11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

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接下来，谈谈毕尔巴鄂的新任教练阿根廷人、外号疯子的性格教练马塞罗·贝尔萨

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Bielsa set to thrive in Bilbao

August 8, 2011


Marcelo Bielsa in his Chile days

It has been 13 years since Marcelo Bielsa has managed a club side. Six years as coach of Argentina and four in charge of Chile endeared him to the world, but with international football placing obvious restrictions on how much a manager can shape his team, there has always been a lingering question – what would Bielsa do with a club side?

His previous experience, with Espanyol, was rather unsuccessful. He only lasted six games before he left for the Argentina job, leaving the club in 18th position in La Liga. The players struggled to adapt to his methods, he struggled to adapt to the demands of European football. Back in Argentina, however, he’d been a successful club manager with his hometown club Newell’s Old Boys, as well as Velez Sarsfield.

His arrival in Spain as the new Athletic Bilbao manager is one of the most exciting developments of the summer. At one point, it seemed that he would become the new Inter coach – but he had promised Josu Urrutia, a candidate for Bilbao’s presidential election, that he would take over at Bilbao if Urrutia won. He did, and true to his word, Bielsa came.

The suspicion is that Bilbao is a better home for him than Milan, on various levels. These range from the very basic details (Spanish-speaking manager will immediately be able to communicate in Spain rather than in Italy) to the composition of the side. Bilbao are a young, energetic team who played high-tempo, vibrant, Bielsa-style football under his predecessor Joaquin Caparros, whereas Inter are used to playing slow football and defending deep, and also have an elderly side.

There is more to it than that, however, because Bilbao are no ordinary club. Their policy of using only Basque players gives them a defined identity that few clubs can match. Their insistence on bringing through youth players has already been embraced by Bielsa, who has not asked for any specific new signings. As an incredibly thorough coach, he should, in theory, thrive in an environment that encourages cohesiveness - and on another note, a club that doesn’t see winning as the be-all and end-all of being a football club.

There’s possibly an ever deeper link than that, though, when one considers the history of Bilbao as a club. It is 100 years since Rafael Moreno Aranzadi – aka Pichichi – made his debut for the club. As Phil Ball recounts in the excellent <A style="BORDER-TOP-STYLE: none; BORDER-RIGHT-STYLE: none; BORDER-LEFT-STYLE: none; BORDER-BOTTOM-STYLE: none" href='http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/08/08/marcelo-bielsa-tactics-athletic-bilbao/[img][/img]‘Morbo’:

“Pichichi began a tradition at Bilbao of goalscoring centre-forwards who were to benefit (allegedly) from the club’s allegiance to la manera inglesa (the English way), as taught to them by a succession of British managers and embarrassingly referred to as ‘the old 1-2-3′. This meant three touches from goalkeeper to centre-forward, who would then of course unfailing bang the leather mercilessly into the onion bag.”

Specific tactics don’t survive for a century – thankfully – but general style can. Ever since those days, Bilbao have been regarded as a side that play direct football, particularly in contrast to the tiki-taka style of the national side. That reputation survives to this day – to the point where, when Spain need to switch to a direct style of play, they bring on Bilbao’s striker, Fernando Llorente. Bielsa, a man notorious the speed and directness he demands from his players in possession, is surely at the right club.

Formation and positioning


Bilbao's starting shape

So, what exactly is he going to do at Bilbao? Let’s start with the formation. Bielsa is most famous for the unusual 3-3-1-3 shape he’s used with both Argentina and Chile, although there is a caveat to this – and therefore a reason why he probably won’t use it as his first-choice system in Spain. With Chile, he always wanted a spare man at the back – a back three against two strikers, a back four against one striker (with the full-backs pushing high up into midfield, effectively leaving 2 v 1 at the back). This meant a switch between 3-3-1-3 and 4-2-1-3 depending upon the opposition – note the World Cup game against Honduras, where he responded immediately to Honduras’ tactical switches to keep his cover at the back.

South America is still – largely – based around two-striker formations, which meant that the 3-3-1-3 was his favoured formation. Spain is overwhelmingly dominated by 4-2-3-1, which makes the situation more complex.

All this might turn out to be irrelevant, however, because so far Bielsa has favoured something called a 4-1-4-1 in much of the Spanish press, although it retains many of the characteristics of the 4-2-1-3. ZM was at the friendly against Tottenham on Saturday to see the side in action, and Bilbao lined up with the system on the right.

The two most interesting roles on that teamsheet are the two defenders on the left-hand side – Javi Martinez and Oscar de Marcos. Neither are defenders. Martinez is naturally a holding midfielder, and has played for the national side in that position, whilst De Marcos is a young winger/forward who wears the number ten shirt.

Bielsa often used midfielders in the defensive line for Chile, believing they were more mobile than some of his centre-backs, and also better at starting moves. The shift for Martinez is perhaps not surprising, because Bielsa always wants a very defensive-minded holding midfielder – a pure stopper, like Gary Medel. Martinez is more of a ball-player, and therefore, whilst it may seem strange to move a player into the defence because his strengths lie in playing the ball rather than winning it back, it’s not completely unexpected. At 6′3 he has the ability to challenge in the air, although in this friendly Roman Pavlychenko got the better of him with high balls.


Bilbao's second half line-up

The use of De Marcos at left-back was more surprising. He performed reasonably well, seemingly having a good relationship with the left-winger, Igor Gabilondo. Like wingers in many of Bielsa’s teams, Gabilondo stretched the play and stayed wide, meaning that De Marcos’ runs were often diagonal, towards goal rather than down the line, as the space was on the inside of Gabilondo, rather than the outside. This helped De Marcos, as he is right-footed, and therefore wanted to come inside anyway.

On the other flank, Iker Muniain was the brightest player. He usually went down the line, but also came inside to the middle of the pitch, and sometimes switched with Ander Herrera, the playmaker. Again, this is classic Bielsa – he doesn’t want to burden one player with the sole playmaking responsibility, which can become a problem with the basic shape of his preferred 3-3-1-3 / 4-2-1-3. By coming inside, Muniain became another source of creativity. Andoni Iraola generally overlapped, though played more conservatively than De Marcos.

Herrera was the player with the most unpredictable movement. As well as moving wide, he also made forward runs to go beyond Llorente – indeed, he had a good chance in the opening minute from a ball over the top after Llorente had dragged defenders away. Herrera found space wherever he could – sometimes he moved deeper than Ander Iturraspe, to add some element of surprise to the way Bilbao played in the middle.

At half time, Tottenham switched to a 4-4-2 having played Pavlyuchenko upfront alone in the first half. This meant Bielsa switched to three at the back – more specifically, it was pretty much the 3-3-1-3. Gurpegi became the right-sided centre-back, and there were substitutions at left-back and right wing – everything else largely stayed the same.

Bilbao were much less comfortable in this system, however. The main problem seemed to be the wing-backs (or the players on the outside of the diamond, if you like) – who played too deep, forced back by Aaron Lennon and Gareth Bale. This meant Bilbao looked like a 5-2-3 too often, conceding the midfield ground and being completely overrun in the second half. This supports the idea that 3-3-1-3 might be unworkable in Spain – a country home to many tricky wingers. In comparison, as the Copa America showed, South America is not currently the place to go for top-quality wide players, at least at international level, so that is something of a new problem for Bielsa.

With the ball

Bilbao were more patient in possession than we have come to expect from Chile – they were happy to hold the ball in midfield in the first half, and knock it back to the centre-backs to start moves from deep. There was more of an emphasis on changing the tempo of attacks rather than being direct straight away – they would work the ball into an area of the pitch where 2 v 1 situations could be created, and then charge towards goal. Creating overloads in specific zones has always been one of Bielsa’s main priorities – even a five-minute stretch of Bilbao’s warm-up consisted of players practicing give-and-goes at high speed.

There was a focus on passing out from the back, with the two centre-backs coming deep to collect the ball and the full-backs pushing wide. The full-backs look as if they charge forward constantly, but actually they’re simply intelligent with the timing of their runs – only moving forward when there’s space to exploit (whether on the outside or the inside of the winger ahead of them).

The focus on possession means that a three-man central midfield is probably necessary. The first half featured a holder (Gurpegi), a runner (Iturraspe) and a playmaker (Herrera) and things went well. When the runner was removed in the second half – or rather, when the runner became the holder – Bilbao looked disjointed. Herrera had to come deeper to get the ball, Llorente was starved of service and couldn’t become involved. The removal of Muniain, who picked up a knock in the first period, also meant their best out-ball was no longer an option.

Without the ball

Pressing was, of course, high on the agenda – although it was not as frantic as we often saw with Chile. Bilbao seemed happy to let Tottenham’s deepest man (often Michael Dawson) to have time on the ball, and Llorente would focus on cutting off the passing angles, as would the midfielders in deeper positions. Tottenham constantly conceded possession in the first half, largely because of the pressure in midfield.

The second half collapse was probably also due to Bilbao not being at full fitness, and therefore unable to press for the duration.

As mentioned previously, Bilbao were extremely prone to pace down the flanks. The two goals they conceded were assisted by Bale and Lennon, and the latter also won a penalty which Niko Kranjcar missed. That was most evident in the second half, but was also a problem in the first – and Bielsa may need to drop his ‘runner’ in midfield deeper to give the full-backs extra protection if this continues to be an issue, which would make the system very much the 4-2-1-3.

Conclusion

Despite the eventual defeat, this was an encouraging performance from Bilbao. They controlled the game in the first half, passing and pressing well. There are too many variables to accurately judge why they fared so poorly in the second half – Bielsa changed shape but Tottenham did too, introducing their two most valuable players (Modric and Bale) in the process. On this evidence, however, the first half system is better for Bilbao – it gave more midfield options and the side was less compartmentalized. The 3-3-1-3 would need much more positional work.

Still, his job at Bilbao is hugely exciting. Often seen as an inflexible manager who sticks to his methods even when they aren’t the logical option, he’ll have to show that he’s adaptable enough to incorporate the qualities and attributes that took Bilbao to sixth in La Liga last year. That might mean an back four and more patient build-up play. Whatever happens, it will be a fascinating season for Bilbao.

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17楼参考译文
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贝尔萨执教毕巴前景分析：疯子耍战术，雄狮也疯狂  

由 kicervalen 发表在GoalHi足球

疯子耍战术，雄狮也疯狂

马赛洛-贝尔萨担任智利国家队主教练的时候

距离贝尔萨上一次执教俱乐部已经13年了。6年执教阿根廷国家队和4年执教智利国家队令他在国际上备受拥戴，但执教国家队也给他如何随心所欲地组队排阵和布置战术带来很大的限制。而且总是有一个问题在不断萦绕着他：如果贝尔萨执教一家俱乐部，那又会怎么样呢？

他之前执教西班牙人的经历并不算十分成功。他在仅仅执教了6场比赛后就前往了阿根廷国内任职，而把俱乐部留在西甲第18名这个尴尬位置。球员们对适应他的战术理念都感到很挣扎，而他对适应欧洲足球的要求也同样感到很辛苦。回到阿根廷之后，他却带领着自己的家乡球队纽维尔老男孩和另一家劲旅萨斯菲尔德取得巨大的成功。

他到达西班牙出任毕尔巴鄂竞技的新主教练是整个夏天最振奋人心的一件事情。曾经，他似乎要成为国际米兰的主教练了，但他答应了毕尔巴鄂竞技主席大选的候选人之一乌鲁蒂亚。如果乌鲁蒂亚在主席大选胜出，他将出任毕尔巴鄂竞技新主教练。最后，乌鲁蒂亚胜出了，而且就像他在大选时承诺的那样，贝尔萨来了。

在很多层面上，毕尔巴鄂竞技与米兰城相比拥有一个更适合贝尔萨执教的环境。这些层面包括像语言沟通这样的基本事情（说西班牙语的贝尔萨可以马上和巴斯克队员们沟通，但在意大利却没法做到），还包括组建球队的整体计划这种大事。毕尔巴鄂竞技是支很年轻而有活力的球队，他们的打法节奏很快，而且跑动频繁。贝尔萨的风格可以直接延续他的前任卡帕罗斯的打法，但国米习惯了慢节奏的比赛和重兵布防的战术，而且他们的平均年龄也比较大。

除此之外巴斯克雄狮还有一些适合贝尔萨的地方，但是毕尔巴鄂竞技也不是一家普通的俱乐部。他们只用巴斯克球员的政策让他们在全世界拥有几乎独一无二的俱乐部地位。他们坚持提拔二队球员的做法已经被贝尔萨所接受和融入，而且贝尔萨也没有要求一些特定的球员签约。作为一位完全“不可思议”的教练，理论上他应该点燃巴斯克球迷的激情，增强球迷和球队的凝聚力。而在另一方面，毕尔巴鄂竞技也不是一家视赢球为全部的俱乐部。

但当考虑到毕尔巴鄂竞技俱乐部的历史时，贝尔萨和俱乐部之间也许有着更为深层的联系。自从拉斐尔-阿兰萨迪（又名Pichichi）在毕尔巴鄂竞技首秀之后已经100年了。就像Phil Ball在“Marbo”里叙述的那样：

“Pichichi开始了毕尔巴鄂竞技的高中锋射手的传统，据称这是由于俱乐部一直采用较为英式的打法而造成的效果，而且这种打法是由一位英国教练指导的，不过他的名称有点尴尬，叫“古典3连击”。这意味着从守门员到前锋之间只有3次触球，然后前锋将会运用自身的技巧将球送进对方的大门”

某种特定的战术都不会持续流行一个世纪，真是谢天谢地，但一般的笼统战术却可以。 从那个时候（Pichichi时代）开始，毕尔巴鄂竞技就被认为是踢法相当直接的球队，尤其与西班牙国家队的“tiki-taka”踢法形成强烈对比。毕尔巴鄂竞技的这种踢法一直延续到现在，甚至当斗牛士们需要采取更为直接的踢法的时候，他们会直接换上毕尔巴鄂竞技的中锋射手费尔南多-略伦特。贝尔萨，一个在麾下队员控球时强调速度和直接性而名闻天下的教练，确实来到了一家适合的俱乐部。

阵型和站位

毕尔巴鄂竞技上半场的首发阵型（图1）

因此，他将会对毕尔巴鄂进行一些什么改造呢？让我们从他的首发阵容开始探讨。贝尔萨是以他在阿根廷国家队和智利国家队里使用怪阵3-3-1-3而出名的，但这个阵型有一个明显的隐患，因此这应该是他不会在西班牙采用这个阵型的理由。在智利的时候，他总是在后场设立一个自由人，这样后场中路就有3个人对付对方两名前锋，或者后场4个人对方对方一个前锋（这时候两个边卫会压上到中场附近，这时候后面实际上就是两个中卫对付一个前锋）。这意1-3味着贝尔萨可以根据对手的情况在3-3-1-3和4-2-1-3之间进行切换。值得注意的是在世界杯上面对洪都拉斯，他在洪都拉斯改变战术之后也马上做出调整，从而保证了后防线上有足够的人数保护防线。

南美足球大部分仍然以双前锋的阵型为主，因此他的3-3-1-3是最拿手的阵型。但西班牙的俱乐部们大多都使用4-2-3-1，这回让情况变得复杂。

以上全部的讨论也许到最后和现实完全无关，然而，迄今为止贝尔萨在很多西班牙的比赛中喜欢使用一种4-1-4-1的阵式，尽管这套阵型还保留着很多4-2-1-3的特点。为了观察毕尔巴鄂竞技的表现，Zonal Marking前往托特纳姆观看了周六的热刺和毕尔巴鄂竞技的热身赛， 而巴斯克雄狮的首发阵容就如图1所示。

在这阵型里最引人注目的两个位置就是两个后防线上的两个左边球员——哈维-马丁内斯和德马科斯。他们两个都不是真正的后防球员。马丁内斯一般打防守中场，而且在国家队也是打那个位置。德马科斯是一个年轻的边锋/前锋，而且他穿着10号球衣。

在智利国家队，贝尔萨经常在后防线上使用打防守中场的球员，因为他相信防守中场比很多正统中卫速度更快更灵活，同时起动上也比较敏捷。马丁内斯的角色也许不太令人意外，因为贝尔萨总是想让一个防守意识很强的作为防守中场，他同时也是一个纯粹的拦截对方进攻的球员，就像塞维利亚的梅德尔。而马丁内斯更喜欢控球，因此把他放到后防线上会显得有些奇怪，因为马丁内斯的长处在于控制皮球而不是把球从对方身上拦截下来，但这还是可以预期的举动。他6尺3寸的身高可以令他在空中有不错的竞争力，尽管在这场热身赛中帕夫柳琴科在空中对抗上占得更多便宜。


毕尔巴鄂竞技下半场的首发阵型

德马科斯的使用是更让球迷觉得意外的。他表现得还不错，似乎和左翼的加比隆多配合得很好。 和其他在贝尔萨球队的边锋一样，加比隆多经常把战线拉宽，而且站位非常靠边。这意味着德马科斯经常要斜线内切，向着球门跑动而不是沿着边线下底。他的跑动线路是内线，而不是被加比隆多占据的外线。这对德马科斯有一定的帮助，因为它是右脚球员，因此切内线对他而言比较适合。

在右翼，穆尼亚因是最出彩的球员。他常常下底，不过也会走内线到球场中路，而且有时候还会和组织核心的安德尔-赫雷拉换位。这还是贝尔萨的经典战术，他不希望把全部进攻的重担都压在一个组织核心身上，因此这会对他喜欢的的3-3-1-3/4-2-1-3造成一些问题。在内切的时候，穆尼亚因就变成另外一个前场创造力的源泉。伊劳拉一般会选择套边，尽管这种打法相比德马科斯而言更为保守一些。

安德尔-赫雷拉是一个经常有出乎意料的动作的球员。在经常拉边的同时，他也经常前插至略伦特之前。实际上，他在开场的第一分钟得到过一个很好的机会，那个机会的出现是因为略伦特和对方中卫争高球的时候把对方拉到了。安德尔-赫雷拉总是凭借自己能力找到空档，有时候他甚至回撤到伊图拉斯佩的身后，为毕尔巴鄂竞技的中场控球增加一些惊喜的因素。

在半场的时候，托特纳姆热刺把阵型换回了4-4-2，他们上半场只有帕夫柳琴科一个人突在前面。这意味着贝尔萨把后防线换成了3中卫阵型——具体而言，这几乎就是3-3-1-3了。古尔佩吉变成3中卫之中靠右边的一个，而且左后卫和右边锋方面都有调动，但整体部分还是保持与上半场一致。

但是，毕尔巴鄂竞技在这个新阵型下却显得没有那么适应。主要问题似乎出在两个边卫身上（或者指代两个位于后场菱形站位之外的两个球员），他们两个站位太靠前，以至于经常被阿朗-列侬和加雷斯-贝尔逼迫他们回防。 这意味着毕尔巴鄂竞技的阵型在大部分时间内更像是5-2-3，他们在下半场由于热刺的占尽优势而丢掉中场。这也说明了3-3-1-3的思路在西班牙是行不通的，因为那是一个边路奇才超多的国家。相比之下，在正如美洲杯所显示的那样，南美现在并不是一个顶级边锋聚集的地方，至少在国家队是这种情况。因此，这对贝尔萨而言是一个新的课题。

控球时候的踢法

毕尔巴鄂竞技在控球很有耐心，甚至比我们从智利国家队情况做出的预测还要耐心。在上半场的时候，他们很喜欢在中场控制皮球，有时候还把皮球回传中卫，从后场重新开始组织进攻。他们很强调在进攻时的节奏变换，而不是采取直接进攻的踢法。他们会尽量把球传到可以形成2对1的地方，然后就开始向球门发起冲击。把皮球频繁地传到某一个特定区域是贝尔萨风格的一大特点，甚至在比赛前热身时间内，毕尔巴鄂竞技球员用了其中的5分钟练习快速的撞墙配合。

他们其中一个传球的重点是从后卫把球传出来。他们的两个中卫会回撤到很深的位置去拿球，这时候两边的边卫会拉边。两个边卫看起来都经常前插助攻，但实际上他们都很明智地选择每一个前插的时机。他们只会在前锋有空位的时候才会前插助攻，这种助攻包括外线套边和内线斜插。

把焦点放在控球上意味着3中卫阵型也许是必然的设定。在上半场，他们设置了一个负责填补位置的防守中场（古尔佩吉），设置了一个拿球前插的后上中场（伊图拉斯佩），还设置了一个组织核心（安德尔-赫雷拉)，这样的中场运行的很顺畅。当后上中场在下半场被拿掉之后，或者说他变成了防守中场，毕尔巴鄂竞技看起来前后场的联系被切断了。安德尔-赫雷拉需要进一步回撤才能拿球，略伦特在前面完全缺乏供应，因此和球队完全脱节。拿掉上半场首发的穆尼亚因也意味着球队失去了一个最好的出球点。

无球时候的踢法

压迫防守是理所当然在球队的打法中处于重要地位，尽管毕尔巴鄂竞技的压迫防守并没有像我们所看到的智利的那般疯狂。毕尔巴鄂竞技似乎很愿意让热刺位置最靠后的那名球员（通常是道森）进行控球，而略伦特只是把注意力集中在减少他的传球线路和角度，因此他就像一个位置很靠前的中场球员。热刺在上半场经常丢掉控球权，这大部分是由于毕尔巴鄂竞技在中场的压迫防守所致。

下半场毕尔巴鄂竞技的崩盘也许是由于球队并不在最佳状态上，因此他们无法做到整场比赛都采取压迫防守。

就像之前所说的那样，毕尔巴鄂竞技很容易在边路跟不上对方的速度。他们所丢的两球分别有贝尔和列侬助攻的，而且后者还赢得一个点球，只是卡拉尼察罚失了。这是下半场阶段球队无法跟上对方速度的最明显的证据，但也是上半场的一个问题所在。如果这个问题还在不断出现，那么贝尔萨也许要撤掉后上中场这个位置，从而增加对两翼的保护，这样整个阵型看起来就很象4-1-2-3了。

结论

尽管最后被热刺击败了，毕尔巴鄂竞技还是有着鼓舞人心的表现。他们在上半场控制了比赛，传球和压迫都做得不错。很难准确判断为什么下半场他们的表现会如此糟糕，这里面不确定的因素太多了。贝尔萨改变了打法和阵型。热刺也是一样，下半场他们把阵中最有价值的两名球员（贝尔和莫德里奇）派上场。根据这场比赛判断，上半场的阵型更加适合毕尔巴鄂竞技，它让中场有更多的选择，而且两个边路的负担没那么重。3-3-1-3的阵型还需要在球员站位上多下工夫才行。

尽管这样，贝尔萨在毕尔巴鄂竞技的工作还是十分令人兴奋的。他通常不会随意改变打法的人，而且他很坚持他的一贯理念。尽管有时候这些理念并不是一个合乎逻辑的选择，他将需要证明他有足够的适应能力去把球员的能力和个人属性完美地整合在一起，因为正是这些球员的能力和个人属性令上赛季的巴斯克雄狮在西甲排名第六。这也许意味着他要采用4后卫阵型以及在进攻组织上需要更加耐心。无论将要发生什么，这赛季对毕尔巴鄂竞技而言都会是一个精彩纷呈的一年。

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ZM对贝尔萨的评论，尤其是配图的两个阵型非常不认同。
两张图里只有San Jose是正牌中卫，Martinez和Gurpegi都是中场，以B8的实力，只靠一名中卫和两个客串中卫来实施全场压迫的战术冒险性太太太大，贝尔萨不可能将此 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-8-10 09:58

可能对贝尔萨已经符号化了

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贝尔萨与瓜迪奥拉遭遇时，将会上演何种气势的对攻呢？遭遇皇马时，两位教练谁的风头更盛呢？

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Italian National Team Moves Into the Future

by Cristiano Acconci at Tuesday, Aug 9 2011 11:46

Former champions Italy battle current world champions Spain in a match that will potentially show how far the Azzurri have come under Cesare Prandelli. When new coach Prandelli was appointed after Italy’s horrendous WC 2010 display, he vowed to rejuvenate and improve his side’s style of play. So far he has stuck to his words by giving players like Giovinco, Guiseppe Rossi, Ranocchia and Balotelli chances as well as a more an adventurous formation.

Prandelli also went through a phase of “multiculturalism” in the beginning as he gave debuts to Amauri (Brazil), Cristian Ledesma (Argentina), and Thiago Motta (Brazil), all of whom were not Italian by birth.

So it is clear that Prandelli is being positive and trying to make the Italian national team a more “modern” team. All that is left are the results. Friendly matches a sided, no one can complain as Italy top their group and look set to qualify for Euro 2012 without too much trouble.

Looking back at last season, these are the best Italian players to fit Italy’s current 4-3-1-2 formation sorted by WhoScored.com performance based ratings:




Overall, this team is a technical one. Lots of assists and key passes scattered around the pitch. The defence is young, but the attack is old, very old. Italy has faced this problem for many years, quality old forwards still producing the goods keeping out younger talent. This is why Prandelli is a good change for the Azzurri, he will give talent the chance.


Predicted line-up vs Spain:


Six new players feature in Prandelli’s line-up when compared to the WhoScored.com XI. In reality Buffon, Pirlo, and De Rossi were missing a lot last year with injuries and off the pitch problems (De Rossi), and arguably they would have been selected, as they are one of the best in their positions.

Italy has an abundance of right back solutions, some to mention are Abate, Santon, Cassani, De Silvestri, and Marco Motta. Prandelli has vouched for Maggio this time, the Napoli wingback has strengths in aerial duels, key passes, concentration and tackling. His main weaknesses are holding on to the ball and crossing accuracy. Prandelli will likely continue with Maggio has he will be getting Champions League matches with Napoli this year.

The most notable change to this new Italy squad is in the midfield and attack. Prandelli stated that he wants to have ball playing midfields, as well as attackers. With the likes of Montolivo, Pirlo, Aquiliani, Rossi, and Cassano, Italy do possess the potential to control ball possession and link up with good combination play.

To outline this in the attacking department, Guiseppe Rossi and Cassano both have passing, key passes, and through balls as their individual strengths. Add to that, Villarreal forward Rossi possesses defensive contribution and dribbling’s strengths, which in La Liga is something to be proud off.

Italy’s future does look a lot brighter than last time around in the World Cup. With the likes of Giovinco breaking into Italy’s first team, Azzurri fans can brace themselves for some good football, and hopefully wave good bye to the old fashioned Catenaccio mentality.  

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意大利国家队的“普氏”革命：与过去做个了断  
由 ccmaximus 发表在GoalHi足球

前世界冠军意大利队将迎战世界杯卫冕冠军西班牙队，这场比赛将很可能展示出切萨雷-普兰德利麾下蓝衣军团复苏的进展。当意大利队经历了灾难般的南非世界杯后，新帅普兰德利走马上任，他许诺会让4届世界冠军重新拥有曾经的活力与风格。迄今为止，他大胆提拔了如乔文科、朱塞佩-罗西、拉诺奇亚和巴洛特利等新秀并为球队设计了更具攻击性的阵型，坚实地履行着当初的诺言。

普兰德利执教伊始便将多元文化的要素融入到这支球队。阿毛里（巴西）、克里斯蒂安-莱德斯马（阿根廷）和蒂亚戈-莫塔（巴西）这三位移民球员都在他的手下上演了意大利国家队处子秀。

很显然，普兰德利正积极地尝试将意大利队打造成一支更加“现代”的队伍，而成绩最能说明问题。友谊赛仅仅是一个方面，批评者们亦不能忽视意大利在2012年欧锦赛预选赛中一路高歌猛进、出线在望的事实。

回顾上个赛季，如下这些球员是whoscored.com球员评价系统筛选出的最适合意大利队目前4-3-1-2阵型的本土球员。

从整体上看，这是个技术型的阵容，场上散布着众多助攻者和关键传球能手。后防线的4名球员年纪尚轻，但攻击线上的前锋们实在太老了。意大利已经被这个问题困扰多年，老当益壮的锋将们压缩着年轻人的成长空间。这也是普兰德利的上任会为意大利队带来积极变化的原因：他将提供给新秀们充分的锻炼机会。

预计与西班牙队交战的首发名单（下图）：

与Whoscored.com选出的11人相比，普兰德利的阵容中出现了6名新面孔。实际上，布冯、皮尔洛和德罗西在上赛季中由于伤病和停赛（德罗西）缺席了大量的比赛。他们都是各自位置上的最佳球员之一，因此入选这份名单并无争议。

意大利在右后卫位置上的人员储备相对丰富，阿巴特、桑顿、卡萨尼、德-西尔维斯特里和马尔科-莫塔各有所长，普兰德利这次则选择了马乔。那不勒斯飞翼在空中对抗、威胁传球、比赛专注度和拦截等方面具有优势，而他的弱点主要集中于控球技术和传中准确度。马乔将代表那不勒斯出战欧冠联赛，普兰德利势必会对他保持关注。

这支“新”意大利队阵容中最显著的变化出现在前卫线和锋线上。普兰德利声称他偏好于招入传控出色的中场和前锋。拥有像蒙托利沃、皮尔洛、阿奎拉尼、罗西和卡萨诺等球员的意大利队确实具备掌控球权和踢出精妙配合的潜能。

锋线的配置更能突出地说明这一点，朱塞佩-罗西和卡萨诺双双具有传球、关键输送和直传的个人特点。不仅如此，比利亚雷亚尔前锋罗西还能在防守端有所贡献并善于盘带突破，这对于身处西甲联赛中的他来说值得骄傲。

意大利队的未来看上去似乎比南非世界杯期间要光明许多。随着乔文科这样的名字跻身于国家队名单，蓝衣军团的拥趸们已准备好迎接漂亮的足球。但愿，他们能与那老掉牙的链式防守思维作个了断。

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图片又挂了，肿么回事? 以前可以看的

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50楼参考译文
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由 余文乐 发表在GoalHi足球

阿森纳1-0 乌迪内斯: 沃尔科特的早早进球让阿森纳取得优势


首发阵容

乌迪内斯的反击持续威胁阿森纳的球门，但什琴斯尼一一化解。

阿森纳用沃尔科特和沙马赫代替了阿尔沙文和禁赛的范佩西。

而圭多林则把上赛季的3511换成了更传统的4141，这样有更多中场球员可以跟进接应中锋迪纳塔莱。

这场比赛充满了开放和激情，但同时也有紧张和压力。如果乌迪内斯下半场全力进攻的话会很有意思，但是他们似乎对第二回合的主场比赛很有信心，他们没有在进攻上投入足够的兵力去围攻阿森纳。

阿森纳的流动进攻

阿森纳的433非常灵活，他们锋线上的三个人经常互相换位，中场的三个人也轮流插上。罗西基留在一个较后位置，这让他更加自如也有更多的时间支配求，而拉姆塞最具攻击性的中场，他的经常前插创造了沃尔科特的进球。

中场的灵活换位似乎让比赛变得开放，在他们早早领先后，这也许太开放了。他们经常在后防线之前留下了很多的空间，而我们也可以看到乌迪内斯的中场们可以太轻易就突破了防线，阿尔梅罗上半场就差点再一次一对一之中打进一球。无他，一个大力趟球，把球躺倒自己身前20米，然后比速度，就把防线冲破了。

同样，阿森纳中场的灵活跑位也创造了类似的效果。巴杜是乌迪内斯的拖后中场，但他踢得太随意，经常前插，然后在被阿森纳的中场突破以后，却散步般回防。

对于一个踢防守反击的球队来说，乌迪内斯在开场阶段令人惊讶的把防线前压。这被沃尔科特利用了，他的速度得以发挥并打进一个进球，热尔维尼奥也很爽。沙马赫表现很平庸，贡献甚少。

下半场

半场过后，乌迪内斯让平齐成为最靠前的中场和迪纳塔莱建立更紧密的联系，这有助于球队压制阿森纳的后卫线，让乌迪内斯获得更多的控球。主队在两个后卫受伤之后雪上加霜。首先是吉布斯因为拉伤离场，然后替补上场的朱鲁再次因为同样的问题被延金森换下。

在这样的情况下，放弃大部分的控球权对阿森纳来说是有好处的。乌迪内斯有点太侧重反击了，他们经常在对手后撤防守的时候显得办法不多。迪纳塔莱喜欢游走在边路，接应队友的过顶长传，另外，尽管他是一个出色的抢点型射手，但让他在禁区内接应传中，他并不是很有威胁。

如果有个更传统的中锋，阿森纳将会更加麻烦。枪手的三个前锋经常挤在中路，乌迪内的两个边后卫大胆的插上助攻，在阿森纳的边后卫位置的形成2打1的局面会有收获的。圭多林相当谨慎地尝试这个，然而，他没有及时地换人，也更多地选择保持阵型。

由于球员受伤，温格（和他的助手帕特-莱斯，因为温格被禁赛）的换人选择有限。弗林蓬换下了罗西基，这让防线前的保护更好了一些，然后比赛以1-0结束。

结论

这个一场不错的比赛，而由下半场来看，似乎双方都满意这个结果。阿森纳会满意没有失球，乌迪内斯也名单1-0会让他们在回到意大利有机会反胜，如果阿森纳打进第二球的话，他们希望就几乎没有希望了。

战术有趣的地方在宏观方面而不是某个特别的细节：一个反击型的球队需要对手各线之间的空间，也需要防线后的空间，而当阿森纳后撤防守，阵型更紧凑，乌迪内斯在运动战的威胁就不如上半场了

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欧冠资格赛首回合枪手1-0乌鸡的补充资料1

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欧冠资格赛首回合枪手1-0乌鸡的补充资料2

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欧冠资格赛首回合枪手1-0乌鸡的补充资料3

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欧冠资格赛首回合枪手1-0乌鸡的补充资料4

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Mourinho tries to counter Messi’s false nine role by pushing Carvalho up the pitch
茉莉尼奥命卡瓦略向前压欲消解梅西这个伪九号作用，然最终还是无解

August 18, 2011


How Real tried to deal with Messi - Carvalho came out of the back, and his three fellow defenders had to narrow
皇马如何对付梅西？卡瓦略凸出后防线顶在梅西前面，在他身后的三个后卫向中间收缩而堆在这一狭窄空间中

One of the notable features from the second leg of the Spanish Supercopa was the positioning of Ricardo Carvalho, and his response to Lionel Messi’s movement into deep, slightly right-sided positions.

Messi tore Real apart in the 5-0 win last season, despite it being a rare occasion where he didn’t end up on the scoresheet. Real tried to play high up the pitch, but Messi played so deep that Jose Mourinho didn’t know how to deal with him – the two centre-backs stayed in position, but holding a high line. Therefore, Messi could receive the ball in space, turn, then send a ball through to one of the wide forwards coming inside. His two assists for David Villa’s goals were perfect, displaying exactly why Pep Guardiola wants to play Messi in that role.

As well as being a great goalscorer and a superb dribbler, Messi is fantastic at slipping the ball through the defence, particularly between full-back and centre-back, and stopping those balls becomes essential when he plays as a false nine.

The obvious answer is to push up a centre-back onto Messi – as Jonathan Wilson suggested before the Champions League final, to leave a bank of three at the back – two narrow full-backs tracking Villa and Pedro Rodriguez, a centre-back staying at home as a sweeper, and another playing high up the pitch on Messi.

Why has this become an issue now, when Real played Barcelona four times after the 5-0 last season? First, because in the four subsequent 2010/11 meetings, Real played very deep, leaving no space in behind and letting Barcelona come onto them. This made Messi’s role less dangerous (although not Messi himself less dangerous: he’s good enough to be a threat whatever the situation in the game) for various reasons.

First, because Real could focus on keeping it tight between the lines and deny him space that way. Second, because there was less space between Real’s defence and their goalline, for those balls in behind. Third, because playing deep seems to lend itself naturally to playing against a false nine – there’s simply less space for him to open up by dropping deep.

Mourinho’s decision to press from the front in this match meant Real had to stay compact and push up, to deny Barcelona space in midfield – and then the issue of tracking Messi arose. Carvalho spent much of the first half ahead of his other three defenders, closing Messi down before sprinting back into the defensive line.

The first goal showed that it didn’t quite work. Carvalho came out of defence and got beaten by Messi, who then played the ball through the gap between Pepe and Sergio Ramos (which had become artificially large, since Pepe had to cover two centre-back positions by himself) to Andres Iniesta.

Pepe, who became an aggressive midfield destroyer in the Clasicos last year, might have been the better man to play this role. Carvalho was beaten easily, and it may be that what he is good at – penalty box defending – isn’t useful in this situation. If this becomes the norm against a false nine (an advanced centre-back, covered by a sweeper ready to pick up runners from midfield and the wings), both players will need to be quick. The former needs to be able to turn quickly and get back in the defensive line, whilst the latter can’t be slow if he’s the last line of cover and is playing high up the pitch.

It is potentially another way the centre-back will evolve. On a related note, it was interesting that when Messi was playing as a false nine and tearing apart Arsenal in the Champions League in 2009/10 (at a time when Messi was relatively new to that role – Barca had played the majority of the campaign with him on the right and Zlatan Ibrahimovic upfront), when Arsene Wenger had to take off one of his centre-backs, Mikael Silvestre, he brought on another full-back, Emmanuel Eboue, rather than back-up centre-back Sol Campbell. He then had a defence of Eboue, Bacary Sagna, Thomas Vermaelen and Gael Clichy.

Sagna isn’t a centre-back by any stretch of the imagination, but the logic was sound (even if Messi did grab another goal). Arsenal needed to play high up the pitch to get back in the game, and with Vermaelen stereotypically coming up the pitch towards Messi, an ageing Campbell would have been a nightmare as the covering defender. By having a quick full-back alongside Vermaelen, Arsenal were theoretically more able to deal with Messi, even if that meant overlooking a natural centre-back for a gap at centre-back.

That’s an extreme example – Campbell was, with respect, probably past the point where he should have been playing Champions League football. But it points to a situation where slow, rugged centre-backs may struggle – albeit in a very specific setting: (a) when needing to play high up the pitch, and (b) against a team playing a false nine.

Coming back to the specifics, it’s hard to justify Carvalho’s place in the side if Real were about to replay this game. With Sergio Ramos comfortable at centre-back, his pace would have been much more useful. Alvaro Arbeloa could be the replacement right-back.

It’s not until December 11th that the sides reconvene at the Bernabeu, but it will be interesting to see how Mourinho adapts.

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56楼参考译文

魔力鸟让卡瓦略前提抑制假九号梅西

胡美满 发表在GoalHi足球


皇马如何对付梅西——卡瓦略站位比其他后卫更靠前，而剩下三名后卫则要站位更紧密一些。

西班牙超级杯第二回合，皇马一个很显著的战术变化是卡瓦略的位置，梅西回撤得比较深，且稍稍靠右，且看卡瓦略如何看防梅西的跑位。在上赛季巴萨5-0战胜皇马的比赛中，梅西虽然没有进球，但是他的跑位撕碎了皇马的后防线。皇马在那场比赛中尝试将后防线向前提，但是梅西的位置回撤很深，鸟叔拿他一点办法也没有。皇马的两名中卫并没有失位，但是他们组成的防线太靠前了，这样梅西就有了一片非常开阔的区域可以从容地带球，转身，并从两名中卫之间将球直塞给本方的前锋。梅西给比利亚的两次助攻精彩绝伦，这也正是瓜迪奥拉把梅西摆在这个位置的用意。

作为一名优秀的射手和以带球见长的球员，梅西对于摆脱中卫很有一套，尤其是利用中卫和边卫之间的空隙突破更是他的拿手好戏。因此当梅西踢假九号的位置时，如何盯防他的突破就成了重中之重。

答案很明显，就是将一名中卫提前，专门看防梅西。就像Jonathan Wilson在欧冠决赛之前说的那样，一名中卫提前看防梅西，其他三名后卫中两名边卫适当向中路回收，看防比利亚和佩德罗，剩下一名中卫拖后，负责大面积扫荡。

上赛季在那场5-0之后，皇马和巴萨又交手了四次，那么为什么要采取这种战术呢？在上赛季的德比四番战中，皇马的阵型收缩得很紧密，没有留下太多空间给巴萨，这就使得梅西在他的位置上威胁性减小（当然不是梅西本身威胁性减小，无论场上处于什么局势，他对于对手来说都是致命的。）

首先，这种战术可以将后卫线和中场两条线的距离保持得很紧密，压缩梅西的空间；其次，这样后防线和门将之间的空间也会变小，从而可以减少对手直塞球打后卫身后的威胁；第三，防线后撤的打法似乎天生就克假九号战术，假九号本来利用回撤赢得空间的战术在上述打法面前行不通。第一个失球使得上面提到的这种战术看起来没什么说服力，卡瓦略上抢，但是他在同梅西的一对一中失败了，接着梅西从佩佩和拉莫斯之间的空档将球传给了伊涅斯塔。（卡瓦略提前之后，佩佩一人要覆盖原本由两个中卫负责的范围，这就使佩佩和拉莫斯之间的空档变得很大。）

在去年国家德比成功地扮演了破坏性防守后腰角色的佩佩，看起来比卡瓦略更适合提前。卡瓦略在一对一防守中占不到什么优势，但他在禁区内的大面积防守是强项，这一强项在他被提前之后却无从得到发挥。如果这种打法要变为应付假九号的常规战术（一名中卫提前，从中场和两翼的球员中选出一名奔跑能力强的负责协同防守），这两名球员必须速度很快，前者需要转身快，能够及时回到后卫线进行防守；而后者如果在全队阵型前压的情况下充当最后一道防线，速度慢的球员当然无法胜任。

当然，还有另外一种设置中卫的战术。这让我想起一场很有意思的比赛，2009-2010赛季欧冠巴萨对阵阿森纳的比赛中，梅西扮演的就是假九号的角色。（彼时梅西对于假九号的位置还不是很熟悉，那时他通常踢右路，伊布突前。）当时温格撤下了一名中卫西尔维斯特，取而代之的不是平时的主力替补坎贝尔，而是边后卫埃布埃。这样，那场比赛枪手的四名首发后卫就是：埃布埃，萨尼亚，费尔马伦和克里希。

无论从哪个角度上讲，萨尼亚都不是一名中卫，但实际效果却很好（虽然还是让梅西抓住机会打入一球）。阿森纳急于扳回比分，阵型大举压上，并派费尔马伦对位盯防梅西，如果上了年纪的坎贝尔出场，他无法胜任大面积的防守，而派上一名速度快的边后卫搭配费尔马伦，令阿森纳对应付梅西有了更大的胜算。虽然减少一名中卫意味着中路防守的空档会变大。

这是一个非常典型的例子——坎贝尔也许认为他应该在欧冠中首发出场，但是，对他本人没有丝毫不敬地说，在这样一场比赛中，一名速度慢，技术糙的中卫很可能会吃亏。上述战术应该在同时满足以下两个要素的比赛中使用：1）球队需要大举压上；2）对手使用了假九号战术。

还是回到皇马与巴萨的超级杯中来，如果重新踢这场比赛，很难说鸟叔还会不会把卡瓦略放到这个位置，拉莫斯也很适合踢中卫，让他踢这个位置可能更能发挥作用，阿贝罗阿可以在右后卫顶替拉莫斯。

直到今年12月11号本赛季首回合国家德比前我们都无从得知鸟叔会进行怎样的调整，不过猜测一下也挺有趣，不是么？

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虎扑的图全挂了
北极海 发表于 2011-8-20 13:07

受累点击一下题目（有链接），过会儿，则这里也能看图的

国内网站搞门户壁垒太那个

不可理解

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梅西在超级杯次回合个人集锦





回撤较深的梅西，还是让皇马防守人员赶到无解


第一个助攻球，传球地点是刚过中线附近，
赫迪拉上去拦截，
没有拦住梅西，
传球是直塞球，太犀利了，
皇马看似铜墙铁壁的中路被直直地从中撕开一个口子，
心有灵犀的小白面对此球，
唯一能做就是不慌不忙挑过卡西头顶入网

话说这个助攻与上一场那个助攻相比难度更大，而接受助攻之人的打门舒适度却要高得多

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梅西助攻，
正是从后场摆脱压上的卡瓦略开始，
凯迪拉在中线附近拦截失败，
梅西于是远距离地传出极品级的中路直塞，
小白于是在卡西目前终于霜了一把

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Arsenal 0-2 Liverpool: Frimpong red card and Liverpool substitutions change the game

August 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

An Aaron Ramsey own goal and Luis Suarez’s tap-in gave Liverpool their first league win of the season.

Arsene Wenger was forced to play Samir Nasri despite his imminent transfer. Emmanuel Frimpong replaced the suspended Alex Song, and various injuries in defence meant that Carl Jenkinson started at right-back, with Bacary Sagna on the left.

Kenny Dalglish left out Luis Suarez for fitness reasons, so Dirk Kuyt started on the right. Behind him was Martin Kelly, chosen over John Flanagan.

Overall this was a match lacking in technical quality – the best chances came from mistakes and long-range efforts rather than clever creative play, and it was only after the red card that things opened up and Liverpool forced the issue – otherwise, it seemed we were heading for a 0-0.

Early stalemate

Dalglish had the flexibility to play either a 4-4-2 or a 4-3-3, depending on the positioning of Jordan Henderson and Dirk Kuyt. He went for the latter to prevent being overrun in the middle of the pitch, which meant we had a fairly stereotypical 4-2-3-1 v 4-3-3 battle, with the midfielder with the most time on the ball being Frimpong. He was Arsenal’s best player and yet was arguably the main reason they lost the match, dismissed for a reckless tackle on Lucas on 70 minutes, having picked up a needless yellow card after just seven.

The perils of a holding midfielder receiving an early caution have been discussed many times before (most notably during the Copa America, when this became a theme of the tournament), and in addition to Frimpong’s eventual dismissal, Arsenal were hampered because he spent much of the game pulling out of tackles, which meant Liverpool could often break through the centre.

On the other hand, in possession he was good. With Henderson usually picking up Ramsey, and Charlie Adam retreating to a position near Lucas, Frimpong had plenty of space in the midfield. And, a little like Santos midfielder Arouca in the Copa Libertadores final, he used this freedom in a deep position to storm forward and launch attacks, rather than just passing sideways. His passing (through sometimes inaccurate) was generally forward, and he came close to a goal with a good long-range shot after a powerful run.

<flash>
by Guardian Chalkboards

Liverpool pressing

That was of particular help to Arsenal, because their passing from back to front was, like in the Newcastle game, extremely slow. The injury problems didn’t help – Sagna was uncomfortable bringing the ball forward on the left, and the same could be said for Thomas Vermaelen when he had to move to the right after Laurent Koscielny went off. With Sagna and Vermaelen out of position, plus Miquel and Jenkinson making their league debuts and understandably a little nervous, Arsenal’s passing from the back was poor.

Equally, Liverpool should be given credit for their pressing. Kuyt, Henderson and Stewart Downing all worked hard to pressure Arsenal players, whilst Adam is less mobile but had a good game without the ball, making five successful tackles and three interceptions.

Liverpool had a good amount of possession and worked the ball forward well, particularly through the full-backs, but there was no obvious approach to actually scoring a goal, other than by using the height of Carroll. Arsenal’s centre-backs should be commended for how they dealt with him, and whilst the Downing-Carroll combination works excellently in theory, the former is still yet to find the latter with a cross from open play in Liverpool’s league season so far. Downing’s only successful cross was a low one from the right, miscontrolled by Kuyt.

Jose Enrique was arguably the best player on show, and Theo Walcott had no idea how to try and beat him – Enrique can match him for pace and is also solid positionally, and Walcott had no impact on the game. Walcott and Arshavin also need to come inside into goalscoring positions when the ball is on the opposite flank – Walcott says he wants to play more central, but on one occasion in the 28th minute, he was on his heels on the right when a run into the centre might have presented him with a tap-in.

70th minute

The game remained a stalemate until the 70th minute, when two things happened. First, Frimpong was sent off. Second, Raul Meireles replaced Kuyt and Suarez replaced Carroll. As these events happened simultaneously, it’s impossible to say which had a greater impact on the game – though it’s fair to say that they were both crucial.

The extra man meant that Liverpool dominated possession. Until the 70th minute, Arsenal completed 322 passes to Liverpool’s 281 – from the 71st onwards, it was Arsenal 105, and Liverpool 142. The momentum was clearly now with the away side.

That gave Liverpool the foundation to build moves, but Meireles and Suarez were the two who created the chances. With Arsenal reverting to a 4-4-1, the former found space between the lines to play clever passes, and Suarez offered fresher legs and better movement than Carroll. Meireles passes towards Suarez created both goals – the first fortunate, via Ramsey’s chest, the second excellently-worked. Suarez found plenty of time and space to complete passes in the final third.

<flash>
by Guardian Chalkboards

Arsenal were exhausted late on – Nicklas Bendtner was introduced, but Arsenal were beaten.

Conclusion

A fairly poor game until the final twenty minutes – indiscipline cost Arsenal, but Dalglish’s tactics were spot on. He matched Arsenal at 11 v 11, then introduced players to exploit the holes at the back after the red card.

Arsenal were a long way off looking a competitive side. Lacking experience deep in the side and lacking creativity further up, their selection problems for the Manchester United game are even more serious because of Frimpong’s suspension, Koscielny’s likely absence, and Nasri’s transfer.

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71楼参考译文

阿森纳0-2利物浦战术分析：枪手之堤溃于红牌，红军爆发始于换人

由 Rivaldinho 发表在GoalHi足球


双方首发

拉姆塞的乌龙和苏亚雷斯的抢点帮助利物浦收获联赛首个三分。

虽然纳斯里很有可能转会，但温格还是被迫让他上场。弗林蓬顶替被停赛的亚历山大-宋，延金森首发出任右后卫，萨尼亚居左。

达格利什将苏亚雷斯留在了替补席上，库伊特首发居右，在他身后则是凯利，而非上一场的弗拉纳甘。

总而言之这场比赛缺乏技术含量，最好的机会都是来自对方失误或者远射，而非机智有创造力的配合，在红牌出现后场面才有所改观，利物浦抓住了机会，不然比赛很有可能以0-0结束。

初期对峙

达格利什手里的棋子既能踢4-4-2也能踢4-3-3，这取决于亨德森和库伊特踢什么位置。他还是把后者放在了中场以免这一区域人数被对方压倒，这样意味着比赛又变成了老一套的4-2-3-1vs4-3-3的对决，中场拿球最多的人变成了弗林蓬。他是阿森纳昨天表现最好的球员，但也因为第70分钟侵犯卢卡斯染红成为了阿森纳输球的原因，我们还应记得比赛第7分钟他就吃到了黄牌。

后腰早早吃到黄牌的坏处我们说过很多次，尤其是美洲杯的时候，这一现象如此普遍，再加上之后吃到红牌，阿森纳彻底崩溃，他出场时间内一直在拼抢拦截，一旦下场，利物浦就能从中路打开缺口。

另外一方面他在有球的时候做得也不错，亨德森一般盯梢拉姆塞，亚当会回撤靠近卢卡斯，弗林蓬在中场有很多空间，这点他有点像南美解放者杯决赛桑托斯的中场阿劳卡，他很好地从纵深插上发动进攻，而非仅仅横传了事。他的传球（有些时候不太精准）大多向前，他还有一次劲射威胁到了对方球门。



利物浦的压迫

在这点上阿森纳也算是送到利物浦嘴边的肥肉，因为他们向前的推进和纽卡那场一样非常的慢。伤病也拖了后腿，萨尼亚在左后卫位置上插上很不舒服，维尔马伦在科斯切尔尼下场后移到右中卫位置也有些别扭。萨尼亚和维尔马伦都不在自己习惯的位置，米奎尔和延金森两位初次亮相的小将又有些紧张，阿森纳后场向前的传球很糟糕。

然而利物浦的压迫也应该得到我们的褒奖，库伊特、亨德森和唐宁都很努力地区逼迫枪手球员，亚当懂得稍微少点，但是他防守还是做得很不错，本场他有五次抢断和三次拦截。

利物浦的控球也不错，推进也很有效，尤其是通过边后卫的推进，但是他们并未真正制造进球机会，高塔卡罗尔并未被有效利用。在对卡罗尔的盯防上阿森纳后卫应该得到表扬，唐宁和卡罗尔的配置理论上很美，但是前者的传中这赛季头两场还没找到过卡罗尔，唐宁本场唯一有效的传中来自右路，但是库伊特未能拿下皮球。

恩里克是红军这边表现最好的球员，沃尔科特不知道该怎么对付西班牙人，恩里克速度跟得上他，位置也站得住，沃尔科特几乎无所作为，他和阿尔沙文都会在无球侧切入寻求抢点，沃尔科特也说过希望自己的位置更靠中路，但是这一幕也仅仅出现在第28分钟。

第70分钟

比赛的僵局直到第70分钟才被大破，两件事接踵而来，弗林蓬吃到红牌，然后两大雷斯入替。几乎同时发生，很难讲哪一件对比赛影响更大，公平地讲，他们都是至关重要的。
多一个人让利物浦控制了球权。直到第70分钟，阿森纳的传球数还以322比281领衔，但是71分钟过后利物浦以142比105胜出，比赛已然被客队控制。

这也给了利物浦压上的底气，梅雷莱斯和苏亚雷斯创造了两粒进球。阿森纳转为4-4-1,之后梅雷莱斯在对方两条线之间找到了空间，呃苏亚雷斯体力充沛比卡罗尔移动更迅速。梅雷莱斯与苏亚雷斯连线制造了那两粒进球，第一球是拉姆塞的胸部乌龙，算是运气好，第二球是完美的配合，苏亚雷斯在对方的防守三区有大把时间和空间倒腾进去。



此时阿森纳已经力竭，本特纳出战无济于事，阿森纳败了。

结论

比赛不怎么样，但是最后20分钟局面打开了。弗林蓬的失控让阿森纳复出代价，但是达格利什的战术仍有一些亮点，11对11的时候与阿森纳势均力敌，在对方吃到红牌后立刻用换人打开空间。

阿森纳如今看来离强者还有很大距离，球队既没有经验，也没有创造力，对阵曼联时他们的缺兵少将情况会更严重，弗林蓬禁赛，科斯切尔尼受伤，纳斯里也可能离开……

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70-71楼的补充资料1
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2011-12英超第2轮 阿森纳VS利物浦 （全场集锦，英语解说）



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2011-12英超第2轮 阿森纳vs利物浦（全场集锦，国语解说）



北京时间2011年8月20日晚上19点45分(英格兰当地时间20日中午12点45分)，
新赛季英格兰超级联赛第2轮比赛激情上演，阿森纳在酋长球场迎战来访的利物浦。
上半场双方均无建树，下半场弗林蓬累计两黄被红牌罚下，拉姆西不慎打进乌龙球，
苏亚雷斯终场前打进一球，利物浦2-0击败阿森纳，11年来首次在客场战胜阿森纳。

双方过去共交锋208场，阿森纳73胜55平81负处于下风。
自从英超成立以来，双方交战45场，枪手15胜15平15负与利物浦平分秋色，其中主场8胜9平4负占优。

不过最近11年，阿森纳在主场未曾输给过利物浦，
阿森纳上一次主场负于红军，需要追溯到2000年2月，随后14次交锋主队7胜7平保持不败。

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70-71楼的补充资料2
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Pass, Move, Goal – Victory Over Arsenal
Posted on August 21st, 2011
Posted by by Paul Tomkins

Strangely, there seemed to be a fair amount of negativity from a fair few fans after Liverpool’s victory over Arsenal. Perhaps the Gunners’ problems had been overplayed to the point where there was a sense that the Reds were going to face some mid-table side.
Of course, even going away to mid-table sides still favours the home team. Last season, Manchester United never won away at an above-average side, but still bagged the title. Away teams win all the time, of course, but the odds still heavily favour the team in its own arena.
Let’s remember that Arsenal still had their first choice keeper. They had their usual keeper, plus Sagna, Vermaelen, Koscielny (briefly), Nasri, Walcott, Ramsey, Arshavin and Van Persie; and remember, Liverpool went to the Emirates last season with an 18-year-old right-back and, before too long, a 17-year-old left-back. So it was a case of role reversal in terms of rookie defenders.
(The other week some numpty on the Sunday Supplement said that Liverpool “collapsed” at the end of last season; two defeats is now a collapse. According to TTT’s Andrew Beasley, Liverpool are averaging 1.85 points per game under Dalglish since his return, with 1.79 enough to guarantee 4th place in the last 16 years.)
Liverpool had no right to go and expect to win at the Emirates, but thankfully they did. By two clear goals, and for the first time since 2000. Pepe Reina leads the Premier League for clean sheets most seasons, but this was his first against the Gunners. The Reds had more shots, more possession and scored more goals. Not many teams do that at Arsenal, no matter what team the home side puts out. So, let’s appreciate that.
Liverpool also started the game without Suarez, due to his Copa America exertions (he wasn’t even ‘supposed’ to feature in the first two games of the season), as well as Glen Johnson and Steven Gerrard. Liverpool were bedding in four new players, and half of the outfield ten were not even at the club at the turn of the year.
So, while Arsenal clearly had greater problems, Liverpool were not at full-strength either, and after the disappointing draw on the opening day, the Reds could have found themselves in the bottom three had they lost; there seemed a little bit of pressure building around the fixture. After the sinkhole that was the start of last season, we know how that needed to be avoided.
Despite all this, I still saw plenty of criticism of Andy Carroll and Jordan Henderson after the game. I was actually more frustrated with Charlie Adam in the first half, after his bright opening 45 against Sunderland, but after the break he kept things ticking over nicely and didn’t misjudge all of his ‘killer’ passes (which, in the first half, mostly went into touch).
Last week, Henderson reminded me of Oyvind Leonhardsen: get the ball on the wing, stop, turn back, give it simple. And repeat. But it was the lad’s debut, against his boyhood club, and in those circumstances he can be forgiven playing it safe. He can play out wide, but he was much better against Arsenal in a roaming central role.
Across both games he had a passing success rate of an incredibly high 89%. Even against Arsenal he didn’t make many ambitious passes (Forward: 41% Backwards: 27% Left: 10% Right: 22% via @EPLIndex). But he was very good at finding space and then finding a red shirt with a first-time pass. If you can play quick, one-touch passing in the opposition half, you already have some Liverpool DNA.


Henderson vs Arsenal (first 60 mins) / vs Sunderland (subbed 60mins)

Henderson vs Arsenal, full 90 minutes (final 3rd emphasised)

Torres vs City (subbed on 78 minutes)

I’m also not sure what people expect of Andy Carroll; rather than viewing what he does well, it seems to be a constant case of “was that worthy of a £35m player?”, as if everything has to be remarkable.
He definitely has more to deliver, that’s for sure, but he’s done fairly well in the first two games, and for the most part Liverpool haven’t resorted to hitting long to find his head. Forget his price tag, and view his contribution as part of a team effort; if Liverpool win a lot of games with him in the side, then it’s working.


Carroll vs Arsenal

I only have to mention the name ‘Aguero’ on Twitter before I get a raft of messages saying that he cost the same as Carroll. In terms of the transfer fee, yes. Add wages and Aguero costs at least twice as much each week, and gets paid beyond the limit of Liverpool’s pay structure. Break that, and then you have to give pay rises to all your best players, and suddenly it’s costing £30m more per year in wages just to add one player. City can afford a massive wage bill; Liverpool can’t.
(Finally, Liverpool can’t offer the Champions League right now – and to players, that’s like the World Cup: they want to be there. It satisfies their professional desires, and it raises their profile. If they are also greedy for more money, being in the Champions League usually sorts that out, too.)
Against Arsenal, Carroll forced a fine save with a header. He showed presence of mind to lay the ball to Kelly for his shot that hit the post, after Adam’s clever ball had played the striker too wide. He set up Downing for a disallowed goal for a slight nudge that was penalised, as happened when he scored against Sunderland (and yet Arshavin was allowed to produce a two-arm push that sent Kelly flying! Refs, eh?)
Above all else, as the lone striker he went up against the superb Vermaelen and his various defensive partners, and gave them a good battle.
The 4-5-1 (morphing into 4-3-3) system that the Reds deployed hinged on runners playing off the spearhead striker. Carroll gives Dalglish that option.



Contrast this with the game precisely a year ago: going to Manchester City (another tough away match) in the second fixture of the season with a flat-fronted 4-4-2, which, in the build up, the now disgraced Andy Gray said would “really please the Liverpool fans”, as it was far more attack-minded than the teams Benítez used to select (when not getting beat there).
Liverpool had no control of the midfield, or any aspect of the game, and lost 3-0. In four wins and one draw since January against last season’s top four, Dalglish has yet to field a out-and-out front two, with Suarez, when paired with Carroll, drifting all over the pitch. Home victories over Manchester United and Manchester City, and away wins against Chelsea and Arsenal, plus another draw away at Arsenal, have been achieved without the need to go for an old-fashioned 4-4-2.
Yesterday, Carroll and Henderson (whose job it was to support the no.9) made 86 passes, 73 of which were successful. Against City 12 months ago, Torres and Ngog made just 39 passes, only 26 of which were successful.
At City, Torres was forced to play slightly deeper than Ngog, which, given his paltry seven successful passes, was a waste of time and space for a player who only comes to life in the final third. Come forward a year, and Henderson had 7.6 times as many successful touches at the Emirates, but get this – in exactly the same areas. (Torres had 73% of his touches in the City half, and 34% in their final third; Henderson had 72% of his touches in the Arsenal half, and 32% in their final third; virtually identical.)
At City, Ngog, the most forward of the two ‘similar’ strikers, had 78% of his touches in the City half, but yesterday Carroll had 84% of his in the Gunners’ half.
Obviously the game took on a different dynamic once Liverpool were behind at City in 2010, but it does highlight how 4-4-2 is often wrongly perceived to be more attacking; it’s not the number of strikers on the pitch that defines a team’s attacking intent and capabilities, but a whole host of factors.
The key thing about the victory over Arsenal was that Liverpool had more efforts at goal from within the area, whereas beyond the Arshavin push that led to Van Persie’s shot, the home side were reduced to shooting from distance (Frimpong, Nasri).
Both of Liverpool’s goals were from working their way into the six-yard box, while as well as two first-half headers (Carroll and Henderson) on target from around the penalty spot, Kelly and Downing went close from well inside the area. (Henderson’s was the weaker effort, but Kuyt’s clever lob into space had no pace on it, making it far harder to head at goal with power.)
‘Shots on goal’ remains a fairly meaningful stat – you need to shoot to score (or bounce the ball off an opposition player … ) – but working good goalscoring chances inside the area is far more encouraging for a team’s long-term chances than continually shooting from distance. (Quality, not quantity, being vital.)
After all, two of the Reds’ 15 efforts overall were from the halfway line, and as such were largely a waste of time. However, excluding the first goal, Liverpool had seven shots in the area (three forced good saves, one hit the post), to Arsenal’s four.
Even when Carroll didn’t win the ball, he did the next best thing, and made it difficult for the defenders to make perfect contact, and therefore harder for them to build their own attacks.
It can be frustrating watching Carroll try to chase a ball in behind defenders, as he’s obviously no Torres at his prime. As an individual, he’s a downgrade on the Spaniard at his best, but the deal allowed Liverpool to get the sublime Luis Suarez as well.
Liverpool now have more options, and between them, Carroll and Suarez can offer more than Torres on his own (especially the moody version we saw last year). In this game, Carroll wore the Arsenal defence down, and Suarez came on to take advantage of that, as well as the space an extra man gave the Reds. (It’s worth noting that, perhaps due to frequent experience of it, but also due to their possession-based approach, Arsenal often do well with ten men.)
Presumably the exclusion of Aquilani, Ngog, Poulsen and Cole means that they are likely to leave before the window closes. If they are not making the squad when the bench isn’t quite at full strength, then it may well be time to bid them all farewell.
Suarez and Meireles came off the bench, but Maxi and Skrtel remained unused subs, which shows that there is a lot more depth there now; even if one or two new additions would add extra weight.
For all the talk of the English (and Scottish) players being brought to the club, the two FSG/Comolli/Dalglish signings to most quickly impress have been Suarez and Enrique. Suarez is simply too good, and too determined, to stand much chance of failing, while Enrique, after a ropey start at Newcastle, has benefited from time to acclimatise to English football, and develop from a young full-back into an experienced 25-year-old who can excel at both ends of the pitch.
Of the new Brits, Downing has looked the most accomplished on the very early evidence, but it’s possible to see what the others offer, even if people will quibble about the fees.
Whatever the nationality, however, the key thing is that the squad is much better than last season, with only Raul Meireles remaining in the match-day 18 from the seven signings of last summer. (The two Englishmen, Cole and Konchesky, quickly fell by the wayside.)
Challenging for the title remains remote, but four points from the first two games, including an away win at Arsenal, is a good base to build an assault on the top four. I know I’d have gladly taken that two weeks ago, and suddenly the doom and gloom surrounding preseason results seems a distant memory.

colinfirth

上楼参考译文
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传球、移动、进球——利物浦对阿森纳取得的胜利
由 jessicaje 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

奇怪的是，相当数量的利物浦球迷对球队对阿森纳取得的胜利持一定程度的消极看法。也许是枪手的问题被夸大了，以至于人们有种错觉，觉得利物浦将要挑战的是一支联赛中流的球队。

当然，即便是利物浦客场对阵中流球队，一般也是主队占优。上个赛季，曼联客战高于平均水准的球队没有一场全取三分，但他们仍然收获了冠军。当然，总有客队能赢，但是一支球队在它的主场总是占据着更大的获胜可能性。

要注意，阿森纳仍然有他们的首席门将。他们派上了首发门将，加上萨尼亚、维尔马伦、科斯切尔尼（时间很短）、纳斯里、沃尔科特、拉姆塞、阿尔沙文和范佩西。另外，利物浦上个赛季做客酋长球场，派上了一名18岁的右后卫和一名17岁的左后卫。所以，从新人后卫的角度看，这是一次角色对换。

（几周前，有些家伙在the Sunday Supplement上说利物浦在上赛季末已经“崩塌”了；两场败仗就已经是“崩溃”了。据TTT’s Andrew Beasley说，利物浦在达格利什手下场均积分1.85，而过去16年跻身四强需要的场均积分1.79。）

利物浦没理由走进酋长球场就指望能够取胜，不过，谢天谢地，他们确实赢了。2-0，二十一世纪以来的第一次。大多数赛季，雷纳都在零封榜上排名领先，但是这是他第一次对阿森纳没有被进球。红军有更多的射门、更多控球权，进了更多球。无论主队派出怎样的阵型，也没有太多球队能够在对阵阿森纳时做到利物浦做到的这些。所以，让我们给利物浦一个赞。

利物浦是在没有苏亚雷斯的情况下开始比赛的，（因为美洲杯，他本不该在联赛开赛头两轮首发），同样缺阵的还有格伦约翰逊和杰拉德。利物浦派上了四名新援，除守门员之外的10名球员中有一半是今年新加入球队的成员。

所以，虽然阿森纳很明显比我们问题更大，但是利物浦也不是一支状态全佳的球队，尤其在收获了失望的揭幕战之后，利物浦如果输了这场比赛，球员士气会降到谷底；球员身上的压力在增加。上个赛季开赛初期是个大漏斗，经历过之后，我们知道有哪些情况是要尽量避免的。

尽管如此，赛后我仍然看到很多对于卡罗尔和亨德森的批评之辞。事实上，看了查理亚当对阵桑德兰那出彩的四十五分钟比赛之后，我倒是对他本场上半场的表现大为失望，但是中场休息之后，一切都运转得不错，所谓致命传球没有全部判断出错（和上半场的情况不同，上半场他的很多传球都中途拦截了。）

上周的亨德森让我想起了奥伊温德-莱昂哈德森：在边路拿球、停球、转身、快速出球，再重复这样的动作。不过那是亨德森的首场比赛，且是对阵培养他成才的老东家，在这种情况下，他表现较为保守是情有可原的。他可以被拉边，但是在对阵阿森纳的比赛中，他被安排在中路位置游走，表现好得多。

纵观两场比赛，他的传球成功率为89%，高得不可思议。即便是对阵阿森纳时他没有给出许多有想法的传球（向前41%，向后27%，向左10%，向右22% @EPLIndex提供的数据）。但是他非常擅长发现空间，然后一脚传球找到队友。如果你可以在对方半场给出快速的一脚触球，那你身上就有一点利物浦的DNA了。

亨德森对阿森纳（开场60分钟）/对桑德兰（替补上场的60分钟）

亨德森对阿森纳，全场90分钟（防守三区突出显示）

注，防守三区，来自英文final third，即攻方前场三分之一区域，也是刘越俗称的“对方30米区域”。
——Rivaldinho

托雷斯对曼城（78分钟替补上场）

我也不是很确定人们到底对安迪卡罗尔抱着这样的期待；不去看他做得好的地方，反而一直有一种“就这样，也值3500万？”的感觉，仿佛他什么都必须十分出色才行。

他肯定还有更大的潜力没有发挥，这一点毫无疑问，但是他在这两场比赛中所做的已经很不错了，而且（他没有发挥完全的）很大一部分要归咎于利物浦并没有诉诸长传给他提供头球的机会。忘记他的价码牌吧，把他的贡献放在球队整体中考察。如果利物浦在有他在场的情况下赢下了很多比赛，那么买他就是对的。

卡罗尔对阿森纳

我只要在推特上一提阿奎罗的名字，立即就有信息向我奔涌而来，说阿奎罗和卡罗尔花费一样。从转会费的角度看，是的，如果工资加上去，那么阿奎罗的周薪至少是卡罗尔的两倍，完全超越了利物浦工资结构的极限。打破工资结构，你就必须给你所有最好的球员加薪，这样一来，引进这一名球员会使球队每年的工资开销增加3000万镑。曼城可以承受巨额工资，利物浦不行。

（最后，利物浦现在还没有欧冠资格，对于球员来说，欧冠就是联赛的世界杯，他们都想踢欧冠。这满足了他们的职业野心也提高了他们的知名度。如果有球员想多赚点钱的话，能够踢欧冠通常也能满足这一点。）

对阵阿森纳，卡罗尔的一个头球被守门员的精彩扑救所化解；卡罗尔头球做给凯利，凯利射门被门柱挡出；亚当一个聪明的传球没有能够找到卡罗尔……虽然这些尝试都失败了，但是从中可以看出他的进攻头脑。唐宁被剥夺的进球也有他的功劳，只是因为一个轻推而被罚，和他对阵桑德兰时的射门一样。（但是阿尔沙文倒是可以双手推搡凯利，恩？裁判大人？）

除此之外，作为单箭头前锋，卡罗尔的对手是能力极强的维尔马伦以及他的各位搭档，他和他们好好对抗了一番。

红军部署出的4-5-1阵型（变阵为4-3-3）的关键是前锋身边的后上接应球员。而卡罗尔就给了达格利什这样的选择（使用451阵型）。

对比一年之前的比赛：联赛第二轮客场挑战曼城（另一场艰难的客场比赛），利物浦排出了锋线扁平的442阵型，用安迪格雷当时的话来说，这个阵型“将让利物浦球迷非常满意” （如果没被横扫的话），因为它比贝尼特斯通常选取的阵型更具进攻性。

利物浦对中场完全没有控制力，或者是场上的其他地方也一样，最后0-3败北。从一月算起，达格利什对阵上个赛季前四名球队取得了四胜一平的成绩，主场战胜曼联曼城，客场击败切尔西阿森纳，再加上一个对阵阿森纳取得的客场平局，这些成绩的取得是在他排出完完全全的双前锋的情况下取得的，苏亚雷斯搭配卡罗尔，两人在整片场地上游走，而没有采取老式的442阵型。

昨天，卡罗尔和亨德森（亨德森的工作是支持9号）一共做出了86个传球，其中73个为成功传球。一年前对阵曼城的比赛中，托雷斯和恩戈格只完成了39次传球，26次成功。

对阵曼城的比赛中，托雷斯的活动区域被安排在恩戈格身后一点的地方，结合他微不足道的七次成功传球，这种安排放在一个在防守三区才能发挥出水平的球员身上真是对时间和空间的浪费。我们再看一年之后，亨德森在酋长球场的成功触球次数是托雷斯的7.6倍，而且需要特别注意的是，是在完全一致的区域内。（托雷斯有73%的触球发生在对方半场，34%在防守三区；亨德森有72%的触球发生在对方半场，32%在防守三区。几乎完全一致。）

对阵曼城的比赛中，恩戈格作为两个相似前锋里更为靠前的一个有78%的触球发生在对方半场，而昨天卡罗尔有84%。

很显然，去年在曼城主场，利物浦在落后之后采取了不同的进攻方式，但是这确实突出了一点，那就是442阵型经常被错误地认为更具进攻性。一支球队的进攻意识和进攻能力不是看场上的前锋数量，而要看一系列综合因素。

利物浦对阿森纳取得胜利的一个关键因素是利物浦在防守三区内做出了更多的射门努力，而反观阿森纳，除了阿尔沙文的传球让范佩西完成一脚射门之外，主队被限制得只能采用外围远射攻门（弗林蓬、纳斯里）。

利物浦的两个球都是在突破进入小禁区之后完成的，包括上半场两个点球点附近命中目标的头球（卡罗尔和亨德森），凯利和唐宁在非常靠里的位置几近破门。（亨德森的头球不算太难，但是库伊特聪明地将球挑起送入禁区，没有停顿，这使得亨德森头球发力攻门变得有难度。）

“命中目标的射门”仍然是一个相当有意义的数据指标——你需要射门才能得分（或者你让球在对方球员身上反弹……），但是从长远角度考虑，能够在防守三区内创造出好的射门命中机会要比持续不断的外围远射更加鼓舞人心。（重要的是质量、而非数量。）

毕竟，利物浦15次射门中有2次来自中线附近，而这样的射门通常都只是浪费时间。然而，除去第一个进球，利物浦在防守三区内有七次射门（三个被精彩扑救所化解，一次击中门框），而阿森纳则有四次。

即便在卡罗尔没有争下球的时候，他也做了他所能做的第二好的事情，他使得对方防守队员很难进行畅通无碍的沟通，从而使对方创造进攻机会变得更难。

看卡罗尔努力在对方后卫身后追球确实会比较恼人，因为他显然不是巅峰时期的托雷斯。作为一个个体，他顶多是西班牙人的弱化版本，不过那笔交易让利物浦同时拿下了超级苏亚雷斯。

利物浦现在有更多选择了，卡罗尔和苏亚雷斯可以搭配贡献出托雷斯一个人能做的事情（尤其是去年我们看到的那个喜怒无常版的托雷斯）。这场比赛中，卡罗尔消磨了对方的防线，苏亚雷斯从中获益，尤其再加上之后红军还在人数上占优。（虽然后者也许不值一提，因为这种事情发生的频率不高，不过考虑到阿森纳以控球为基础的进攻套路，他们有时候人数上落后也可以做得很好。）

阿奎拉尼、恩戈格、鲍尔森和乔科尔被排除在名单之外大概意味着他们很可能在今夏离开。如果在板凳人员不够齐整的时候他们也没有进入阵容之中，那么也许这就是将他们统统送走的时候了。

苏亚雷斯和梅雷莱斯替补出场，但是马克西和斯科特尔坐在板凳上没动，这就显示出我们的板凳还是有一定深度的，不过一到两个新援可以再增加一点分量。

虽然有种种关于英格兰（和苏格兰）球员被带到队中的讨论，芬威集团、科莫利和达格利什最为快速起效的两个签约还是苏亚雷斯和恩里克。苏亚雷斯简直是太棒了，如此坚决，买他简直就不可能出错，而恩里克，在纽卡开了一个不怎么样的头，花时间去适应了英格兰足球，从一个年轻边后卫成长为一位富有经验的25岁球员，无论在前线还是防线他都十分擅长。

在新引进的英国球员中，就目前的情况看唐宁是最为成熟的，但是我们还可以看看其他人能够贡献出什么，虽然大家对他们的转会费总是耿耿于怀。

然而，不管是什么国籍，最为关键的一点是今年的阵容比去年好，去年夏天的七个引援中只有梅雷莱斯还留在十八人大名单当中。（两个英格兰人——乔科尔和孔切斯基很快就被抛在一边了。）

想要参与冠军争夺对于利物浦来说还为时尚早，但是前两场比赛拿下四分——其中包括了客场战胜阿森纳——算得上是一个好的开始，可以在此基础之上向前四发起冲击。我知道我应该在两周之前就这么说，而且突然之间，围绕着季前热身赛果的种种凄惨悲凉情绪似乎已经是很久很久以前的事情了。

colinfirth

其实巴萨这个343只可能偶尔为之，这也侧面看出瓜迪奥拉用兵大胆狠辣的一面。黄潜失去卡索拉之后，他们就没有了边路的攻击支点，博尔哈是伪边前卫真中场核心，卡尼也是个喜欢内收进攻的假边前卫，巴萨只需蒂亚戈稍稍 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-8-31 14:11

说说小马的右边后卫（貌似有过失误，所幸神勇的巴尔德斯将快过的门线之球捞了出来）

以及桑切斯右边锋

可保这一路基本无大碍?

还是佩德罗和阿比达尔左边路，防守要强于右边路？

colinfirth

试着翻译152楼前几段
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题目：巴萨 2-2 ac米兰战术分析：米兰阵型狭窄化挫败巴萨

这虽然是巴塞罗那主导的一场比赛，但是米兰却在第一分钟和最后一分钟分别得分，给在诺坎普主场最后时刻不思进取的巴萨人上了一堂什么叫高效节能的惩罚课。

佩普·瓜迪奥拉排出习以为常的4-3-3阵型，不过用塞尔吉奥·布斯克茨和哈维尔·马斯凯拉诺首发搭档中卫，前面是赛义杜·凯塔作后腰以保护。

马克西·阿莱格里没有派上伊布，而是用帕托首发作突前单刀，卡萨诺在其后支持。安东尼奥· 诺切里诺和蒋禄卡·赞布罗塔也出现在首发阵容中。

分析起来，这是一个奇特的比赛 — — 米兰是如何做好战术工作的？某些方面（非常有效） — — 阵型狭窄化成尖刀状，这利用了巴萨后防缺乏速度的弱点 — — 果然一开场就奏效了，但也许巴塞罗那可以将比赛比分加以超脱。由于瓜迪奥拉大致使用他惯常阵型和战术 （中后卫放在一边，这个问题涵盖了很多最近出现的漏洞），故此还是让我们看看米兰的战术带劲些。