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【10-11 ZM专贴】280L:替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

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51#
发表于 2011-4-22 09:26:14 | 显示全部楼层
热刺,这次可以说帮了曼联大忙,当然他们自己还想下赛季打欧冠的话,就得再拼命一些
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52#
发表于 2011-4-22 09:27:57 | 显示全部楼层
乌迪内斯这个队战术素养很不错,比赛中频繁切换于三后卫和四后卫之间,圭多林的战术变化也比较多
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-4-22 09:15


拉维奇要能进1球,也许对主队士气有帮助。卡尼浪费机会也太多
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53#
发表于 2011-4-22 10:15:42 | 显示全部楼层
势单力薄打欧冠,比吃毒药还厉害?呵呵
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54#
发表于 2011-4-24 20:53:00 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-27 11:46 编辑

Manchester United 1-0 Everton: United dominate but leave it late
April 23, 2011


The starting line-ups

Another poacher’s goal from Javier Hernandez, and another late victory for Manchester United.

Sir Alex Ferguson made many changes to his side, bringing in Darron Gibson and Johnny Evans for rare starts. Wayne Rooney played off Javier Hernandez.

David Moyes was without Johnny Heitinga, so brought Jack Rodwell into the central midfield zone alongside Phil Neville, with Tony Hibbert at right-back. Tim Cahill was on the bench.

The game went through three distinct stages: (a) in the first half, United were all over Everton and should have scored a few goals (b) for the first twenty minutes of the second, the game was much more even and (c) Ferguson’s substitutions helped United stamp their authority on the match once again in the final stages.

United dominance

In the first half, the ball spent barely any time in Manchester United’s half of the pitch. The tactical battle was almost entirely about United’s front four against Everton’s defence and two holding midfielders – and though United frequently found space and created promising situations, their final ball into the box was often wasteful.

Everton have generally got things right away from home against the top sides this season – when Gareth Bale mania was in full force, Moyes produced a clever plan to nullify Tottenham at White Hart Lane, he set up very well at the Emirates to deny Arsenal the dominance they’re used to at home – before Everton faded late on, his tactics away at Manchester City produced a great defensive display and a 2-1 win, and he also beat Chelsea in the FA Cup at Stamford Bridge.


United tried to play down their right, exploiting the space behind Leighton Baines

Here, however, they had problems in the first half, and Their main problems stemmed from the pace of Hernandez. Everton are usually good at keeping it tight between the lines, but the Mexican’s sheer pace forced Phil Jagielka and Sylvain Distin deeper. (They would also have been well aware that they were opened up by United earlier in the season at Goodison Park by Dimitar Berbatov running onto a through ball and finishing well, so they quickly dropped deep.)

Of course, this opened up space for Rooney, who played ‘in the hole’, in the role he’s mastered in recent weeks, particularly in the games against Chelsea. Phil Neville was Everton’s deepest midfielder, to the right, and Jack Rodwell moved higher up the pitch towards the left, so Rooney found space by moving into the inside-right channel, between the lines. Rodwell was slow to close Rooney down.

In fact, most of Everton’s problems occurred in that zone of the pitch. Leighton Baines is one of Everton’s best attacking threats, but as we’ve noted throughout the season, Everton are also vulnerable down that side of the pitch defensively. As Baines tried to move forward into the attack, both Rooney and Hernandez moved in behind, and United were keen to hit balls into that space – see the opportunity for Nani that came after Antonio Valencia outmuscled Baines.

Nani was disappointing – Tony Hibbert looked vulnerable early on but eventually got into the game and defended well. Nani can play on either side, but he remains much better on the right – when used on the left, he’s too keen to come inside and use his right foot, making him much more predictable. His delivery here was poor.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Second half

Moyes got little from Jermaine Beckford or Diniyar Bilyaletdinov, so brought on Victor Anichebe with Tim Cahill just off him. Anichebe moved to the left and helped pin back Fabio, whilst Leon Osman on that side also did a good defensive job. With John O’Shea hardly a great attacking outlet on the other side, United were much less dangerous with less drive from full-back.

Rodwell also picked up his game and was much more aware of Rooney’s movement in behind him. He couldn’t afford to drop goalside of Rooney and completely concede the midfield battle to United, so instead worked on preventing balls from the midfielders and full-backs being played into Rooney. United suddenly looked a little nervous, and Everton held the ball better.

United rally late on

A couple of factors combined to get United back in the game. Fitness was key – on a very hot day, United had 61% of possession, and Everton had to work very hard without the ball. Equally important, though, was United’s ability to change the game from the bench.

Michael Owen and Ryan Giggs came on for Nani and Gibson in the most eye-catching moves, but equally important was Patrice Evra’s introduction for O’Shea. With first Nani and then Rooney playing on the left and always looking to bring the ball inside, Evra stretched the play, made United more dynamic when spreading play to the flanks (Anderson should be praised for consistently good, positive diagonal balls) and from 70 minutes onwards they were all over Everton again.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Despite all the changes, it was Valencia down the right, the main battleground early on in the game, that produced the goal. He put pressure on Distin to win the ball, dragged the Frenchman out to the flank, and then his deflected cross found Hernandez at the far post for what we can start to call a ‘classic’ Hernandez goal.

Conclusion

A few changes established United’s position in the ascendency, but equally their persistence and commitment to their usual tactics – get the ball out wide, and get men into the box – proved crucial at the end of the game. The good movement from Hernandez, Owen and Rooney inside the penalty area was particularly notable.

Moyes’ switches midway through the game allowed Everton to compete – but making two changes so early meant he couldn’t react to United’s three attack-minded substitutions in the second half.
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55#
发表于 2011-4-24 20:58:34 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-24 21:06 编辑

196楼参考译文
---------------------------------------

2011-04-24 / 挂居



埃尔南德斯再次神奇抢点,曼联再次在比赛的最后时刻进球。

爵爷大幅度调整阵容,吉布森和埃文斯都罕见地首发了。鲁尼在锋线上搭档埃尔南德斯,游弋在后者身后。

海廷加无法上次,莫耶斯用罗德维尔和小内维尔组成中场,右后卫是希伯特。卡希尔在替补名单中。

比赛可以分成三段:(A) 上半场,曼联对埃弗顿成围攻之势,他们本应获得不少的进球 (B)下半场前20分钟,双方还比较均势 (C) 弗格森的换人改变了局面,帮助球队在最后时刻取得胜利。

曼联的统治

在上半场,比赛很少在曼联的半场进行,完全是红魔的前场四人组和埃弗顿的四名后卫加两名后腰之间的攻防演练,虽然曼联经常找到空间并创造出机会,但禁区内的临门一脚总是浪费掉了。

埃弗顿非常善于在客场和顶级球队周旋。在贝尔状态最好的时候,莫耶斯准备了一个聪明的战术让热刺在白鹿巷吃瘪,也可以在酋长球场让阿森纳无法打出平时在主场的那种控制足球,尽管最后丢球了。他们作客曼城,打出了非常好的防守表现,并成功2-1取胜。足总杯上,埃弗顿作客斯坦福桥把切尔西淘汰了。



然而他们上半场的防守是有问题的,而威胁主要是来自埃尔南德斯的速度。埃弗顿通常能很好地保持三线紧密,但墨西哥人的速度逼使贾基尔卡和迪斯丁后撤。 (他们也清楚第一回合在古迪逊就是被朴智星和贝尔巴托夫接应直塞后轻松破门的,所以他们非常注意及时后撤。)

当然,这为鲁尼创造了空间,后者在最近几周都处在这个前锋身后的9号半位置上,尤其是对阵切尔西的比赛。右后腰内维尔撤得最深,而左后腰罗德维尔就靠前一点。所以鲁尼就可以在对手两线之间找到一条从中路通向右翼的走廊,罗德维尔也没有及时压迫他。

事实上,埃弗顿大部分的危险都出现在那个区域。拜恩斯是埃弗顿其中一个最有威胁的进攻点,但就像本赛季我们一直所说的,埃弗顿的左路防守也是别人的攻击重点。当拜恩斯尝试前插去助攻时,鲁尼和埃尔南德斯埋伏在他身后,曼联也热衷于把球分到那个空间,纳尼的机会就来自于瓦伦西亚对拜恩斯的暴力突破。

纳尼的表现让人失望 —— 开场阶段希伯特似乎是容易被攻击的,但后来他慢慢融入了比赛并防守出色。纳尼两边都可以打,但他依然只在右路有更好的发挥,当出现在左路的时候,他太热衷于内切使用他的右脚了,这让他很容易被对手看穿意图,而他在这一区域的传中很烂。



下半场
贝克福德和比利亚莱迪诺夫上半场毫无表现,所以莫耶斯半场就换上了阿尼切比和他身后的卡希尔。阿尼切比移到左路去压制法比奥,而奥斯曼在这一侧的防守也做得不错。由于另一侧的奥谢攻击力有限,缺乏边后卫助攻的红魔在进攻中的威胁大减。

罗德维尔同样找回了感觉,并开始更加留意鲁尼在他身后的动向。但如果他一味紧跟鲁尼的话,就会将中场拱手让给曼联球员,因此他采取的是切断鲁尼与其中场和边后卫队友间传球线路的策略。曼联很快就显得有些不适应,埃弗顿在控球上占据了上风。

红魔重整旗鼓
几个原因让曼联重新找回了比赛的主动。体能是其中的关键 —— 当时天气很热,曼联控制着61%的球权,而埃弗顿则在争抢皮球的过程中消耗巨大。同样关键的另一方面则是曼联依靠换人改变比赛的能力。

欧文和吉格斯换下纳尼和吉布森是两个非常显眼的调整,但埃弗拉顶替奥谢也有着同等重要的作用。先后出任左翼的纳尼和鲁尼都喜爱带球内切,而埃弗拉则为球队提供了宽度,让曼联的边路战术更加灵活(值得赞扬的还有安德森,他稳定而出色的对角线传球颇具威胁),70分钟之后,曼联便重新压制了埃弗顿。



尽管做出了改变,但还是由最初的主战场瓦伦西亚创造了这个进球。他压迫迪斯丁并夺下了皮球,把法国人引到了边路,然后传中找到远门柱的埃尔南德斯,帮助后者打进了“小豌豆”式的进球。

结论

曼联的阵容调整让他们取得了优势,但是关键的绝杀还是由他们的经典战术来实现(把球分边,中路抢点)。埃尔南德斯,欧文和鲁尼在禁区内的跑位是值得关注的。

莫耶斯在比赛中的临场调度保持了埃弗顿的竞争力,但早早的两个换人使得他没有办法应对曼联下半场的三次攻击性调整。
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56#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:42:22 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-27 11:46 编辑

Schalke v Manchester United: tactical preview
April 26, 2011


Possible starting line-ups

Schalke have reached their first-ever European Cup semi, whilst United are in their fourth in the last five seasons.

Team news

The headline news is that Dimitar Berbatov hasn’t travelled because of a groin strain. On face value, the absence of the Premier League’s top scorer should be quite a blow, but considering that Ferguson has only picked Berbatov for one of United’s last ten Champions League knockout games, it really shouldn’t cause too much concern.

Darren Fletcher is also still out. He is more of a loss, as he would have been used in the centre of midfield. Aside from that, Sir Alex Ferguson has no major injury concerns.

Ralf Rangnick is waiting to see whether centre-back Benedikt Höwedes is fit enough to play. If not, midfield Joel Matip can drop in to play centre-back.

Selection decisions

Rangnick’s back four and front two pretty much pick themselves – with the exception of the left-back spot, where Sergio Escudero’s younger legs could be preferred to veteran Hans Sarpei.

His major decisions are in midfield. We can assume that Jefferson Farfan will start wide on the right, and it also seems likely that Greek youngster Kyriakos Papadopoulos still play in a deep midfield position. He, like Matip, is another who can play either at centre-back or in the centre of midfield, and he’ll probably be told to stick close to Wayne Rooney, having done a good marking job on Wesley Sneijder in Schalke’s previous tie.

The choice in the midfield is between playing the creative Jurado in the centre, with Alexander Baumjohann providing another attacking outlet on the left flank, or to ask Jurado to drift inside from the left, and insert another more sturdy central midfielder – probably Matip, but possibly Peer Kluge. It essentially depends on how open Rangnick wants his midfield to be – against Inter, Schalke often looked vulnerable to direct attacks down the centre, but Leonardo’s side were too ponderous to be able to exploit these gaps. United won’t be as foolish.

Ferguson’s usual decision is whether to play 4-4-2, his natural shape, or switch to a 4-5-1 to give himself extra protection in the centre of the pitch. A 4-4-2 seems more likely, though, for various reasons – but chiefly because Schalke aren’t a side United should have problems with in the centre, and also because the German side’s backline often looks very prone to pace. That would encourage the use of Javier Hernandez upfront, with Rooney in the hole. From there, United could easily revert to 4-5-1 should they need to, taking advantage of Rooney’s versatility, as they did late on away at Chelsea.

Ferguson’s selections in big games recently have been very unpredictable. Who expected Ryan Giggs and Michael Carrick in the centre against Chelsea? Or Darron Gibson and John O’Shea against Arsenal (with the slight caveat that he was resting players) ? Considering how well Giggs and Carrick did in that tie, it seems likely they’ll be used again. Carrick was rested at the weekend in preparation for this contest, and his patient passing style may be vital to United’s gameplan.

On the flanks, Park Ji-Sung is made for this sort of match, in order to nullify one of the opposition full-backs. The other choice would be between Antonio Valencia and Nani. Nani’s form has dipped recently after Valencia’s return has pushed him to the right, but Ferguson may prefer Nani for his versatility. The last time United travelled to Germany, to play Bayern, Ferguson indicated that he left out Valencia (in favour of Park and Nani) because those two had the ability to switch if needed, whereas Valencia was restricted to the right. Still, on form, it would probably be Valencia who gets the nod.

The other decision is at right-back, between Rafael and John O’Shea. Rafael has become more trustworthy since this time last year, but O’Shea’s big game experience might be favoured. In truth, Rafael’s pace would be a better bet against Baumjohann and O’Shea’s positional sense would be more useful against Jurado – Ferguson’s selection there may be influenced by how, and who, he thinks Schalke will play.

Key areas

The most important part of Schalke’s gameplan against Inter (and to a certain extent against Valencia, although that was under the previous management) was to switch play across the pitch to the full-backs, and take advantage of the fact that they were constantly in space. This won’t happen against United, though – if there’s one thing Ferguson has been good at in recent years in European games like this, it’s been his ability to nullify opposition full-backs, most famously with his use of Park.

Therefore, Schalke will have to construct attacks differently. Direct wing play is one option – Patrice Evra is a fine full-back but Farfan will fancy his chances in 1 v 1 situations, but the key man will be Raul. United lack a midfield destroyer and Nemanja Vidic can be uncomfortable coming out of defence to pick up deep-lying forwards. Therefore, Ferguson’s side may be prone between the lines – and whilst Raul’s goalscoring ability will be a threat, his link-up play is even more important.

Raul has also been impressive this season with his performances without the ball. Against Valencia and Inter he’s dropped onto the opposition’s holding midfielder in the defensive phase of play, so it’s likely to see him occupying Carrick in this match. United may have to work harder to keep the ball, so the passing ability of Rio Ferdinand, stepping out from the back, and Rooney, dropping into midfield to scamper away from Papadopoulos, will be important in getting the ball from flank to flank.

United’s usual strategy away in Europe is quite cautious – reasonably happy with a 0-0, delighted with a 0-1. This might be a rare occasion when Ferguson feels the need to break more quickly, though. Schalke can be vulnerable to rapid breaks, especially if they play Jurado in the centre and therefore have three attacking midfielders in the side, and pace at the back remains a problem. This year’s Champions League first legs haven’t been as tight as usual – as Schalke know all too well after winning 2-5 in the last round – so a cagey match here isn’t a given.
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57#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:44:08 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-27 11:47 编辑

199楼参考译文:占位
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58#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:48:18 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-27 11:50 编辑

Schalke 0-2 Manchester United: Schalke torn apart by United’s passing and movement
April 26, 2011


The starting line-ups

Manchester United were superior throughout the 90 minutes and could have won by a much greater margin.
Ralf Rangnick was without Benedikt Höwedes at the back, which meant Joel Matip had to play at centre-back. Other than that, it was the expected team in the expected formation.

Sir Alex Ferguson omitted Nani to play Antonio Valencia on the right, and played Fabio behind him. The side was the same as the XI that started against Chelsea, with the exception of one Brazilian twin in for the other.

Manchester United dominated the game from start to finish – better at the back, always in charge in midfield, and creative in the final third. The only poor aspect of their performance was their finishing – though credit is due to Manuel Neuer for a fine first half performance. He was only holding back the tide, however, and United’s goals duly arrived midway through the second period.

With little change in the pattern of play throughout the game (with the slight exception of when Rangnick replaced Alexander Baumjohann with Peer Kluge towards the beginning of the second half and Schalke briefly competed in midfield) there’s no real reason to review the game chronologically. Instead, here’s a look at what Schalke did badly, and what United did well.

Schalke errors

(a) Not compact enough

This was Schalke’s biggest problem. The concept of being ‘compact’ from back to front is widely established in top-level modern football. It doesn’t matter whether a team presses high up the pitch or uses a deep defensive line – the gap from the defence to attack shouldn’t be stretched. Arrigo Sacchi famously wanted a distance of no more than 25 metres in this respect, and Rafael Benitez – a self-confessed Sacchi disciple – is another who encourages his sides to be compact.

This idea seemed to completely escape Schalke in this match, however, as Kyriakos Papadopoulos would often become stranded in front of his own defence, with a huge distance between Schalke’s back five and the rest of the side. The three attacking midfielders tended to jog back, meaning United found gaps between the lines and were able to play.

(b) Allowing Carrick to play

Michael Carrick is a player who divides opinion, but it’s widely established that there’s a huge difference in his performance level when he’s left free, and when he’s closed down in possession. Carrick has a good passing range but needs time and space to pick his passes, and Schalke stood off him, allowing him (and Giggs) to dictate play in the midfield zone.


Carrick's passes

In previous games Raul had been very good at dropping onto the opposition holding midfielder and preventing them from passing, but Carrick moved slightly higher up the pitch into a position Raul didn’t want to drop into. He completed more passes than any other player, and also covered the furthest distance.

(c) Using only one holder

This was a good advert for the use of a ‘double pivot’ in midfield. Jurado was slack in his defensive duties – he didn’t drop in alongside Papadopoulos quickly enough (and nor did he press higher up the pitch). This meant that Wayne Rooney could move from side to side and drag Papadopoulos around the pitch, opening up space for midfield runners.

(d) Not patient enough in possession

Against Inter, Schalke could play the ball out wide to their full-backs, who were in space and could bring the ball forward. Here, they didn’t have the luxury of ‘free’ players, and so had to try to move up the pitch as a unit. Their passing meant that this wasn’t possible, though – they played forward passes too quickly and couldn’t retain the ball up top.

What Manchester United did well

(a) Pinning back the Schalke full-backs

It’s the usual Manchester United strategy in Europe, but Park and Valencia had excellent games defensively. Atsuto Uchida and Hans Sarpei tried to get forward to stretch the play and provide width, but were rarely in the game and Schalke had to try play forward passes, which were frequently unsuccessful.

(b) Exploiting space between the lines

Schalke were bad in this respect, but United still had to take advantage. Rooney’s movement dragged his marker around and this opened up space in front of the defence for Giggs and Park Ji-Sung to run into. Park spent much of the game coming inside, similar to his movement at the start of the season, whilst Giggs’ bursts forward were reserved but well-timed – particularly in the case of his goal, but he also had other goalscoring chances.

(c) Getting behind the ball quickly

A basic tenet of their game, but United’s (new?) 4-4-1-1 shape was particularly obvious here. The defence sat quite deep, Carrick and Giggs occupied space rather than individual players in front, and the wide players tracked the full-backs. With Rooney dropping in to pressure Schalke in the middle of the pitch, United were disciplined in the rare spells Schalke held onto the ball.

(d) Intelligent passing from midfield

Again, Schalke helped United hugely by standing off, but United used the ball intelligently. Carrick was clearly the main man – his passing was reliable, but also varied. He played short sideways passes, incisive forward balls, and long diagonals out to the flanks. Rooney was also impressive with his passing – he moved away from Papadopoulos to get time on the ball, and then moved play from flank to flank.

Conclusion

Schalke terrible or United fantastic? With such a one-sided performance it’s often hard to tell, but if we’re focusing on tactics – which, of course, we are – it has to be marked down as Schalke being woeful. It’s rare to see a top-level side leaving such huge space between the lines, even rarer to see such little defensive effort from half the outfield players. Losing 0-2 flattered Schalke.

That might seem harsh on United – and the obvious question would be, “If Schalke are so bad, how come Valencia and Inter didn’t carve them apart?” To which the answer is, “They did.” Inter scored two goals in the first leg as well (the Italians were just desperately awful at the back and managed to concede five goals), whilst Valencia created constant opportunities and managed to waste them – much like United did in the first half here. As Unai Emery said after that game, “We had four chances and we don’t take any. We’ve been knocked out unjustly, we’ve missed an opportunity with everything in our favour. It was a game where we had more chances and we lost.” It’s a long way back for Schalke.
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59#
发表于 2011-4-27 11:51:03 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-28 13:43 编辑

201楼参考译文

----------------------------

2011-04-27 / 余文乐



曼联全场压制对手,他们本可以以更大的比分获胜的。

朗尼克手下缺少了霍维德斯,所以马蒂普不得不出现在了中卫的位置上。除此之外,沙尔克基本是最强阵容出战。

弗格森爵士没有用纳尼,他让瓦伦西亚和法比奥搭档右路。这个阵容和对阵切尔西的首发完全一样,只是右后卫位置上用法比奥代替了拉斐尔(译注:视觉上完全没有区别=。=)

曼联从一开始就掌控了比赛,直到终场。他们后防稳健,中场牢牢控制,前场创造力丰富。唯一不足的地方就是临门一脚,虽然主要原因是诺伊尔上半场的神级发挥。然而,他无法改变趋势,曼联的进球还是在下半场的中段适时的到来了。

这场比赛的形势基本没有变化(除了克林格换下鲍姆约翰之后中场的短暂均势),我们没有理由继续按时间顺序去分析这场比赛。这次,我们分别看看沙尔克的不足和曼联的长处。

沙尔克的错误

(a) 阵型不够紧凑

这是沙尔克最大的问题。阵型“紧凑”这个概念在现在的顶级足球已经很普遍了。这个与球队阵型前压还是收缩防守没有关系,攻防两线的距离不要被拉大就可以了萨基曾有名言,他说这个距离不能超过25米。而公认的萨基粉丝贝尼特斯也另一个保持阵型紧凑的提倡者。

然而这次比赛沙尔克完全没有这个概念。因为帕帕多普洛斯经常会在防线手足无措,后防五人组和其他球员的距离非常的大。那3名前腰喜欢散着步回防,这让曼联在两线之间找到空间并加以利用。

(b) 对卡里克放任自由

卡里克是一个充满争议的球员。让他自由发挥和让他在压迫下发挥,表现有着非常大的不同。卡里克的传球覆盖范围很大,但他需要时间和空间去完成传球,而沙尔克完全不逼抢的战略让他和吉格斯能够在中场指点江山。

在先前的比赛中,劳尔会后撤去逼抢对手的后腰,让他们不能舒服的出球。但卡里克稍微向前压了一点,而劳尔并不愿意后撤如此之深。他完成了全队最多的传球,而且也覆盖了最远的距离。

(c) 单后腰

这是双后腰战术的最佳广告。胡拉多经常不能及时回到帕帕多普洛斯旁边放手(也不在前场逼抢)。这让鲁尼带着帕帕多普洛斯在两条边线上来回移动,为后上的中场扯开空间。

(d) 没有耐心保持控球

对国米的时候,沙尔克能够把传给空位的边后卫,往前推进拉开宽度。但这场比赛,他们没有这种‘空位’的球员,所以必须尝试整体推进。但是他们的传球让这种尝试无法实现。他们太快就送出直传,而没有尽可能的保持控球。

曼联的成功之处

(a) 压制沙尔克的边后卫

这是曼联欧战时的常规战术,但朴智星和瓦伦西亚在防守端的表现真的非常好。内田笃人和萨尔佩尝试向前助攻为队友的进攻提供宽度,但这场无法施展,沙尔克只能尝试通过直传寻找机会,但是通常是不成功的。

(b) 利用对手两线之间的空间

虽然沙尔克自己表现糟糕,但是曼联还是需要加以利用才能获利。鲁尼的移动使得他的盯防者到处跑,这让吉格斯和朴智星有机会上前助攻。朴智星大部分时间都在内切,这很像他在赛季初时候的安排。而吉格斯的前插选择很谨慎的但是他的时机把握得非常的好,尤其是他的那个进球。但他也有其他的进球机会。

(c) 及时回防

这是他们的一个基本原则,但是他们的(新)4411阵型已经初现端倪。防线撤得比较后。卡里克和吉格斯共同覆盖空间而不是各自为战。边路球员跟对手的边后卫。鲁尼后撤,在中场压迫对手,曼联在沙尔克仅有的控球时间表现了良好的战术纪律。

(d) 中场聪明的传球

沙尔克的不压迫方针给了曼联巨大的帮助,但曼联用球也非常聪明。卡里克是关键,他的传球非常可靠,但同样是多变的。他短传,他直塞,他大脚转移。鲁尼的传球同样让人印象深刻-他摆脱帕帕多普洛斯的防守并得到拿球的时间,然后把皮球转移到两边。



结论

是沙尔克太糟糕还是曼联太劲爆?这么一边倒的比赛通常都是很难判断的,但如果我们把焦点放在战术上(当然我们就是这样的=。=),必须是沙尔克太糟糕。很少会见到顶级水平的比赛会在两线之间有这么巨大的空间,更加难以看到的是半数球员都如此不愿防守。只输两球真是太幸运了。

这对曼联来说可能有点不公平,但问题也很直白:“如果沙尔克真的那么差,为什么巴伦西亚和国际米兰都没能做到撕开他们的防线?”答案是:“他们做到了。”国际米兰在第一回合同样打进了两个进球(意大利球队是在后防极其失策而丢掉五个球的)。而巴伦西亚创造了无数的机会然后又把他们浪费掉了,这很像上半场的曼联。就像埃梅里上半场所说的那样:“我们有四个机会但我们一个都没抓住。我们被淘汰很冤枉,我们错过了一个完美的机会。那场比赛我们有着更多的机会但是我们输了” 沙尔克要追平的话,真的很难了。
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60#
发表于 2011-4-28 18:30:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:17 编辑

Real Madrid 0-2 Barcelona: two goals for Messi
April 28, 2011


The starting line-ups

Lionel Messi scored a poacher’s strike and then a superb solo effort to give Barcelona a major advantage in the tie.
Jose Mourinho named his expected side – Lassana Diarra was in for Sami Khedira, whilst Raul Albiol came in for the suspended Ricardo Carvalho.

Pep Guardiola also chose the side expected in the preview. Carles Puyol returned from injury to fill in at left-back, whilst Seydou Keita replaced the injured Andres Iniesta.

The game was scrappy, dirty and not particularly pleasing on the eye. For much of the contest, the objective of both sides seemed to be to get opposition players sent off, rather than actually try to score a goal. Tactically, it wasn’t fascinating for long periods.

Real without ball

The main question before the game was how Real would play without the ball. In the league they sat back deep and let Barcelona have possession, then in the cup they pushed up, pressed and got in Barcelona’s faces. Having played much better in the cup final – a game they won – it seemed the latter would be their approach here.

They were much more conservative, however, sitting relatively deep and concentrating on nullifying Xavi. Pepe, probably the best player across the previous two contests, continued to track him across the pitch. Cristiano Ronaldo was visibly annoyed with Real’s tactics – at one point desperately trying to close down three Barcelona players, with no help from his teammate. Real were letting Barcelona play.

Barcelona possession

So, with Barcelona enjoying around 65% of possession in the first half, the game’s major issue in the was this – how could Barcelona transform their dominance of the ball into goals. They essentially had three problems to try and get around here. First, Xavi was being man-marked. Second, Iniesta wasn’t playing. Third, since Barcelona were only dangerous in the cup final when they played with width, David Villa and Pedro Rodriguez stayed very wide, making them less of a direct goal threat, whilst Messi was very deep.

Barcelona were essentially playing no centre-forward, and with Real packing the area in front of the defence with three holding midfielders, shots from long-range and interplay through the centre of the pitch were also unlikely to result in a goal. Therefore, there were three ways Barcelona stood a chance of scoring – (a) with a wide forward cutting in – as Villa did when he flashed an early shot past the post, (b) with midfield runners – what Xavi did when he had the best chance of the first half, and (c) Messi beating players to get into the box himself. That didn’t happen in the first half, but it would have a very obvious impact later on.

For their part, Real rarely threatened in the first period, aside from one moment when Valdes struggled to hold onto a long-range Ronaldo shot.


Xabi Alonso's passing was disappointing

Second half

Mourinho made a change at half time, bringing Emmanuel Adebayor on for Mesut Ozil – who completed just two passes in the first half – and pushing Ronaldo to the right of midfield. This change has been questioned in the immediate aftermath of the game, specifically the decision to bring on Adebayor over Karim Benzema and Gonzalo Higuain, but it made perfect sense – Adebayor had a very big impact in the previous two Clasicos from the bench. He was the logical choice.

Unfortunately, Real couldn’t really take advantage of his strengths. He won a long ball after 40 seconds of the first half, but generally had no support to get on the end of flick-ons. Real’s expected approach – get the ball wide, then hang up crosses (something that worked so well in the cup final) broke down before it even begun, because Xabi Alonso exerted little influence on the game, and his long balls to the flank were often wayward, as the chalkboard on the right shows.

Red card

The key moment of the game was Pepe’s red card. It meant that Real were forced to switch to a 4-4-1 shape, and had three direct consequences.

First, obviously, it meant Barcelona enjoyed even greater dominance of the ball, now with an extra man in midfield. The game was even more about Barcelona’s conversion of possession to chances.

Second, it meant that Xavi was no longer being man-marked, and he was free to move up the pitch into more attacking positions – he provided the ball out wide for substitute Ibrahim Afellay for the first goal.

Third, it meant that Alonso had to move forward slightly into a 4-4-1 and Real were now much more vulnerable between the lines, meaning Messi got more space and more time on the ball, eventually scoring both goals. It’s particularly obvious on the second goal that there is a huge gap between the two Real banks of four. Making tactical criticisms of such a wonderful goal is probably unfair, but an extra man in that zone may have stopped Messi, or at least forced his run wider before one of the defenders truly stopped him.

No Mourinho changes?

By this time, Mourinho had been sent to the stands, and it was surprising that he (or one of his coaches) didn’t choose to make a substitution after Pepe’s dismissal. There are two strands to this criticism – there’s the obvious fact that Real were now without one of their key players, someone who was widely recognised as playing an important role in stopping Xavi, and Real now faced a problem in midfield. There’s also the more simple argument that with Barcelona keeping the ball and tiring Real, some simple fresh legs may have been useful. Afellay demonstrated that on the other side.


These are the passes received (rather than played) by Lionel Messi - it's interesting how deep they are, and how rarely he picks up the ball in the final 25 yards of the pitch

Admittedly, Mourinho’s options from the bench were limited, but he could have removed one of his three forwards, put on Esteban Granero as a third central midfielder, and played no-one on the right of midfield – Carles Puyol wasn’t a huge attacking threat from left-back. That’s no criticism of Puyol (who had a great game) – merely a recognition that leaving him free at left-back would have been preferable to giving Xavi and Messi more time on the ball. It’s easy to be wise in hindsight, but making no substitutions whatsoever after the goal was a surprising decision from Mourinho, and he rather gave Guardiola and Barcelona time to assess the situation before pouncing.

Other factors

Three other points of note.

Puyol and Keita were drafted into the side as something of an emergency, but in a tough, physical game like this, their strength came in handy. Puyol and Keita are much more physically imposing players than Adriano and Iniesta, and though there was less technical quality from those positions, it didn’t turn out too badly.

Barcelona sat deeper than usual at the back, which caused Real problems. Alonso was unable to hit balls over the top of into wide positions, whilst when Ronaldo (in the first half) and Adebayor (in the second) played high up against the defence, there was a big gap between them and the midfield. On a related note, Dani Alves was very conservative.

The quality of Real’s set-pieces was dreadful. Alonso’s balls into the box were often weighted wrongly, whilst Ronaldo’s shots were usually wasteful. This seemed like Real’s best chance of scoring a goal, yet they constantly produced little.

Conclusion

There were two stages here. First, Real let Barcelona have possession, but relatively few chances were created. The second phase came after the red card to Pepe – which must go down as the turning point in the game. It freed up space for Xavi and Messi, Barcelona’s two best players, Mourinho didn’t respond, and Barcelona eventually scored two crucial goals.
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61#
发表于 2011-4-28 18:34:26 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:29 编辑

209楼参考译文
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皇家马德里0-2巴塞罗那:佩佩染红成转折 梅西两球助巴萨  
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


两队首发阵容

梅西先偷袭打进一球,接着又漂亮地以一己之力,帮助巴萨在两队的竞争中获得巨大优势。

穆里尼奥排出了我们所预期的阵型——拉斯·迪亚拉替换赫迪拉,阿尔比奥尔替换禁赛的卡瓦略。

瓜迪奥拉也排出了与前瞻里预测一致的首发。普约尔伤愈复出并任左后卫,而凯塔替换受伤的伊涅斯塔。

比赛火药味儿浓重,踢得比较脏,并不十分好看。在大部分时间里,两队的目标似乎是要将对手弄下场,而不是真正努力地去进球。从战术上说,如此长期发展下去可没什么吸引人的。

得不到球权的皇马

比赛开始前的主要问题是,皇马在无球时应该怎么办。联赛那场他们让后卫收缩,将控球权拱手让给巴萨,而在国王杯那场他们阵型提前,积极逼抢,直面巴萨进行对抗。在国王杯决赛中他们踢得要好多了——他们也赢得了这场比赛——看上去后者应该是他们本场的策略。

然而他们收缩靠后,集中精力以限制哈维的做法比上次更加保守。可能是前两场参赛球员里表现最好的佩佩,继续在场上紧盯哈维。C罗明显对皇马的策略表示不满——没有队友支援的他,一度绝望地试图破坏巴萨三名队员间的传递。皇马是在放手让巴萨去踢。

巴萨控球流

如此以来,巴萨在上半场有几乎65%的控球率,比赛中的主要问题于是变成了:巴萨如何能将他们的场面优势转化成进球。他们有3个基本难题要努力寻求解答:1、哈维被盯死;2、伊涅斯塔不在场上;3、国王杯中巴萨利用宽度时才变得有威胁,那时比利亚和佩德罗站位很靠边,使得他们对球门威胁减小,而梅西回撤得非常深。

巴萨本质上踢的无锋阵型,当皇马在后防线前筑起三后腰时,通过远射和中路渗透都不太可能获得进球。因此巴萨有3种方法可以试试,有一定的得分机会:1、边锋内切,就像比利亚开场不久擦门柱而出的那次射门;2、中场球员插上,就像哈维那次上半场最好机会的攻门;3、梅西自己过人突入禁区。这在上半场并未出现,然而在接下来的比赛中它会有明显的影响。

而在皇马这边,他们在上半场很少威胁到巴萨球门,除了那次巴尔德斯勉强扑下C罗的远射。

下半场

穆里尼奥下半场有一个换人,用阿德巴约换下厄齐尔——他上半场只传了两次球——并让C罗转移到右路。赛后人们立即质疑这次换人,特别是换上阿德巴约而不是本泽马或伊瓜因的决定,但它却是非常有道理的——在前两次国家德比中,阿德巴约的替补上场起到了很大的作用。他是个合理的选择。

但不幸的是,皇马并未真正发挥他的力量。下半场开场40秒他就接到一记长传,但没有支援的队友可让他头球摆渡一下。皇马预期的战术——分边、传中(这在国王杯那场里非常有效)在还没开始前就被破坏了,因为阿隆索没能在比赛中发挥作用,他的分边长传不够坚定,做得不力,如图所示。


阿隆索传球很糟糕

红牌

比赛的关键是佩佩的红牌。这意味着皇马不得不转型4-4-1,于是有了如下3个直接后果。

1、显而易见,中场多一人的巴萨因此占有了更高的控球率。比赛更成了巴萨把控球变成机会的这一转变过程。

2、哈维不再会被人紧盯,他能自由地提前位置,在场上更具攻击性的位置游走——是他将球分边,让替补上场的阿费莱助攻第一球。

3、阿隆索的位置得稍稍提前,以形成4-4-1的阵型,因此皇马中场和后卫间的保护变得脆弱,使得梅西有更多的空间和拿球机会,最终他打入两球。皇马两线的四名防守队员间的巨大空当,在梅西攻入的第二球上体现得尤其明显。对这样一个美妙进球进行战术评价也许有点儿不公平,不过那个区域要是能多个人的话就能阻止梅西,或者至少迫使他向侧边移动,直到一个防守队员能真正拦截他。

穆里尼奥不换人?

此时穆里尼奥被罚上看台,令人吃惊的是他(或者教练组的一员)没有针对佩佩的罚下换人。对此的批评有两个方面的考虑,一是事实很明显,皇马现在缺少了他们的一个关键球员,一个被广泛认为是对限制哈维非常重要的队员,皇马的中场面临难关。二是一个更简单的原因,现在巴萨控球并以此消耗皇马的体力,换上体力充沛的替补会有作用,另一侧的阿费莱就证明了这一点。

确实穆里尼奥能选用的替补也有限,但他能换下三个前场之一,换上格拉内罗作为第三中场,在中场右路不设点——在左后卫位置的普约尔不是个很大的威胁。这不是在批评普约尔(他踢得很好),单单只是分析结果——放他在左后卫不管,比给哈维和梅西更多拿球的时间要好得多。事后诸葛亮总是容易的,但穆里尼奥在丢球后不换人的决定无论如何都令人意外,而且他还给了瓜迪奥拉和巴萨时间来分析局势以便猛攻。


梅西接到的传球路线图,很有趣的,这些传球位置回撤很深,而梅西很少在距离球门25码处拿球

其他因素

3个其他因素值得一提:

普约尔和凯塔本来是救急之用,然而在本场这般激烈、充满身体对抗的比赛中,他们的力量有了用武之地。普约尔和凯塔比阿德里亚诺和伊涅斯塔身体对抗上有优势得多,尽管他们在这些位置上的技术差了一些,但结果并不坏。

巴萨比往常要收缩一些,这给皇马带来麻烦。阿隆索没法儿打身后球分边,而当C罗(上半场)和阿德巴约(下半场)深入敌后时,他们和本方中场的距离太远。与此相关的是阿尔维斯本场踢得很保守。

皇马的定位球进攻质量很差,阿隆索的发球力量不合适,而C罗的射门常常无功而返。皇马并没有制造什么机会,这差不多是他们最好的了。

结论

比赛可分为两个阶段,第一个是皇马让巴萨控球,但巴萨并未制造太多机会;第二个是佩佩吃到红牌之后——他的罚下是本场的关键点。这使得巴萨最好的两个球员——哈维和梅西有了更多的空间。穆里尼奥没有做出相应的调整,巴萨最终获得两个关键进球。
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62#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:50:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 17:52 编辑

Porto 5-1 Villarreal: Falcao nets four as Porto take giant leap towards Dublin
April 28, 2011


The starting line-ups

Villarreal were 1-0 up at half time, but a superb second half performance from Porto puts them fully in charge of the tie.

Andre Villas Boas used his usual 4-3-3 system. Cristian Sapanaru was at right-back, and Cristian Rodriguez was wide left.

Juan Carlos Garrido named a side which seemed to be his usual 4-2-2-2 before kick off. Nilmar and Giuseppe Rossi were supported by Cani and Santi Cazorla, two wide players who come inside, and Borja Valero and Bruno Soriano, two classic deep-lying Spanish ball-playing midfielders. Jose Catala was surprisingly used at left-back over Joan Capdevila.

However, Villarreal’s formation was actually slightly different to usual, with Nilmar playing a right-sided role, filling in as the right-sided midfielder in a 4-4-1-1 without the ball. As always, Villarreal were fluid, but Cazorla usually played ‘in the hole’.

First half

The major talking point in the first half of the game was Porto’s very high defensive line, which played perfectly into the hands of Villarreal. Rossi’s pace caused Porto no end of problems, whilst Nilmar also looked dangerous on the right hand side. Villas Boas seemed to have taken a suicidal approach.

His reasoning for the high line was presumably because he wanted his side to press in midfield. Villarreal are at their best when they’re allowed time to pass the ball – particularly the two deep-lying central midfielders – and Porto wanted to put a stop to that. That meant pressing, and, in turn, a high line.

It wasn’t really working though, and it was partly related to Porto’s other tactic. Because Villarreal generally play 4-2-2-2, their wide players come narrow into the centre of the pitch, and Garrido’s side can often be caught out with runs forward from the opposition full-backs. Therefore, Villas Boas pushed his full-backs high up the pitch – often higher than the midfield three – in order to exploit this weakness.

This meant that Fernando had to play very deep in midfield – even deeper than usual – and cover the full-back areas. On occasions he dropped into form a back three, as Porto shifted to 3-4-3. Indeed, he picked up an early yellow card when he fouled Nilmar in the left-back zone, and so had to be careful with his tackling. A combination of Fernando’s deep positioning, the fact he was on a yellow card, and Villarreal’s surprising formation in midfield meant that the away side could often pass around Porto in midfield and get time on the ball to play through passes. This, of course, is something you have to prevent if playing a high line.

The major individual battle was occurring down Villarreal’s right, Porto’s left. Nilmar was playing to that side but was slack with his defensive duties, whilst Alvaro Pereira was very high up the pitch. One of those two looked likely to get the breakthrough – Pereira’s delivery was poor, and whilst Nilmar wasted an early 1 v 1 after springing the offside trap, his cross for Cani was excellent, and Villarreal were 1-0 up on the stroke of half time.

Second half

What on earth happened to turn the game around so drastically in the second half? Non-tactical factors must be considered, particularly the tiredness that has been so obvious in Villarreal’s game recently, particularly the 5-0 reverse against Valencia.

First, it was slightly surprising that Garrido didn’t change things at half time. Villarreal had looked vulnerable despite leading – particularly down the right. More energy in midfield would have been useful.

Villas Boas didn’t use a substitute but he did change things. Fernando stopped playing so deep and never dropped into the defence after the break, whilst Joao Moutinho played alongside him, forming more of a midfield duo. Porto looked more secure in front of their defence – and aside from an early Cazorla chance – they weren’t opened up as easily because there was more pressure on the ball.

Villarreal twice conceded because of their own high defensive line. We’ve noted before that Villarreal are very keen on defending along the edge of the 18-yard line, even when the positioning of the ball makes it seem a slightly strange position to take up. On occasions it works well, but for Falcao’s header (the fourth goal) and quite probably the first (the concession of a penalty) it was their downfall.

They had two further problems – both down the opposite side to their problems in the first half. They had the same issues Benfica encountered when conceding five at the Dragao earlier in the season – first, the pace and power of Hulk was unstoppable at times. He set up Falcao for the third goal after beating Catala, and was also fouled for the free-kick that resulted in the fourth.

Hulk’s movement also caused problems. With more of a Moutinho-Fernando duo, Fredy Gurain could push forward to make Porto more of a 4-2-1-3, albeit with Guarin to the right. From there, Hulk could move to the flank and drag Catala out, then Guarin could power through and get in on goal – see the third goal. It was Fernando Belluschi playing that role against Benfica, but it was the same process. Villarreal even forgot how to defend corners, and Falcao scored his fourth, and Porto’s fifth, with a header back across goal.

Conclusion

The obvious cliche – a game of two halves. Villarreal exploited Porto’s high line in the first half, but couldn’t deal with Porto’s more effective midfield pressure after half time. More specific battles – particularly involving Hulk – opened Villarreal up far too easily, whilst the away side’s obsession with the 18-yard line was also questionable.
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63#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:52:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 17:56 编辑

212楼参考译文
--------------------------
波尔图5-1黄潜战术分析:博阿斯妙手变天
2011-04-29 / cnzcnz

比利亚雷亚尔1比0领先结束上半场,但是波尔图在下半场重新找回了进球的感觉,5个进球也让他们几乎肯定拿到了一个决赛席位。

博阿斯沿用了一直以来的433阵容。萨帕拉努出任右后卫,乌拉圭C罗(Cristian Rodriguez)打左边锋的位置。

比利亚雷亚尔主帅加里多排出了常用的4222阵型。尼尔马和罗西搭档锋线,卡尼和卡佐拉经常内切为他们提供支持。中场中路则是维罗和索利亚诺,他们踢得是经典的西班牙控球中场,位置相对靠后。左后卫的位置上卡塔拉出人意料地代替卡普德维拉出战。


两队首发阵容

不过事实上比利亚雷亚尔的阵型和平时使用的略有不同:尼尔马的位置居右,无球时回撤打右中场,于是阵型回缩成为4411。和平时一样,比利亚雷亚尔的阵型具有一定的流动性,但是卡佐拉位置一般都在中间。

上半场的战术对决

上半场比赛的一大看点是波尔图压上的后防线,而这也正中习惯防反的比利亚雷亚尔的下怀。罗西的速度给波尔图造成了无止境的难题,尼尔马在右侧也相当有威胁。博阿斯上半场的阵型看上去很失败,跟自杀没什么两样。

他之所以摆出这么一个压上的阵型可能是为了在中场向对手施压以获得主动权。看上去比利亚雷亚尔获得球权并且可以自由地进行传递时是最具威胁的,特别是由于两个习惯后撤的中场可以舒服地传球时。波尔图试图通过压缩中场空间来阻止比利亚雷亚尔的传接球。这也意味着防线必须压前---一把双刃剑。

但是这个办法并没有起到应有的效果,这要归结于波尔图的其他战术设计。因为比利亚雷亚尔通常打的是4222,他们的边路球员经常内切到中路,这也给对手两个边后卫的助攻留下来通道。所以博阿斯让他的两个边后卫尽量压上助攻,他们的位置经常比中场三人组还要靠前,当然是针对比利亚雷亚尔的这个弱点专门安排的。

这也就意味着费尔南多必须回撤得很深,比平时的位置更靠后,这样才能有效地给边后卫补位。他经常回到后卫线上组成三后卫,这样波尔图的阵型就变成了343。事实上他在第五分钟便由于侵犯尼尔马吃到了一张黄牌,这样让他下脚铲球时不得不三思而后行。费尔南多的回撤,加上他身背一张黄牌,和比利亚雷亚尔的变阵使得客队在中场获得压倒性的人数优势,可以有充足的机会进行传接配合。而这种情况,对于博阿斯来说并不是一件好事,尤其是使用后卫压上战术的时候。

绝大多数的一对一发生在比利亚雷亚尔的右路,也就是波尔图的左路。尼尔马应该出现在那个位置,但是他防守并不积极。而对面的阿尔瓦罗佩雷拉站位相当靠前。这样一来,由于他们两个都没人盯防,至少有一个人能够把握机会获得领先。佩雷拉的传中质量很糟糕,而尼尔马虽然浪费了一个反越位后的单刀球机会,但是他给卡尼的传中球质量很高,这也让比利亚雷亚尔在半场结束前收获了一个珍贵的客场进球。

下半场风云突变

中场休息的时候到底发生了什么?为什么下半场就像是换了两支球队在比赛?我们不能排除非战术原因,尤其是比利亚雷亚尔最近比赛中所表现的疲劳,例如0比5惨败给瓦伦西亚那场。

首先加里多在中场休息的时候没有做出换人调整是有些出乎我们的意料的。虽然上半场取得了领先,但是比利亚雷亚尔在右路显得比较不利。如果中场能够换上几个新鲜血液,应该会起到很好的效果。

博阿斯也没有换人,但是他却进行了调整。费尔南多回到常规的位置,而且下半场再也没有回到后防线附近。而穆蒂尼奥注意和他的衔接,两人的组合很好地完成了攻防任务。这也让波尔图的防守更加稳固,下半场45分钟对方只有卡佐拉在开始阶段获得过一次机会。由于波尔图加强了对球权的争夺,比利亚雷亚尔很难再撕开波尔图的防线。

比利亚雷亚尔有两个失球是由于他们过于靠前的后防线。我们注意到比利亚雷亚尔很注意在大禁区线附近展开防守,但是他们并不懂得变通,站位太死,尤其当球的位置靠近禁区时,依然使用如此靠前的站位极易被直塞球打穿。当然在很多情况下这样的站位能够起到应有的作用,但是我们也看到法尔考的头球(第四个进球)和第一个失球(导致点球的那个犯规)都是由于站位太靠前所致。

不仅如此,比利亚雷亚尔还有两个问题,也是上半场波尔图遇到过的。比利亚雷亚尔遇到了本菲卡在葡萄牙德比5分钟内便丢球时同样的难题:首先,浩克的速度和力量让他不可阻挡。他生吃卡塔拉之后为法尔考创造机会攻进了第三个进球,而第四个进球之前的任意球也是拜他所赐。

浩克的活动范围也让比利亚雷亚尔吃尽了苦头。由于中场穆蒂尼奥和费尔南多双人组发挥出色,瓜林可以腾出手来插上助攻,这也让波尔图的阵型更像是一个 4213,尽管瓜林的位置相对靠右。而在右边由于浩克往边路的扯动将卡塔拉吸引开,瓜林得以在无人盯防的情况下插上并且获得进球机会(见61分钟的第二个进球)。对阵本菲卡是完成这一任务的是贝卢斯奇,但是这个套路是一样的。比利亚雷亚尔甚至忘记如何防守角球,让法尔考在远点几乎无人防守的情况下攻入球队的第五球,完成了大四喜。

结论

这又是一场上下半场截然相反的比赛。比利亚雷亚尔在上半场充分利用了波尔图过于靠前的后防线,但是下半场无法应对波尔图更加有效的中场压迫。而在局部地区,特别是浩克所在的区域,比利亚雷亚尔的防线多次被轻松撕开,这也和客队过于执着在大禁区线附近布置防线有关。
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64#
发表于 2011-4-29 17:57:35 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-4-29 18:03 编辑

ls的参考译文题目,译者不知为啥不能尊重原文本意呢?

原文题目直译为:波尔图5-1黄潜之战术分析:法尔考探囊取物般收获大四喜、波尔图迈向都柏林一大步(一只脚大跨进都柏林),不是很好嘛?!
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65#
发表于 2011-5-4 10:23:30 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-5-4 10:26 编辑

Barcelona v Real Madrid: tactical preview
May 3, 2011


Potential starting line-ups

Amongst the squabbling, appealing and conspiracy theories, there’s a football match to play tonight at the Camp Nou.

Now into the fourth part of a four-part Clasico series, there’s relatively little left to say about the potential tactics of both managers. We’ve had one win for Pep Guardiola, one win for Jose Mourinho (in extra time) and one draw. We’ve had different formations, different players and wildly different patterns to matches, and it’s difficult to predict what more can reasonably be expected tonight.

There are two caveats to all this, two reasons why things will be slightly different in this match. The first reason is injury and suspension news, the second is the fact that Barcelona start with a two-goal advantage, meaning both sides’ mentality will change accordingly. These are the two factors to consider.

Team news

For the fourth Clasico in four this season, Real Madrid had a player dismissed in the first leg, Pepe. Both sides would agree that there is no coincidence here, regardless of whether they are blaming (a) a wide-ranging UEFA conspiracy that favours Barcelona, or (b) a natural consequence of Barcelona dominating possession and a physical approach from Real Madrid. Either way, it’s something Mourinho has dealt with well before.

The problem is that Real are without two key defensive players (if not necessarily two key defenders). Sergio Ramos will miss out because of his yellow card, in addition to Pepe’s red card ban. Ricardo Carvalho (suspended for the first leg) will come in alongside Raul Albiol (suspended for the cup final) in a return to the centre-back partnership that started the recent 1-1 draw in the league.

Pepe will probably have no direct replacement. Mourinho used three deep-lying midfielders in the first leg, but with Pepe and Sami Khedira unavailable, he’ll probably move back to the 4-2-3-1 system he’s favoured for most of the season. Lassana Diarra will sit deep with Xabi Alonso, with Mesut Ozil higher up the pitch in the centre, and Angel di Maria on the left. This also means that Cristiano Ronaldo will move to the right, and a striker will come in up top. Emmanuel Adebayor is likely to be favoured over Karim Benzema and Gonzalo Higuian.

Guardiola has fewer problems. In fact, with the pleasing news that Eric Abidal is back in the squad again after successful treatment for a tumour on his liver, and Maxwell rumoured to be nearing fitness, things are looking up – despite Guardiola’s complaints about his injury problems.

Those two are unlikely to be used here, however, with Carles Puyol set to play at left-back again. If Ronaldo is used on the right, this will work reasonably well in theory for Barcelona – Guardiola would rather have Puyol up against the Portuguese forward than Maxwell or Adriano. Barca’s full-backs stayed very deep in the first leg to prevent diagonal balls over the top catching them out, so Puyol will again not be out of place at full-back. There’s a chance Ronaldo could be switched to the left to give him a go at Dani Alves, but that may be a problem defensively.

The return of Andres Iniesta is a more important factor. In theory he should replace Seydou Keita without any problems, but Keita’s physicality was actually very useful in the first leg. With no Pepe, Barcelona don’t have to worry so much about being overpowered in the midfield zone, but it’s not unthinkable that Guardiola could use Keita in the midfield and push Iniesta into the front three, and dropping either Pedro or David Villa.

The situation

The use of a ball-playing midfielder in the front three makes more sense when you consider Barcelona’s two-goal lead. Perhaps that is the most interesting aspect of this game – Guardiola has never come back to the Camp Nou in the Champions League having won the first leg away from home. In Guardiola’s eight ties in this competition, three (Bayern, Chelsea, Shakhtar) have seen the first leg played at home, three have seen a first leg score draw away from home (Lyon, Stuttgart, Arsenal (the first time)) and two have seen a first leg defeat away from home (Inter, Arsenal (the second time)).

So what do you get when probably the best side in history at keeping the ball doesn’t actually need to win the game? Well, we don’t know. But it could be a remarkably dominant display of possession. Granted, the games against Lyon, Stuttgart and Arsenal were similar in that a 0-0 would have done Barcelona in the second leg, but there was still some desire for a goal. A two-goal cushion is something entirely different, and Guardiola would be content if his centre-backs just played one-twos for the whole game.

Xavi has denied the suggestion that Barcelona will try and ‘kill’ the game, with the inevitable soundbite – “We can’t just control our 0-2 lead. This team can only attack. Our fans also wouldn’t allow us to play different” – but it’s hard to believe Barcelona will leave any spaces at the back, or risk conceding possession too cheaply.

The situation of the tie has bigger consequences for Real Madrid, however. They spent the first leg sitting back in their own half with only Ronaldo closing down – see the first clip in the video below.

<video>

In short, this will have to change – Real will have to play higher up the pitch, they’ll have to try and force Barcelona into mistakes, or conceding possession. They did this very well in the Copa del Rey final, but they used Pepe as their main destructive force in midfield, they also had Khedira in the side, they also had the pace of Ramos at the back, they also weren’t playing at the Camp Nou. It will be very difficult for Mourinho to press Barcelona for 90 minutes.

The biggest issue is how to deal with Xavi in Pepe’s absence. Pepe near-enough man-marked the Spanish midfielder in the last two meetings, and Real were exposed after his red card. Ozil could be given that job, but in the 5-0 earlier in the season, Xavi simply moved higher up the pitch and dictated play from there.

Therefore, it is likely that he’ll start reasonably cautiously. Each of the three recent Clasicos have finished 0-0 at half time, and Mourinho may want his side to sit back and make sure they don’t lose the tie within the first half, before pushing forward late on, pressing intensely, and hoping Barcelona get tired and/or complacent.

A year ago Mourinho’s semi-final victory was sealed at the Nou Camp in remarkable circumstances, but progression from this tie would be even more amazing.
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发表于 2011-5-4 10:27:10 | 显示全部楼层
231楼参考译文:占位
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发表于 2011-5-4 10:28:12 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-5-4 10:49 编辑

Barcelona 1-1 Real Madrid: Barca progress
May 4, 2011


The starting line-ups

Barcelona rarely looked under real pressure and completed a 3-1 aggregate victory.

Pep Guardiola named the expected XI – Andres Iniesta returned from injury to replace Seydou Keita. Javier Mascherano continued at centre-back, with Carles Puyol at left-back.

Jose Mourinho switched to his 4-2-3-1 system but made two surprise selections. Kaka was in ahead of Mesut Ozil, whilst Gonzalo Higuain started upfront. Mourinho was not in attendance at the stadium (as far as is known at time of publishing) so assistant Aitor Karanka was in charge for the night.

Pleasingly, the game was less scrappy than the first leg – there were fewer squabbles and more goalscoring chances.

Real press upfront

Fearful of Barca dominating possession and killing the game, Real pushed up and pressed Barcelona. They did this reasonably effectively – they forced Barcelona into rare mistakes at the back, and combined with a pitch that looked particularly rain-sodden towards the end Barcelona were defending in the opening period, it seemed a Real chance might come from the pressing.

The other major tactical news was the use of Cristiano Ronaldo on the left, up against Dani Alves. This is where he has been used for much of the season, but Mourinho had been reluctant to use him on that flank because of Alves’ attacking threat. With Ronaldo ineffective when on the right in this series, he was given a go on the left – and whilst Ronaldo will be disappointed he didn’t influence the game more, he was a constant threat when he picked the ball up on the flank. He was assisted by Marcelo, who was positionally brave and created overlaps, allowing Ronaldo to come inside. Alves was beaten a couple of times, and Mascherano had to come over from centre-back to help out.

Midfield

The battle was 3 v 3 in the centre of midfield, where Real’s pressing continued. Pepe had been the key man in the previous two games, playing high up the pitch and aggressively patrolling the midfield zone, and Real missed his presence. Kaka stuck tightly to Sergio Busquets – maybe too tightly at times, as he was himself marked by Busquets when Real won possession.

Xavi was closed down by Xabi Alonso, the left-sided holding player (in itself a more positive strategy from Real – it had been Mesut Ozil (in the Kaka role) who had been given that job back in the 5-0). In that game, Xavi took advantage of Ozil’s natural tendencies by moving higher up the pitch – here, he took advantage of Alonso’s by dropping deeper and linking with Busquets. Alonso didn’t always track him, so Xavi’s passing dominance was even more obvious than usual – he completed 126 passes. The next highest was Busquets on 80.

Closing down deeper

Diarra was broadly tracking Iniesta but also had to provide the energy and physicality of Pepe. He had a good game overall but was lucky that he was only shown a single yellow card, as he broke up play with eight fouls.


Diarra and Carvalho both closed down quickly, but conceded fouls in doing so

The same was true of Ricardo Carvalho, a result of Lionel Messi dropping deep in his false nine role in order to make the battle 4 v 3 in midfield. Real couldn’t pass Messi onto a midfielder, and so Carvalho had to come out of defence and try and nick the ball from in front of Messi, with nearly disastrous consequences.

When Carvalho wasn’t diving in, Messi enjoyed time on the ball, space between the lines, and also held off challenges to create chances. Barcelona had a spell of concerted pressure just before the break, which largely came from pressing of their own.

Second half

Barcelona went ahead early on in the second period, when Iniesta’s great through ball found Pedro Rodriguez to finish smartly. This put the home side well and truly in command of the game.

Guardiola’s strategy worked well – he could have instructed his side simply to try and keep possession of the ball, but with Real pressing high up, it was right to try and exploit spaces at the back. The goal was a direct result of this – Real had five players around the opposition penalty area when Victor Valdes had the ball, and he sidefooted a pass out to Alves on the right flank – Barca had 5 v 5, and made the most of the situation.

Subs

Real immediately changed things with the introduction of Adebayor for Higuain, presumably to try and take advantage of Adebayor’s strength and aerial dominance. Ozil replaced Kaka soon after – the fact Real replaced the two players who were surprise inclusions suggests Mourinho made a mistake with his starting XI.

Ozil went to the left, allowing di Maria into the centre of the pitch – and Real’s pressing looked reinvigorated. Their goal came because of that pressing – Marcelo tracked Pedro deep into the Barca half, put pressure on the ball and forced a risky pass, then Alonso pressed Xavi and nipped in ahead – winning the ball and launching the attack that ended with Marcelo’s finish.


Both sides pressed high up, and intercepted passes in the opposition half

This prompted a nervous spell for the home side, but they eventually regained their passing ability and saw the game out well. Real had threatened to come back in the game, but Marcelo’s goal was actually their final attempt of the match. They were unable to close down for the entire game, the pressing dropped towards the end and passes became long, tired straight balls forward.

Barcelona weren’t too fussed about scoring a second, brought on Seydou Keita and Eric Abidal to see the game out, and 1-1 looked likely from 80 minutes onwards.

Conclusion

Real’s European Cup bid may have come to an end in Barcelona, but they really lost this tie back in Madrid. With the obvious caveat that Barcelona didn’t need to win the game, a 1-1 draw away at the Nou Camp is a fine result – it was the 0-2 home defeat that cost Real. Mourinho’s tactics from the start in the first leg seemed surprising at the time and misguided in hindsight, and his failure to adjust after Pepe’s sending-off was the deciding factor in the tie.

On the other hand, Guardiola will consider this a job well done. It’s difficult to remember a period in the 180 minutes when Barcelona looked second best – they played their natural game to an extent, but were also more reserved in certain ways – particularly with the use of the full-backs, who remained in position for most of the tie and largely prevented quick Real breaks down the flanks – the strategy that was so effective in the cup final.

It wasn’t a contest dominated by tactics, but it was a good advert for pressing and playing high up – both because Barcelona won, and because Real looked far better when they played a proactive game themselves.
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68#
发表于 2011-5-4 10:31:47 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-5-4 10:50 编辑

233楼参考译文
-----------------------
巴萨1-1皇马战术分析:压迫积极一点,比赛美好一些
由 Rivaldinho 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


首发阵型图

巴萨看上去基本上没有受到威胁,以总比分3-1完赛。

瓜迪奥拉的首发11人在预料之中,伊涅斯塔从伤病中归来取代了凯塔。马斯切拉诺继续出任中卫,普约尔出任左后卫。

穆里尼奥切换到了4-2-3-1体系,有两个非常意外的选择,卡卡首发挤掉了厄齐尔,和伊瓜因一同突前。据悉穆里尼奥并未到场,这场比赛由他的助手卡兰卡指挥。

幸好比赛比第一回合要流畅些,争执少了,得分机会多了。

皇马的前场压迫

由于忌惮巴萨会用控球耗死比赛,皇马开始压上压迫巴萨,他们的行动卓有成效,巴萨防线出现了不多见的错误,再加上这个因下过雨而泥泞不堪的球场,巴萨开局阶段处于守势,貌似皇马会从这样的压迫中获得机会。

另外一则重要的“战术新闻”是C罗居左,顶着阿尔维斯,这是他本赛季大多数时候出现的地方,但是穆里尼奥先前因为忌惮阿尔维斯的攻击力没有把C罗放在那一侧。但是整个系列赛C罗在右路表现平平,这次他来到了左路,C罗会因为自己没能更多地影响比赛而感到失望,但实际上他只要在边路拿球就是个威胁。他有马塞洛支援,后者压上大胆,可以覆盖左路,让C罗内切,阿尔维斯经常面对此二人,马斯切拉诺不得不跑出来帮忙。

中场

中场是3v3的对决,皇马在那里依旧进行着压迫。佩佩是过去两场的关键球员,他在场上压得非常考试,有效扫荡了中场,皇马非常想念他。这场的卡卡紧紧贴住布斯克斯,有时候都嫌贴得太紧,皇马赢得球权的时候攻受关系又会反过来。

哈维被皇马偏左的后腰阿隆索紧逼,5-0那场比赛哈维利用了厄齐尔压得过上的倾向,这场比赛他又利用了阿隆索拖得太厚的特点,和布斯克斯有效衔接。阿隆索没有一直跟着他,所以哈维的传球统治力比以往更明显,他完成了126次传球,第二多的布斯克斯则是80次。

后场的防守紧逼

迪亚拉一直在追击伊涅斯塔,但是他也必须提供佩佩展现的能量和身体,总体而言他踢得很好,但是他只拿到一张黄牌已是走运,整场比赛他有8次犯规。



迪亚拉和卡瓦略压迫积极,犯规颇多

同样的情况发生在卡瓦略身上,梅西回撤变身伪中锋以增加中场人数优势,皇马没法因为梅西增加一个中场,于是卡瓦略跑出防线试图上抢梅西,但是他的防守是灾难性的。

但是卡瓦略不这么做,梅西就能享受控球,享受空间,他能够摆脱防守创造机会。在半场结束前受到了一些压力,但这主要是他们自己的压迫战术所造成的。

下半场

巴萨啊下半场早早取得领先,伊涅斯塔漂亮的直传助攻佩德罗机敏得分,这让主队完全掌控了比赛。

瓜迪奥拉的策略行之有效,他本可以让自己的球队简简单单控球就好,但是皇马既然压上了,那么开发他们背后的空间就是正确的选择。这粒进球就是直接结果,巴尔德斯拿球时皇马五人在巴萨禁区周围,他把球分给右路的阿尔维斯时巴萨形成了5打5,很好地利用了这一局面。

换人

皇马立马用阿德巴约换下伊瓜因,试图利用他的力量和空中优势。厄齐尔也很快换下卡卡,皇马之所以拿下这两位意外的先发,暗示着穆里尼奥在安排首发阵容时犯了错。

厄齐尔来到左路,让迪马里亚内收,皇马的压迫也再度兴起。他们的进球来自于压迫,马塞洛在巴萨半场跟防佩德罗,迫使对方做出冒险的传球,阿隆索又压迫哈维,断下皮球发起进攻,最后马塞洛完成一击。




两队都在对方半场疯狂抢断

这让主队有些紧张,但是很快他们就重新找回了传球的感觉,很好地搞定了比赛。皇马貌似要反扑,可实际上马塞洛的进球是他们这场最后的尝试。他们没法整场都压迫对手,随着压迫松懈下来,传球也变成了简单粗暴的长传。

巴萨也不急着进第二个球,凯塔和阿比达尔出战,从80分钟开始1-1的终场比分就已然注定。

结论

皇马的欧冠之旅在巴塞罗那走到了尽头,但真正导致他们失利的还是马德里一战。巴萨这场无需赢球,在诺坎普1-1的平局对皇马来说也算不错,让皇马输掉这个淘汰赛的还是主场的0-2。穆里尼奥第一回合的策略看起来有些奇怪,佩佩下场后他没能做出及时调整,这也成为了决定性的因素。

另外一方面瓜迪奥拉很好地考虑了这项任务。过去180分钟巴萨基本没有落于下风,他们很大程度发挥了自己的本能,但是在某些方面也有些保守,尤其是边后卫的使用,大部分时候他们站住位置防止皇马两翼的快速反击,这一战术在国王杯决赛曾让巴萨大吃苦头。

这场比赛不是真正的战术对决,却是提上压迫策略的好广告,一方面因为巴萨获得了胜利,另一方面也因为皇马踢得更积极,看上去确实踢得更好了。

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69#
发表于 2011-5-5 13:47:33 | 显示全部楼层
法比奥这个进攻菜鸟,打阿森纳时,技术上短板很明显,但是这场球优势明显。瓦伦西亚在上一场酋长球场时就该首发的Alex2011 发表于 2011-5-5 09:53


双胞胎不好认,这一场是拉斐尔
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70#
发表于 2011-5-15 06:04:35 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-5-15 06:28 编辑

Manchester City 1-0 Stoke: Man City clinch first trophy since 1976 after Toure strike
足总杯决赛曼城1-0斯托克城之战术分析:图雷绝杀进球助曼城收获自1976年以来的第一座冠军奖杯

May 14, 2011


The starting line-ups

Yaya Toure’s powerful shot 15 minutes from time gave Roberto Mancini’s men the victory.
丫丫图雷在第75分钟的强力射门进球为罗伯特曼奇尼球队带来巨大胜利果实。

Mancini was able to call upon Carlos Tevez upfront, meaning Edin Dzeko dropped to the bench. Mario Balotelli started on the wing, and Aleksander Kolarov played over Pablo Zabaleta at left-back.

Tony Pulis brought Matthew Etherington back into the side – though he didn’t look fit – and Robert Huth also recovered from injury to play at the back. Thomas Sorensen got the nod over Asmir Begovic in goal.

City were better throughout the game – never quite in complete control, but always the better side. They carried out their gameplan more effectively than Stoke.

Formations / Stoke threat

The battle of formations was pretty much as expected. City were 4-2-3-1, Stoke were more 4-4-1-1 than 4-4-2, as Jon Walters was asked to keep goalside of Nigel de Jong in the midfield zone.

That was part of Stoke’s problem, because Walters was therefore forced to play far too deep and this meant Kenwyne Jones lacked support throughout the contest. For his part, Jones played the centre-forward role very well – he won free-kicks from Vincent Kompany (who looked uncomfortable coming up the pitch) won headers against both centre-backs, had a penalty shout in the first half when he caused Kompany problems, and also had Stoke’s best chance of the game when getting on the end of an Etherington ball over the top in the second.

That was the extent of Stoke’s threat, however. With Walters deep, Etherington lacking his sharpness and Jermaine Pennant’s delivery from the right rather poor, Stoke were underwhelming. Stoke are notoriously a long ball side , but their passing performance in open play was poor even by their standards – Opta recorded, for example, that Stoke’s first half pass completion ratio was their worst of the season, and by the end of the game half of their outfield players finished with below a 50% pass completion ratio. They were outnumbered in the midfield zone and didn’t spread the play wide well enough.

City overlaps

In open play, the main point of note was how City brought their wide players inside and were fluid in and around the penalty box. Sometimes this produced chances in itself – Balotelli cut in and forced a superb save from Sorensen, whilst Silva found himself with a great chance but thumped the ball into the ground and over the bar. On other occasions, it opened up space for the City full-backs to get forward – Kolarov was a real threat down the left but his delivery was erratic. Micah Richards was a little too reserved on the other side and could have asked more questions of the half-fit Etherington, especially with the excellent Nigel de Jong providing protection deep in midfield.

Delap’s throws were dealt with reasonably well, and Pennant’s free-kicks from the right were disappointing. In fact, the most interesting set-pieces were goal-kicks – when Stoke had one, they brought their wide players inside to try and get on the end of Jones’ flick-ons (the only time he had support in the game) and when City had one, Stoke pressed them high up the pitch which forced Joe Hart to go long, often conceding possession. Hart also conceded possession when he tried quick goal-kicks after set-pieces, with Stoke’s centre-backs were up the pitch. He is a fine goalkeeper, but his distribution is not quite at the level it should be.

Aside from the wide players coming inside, City often looked dangerous when players moved forward from deep, central positions. Both Toure and Kompany had efforts from long distance – with Stoke’s two central midfielders moving towards their own centre-backs quickly and Walters staying on De Jong (rather than in a specific zone), City had space in that area of the pitch.

Second half


The line-ups when the goal went in

Pulis elected not to make a chance at half time, despite his two wide players struggling and Stoke being outplayed in midfield.

With the same XIs for the second half, the game continued in the same pattern. City were the better side, and despite Jones’ golden chance, looked more likely in front of goal.

Etherington’s injury eventually meant he had to depart, with Dean Whitehead coming on and Delap going left. This meant that they looked more readily to Pennant on the right, but Kolarov was more defensive in the second half and had few problems.

Mancini sub

Mancini gambled on 72 minutes with an attacking move – Gareth Barry off, Adam Johnson on. Barry may have been carrying a knock, but it was still positive for Mancini to go with an extra attacking player, rather than with Patrick Vieira, for example. Silva came inside and Johnson went to the left, with Toure dropping deeper.

This had a clear impact for the goal – Toure may have been starting off further out, of course, but he still got forward, and it was notable how many players City had in the box for the goal, as Toure arrived late to crash the ball in. That wouldn’t have happened if the more reserved Barry had been the ’second function’ midfielder rather than Toure, so Mancini’s substitution deserves credit.

Stoke caused few problems late on. John Carew replaced Delap with Walters coming to the left, but Stoke looked physically drained and were unable to win the ball back quickly enough. Their natural response without the ball – to drop deep and wait for attacks to come, was no longer good enough and Manchester City were calm in the final ten minutes.

Mancini brought on Zabaleta for Tevez and went 5-4-1ish, with a spare man at the back against the double aerial threat of Carew and Jones, and Vieira replaced Silva very late on for extra protection, but Manchester City were comfortable and deserved the win.

Conclusion

Stoke didn’t play well. They didn’t carry out either aspect of their gameplan well enough – the classic physical/long ball threat was not as dangerous as usual, partly because of a high line from Mancini, and partly because Jones didn’t get enough support. They didn’t play well enough on the floor, either, unlike in the 5-0 semi final win over Bolton – despite a fine pitch, the passing was wayward and they were hampered by Etherington and Pennant’s reduced mobility.

Mancini’s side were not spectacular, but very well organised and, with the exception of Jones single-handedly causing Kompany and Joleon Lescott physical problems, composed with and without the ball. Tactically, Mancini got things spot on here. His side were in control of the game early on, and then he injected another attacking player to add fresh impetus when Stoke were growing into the contest.
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71#
发表于 2011-5-15 06:10:54 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-5-15 13:12 编辑

上楼参考译文
--------------------------




图雷在终场前15分钟的劲射为曼奇尼的球队带来了胜利。

本场比赛特维斯可以出战,也就是说哲科得坐板凳。巴洛特利位居侧翼,科拉罗夫挤掉萨巴莱塔出任左后卫。

虽然埃瑟林顿看起来并未完全恢复,但是普里斯还是让他首发出战,胡特及时伤愈出现在后防,索伦森取代贝戈维奇出任首发门将。
曼城整场表现更胜一筹,但是从未完全掌控,他们在战术执行上比斯托克城更有成效。

阵型 / 斯托克城的威胁

双方阵型尽在意料之中,曼城是4-2-3-1,斯托克城更像4-4-1-1而非4-4-2,沃尔特斯还有在中场阻滞德容的任务。

这是斯托克城的一个问题所在,沃尔特斯撤得太深,琼斯缺少支援。琼斯本身的中锋角色扮演得非常好,在定位球中他一次次战胜孔帕尼,上半场在禁区内孔帕尼还对他有一次疑似犯规,琼斯也在下半场接埃瑟林顿传球获得了全队整场最好的机会。

但这就是斯托克城进攻威胁的极限了,沃尔特斯撤得太深,埃瑟林顿不够犀利,彭南特的右路传送没谱,斯托克城的进攻碌碌无为。他们确实是长传球队,但是他们本场的传接表现比平时的水准还差,OPTA显示斯托克城上半场的传球成功率是整个赛季最低,全场比赛有一半的球员传球成功率低于5成。他们在中场区域人数处于劣势,也没有很好地在边路做出文章。

曼城占到上风

运动战中的关键是曼城让他们的边路球员内收,在禁区周围的活动非常流畅。这样做也制造了机会——巴洛特利内切射门逼迫索伦森做出神奇扑救,席尔瓦也有面对空门的机会,但是他的反弹球高出横梁。另外这也给了曼城边后卫前插的空间,科拉罗夫在左路是个绝对威胁,但是他的传中一塌糊涂。理查兹相对左路较为保守,鉴于埃瑟林顿状态不佳德容保护得当,他本可以贡献更多。

对于德拉普的手榴弹战术曼城处理得当,彭南特的右路定位球则让人失望。实际上最有趣的定位球还是球门球。斯托克城一旦有球门球机会,他们就让边路球员内收捡琼斯的二点,曼城拿到球门球时斯托克城就会在前场展开紧逼,迫使哈特只能使用长传,这样做的后果往往是丧失球权。哈特在摘到定位球之后的快发球门球也总是找不到点,他是个好门将,但是他对前场的传送还不够级别。

撇开边路球员内收不谈,曼城中路球员的后插上也很有威胁,图雷和孔帕尼都有尝试远射,斯托克城的中场球员一直都试图快速靠近本方中卫,沃尔特斯要盯梢德容,在那个区域曼城是有空间的。



下半场

普利斯的球队上半场没有创造一次机会,他的两个边路球员踢得很挣扎,在中场又失势了。
下半场还是同意两批人,比赛也是同意的模式。撇开琼斯的黄金机会不谈曼城更占优势,看上去总有破门的可能。
埃瑟林顿的伤病意味着他没法继续踢下去,怀特赫德出战德拉普拉到左路,这意味着他们更加依赖右路的彭南特,但是科拉罗夫下半场踢得更保守,因此问题不大。

曼奇尼换人

曼奇尼在第72分钟做出赌博,他在进攻端做出换人,巴里下场,亚当-约翰逊出战。巴里也许是受了伤,但是曼奇尼这时候能派上一名进攻球员而不是维埃拉之类的球员还是很积极的。席尔瓦内收,约翰逊来到左路,图雷位置更靠后。

这对于进球的效果显而易见,图雷的位置是后撤了,但他还是在前插,看看那个进球吧,有多少曼城球员在禁区里,图雷赶到后将球抽入网窝。要是图雷的位置站的还是先前的更保守的巴里,这个进球便不会发生,所以曼奇尼的换人应该获得肯定。

斯托克城之后也没制造多少威胁,卡鲁替换德拉普出战,但是斯托克城看起来有些力竭,无法很快地夺回球权。他们无球时的反应便是后撤,等着对手攻过来,曼城在最后10分钟也足够冷静。

之后曼奇尼用萨巴莱塔换下特维斯,阵型类似于5-4-1,面对卡鲁和琼斯的双塔防线需多一人应对,维埃拉在最后时刻换下席尔瓦提供更多保护,曼城最终还是安然保住胜局,他们的表现也配得上这场胜利。

结论

斯托克城踢得不好,他们没能很好地执行战术计划——经典的长传冲吊战术不如往常奏效,一方面也是因为曼奇尼指挥球队防线压上,另外一方面琼斯没有得到足够的支援。他们的地面配合也不如当初5-0战胜博尔顿时那么好,他们有很多横传,埃埃瑟林顿和彭南特机动性下降也让他们推进受阻。

曼奇尼的球队踢得并非说多么出色,但是他们踢得很有组织性,除了琼斯利用身体优势给孔帕尼和莱斯科特制造了麻烦,其余时刻有球无球他们都应对自如。战术上曼奇尼找对了点,他的球队从一开始便掌控比赛,之后在斯托克城略有起色时他又遣上另外一名进攻球员增加冲击力。
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72#
发表于 2011-5-15 13:08:25 | 显示全部楼层
据说曼城颁奖时,卡梅隆首相到场了
http://bbs.goalhi.com/2270502.html
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73#
发表于 2011-6-6 17:53:13 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-6-6 17:55 编辑

Inter 3-1 Palermo: Sneijder-Eto’o combination twice opens up Palermo
May 30, 2011


The starting line-ups

Leonardo won his first trophy as a coach, as Inter lifted the Coppa Italia.

Wesley Sneijder was fit to start for Inter, with Yuto Nagatomo at right-back, and Cristian Chivu on the opposite side.
Delio Rossi used his 4-3-2-1 system. Fabio Liverani was left out, and Afriyie Acquah played the holding role.

Palermo had the majority of possession, spent most of the game in the Inter half, and probably had more chances. They lacked a cutting edge, however, and Inter were ruthless with their quick breaks – a little like in the Champions League final last season.

Inter tactics

Palermo’s Christmas tree shape was largely as expected, but Leonardo’s formation was a slight surprise. A 4-3-1-2 was expected, but instead the Brazilian chose a 4-4-1-1 system, with Samuel Eto’o high up on the left, Wesley Sneijder in a free role, and Giampaolo Pazzini alone upfront. This was welcome news, as it made the match-up between formations more interesting.

Inter’s attacking build-up play was poor when they didn’t break quickly. Nagatomo tried to get forward down the right, covered by Javier Zanetti, but on the other side Chivu wasn’t quick enough to overlap to allow Eto’o inside. In the centre, Sneijder often got into space between the lines but passes rarely came his way – Thiago Motta and Dejan Stankovic are both good ball-players, but were more concerned about protecting their back four from Palermo’s double trequartista threat than playing football themselves. Meanwhile, Pazzini was isolated upfront, and hopeful lobbed balls towards him in the air were predictably unsuccessful.Battlegrounds

Partly because of that, Javier Pastore and Josip Ilicic weren’t particularly involved in the early stages of the match, although there was one occasion when Inter’s defence was opened up when both Lucio and Andrea Ranocchia got dragged up the pitch – this should have put Pastore in, but his control was poor.

There were two interesting battlegrounds on the pitch, and both were eventually won by Inter. The first was in Palermo’s left-back zone, where Mattia Cassani wanted to attack and provide width for Palermo, but was troubled by the presence of Eto’o.

The second was Acquah against Sneijder. The young Ghanaian allowed Sneijder to go free between the lines and got sucked into the midfield battle ahead of him – it’s difficult to see why, because Palermo had numbers in that zone (more so that if Inter had played 4-3-1-2, certainly) and Acquah had no need to get involved. He could have stayed goalside of Sneijder, but moved up the pitch, missed a tackle, and then Sneijder sent the ball through to Eto’o, who came inside and finished with typical confidence.

Second half


The line-ups midway through the second half, after some substitutions

Rossi really pushed his side forward in the second period. It was immediately obvious that the two full-backs were even more attack-minded (and even wider) than before the break, and on 54 minutes Palermo brought on another forward, Fabrizio Miccoli – with Acquah sacrificed.

This was obviously a very attack-minded move, and some reorganisation was necessary. Antonio Nocerino and Giulio Migliaccio played a little deeper to compensate for the absence of a true holding player, and Ilicic also dropped back a little to the right. Miccoli played left-of-centre, Pastore came to an inside-right position, and Abel Hernandez continued to play upfront.

This meant that Palermo now had a front four playing very narrow – but this was OK, because the width was coming from the full-backs, keeping the active playing zone large enough to stretch Inter. And Palermo played some fantastic football – Ilicic saw more of the ball because he wasn’t really being picked up by anyone, and Pastore kept beating players cleverly. All that was needed was a finish, but Hernandez’s shots were poor, and Inter got some last-ditch blocks in.

Closing stages

Leonardo saw Cassani as a threat down the right, and Eto’o was reluctant to drop back and defend too much, so Goran Pandev replaced Pazzini, with Eto’o going upfront. This had two benefits – first, Pandev was more defensively aware on the left flank, and second, with Palermo pushing forward and playing high up the pitch, Eto’o’s pace was an obvious danger in a central role. He took up good positions outside the two centre-backs, and Sneijder kept trying to play him in down the centre-right channel – a few balls were cut out by substitute Moris Carrozzieri, but the Dutchman (now enjoying even more space after Acquah’s departure) eventually played another ball to Eto’o, and that same combination doubled the lead.

That should have been game over, but there was a flurry of activity very late on. Ezequiel Munoz scored a hilariously free header from a corner, then was sent-off and left a hole at the back, and substitute Diego Milito pounced to make it 3-1 in stoppage time.

Conclusion

An entertaining game – Palermo were better in midfield and their build-up play was very good, but Inter had the most deadly player on the pitch, and Samuel Eto’o scored two stereotypical goals to settle the game.

It’s fair to say that both managers performed well here. Rossi’s side were frequently creating chances by playing neatly in midfield, but were lacking in the penalty box, whilst Leonardo’s surprise starting line-up made the Sneijder-Eto’o combination possible for the first goal, and his substitutions also worked nicely in the second half.

A good tactical battle.
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74#
发表于 2011-6-6 17:55:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-6-9 17:44 编辑

269楼参考译文
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[翻译团]意大利杯决赛战术分析:棋逢对手莱帅封神,再杀巴勒莫国米捧杯
由 omarstone 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

国际米兰3-1巴勒莫:斯内德-埃托奥双剑合璧,两破巴勒莫

首发阵容

莱昂纳多赢得了自己作为教练的第一个冠军,也使国际米兰获得了意大利杯的殊荣。

韦斯利-斯内德回到首发,长友佑都任右后卫,克里斯坦-齐沃任左后卫。

德里奥-罗西使用了4-3-2-1阵型,利维拉尼没有首发,阿克夸赫站司职后腰。

控球率上,巴勒莫占优,比赛的大部分时间都在国米半场展开,而且,巴勒莫本该制造出很多机会。但是,他们缺少前锋的一锤定音,相反国米则继续依靠他们犀利的反击—一如上个赛季的冠军杯决赛。
序幕:国米的先手

巴勒莫果然排出他们的圣诞树阵型,但是莱昂纳多的布阵则有点奇怪。本来普遍的猜测是4-3-1-2,但是,意大利人出其不意地选择了4-4-1-1,埃托奥位于左翼,韦斯利-斯内德自由人,帕齐尼单箭头居前。这是个好消息,因为这使得对手在阵型上的博弈更加精彩有趣。

国米未打破僵局时,他们的地面进攻并不好。长友佑都尝试从萨内蒂覆盖的右侧下底,但是另一侧的齐沃不能快速的压上让埃托奥可以内切到禁区内。中场,斯内德通常能进入衔接中前场的区域,但是却很少能拿到球。莫塔和斯坦科维奇都是控球高手,但是他们将更多的精力投入到如何保护后场上,因为巴勒莫双前腰的协作显然比他们各自为战有更大的威胁。同时,突前的帕齐尼显得孤立无援,可想而知,长传冲吊是不太现实的。

开幕:战场厮杀

帕斯托雷和伊利西奇并没有在开场就完全融入比赛。当卢西奥和拉诺齐亚压上助攻,国米防线洞开时,巴勒莫曾有一个绝好的机会—这本该给帕斯托雷制造出机会,但是他的控球出现了失误。

场上曾出现两次有趣的对抗,但两次都是国米获得了最终的胜利。第一次发生在国米的左后方:马蒂亚-卡萨尼想通过压上助攻来提升巴勒莫的进攻宽度,但是埃托奥的出现打翻了他的如意算盘。
第二次是阿克夸赫和斯内德的对决。年轻的加纳人让斯内德闲庭信步般地游走于中前场之间,很难看出这是为什么,因为这个区域内巴勒莫安置了好几名球员(如果不是,国米就该使用4-3-1-2阵型了),阿克夸赫没必要来覆盖这个区域。他本应该卡住斯内德的位置,但是他选择了逼抢,进而是铲球失误,紧接着,斯内德传给了已经埋伏在禁区的埃托奥,后者极度自信地完成了最后一击。

高潮:易边再战


双方换人后的下半场阵容

果然,罗西在下半场要求自己的球员压上,而且立刻收到了效果:比分被改写之后,边后卫将更多的精力放在了进攻端(而且打得更开),而且在第54分钟时候,罗西用另一个前锋米科利换下了阿克夸赫。

这当然是吹响进攻号角的提示,而且球队也确实需要重新安排一些战术。为了弥补缺少一个真正的后腰球员的损失,安东尼奥-诺切里诺和吉乌里奥-米格里亚西奥稍稍后移,伊利西奇扯到左侧拖后一点的位置。米科利打左中,帕斯托雷来到了右中的位置,阿贝尔-赫尔南德斯继续突前。

这意味着巴勒莫已经在前场堆砌了四名球员,这会使空间变得狭窄—但是,这也没问题,因为空间来自边后卫,这样可以保持进攻球员的地区足够开阔以压缩国米。巴勒莫打出了几次漂亮的进攻—伊利西奇得到了更多的持球机会,因为他没有被人盯防,帕斯托雷的过人也十分巧妙。他们还需要一个杀手-可以一锤定音,不过可惜,赫尔南德斯忘带了射门靴,而且国米的后防化解了这些进攻。

尾声:跌宕起伏

莱昂纳多发现卡萨尼的右路下底很有威胁以及埃托奥回防后撤不积极,所以,他用格兰-潘多夫替换掉了帕齐尼,从而将埃托奥顶在了最前方。这有两个好处—一来潘多夫可以在左侧防区投入更多的精力;二来随着巴勒莫的压上,埃托奥的速度会在中路形成一个很大的威胁。埃托奥占据着两名中卫之前很好的位置,斯内德一直都在尝试在右肋部给他塞球—一些传球被换上场的莫里斯-卡罗齐耶里断掉。但是,荷兰人(在阿克夸赫下场后,得到了更多的空间)最终第二次助攻了埃托奥,而且是几乎一样的配合使国米取得了两球的领先。

这本已经终结了比赛,但是稍后却掀起了高潮。穆尼奥斯通过角球打进了一个头球,但是随后他的被罚出场致使巴勒莫在少一人的情况下,后场出现漏洞,替补上场的迭戈-米利托在补时阶段将比分定格在3-1。
画外:结论

一场有趣的比赛—巴勒莫在中场表现更好,而且他们的地面进攻更有效率,但是场上国米却有一个最致命的杀手,埃托奥两个教科书般的进球终结了比赛。

公平地说,两个教练的指挥已经很出色了,罗西的球队确实通过简洁的传球频繁地制造着机会,但是却缺少禁区内的一锤定音。同时,莱昂纳多出其不意的阵容设计使斯内德-埃托奥这对组合完成了第一个进球,而且他下半场的精彩换人也着实可圈可点。

这是一次精彩的战术对决!
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发表于 2011-6-6 17:56:46 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Penelope 于 2011-6-6 17:59 编辑

Portugal 1-0 Norway: Portugal attack, Norway sit back, and Postiga gets the breakthrough
June 5, 2011


The starting line-ups

Helder Postiga’s well-taken goal gave Portugal an important victory.

Paulo Bento was without Ricardo Carvalho through injury, so Pepe was partnered by Bruno Alves. Joao Pereira came in at right-back, and the midfield trio was the three Ms.

Egil Olsen played his usual 4-5-1 system, with the expected XI. John Carew was upfront, and Vadim Demidov came in at the back for his first start in the Euro 2012 qualifying campaign.

The game was simultaneously extremely predictable and quite exciting. The two sides have vastly different styles of football – Portugal have skilled technical players, but a classic problem with potency upfront, and a secondary problem with creativity from midfield. On the other hand, Olsen always favours men behind the ball, before launching quick breaks with direct passes forward.

Shapes

Portugal used a 4-3-3 system, with two wingers coming inside, and attacking full-backs. Raul Meireles played deep in midfield and had time on the ball to distribute intelligently forward, whilst Cristiano Ronaldo played slightly narrower than Nani on the opposite side.

Olsen’s system is never quite a pure 4-5-1, because he likes to use one wide midfielder (Morten Gamst Pedersen) and one player who is a winger-cum-second striker (Erik Huseklepp). Huseklepp plays higher up the pitch and makes diagonal runs inside, so Bjorn Helge Riise had to move out to the right to cover that flank when Portugal broke quickly. This was a slight worry, with Ronaldo and Fabio Coentrao down Portugal’s left.

Battles

With Norway content to drop deep and favouring a zonal system of defence, the game was not so much about individual battles according to the formations. It was more about two factors – (a) whether Portugal had the creativity to break down Norway and (b) whether Norway’s transitions were good enough to cause a threat on the break.

With Norway defending quite deep and narrow, Portugal were keen to get the ball wide quickly. Ronaldo looked to come inside and shoot but was quickly surrounded by players, and Nani was more involved early on down the right. The 3 v 3 battle in the centre made things congested in that zone and Portugal rarely looked like creating chances from that part of the pitch, although the long-range ability of Meireles and Carlos Martins (plus the two wingers coming inside) meant Norway had to close down quickly. Carew played left-of-centre up against Pepe, so the Real Madrid player was unable to bring the ball out of the back, as he often does to create an extra man in midfield.

Norway breaks

Despite spending most of the game on the edge of their own box, Norway had a couple of great chances in the first half when they stormed forward quickly. Carew was barely involved in the game, and Pedersen didn’t play particularly well, but Huseklepp was a threat down the right – he had a good early chance on the counter, and also combined well with Bjorn Helge Riise, who played a very energetic game and made good ‘underlapping’ runs inside Huseklepp.

With Carew marshalled well by Pepe, diagonal ball were the key for Norway in getting up the pitch, and they were fortunate to have Henning Hauger free ahead of their back four – he was usually in space, and had time on the ball (plus a clear vision of what was ahead of him) to sweep passes wide.

Portugal variation

It was mainly Portugal with the ball, however. Whilst their general strategy means that the typical deep-and-narrow defensive approach should work well against them (as sides play against Arsenal and Barcelona, for example) Portugal are comfortable crossing from wide areas – and it was their willingness to centre the ball that paid dividends.

In Postiga, Portugal have a forward who can get himself on the end of crosses (and also one who is comfortable coming deep, but with the Norweigan defenders letting him go free and a lack of ‘llegada’ from the Portuguese midfielders, this wasn’t so useful). They also have Ronaldo, who can come inside as a second striker and has a superb leap, and this meant that they could knock the ball out to Nani, an excellent crosser, and have two good targets in the centre. Nani didn’t have a great game overall, but his low cross for Postiga just after half time put Portugal into the lead.

1-0

The situation at 1-0 was slightly odd, because Olsen was concerned about the head-to-head situation in the group (this is used as the decider for teams level on points, rather than goal difference, and Norway won the previous meeting between the sides 1-0) and so Norway didn’t really push forward much at 1-0.

In fact, the tactics for both sides remained the same until the final whistle. Substitutions were like-for-like, and Norway continued to sit back in their own half and wait for Portugal to come onto them – which they didn’t always do. Portugal’s midfielders sat deeper and Norway couldn’t counter, so their build-up play was a little less basic. The introduction of Mohammed Abdellaoue for Carew also meant hitting the ball long quickly wasn’t such an option.

The Norweigan full-backs got forward a couple of times, and the away side won their first corner in stoppage time, but the scoreline never looked likely to change after Postiga’s goal.

Conclusion

We knew what to expect here, and we got it. A game very similar to the first meeting between the sides produced another narrow home win.

Bento’s side played well, but the midfield zone still doesn’t feel right. With Meireles, Moutinho and Martins, there are three decent users of the ball – but not enough attacking threat, nor a true holding player to prevent opposition counter-attacks down the centre. It’s the same problem ZM identified before last summer’s World Cup – “on the Venn diagram of what they (the midfielders) bring to the side, there’s too much crossover.” As if to prove the point, Meireles was playing as Portugal’s most attack-minded midfielder when that article was written, and here played as the deepest of the three…

Norway were classic Norway, and we discovered little that we didn’t know before this game. They’ll have been disappointed to have conceded a goal from a cross, as they are generally very good at penalty box defending. Still, along with Portugal and Denmark they are on ten points and joint top of Group H, and arguably have the best run of remaining fixtures of those three sides, so remain in a very strong position.
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