11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

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524楼参考译文

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蓝军
1-3输给曼联
3-5输给枪手
1-2红军
三场重要战役都落败
博阿斯帅位可能都要出问题了

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曼联 第一球明显越位啊 本菲卡威武 小丑威武 盖坦威武
DanielCraig 发表于 2011-11-23 14:33

冠军之队又是主场，这些都是在所难免的

好在本菲卡hold住自己命运

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Arsenal 2-1 Dortmund: Dortmund press excellently but van Persie scores another double
November 23, 2011

The starting line-ups

A fast-paced, technical game ended with Arsenal securing their qualification to the second round.
Arsene Wenger named an unchanged XI from the team that triumphed over Norwich at the weekend.
Jurgen Klopp also made no changes to the side which won 1-0 at Bayern Munich on Saturday.
This was a very enjoyable, even match – Dortmund actually had more attempts (and attempts on target) than Arsenal, but Robin van Persie was yet again the difference.

Pressing
Dortmund pressed very well against Bayern, and did so to an even greater extent here. Their first half game was reminiscent of Barcelona’s astonishing spell of pressure at the start of the 2-2 draw at the Emirates back in 2009/10, albeit less extreme. They stayed compact, moved forward as a unit and forced the Arsenal players into hurried passes, really testing their first touch under pressure. Some players, like Mikel Arteta, were more than comfortable – others, like Gervinho, were troubled by the close attention.
Because of the pressing, Arsenal took a long time to assert themselves on the game. Although the statistics will show that they enjoyed good possession in the opening minutes, much of this involved the back four playing the ball to each other.
Arsenal midfield
The interesting thing about Dortmund’s positioning when pressing involved Shinji Kagawa – fielded high up as, in effect, a second striker rather than a number ten. Whilst Robert Lewandowski played up against Per Mertesacker, Kagawa looked to close down Thomas Vermaelen (or stop his passing), which showed how brave Dortmund were being. Often, in this situation, a manager will instruct the second striker to drop onto the opposition’s holding midfielder – in Liverpool’s win over Chelsea, for example, Craig Bellamy started the game getting goalside of Jon Obi Mikel.
This meant that Arsenal had, in theory, a numerical advantage in the centre of the pitch. They struggled to make this count in the opening minutes – the midfielders weren’t working hard enough to get into positions to receive the ball, but when Aaron Ramsey started coming deeper, Sven Bender and Sebastien Kehl generally looked to close down he and Arteta, and Song got more time on the ball, having been caught in possession in the first few minutes.
Arsenal could barely play the ball forward from the defence in the opening 15 minutes

Song
Song used his freedom to become Arsenal’s key player. He steadied the ship and stayed much more in position than usual – rarely looking to get ahead of Arteta and Ramsey, as he’s done in recent weeks. It was strange that he created the first goal from a run forward – it was entirely out of keeping with the rest of his performance, as outlined below – it was the only pass he played in the final third. He was excellent defensively, however, completing all five of his attempted tackles and making seven interceptions – in both cases, the most of any player on the pitch.
Song only played one pass in the final third - the assist

Pace
Dortmund pressed more than Arsenal, consequently played a higher line, and therefore were a little vulnerable to pace in behind. Gervinho couldn’t quite time his runs correctly, but Theo Walcott was prominent and his good relationship with van Persie continues to create openings.
The difference in winning the ball - Arsenal dropped into their own half, Dortmund pressed higher up

But it was because of Dortmund’s excellent cohesive pressing that Arsenal weren’t as likely to score by knocking it over the top as against the high line of Chelsea, for example. Arteta and Ramsey rarely had time to turn to play a through ball, whilst Song did often pick up the ball facing the right way, but wasn’t ambitious with his passing.
Injuries and substitutions
Dortmund lost both Mario Gotze and Sven Bender to early injuries – like-for-like replacements were introduced, but Dortmund clearly lost a great deal of quality. After those setbacks, they never pressed quite as well, and considering that was the major part of their gameplan, it was a huge blow. Klopp had deliberately selected the side that worked so well as a unit at the weekend, now the unit was broken up very early on.
It also meant that Klopp only had one more substitution for the second half – he used it bravely, bringing on Lucas Barrios to play upfront with Lewandowski, moving Kagawa right and Kevin Grosskreutz into the middle alongside Moritz Leitner, who had replaced Bender.
The change was effectively the same kind of substitution Paul Lambert (a former Dortmund player, coincidentally) made at the weekend against Arsenal – midfielder off, striker on, and a move to a clear 4-4-2. But it had the same effect – namely that Arsenal enjoyed more time on the ball in midfield, found gaps, and dominated possession more. It was a move Klopp had to make, but might have contributed to Dortmund’s disappointing second half.
Amongst all this, the three goals were almost separate from the tactical battle. One was from Song’s only dart forward, another was from a set-piece, another was the consolation through Kagawa – so late that even Klopp looked at his watch and shook his head.
Conclusion
Dortmund were impressive but ultimately underwhelming in the final third, Arsenal looked nervous early on but had the ruthlessness upfront when van Persie got two good chances.
We didn’t really learn anything new about the two sides – but Arsenal will consider it a good night’s work and have qualified with a game to spare, the only English side to do so.

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567楼参考译文
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阿森纳2-1多特蒙德战术分析：范佩西梅开二度决定了比赛

2011-11-25 / dogtu

关于首发：

一场快节奏的技术流较量，阿森纳最终用胜利锁定了晋级淘汰赛的资格。
相比上周联赛对阵诺维奇，温格没有做出任何改变，恰巧克洛普也是，他们的先发11人和做客慕尼黑的完全一样，赛前F组形式一片混乱，本轮是事关出线的生死战，双方都派出了最强阵容出场，没有丝毫懈怠。
比赛势均力敌，颇为激烈——多特蒙德似乎攻势更猛，他们的射门次数更多，射正次数也更多，只是他们没有超级范佩西。

压迫：

多特蒙德上轮对阵拜仁就展现了出色的逼抢能力，他们本场甚至做得更好。比赛的上半时很容易让人联想起2009/2010赛季，阿森纳2-2巴塞罗那的比赛，虽然情况并没有当时那样极端。多特蒙德阵容很紧凑，整体向前压迫，阿森纳球员只能匆忙的选择出球，这时压力之下的快速出球能力就显出了区别，比如阿尔特塔就能从容不迫，热尔维尼奥就显得比较狼狈。
阿森纳花了很长时间才适应场上节奏，虽然数据显示他们开场阶段的控球率并不差，但这其实更多的只是他们的四后卫在互相传递。

双方中场：

在多特蒙德的压迫阵型中有趣的一点是香川真司的位置，和常规的4-2-3-1不同，他本场的站位更加突前，与其说是10号选手，不如说是影子前锋。莱万多夫斯基对位默特萨克，香川则更多的逼抢维尔马伦（或阻止其传球），这也显示出了多特志在获胜的心态。通常在这种情况下，主教练会要求影子前锋更多会出现在对手后腰附近，比如利物浦战胜切尔西的比赛中，贝拉米和米克尔就总是始终形影不离。
这样的后果就是，阿森纳在中场获得了理论的人数优势，一开始他们还很难利用这一优势——其中场球员并未尽力去接应自己的后卫，但当拉姆塞开始回撤拿球，斯文本德和凯尔就只能向前紧逼他和阿尔特塔，于是，开场阶段还很难拿住球的宋就获得了较为充足的时间

比赛前15分钟的传球路线图，可以看出主队传球选择更多的在后场倒脚，很难将球向前推进。

相反多特蒙德更倾向于进攻，尤其是格策镇守的右边路传球成功率颇高。

宋：

凭借他所获得的空间，宋成为了本场阿森纳的关键先生。他稳住了全队，并且比平时更加坚守自己的位置——很少像前几周那样，助攻到阿尔特塔和拉姆塞的身前。有些奇怪的是，第一个进球正是来自于他在左路晃过多特蒙德三名并没紧逼的防守队员后，助攻范佩西得分。如下图所示，这与他全场的表现对比鲜明，也是他在对方禁区附近的唯一一次传球。与此同时，他在防守端同样出色的完成了任务，全场的5次铲断尝试全部成功，并且做出了7次拦截，两个数据都是双方队员中最多的。

宋的传球路线图，可以看出在对方禁区附近的唯一一次传球就完成了黄色的助攻。

7次拦截在后腰位置构筑了一道坚固的城墙。

速度：

多特蒙德的压迫比阿森纳更积极，因此防线提得很靠前，而当对方以速度偷袭其身后时，他们的防御力也稍有减弱。热尔维尼奥在启动时间的把握上略显不足，但另一侧的沃尔科特面对施梅尔策表现出色，他与范佩西的默契配合数次在多特防线上打开了缺口。

阿森纳全场的24次拦截多发生在己方半场，相反多特蒙德更加具有攻击性，前场多次积极反抢。

但由于多特蒙德出色的整体压迫，阿森纳并不像他们在对阵切尔西时那样，能轻易通过过顶传球创造出得分机会。阿尔特塔和拉姆塞很少有足够的时间转身送出直塞，而宋虽然经常获得面向前场接球的机会，但却缺少尝试长传的野心。

伤病和替补：

多特蒙德的两名核心斯文-本德和格策早早因伤下场，克洛普没有选用常规的替补库巴，而是决定用佩里希奇继续冲击，本德的下场也不得不让他们拆散有着出色发挥的后腰组合，尽管做出了对位的换人，但球队的整体实力显然受到了不小的损失。此后，他们的压迫效果便打了折扣，考虑到这是其赛前计划中的主要部分，黄黑军团所受的打击相当巨大。克洛普特意选择了周末发挥出色的原班人马，而这一整体却很快就遭到了伤病的破坏。
同时这也意味着克洛普在下半时落后时只有一个名额可以调整，他选择了换上巴里奥斯在锋线上搭档莱万多夫斯基继续进攻，此时香川真司被放在了右前卫，格罗斯克罗伊茨和替换本德的莱特纳在中路组织进攻。
这种类似搏命的换人，和前多特蒙德队员兰伯特执教的诺维奇在上周末1-2输给阿森纳的比赛一样，急于进球，冒险用前锋换下了后腰，将阵型改成清晰的4-4-2。而其效果也如出一辙，即恰好使阿森纳在中场控制的更加得心应手，能更从容的寻找机会，也获得了更多的球权。换人名额的限制，让克洛普除此之外也没有他招，这也决定了下半场的多特蒙德濒临崩盘。
总而言之，本场比赛充满着激烈的对抗，双方谁也没能打出流畅的传球和进攻，三粒进球更显得像是独立事件，和比赛的风格又不太一致。第一个来自于宋罕见插上的精彩助攻，第二粒源于角球抢点，香川真司最后打入一粒安慰球，克洛普此时看了手表并摇了摇头，时间已经没有了。

结论：

多特蒙德表现出色，但在对方禁区附近并未制造多少威胁。虽然已经基本无缘下阶段欧冠比赛，但这支生力军的加入还是让我们眼前一亮，他们的逼抢能力，也足够让老牌球队放下身板。阿森纳在开局阶段一度被反客为主，但多年强队的底蕴还是让他们找到了控制比赛的钥匙，并且由于超级罗宾的存在，他完全没有错失属于他的机会。
我们没有从两支球队身上看到太多新鲜的东西。本轮比赛以后，多特蒙德在联赛中还将面对艰苦的赛程，而阿森纳成为第一只出线的英超球队之后，已经可以喘一口气了。

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不是底气不足，而是实力使然，

曼城的防守在顶级较量里，会凸显漏洞。
小豆丁梅西 发表于 2011-11-24 13:14

蓝军欧冠出线形势受到轮子严重威胁

目前仅有枪手出线板上钉钉了，其他三支队伍都有麻烦了

c组，积9分的曼联出线问题不大，最后一轮只要打平就可以了，但是积8分的巴塞尔若像客场打曼联那样发疯肿么办？

E组，积8分轮子最后一场客战蓝军只要1-1平就可以了，因为前者净胜球多，那么同积8分蓝军麻烦大了

A组，曼城不要说最后一场胜了拜仁命运还不在自己手里，问题是能胜吗

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曼联出线问题不大，概率为九成九，

车仔其次，最后一场拼出胜利，也能过关，机会五五开，

曼城机会最小，但也不是不可能，除了自身争气击败拜仁外，曼城最有利的因素也许就是钱了，

因为出线无望的潜水艇完全没 ...
小豆丁梅西 发表于 2011-11-24 13:43

曼城即使有钱，得一面与拜仁作战，一面奖赏黄潜，而黄潜本赛季两线作战的表现可谓烂泥扶不上墙了

那不勒斯拼劲不怕任何队，除了赛季初友谊赛对巴萨0-5外

轮子最近对皇马一战所表现出劲头同样可怕，只要客场1球平就可挤掉蓝军的，首战两队就是1-1言和的

话说蓝军本赛季的失利太丧气了，1-3输曼联、3-5输枪手、1-2输红军、1-2输勒沃库森

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Milan 2-3 Barcelona:Milan fail to pick up Xavi
米兰 2-3 巴萨：米兰只盯防梅西却三次漏了哈维
Thursday, 24 November 2011

Barcelona overcame Milan at the San Siro in a match which differed markedly from the 2-2 draw between the teams in September. In that encounter, Milan scored early on and ‘parked the bus’ before conceding two goals, then snatching an equaliser in the dying seconds. They attempted to be more proactive in front of their home crowd, but this played into the Catalans’ hands.

The teams set out as usual; Milan in a 4-3-1-2 and Barcelona in their well-known 4-3-3. Max Allegri left out captain Massimo Ambrosini in favour of Alberto Aquilani, as if to signal a more positive intent. Barcelona were missing Dani Alves and Gerard Piqué was only deemed fit enough for the bench so Mascherano and Busquets played at centre-back, with Puyol moving out to the right of defence and Keita filling the holding midfield slot. Thiago Alcântara played narrow on the right of attack.

First half: faltering defences lead to a lot of chances

Milan came out of the blocks strongly, attacking the away side and pressing intently. But this rather resembled Manchester United’s start to the Champions league final as Barcelona soon found their stride, taking control for the majority of the game (they finished with 59% possession). Milan’s narrow midfield had its usual problem of dealing with fullbacks motoring forward; as there was nobody to oppose Eric Abidal, he was a very easy out-ball.

As for Milan’s fullbacks, they were having a tough time defensively. Both switched off for the first goal; Zambrotta letting Thiago beat him to a ball which he had no right to win, before Abate failed to see Keita ghost into the far post, the Malian’s ball deflecting off van Bommel for an own goal. The tricky Thiago was giving Zambrotta a hard time, again getting the better of him to set up a good chance for Messi.

Milan’s midfield wasn’t doing a much better job. Despite van Bommel’s attention, Messi was finding space between the lines and was given options by the onrushing Xavi and Fabregas. This was a result of Allegri’s decision to place two playmakers ahead of van Bommel. While this was commendable for positive intent, a ‘runner’ such as Ambrosini or Nocerino could have done better at tracking Barça’s central midfielders. Van Bommel could even have dropped deeper to try to restrict Messi’s space in front of the Milan defence (see the space between him and the centre-backs in the average positions below).




To be fair to Milan, they carried an attacking threat of their own. While Barcelona’s pressing makes it hard to pass through them (especially with all of Milan’s midfield being in the middle), they found some joy with Aquilani playing diagonal balls to the left, giving Boateng or Robinho a one-on-one with Puyol and the opportunity to pass into the box. That was the buildup for Ibrahimovic’s equaliser

This was aided by Barcelona’s own defensive troubles; playing two defensive midfielders in central defence works well when they dominate, as those players play in their usual zone (around the halfway line). However, they seemed unsettled when Milan came at them and at times struggled with positioning. This was exploited in the previous encounter by Pato’s pace; this time round, Ibrahimovic was to profit. First, his ability to hold the ball up led to a chance that Robinho should have converted. Minutes later, he had made it 1-1. Poor positioning and loose marking from Mascherano and Busquets was evident on both occasions.

Still, Barcelona kept attacking and the lack of tracking from Milan’s midfield cost them. Xavi got on the end of a Messi through-ball and while Nesta may not have actually fouled him, they deserved to retake the lead from Messi’s penalty.

Second half: Milan pull it back but don’t learn from mistakes

Pato came on for Robinho at half-time, with Allegri maybe casting his mind back to Busquets and Mascherano’s struggles with his explosive pace a couple of months ago. He failed to provide the same threat as Barcelona were not losing this time, so there was less need for the centre-backs to push up so much. But he still managed to take advantage of their penalty-box uncertainty; winning his header against Busquets (who stands almost 4 inches above Pato), before Mascherano headed the ball to Boateng for another equaliser resulting from direct play.

However, Milan also failed to learn from their mistakes. While their play with the ball was improving, they were still looking vulnerable when Messi ran at them. Inevitably, another through ball found its way to Xavi, who finished superbly.

After an exciting hour, the game started to peter out as Milan searched for an equaliser in vain. Their midfield shape is more suited to counter-attacking or controlling the middle rather than chasing a goal, although long balls to Ibrahimovic looked like they might bring some joy. Nocerino, who could have been on earlier for defensive reasons, was instead brought on for van Bommel to give the midfield some thrust (with Seedorf becoming a deep-lying playmaker in front of the defence). Still, they could not create more clear chances against Barcelona, who did a good job of stopping the supply from deep by bringing on Pedro and Sanchez for Villa and Fabregas to close down from the front; a prime example being Sanchez superbly chasing back to stop Aquilani playing the ball forward in the 87th minute.

Barcelona attacked superbly and will be delighted to have won in the San Siro but this match showed that with both Busquets and Mascherano in central defence, they can be unsettled by direct play. They will be keen to have at least one of their ‘natural’ centre-backs playing in the later stages. As for Milan, they competed well enough against top-class opposition and showed that they have the attacking talent to trouble anyone, but getting outplayed at home brings up the limitations of Allegri’s narrow midfield and suggests that they’re outsiders in the Champions League this year.

Ihsaan Budaly
http://thefalse9.blogspot.com/2011/11/milan-2-3-barcelonamilan-fail-to-pick.html

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573楼参考译文
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米兰2-3巴萨战术分析：红黑军团纠结中场布阵，巴塞罗那怀念正牌中卫

2011-11-25 / 制霸中轴线



巴塞罗那在圣西罗战胜了米兰，这场比赛和九月份双方的那场2-2有着显著的区别。在双方第一回合的比赛中，米兰早早取得了进球，随后开始在球门口“停大巴”，然而他们还是丢了两个球，好在席尔瓦在读秒阶段的进球最终扳平了比分。这一次，在主场观众面前他们尝试了更加积极的打法，不过正因如此，比赛落入了加泰罗尼亚人的节奏。

双方排出了常规的首发阵容：米兰的4-3-1-2和巴萨广为人知的4-3-3。首发上阿莱格里选择了阿奎拉尼而非队长安布罗西尼，似乎在暗示着一种积极的尝试。巴萨方面达尼-阿尔维斯缺阵，皮克伤愈进入替补席，马斯切拉诺和布斯克茨搭档首发中卫，普约尔镇守右路，凯塔担任后腰。蒂亚戈-阿尔坎特拉则在前场偏右路活动。

上半场：犹豫不决的防守导致大量机会

米兰开场先声夺人，对客队展开了猛攻并且主动加强了紧逼。但这只不过是曼联在欧冠决赛对阵巴萨时开局的重现，巴萨很快找到了他们的节奏，在大部分的时间内掌控了比赛（全场比赛他们的控球率是59%）。米兰缺乏宽度的中场和往常一样无法很好的解决对方的边后卫插上，由于无人对位防守，阿比达尔在边路表现得游刃有余。

米兰的边后卫则在防守端十分吃力。两个人都在第一个进球中犯错：赞布罗塔大意被蒂亚戈在机会不大的情况下抢到球权，阿巴特则没有注意到偷下至远门柱的凯塔，马里人的横传碰到范博梅尔造成了乌龙。狡猾的蒂亚戈让赞布罗塔很难堪，随后他又一次在两人的对决中占到上风，为法布雷加斯创造了一个很好的得分机会。

米兰中场的表现同样不佳。尽管有范博梅尔专门留意，但梅西还是在两条线之间找到了空间，前插的哈维和法布雷加斯给他提供了传球的选择。这是阿莱格里战术安排的结果——他在范博梅尔身前安置了两名组织者（译注：阿奎拉尼和西多夫），这种积极的战术固然值得赞许，但是安布罗西尼或者诺切里诺这样的跑动型中场可以在跟防巴萨的中前卫方面做得更好。甚至范博梅尔也应该回撤得更深来压缩梅西在米兰防线前的得球空间（参考下面的平行站位图中他和两名中后卫之间的距离）。



公平的是，米兰也有自己进攻威胁。虽然巴萨的紧逼让向前传递变得艰难无比（尤其是米兰的全部中场球员都集中在了中路），但米兰还是找到了方法——阿奎拉尼传向左路的对角线传球为博阿滕和罗比尼奥创造了和普约尔单对单并将球做入禁区的机会，这也是伊布打进扳平球的来源。

巴萨自身的防守也对此负有责任：在局势全面占优的情况下，让两名后腰担任中卫非常有效，因为他们更多出现在自己熟悉的区域（中圈附近）。但是当米兰对他们发起攻势的时候，两名客串中卫看起来犹豫不决，在防守选位方面也存在漏洞。上次交手时帕托的速度暴露了这一问题，这次的受益者则变成了伊布拉希莫维奇：一开始，他的控球能力为罗比尼奥创造了一个势在必进的机会。几分钟以后，他亲自扳平了比分。马斯切拉诺和布斯克茨糟糕的站位和不够紧凑的盯人在这两次防守中暴露无遗。

巴萨继续保持进攻，米兰中场在跟防方面的不足让他们付出了代价。哈维接到梅西的直塞被阿奎拉尼侵犯，梅西罚入点球——虽然那也许并不是一个犯规，但巴萨的领先理所应当。

下半场：米兰扭转局势但并没能吸取教训

半场休息时帕托换下罗比尼奥，阿莱格里的脑海里也许浮现出了几个月前他用惊人的速度生吃布斯克茨和马斯切拉诺的画面。然而帕托没能制造同样的威胁，因为巴萨这次并没有落后，所以两个中后卫也不需要过于压上。但巴西前锋还是成功地利用了他们在禁区里的迟疑不决：他力压布斯克茨争顶成功（后者比帕托足足高出了4英寸……），随后马斯切拉诺把球顶给了博阿滕，米兰用快速直接的方式再次扳平了比分。

然而，米兰并没能吸取教训。他们的传控球在进步，但在梅西的突破面前他们还是显得如此脆弱：几乎是不可避免的，梅西又一计直塞找到了哈维，后者一击致命。

在令人激动的一个小时之后，比赛开始陷入僵局，米兰尝试扳平的努力也一次次失败。他们的中场阵型更适合反击或者中路控制，而不是追求进球，尽管送给伊布的长传让他们看起来似乎有些许威胁。诺切里诺本该在早些的时候上场帮助防守，结果却在此时为了助推中场替下了范博梅尔（西多夫则在防线之前担任拖后组织核心）。和之前一样，他们无法创造出更多好机会，因为巴萨聪明地用佩德罗和桑切斯换下比利亚和小法并从前场开始逼抢，这一举措切断了米兰后场的弹药输送。一个很好的例子来自桑切斯，他在第87分钟用一次精彩的回追阻止了阿奎拉尼向前传球。

巴塞罗那的进攻非常精彩，他们有理由为在圣西罗获胜感到高兴，但是这场比赛暴露出了布斯克茨和马斯切拉诺客串搭档中卫时的问题：面对快速直接的进攻显得犹豫不定。在随后的阶段里他们肯定更希望能用至少一个正牌的中后卫担当首发。至于米兰方面，他们在面对强敌时发挥出色并且证明了自己在进攻端的天赋能给任何对手带来麻烦，但在主场被击败还是体现出了阿莱格里战术中缺乏中场宽度的局限，这也暗示着他们在今年的欧冠中恐怕注定只是过客。

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573和576楼两个战术帖对同一场比赛分析各有侧重，前一帖似乎更注重主队表现和得失

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上半场30分钟梅西助攻桑切斯扳平比分太重要了

这是巴萨第二次运动战中的有效打门，第一次梅西单枪匹马独创虎穴，差点破门，要不是卡西神勇的话

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Barcelona 2-2 Real Madrid: Real press, continue it for longer, but waste too many chances
January 26, 2012


The starting line-ups

Real started and ended strongly, but a strong five minute spell for Barcelona before half time was enough for them.
Pep Guardiola named an unchanged side from the first leg, with Jose Pinto continuing in goal.

Jose Mourinho named a very attacking side, with Kaka coming in as the central playmaker annd Gonzalo Higuain upfront. Pepe moved into defence.

This was as dominant and proactive a performance as we’ve seen from Real Madrid under Jose Mourinho in the Clasicos – Barcelona were rarely allowed to get into their stride, and were hanging on late in the game.

Early stages

As we’ve come to expect, Real pressed from the opening minute, with four attackers moving forward to shut down Barcelona’s four defenders. And, as we’ve also become accustomed to, they had an early chance before Barcelona had settled, when Higuain capitalized upon a poor pass, but shot wide within ten seconds.

That incident summed up the first half – Barcelona’s passing was sloppy, but Real wasted chances. Mourinho’s side deserve a large share of the credit for their work rate and bravery in chasing early on, but equally Pinto seemed to cause Barca a lot of problems – he isn’t as comfortable as Valdes on the ball, and a couple of times his poor distribution resulted in giving the ball away near the penalty box.

Real also did well at transitions. It’s not often they play more direct attacking players, and Kaka did well to drive counter-attacks forward a couple of times. As Sergio Busquets was drawn to Kaka, space often opened up for Mesut Ozil, who had one of his more prominent Clasicos coming in from the right of a 4-2-3-1.

But then, Barcelona would have been expecting Real pressure from the first whistle – Real just always seem to fade after around 30 minutes. But, despite the goals going in just before half time, that didn’t really happen.

Barcelona problems

Barcelona’s passing was much poorer than usual. There seemed to be two main problems here – first, they couldn’t get the ball out from the back quickly because of Real’s pressing. Second, they didn’t stretch the play well enough, and were trying to play in a congested space in the middle. In the first leg, their out-ball was always Iniesta, free on the left wing. He played the same role again, but was up against Alvaro Arbeloa, a natural full-back, rather than Hamit Altintop, who didn’t know how to play the position.

Therefore, Arbeloa was much better at tracking his man, Iniesta didn’t know whether to go wide (where he rarely got the ball) or come inside, where he then added to the congestion. Barca didn’t have a right-winger, Dani Alves had been told to play more cautiously, and what’s more, Barca didn’t even seem to be focusing upon ball retention and killing the game – they gave the ball away too much.

Their main area of penetration in the first game was by hitting balls over the defence, and looking for Cesc Fabregas to break from midfield. Fabregas did that once, but played a poor pass to Messi. Alexis Sanchez was the other threat, playing right-of-centre and working that side of the pitch, but Real seemed to play a little deeper in defence than in the first leg. They also had Pepe, more mobile than Ricardo Carvalho.

Real weren’t as compact as usual, though. When Lassana Diarra moved forward towards Xavi, it often meant Messi was free between the lines. That was most obvious for the first goal – look at where Messi gets the ball, he’s beyond Real’s two holders already. As brilliant as his run and pass was, he didn’t actually have to go past a challenge.

It was Pedro who scored the goal, and Barcelona actually benefited from Andres Iniesta’s injury. Pedro came on, stretched the play and provided the threat of pace over the top – it seemed to expand the active playing zone and give Barca more space to play in elsewhere.

Substitutions


The line-ups after Real's three changes

The key to the second half, and Real’s comeback, was Mourinho’s double substitution after an hour. Esteban Granero had already replaced Diarra, primarily as the Frenchman was on a booking (and if he can’t tackle, there’s no point him being on the pitch) but this also helped Real move the ball more quickly.

Karim Benzema replaced Higuain and went upfront in a straight swap, but more interestingly Jose Callejon was introduced down the left, with Kaka going off. That meant he could watch Dani Alves’ runs, and Ronaldo could go upfront. Real were now, more or less, 4-4-2, with Benzema and Ronaldo taking it in turns with their movement – one went left, the other went right. One came deep, the other went over the top.

It worked excellently, pulling Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol all over the pitch. Those two had looked nervous all night, but this meant they no longer had a spare man, and Guardiola didn’t take the decision to move Sergio Busquets deeper to form more of a back three / five, which would have been the logical option – Fabregas and Xavi would have played in midfield, and Javier Mascherano could have come from the bench if needed. Busquets, after all, was no longer dealing with a central playmaker.

Maybe a spare man would have prevented the Real goals? It’s impossible to say, but Ronaldo’s march past Puyol was relatively easy, and the second goal was another example of Barcelona conceding possession cheaply at the back. It’s not that they looked to pass it, it’s that they passed it poorly, and then found themselves in poor positions.

Another issue was Barcelona’s lack of pressure from the front. Indeed, whilst they weren’t outpassed here, they were probably outpressed by Real.

Late on, Guardiola replaced Sanchez with Mascherano, who went to centre-back, with Puyol moving across to the right. Again, an extra centre-back (rather than a replacement centre-back) seemed more sensible, but Barcelona held on.

Conclusion

Real didn’t win the match, nor the tie, but they produced as good a performance as you’ll see from an away side at the Nou Camp this season. Mourinho was braver than ever before with his selection and instructions to press – Real won the ball high up, stopping Barca building attacks, and creating chances of their own.

Their problem was the simple wastefulness in front of goal – they produced more goalscoring chances than Barca; only finishing let them down. The blame there lies with certain players, rather than with Mourinho’s tactics, which worked well.

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703楼参考译文
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巴萨2-2皇马：主帅压迫战术很奏效，球员浪费机会太随意
2012-01-26 / maryantonia

双方首发阵容

皇马的开局不错，结尾也很强势，但巴萨在上半场结束前五分钟的灵光闪现已经足以使他们晋级。

瓜迪奥拉排出的阵型跟首回合没有区别，守门员仍然是平托。

穆里尼奥排出了一个非常具有攻击性的阵型，卡卡出任中场组织核心，伊瓜因顶在前面。佩佩移到了后卫线上。

这基本是穆里尼奥手下的皇马在德比大战中表现最强势最主动的一次——巴萨很少有机会能大举进攻，在比赛后段甚至只能招架。

开场阶段

正如我们预想的一样，皇马从开场就大举压迫，四名攻击手前移堵住了巴萨的四名后卫。而且，其实大家也几乎习以为常了，皇马在巴萨还没有站稳脚跟的时候就得到了机会，伊瓜因截下了巴萨的一次糟糕传球，可惜他的射门稍稍偏出，而这一切发生在开场还不到10秒钟。

这一幕基本可以代表了整个上半场——巴萨的传球质量很糟，但皇马一直在浪费着机会。穆里尼奥的球队开场阶段就展现出了背水一战的努力和勇气，本来配得上更好的结果；不过巴萨也有不少麻烦是平托给造成的——他拿球时候的动作没有巴尔德斯那么流畅，有几次他糟糕的开球都直接送给了禁区附近的皇马球员。

皇马的攻防转换也相当不错。他们并不经常派上更具有直接攻击性的球员，而且卡卡在几次反击时候的表现都非常突出。布茨克斯得去盯防卡卡，于是就给厄齐尔留下了大片的空档，而身处4-2-3-1阵型右翼的厄齐尔，本场的表现也堪称是他在德比中最优秀的一次。

不过，巴萨应该从哨声响起那一刻就知道皇马会大举压上吧——皇马似乎总是在30分钟左右的时候会逐渐衰弱下去。不过，虽然中场休息前被进了两个球，但皇马丝毫没有衰退的迹象。

巴萨的问题所在

巴塞罗那的传球比以往要糟糕许多。他们主要的问题有两个——首先，由于皇马的压迫，他们没法从后场快速发动进攻。第二，他们的阵型没有充分拉开，似乎只是想在拥挤的中路打开通道。在首回合的较量中，他们的出球总是来自在左翼自由活动的伊涅斯塔。这次他的角色也没差，只不过他对抗的阿贝罗阿本来就是边卫，并不是之前改打不太熟悉位置的阿尔滕托普。

因此，阿贝罗阿在盯防伊涅斯塔的时候表现得要好得多，让后者不知道是应该拉边（他在边路不怎么能拿到球）还是内切，如果内切进来的话，中路就更加拥挤了。巴萨并没有右边锋，阿尔维斯被叮嘱过要打得谨慎些，而且，巴萨甚至似乎没有把精力集中在控制球权和杀死比赛上——他们失去了太多球权。

第一回合的较量中，巴萨突破的主要方式是靠过顶球来越过后卫线，或者是让法布雷加斯从中路尝试突破。法布雷加斯成功过一次，不过传给梅西的球质量太差。桑切斯是另外一个威胁所在，他的位置是中路偏右，于是他在场上也多在那一边活动，不过皇马的防线跟第一回合相比，似乎要稍退后一些。而且，这回皇马后卫线上有佩佩，他比卡瓦略更擅长移动。

不过，皇马的阵型没有以往那么紧密。当拉斯-迪亚拉朝哈维的方向前移的时候，通常就意味着梅西处于两条线中无人盯防的状态。这在第一个进球的时候最为明显——看看梅西是从哪里得球的吧，当时他已经在皇马的双后腰之后了。而且他的跑动和传球都精彩绝伦，他甚至没有给对方犯规的机会。

射门得分的是佩德罗，巴萨其实反而是从伊涅斯塔的受伤下场中获益了。佩德罗替换上场，拉宽了巴萨的阵型，还加强了速度上的威胁——这拓展了巴萨的活跃区域，也使巴萨在其他地方获得了更多发挥的空间。


皇马三次换人之后的阵型

换人

下半场的关键，也就是皇马复苏的关键，是穆里尼奥在比赛进行到60分钟时的双重换人。之前格拉内罗已经换下了黄牌在身的迪亚拉（法国人如果不能铲球，留他在场上用处不大），而皇马的出球速度也随之变得更快了。

本泽马换下了伊瓜因，这是很直接的对位换人，不过更耐人寻味的是卡列洪上场出现在左路，卡卡被他换下。这意味着卡列洪可以盯住阿尔维斯的跑动，而且C罗也可以顶到更前面。现在的皇马，或多或少地，变成了4-4-2，本泽马和C罗通过跑位轮换着位置——一个去左边，另一个就去右边。一个回撤，另一个就突前。

这样的效果非常好，于是皮克和普约尔开始在场上疲于奔命。这二位整晚看起来都非常紧张，这也意味着他们并没有额外的帮手，瓜迪奥拉没有下定决心把布茨克斯移到后边形成三人或五人的后卫线，而这看起来更符合逻辑——法布雷加斯和哈维就可以在中场活动，而如果需要的话，板凳上的马斯切拉诺也可以上场，毕竟布茨克斯现在已经没有需要去对抗一位中场组织核心了。

或许多个人手会阻止皇马的进球？很难这么定论，不过C罗靠跑动很轻易就可以越过普约尔，而且第二个进球也正是巴萨后场太过轻易就被断球以致造成恶果的另一个例子。不是说他们传球的意识很糟糕，只是他们传球的质量太糟糕了，然后就发现自己的失位惨不忍睹。

还有个问题就是巴萨在前场没有形成足够的压力。实际上，他们不是在传球上处于下风，而是可能被皇马压迫得太厉害了。后来，瓜迪奥拉用马斯切拉诺换下桑切斯，马斯切拉诺来到中卫位置，普约尔移到右路。前边已经说过了，增加一位中卫（而不是替换一名中卫）似乎更为合理，不过巴萨最终守住了比分。

总结

皇马没能拿下比赛，也没能赢下两回合的对决，但他们却打出了本赛季你能看到的，在客战诺坎普的球队中所能打出的最好的一场比赛。穆里尼奥比之前更勇敢，不论是他的排兵布阵，还是命令球队压迫的指示——皇马在很靠前的位置争到了球权，阻止了巴萨发动反击，创造了属于自己的机会。

他们的问题是，面对球门时候浪费了大把的机会——他们比巴萨多了太多的破门良机；结果大部分都被浪费掉了。因此，应该受到责备的是某些球员，而不是穆里尼奥，他对本场比赛的战术安排非常有效。

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zm分析耐人寻味，开篇一句话就是皇马强势开局和结束时，然而巴萨只是在上半场结束前5分钟一发力打进2球就足以保证他们晋级。这种结果，在联赛中，屡屡碰到过，例如客场对皇家社会，客场对西班牙人。。。都是领先后被扳平的。

这表明巴萨中后场控制力较过去在下降，尤其防守大意毛病被放大而已，这与普约尔的年迈以及后防无人可换的窘境有关

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另一方面，巴萨坚持国王杯用平托，哪怕上赛季丢掉冠军，也无所畏惧

这在国家德比中，皇马是无论如何不能把卡西替补搞上来的，两相对比，境界立判高下

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弗格森还是明显瞄着英超冠军的，足总杯有半卖半送之嫌，这也好，和曼城死掐到底！

照这个架势，欧联基本上也可以放手，偶然性偏大，鸡肋赛事不拿也罢 ...
北极海 发表于 2012-1-29 10:30

英超冠军大概还是二曼之争了

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Juventus 2-1 Udinese: Juve mimic Udinese’s tactics but remain an all-round attacking threat
January 29, 2012


The starting line-ups - Juve, despite being at home, were in pink

Alessandro Matri scored a classic centre-forward’s goal to strengthen Juve’s position at the top.
Antonio Conte switched to three at the back, as he did in the previous meeting between the sides. Simone Pepe and Claudio Marchisio were only fit enough for the bench.
Udinese lined up largely as expected – Francesco Guidolin was without various players because of the Africa Cup of Nations, plus Giampiero Pinzi through injury.
The sides played in a similar fashion but Juve were clearly the better side, able to offer a threat after long spells of possession, whereas Udinese were too reliant upon counter-attacking.

Early stages

Nevertheless, this was a game dominated by playing on the break, as Marcelo Estigarribia, Matri and Di Natale all had one-on-one chances on the counter. Both sides played three at the back with five midfielders ahead, though there were differences in the way they played upfront. Udinese were 3-1-4-1-1, with Gelson Fernandes sitting deep as a spare man in front of the defence, and Almen Abdi playing as the attacking midfielder. Juve were roughly the same, with the first key difference being the use of Fabio Quagliarella, a second striker rather than an attacking midfielder.
The second key difference was more important. Andrea Pirlo played in roughly the same position as Fernandes, but is clearly a different type of player – he’s a deep-lying regista who controls the game and prompts attacking moves. As a result, the main impact of his presence was to force Abdi deeper to pick him up without the ball, leaving Antonio Di Natale against three defenders by himself. He spent the game, as usual, drawing wide to find space, but Juve’s outside centre-backs were happy to follow him out there.

Juventus possession

The knock-on effect of the 3 v 1 situation, especially with Di Natale moving to the left, was that Giorgio Chiellini could move forward on the ball. He probably didn’t do this enough early on, but gradually started to force Udinese – particularly Mauricio Isla – forward to close him down, leaving space between the lines, especially when Fernandes then had to step forward to close down Emanuele Giaccherini. This gave Juve more fluidity when in possession.
The key tactical decision was a poor one from Guidolin. Abdi hadn’t been very effective going forward, so Guidolin decided to switch him and Pablo Armero after 25 minutes, presumably to give more drive on the break – Armero is a great runner with the ball. But the Colombian wasn’t as good as Abdi at tracking Pirlo – in fact, it looked like he either couldn’t be bothered or had been told not to. As a result, for the final 15 minutes of the first half Juve were dominant in terms of possession and clever on the ball too, with Pirlo instrumental in their spell of pressure. They went ahead on the stroke of half time.

Second half

Guidolin then changed things again, removing Abdi completely with Antonio Floro Flores on in his place. Armero moved back to his starting position. This was better – Floro Flores tracked Pirlo when out of possession, but also sprinted past him when Udinese won the ball. This worked out perfectly for the goal – Floro Flores first prevented a pass into Pirlo, and then when the alternative pass went astray and Isla intercepted, he got himself into a goalscoring position to equalise.
But that was the only way Udinese were going to score – their players, even Di Natale, all specialise on the break. Juve had Matri, who created a goal from nothing by getting the ball with his back to goal, rolling the defender then steering the ball into the far corner. Juve could be a threat, even with the opposition defence all in position.
The goal also owed much to a clever flick from Marchisio, who had just replaced Quagliarella. Marchisio is clearly a deeper player naturally, and so this worked very well for Juventus – as soon as they re-took the lead, they could use Marchisio as a number ten ahead of the midfield to retain possession. The sides had essentially switched formations – Udinese started with a forward and a number ten but went to two forwards, Juve had done the opposite.

Juve shut the match down

And with Marchisio playing deeper, Juve retained the ball excellently. Udinese aren’t accustomed to closing down and winning the ball high up, and seemed confused about how they were meant to do it. Pirlo was being left free more and more, which meant either Isla or Armero moved towards him. That left their man (Giaccherini or Arturo Vidal) free, which forced Fernandes higher up, which then left Marchisio free and the back three were reluctant to come out.
Eventually Guidolin sacrificed the back three, bringing on midfielder Cristian Battochio for Domizzi. They switched to more of a 4-4-2 – Giovanni Pasquale and Dusan Basta dropped in, with Armero and Isla wide in midfield, and Battochio joining Fernandes in the middle. It was numerically the right approach, but Pasquale and Basta moved too deep – really they needed to continue the pressure in midfield and leave 2 v 1 at the back – almost line up in a 2-6-2 formation.
Instead they stood off, let Juve play and never looked likely to come back. Yet again, it was an example of a counter-attacking side looking lost when they had to chase the game.

Conclusion

Two main factors here – first, the fact that Juve were more capable in possession, which basically comes down to having both a better playmaker (Pirlo) and more of an all-round striker (Matri).
Second, the battle concerning Pirlo – Abdi, Armero and Floro Flores all had a go, with varying levels of success.
Juventus were highly impressive yet again – Conte changed his shape, but Juventus looked comfortable. In a battle of similar systems, it was Juve, rather than Udinese, who looked as if they’d been playing this way all season

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715楼参考译文
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尤文图斯2-1乌迪内斯：复制品战胜原型，尤文以全面致胜

2012-01-30 / maryantonia



马特里打进了典型的中锋式进球，让尤文图斯稳稳占据积分榜首位。

孔蒂摆出了三后卫，与上一次跟乌迪内斯交手的时候一样。佩佩和马尔基西奥由于刚刚伤愈，只进入了替补席。

乌迪内斯的首发跟预计的差不多——圭多林手下有几名球员因非洲杯缺阵，平齐则仍在养伤。

两支球队的打法很相似，不过尤文图斯更胜一筹，他们能够在长时间的控球之后发动具有威胁性的进攻，而乌迪内斯则太过于依赖自己的防守反击。

开场阶段

不过，这场比赛的主流就是建立在防守反击上，埃斯蒂加里维亚、马特里和迪纳塔莱都在反击中得到了一对一的单刀机会。两方都排出了三后卫和五中场，只是在前场进攻方面有些许不同。乌迪内斯是3-1-4-1-1，费尔南德斯处于后场很深的位置，担任后卫之前的自由人角色，而阿布迪则是攻击型中场。尤文图斯大体来说也差不多，最关键的不同之处是对夸利亚雷拉的使用，与其说他是攻击型中场，倒不如说是第二前锋更为贴切。

第二处关键的不同要更加重要。皮尔洛跟费尔南德斯的位置大致相同，但他俩是完全不同类型的球员——皮尔洛是后撤很深的创造性球员，他负责控制比赛和策动进攻。因此，他的存在带来的主要影响，是迫使阿布迪在无球状态下需要退得更深来盯防他，于是只能丢下迪纳塔莱一个人去对抗三位防守队员。迪纳塔莱跟往常一样，通过拉边来寻找空间，不过尤文处于两边的中卫在外围盯他显然盯得非常愉快。

尤文图斯的控球

3对1造成的直接后果，尤其是当迪纳塔莱移到左边的时候，是基耶利尼可以带球向前跑动。刚开始的时候他并没有充分利用这一点，不过随着比赛的进行，他逐渐迫使乌迪内斯——主要是伊斯拉——前移来把他压制住，这就在两条线之间留下了空间，尤其是当费尔南德斯也随即需要前移去压制贾切里尼的时候。而这就让尤文的控球更加的流畅。

战术上的关键点是圭多林走的一步昏招。阿布迪的前移没什么效果，于是25分钟时，圭多林决定让他跟阿尔梅洛换一下位置，想要加强一下反击——因为阿尔梅洛的带球插上非常强。不过哥伦比亚人在盯防皮尔洛方面不如阿布迪——实际上，看起来他似乎也没想要去盯皮尔洛，或者说也没人要他去这么做。

结果，上半场的最后15分钟里，在皮尔洛的指挥之下，尤文图斯的控球大占上风，处理球也更加聪明灵活。于是他们带着领先优势进入了中场休息。

下半场

圭多林又做出了调整，他换下了阿布迪，派上弗洛雷斯去踢同一个角色，而阿尔梅洛也退回到他刚开始的位置。这样好得多了——弗洛雷斯在对方控球的时候盯住了皮尔洛，而且己方拿球的时候也可以冲刺越过他。这样的效果非常好，还造成了进球——弗洛雷斯先是阻止了对方将球传给皮尔洛，然后对方换向传球的时候，球又被伊斯拉拦截，弗洛雷斯随即跑到了可以射门得分的位置，最终扳平了比分。

不过这也是乌迪内斯唯一可以得分的手段——乌迪内斯的球员们，包括迪纳塔莱，都是反击的好手。但是尤文图斯有马特里，他背对球门拿到了球，晃过对方后卫将球打入远角，这是个无中生有的进球。所以，即使是对方后卫都卡住了自己的位置，尤文仍然可以制造威胁。

这个进球也有一大部分功劳是来自马尔基西奥灵巧的一蹭，那时他刚刚替换夸利亚雷拉上场。马尔基西奥显然是个位置属性更靠后的球员，所以这次换人对尤文图斯非常有好处——只要他们重新取得领先，就可以让马尔基西奥扮演10号球员角色，位于中场突前的位置来保持控球率。实际上此时两支球队的阵型已经发生了变化——乌迪内斯刚开始的时候是单前锋和10号球员，但现在变成了双前锋，而尤文图斯则恰好相反。

尤文图斯终结了比赛

有了马尔基西奥的后撤，尤文图斯完美地控制住了球。乌迪内斯不太习惯前压紧逼去抢球，他们看起来很困惑，不知道该如何去做。皮尔洛得到的空间越来越大，伊斯拉和阿尔梅洛之中得有一个人盯着他，造成的后果就是他们本来的盯防对象（贾切里尼或者比达尔）自由了，于是费尔南德斯又被迫上提协防，这样一来，马尔基西奥就被放空了，而乌迪内斯的三后卫也并不愿意出击。

最终圭多林放弃了三后卫，他换上了中场球员巴托基奥，换下了多米奇。乌迪内斯的阵型更像是4-4-2了——帕斯夸莱和巴斯塔后撤，阿尔梅洛和伊斯拉在中场位置拉边，巴托基奥和费尔南德斯一起守在中间。在人数上来看，这是个正确的变动，不过帕斯夸莱和巴斯塔退得太往后了——实际上他们需要继续在中场实施压迫，留下两个后卫2对1——也就是说类似于2-6-2的阵型。

结果，他们退守了，任凭尤文为所欲为，而且看起来也没有想回到中场去的意思。于是，这又是一个防守反击的球队在应该追击的时候却迷失掉自己的例子。

结论

主要有两点——第一，尤文图斯更擅于控球，因为他们不但有个更好的组织进攻核心（皮尔洛），还有更全面的前锋（马特里）。
第二，关于对皮尔洛的控制——阿布迪、阿尔梅洛和弗洛雷斯都尝试过，完成的水准大不一样。

尤文图斯又一次令人印象极为深刻——孔蒂改变了阵型，不过尤文图斯看起来打得也是得心应手。而在一场体系类似的战斗中，流畅到看起来好像整个赛季都是这么打的竟然是尤文图斯，而不是乌迪内斯。

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Chelsea’s change in defensive system under Roberto Di Matteo
April 16, 2012


Three Chelsea systems without the ball: (a) Villas-Boas' 4-3-3, (b) Villas-Boas' 4-2-1-3, (c) Di Matteo's 4-2-3-1

The major change at Chelsea under Roberto Di Matteo has been the difference in the wide positions, stemming from a combination of the change of style, and the change of formation.

Andre Villas-Boas wanted 4-3-3 and lots of pressing – therefore the job of the wide players was to close down the full-backs, and they defended high up the pitch.

Villas-Boas then started playing with Juan Mata as a central playmaker, but the formation remained more 4-2-1-3 than 4-2-3-1 – a minor difference, but the wide players were still staying high up the pitch, even as Villas-Boas went from a heavy pressing game to something more cautious.

Di Matteo’s formation, on the other hand, is 4-2-3-1 – Chelsea are defending with two banks of four behind the ball, something they haven’t done for a long time.

With their past few coaches, Chelsea have been used to playing 4-3-3, or 4-3-1-2, or 4-3-2-1, all of which defend with either a four and a three, or a four and a five, depending on how cautious they were playing.

Defending with a second line of four is very unusual for Chelsea, and Di Matteo deserves a lot of credit for implementing the system so quickly and successfully. Oddly, Di Matteo’s major problem at West Brom was the lack of defensive organisation, and Roy Hodgson’s job when replacing Di Matteo was all about getting the side structured without the ball.

The major effect of the change in system is the identity of the wide players. Daniel Sturridge, [url=http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2114903/Daniel-Sturridge-wants-Thierry-Henry-style-winger-striker.htmlhttp://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport ... winger-striker.html]who regards himself very much as a forward pushed out wide[/url], rather than a wide midfielder, could work well within the 4-3-3 as he was playing high up, close to goal, and usually receiving the ball within thirty yards of goal. Now ‘his’ role has changed completely – it involves retreating 30-40 yards when the ball is lost, and defensively Sturridge is not particularly adept.

On the other flank, Juan Mata is also no longer quite right for the wide role. This is a different situation – at Valencia he played that role well enough, and he’s certainly more defensively aware than Sturridge. But a combination of factors – (a) his fitness, which has clearly dropped significantly in recent weeks, (b) the fact he’d been used to pressing high up, and now would be being told to drop deep, and (c) the desire to play him in a central role, perhaps the most important factor – has meant he also no longer plays on the flank.

Therefore, in Sunday’s game against Tottenham, it was Ramires and Saloman Kalou who played in the wide positions. These two are clearly less spectacular players, but both are much more disciplined and underrated in terms of their efficiency with the ball. I’ve written about Ramires for the Guardian, but Kalou was also impressive yesterday, and of all the Chelsea players who could broadly be termed attackers, is probably the most aware tactically.

There is also now a central midfield two, rather than a three. This is less of a departure from the 4-2-1-3 we saw occasionally under Villas-Boas, though Chelsea are still getting used to playing this way. Yesterday it was unusual to see John Obi Mikel often briefly higher up than Frank Lampard when Chelsea didn’t have the ball, and that ‘two’ is now functioning as a unit rather than with one given the primary defensive responsibilities.

There was a little bit of confusion about how to pick up Rafael van der Vaart – in the old 4-3-3, he would clearly have been tracked by Mikel, the only holder. Now, there has to be more communication and improvisation as the opposition number ten varies his position.

How Chelsea will cope with Lionel Messi this week Messi remains to be seen, and it’s difficult to work out whether it’s better to play with two holders or one holder against him. The only time Messi looks relatively infffective is when he has to come deeper than both men in a double pivot to pick up the ball – as was the case for Argentina in the Copa America, and for Barcelona in the Copa Del Rey defeat to Real Madrid last season.

That is probably what Chelsea will be hoping for, which means Di Matteo will ask his double pivot to play very deep, probably allowing Barcelona’s midfielders a lot of time on the ball.

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910楼参考译文

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巴萨继续这种1234或者334阵型的话，的确需要进补一个高中锋
showfun 发表于 2012-4-16 22:53

有了伊布介个不太成功引援案例以后，瓜可能对此比较纠结的

colinfirth

本泽马那脚传球，我看是射门打次了，成了助攻吧，哈哈。
小豆丁梅西 发表于 2012-4-18 11:33

撇开来说吧

本泽马若为前场核心，而且他信心爆棚，这支皇马是可以拿各种冠军的，但可惜了鸟人这半缩头乌龟的战略

你看，皇马最近打希洪，打马竞，还有这场打拜仁，大多不利时候，本泽马这路冲击或者开火，最终会带来进球的，当然天使也会在右路助攻，但是不如丫往禁区走那么厉害的


所以，当年巴萨若用3千还是3千5百万抢来本泽马，比要伊布划算多了

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拜仁若是晋级决赛，似乎无人可挡的

关键是信心要爆棚的

就如巴萨在0809赛季那么艰难时刻挺过来一样，那么即使对阵曼联的决赛前，大家（尤其是巴萨球迷）谁敢说就能拿冠军呢，可是比赛一打开20分钟后，基本上球迷的信心就有了，关键是巴萨球员所展现出气质不一样了，比之0708赛季半决赛对阵曼联时，已经脱胎换骨了

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欧早就说过类似话或者意思，

秋裤罗貌似见了鸟帅后，表现基本是怂的

0910赛季，拜仁逆转淘汰曼联，他的表现堪比梅西对阵枪手的表现，但是到了伯纳乌决战国米时，他的表现几乎可以说是隐形的

而这场比赛，欧看了下半场，他在拜仁的亮点赶不上刀疤脸、戈麦斯，甚至右路冲击力还不如拉姆那几下犀利

whoscored给他打分仅有6.5分，队内仅比替补穆勒6.1、首发博阿藤6.2和小猪5.7高一些，与巴德斯图贝尔持平，杜斯塔沃也有6.8分，而拜仁其他球员都在7分以上的，包括阿尔巴7.0分

他是鸟的“卧底”，有木有？

或者见了鸟有心理阴影，有木有？

赛后有一个镜头耐人寻味的，佩佩判若有风度的绅士一般，与球裤罗拥抱道别，又与裁判组一一握手致谢告别（偶是猜丫这一刻表现的，是不是？）

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Wigan stay up after a switch to 3-4-3
May 16, 2012

The surprise package in the second half of Premier League season was the only side who switched to a back three on a permanent basis.

Background

It seems odd to trace Roberto Martinez’s successful experiment with a three-man defence back to an eight-goal defeat, but that’s where we’re going to start. On the final day of the 2009/10 season, Wigan travelled to Stamford Bridge, where Chelsea needed a win to make sure of the Premier League title. Chelsea won 8-0.


Wigan's formation v Arsenal away (2-1 win)

But that didn’t quite tell the story of the match. For the first half hour, Wigan actually dominated. They played an unusual 3-3-1-3ish formation, with Martinez taking the opportunity to experiment at a stage when Wigan had nothing to play for. They conceded an early goal, a slightly fortunate Nicolas Anelka strike following a set-piece – but from then on they were the better side for a good 20-minute spell. Chelsea, who were relentless and powerful at that point – but actually lacking in shape and discipline – found it very difficult to cope with the fact Wigan were playing three players in very wide positions with the ball, and by stretching the play as wide as possible, Wigan dominated possession.

What went wrong? Well, Wigan went down to ten men. Gary Caldwell was sent off for denying a clear goalscoring opportunity, and Wigan could no longer play with their brave starting formation. The entire point of them playing that match was no longer there, and they ended up losing the second half 6-0 with a ramshackle formation and a half-hearted attitude.

An interesting feature of Martinez’s post-match press conferences is his insistence on looking at a short, 10-15 minute spell when Wigan were the better side – even if it was at the end of a heavy defeat – and taking positives from it. At one stage this season, his confidence that these spells could be replicated over the course of 90 minutes bordered on the insane, considering his side was playing terribly for the majority of games. But this tendency to look beyond the result and see patterns of play in a set period of time is very interesting, especially when looking back at this fine first half performance (with eleven players) in an eight-goal thrashing.

Return to three at the back

Martinez returned to the three-man defence on the 11th February this year, for the home game with Bolton. Before that, Wigan had picked up 16 points from 24 games. From then, they won 27 points from 14 games. The turnaround was extraordinary, and while Wigan have made late comebacks something of a habit, their formation clearly played a crucial part in this season’s turnaround.


Formation v Newcastle at home (4-0 win)

Here are Martinez’s thoughts on the 3-4-3:

“When you play a 4-3-3, you rely a lot on the full-backs to get high up the pitch. You shouldn’t look at a system as away to win a football match, it is the players that play the system. Maynor [Figueroa], Gary [Caldwell] and Antolin [Alcaraz] have been so solid with a back three, and it allows [other] players to be high up the pitch, like the wing-backs. They aren’t full-backs that need to get deep and then forward to give us an extra man, they are in positions where they can do both a little bit better, and we can be a little bit more solid.

“The difference is the width that we get…before, we had to compromise a little bit, when you want to be very attack-minded, the full-backs have to push on, so you leave two players at the back. Now you’re still pushing the wing-backs on, but you’ve still got three players at the back, plus probably a midfielder. In the West Brom game, as Paul Scharner will tell you, we were attacking with seven, eight, nine players and they were surprised it, and that’s what the system gives you, without being weak at the back.

“It suits our players. When you’ve got a Jean Beausejour who is a specialist in that position, you take advantage of that. The back three gives you that. Then there’s the energy we’ve got in midfield, players who can play between lines like Shaun Maloney and Jordi Gomez. It’s so difficult to play against…there’s a few clubs playing it around Europe now, Napoli are one: they play it with Cavani, Hamsik and Lavezzi…this is the advantage of this system – it goes where the danger is…it’s not in defensive lines, it’s not working as a unit of four, it’s not man-marking.”

Back three characteristics

The most interesting part of the formation is, naturally, the back three. Other Premier League sides have experimented with a back three, but generally only in one-off games, and often for defensive reasons.
Martinez has been more committed to the shape, and it’s been interesting how ‘logical’ the statistics of his three centre-backs have been – Antolin Alcaraz, the right-sided centre-back, and the left-sided Maynor Figueroa, play as the ‘proactive’ defenders, happy to track a man, and willing to come up into midfield to make an interception. Gary Caldwell, who plays in the centre of the three, is effectively the spare man and does the dirty work in the penalty box.

Therefore, using the statistics in this piece for WhoScored, there is a big difference between the performance of the ‘outside’ centre-backs, and Caldwell. See the figures for tackling and intercepting, compared to clearances, blocks and aerial duels won:

These statistics take into account a period when Wigan played a back four, with Alcaraz a centre-back and Figueroa a left-back. But, regardless, the separation of duties works very naturally.

Defensive version

The interesting thing about the shape is that Martinez has made it work in two very different guises. There is the extremely defensive, counter-attacking shape (that is effectively more like 5-4-1, with the wide players dropping back a line), that Wigan played in the 2-1 win at Arsenal. That’s not unnatural – at the last World Cup, for example, we saw the usefulness of a three/five-man defence for minnows against stronger sides – if you’re going to sit deep in your own third of the pitch and not compete in an open game, the ‘formation battle’ isn’t so crucial. Instead, if you’re focusing on getting men behind the ball, you may as well employ an extra centre-back to deal with aerial balls into the box.

In the Arsenal game, Wigan sat very deep in front of their own penalty area. They had a 3 v 1 against Robin van Persie, and one of the centre-backs, usually Figueroa, would follow him into deep positions. Caldwell would shuffle across, Wigan would defend with a 2 v 0, with no Arsenal player looking to make a run into Figueroa’s space. The wing-backs became permanent full-backs and picked up the Arsenal wingers, while the wingers dropped back and tracked the Arsenal full-backs.

The interesting player was Victor Moses – although he generally stayed goalside of Bacary Sagna, he sprinted past the Frenchman as soon as possession was won, always providing the out-ball and launching Wigan breaks. The only ‘problem’ for Wigan was in the midfield, where they had a 2 v 3, but since they weren’t looking to have possession, this wasn’t a huge problem. James McArthur and James McCarthy picked up Arsenal’s two more attacking midfielders, while Franco Di Santo dropped back to become an extra midfielder, pressuring Alex Song.

Attacking version

Against Newcastle it was more attacking. Newcastle were playing a 4-3-3 shape, so Wigan only had 3 v 3 at the back. Faced with either playing 5 v 3 with the wing-backs dropping deep, or 3 v 3 with them pushing on, they went for the brave option. With Alan Pardew’s side looking to play quite a reactive game and letting Wigan have the ball, Martinez instructed his wing-backs to get forward and create 2 v 1 situations with the wingers down the flanks – Newcastle were caught understaffed at the back, conceding two goals in the opening 15 minutes.

The most interesting feature of the play, and a small example that sums up the benefit of the 3-4-3 shape, was that Newcastle didn’t know how to press the 3-4-3 with their 4-3-3. The problem was this – Ali Al-Habsi would look to play the ball out to his three centre-backs, so Wigan could get the ball down and play. Newcastle wanted to stop them building from the back, so Hatem Ben Arfa and Demba Ba in the wide positions looked to close down Wigan’s ‘outside’ centre-backs. But this then left the Wigan wing-backs free, and Al-Habsi could knock balls out to the flank, where the wing-backs would then move forward to create those 2 v 1 situations. If the Newcastle full-backs came out to the Wigan wing-backs, then the Wigan wingers would be free.


Newcastle were unable to press Wigan's 3-4-3 with a 4-3-3

Newcastle’s spare man was in the centre of midfield, and they could have been cleverer with how the three shifted across the pitch to close down the Wigan wing-backs, but they still would have been vulnerable to quick balls out to the flanks anyway. In the end, Pardew decided the only way Newcastle could press Wigan (at 2-0 down, and needing the ball) was to switch to a 3-4-3 himself. Newcastle hadn’t played that way before, and haven’t played that way since. Martinez had forced the overachievers of the season to play in an alien way, and that in itself was a victory.

Flexibility

Martinez has also shown great ability to vary the shape within games, able to play 4-3-3 or 3-4-3. Emmerson Boyce can play right-wing-back or right-back, Maynor Figueroa can play left-centre-back or left-wing-back, Jean Beausejour can play left-wing-back or left midfield. “At Anfield we played the two separate systems,” says Martinez. “And no-one would have been able to see the difference [in terms of standard of play].”

When asked if he thinks a sweeper should always play behind two other centre-backs in a back three, Martinez says, “If you play against a front two, you can do that. But if you play against a one and a one, then the sweeper plays in front, because obviously you can’t be three-versus-one at the back.”

Individuals have played their part. Moses’ rise into a top-level player has been crucial, Figueroa’s passing ability means he’s almost been like an extra midfielder when needed, and the signing of Jean Beausejour is one of the underrated transfer decisions of the season. He’s a natural crosser, knows this (rough) system well having been a wing-back in Marcelo Bielsa’s Chile side, and has provided more assists than any other Wigan played despite only joining in January.

But the key has been the system, and the manager who implemented it. Amongst more in-depth tactical analysis of the 3-4-3, there’s a lot to be said for simply ‘doing something different’ if you’re a weaker side in a league – give the opposition a new challenge, make them uncomfortable and ideally make them change, as Newcastle were forced to.

“In a year’s time, there will be a lot of teams playing a 3-4-3, believe me,” Martinez says. “And we’ll have to be able to change, to adapt to it. And that is why it’s so important that players are flexible tactically.”