11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

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比赛没看，晚上再详细研究一下

不过巴萨没获胜确实非常出人意料，赛前巴萨取胜的赔率只有1.25，这几乎是在主场打保级队才会出现的赔率

米兰连续几个赛季小组赛和西超分在一起，似乎打西超有点经验了 ...
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-9-14 16:41

其实与西甲打皇家社会差不多，都是领先后，中场各种倒脚不思进取造成的

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PSV 2-2 Ajax: PSV press, Ajax fight back
September 19, 2011


The first half line-ups (PSV in white/red, Ajax in blue)

PSV twice took the lead by exploiting a clear weakness in the Ajax defence, but the away side managed to claim a point.
Fred Rutton made two changes from PSV’s previous league game. Wilfred Bouma and Zakaria Labyad dropped out, with Timothy Derijck and Tim Matavz coming in.
Frank de Boer was without Miralem Sulejmani and chose to bring Vurnon Anita into the side as the holding player.
This match was open and entertaining, largely because there were two attack-minded midfields who wanted to play the ball rather than win it back.

PSV start strongly
For the first few minutes there was a huge difference in the two sides’ attitude without the ball – PSV pressed Ajax strongly from the first whistle, winning the ball quickly and putting them in command of the game. Ajax, however, were happy to sit back in their own half, showing a surprisingly passive approach when out of position.
The first goal resulted directly from the pressing – Ajax were high up the pitch when Gregory van der Wiel was dispossssed, and some neat passes down the PSV left eventually resulted in Tim Matavz finishing well. The battle in that part of the pitch – Ajax’s right-back zone – turned out to be the key battleground of the game.
Midfield battle
PSV’s pressing didn’t last long, however, and the game settled down into a fairly tame, free-flowing midfield battle based around movement rather than tackling. PSV’s two attack-minded central midfielders, Ola Toivonen and Georgino Wijnaldum, showed a decreasing amount of interest in defending as the game progressed, and it was a surprise that Theo Janssen didn’t influence the game more when breaking forward from central midfield.
There was some confusion in the way Ajax played to the right of the pitch. Cristian Eriksen played as a narrow right-winger, tucked into the midfield, whilst Siem de Jong started to the right of the triangle and burst forward. In addition, van der Wiel tried to motor forward on the overlap, and presumably there was the intention of making a triangle on that flank to overload PSV – but it never quite worked, and the main outcome was the leave the flank ripe for PSV counters, through Erik Pieters and Dries Mertens.
Ajax step it up
The injury to PSV goalkeeper Przemysław Tytoń, which stopped the game for 15 minutes at the end of the first half, was a key factor in the game. PSV’s momentum was broken up, and after that stoppage Ajax regrouped and started to press much more. They played the game in PSV’s half and eventually found an equaliser through Kolbeinn Sigþórsson – for all their attempts at intricate play, it was Sigþórsson doing a battering ram act that eventually got them the goal.
PSV then recovered after half time and started pressing more, and it’s tempting to conclude that the concession of a goal, and the return to a deadlock in the game, suited their natural game more – in particular, their midfield. They were much more positive and worked good situations down their left. This was the period when van der Wiel was exposed – he made a crazy tackle on Mertens to concede the penalty for the second goal, then got caught too high up the pitch for a chance Mertens wasted when one-on-one.
Late on
Van der Wiel partly atoned for his poor defensive performance with a good run down the right for the equaliser. By this stage, Frank de Boer had introduced the physical threat of Dmitri Bulykin for Sigþórsson, and this prompted more direct balls into the box – Bulykin tucked home Sigþórsson’s ball.
The final stages were exciting but not frantic – both teams tired, and though the midfields basically gave up defending, there was a feeling that both managers were content with a point.
Conclusion
There is an interesting pattern to many Eredivisie games in terms of tactics – they’re rarely won by a change of formation, but the game goes through many separate phases – often revolving around whether the sides are pressing. This was the case here – especially in the first half, when both teams were on top when they pressed.
Ultimately, this was a battle between two teams who aren’t built to play against each other – they’re built to convincingly beat more lowly sides. Both wanted to dominate possession, to play the ball gently through midfield and to construct clever attacks, when a bit of organisation wouldn’t have gone amiss. Still, it was a good game, and the nature of the final scoreline – PSV making the running, Ajax just about catching up – summed up the game well.

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233楼参考译文

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zm也是，对巴萨8-0大赢奥萨苏纳不感兴趣，却对巴萨2-2平瓦伦很感兴趣

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Valencia 2-2 Guardiola: Emery gets the better of Guardiola early on, but Barca fight backSeptember 22, 2011


The first half line-ups

Cesc Fabregas’ goal secured a point for Barcelona, but they were the weaker side in the first half.

Unai Emery tried his trick from last season against Barcelona, fielding two left-backs in Jeremy Mathieu and Jordi Alba down the left, in order to deal with the forward runs of Dani Alves. Jonas dropped out accordingly, and Bruno Saltor was replaced by Miguel.

Pep Guardiola went for a 4-3-3ish shape, albeit with Alves pushed very high up the pitch. David Villa was only on the bench.

Valencia dominated the first half by doing two things well – first, pressing Barcelona, squeezing the play and forcing the away side into errors in possession. Second, by attacking Barca in behind Alves and creating three good chances through this route.

The battle down Alves’ side

This was the key factor in the game. Emery’s double left-back strategy had worked well at the Camp Nou last year – Valencia scored with a break through Mathieu, and were 1-0 up at half time until Barca staged a second half comeback. The idea, of course, is that because Alves’ runs are so dangerous, by fielding a defensively-aware player on the left of midfield, you have a player who is comfortable tracking back to his own defensive line.

Of course, if you’re Alves, you’re going to test this as much as possible to try and force Valencia’s players towards their own goal. Therefore, Alves played high up the pitch, on the right-hand touchline, to push Mathieu deeper and deeper. The problem was, Mathieu was Valencia’s biggest threat going forward. He constantly broke forward and exploited the space in behind Alves, setting up two goals and producing a third great chance, where Roberto Soldado missed an open goal. But how could he do this, if he was meant to be tracking Alves?

Guardiola’s error

Well, as it turned out, he wasn’t. Pedro seemed to start on the right wing but quickly switched the left, and the rest of Barcelona’s fluid front three consisted of Lionel Messi playing a false nine role, and Cesc Fabregas buzzing about between the lines. Barcelona were essentially playing with no right-winger, and therefore Alves didn’t need to be watched by Mathieu – Jordi Alba could deal with him perfectly well. After all, it’s not like you particularly need to double up on Alves, you simply need someone who can track his run. Barcelona had no winger to bring Alba inside, and therefore he could track Alves.

Mathieu, then, was free to bomb forward. This dragged almost Barcelona’s entire team out of shape. Javier Mascherano had to come across to right-back, then Carles Puyol had to shuffle over, then Eric Abidal had to move to centre-back, from where he scored an own goal, then made an error for the second, scored by Pablo Hernandez coming in at the back post. With Abidal coming inside, Hernandez had to be dealt with by Seydou Keita, whilst Sergio Busquets tried to drop in and help out in the centre of defence too. Barcelona were essentially having a chain of four players (plus Busquets) all trying to cover the position vacated by another.

This had an impact higher up – Xavi Hernandez was left on his own (and what is Xavi without short passing options?) and there was no connection from defence to midfield. Barcelona’s only hope of a goal was a Messi ball through to Fabregas or Pedro, and that’s where their first goal arrived from, through the latter.

Elsewhere, Valencia were coping well in midfield. Hernandez tucked in and played narrow, picking up Keita to make up the numbers in midfield, safe in the knowledge Abidal wouldn’t be attacking much. Adil Rami was fortunate not to get a second booking for bringing down Messi, but was otherwise impressive in coming up the pitch to him and Fabregas, largely keeping them quiet.

Second half


The second half line-ups

Guardiola had to change things for the second period, and he did. Pedro came to the right, with Fabregas initially floating in from the left. Alves was told to stay at right-back and not attack at all, and Barcelona kept it tight for the first ten minutes of the second half. Emery brought on Tino Costa to replace David Albelda, who had been excellent but had picked up an injury.

The story of the second half is best told through substitutions and the resulting formation changes.

1. Guardiola made two substitutions. Adriano came on for Pedro, playing on the right-hand side. This was a slightly surprising move, and meant that there were four full-backs (Adriano, Alves, Mathieu, Alba) all down the same flank. Villa also came on for Keita, with Fabregas dropping deeper.

2. With Barca enjoying more possession than in the first half, Guardiola felt able to make a more attacking move. Thiago Alcantara came on for Puyol. This could have meant Busquets going to centre-back, but in fact he shuttled between a centre-back position and a holding role. When Barca had the ball, he was in midfield, with a lopsided back three of Alves, Mascherano and Abidal behind.

3. Seeing that Busquets was attempting to play ahead of the defence, Emery took off Canales and brought on a support striker, Jonas, who could get forward and link up with Soldado, therefore pushing Busquets back. Jonas wasn’t particularly good at this role, however, and Barca dominated possession to allow Busquets into midfield.

4. Now Barcelona were using Alves very deep – almost as a right-sided centre-back – plus had Adriano ahead, not the greatest attacking threat (although he was key in this fixture last year) Emery could put on a true winger down that side. Pablo Piatti arrived, in place of Mathieu who had tired. Valencia were trying to win the game.

The formations then looked like the diagram above. Barcelona in a 3-4-3 diamondish shape like they used against Villarreal, with Valencia a 4-2-3-1 with an offensive tilt.

How did Barcelona get back into the game? Their dominance of possession was key, with a slight overload in the centre of midfield. Messi came into that zone unmarked and played some superb passes, including the assist for Fabregas, and later slid a great ball out to Villa on the left. Valencia tired, as they have done a couple of times this season, and failed to put pressure on the man on ball late on, allowing Barcelona to pass their way through the defence. In the final moments, it was the home side hanging on.

Conclusion

Emery won the pre-match tactical battle, but Guardiola used his substitutions more wisely to get back into the game.

It was surprising to see Barca so vulnerable early on, and maybe Guardiola got a little carried away with Alves’ abilities. He has the energy to cover the flank by himself, but that doesn’t mean he can be used 2 v 1 – because one of the players will get goalside of him and break quickly. He needs a wide player ahead of him who will come inside and open up space.

Emery should be praised for his starting tactics, as well as some brave substitutions late on to try and force Barca back. Ultimately Messi’s quality was the biggest factor in getting the away side back into the game – and there’s no shame in that. Ultimately, this was a tactical victory for Emery.

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上楼参考译文
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瓦伦西亚2-2巴塞罗那：埃梅里赢得开局，巴萨逆袭保一分

由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

上半场的阵型

法布雷加斯的进球为巴塞罗那保住了一分，而在上半场他们处于劣势之中。

埃梅里用了上赛季他对付巴萨的法子，在左翼安排了马蒂厄和阿尔巴两个左后卫，以限制阿尔维斯的前插助攻。与此相应地乔纳斯未能出场，米格尔顶替萨尔托首发。

瓜迪奥拉排出了433的阵型，但实际上阿尔维斯的位置非常靠前。比利亚并没有首发。

蝙蝠军团上半场有两件事完成得相当不错，他们也藉此掌控了比赛：一是压迫巴萨，挤压他们活动空间，逼迫客队控球时出现失误；二是打阿尔维斯身后的空当，并凭这一招就创造了3个绝佳的机会。

阿维尔斯一侧的对抗

这是本场比赛的关键之处。在去年的诺坎普球场，埃梅里的双左后卫战术效果相当不错——马蒂厄的突破为瓦伦贡献1球，保持1-0的领先结束上半场，而下半场则是巴萨的逆袭。他采用这种战术明显是因为阿尔维斯的前插非常有威胁，那么在左翼安排一个注重防守的球员，就能有一个人很舒服地守住他负责的防区。

当然，要是你是阿尔维斯，你也会尽可能挑战对手下的套儿，并把瓦伦的球员逼向己方球门。于是乎阿尔维斯位置很靠前，在右翼边线活动，逼得马蒂厄不断退后。问题却是，马蒂厄成了对巴萨威胁最大的人。他不断地突破，利用阿尔维斯身后的空间，策划了两个进球，并制造了第三个绝好的机会，可惜索尔达多错失空门。如果他的任务是跟住阿尔维斯，那他又是如何做到这些的呢？

瓜迪奥拉犯的错

好吧呀，就像我们所见到的，他并没有去跟阿尔维斯。佩德罗首发好像是在右翼，但他很快就换位到了左边，而巴萨前场三叉戟中梅西踢伪9号的位置，法布雷加斯则在锋线与中场间游弋。巴萨实际上没有右边锋，于是马蒂厄也没必要盯防阿尔维斯——阿尔巴就能很好地对付他了。毕竟球队的布局并不是要你特别留心给阿尔维斯上个双保险，你只要有人能跟着他就可以了。巴萨没有边锋吸引阿尔巴，于是他就能守住阿尔维斯了。

于是马蒂厄就能自由地上前助攻了，这也使得巴萨整个阵型变得七零八落。马斯切拉诺得去右后卫的位置补位，于是普约尔也得平移过去，之后阿比达尔移到了中卫位置，也就是在这个位置他进了那第一个乌龙球，并在处理第二个进球时犯了个错误，那是巴勃罗在远点插上打进的。阿比达尔去中路后，巴萨得靠凯塔应对巴勃罗，同时布斯克茨回撤来加强中路的防守。巴萨实际上有一串儿4个人（加上布斯克茨）来一个接一个地填补空当。

这对他们的前场有不小的影响——哈维落单了（没了传球目标的哈维有什么用呢？），防线和中场的联系也断了。巴萨想进球就只能指望梅西分个球给法布雷加斯或者佩德罗，而他们第一个进球也确实是这么来的，由佩德罗打进。

另外瓦伦的中场也运转得很流畅。巴勃罗打入敌阵，活动区域狭长，对位凯塔以确保中场的人数优势，在清楚阿比达尔助攻不多的前提下他的位置很安全。拉米很幸运，他没有因为放到梅西而吃到第二张牌，而他在场上对阵梅西和法布雷加斯时的表现给人留下不错的印象，很大程度上是他让这俩儿一对巴掌也拍不响。

下半场

瓜迪奥拉必须在下半场做些变化，他也确实这么干了。佩德罗来到右路，而法布雷加斯则一开始从左翼游荡到中路。阿尔维斯被交代乖乖留在右后卫的位置，完全不助攻了，而巴萨整体在下半场前十分钟保持了较为紧密的阵型。埃梅里用科斯塔换下阿尔贝尔达，他表现出色但不幸受伤。

下半场值得注意的关键是几个换人，以及由此导致的阵型上的改变。

1.瓜迪奥拉换了两个人。阿德里亚诺换下佩德罗，在右翼活动。这一招有点儿让人意外，意味着在同一侧有4个边后卫出场了（阿德里亚诺，阿尔维斯，马蒂厄和阿尔巴）。比利亚换下凯塔，法布雷加斯位置后撤。


2.巴萨在上半场控球更多，瓜迪奥拉觉得可以采取更具攻击性的手段了。他用蒂亚戈换下普约尔，这意味着布斯克斯回撤到中卫位置，但实际上他在中卫和后腰间徘徊。当巴萨拿球时他在中场，身后是阿尔维斯、马斯切拉诺和阿比达尔三人组成的并不均衡的后防线。

3.看到布斯克茨试图参与中场的组织，埃梅里换下卡纳莱丝，换上一个支援型前锋乔纳斯，他能前插并将索尔达多和中场连接起来，藉此将布斯克茨逼回去。但乔纳斯任务完成得并不好，巴萨控制住了球权，使得布斯克茨能参与到中场组织中来。

4.现在巴萨把阿尔维斯摆得非常靠后——基本上是一个在右边的中卫了——再加上阿德里亚诺顶在前面，这边不再是一个极具威胁的攻击点了（尽管去年他是这阵型中的关键人物），埃梅里可以在这边放一个真正的边锋了。皮亚蒂换下了体力不济的马蒂厄，瓦伦想要拿下比赛。

下半场的阵型

现在的阵型就如同上图所示了。巴萨是343的钻石型阵型，就像他们对阵比利亚雷尔时的那样，而瓦伦则是带有攻击箭头的4231。

巴萨是如何重新掌控比赛的呢？关键是他们的控球，并在中场有稍稍的人数优势压制。梅西回撤到这个区域，无人盯防，而他传了好几个好球，包括助攻法布雷加斯的那个，之后又给左侧的比利亚送去一记妙传。瓦伦体力下降，他们本赛季已经好几次这样了，面对巴萨拿球队员无力再紧逼，使得对手能用传球洞穿己方防线。在比赛最后时刻
苦苦坚持的变成了主队。

结论

埃梅里赢得了赛前的战术布置，但瓜迪奥拉用他明智的换人将巴萨带回比赛的正轨。

比赛刚开始时巴萨如此不堪一击真是让人吃惊，也许瓜迪奥拉有点儿过于相信阿尔维斯的能力了。他有足够的能量可以在那一侧来来回回，但这不意味着可以拿他1对2——因为有1个人可以找他的空当并迅速突破他。阿尔维斯需要一个活动范围广的人顶在他前面，那人可以内切来为他打开空间。

我们得赞埃梅里的初期战术布置，还有之后他采取的一些大胆的，试图逼迫巴萨退守的换人。最终梅西的个人能力成了带领客队扳平的最大因素——这就没有什么值得自己反省的了。最后一句，这是一次属于埃梅里的战术胜利。

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下半场丢球后，中场最后也失控，没有拦截没有反抢也更木有组织进攻，肿么一丢球以后就这样提不起士气来

换人效果也起不了多大作用

上下半场差距太大，尤其对方发起狠来

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313# mcruz11  
我只是不明白，萨贝拉怎么会看不出这些显而易见的弊端。而且从他的选人来看，明显不是走三后卫的路子，要不选盖坦萨尔维奥他们进来干吗？ ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-12 13:13

阿根廷教练的事似乎不能用战术来解释的

否则难以有道理上通行证

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313# mcruz11
我只是不明白，萨贝拉怎么会看不出这些显而易见的弊端。而且从他的选人来看，明显不是走三后卫的路子，要不选盖坦萨尔维奥他们进来干吗？希望他好好思考思考。 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-10-12 13:13

委队还只会用定位球破门，若是换成那波里，估计阿根廷会丢3个球以上的

而且要不是安度哈尔神勇扑救，上半场早就丢球了

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中场中路给人家打反击时空间太多，不侥幸的话，会丢更多球

而下半场左路后卫防守又出现上一场打智利时弊端，给人家较多定位球机会

最后两个边几乎推进不到前场了，处处受阻了

只好大脚从后场长传瞎蒙了

说实话，国足昨晚机会都比阿根廷队多，可惜这帮球员终归还是属于草包类，不会将主场优势和裁判善意帮助的东风转化为球迷希望的实现

一场比赛，怎么上下半场区别这么大呢？关键是人家上半场是战略守势

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zm的小结说得很有意思，从数据上看，主队好于客队，不过整场来看两队缺乏吸引人的地方，跑动不积极、散步等充斥90分钟。

鲁尼、纳尼、小豌豆不首发，估计弗格森再为欧冠做打算：曼联2连平，积分暂时排第三

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Chelsea 3-5 Arsenal: Chelsea’s high line ripped to shreds in amazingly open game
October 29, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chelsea had a clear weakness coming into the game – their defence plays high up the pitch and are prone to pace in behind – and Arsenal exploited it to great effect.

Andre Villas-Boas brought Branislav Ivanovic into the side for David Luiz, who was poor at QPR. Jon Obi Mikel played rather than Raul Meireles in the holding role – the rest of the side was as expected.

Arsene Wenger continued with Johan Djourou at right-back and Thomas Vermaelen was fit only for the bench.

This was a game with plenty of chances and some terrible defending – Arsenal were better at exploiting the weaknesses of their opponent.

Change in roles

The most interesting feature of the game was the difference in pattern from the usual matches between these two. For the last two or three seasons, the storyline was predictable: Arsenal dominated possession and Chelsea sat back, then played on the break (and often won).

Here, the roles were reversed. Chelsea had the majority of the ball, Arsenal were more direct. Wenger admitted in his pre-game interview that Chelsea had ‘a little more creativity’ than his side due to the presence of Juan Mata, which would have been unthinkable at any point over the last few years. Villas-Boas has clearly changed how Chelsea play.

High line

That brings us to the second point, and the key factor in the scoreline – Chelsea’s high defensive line, which ZM looked at in midweek.

This was always going to be a problem – Arsenal exploited this continually throughout the match, and whilst it wasn’t responsible for all five goals, Arsenal could have had five goals based solely upon knocking the ball in behind and using the pace of Theo Walcott and/or Gervinho. The Ivorian’s first half miss at 0-0, for example, was shocking.

It was a a continual problem – the first goal came with Gervinho slipping through unchecked, Walcott’s came when he had space to exploit by bursting through. Individual mistakes contributed to the second goal (Daniel Sturridge not tracking Andre Santos) and the fourth (Florent Malouda’s poor pass and John Terry’s stumble), whilst Villas-Boas wrote off the fifth one, saying that his side were pushing forward to get a fourth game and therefore were always going to concede space at the back, a plausible explanation.

Still, it can’t be refuted that the majority of Arsenal’s chances came by exploiting space in behind, and working a one-on-one with Petr Cech. There is, really, no further analysis needed of such an obvious issue in the match, and something that was covered in great depth in midweek.

Chelsea movement

It shouldn’t be forgotten that Chelsea created a lot themselves – in addition to the three goals, they wasted other chances – particularly at 0-0. It would appear that Villas-Boas knew the threat of Arsenal’s pace from their wingers, but rather than deciding to defend deeper (more on why he didn’t do that later), he instead tried to aggressively push Gervinho and Walcott back.

A key feature of the matches between these two in recent years has been Ashley Cole tearing past Arsenal’s right-winger to stretch the play and provide crosses. It happened twice in the first five minutes – Djourou looked lost at full-back, Walcott switched off and two Cole cut-backs were intercepted by Arsenal centre-backs.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

There was a further subtlety to pushing the full-backs forward, though – Jon Obi Mikel often dropped into the defence to form a back three, allowing the full-backs higher up. To as not to lose the 3 v 3 in midfield, Juan Mata moved inside. On the other wing, Daniel Sturridge moved higher up and got in behind Arsenal – Andre Santos’ positioning is very suspect, and Sturridge had two good chances. Santos was also at fault for Frank Lampard’s goal, being beaten too easily by Mata when the Spaniard moved to that flank. In fact, it’s difficult to say that any of the full-backs got the better of their respective winger – the Arsenal full-backs were poor positionally, Chelsea’s were outpaced.

The midfield battle wasn’t particularly crucial in getting the upper hand. As already mentioned, Chelsea had more possession but lost the game.

Progression of the game

How did the game change over time? From 0-0 to 2-3, not much. Part of the reason for the openness was the relentless speed at which the game was played – only when Arsenal were ahead (and even then only in brief spells) did Aaron Ramsey and Mikel Arteta put their foot on the ball and try and control the tempo. The rest of play was frantic, direct and goal-hungry.

The situation did change at 2-3, though – the longest the game remained at any particular scoreline. Villas-Boas made three positive substitutions and Chelsea moved the ball a little quicker. How much did the changes actually impact the match? Looking purely at the way the goals went in, hugely: Chelsea got back in it, yet made themselves susceptible to Arsenal breaks.

Yet in reality, Chelsea didn’t create much at 2-3 until Mata’s long-range effort – and Arsenal only scored their crucial fourth due to an individual mistake, at a time when removing Walcott for Tomas Rosicky looked like they may have lost their attacking thrust and consigned them to getting men behind the ball. Amongst all the tactical problems and substitutions, Malouda’s misplaced pass was crucial.

Conclusion

Arsenal’s defensive problems are still evident. They conceded three goals and this is still an issue that must be addressed. But they won, and they won intelligently. Pace was going to be a factor, they played direct football and created plenty of excellent openings, enough to win any game of football.

This is potentially a very important win for Arsenal, because of the nature of the goals they’ve scored. So far this season there hasn’t been the obvious, logical move towards a more direct style of football that should come when you go from being based around passers like Cesc Fabregas and Samir Nasri, to quick wide forwards like Walcott and Gervinho.

Too often in 2010/11, even when they have won, Arsenal have built up play too slowly and been rescued by van Persie. This is surely the answer – a cohesive, quick style of play that suits all their forwards. A return to more of a tiki-taka approach in the next game would be a disappointment (although of course, most sides will play much more negatively against them, and it may not be possible to be so counter-attacking).

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Villas-Boas will defend his high line. On the basis of this game, it’s a ludicrous decision. But consider his long-term goal at Chelsea – to bring in a more positive, proactive, aggressive style of football – and he’ll argue, with some justification, that such an overarching change in ideology is not compatible with suddenly switching to a more defensive mindset for a one-off occasion. Chelsea have suffered from short-termism in recent years and lacked finesse. Villas-Boas wants to give them more of an identity, and for that he should be praised.

That said, one has to question whether the individuals in his backline can cope with this strategy. A side cannot be so amazingly prone to one particular approach that it’s possible to accurately identify where they’ll lose in the days before the game. Villas-Boas has a great vision for Chelsea, but he can’t be blind to his players’ failings.

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495楼参考译文
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切尔西3-5阿森纳战术分析：切尔西的前压防线被撕成碎片
由 余文乐 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


The starting line-ups

切尔西的战术有一个明显的缺陷，他们的防线压得很靠前，容易被速度打身后。而阿森纳把这一点利用得非常的好。

博阿斯用伊万诺维奇轮换了上轮对QPR时表现不佳的鲁伊斯。而米克尔才成为了首发的防守中场，而不是梅雷莱斯。其余的阵容选择一如众人所料。

温格继续使用朱鲁出任右后卫，状态尚未完全恢复的维尔马伦在替补席上候命。

这是一场有着很多机会和不少可怕防守的比赛，而在利用对手弱点方面，阿森纳做得更好。

角色互换

比赛最引人注目的特征就是，比赛的场面和之前两三年的比赛完全不一样。过去，故事大多会这样发生：阿森纳主导了控球，而切尔西后撤防守，然后打反击（然后经常获胜）。

今天，双方的角色互换了。切尔西拥有大部分的控球时间，阿森纳踢法更加直接。温格在赛前的访谈中承认在创造力方面，切尔西比他的队伍稍微强一点，因为他们有马塔。这在过去几年也是不可想象的。博阿斯已经明显地改变了切尔西的比赛模式。

防线前压

这就引出了第二点，也是决定最终比分的关键因素-切尔西防线前压，我们在周中就说过这个问题。

这个问题一直存在。在整场比赛中，阿森纳都在利用这一点。尽管并非5个进球都和这一点有关，但他们本可以在单单在这一点上就打进5球，他们可以一脚长传过顶，然后利用沃尔科特和热尔维尼奥的速度。科特迪瓦人在0-0时候的射门偏出，让人惊讶。

这个问题持续不断地出现，第一个进球在于热尔维尼奥在没有盯防的情况下中间突破了防线，沃尔科特的进球则因为他有空间去突破防线。第二个（斯图里奇没有紧追桑托斯）和第四个（马卢达的糟糕回传，特里滑倒）进球跟个人失误有关。而第五个，博阿斯说他的球队在尝试追平比分，这样后面空位多是很正常的事情，这只是一个冠冕堂皇的解释而已。

阿森纳大部分的机会都来自利用防线身后的空间，然后和切赫一对一，这你无法反驳。而且我们也不需要为比赛中如此明显的现象作更多的分析，况且，我们周中已经很认真地分析过了。

切尔西的移动

我们不能忘记切尔西也创造了很多的机会，尤其是0-0的时候。但除了那3个进球，其他的都被他们浪费了。似乎博阿斯知道阿森纳边锋速度对他们的危险，但博阿斯没有选择后撤防守，他选择坚持侵略性的踢法，试图把热尔维尼奥和沃尔科特压在后场。

近年来，这两队的比赛的一个关键特征就是，阿什利科尔越过阿森纳右边锋的防守前插支援进攻并提供传中。而这在开场的5分钟内就出现了2次。朱鲁看起来在右后卫的位置上摸不着头脑。沃尔科特没有回追，科尔两次的传中都被阿森纳的中卫解围。


by Guardian Chalkboards

切尔西边后卫助攻还有一个很微妙的安排。米克尔经常后撤，形成防线三人组，这样边后卫可以大胆前插。而为了在3v3的中场争夺中不落下风，马塔经常内收。在另外一边，斯图里奇压得更靠前，在阿森纳身后寻求机会。桑托斯的位置感不能让人放心，而斯图里奇有两个很好的机会。桑托斯在兰帕德的进球中也有犯错的地方，他太轻易地让换位到这边的马塔传中了。事实上，没有一名边后卫是做得好的。阿森纳的边后卫位置感差，切尔西的边后卫速度不给力。

中场争夺并不是关键的因素。就像前面说的那样，切尔西有更多的控球，但他们输掉了比赛。

比赛的进程

这场比赛是怎样随着时间转移的？从0-0到2-3，原因并不多。比赛如此开放的部分原因是比赛以从不间断的高速进行，只有当阿森纳领先的时候（这段时间非常短），拉姆塞和阿尔特塔才会拿球控制节奏。在其余的时间中，比赛处于一种狂乱的、直来直往、渴望进球的状态。

但在2-3的时候，情势的确变化了。这是比分定格时间最长的一段。博阿斯做了三个主动换人，而切尔西转移球速度变快了一点。这些换人对比赛又有多大影响呢？?单纯从进球来看，影响很大：虽然切尔西扳平了比分，但让他们更加容易被阿森纳的反击。

然而事实上，切尔西在2-3之后并没有创造什么机会，直到马塔的远射。而阿森纳的第四个进球仅仅是来自于一次个人失误，当时他们已经用罗西基换下沃尔科特，看起来他们可能已经开始准备放弃进攻，开始死守。说了那么多战术问题和状况，最致命的还是马卢达的回传失误。

总结

阿森纳的防守问题依然明显。他们丢了3个球，这依然是一个需要解决的问题。但他们赢了，他们赢得很聪明。速度是一个因素，他们踢出了快速简洁的足球，创造了许多缺口，这足以让他们赢得任何比赛。

基于他们进球的性质，这很可能是阿森纳的一场非常重要的胜利。这个赛季到目前为止，他们还没有打过这样一场快速简洁的比赛，阿森纳本来就应该这样打。要知道，他们的战术重心已经由小法和纳斯里这样的传球手转移到沃尔科特和热尔维尼奥这样的速度型边锋身上。

在上赛季，阿森纳组织经常是组织进攻太缓慢，就算是赢球的比赛也是如此。他们常常需要范佩西的拯救。一个快速的、配合默契的踢法适合他们的前锋。如果他们在下一场比赛再次回归到tiki-taka的话，会让人失望的（当然，大部分球队对阵阿森纳的时候都会踢得较为保守和注重防守，那也许不能得到如此多反击的机会）。


by Guardian Chalkboards

博阿斯会为他的防线前压战术辩护。但就这场比赛来看，这是一个荒谬的决定。但考虑到他在切尔西的全盘计划是带来一种更加积极主动，更具侵略性的足球，他会找一些理由为自己辩护，一个在理念方面如此重大的转变，不会为单单的一场比赛突然转换为一个更防守型的战术。切尔西近年来有点短视，缺乏长期策略。而博阿斯想要为他们塑造一直风格印记，他应该为此受到赞誉的。

那意味着，现在的问题是，他防线上的那些人是不是已经满足这种战术的要求。一支球队有一个如此明显的弱点，而且这个弱点在这场比赛之前已经暴露无遗。对于切尔西，博阿斯有着伟大的蓝图，但是他们不能对球队的过错视而不见。

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枪手经历了赛季那几场梦魇般比赛后，从欧冠小组赛上开始找感觉，直到最近联赛连胜，逐渐恢复强队本色

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Eduardo fails to track Igor Denisov, and Zenit get the upper hand in important victory
November 1, 2011


The starting line-ups - key man Denisov highlight in blue

After such an exciting first game between these two sides, the return match was something of a disappointment.

The match essentially revolved around a single key battle in the centre of the pitch. Zenit are usually 4-3-3 with one midfielder in the holding role, whilst Shakhtar generally line up 4-2-3-1. As in the first game, the midfield triangles were set to match each other.

Mircua Lucescu sprung a slight surprise in his side, though, with the use of Eduardo in the centre of the pitch, in support of Luiz Adriano. Eduardo has usually been used either on the flank or as the centre-forward – this was the first time he’d been used as a central player in the attacking band of three, with Willian and Alex Teixeira in the wide positions.

This changed that midfield battle. Eduardo is not used to tracking central midfielders, and therefore constantly failed to get goalside of Igor Denisov, Zenit’s deepest midfielder. It was unclear whether Lucescu had asked Eduardo not to track his man and stay in a position where he could launch quick attacks, or if he was simply not following orders. Either way, he played much higher up the pitch than Jadson in the first game.

In a game that took a long time to get going, the obvious result was that Denisov was always in space, and was allowed to dictate the game. He completed the most passes of any player – 62. The next highest player was his midfield colleague Konstantin Zyryanov on 50.

What made his freedom particularly obvious was that he didn’t just sit in position and knock passes from side to side – he sprinted forward to get into goalscoring positions – the Arouca role. Zenit play a wonderfully fluid midfield where Zyryanov and Roman Shirokov take it in turns to drop deep and cover Denisov’s forward runs (look at the midfielder’s average positions – right on top of each other) so he was able to make it to the edge of the box to attempt five shots. All came in the first half – as Zenit went ahead in the 45th minute, he was asked to be more conservative after the break.



His tendency to move forward also meant that he played more passes in the final third than any other player – 28. And he created two chances for teammates, too. All this is rather surprising for a side’s deepest midfielder.



It’s notable that his shots and chances created all came from a centre-right position. It might well be the case that this was because Eduardo tended to stray to (his) right of the pitch, and therefore Denisov had more space to exploit by moving to the right himself.

If it was calculated gamble by Lucescu, to get Eduardo into space, it didn’t work; he barely created anything on the break as Shakhtar were particularly poor. Instead, Denisov took advantage to control the game – the only surprise was that his influence didn’t result in a goal or an assist – Zenit deserved to win by a greater scoreline.

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502楼的参考译文

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zm关注本赛季泽尼特的比赛，至少已经是第二次了。

偶对本组欧冠积分排名第一的阿波尔的比赛更感兴趣些

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Inter 2-1 Lille: both sides poor, and vulnerable in different ways
November 2, 2011


The starting line-ups

Inter overcame Lille in a match lacking in quality.

Claudio Ranieri stuck with the 4-3-1-2 he used in the weekend defeat to Juventus, but there were changes in defence, midfield and attack. Walter Samuel, Thiago Motta and Diego Milito all returned.

Rudi Garcia played a flexible 4-2-3-1 that changed throughout the game, and seemed to become a 4-4-2 in the second half. In the first half, Joe Cole started centrally but drifted to the right, Eden Hazard was on the left and Moussa Sow was a right-sided forward.

Inter created chances without playing particularly well, whilst Lille frequently got into promising positions on the flanks but failed to turn these situations into goals.

Lille weaknesses

Early on, Lille were extremely vulnerable to balls being hit over their defence for Diego Milito to run onto – the Argentine hit the bar through this approach after a couple of minutes, and a similar ball was played to him soon after. Mauro Zarate also tried to get on the end of a ball from this approach, though Mickael Landreau started to sweep rather more keenly after the first few minutes.

Lille were also sometimes unable to deal with Inter’s full-backs getting forward. With a 3 v 4 disadvantage in the centre of midfield, Hazard and Sow were brought inside to help out, leaving Javier Zanetti and Cristian Chivu free. Zanetti set up the second goal in the second half, with a cross for Milito.

Debuchy free

Inter, in traditional fashion, couldn’t cope with opposition full-backs moving forward. Stephane Lichsteiner exposed them at the weekend in this respect, and Mathieu Debuchy did something similar here. Time and time again, the ball was played out to him, Esteban Cambiasso couldn’t quite get out in time, and Debuchy had time to cross. With Franck Beria at left-back less comfortable on the ball, almost all Lille’s crosses came from the right, as shown below. The majority came from Debuchy, most of which were unsuccessful.



It was a shame that only one Lille full-back was comfortable at crossing – as Schalke showed last year, bringing both forward and constantly switching the play from side to side is very effective against an ageing 4-3-1-2 (and that’s what it was: the oldest Champions League starting XI in history for Inter tonight). Schalke constantly moved the ball laterally across the pitch, which Lille rarely did here.



Lille strategy

Lille could have been a little braver with their positioning, seeking to quickly hit Inter on the break. More of an aggressive 4-2-1-3, for example, might have been a better strategy. Hazard and Sow could have played high up and pinned the full-backs into their own half, looking for balls in behind to run onto. Cole would have been the link man, looking to play slide passes.

It would largely have left defending to six men, but then Inter’s play is predictable, overly dependent upon Sneijder for creativity – and it’s debatable whether his level of performance lives up to his reputation as a creator – and above all, narrow (if you nullify the full-backs). It wouldn’t have been unreasonable to expect six defensive players to cope with Milito, Sneijder and Zarate, plus the sporadic runs from three conservative midfielders.

Lille may have actually dominated possession more than is ideal – by doing so they let Lucio and Walter Samuel retreat to a comfortable position on the edge of their own box. Playing quickly and exposing their lack of pace is probably a more promising approach – it won’t give you much possession, but it should bring chances. (Of course, you need a strategy in possession too – but Lille had that, by playing out to Debuchy.)

Counter-attacking was less of an option when 1-0 down, and to be fair to Lille, their pressing after half time was very good. They got back into the game having replaced three of the four attacking players, and Garcia deserves some praise for seeing that Tulio De Melo was a better target man for crosses than Ireneuz Jelen, but his goal was primarily because of poor defending.

Conclusion

A poor game between two sides struggling for confidence. Lille seemed to have a slightly more cohesive gameplan but couldn’t execute it well enough in the final third, whilst Inter still look exactly what they are – a very old side who have no real ideology, having been coached by five different managers in the last 18 months.

Lille probably won’t qualify, Inter probably will – but it’s difficult to see either side having a real impact upon the tournament.

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508楼参考译文
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国际米兰2-1里尔战术分析：两队均无状态，弱点各有不同  
由 谢联替补 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


双方首发阵容

在一场乏善可陈的比赛中，国际米兰击败了里尔。

拉涅利坚持使用了他在周末负于尤文的比赛中使用的4321阵型，但三条线的人员都有所变化。萨穆埃尔、莫塔和米利托均重返首发。

鲁迪-加西亚还以4231应对，但其阵型颇为灵活，在下半场则切换为了442。上半场，乔科尔首发出任前腰，但经常游弋到右路，阿扎尔居左，而索乌的角色则是名身居右路的前锋。

尽管踢得不算好，国际还是创造了不少机会，而里尔虽然在边路屡屡占得先机，却无法抓住空档取得进球。

里尔的弱点

比赛伊始，里尔对对手过顶身后球找米利托这一点的防守有些弱不禁风，依托既定战术，阿根廷前锋开场两分钟便一脚劲射轰在门梁上，其后很快便接到了另一次类似传球。萨拉特也试图从此战术上尝到甜头。不过比赛进行了一段时间后，朗德罗开始大胆地出击解围。

里尔对国米边后卫的插上同样无能为力。由于在中场中路3对4的人数劣势，阿扎尔和索乌不得不经常靠向中路来施以援手，这给了萨内蒂和齐伍不少空间。下半场萨内蒂助攻了第二球，他的传中让米利托一蹴而就。

被放空的德比希

同样，国际在对手边卫前压时一如既往得应对得很差。上周末，利希施泰纳便让他们的这一缺点大白于天下，而昨晚，马蒂厄-德比希也完成了相似的任务。一次又一次，球交到他的脚下时，坎比亚索还远在天边，这使得德比西有充分的时间完成传中。由于左路的贝利亚在拿球时没有这么随心所欲，因此如下图所示，里尔几乎所有的传中都来自右路。这其中大部分出自德比西，尽管成功率不敢恭维。



很遗憾，对里尔来说，只有一位边后卫能够从容传中。因为去年沙尔克04就曾向我们演示过，攻击（国米）这套老迈的4312阵型卓有成效的方式之一，便是将两边卫同时前提并且在两边之间不断转移（记住一件事：今夜国际的首发十一人是欧冠历史上最高龄的阵容）。当时的沙尔克一刻不停地横向转移球，而今夜的里尔甚少做到这一点。



里尔的策略

里尔的布阵本可以更大胆一些，争取在反击中以速度打击国际。颇具侵略性的4213阵型便是个不错的备选项。阿扎尔和索乌应该大幅前压，将对方的边卫钉在后半场，并寻找机会打对方身后。乔科尔可以作为组织者，寻机送出威胁传球。

这样做的风险是只留六名球员进行防守，而好处则是使国际的进攻变得很容易预测：他们将过分依赖斯内德的创造力，而这位名声响亮的传球大师本场的表现似乎有些名不副实；除此之外，如果边卫受到压制，则国际的整体阵型会变得狭窄。用六名防守队员来应付米利托、斯内德和萨拉特算不上是不敬之举，哪怕他们身后那三位略显保守的后腰会贡献零星的跑动支持。

里尔其实已经取得了有些过分的控球优势，他们对球权的掌控让卢西奥和萨穆埃尔可以后退到本方禁区边缘较为舒服的防守位置。实际上，快速出球，利用国际两名中卫的速度劣势做文章也许是种更有成效的战术。你不需要大量控球，但能创造更多机会。（当然，你同样需要在控球时有相关的策略，而里尔的选择便是将球交到德比西脚下。）

当一球落后时，防反不会成为首选战术。公平地说，中场休息之后里尔的压制做得很不错。他们更换了4名攻击手中的3人，并重新投入了比赛当中。加西亚用德梅洛替换耶伦充当前场支柱的举措值得表扬，前者对传中的处理胜过后者，但他的进球其实更多是拜对方混乱的防守所赐。

总结

两支同样有待重塑信心的球队联手奉献了一场糟糕的对决。里尔的赛前布置似乎更有针对性，但他们在前场40米区域对战术的执行很不到位，而国际的表现则是一如既往：一台没有战术指导思想的老爷车，在过去18个月里由五名不同的司机掌控着方向盘。

里尔应该不太可能出线了，而国米几乎铁定晋级。但就本场来说，任何一方在本届欧冠上似乎都很难兴风作浪。

colinfirth

这场球好看 只是结果对我这个萨迷有点煎熬啊
蓝白年代 发表于 2011-11-7 11:38

纠结啦

colinfirth

Bosnia 0-0 Portugal: both sides play defensively on a very poor pitchNovember 11, 2011

The starting line-ups

A largely uneventful game, and all square going into the second leg the Estadio da Luz on Tuesday.

Safet Susic had various selection problems at the back, meaning that captain Emir Spahic was the only first-choice member of the back four playing. Further forward, the side was as expected.
No major surprises from Paulo Bento either – 4-3-3, with Miguel Veloso in the holding role behind old Sporting teammate Joao Moutinho, and Raul Meireles.
Susic’s concern about the back four may have contributed to his decision to play cautious football in the first two-thirds of this match, although for long periods they simply poor on the ball.
Bosnia tactics
Bosnia played in a similar fashion to in Paris, when they were unlucky not to win. The most interesting feature of their side is the way Haris Medunjanin drops very deep to become a left-sided centre-back in a three, which pushes the full-backs forward (particularly the left-back, Sejad Salihovic) – and both are really midfielders anyway.
Higher up the pitch, left-winger Senad Lulic plays high up and wide, and on the other flank, Miralem Pjanic looks to come inside into the middle to become an extra playmaker. Usually, the combination of a natural wide player and a ‘false’ playmaker on the flanks works well and gives a nice balance, but it did make Bosnia lopsided, because Salihovic attacked much more than Adnan Zahirovic, who was understandably told to stay in position up against Cristiano Ronaldo, who played high up on the left.
Therefore, little went down Bosnia’s right – they couldn’t get the ball to Pjanic, and he increasingly came infield towards the end of the first half, frustrated at seeing little of the ball, but rather contributing the lopsidedness by leaving his position. His creativity was also stifled as he had to help double up on Ronaldo. Zvjezdan Misimovic also struggled to get into the game, with Portugal’s three central midfielders sitting deep, and in the first half it was difficult to see how Bosnia were trying to score a goal. Edin Dzeko was followed out from the back by Pepe and Bruno Alves, with the other covering, and Veloso sometimes dropping in.
Portugal tactics
Portugal complained about the state of the pitch before the game, and it seemed to be a factor in their gameplan. They rarely looked to play through midfield – although they do lack a number ten anyway – and played an extraordinary number of long balls, for which Helder Postiga challenged.
Their best opportunities came from direct play – when Postiga fired over after Moutinho had headed down for him after a free-kick, and when Ronaldo got in down the left after a big diagonal from his Real Madrid teammate Pepe. Meireles and Moutinho were given some license to get forward into advanced positions, but the attacking basically came from the front three.
Final 25 minutes
The line-ups for the final 25 minutes

Bento made straight swaps – Hugo Almeida for Postiga, then Ruben Micael on for Raul Meireles, but Susic made dramatic changes to give Bosnia more attacking threat.
He decided to bring on a second striker, Vedad Ibisevic, which meant taking off Medunjanin. To make up for this, there were various changes. Darko Maletic came on for left-back Salihovic but went to right-back. Previous right-back Zahirovic went into midfield in place of Medunjanin, whilst the left-back gap was filled by Lulic dropping back, and Misimovic going out to the left of midfield. It was more like a 4-4-2.
This pushed Bosnia up the pitch, and the simple addition of a second striker meant a more obvious goalscoring threat. Alves and Pepe now both had to mark, but both (especially Alves) switched off and let Ibisevic have two good goalscoring chances.
A more subtle result from the change was that Misimovic and Pjanic, now both playing deeper as narrow wide midfielders in a four, could actually get the ball and they had more opportunities to play good passes. Those zones are where the 4-3-3 is vulnerable when the wingers play high up the pitch (as Ronaldo and Nani did), because the full-backs don’t want to come that high up the pitch. Therefore, it helped Bosnia that their two most creative players ended up in those positions, even if it probably wasn’t Susic’s intention. Bosnia were the dominant side late on, but poor finishing let them down.
Portugal threatened on the break through Ronaldo, but they faded as the game went on, and Almeida contributed nothing more than Postiga.
Conclusion
A game of various stages – Portugal were better in the first half, the game was even for the third quarter, then Bosnia were on top late on. For that, Susic deserves credit, and you can understand why he was cautious early on given his problems at the back.
Portugal had no link between the midfield trio, which is comprised of three fairly similar players, and the forward three. That made direct football their best best bet, but Ronaldo’s shooting was poor and neither striker was good enough to handle two centre-backs without support from a midfield runner.
Tuesday night’s game should be more open.

colinfirth

521楼参考译文

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Turkey 0-3 Croatia: Bilic shows how to play a 4-4-2 against a 4-3-3November 12, 2011

The starting line-ups

A superb display from Croatia put them in a commanding position going into Tuesday’s second leg.

Guus Hiddink played a 4-3-3 system, with Giray Kacar brought in at the back. Kazim Kazim was injured, so Burak Yilmaz continued upfront, with support from Arda Turan and Hamit Altintop.
Slaven Bilic used 4-4-2, with Mario Mandzukic and Ivica Olic upfront. Luka Modric was in the middle with Ivan Rakitic tucked in on the left, whilst Vedran Corluka was on the left and Domagoj Vida right.
Croatia raced into a second minute lead and always looked in control, wrapping up the game (and probably the tie) with the third goal through Corluka on 50 minutes.
Formations match-up
This was a contrast of systems, a classic battle between a 4-3-3 and a 4-4-2. Whilst formation doesn’t completely dictate the style of football being played, it’s clear that different formations are more suited to different approaches (or vice-versa). The difference between a 4-4-2 and a 4-5-1 / 4-3-3 is summed up nicely by Sir Alex Ferguson.
“The idea behind the 4-5-1 is that you can control the midfield and keep possession of the ball – that’s always your aim when you use that formation,” he says. “I believe the team that has possession of the ball has more opportunities to win the match. As for the 4-4-2, there is more emphasis in that formation placed on playing the ball forward and usually you use the two traditional wingers.”
This game was the perfect case study – the 4-3-3 dominated possession (70% compared to 30%) but the 4-4-2 was more direct and created more goalscoring chances (13 shots, 9 on target, 3 goals compared to 2, 0, 0) according to UEFA.
Croatia tactics
So, how did Croatia do it? For the first five minutes, they pressed heavily at the top of the pitch, with both Olic and Mandzukic working tirelessly to close down the centre-backs and the deepest Turkey midfielder, Selcuk Inan. Mandzukic would often drop deep onto Inan to prevent him getting the ball, and then when Croatia won the ball, he’d sprint forward to join Olic whilst Inan would be attracted to the ball.
The early goal was crucial, because it meant Turkey had to attack and leave spaces at the back for Croatia breaks. Those attacks from the away side were very quick, generally coming down the flanks – Croatia would leave one player in front of the defence, usually Tomislav Dujmovic, but the rest would break forward immediately. Rakitic and Darijo Srna were the key players, able to pick up the ball in space and run at the Turkey full-backs – both of whom had very poor games.
Two banks of four
Croatia were on top for the first ten minutes, but then Turkey started to make the most of their numerical advantage in the middle, and the passing from the away side was poor. Olic and Mandzukic stopped pressing and instead dropped alongside Inan, making it difficult for Turkey to play out from the back to Inan, and equally difficult for Inan to play the ball forward when he did get possession.
Defensively, Croatia did nothing special, defending deep with two banks of four. Turkey had the right idea with the ball, being patient and logical with their passing – trying to drag the Croatian wide midfielders inside to deal with the 3 v 2, then getting their full-backs forward on the overlap.
Turkey lacked penetration, though, with a midfield offering little creativity. Croatia often looked slightly open in that they left a lot of space between the defence and midfield – but this was partly as a result of Turkey having no-one coming into that zone. Altintop, perhaps, could have drifted inside to try and open things up, but more often than not it was Yilmaz dropping deep to offer a threat in that area, which just contributed to Turkey playing infront of Croatia, rather than going through them.
Srna attacks
Srna started the game very poorly, but went onto become a key player down the right,. He was the best Croatian player at turning defence into attack quickly with direct running, and was also very clever at winning free-kicks, which he delivered with great accuracy himself. He provided the cross for Mandzukic’s second before half-time, then won and took the free-kick for Corluka’s header at the start second half.
Bilic deserves great credit for playing Srna there and having faith in the inexperienced Vida behind him – another manager may have dropped Srna to his favoured position of right-back, but then he wouldn’t have been such a force going forward.
Substitions
The game changed little as the game went on. Hiddink brought on winger Gokhan Tore to play on the right for the second half, managing to get rid of the terrible Gokhan Gonul, whose poor defending against Corluka for the first goal was arguably the key incident of the game. Altintop dropped to a right-sided central midfield position, with Sabri Sarioglu going back to right back.
Later, he brought on Mehmet Topal for Inan to try to circulate the ball quicker from midfield, and Umut Bulut for Yilmaz for a more direct option upfront, but Turkey barely created a chance.
Bilic introduced Danijel Pranjic for Rakitic to help shield the defence, then replaced the two strikers when they tired – but all substitutions came after 80 minutes – he wanted to change as little as possible.
Conclusion
Bilic knew how well his tactics had worked. “We deserved to win by even more goals,” he said. “It was fantastic. I want to congratulate all my players – they played the whole match without making any mistakes. It was really amazing.” “Turkey did not create a single chance, which is quite remarkable since they had the home advantage,” added Olic.
Hiddink took the blame for the defeat. “I am responsible for the results. The players have to execute things properly, but I take full responsibility…if you come out in the first minute, badly-organised and outplayed very easily, then it’s already a difficult game. We gave them the favour of two counter attacks, which was the killer.”
Bilic showed how to play away from home with a 4-4-2 – he ordered his players to sit deep, then break quickly down the flanks through the wide players, and also paid attention to Turkey’s spare midfielder, Inan, and dropped one or both strikers close to him. The work rate of the front two, the directness of Srna and the discipline of Dujmovic were also vital.
Turkey were dreadful, though – so much possession and hardly a sniff of a chance. The lack of creativity and thrust from the centre of midfield was amazing, and Tuesday’s return game will surely be Hiddink’s last as a manager.

colinfirth

522楼参考译文
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土耳其0-3克罗地亚之赛后观察：比利奇示范用4-4-2对抗4-3-3

土耳其（4-3-3）：德米雷尔/巴尔塔、挨格门、卡查尔、古努尔/伊南、埃姆雷、萨里奥格鲁/大阿尔滕托普、图兰、伊尔马兹

克罗地亚（4-4-2）：普莱蒂科萨/乔尔卢卡、西穆尼奇、施尔登菲尔德、维达/拉基蒂奇、莫德里奇、杜伊莫维奇、斯尔纳/奥利奇、曼季茹基奇

首回合克罗地亚的华丽表现，使得他们在下周二的第二回合比赛中占据主动。

这场比赛，希丁克摆出了4-3-3的阵型，卡查尔镇守后防线。而由于卡齐姆因伤缺阵，所以伊尔马兹继续顶在最前面，在他身后有图兰和大阿尔滕托普的支援。

另一边，斯拉文-比利奇使用的阵型是4-4-2，马里奥-曼季茹基奇和奥利奇在锋线上搭档。而莫德里奇坐镇中场，而拉基蒂奇被放到左中场，与此同时，乔尔卢卡和多马戈伊-维达分别担任左右边卫。

克罗地亚迅速进入状态，第二分钟就取得领先并且看上去一直控制着比赛节奏，而乔尔卢卡在第50分钟攻进的第三个进球更是宣布比赛（其实也是两回合附加赛）的结束。

阵型对比

这是一场体系的对比，一场经典的4-3-3与4-4-2的战役。虽然阵型不完全决定着球队比赛的风格，但是可以明显看出，不同阵型更适合于不同的战术（或者反之亦然）。弗格森爵士精确地总结了4-4-2和4-5-1或者4-3-3之间的区别。

“4-5-1阵型的关键就是控制中场并且保持控球权，而且这也正是使用这个阵型的目所在。”他说道。“我相信控球率更高的球队有更大获胜几率。至于4-4-2阵型，则是更强调将球往前推进，所以你需要使用两个传统边锋。”

这场比赛是一个极好的范例：根据欧足联的数据，使用4-3-3的土耳其掌握了大多数的控球时间（控球率70%：30%），但是使用4-4-2的克罗地亚的进攻更加直接并有更多进球机会（射门13：2，中框9：0，进球3：0）。

克罗地亚的战术

那么，克罗地亚是怎么做到的？在开场的前五分钟内，他们在前场不停逼抢对手，奥利奇和曼季茹基奇更是不知疲倦地奔跑逼抢土耳其的中后卫以及他们的后腰塞尔丘克-伊南。曼季茹基奇经常跑到了对手腹地去阻止伊南拿球，然后当克罗地亚赢下球权后，他就和搭档奥利奇一起狂奔着向对手球门发起冲击，而伊南却顾此失彼，把注意力放在抢球上了。

这么早的进球是决定性的，因为这个丢球意味这土耳其必须大举压上，同时他们后场留下的空当就会被克罗地亚利用来打反击。客场作战的克罗地亚一般地从两翼发动高速的进攻，他们通常只会留下杜伊莫维奇一个中场在防线身前，其他中前场队员都立即进攻到前面去。拉基蒂奇和斯尔纳都是关键球员，他们不仅在前场狭小的空间里控制住球，并且不停地冲击土耳其两个边后卫。重压之下，土耳其的两个边后卫表现得极其糟糕。

八人防线

在前十分钟，克罗地亚一直占据场面优势，但之后土耳其人开始利用他们中场的人数优势，以及客队克罗地亚糟糕的传球抢回优势。奥利奇和曼季茹基奇适当回收，停止逼抢土耳其的后防，转而开始盯防后腰伊南，削弱伊南在中场调度的作用，因为不仅后防难于将球传递给他，而且即使当他得球后同样不能轻松将球往前场传递。

在防守上，克罗地亚没有什么特别的布置，只是将阵型拖后，中场和后防形成两条四人防线。而土耳其在控制球权方面处理得非常正确，通过耐心并且合理的传球来把克罗地亚的两个边前卫吸引到中路来协助两名克罗地亚中场处理2打3的局面，从而让土耳其的两个边后卫得到插上的空间。

但是由于土耳其中场缺乏创造力，所以并没有几次进攻可以穿透对手的防线。克罗地亚中场与后防之间常常看上去有些许的空虚，不过在一定程度上，这也是土耳其从来没有人能渗透进入到这个区域的结果。大阿尔滕托普或许应该尝试进入这些空当来开启局面，但是土耳其的进攻多半只是伊尔马兹回撤到这个区域来虚张声势一般地威胁一下对手防线，结果只能是面对着克罗地亚球员勉强出脚，未曾有过突破防线的机会。

斯尔纳的攻击

斯尔纳开场时并不在状态，不过调整之后就是右路的关键球员。他是克罗地亚队中最擅于快速转守为攻的球员，向前插上及其坚决。同时他还是一名擅于博取任意球的传球大师，并且他的任意球技术相当精湛。半场结束前曼季茹基奇的进球就是来自于他的传球，而下半场开始不久乔尔卢卡的头球进球更是来自于他搏到并亲自主罚的任意球。

在使用斯尔纳出任右中场以及信任经验不足的维达担当右边卫上，比利奇理应受到称赞。因为其他教练都会把斯尔纳放到他自己最喜欢的右边卫的位置上，但是这样他就不能为球队提供强大的攻击力。

换人

比赛时间在变化，比赛局势却依旧。古努尔表现糟糕，土耳其的首个丢球——可以说是这场比赛的关键所在——就是因为他面对乔尔卢卡的糟糕防守所致的，下半场开始，希丁克就用边锋托雷换下他。因此大阿尔滕托普回到右后腰的位置，萨里奥格鲁则后撤到右边卫。

之后，希丁克还用托普尔换下伊南，试图改变能使球快速通过中场。还有用布鲁特换下伊尔马兹，这样令球队有一个更直接的传球目标，虽然如此，土耳其仍然破门乏术。

比利奇用普兰尼奇换下拉基蒂奇以加强对防线的保护，然后就是将两名已经精疲力尽的前锋换下，但是这些换人都在80分钟以后，因为他并不想作出太多改变。

总结

比利奇知道他这比赛的战术非常奏效。“这场比赛我们可以赢得更多。”他说道。“这比赛踢得非常棒。我想恭喜我的所有球员，因为他们全场比赛没有犯下任何错误，这太让人惊喜了。”而奥利奇补充说：“土耳其占有主场优势，但是整场比赛他们却连一个机会都没有，这是一项非凡的成就。”

希丁克承担了输球的责任。“我为输球的结果负责。队员们应该更好地执行赛前的安排，但我应该负全责……如果从比赛的第一分钟开始，我们的组织很糟糕，而且很容易被击败，那么这就会是一场艰苦的比赛。我们轻易地送给了他们两个反击机会，这是非常致命的。”

比利奇展示了在客场如何使用4-4-2：他要求队员位置要靠后，然后将球抢断下来后迅速传到两翼发动进攻，与此同时，将注意力放在土耳其无人对位的中场伊南，他将一个或者两个前锋放在他身边对他进行骚扰。两名前锋的工作效率、斯尔纳的快速插上以及杜伊莫维奇坚持防守位置都是赢球的最基本要素。

土耳其的表现糟糕透了，如此高的控球率却换不来一次机会。创造力以及中场中的冲击能力的缺乏令人十分诧异，而且这样的结果，几乎可以说星期二的第二回合比赛将肯定是希丁克作为土耳其教练的最后一战。

colinfirth

Spain continue to dominate possession but need more penetration
November 14, 2011

A criticism of Spain days after an unfortunate 1-0 defeat to England is always likely to come across as a wild knee-jerk reaction, but Spain’s problems against decent sides have been evident for over a year now.

They were handed an extremely easy qualification group for Euro 2012 where they had few problems, but in friendlies with larger nations they’ve struggled. Since the World Cup, they’ve drawn 1-1 with Mexico, lost 4-1 to Argentina, lost 4-0 to Portugal, lost 2-1 to Italy and lost 1-0 to England. They went 2-0 down to Chile and came back to win 3-2 in the 91st minute. Granted, they’ve beaten the USA, Colombia and Venezuela (and won their qualification group at a canter), but the graph below shows how poor their results have been against sides in the top 40 according to the FIFA rankings, the type of side they’re likely to encounter at Euro 2012.


The relative strength of Spain's opponents since the World Cup - the higher the bar, the higher their world ranking (as of now). Green bars indicate a Spain victory, red indicates a defeat, orange indicates a draw. The countries above the dotted line indicates they're in the top 40 in the FIFA rankings.

Using this (admittedly arbitrary) cut-off point, their record is P7 W2 D1 L4 F7 A14. This, for the World Champions and a side some consider one of the best of all-time, is an awful run. Spain take friendlies seriously and Vicente Del Bosque has hardly been putting out weakened sides – he’s rotated here and there, tried some new options, but Spain have so much strength in depth that even their second XI would contain world class players.


The starting line-ups for the England game. The midfield three was fluid - Busquets often ended up ahead of Alonso.

Selection

Del Bosque’s selection for the England game was concerning. He started with David Villa upfront, Andres Iniesta on the left and David Silva on the right. Using two wide players who like to come into the centre of the pitch has often looked bad for Spain under Del Bosque – they come inside, flood the centre of the pitch and make Spain too predictable, too narrow, and ultimately too easy to defend against.

That was the situation in the opening day defeat to Switzerland at the World Cup, when Spain were dreadful because of the sheer lack of width. This photo summed it up – the four attacking players all within a ten-yard square, no attacking threat at all from the flanks, and Switzerland able to defend very narrow and keep a clean sheet.

A slight change of shape was crucial to Spain’s World Cup win. Del Bosque realised he needed width, and after Jesus Navas had a good impact against the Swiss, Silva didn’t play another minute in the competition, with Iniesta the only wide player coming inside’ and a more direct player on the other flank – either Navas, Villa (played wide-left when Fernando Torres was upfront) or Pedro Rodriguez, who came in for the final two games. Spain now had more variety in their attack – one wide player contributed to the midfield dominance, the other provided forward runs and penetration, and stretched the opposition defence, creating gaps for the other players to play through.

Silva was the unfortunate victim of that Switzerland game. “When I was the only casualty of the defeat against Switzerland I thought it might be a state of fitness, but after criticism of my performances (it seems) the coach does not trust me,” he said recently. “Before that game I felt confident. I played regularly and had a place in the team, but after losing to Switzerland everything began to change. I was a victim of the poor debut that we had in the World Cup.”

His sudden disappearance was harsh on him individually, but it made sense for the sake of the side. Considering that the other man Del Bosque could have dropped, Iniesta, went onto have a key impact throughout the tournament, it’s hard to say that the manager’s decision was incorrect.

The first few minutes of the game against England saw the expected pattern – Silva and Iniesta coming inside, and England able to contain them comfortably by defending narrow.

Silva false nine


Midway through the first half, David Silva became a false nine

Midway through the first half, Del Bosque switched system and pushed Silva forward to be a false nine, Villa to the left and Iniesta to the right. Clearly, there’s a desire to try to create an appropriate replacement for Lionel Messi in a very Barcelona-centric national team, but false nines have yet to have success at international level.

Argentina tried Messi in that role at the Copa America but fell back on the safety of a traditional nine later on, whilst Brazil wanted Pato (maybe not a false nine, but certainly not a traditional nine) as a lone striker but then turned to Fred when things went badly.

In theory, Silva as a false nine and a forward, Villa, on the left should have eased Spain’s problems with the two wide players coming into the middle, but in some ways it made it worse. With England sitting deep, Villa didn’t feel comfortable going in behind the right-back and instead cut into the middle of the pitch quickly. Iniesta also drifted in, and Silva naturally dropped deep.

Therefore, instead of having a striker looking for balls over the top and two wide players coming in, you had the striker and the wide players all drifting into a similar position. Spain had complete dominance of possession against England but barely created a chance in the first half.

Need for width

On the subject of a lack of width, two side points. First, the need for a more naturally wide player is even more paramount than at the World Cup, because there is less attacking threat from full-back. The left-back position is up for grabs – Jordi Alba fared well here but has a long way to go before becoming the force that the underrated Joan Capdevilla was, a player who could cross the ball very well.

On the other flank, Carles Puyol’s fitness concerns means that Sergio Ramos is often having to play as a centre-back, as he did here, which means Alvaro Arbeloa – a decent functional full-back rather than a buccaneering one – plays at right-back.


Pedro's theoretical role for Spain

Second, Pedro Rodriguez was injured and not with the squad, which is a big problem for Spain. His importance to Spain’s system has been completely overlooked – as the only natural top-class wide forward Spain have, there is no real replacement when he’s out, a major issue considering he was the man who came in and completed the side during the World Cup. If Del Bosque wants to try to replicate a Barcelona-style system, Pedro is crucial. No other player understands Pep Guardiola’s system better than Pedro. “When I didn’t know which positions to take up last season,” Villa said, “I just watched Pedro and copied him.”

The qualities of other players can be replaced through injury – even far better players like Iniesta or Xavi – but Pedro’s attributes are largely unique within the Spain squad.

Fabregas

The other ‘outsider’ who turned out to be crucial at the World Cup was Cesc Fabregas, despite the fact he didn’t start a game. He brought driving runs from the centre of midfield which proved crucial in the quarter-final win over Paraguay and the final win against Holland. This is another quality that Spain lack elsewhere, and another potential answer to the problem of no penetration.

Fabregas has started his Barcelona career superbly, often playing just off the ‘false nine’ Messi. Their relationship is brilliant, and Fabregas has perfected what Tom Williams outlined as the ‘false ten’ role after last summer’s World Cup – providing the direct runs to exploit the space created by a false nine.

His appearance for the second half made sense, then – until you realised that he was replacing Silva and being asked to play the false nine role himself. There, Del Bosque appears to have completely missed what Fabregas brings to Spain – playing as a false nine you’re generally starting high up and coming towards the ball, when Spain need Fabregas going towards goal.


Fabregas' natural role

He can play as a false nine, but it’s not his best role, and he was at his most threatening when he dropped deeper and could then drive towards goal. In the final two minutes he had two shots - one after a cut-back from Torres that deflected into the arms of Joe Hart, the other from a low cross from Villa that Fabregas dragged past the far post when he should have scored. It was a terrible finish, but no other Spain player would have got into the position to miss it.

After Pedro and Fabregas, the third and final crucial player who ‘gives Spain something different’ is Fernando Llorente, who didn’t appear. When Spain wanted to go more direct, they introduced Torres – but the answer is surely Llorente, who was excellent against Portugal in the World Cup by providing an aerial threat upfront, and has done the same thing since – most obviously against Scotland.

Sid Lowe has (at the World Cup) very reasonably defended Torres’ place in the Spain side by saying he often plays ‘the Heskey role’ but Torres has been out of form for two years, and if you’re looking for a Heskey figure, it’s Llorente rather than Torres.

Conclusion

Football in 2011 is largely based around possession play in the midfield, and Spain have the best selection of midfielders in the world and also the most blatant commitment to passing football. That will not change based upon the results of a few friendlies. “We know that’s our way of playing, regardless of the score,” says Xabi Alonso, probably their most intelligent and articulate footballer. ”It’s very well defined, we have the right players and the right mentality…success convinced us that it is the right way forward. The past doesn’t count in terms of results but in terms of approach it does. It doesn’t mean we’ll win in the future but we know how we’ll try to win.”

Yet such a fierce commitment to a footballing ideology can hamper efficiency, and Del Bosque needs variety in the attacking positions. No-one is calling for Spain to abandon their philosophy and play like Stoke, but passing quality must be combined with penetration and direct running. That’s why they won the World Cup – because they had great quality in build-up play and combined it with some immediacy in the final third with the use of Pedro, Fabregas or Llorente.

Del Bosque can’t have forgotten the Switzerland game, and it’s not unreasonable to suggest that he simply has too many great passers that he feels deserve a chance. If Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso and Sergio Busquets are the first choice three in the middle, it leaves other ‘passers’ Silva, Iniesta, Juan Mata and Santi Cazorla battling for the three places ahead. But in stylistic terms, as outlined above, it should probably only be one place they’re battling for…the other two spots must be freed up for more direct players. The more pure ‘passers’ they play, the more the opposition will sit deep and narrow, and the more Spain will need (a) driving midfield runs, (b) wing play or (c) a strong centre-forward to get the breakthrough.