他们连克巴萨和拜仁,而最大功臣就是切赫,要不是他神勇,拜仁上半场就有进球的!

例如,在德罗巴头球扳平比分前,车子的角球与拜仁的角球之比是0比16(仅凭看直播时大概印象吧,不太准确的)!

不得不说,车子候补教练迪马涛居绝对是个灵魂巫师,比海老鬼淡定多了!
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1007#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:05:43 | 只看该作者
我真心希望德罗巴拿下先生,虽然可能性还是不大。
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1006#
发表于 2012-5-20 08:03:21 | 只看该作者
我擦,非洲刘德华面前,所有前锋包括梅西跳水都是渣
笑啊笑啊的猪 发表于 2012-5-20 04:16


先拍个照吧


欧是正儿八经的阿迷、西迷加德迷

而且是车子黑,但是看了切尔西点球大战是脱胎换骨,我也为他们精神境界所打动

祝贺他们,他们顶着压力,战胜了自己,配得上这场伟大胜利!

但是他们胜利,用不着任何失败者当替死鬼呀,这是他们自己赢来的

你个大阿黑,尤其是梅西黑!
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1005#
发表于 2012-5-20 07:40:47 | 只看该作者
德国人打点球输给英国人……
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1004#
发表于 2012-5-20 04:16:43 | 只看该作者
我擦,非洲刘德华面前,所有前锋包括梅西跳水都是渣
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1003#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-19 18:18:05 | 只看该作者
偶猜一下结果吧,大概是08决赛结果吧

点球决胜,拜仁取胜

哈哈
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1002#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-19 18:14:33 | 只看该作者
这篇前瞻真能扯呀

扯啥10半决赛巴萨vs国米之战呢
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1001#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-19 18:08:05 | 只看该作者
1000楼参考译文
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1000#
 楼主| 发表于 2012-5-19 18:06:12 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2012-5-19 18:10 编辑

Bayern v Chelsea – European Cup final preview
May 18, 2012


Probable starting line-ups

If Chelsea did an ‘Inter 2010′ in the semi-final against Barcelona, they need to repeat the trick here – Inter went onto beat Bayern in the final that year.

Jose Mourinho’s side played extremely defensively in the final two years ago, essentially continuing the strategy they’d used at the Nou Camp a few weeks earlier, despite the fact they were playing a much more attacking game in Serie A at the time. Will Chelsea do the same?

Broadly the same approach makes sense. No-one plays quite like Barcelona, but in terms of ball retention, Bayern are the closest thing. Barca lead the way in terms of average possession and pass completion rate across Europe’s major five leagues, but Bayern are second in both categories. Though they’ve always been a side with fine passers, they’ve become even more about retention since the final two years ago – then, they mixed possession play with direct play down the flanks from Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben. Those two are still in the side, of course, but tend to find themselves trying to break down packed, deep defences more frequently.

Selection

Both sides are without key men through suspension. Jupp Heynckes is without defenders Holger Badstuber and David Alaba, plus holding midfielder Luiz Gustavo. The line-up shown above is highly probable, as when Bayern played their final league match of the season (against relegated Cologne, with the title out of reach), Heynckes went for that XI despite having Alaba and Badstuber – regular first-teamers – available. It seemed to be warm-up for this final.

That said, he does have options – two of them. The first would be to play Philipp Lahm at left-back instead of Diego Contento, bringing Rafinha into the side, though it’s difficult to predict Chelsea’s wingers to match full-backs against wingers they’d be suited to. The second potential surprise would be to play Daniel van Buyten – injured for a long spell this season – at centre-back, allowing Antoliy Tymoshchuk into his preferred position as a holding midfielder, and meaning Toni Kroos could move forward into the attacking midfield role.

Chelsea have John Terry, Branislav Ivanovic, Ramires and Raul Meireles all suspended. Assuming David Luiz and Gary Cahill are fit to start in the centre of defence, Roberto Di Matteo essentially has to pick between Michael Essien and Florent Malouda – albeit not as a straight choice in the same position. The thinking is this – in the league he’s generally played a 4-2-3-1, with Frank Lampard deep alongside John Obi Mikel, and Juan Mata as the number ten. Malouda and Salomon Kalou would be the wingers.


Chelsea's 4-5-1 against Barcelona was interesting when you look at their average positions - note both (a) the tightness of the three central midfielders and (b) the fact that Drogba's touches came in a deeper position than the two wingers, as his game involved linking play before the ball was played out wide

But against Barcelona Chelsea were more like a 4-3-3 (or 4-5-1, really) with three holding midfielders. That would mean Essien playing the Raul Meireles role as one of the three central midfielders, with Lampard possibly becoming the most advanced of the triangle. This would push Mata wide, where he played against Barcelona, probably in place of Malouda – who is a fitness doubt anyway. Fernando Torres and Daniel Sturridge are highly unlikely to start – Torres and Didier Drogba never start together, while the increased defensive awareness needed in Di Matteo’s system (compared to that of Andre Villas-Boas) means Sturridge has fallen out of favour dramatically.

General gameplans

There isn’t too much to say here. This is highly unlikely to be a possession battle – Bayern will dominate the ball, while Chelsea will focus upon organisation and counter-attacking quickly down the flanks. It’s difficult to see that Chelsea would be any better off by attempting to dominate the play. Around 60-65% Bayern possession is probable while the game is 0-0.

Battlegrounds

1. Schweinsteiger and Kroos

In Heynckes’ ideal world, he wouldn’t be fielding these two together – he’d have Gustavo anchoring the midfield, leaving Schweinsteiger to venture forward. This combination has only started together three times this season (once was that ‘test’ game with Cologne), and on paper it’s not quite a natural partnership. These are both playmakers, both passers, and while both are intelligent enough to make this work, there are questions.
First, which one will sit deeper? Or will they play as a true double pivot, like Schweinsteiger did with Sami Khedira at the World Cup, allowing each to go forward at different times? It will also be interesting to see how much they look to get beyond Muller.

The potential spanner in the works is Juan Mata – who might play as the number ten, or might play out wide and drift into central positions. Then there’s the further question of whether he drops back goalside of these two players if he’s the number ten, or whether he stays higher up and, like Wesley Sneijder two years ago, combines with the primary forward on the break.

However, the clear positive of the partnership is the increased passing ability. Retention will be better, but more crucially Bayern will possess two players able to slide intricate through balls into the attackers. Chelsea might need to instruct Lampard to press them, though this would obviously leave more space between the lines.

2. Muller positioning

The knock-on effect is that Thomas Muller is highly likely to start in the number ten position. Heynckes has gradually moved away from using him there in the past couple of months, using Kroos instead – he plays deeper and acts as a link player, whereas Muller is more of a forward. There’s a danger Bayern can become a broken team when Muller plays.
However, the last time Muller played high up in the Champions League, away at Marseille, he spent long periods of time drifting to the right of the pitch, where Arjen Robben was positioning. That could happen here, and just by the probable positions of Lampard and Mikel, he’s likely to get more space to the right of the pitch anyway. A trio of Muller, Robben and Lahm could be extremely dangerous.

On a less tactical note, Muller missed two golden chances in the 2010 final before Milito’s second goal, and will be desperate to have an impact here.

3. Chelsea defensive line

This is where Chelsea have to be careful. They could defend deep and narrow against Barcelona because Barcelona don’t have a natural number nine, nor do they like putting crosses into the box from wide positions. But this situation is different – first, Bayern do have a number nine in Mario Gomez. In combination with Chelsea missing both Terry and Ivanovic, his aerial power could be crucial and therefore Chelsea can’t drop too deep.

Second, Bayern have proper wingers on either side who will take advantage of being able to get up to full speed before taking on the full-backs. The caveat, of course, is that both Ribery and Robben play as inverted wingers and naturally want to come inside onto their stronger foot. Therefore, Chelsea will want to show them down the line, but not so much that they have time to cross – as both can do so, even with their weaker foot. It’s a complex equation for what should be a very simple problem – the basic conclusion is that Chelsea’s full-backs need to play well.

4. Drogba

Drogba is made for this game – as a cup final specialist, in a side defending deep and likely to play direct, and probably up against Tymoshchuk, not a natural centre-back. There’s something brilliantly unsubtle about Drogba’s game – whereas Chelsea spent months trying to supply Torres with the intricate, clever through-balls, now they can just lump the ball in Drogba’s general direction. That’s an exaggeration, and they won’t be hoofing it, but Drogba’s superb first-half strike against Tottenham in the FA Cup semi-final showed that this approach can work. Against Barcelona in the Nou Camp, Chelsea’s most frequent passing combination was Petr Cech to Drogba.

How can Bayern be more secure? Maybe Heynckes will want his full-backs being more cautious, only going forward one at a time in order to keep a 3 v 1 at the back, but ultra-direct play will probably take them out of the equation anyway. The probable solution is for Bayern to play with a high line – they’ll be slightly more confident about coping with Drogba’s pace than his aerial power, so will look to push him up away from goal.



5. Chelsea transitions

This is absolutely key. Di Matteo will have studied Dortmund’s 5-2 German Cup final victory over Bayern last weekend, and noted how efficient and dangerous they were on the break. The formula was simple – Dortmund’s attacking midfielder Shinji Kagawa make himself available for the out-ball, then the Dortmund wingers Kevin Grosskreutz and Jakub Blaszczykowski immediately sped past the Bayern full-backs, taking advantage of a moment’s hesistation from Lahm and Alaba when Bayern lost the ball. Quickly, 3 v 2 and 4 v 3 situations emerged on the break.

The absence of Ramires is a huge blow in this respect, but Malouda and Kalou have the discipline and energy required to form a second bank of four, then burst towards goal. But it’s important that Chelsea have a clear line of service to them – Lampard has been brilliant playing balls out to Ramires from deep in recent weeks and will need to do the same here, and if Mata plays as the number ten, he has to be intelligent with his movement like Kagawa was, moving deep into the channels and finding space, then laying the ball off quickly for the wingers speeding past him.


Perhaps there’s a wider context here. Real Madrid beat Barcelona to La Liga, with transition-based play overcoming tiki-taka. Dortmund’s victory over Bayern was something similar, as was Atletico’s win over Athletic in the Europa League final. Such results are hardly indicative of a seismic shift, but a win for Chelsea would be yet another victory for reactive football.
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999#
发表于 2012-5-18 15:36:57 | 只看该作者
998楼参考译文
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998#
发表于 2012-5-18 15:33:33 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 colinfirth 于 2012-5-18 15:35 编辑

Wigan stay up after a switch to 3-4-3
May 16, 2012

The surprise package in the second half of Premier League season was the only side who switched to a back three on a permanent basis.

Background

It seems odd to trace Roberto Martinez’s successful experiment with a three-man defence back to an eight-goal defeat, but that’s where we’re going to start. On the final day of the 2009/10 season, Wigan travelled to Stamford Bridge, where Chelsea needed a win to make sure of the Premier League title. Chelsea won 8-0.


Wigan's formation v Arsenal away (2-1 win)

But that didn’t quite tell the story of the match. For the first half hour, Wigan actually dominated. They played an unusual 3-3-1-3ish formation, with Martinez taking the opportunity to experiment at a stage when Wigan had nothing to play for. They conceded an early goal, a slightly fortunate Nicolas Anelka strike following a set-piece – but from then on they were the better side for a good 20-minute spell. Chelsea, who were relentless and powerful at that point – but actually lacking in shape and discipline – found it very difficult to cope with the fact Wigan were playing three players in very wide positions with the ball, and by stretching the play as wide as possible, Wigan dominated possession.

What went wrong? Well, Wigan went down to ten men. Gary Caldwell was sent off for denying a clear goalscoring opportunity, and Wigan could no longer play with their brave starting formation. The entire point of them playing that match was no longer there, and they ended up losing the second half 6-0 with a ramshackle formation and a half-hearted attitude.

An interesting feature of Martinez’s post-match press conferences is his insistence on looking at a short, 10-15 minute spell when Wigan were the better side – even if it was at the end of a heavy defeat – and taking positives from it. At one stage this season, his confidence that these spells could be replicated over the course of 90 minutes bordered on the insane, considering his side was playing terribly for the majority of games. But this tendency to look beyond the result and see patterns of play in a set period of time is very interesting, especially when looking back at this fine first half performance (with eleven players) in an eight-goal thrashing.

Return to three at the back

Martinez returned to the three-man defence on the 11th February this year, for the home game with Bolton. Before that, Wigan had picked up 16 points from 24 games. From then, they won 27 points from 14 games. The turnaround was extraordinary, and while Wigan have made late comebacks something of a habit, their formation clearly played a crucial part in this season’s turnaround.


Formation v Newcastle at home (4-0 win)

Here are Martinez’s thoughts on the 3-4-3:

“When you play a 4-3-3, you rely a lot on the full-backs to get high up the pitch. You shouldn’t look at a system as away to win a football match, it is the players that play the system. Maynor [Figueroa], Gary [Caldwell] and Antolin [Alcaraz] have been so solid with a back three, and it allows [other] players to be high up the pitch, like the wing-backs. They aren’t full-backs that need to get deep and then forward to give us an extra man, they are in positions where they can do both a little bit better, and we can be a little bit more solid.

“The difference is the width that we get…before, we had to compromise a little bit, when you want to be very attack-minded, the full-backs have to push on, so you leave two players at the back. Now you’re still pushing the wing-backs on, but you’ve still got three players at the back, plus probably a midfielder. In the West Brom game, as Paul Scharner will tell you, we were attacking with seven, eight, nine players and they were surprised it, and that’s what the system gives you, without being weak at the back.

“It suits our players. When you’ve got a Jean Beausejour who is a specialist in that position, you take advantage of that. The back three gives you that. Then there’s the energy we’ve got in midfield, players who can play between lines like Shaun Maloney and Jordi Gomez. It’s so difficult to play against…there’s a few clubs playing it around Europe now, Napoli are one: they play it with Cavani, Hamsik and Lavezzi…this is the advantage of this system – it goes where the danger is…it’s not in defensive lines, it’s not working as a unit of four, it’s not man-marking.”

Back three characteristics

The most interesting part of the formation is, naturally, the back three. Other Premier League sides have experimented with a back three, but generally only in one-off games, and often for defensive reasons.
Martinez has been more committed to the shape, and it’s been interesting how ‘logical’ the statistics of his three centre-backs have been – Antolin Alcaraz, the right-sided centre-back, and the left-sided Maynor Figueroa, play as the ‘proactive’ defenders, happy to track a man, and willing to come up into midfield to make an interception. Gary Caldwell, who plays in the centre of the three, is effectively the spare man and does the dirty work in the penalty box.

Therefore, using the statistics in this piece for WhoScored, there is a big difference between the performance of the ‘outside’ centre-backs, and Caldwell. See the figures for tackling and intercepting, compared to clearances, blocks and aerial duels won:


These statistics take into account a period when Wigan played a back four, with Alcaraz a centre-back and Figueroa a left-back. But, regardless, the separation of duties works very naturally.

Defensive version

The interesting thing about the shape is that Martinez has made it work in two very different guises. There is the extremely defensive, counter-attacking shape (that is effectively more like 5-4-1, with the wide players dropping back a line), that Wigan played in the 2-1 win at Arsenal. That’s not unnatural – at the last World Cup, for example, we saw the usefulness of a three/five-man defence for minnows against stronger sides – if you’re going to sit deep in your own third of the pitch and not compete in an open game, the ‘formation battle’ isn’t so crucial. Instead, if you’re focusing on getting men behind the ball, you may as well employ an extra centre-back to deal with aerial balls into the box.

In the Arsenal game, Wigan sat very deep in front of their own penalty area. They had a 3 v 1 against Robin van Persie, and one of the centre-backs, usually Figueroa, would follow him into deep positions. Caldwell would shuffle across, Wigan would defend with a 2 v 0, with no Arsenal player looking to make a run into Figueroa’s space. The wing-backs became permanent full-backs and picked up the Arsenal wingers, while the wingers dropped back and tracked the Arsenal full-backs.

The interesting player was Victor Moses – although he generally stayed goalside of Bacary Sagna, he sprinted past the Frenchman as soon as possession was won, always providing the out-ball and launching Wigan breaks. The only ‘problem’ for Wigan was in the midfield, where they had a 2 v 3, but since they weren’t looking to have possession, this wasn’t a huge problem. James McArthur and James McCarthy picked up Arsenal’s two more attacking midfielders, while Franco Di Santo dropped back to become an extra midfielder, pressuring Alex Song.

Attacking version

Against Newcastle it was more attacking. Newcastle were playing a 4-3-3 shape, so Wigan only had 3 v 3 at the back. Faced with either playing 5 v 3 with the wing-backs dropping deep, or 3 v 3 with them pushing on, they went for the brave option. With Alan Pardew’s side looking to play quite a reactive game and letting Wigan have the ball, Martinez instructed his wing-backs to get forward and create 2 v 1 situations with the wingers down the flanks – Newcastle were caught understaffed at the back, conceding two goals in the opening 15 minutes.

The most interesting feature of the play, and a small example that sums up the benefit of the 3-4-3 shape, was that Newcastle didn’t know how to press the 3-4-3 with their 4-3-3. The problem was this – Ali Al-Habsi would look to play the ball out to his three centre-backs, so Wigan could get the ball down and play. Newcastle wanted to stop them building from the back, so Hatem Ben Arfa and Demba Ba in the wide positions looked to close down Wigan’s ‘outside’ centre-backs. But this then left the Wigan wing-backs free, and Al-Habsi could knock balls out to the flank, where the wing-backs would then move forward to create those 2 v 1 situations. If the Newcastle full-backs came out to the Wigan wing-backs, then the Wigan wingers would be free.


Newcastle were unable to press Wigan's 3-4-3 with a 4-3-3


Newcastle’s spare man was in the centre of midfield, and they could have been cleverer with how the three shifted across the pitch to close down the Wigan wing-backs, but they still would have been vulnerable to quick balls out to the flanks anyway. In the end, Pardew decided the only way Newcastle could press Wigan (at 2-0 down, and needing the ball) was to switch to a 3-4-3 himself. Newcastle hadn’t played that way before, and haven’t played that way since. Martinez had forced the overachievers of the season to play in an alien way, and that in itself was a victory.

Flexibility

Martinez has also shown great ability to vary the shape within games, able to play 4-3-3 or 3-4-3. Emmerson Boyce can play right-wing-back or right-back, Maynor Figueroa can play left-centre-back or left-wing-back, Jean Beausejour can play left-wing-back or left midfield. “At Anfield we played the two separate systems,” says Martinez. “And no-one would have been able to see the difference [in terms of standard of play].”

When asked if he thinks a sweeper should always play behind two other centre-backs in a back three, Martinez says, “If you play against a front two, you can do that. But if you play against a one and a one, then the sweeper plays in front, because obviously you can’t be three-versus-one at the back.”

Individuals have played their part. Moses’ rise into a top-level player has been crucial, Figueroa’s passing ability means he’s almost been like an extra midfielder when needed, and the signing of Jean Beausejour is one of the underrated transfer decisions of the season. He’s a natural crosser, knows this (rough) system well having been a wing-back in Marcelo Bielsa’s Chile side, and has provided more assists than any other Wigan played despite only joining in January.

But the key has been the system, and the manager who implemented it. Amongst more in-depth tactical analysis of the 3-4-3, there’s a lot to be said for simply ‘doing something different’ if you’re a weaker side in a league – give the opposition a new challenge, make them uncomfortable and ideally make them change, as Newcastle were forced to.

“In a year’s time, there will be a lot of teams playing a 3-4-3, believe me,” Martinez says. “And we’ll have to be able to change, to adapt to it. And that is why it’s so important that players are flexible tactically.”
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997#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:09:07 | 只看该作者
题目很有意思的,当然也反映了主旨内容

法尔考上赛季就是欧联杯最佳射手,本赛季决赛时又打进2球为马竞三年内再夺欧联杯冠军立下汗马功劳的

看来马竞引入他也不亏啦!
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996#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:06:57 | 只看该作者
995楼参考译文
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995#
发表于 2012-5-11 00:03:20 | 只看该作者
本帖最后由 pedro 于 2012-5-11 00:06 编辑

Atletico Madrid 3-0 Athletic Bilbao: Falcao wins the Europa League again

May 9, 2012


The starting line-ups

Atletico Madrid lifted the UEFA Cup for the second time in three years.

Diego Simeone named his expected line-up – Tiago was suspended, so Mario Suarez and Gabi played in the centre of midfield. None of the starting XI started the 2010 final.

Marcelo Bielsa’s line-up was also as expected – Fernando Amorebieta was declared fit to start, although he had a poor game, caught out for all three goals.

This was a pretty basic encounter – Athletic dominated possession, but Atletico took an early lead, then were content to sit deep.

Falcao

For the second year in a row, the Colombian striker was the key player in the Europa League final. Last year he won the competition for Porto with a fine header, but here he showed more all-round ability and constantly worked the channels well, having the beating of both Fernando Amorebieta and Javi Martinez and receiving the ball in a position where he could drive directly at goal.

His stunning seventh minute strike was crucial because it set the tone for the rest of the game – until then Atletico Madrid had been pressing high up and contesting quite an open game in midfield. After that, they were able to retreat into their own half and soak up pressure, a strategy that wouldn’t have been as viable at 0-0. His second goal, a brilliant Puskassed dragback-and-fire from close range, furthered Simeone’s belief that Atletico were able to win by simply counter-attacking.

Numbers game

So what of the tactical battle? This was fairly obvious – Atletico Madrid were 4-2-3-1, Athletic Bilbao were 4-3-3. There was a 3 v 3 in midfield, clear battles on the flanks, then each side had a spare man at the back. Atletico could match Athletic all over the pitch and be content with a safety net in defence, and Athletic struggled to play their way through.

Bielsa’s side had one clear possibility to get a man past his opponent – the Ander Iturraspe versus Diego battle deep in midfield. In the semi-final against Sporting, Iturraspe did very well to shuttle past the two attacking midfielders and catch the opposition number ten out (which actually resulted in Sa Pinto replacing his number ten to bring in a more defensive option who could track Iturraspe). Diego isn’t the best player defensively, wasn’t sure whether to press the second Athletic centre-back or drop goalside of Iturraspe, and his awareness without the ball could have been tested more – but Athletic were surprisingly unwilling to bring Iturraspe forward.

Athletic movement

Athletic’s main strategy was to bring their wingers inside at the start of the game – particularly Iker Muniain, who tried to become the extra man in the middle. But their movement was a little too rushed, too frantic and involved too many players moving into the same zone. They weren’t stretching the play, with Markel Susaeta taking up very ‘obvious’ positions in the centre of the pitch.

There were very few runs like those depicted in diagrams 5 and 6 here – the wingers were always moving central. The full-backs were meant to get forward and stretch the play, but the long diagonals were often wayward, and both Adrian Lopez and Arda Turan did their defensive jobs well.

Atletico tactics

Simeone’s side set out in a fairly standard shape without the ball, with two banks of four featuring two very central, very deep holding players. It was rare to find either Suarez or Gabi out of position, and Athletic continually had to try and play around them as they were unable to go through them – and with their reluctance to go wide, this made things tricky.


Line-ups after Bielsa's half-time changes

The Atletico full-backs tucked in narrow, and the wingers tracked the full-backs, then broke forward quickly to support Falcao. Adrian on the right did a good job in becoming a second striker on the few occasions that Atletico got into the final third. Turan played deeper and contributed more to build-up play, combining nicely with Diego. Atletico also did well to initially press Bielsa’s sides at the start of moves, breaking up their build-up play from the back.

Bielsa’s first and second changes

Athletic needed to change their gameplan, and despite the fact that Athletic didn’t get back into the game in terms of goals, Bielsa’s first change worked well. He made two substitutions – the first was a straight swap, with Iturraspe (who didn’t offer forward drive and was too slow on the ball) replaced with Inigo Perez.

The second change was more important – Jon Aurtenetxe departed, with the highly versatile Oscar De Marcos going to left-back. Muniain moved to the centre of midfield in De Marcos’ previous role, and Ibai Gomez was on down the left. This demonstrated that Bielsa thought Athletic were far too vertical in the centre of midfield when attacking, with both Herrera and De Marcos driving directly towards goal.

Muniain, who plays as a central winger when in the middle of the pitch, was allowed to drift wide to the channels and create overloads with the wingers, who also stayed wider in the second half and stretched the play (of course, it also helped that Gomez does this more naturally than Muniain; Susaeta simply change his role).

Within a minute Muniain had moved wide and forced a corner, although this was on a mini-break and thereafter with Atletico sitting deep, this was less of a possibility as Muniain was making runs in front of the Atletico side, where they could watch him closely. Simeone didn’t bother to change his system, as Athletic were using roughly the same formation.


Line-ups after Bielsa's third change


Bielsa’s third change

His next move was more desperate – the hard-working but technically limited Gaizka Toquero replaced Herrera, which meant Muniain moving deeper and playing as the ‘second’ midfielder in a two, while Toquero went upfront alongside Llorente.

Consequently, Atletico were robbed of their spare man, so Suarez became the game’s key player – dropping in to become an additional centre-back to create a 3 v 2 at the back when Athletic got the ball wide, but then moving forward into midfield to make a 3 v 2 in midfield when Atletico had spells of possession, helping the slow the tempo of the game. He made a lot of clearances, and if Falcao was the star of the first half, Suarez was the star of the second – though the glory went to Diego, with an excellent third on the counter.

Conclusion

Often the tactics play a big part in the scoreline – here, the scoreline played a big part in the tactics. Atletico’s approach changed dramatically but fluently once they had gone 1-0 up, as if that had been part of their gameplan all along and had been drilled on how to adjust. Ultimately Athletic couldn’t find a way through. Bielsa’s sides never score enough goals for their dominance of possession, and tonight was a great example of how easier it is to break down a disorganised, recovering defence, rather than one with structure and balance.

Simeone’s happiness with his formation and shape were summed up by the fact he didn’t use the bench until the 88th minute, when Atletico were already 3-0 up.

The final word must be on Falcao – tonight was a masterclass in how to play the lone striker role in a counter-attacking side – he was ruthless in the penalty box, but also clever with his movement and the manner with which he received the ball, always on the run towards goal.
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