【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人

Penelope

Uruguay 1-1 Peru: Guerrero and Lodeiro the key men as both sides waste chances to win it乌拉圭1-1秘鲁：双方都浪费了取胜机会，而格雷罗和罗德依洛成为关键之人

July 5, 2011


The starting line-ups 双方首发阵容

A more exciting game than many of the previous Copa America contests resulted in another draw. 美洲杯开赛以来更为激动人心的一场比赛，结果又是一场平局。

Oscar Tabarez named his expected side, with all three of his star forwards on the pitch, supported by Nicolas Lodeiro from midfield. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯排出了他中意的阵容，前方是三前锋，之后由中场尼可拉斯-罗德依洛来支持。

Sergio Markarian wasn’t able to call upon Juan Manuel Vargas from the start, and so instead used Yoshimar Yotun, more frequently used as a defender, on the left flank. 塞尔吉奥-马卡连没能让胡安-曼纽尔-瓦伽斯（巴尔加斯）首发，而是代之以更频繁地出任后卫的友石马-约顿担纲左翼重任。

The match was played at a higher tempo than the previous four matches in the tournament, with Uruguay closing down quickly early on, and Peru trying to get the ball forward quickly to Paolo Guerrero upfront. 这场比赛，随着乌拉圭早早地快速推进，而显得比本届杯赛开赛以来前4场气氛都高涨，同时秘鲁队也欲求快速地将球传给突前的帕奥罗-格雷罗。

Uruguay shape

Uruguay’s system was very similar to their formation in the infamous game against Ghana at last summer’s World Cup – two holding players with a more attack-minded player to the left, and Diego Forlan starting central, then dropping deep to drag a centre-back out, usually Alberto Rodriguez. That space wasn’t exploited particularly well by his two fellow forwards, however – Luis Suarez was the closest man to Forlan, with Edinson Cavani staying wide, although the two did switch flanks.

Some good combinations early on came to nothing, and Uruguay suddenly burst into life later in the first half when Lodeiro went from being invisible in the first 20 minutes, to being the game’s key player. He drifted forward unnoticed into great positions in the centre of the pitch, a little like Andres Iniesta does, and looked to get beyond Forlan when the Atletico striker moved away from goal. Exploiting that space helped Uruguay create chances – first Lodeiro seemed to lose track of the ball coming towards him when making a forward run into a great position, but later on he threaded the ball through to Suarez who finished well. Strangely, after that excellent 15-minute spell, Lodeiro was much quieter after half time.

Peru strategy

Peru played a very simple game – they hit direct balls forward to Guerrero, who led the line excellently and brought the two wingers into play well. He most frequently combined with Luis Advincula down the right, although the opening goal cut out any combination play altogether – a huge long ball over the top to Guerrero saw him break the offside trap and round Fernando Muslera to score.

Peru’s other threat came from the long throw of Yotun down the right, but he was mainly focused upon his defensive duties. Maxi Pereira steamed forward from right-back and provided the same attacking thrust he does with Benfica. On the other side, Martin Cacares had a lot of time on the ball with Advincula trying to move central and link up with Guerrero, but is so right-footed that he didn’t really stretch the play as much as he should have – it would have been nice to see Alvaro Pereira used there to provide overlaps, but Tabarez seems to see him more of a wide midfielder than a full-back. Still, Cacares had enough time on the ball to start the move for the goal – but that sums up how much space he had at that point, rather than acting as an advert for his quality in possession.

Second half

The same pattern continued in the second half, although with Lodeiro fading, Uruguay looked less potent. Suarez become more involved, however, and he and Forlan created a good chance that the latter blazed over the bar.

Tabarez’s substitutions didn’t really change the game, with Abel Hernandez and Cristian Rodriguez straight swaps for Cavani and Lodeiro. Uruguay still needed more from left-back, but Pereira remained on the bench.

In fact, it was Peru who grew into the game, and the introduction of Vargas pushed them forward. He replaced Advincula, with Yotun moving to the right and nullifying Cacares.

Vargas’ quality also pushed back Maxi Pereira, and suddenly Peru were well in the game, having simply played defensive, direct football in the first half. Vargas had a couple of efforts that tested Muslera, and then late on his cross found Guerrero at the near post, who headed wide.

Conclusion

A little more excitement here, but there’s still been relatively little tactical interest from the Copa America – we’re still waiting for a game to be won through strategy, or for a manager to change things drastically from the bench. This was a decent game, but basically just the stronger side playing well and then struggling in front of goal, against an underdog getting men behind the ball and then hitting it long for the frontman.

Penelope

15楼参考译文：占位

Penelope

Argentina 0-0 Colombia: another goalless draw阿根廷0-0哥伦比亚：主队破门乏术，又是一场0平局
July 7, 2011


The starting line-ups

The third 0-0 from seven Copa America games so far, as Argentina again struggled.

Sergio Batista made one change from the opening day 0-0 against Bolivia. Marcos Rojo dropped out, with Pablo Zabaleta coming in on the right. Javier Zanetti moved to the left.

Hernan Dario Gomez also made a single change, bringing in Carlos Sanchez for Gutavo Bolivar, a straight swap in midfield.

Argentina had much of the play but failed to create enough chances to get the breakthrough, a common feature of this tournament. Colombia sat back and played on the break, and deserved their point.

Tactics v Messi

Colombia’s first task, of course, was to stop Lionel Messi. Unlike in the opening game against Bolivia, where was up against two holding players, here he was up against a sole deep-lying midfielder who looked to track his movement into deep positions, and therefore had to be more intelligent with his movement, diagonally moving away from goal to collect the ball.

The Colombian centre-backs rarely followed Messi – with the exception of one occasion when Luis Perea came out and harried him in midfield – they instead focused upon sitting deep, not allowing Carles Tevez or Ezequiel Lavezzi to find space in the back four.

With Messi-minding left to Sanchez, this meant that Argentina had 4 v 3 in the midfield when Messi moved deep, a situation they didn’t take full advantage of. A slight problem with a 4-1-4-1 is that when the holding midfielder is taken away from the centre (or if he departs completely, like Pepe in the Champions League semi-final first leg) and the midfield doesn’t drop deeper, there can often be too much space between the lines. Neither Ever Banega nor Esteban Cambiasso moved into that ‘red zone’ often enough – it was (surprisingly) the latter who did find himself in space there on 30 minutes, but Argentina didn’t play the ball to him.

Argentina disjointed

Colombia’s tactics higher up the pitch worked excellently. They let Nicolas Burdisso and Gabriel Milito have time on the ball, confident that neither are technically proficient enough to provide clever passes from the back. Instead, they dropped deep into their own half and pressed as soon as the ball was played into midfield, forcing Cambiasso and Javier Mascherano to return the ball to the back. The two Colombian wide players tracked the full-back, where there was less overlapping than in the first game, with Zabaleta not a great attacker, and Zanetti on the ‘wrong’ flank (albeit somewhere where he is comfortable).

Argentina’s best chance of a goal came from the same method as in the first game – Messi moving deep, then slipping the ball for Lavezzi between Mario Yepes and Pablo Armero. Again, Lavezzi’s movement was good but his end product was poor. On the opposite flank, Tevez still looks unsuited to that wide role – having played as a false nine all season, he seems more comfortable receiving the ball with his back to goal and moving towards play – and with Messi doing broadly the same thing, Argentina’s only real method of penetration was from Lavezzi.

Colombia breaks

Colombia were threatening throughout the game on the counter-attack, particularly with the two wide players moving inside and the full-backs overlapping – both Armero and Juan Zuniga have been very impressive in the two Colombia games in the competition so far. Argentina’s defence looks incredibly prone to pace – and considering Argentina are generally on the attack, Gabriel Milito and Nicolas Burdisso are high up the pitch, leaving lots of space in behind. Their first reaction when Argentina lose the ball is to back off quickly towards their own goal, which in turn leaves Mascherano stranded and forced to cover a lot of space by himself. It’s rather surprising that Argentina haven’t conceded a goal from open play in this tournament yet.

Batista tried to change things in the second half, first with Fernando Gago and Sergio Aguero straight swaps for Cambiasso and Lavezzi, then with Gonzalo Higuain on for Banega, and more of a 4-2-1-3. Argentina didn’t really get any better, and Batista will surely be forced into changes for the final game of the group phase.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming match – the tactical interest here came from Colombia’s tactics. The way they pressed the ball coming into midfield worked well, and by not allowing their centre-backs to be dragged out of the back, Argentina rarely looked likely to break through their defence.

Argentina’s side was almost unchanged from the first game, and their problems remain the same.

Penelope

24楼参考译文
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阿根廷 0-0 哥伦比亚：破门乏术，阿根廷继续沉沦
July 7, 2011

两队首发

截止至目前的七场美洲杯比赛中的第三场平局，阿根廷依然没能找回自己的强队风范。

相比揭幕战对阵玻利维亚时的阵容，塞尔吉奥-巴蒂斯塔只做出了一处变动。尼古拉斯-罗霍无缘首发，帕布罗-萨巴莱塔出任右边后卫。哈维尔-萨内蒂则被换到了左闸位置。

埃尔南-达里奥-戈麦斯同样有一处调整，在中场用卡洛斯-桑切斯直接取代了与其位置相同的古塔沃-玻利瓦尔。

阿根廷在控球时间上占据了很大优势，但却并未创造出多少打破僵局的机会，这也是本届杯赛迄今几场的普遍特征之一。哥伦比亚则采取了稳守反击的策略，他们的表现配得上这场平局。

遏制梅西

哥伦比亚的首要任务无疑是遏制梅西的发挥。与首战玻利维亚时被两名后腰夹击不同，此次他所要应付的是一名专职的拖后中场，其任务便是在他回撤时保持如影随形，因此，他必须以更加聪明的跑动方式，沿斜线方向远离球门拿球。

除了路易斯-佩雷亚的一次中场破坏之外，哥伦比亚中后卫几乎从不紧逼梅西，相反，他们专注于收缩防守，不给卡洛斯-特维斯和埃泽奎尔-拉维奇留下在四名后卫之间觅得空当的机会。

在桑切斯一心盯防梅西的情况下，只要梅西回撤，阿根廷即可形成中场四打三的局面，但这一优势并未得到他们的充分利用。四一四一阵型中一个细微的问题是：若单后腰被带离中路（或与中场其他球员完全脱节，例如欧冠半决赛首回合中的佩佩），且其他中场球员没有随之后移，则中场首尾之间便会出现严重的真空。但埃维尔-巴内加和伊斯特班-坎比亚索出现在此“危险区域”里的次数却都不够多——而当第三十分钟，后者在这里跑出空当的时候，队友们又（令人诧异的）没有及时送上传球。

阿根廷混乱无章

哥伦比亚的前场战术效果显著。他们放任尼古拉斯-布尔迪索和加布里埃尔-米利托拿球，自信此二人皆不具备从后场策动攻势的技术水准。相反，他们稳守本方半场，一旦球至中场便立刻展开紧逼，迫使坎比亚索和哈维尔-马斯切拉诺回传防线。两名哥伦比亚边路球员时刻跟住对方边后卫，鉴于萨巴莱塔攻击力有限，而萨内蒂处在“逆边”（尽管他在这里踢得非常舒服），这两个位置的插上次数比第一场有所下降。

阿根廷最好的一次进球机会来自于和首场如出一辙的战术——梅西回撤，将球塞给正好处在马里奥-耶佩斯和帕布罗-阿梅罗之间的拉维奇。拉维奇的跑位照旧不错，可惜机会再次断送在了他的临门一脚上。另一侧，特维斯依然未能适应边路的位置——整季都担任伪九号的他看起来更习惯于背身拿球后再向前推进——而梅西的技术特点也是如此，于是，拉维奇就成了阿根廷唯一的冲击力来源。

哥伦比亚的反击

整场比赛里，哥伦比亚的反击一直都颇具威胁，尤其是当边前卫内收，边后卫插上的时候——截止至目前，阿梅罗和胡安-祖尼加在哥伦比亚的两场比赛中均发挥得十分出色。阿根廷的防线在速度面前显得极为脆弱——而且，由于阿根廷在大部分时间里都是进攻一方，加布里埃尔-米利托和尼古拉斯-布尔迪索的站位相当靠前，在身后留下了大片的空间。一旦阿根廷失去球权，两人的第一反应便是迅速撤向球门，而马斯切拉诺则会因此被置于只能独当一面的困境之中。本届杯赛开幕至今，阿根廷还没有在运动战中失球其实是一个相当诡异的现象。

下半场，巴蒂斯塔试图作出调整，先是用费尔南多-加戈和塞尔吉奥-阿奎罗换下对位的坎比亚索和拉维奇，继而又派冈萨洛-伊瓜因上场顶替巴内加，使阵型更接近于四二一三。然而，阿根廷的表现并未有任何实质性的提升，小组赛最后一场，巴蒂斯塔必须让一切有所改变。

结论

又（为什么是又）一场无趣的比赛——值得一提的战术现象多来自哥伦比亚一方。他们在球至中场时的施压策略收效很好，此外，其中后卫从不轻易离开自己位置的策略让阿根廷鲜有撕破其防守的机会。

与首场比赛相比，阿根廷队几乎没有任何变化，一切问题照旧存在。

Penelope

Set-pieces dominate the first week of the Copa
美洲杯小组赛第一轮，定位球破门是主导

July 7, 2011



For a tournament often hailed for its flair and unpredictability, the Copa America has clearly been lacking excitement.

So far, the goals per game count stands at a pathetic eight, from seven matches. That gives a goals per game rate of just 1.14 – roughly half the goals per game rate of last summer’s World Cup, where the figure was 2.27. There have been three 0-0s, and only Chile have scored more than once.

Further analysis of the method of the goals reveals that – five of the eight goals have been scored from set-pieces. Only three have been from open play – Javi Guerrero’s cool finish after a long ball against Uruguay, Luis Suarez’s quick shot in that same game against Peru, and Adrian Ramos’ winner against Costa Rica.

The other five goals have come quickly after set pieces. The ratio of goals scored from dead ball scenarios is generally between 30-40%, but so far in this tournament it is 62.5%.

It’s not as if teams are actually scoring a greater number of goals from set plays, simply a greater proportion. To take a ‘normal’ number of goals per game (let’s take the ratio of the World Cup, 2.27) and multiply that by the number of games so far (7), we could have expected 15.89 goals.

Since the ‘normal’ percentage of goals scored from set-plays is 30-40%, we would have expected to have seen between 4.77 and 6.34 goals from set-plays so far. The figure of five is nothing unusual.

The problem, of course, is those goals have been obvious as there have been few goals scored from other methods. Three goals in seven games from open play is a disastrous figure – and whilst defensive organisation should get some of the credit, it’s been obvious that the main problem has been a lack of creativity.

Too many sides are depending upon one player (Lionel Messi, Ganso) for creating chances, rather than possessing a number of skilful players in the side to play key passes. The most exciting side so far, Chile, have been the side who have attacked with the greatest number of players – they’re also the only side to score two goals, and the only side to win a game against eleven men. And yet, even Chile’s two goals both came from set-pieces.

Hopefully managers will pick a greater number of players in the second week and the Copa will improve, as this is a worrying trend.

Penelope

26楼参考译文
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由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

美洲杯第一周 定位球是关键

美洲杯因其人才济济，充满不确定性而盛名在外，但现在的它明显缺乏激情。

到目前为止7场比赛的进球数只有可怜兮兮的8个，这使得场均进球才1.14个——大概是去年夏天世界杯场均进球的一半左右，当时是2.27个。目前有3场0-0，只有智利打入了一球以上。

对进球的进一步分析得，8球中有5球来自定位球，只有3球是运动战进球——对阵乌拉圭时格雷罗拿到长传后一个漂亮的击杀，苏亚雷斯在同一场比赛中攻入秘鲁大门的快速一击，以及对阵哥斯达黎加时拉莫斯的制胜球。

其他5个进球都是发定位球后很快就得分了。从死球开出后的得分的比例大概在30~40%，而目前美洲杯的比例是62.5%。

这实际上并不是球队们从定位球中获得更多的进球，单单只是一个更高的数据比例而已。用场均的“正常”进球数（就用世界杯的2.27吧），乘以目前的比赛场数（7），我们本应该能看到15.89个的。

既然从定位球得分的“正常”比例是30~40%，我们期望的定位球进球在4.77到6.34个之间，目前的5个没啥出人意料的。

这些进球存在的问题很明显，当然是从其他手段进的球太少了。7场比赛3个运动战进球，这个数据简直就是灾难性——防守端因此可以获得掌声，但同时最主要的毛病也是明摆着的：他们很缺乏创造力。

许多球队都过于依赖某一个球员（梅西，甘索）来创造机会，而阵中没有一批技术好的球员来完成关键的传递。目前最令人兴奋的球队智利，是调动球员参与进攻人数最多的——他们也是唯一一支攻入两球的球队，唯一一支对手11人全勤也获胜的球队。但是，就连智利的两个进球也是来自定位球。

希望第二周的比赛中，教练们能排出一批更出色的球员，美洲杯的比赛能更为好看，目前的情势可着实让人担心

Penelope

乌拉圭是不断在三、四后卫中进行切换

智利的三后卫就相对明显一点

实际上智利队在防守阵型中也经常变成四后卫，后腰梅德尔的位置会回收到庞塞的身边，作为一名上抢的中卫 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-10 10:57

看来南美人都爱玩很潮的战术？

Penelope

Argentina 3-0 Costa Rica: Batista finally changes system, and Argentina progressJuly 12, 2011


The starting line-ups

A much-changed Argentina side finally got a win, mainly thanks to some Lionel Messi magic.

Sergio Batista gave first starts to Gonzalo Higuain, Angel di Maria, Fernando Gago and Sergio Aguero. Carlos Tevez, Ezequiel Lavezzi, Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso dropped out.

Ricardo La Volpe brought in Jose Cubero and Cesar Elizondo in midfield, and their shape was similar to their opening day defeat to Colombia.

Argentina were utterly dominant here, recording 17 shots to Costa Rica’s five, becoming the first side in the competition to score three goals in a game.

Costa Rica tactics

Costa Rica sat deep without the ball in a broad 3-5-1-1 system, vaguely similar to the unusual shape North Korea contested last year’s World Cup with, albeit a more attack-minded version than that.

As in the game against Colombia, there was lots of movement, particularly down the left side of the team. Francisco Calvo, Pedro Leal and Cesar Elizondo often seemed to be playing in the same position, such was their tendency to cover each other on runs forward. On the other side, the right-sided midfielder Heiner Mora played much narrower, and the wing-back Jose Salvatierra was pinned back by Aguero.

Argentina shape

The main story in this game was all about Argentina’s new shape, however. Having persevered with the Barcelonaesque 4-3-3 in the opening two games – with little success – Batista’s radically-changed XI was expected to line up in a 4-2-1-3 shape, with Lionel Messi in the hole. This has generally been Batista’s plan B, although a more boxy 4-4-1-1 was also predicted by some.

In fact, it was neither of those shapes – it was a strange, lopsided system that was vaguely a diagonal 4-2-2-2, but featured so much fluidity and movement from the attacking players that it’s difficult to give it a definitive name. Javier Mascherano sat deep in his usual role, with Gago slightly in front of him, to his right. Di Maria was generally in the centre of the pitch in an attacking role, but retreated to become a third midfielder without the ball.

Further forward, Aguero moved around but generally stayed on the left flank, whilst Messi played as a number ten, and Higuain was a traditional centre-forward. All this meant that Argentina didn’t really have anyone on the right – both Messi and Higuain took it in turns to move out to that side, but with right-back Pablo Zabaleta hardly the most technically gifted defender, they lacked an outlet from that position.

Out-and-out striker

Having struggled so far without a permanent frontman, Argentina looked delighted to have an obvious reference point upfront, emphasised by the fact that they looked direct to Higuain for a half-chance within the opening thirty seconds of the game. Like Brazil, Argentina have attempted to play without a true striker – as if the fluidity enjoyed by Barcelona (and others who use a false nine) is a must for any side to play beautiful football.

That may be the ideal, but with little time on the training ground to work on attacking moves and combination play, it appears difficult for international sides to play without a true striker. Just as Brazil turned to Fred to save them against Paraguay, Argentina relied on Higuain here – the centre-forward is being treated as something of a ‘get out of jail free’ card.

In truth, Higuain had a shocking game in front of goal. Messi constantly teed him up for chances, only for the Real Madrid striker to slice the ball over, to fire straight at the goalkeeper, or to miss the ball completely, as he did when presented with a point-blank cross from Messi in the first half.

Messi influence

The key, though, was that Messi was involved. In the first two games, he only had two options – to run with the ball, or to play a through-ball for Lavezzi in the outside-right position. Tevez came inside into his space, and often wasn’t a worthwhile passing option. Here, he had more clear passes ‘on’ – Aguero was the wide forward Messi could look to in order to spread the play, Higuain was the man making runs over the top and providing a physical presence, and Di Maria broke forward from midfield far better than Banega did in the opening two games, connecting midfield and attack.

More crucially, Messi’s role allowed him to find space, and he could run at the ball with speed. Part of this may be simply the fact that he was up against an U23 version of a side ranked 53rd in the World, and perhaps we should expect a good performance from the World’s best player in these circumstances. However, there was an improvement in the way he received the ball – when playing as a false nine he always had his back to goal and was moving away from the danger zone (with only one player, Lavezzi, running towards it) and in the 4-2-1-3, he was picking up the ball deeper than the opposition’s two holding players, again, far too deep.

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This position seemed a happy medium – Di Maria was the man who brought the ball forward from midfield so Messi didn’t have to, and Higuain provided the battering ram presence to occupy the centre-backs. Higuain’s role also worked in a similar way to Javier Hernandez’s at Manchester United, in the way Hernandez forces the opposition to defend deep, opening up space for Wayne Rooney in the whole. Higuain doesn’t quite have that searing pace, but the concept is the same – the centre-backs’ first thought was not Messi, but the centre-forward.

The first goal was lucky – Aguero tapped home an open goal after a deflection and a rebound – but the second and third were excellent, and both involved Messi picking the ball up, running with it, and slipping the ball through to a left-sided attacker to finish – first Aguero, then Di Maria. The runs from the latter two are exactly what Tevez didn’t do, and exactly what Messi wants and enjoys at club level. Having strived to replicate Barcelona-spec Messi by copying Pep Guardiola’s formation, Batista seems to have found Messi’s best form by ditching it entirely.

Conclusion

Argentina have finally arrived. The quality of their performance shouldn’t be overstated considering the standard of opposition, but then Costa Rica put in decent performances against Colombia and Bolivia.The Costa Ricans often defended with nine players behind the ball, and Argentina created enough chances to justify praise of their system.

Batista now has to make a decision about his next line-up – Higuain’s finishing was terrible, yet he played an important part in the way the team played. An unchanged line-up wouldn’t be a surprise, although opposition with a strong left side would relish the lack of protection afforded to Zabaleta.

For Costa Rica, this tournament was purely a learning experience, and they may be out. If so, they’ve acquitted themselves admirably…but a Venezuela win over Paraguay would see them progress to the knockout stage.

Penelope

56楼参考译文：占位

Penelope

56# Penelope  

“Messi picking the ball up, running with it, and slipping the ball through to a left-sided attacker to finish – first Aguero, then Di Maria. The runs from the latter two are exactly ...
ychee 发表于 2011-7-13 19:19

是的，左边后卫留下的空档是个风险。

小组第一场丢球，就源于在这个位置的对手一个任意球开始。

10世界杯对阵德国时被动也始于，尽管具体原因不同，但共同的一点均是防守不力造成的。

巴西队被巴拉圭打得很被动，阿尔维斯攻上流下的空档也是如此。

对了，谁先一味埋头进攻就有先丢球的风险，且大。

委内瑞拉与巴拉圭一战，委内瑞拉7分钟不到就先进球了，但是巴拉圭先攻势汹汹

Penelope

Uruguay 1-0 Mexico: Uruguay’s pressing leads to dominance, and progression to the knockouts乌拉圭1-0墨西哥：乌队压迫占据主动和优势因而取胜得以晋级淘汰赛
July 13, 2011


The starting line-ups

Alvaro Pereira’s scrappy goal set up a quarter-final showdown with Argentina. 阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚混战中进球为乌拉圭谋得C组第二，将在1/4决赛中与阿根廷队较量。

Oscar Tabarez dropped Edinson Cavani and Martin Caceres, bringing in Alvaro Gonzalez and Cristian Rodriguez either side of a narrow 4-4-1-1, moving Alvaro Pereira to left-back. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯首发阵容中撤下艾丁森-卡瓦尼和马丁-卡塞雷斯，换上阿尔瓦罗-贡萨雷斯和克里斯蒂安-罗德里格斯出任两边翼，形成前窄的4-4-1-1阵形，其中将阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚移到左边卫位置上。

Luis Fernando Tena made one change, with Miguel Ponce replacing Javier Aquiano. Mexico also lined up in a broad 4-4-1-1 system, with Giovani dos Santos behind Rafael ‘Lugo’ Marquez.

Uruguay played far better than in their previous two games, and only wastefulness in front of goal prevented them from recording a greater victory.

Mexico are now out, and Tena’s main priority here was to give experience to his young squad – the half time removal of his two most established players, dos Santos and Paul Aguilar (neither of whom had endured a bad first half) when Mexico were chasing the game at half time, indicated that his tactics were not primarily based around winning the game. Instead, we’ll focus on Uruguay, and their improvement.

Pressing

With the exception of Chile throughout the competition, Uruguay put on the best display of pressing we’ve seen at the Copa America. Diego Forlan and Luis Suarez worked tirelessly from the front, and it helped that the formations were ‘matched’, so Uruguay’s players each had a man to close down.

Mexico sometimes got out of the press when Diego Reyes moved deeper, but Forlan was happy to continue closing down in that deeper position, and Mexico rarely got out of their own half.

Width from left-back

A complaint in ZM’s report on Uruguay’s first game, against Peru, was that Cacares at left-back displayed little attacking prowess, mainly because he is very right-footed and therefore had problems stretching the play. The use of Alvaro Pereira at left-back, rather than in the left-sided midfield role he more frequently takes up at international level, effectively solved this problem. The use of a narrow midfield four meant that the possibility of overlapping runs was important – although as it happened, the early lead through Pereira’s goal meant that Uruguay’s full-backs took up more conservative positions.

The goal was a scrappy tap-in from a set-piece, but it means Pereira how has a record of five goals in 30 international appearances, a decent record for someone in his position(s). It will also boost his confidence and make Tabarez likely to stick with him for the game against Argentina – potentially crucial, considering how Sergio Batista effectively played without a right-winger in the win over Costa Rica.

Forlan drops deep + wide midfielders run on

A little like Gonzalo Higuain the previous evening, Forlan’s contribution to the shape of the side compensates for a poor game in front of goal – he’s had more shots than any other player at the Copa, but is yet to score. He moved into very deep positions to pick up the ball – and although he’d done this in previous games, here he had two midfield runners who looked to exploit the space, and therefore there was more fluidity and cohesion to Uruguay’s attacking movement. Suarez also seemed happy as an out-and-out striker, working the channels and moving to both flanks.

The other effect of the two wide players coming inside was to flood the centre of the pitch, a little like the way Villarreal play. This helped them keep possession for long periods, and ultimately resulted in chances being created.

Two holders + man-marking

As usual, Diego Perez and Egidio Arevalo worked brilliantly in the centre of the pitch, scrapping and breaking up play ahead of the centre-back. At the World Cup and Copa America, Tabarez has used 4-4-2, 3-5-2, 4-4-1-1, 4-3-3, 3-4-3 and a lopsided 4-4-2 diamond – but has never broken up the Perez-Arevalo combination.

At the back, Diego Lugano and Sebastian Coates tracked their respective strikers a long way across the pitch, often swapping side as they did so because of the movement of dos Santos and Marquez. Coates had another good game.

Conclusion

Just as Argentina finally found form after making sweeping changes, Uruguay have done similar. In terms of personnel it was less dramatic – only two changes – but with Pereira changing position too, plus a different shape to the way the front two played, it was a vastly different Uruguay side as a whole.

The game with Argentina will be interesting, particularly in terms of how Tabarez deals with Messi – the Perez-Arevalo combination will be needed more than ever. As always with Tabarez, however, the rest of the side is entirely up for debate – which means it should be a fascinating tactical battle.

Penelope

62楼的参考译文：占位

Penelope

Uruguay 2-0 Peru: Tabarez changes formation again to take Uruguay to the final
July 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

Luis Suarez scored two second half goals in a confident Uruguayan performance.

Oscar Tabarez was without Diego Perez, so Napoli’s Walter Gargano took his place. Sebastien Coates returned at centre-back.

Sergio Markarian brought in Giancarlo Carmona for Renzo Revorendo, and Yoshimar Yotun for William Chiroque.

With both sides contesting the quarter-finals as underdogs and both used to playing reactive football in this competition, much of the game was something of a stalemate, with neither side committing enough players into attack to overload the opposition.

Formations

There were a couple of surprises in the formations. Markarian decided to use Juan Vargas higher up in close support of Paolo Guerrero, in a formation that could vaguely be described as 4-1-3-1-1, with Adam Balbin sitting ahead of the back four and keeping an eye on Diego Forlan.

With the exception of the two changes, which were essentially like-for-like swaps due to suspension, Tabarez kept the same XI players that had played a 4-4-1-1 against Argentina. He shifted his side into a back three, however, taking advantage of Martin Caceres’ versatility, and the energy of his two wing-backs. Coates was a spare man at the back, and Egidio Arevalo played as a sole holding player, rather than in the double pivot he’s used to. Walter Gargano played as a left-sided carrilero, with he and Alvaro Gonzalez moving out to close down the opposition full-backs.

Spare man

As we’ve discussed countless times before, a back three is generally favoured against a two-man strikeforce, in order to retain a spare man at the back. Peru had played one upfront in their previous game, though, and a similar shape in the meeting between the two sides. Vargas was advanced, but not quite as advanced as he was in this game. Tabarez’s other reason for using a back three – as an all-out defensive system, as against France last year – was surely not the reason here.

As it happens, the more advanced positioning of Vargas meant that Uruguay’s system worked quite well. Diego Lugano stepped out of the back to mark Vargas – although Luagano probably had to come higher up the pitch than he would have liked – and Coates swept up behind. The only slight confusion was about whether Cacares or Alvaro Pereira picked up Luis Advincula – and a late run into the box from him in the first half was probably Peru’s best chance of a goal. Like in the win over Colombia, Guerrero played to the left of the pitch to try and link up with Vargas, which meant Caceres wasn’t picking him up, as you would expect against a traditional front two.

Areas of strength

The idea in a battle between two different formations is to maximise your advantage in one particular area of the pitch. Uruguay did so with their spare man at the back – Fernando Muslera had little to do – but Peru failed to make the most of their free players, the full-backs. They had no direct opponent, but their attacking contribution was very little. They should have either come forward, linked up with the wide midfielders and played 2 v 1s down the flanks, or focused on drawing Gonzalez and Arevalo out to the flanks, then exploiting the space in the middle of the pitch (or down the other flank, as either of those two players tucked in).

Another option would have been to drop Vargas a little deeper and then focus on possession, overpowering Uruguay in the middle of the pitch, giving them a surplus at the back. In the end, Peru basically played into the hands of Tabarez.

Suarez

The Uruguay manager will have been content with how the game was developing – he had the safety-first approach of keeping things tight at the back, then wa confident Suarez could nick a goal – or two – upfront. Suarez replicated his role against Argentina – which was essentially to be an irritant, to run his legs off, to buy free-kicks and to work the channels. His movement to the flanks was possibly another reason why the Peruvian full-backs were so reserved, and he topped off this performance with two good finishes.

That, combined with Vargas’ red card, wrapped things up fairly early. On that note, by the second half Tabarez switched Lugano and Coates, which meant the former swept up, and the latter was the man coming up to meet Vargas – hence why he got the Fiorentina man’s elbow into his face.

Conclusion

Tabarez changes his shape frequently – this was an interesting game because Uruguay were the favourites, and therefore there was some speculation he might take the lead, forget about nullifying the opposition and focus upon his attacking strengths. No chance – it was another reactive (but excellent) display of tactics.

Markarian has done excellently to reach this stage, but Peru’s performance here was poor. The lack of any meaningful contribution from the full-backs was the main problem – those two were content to defend, when they should have been helping stretch Uruguay.

Penelope

128楼参考译文：占位

Penelope

Japan 2-2 United States (AET): Japan win their first ever Women’s World Cup
July 20, 2011


The starting line-ups

Japan came back from 1-0 and 2-1 down to triumph on penalties.

Norio Sasaki kept an unchanged team from the side which overcame Sweden in the semi-final.

Pia Sundhage made a couple of changes. Rachel Buehler replaced Becky Sauerbrunn at centre-back, and Megan Rapinoe came in for Amy Rodriguez, with Lauren Cheney moving upfront.

This was an entertaining game that took a strange pattern – Japan dominated possession (53%) but had significantly fewer attempts on goal (14 to 27), and the US are the side who will feel they should have won the game in normal time.

Overall framework

The tactical battle here was, on paper, very simple. Two 4-4-2s – with some modifications – lined up against each other, and that was broadly how the formations remained for the entire game. This not inherently a very tactical battle.

However, this produced a very open game, even if the scoreline at the end of normal time doesn’t reflect the number of chances. The key factor was the positioning of the wide players – although they sometimes picked each other up when the ball was dead, as attacks formed the battles were more frequently wingers v full-backs than wingers v wingers, and with neither side having a spare man at the back, any quick passing combinations that bypassed an opponent, or any runs on the ball that beat a single player, often resulted in chances.

Different approaches

Japan’s wide players came inside and tried to move into the ‘red zone’ in the centre between the US lines of midfield and defence, and in that respect they played a little like Villarreal. They also benefited from the movement into deep areas of Kozue Ando, who was involved in more good link-up play than either of the US forwards.

That showed the contrast in styles in this match. Japan were much more patient, favouring slow build-up play and clever through-balls towards the forwards. The US were more direct, and had a more obvious and successful gameplan, to hit Japan with pace and power. They had a decent chance in the opening minute through Cheyney, who exploited the lack of pace in the Japanese backline (in particular, Izusa Iwashimizu), which was a dangerous tactic when playing so high up the pitch.

Morgan introduction

Cheney’s intelligent runs into the channels were very dangerous, and it was a slight surprise when she was replaced by perennial supersub Alex Morgan at half time, especially when Sundhage had the option of pushing Cheney to the left of midfield to accommodate Morgan upfront.*

It turned out to be an inspired move, however, because Morgan was the game’s best player for the final 75 minutes of the match. Just as Cheney had threatened from balls over the top early on, Morgan’s goal was another simple situation with sheer pace getting past a high line, only this time with an emphatic finish.

Midfield battle

The presence of only four central midfielders meant that this area of the pitch was open for forward runs. Carli Lloyd broke forward to have numerous (generally inaccurate) shots from the edge of the box early on, whilst Japanese captain Homare Sawa grew in stature as the game went on – she drove the side forward, with Mizuho Sakaguchi playing a more disciplined holding role alongside her.

For a side so intent to play pretty football, it was something of a surprise that Japan got their equaliser purely through sheer panic in the US defence, and a scrappy finish from Aya Miyama, who had come inside into a goalscoring position. Sasaki deserves credit for encouraging his wide players into the middle of the pitch – the knock-on effect was that the full-backs had space to motor into, and were more of a force in the game than the US full-backs, who remained more conservative. In fact, the way Japan shuffled across the pitch to create space for their overlapping full-backs was very similar to the way their men’s side shifted to create space for Atsuto Uchida and Yuto Nagatomo at this year’s Asian Cup, which they also won.

Extra time

Extra time was more balanced than normal time, with the US’ dominance less obvious. Fitness levels started to come into the equation, and with Japan much better at retaining the ball and tiring the US players, they looked more confident.

The key player was still Morgan, however. She produced two good crosses from the left flank in succession, the second of which was headed in by Wambach. This was another dimension Morgan provided – she is left-footed and could move across to that flank and deliver good balls into the box, something that had happened relatively rarely considering the wingers were coming inside.

Japan’s second equaliser came from a corner, converted by Sawa – but that corner was won by another great forward run from right-back Yukari Kinga, demonstrating the importance of bringing full-backs into play.

Morgan still could have been the hero – an excellent run from the right channel put her through on goal, and but for Iwashimizu denying her a clear goalscoring opportunity with a foul, it could have been 3-2. That was in the 120th minute, fully 120 minutes after Iwashimizu had first looked troubled by pace. It went to penalties, where Japan were much more composed.

Conclusion

Overall this game was relatively uninteresting tactically – two 4-4-2s. The more specific aspects of the game provided more excitement – particularly the introduction of Morgan (the only brave decision either manager took in the 120 minutes), which changed the game and should have been enough for the US to take victory.

Penelope

130楼参考译文：占位