11-12 ZM专贴（拜仁1-1蓝军：客队赢得点球大战）

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Ivory Coast 1-0 Mali: Yaya Toure plays higher and the Ivory Coast play better
February 8, 2012


The starting line-ups

Gervinho’s solo goal sets up a final between the Ivory Coast and Zambia.

Francois Zahoui made a couple of changes to the team that overcame Equatorial Guinea in the previous round. Siaka Tiene, Salomon Kalou and Cheick Tiote all returned.

Alain Giresse made changes to his attackers – both Abdou Traore and Modibo Maiga were dropped, with Samba Sow and Cheik Diabate coming in.

Opening stages

The Ivory Coast dominated the opening stages here, keeping the ball better and getting more men forward than in their previous games, making them much more of an attacking threat, both on the break and when Mali had men behind the ball.

The key to this was Yaya Toure, who was deployed high up the pitch as a number ten – sometimes ahead of Gervinho and Kalou – and in close support of Didier Drogba. Although he often picked the wrong pass in the final third, he provided the link between the midfield and the attack, helping to carry the ball and prevent the Ivory Coast becoming a broken team, as they often are when they play three central midfielders all broadly playing a defensive-minded job.

He was also a goal threat himself – he stormed forward to hit the post from the right of the box. This was the second time the Ivory Coast had hit the woodwork, with Drogba having headed against the post from a Tiene free-kick earlier. As they showed in the previous game, the Ivory Coast are particularly dangerous from dead ball situations, though here they weren’t so reliant on that approach.

The below diagram compares the positions Toure received the ball in this match and the game against Equatorial Guinea in the two first halves (because in the previous game he was pushed higher up the pitch at the break).



Countering

A lot of teams have depended upon counter-attacks in this tournament. Usually, the superior team dominates possession and the weaker side soak up pressure before breaking. Here, however, Mali played the ball very slowly when they won it and their main approach involved gradual build-up play followed by crosses from wide towards Cheick Diabate. The balls into the box were often high and overhit.

It was actually the Ivory Coast who were the bigger threat on the break, and with Gervinho and Kalou they had two players who loved running with the ball. Gervinho struck just before half-time. He’d looked a threat throughout the game, partly because Ousmane Berthe tried to stick very tight to Drogba – he picked up a booking early on – and left space behind him.

Creation

Toure’s involvement has already been covered, but for Mali it was Seydou Keita playing that role. It was notable that he had to keep coming deep to pick up the ball, and therefore wasn’t able to play passes into dangerous zones (although strangely, the pass for Gervinho’s winner was one of Toure’s passes from a deeper position.



It does rather illustrate the difference in creativity between the top sides in Africa and the top sides in Europe – that the two players deployed as creators here were used as much more functional players for Barcelona – Toure as a holder, Keita as an energetic midfield scrapper.

Little change

The problem with the game was that it didn’t really progress tactically. Gieresse took off right-winger Mustapha Yatabare, brought on Gerra Dembele and went to more of a 4-4-2 system, but then Yatabare had been the main player providing crosses, and Mali’s approach looked confused.

The Ivory Coast generally kept their back four and two holders in position and played a very structured game late on. It meant that they were solid and comfortable defensively. Mali were barely a threat, with only one shot on target throughout the game – many were blocked by the Ivory Coast, demonstrating the value of keeping men behind the ball.



Conclusion

Only one real point of interest in an otherwise underwhelming game. Toure played high up the pitch, and the Ivory Coast were a more complete side. They have Zokora and Tiote to sit – Toure must be used as an attacking midfielder to prevent the side becoming compartmentalised instead of cohesive.

pedro

748楼参考译文

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Milan v Arsenal should be an interesting battle of very different formations and styles
February 15, 2012


Possible starting line-ups

A quick preview of tonight’s game…

On the left is the potential starting line-ups for the two sides. There may be changes to this – Arsenal have injury problems at the back and may play Francis Coquelin at full-back, while Milan’s three advanced midfielders can all switch around, as they did against Inter.

But the real interest here is not the players used, but the battle of systems. Milan play 4-3-1-2, Arsenal 4-3-3. This, more than most games, should be an excellent clash of styles. Milan are slow at the back and narrow in midfield – they are clearly vulnerable to pace down the flanks, as Tottenham demonstrated at the San Siro last year.

Arsenal should be able to get joy down the wings, in two separate ways – (a) attacking the full-backs at speed, and (b) by getting the full-backs forward to create 2 v 1s against the Milan full-backs. This will force the shuttlers on the sides of the diamond out to the flanks, will leave gaps in the midfield and then force the Milan trequartista to drop back and help out, making Milan a broken team. (Their trequartista is usually Kevin-Prince Boateng or Urby Emanuelson, players based around energy rather than guile, because Max Allegri is so concerned with joining the forward two to the midfield three. If that link man can be taken out of the game or pushed deeper, Milan have problems.)

The importance of attacking down the flanks is why it makes sense for Wenger to play two naturally attacking full-backs, if possible. Kieran Gibbs may not be fully fit, but it is vital to have good attacking players there, on their natural sides, rather than other options (Thomas Vermaelen is a centre-back, Coquelin and Sagna are right-footed).
Milan’s front two do little defensive work, but the movement of Robinho out to the flanks can stop the full-backs getting forward.

If Arsenal are taking lessons from Tottenham’s display last year, then it makes sense to sit back and counter. Arsenal aren’t particularly good at defending deep – Vermaelen and Laurent Koscielny prefer to push high up the pitch and force attackers away from goal, but Vermaelen must beware of giving space to Zlatan Ibrahimovic in behind, as he did twice in the 2-2 draw with Barcelona two years ago. Milan’s threat comes from individual quality upfront – to win the game, they need to excel in that department rather than tactically.

But Milan’s midfield aren’t at all creative on the ball, as explained here. The man who plays the most key passes in the side is Ibrahimovic, while the assist leader this season is Antonio Cassano, who has been out for four months. The possible presence of Alberto Aquilani would change that, but otherwise opponents can afford to let Milan have time on the ball – there’s no real need to close down.

The key player, though, will be Mark van Bommel, sitting deep in the midfield. As shown by the blue, orange and red highlighting in the diagram above, Arsenal should match Milan 3 v 3 deep in midfield, but van Bommel will be free. His influence on the side shouldn’t be underestimated – his calm, reliable passing sets the tempo. Arsene Wenger rarely varies his tactics significantly, but it would be worth him asking Robin van Persie to drop onto van Bommel, and effectively playing 4-3-3-0 without the ball. That would nullify van Bommels influence and also create more space for Arsenal to break into.

On that note, while Tottenham’s strategy at the San Siro worked well, they were fortunate that Milan’s deep-lying midfielder was Thiago Silva, a centre-back out of position and not particularly great at the ball. In the return leg, Allegri used Clarence Seedorf there and the Dutchman was given too much time on the ball, completing 20 more passes than any other player. Van Bommel needs to be watched, but if Arsenal can break past him and force him into an early yellow card, his defensive ability is severely weakened.

This is likely to be an odd battle – fascinating tactically by virtue of the fact it won’t be very tactical. In other words, these two coaches are quite inflexible, playing roughly the same system every week. The 4-3-1-2 v 4-3-3 match-up is very obvious – the former has an extra man in midfield, the latter is stronger down the flanks.

The clash seems to suit Arsenal more, and this performance will say a lot about them. Arsenal now play a system based around getting the ball wide and attacking quickly down the flanks – facing a narrow side that is slow at the back plays into their hands. With that in mind, if Arsenal don’t come out on top here, one wonders which of Europe’s big guns they would stand a chance of beating.

pedro

758楼参考译文

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Milan 4-0 Arsenal: Milan make their strength count and win comfortably
February 15, 2012


The starting line-ups

Milan thrashed Arsenal in an amazingly dominant performance.

Max Allegri went for the usual diamond in midfield. Clarence Seedorf started on the left but went off injured quickly, and was replaced by Urby Emanuelson. Philippe Mexes started at centre-back, rather than Alessandro Nesta.

Arsene Wenger picked two natural full-backs, with Kieran Gibbs fit enough to start, but not fit enough to complete the game. Tomas Rosicky was a surprising choice on the left of midfield.

As forecasted, this was a match between two completely different sides. Certainly not as forecasted, Milan maximised their areas of advantage to produce a ruthlessly efficient display.

Midfield battle

This battle was key. Milan had 4 v 3 in that zone, but Arsenal actually dominated possession – it was 55% at half time, and 57% at full time. In a way, this Arsenal’s first problem – the ideal gameplan seemed to be sitting back, soaking up pressure and breaking at speed. They shouldn’t have wanted to see lots of the ball. Surprisingly, despite a focus on attacking down the flanks this season, Arsenal were very slow with the ball and seemed happy to hold onto it for long periods with no direct threat.

Milan didn’t see much of the ball for long spells, but they used the midfield advantage to great effect when they did have it. There was no obvious Arsenal strategy when they were out of possession – one would have expected either (a) Song to push up and leave Kevin-Prince Boateng free, meaning Arsenal could get tight to Mark van Bommel, or more likely (b) Ramsey to drop back off van Bommel, meaning Alex Song could pick up Boateng and the players on the side of the Milan diamond would be occupied.

But neither approach was properly carried out in full – there was too much chasing in the midfield zone from Arsenal – none of the players really seemed to know their responsibilities, with the result that neither van Bommel nor Boateng were nullified effectively. Arsenal looked like 4-4-1-1 without the ball, with the wingers getting back into defensive positions and Ramsey slightly higher up, but they didn’t really need that extra support on the flanks.

Song generally picked up Boateng when Milan had the ball, but tried to push up higher than him when Arsenal had possession. That meant turnovers were a danger, and Boateng’s movement for the first goal came from an initial starting position well in advance of Song when Wojciech Szczesny cleared poorly. Boateng’s finish was excellent, and like against Barcelona he tended to move to the right of the attack, as Robinho was drifting wide to the left.

No Arsenal width

Milan’s strength in the centre was expected, but Arsenal were supposed to counter that with their pace down the flanks. This strategy was never put into place – the odd decision to start Rosicky indicated that Arsenal weren’t even pursuing that approach, let alone carrying it out successfully. Rosicky wasn’t particularly bad, but his tendency to come inside and slide balls towards van Persie made Arsenal increasingly narrow, which Milan were happy with. Robin van Persie found himself between a trio of Milan players and was isolated throughout the first half.

There was a brief incident in the second half when Rosicky got past Mexes, and had his shirt pulled, with the Frenchman more than happy to take a yellow card to slow an attack. That was the only time Arsenal really got past the defence, and it showed how uncomfortable Milan were with the quick threat in behind, adding to the confusion that Arsenal weren’t doing this more often.

Ramsey had a poor game, often making the wrong decisions on the break. His longer passes were also wayward, but at least he was often looking for diagonals to the flanks, which should have formed more of Arsenal’s gameplan. Theo Walcott was barely involved.

Ibrahimovic

The final area of Milan strength was with Zlatan Ibrahimovic, who Arsenal had no plan for. He seemed to surprise both Arsenal centre-backs in different ways – Thomas Vermaelen was outpaced by him, while Laurent Koscielny stood off when Ibrahimovic dropped towards the left of the pitch. As mentioned in the preview, Ibrahimovic plays more key passes that any other Milan player, and here he moved deep very well to slide balls through the defence, creating more chances than any other player on the pitch.

The fact that he moved to the left worked well, because it is Vermaelen, rather than Koscielny, who is the player more comfortable coming up the pitch to close down a striker. Koscielny naturally stands off, and gave the Swede too much space before going off injured. Having three different centre-back partnerships (Koscielny-Vermaelen, Djourou-Vermaelen, Djourou-Song) clearly didn’t help.



Substitutions

Wenger didn’t go with a width-based approach from the outset, and the decision at half time to take off Walcott underlined that. He pushed Thierry Henry upfront, and then lined up with an extremely narrow-looking midfield, with Ramsey right and Rosicky left in a 4-4-2. Whilst in theory this meant Arsenal might cope better defensively with bodies in the centre, this was an odd move if they were trying to get back in the game, which they clearly were.


The line-ups after Arsenal's half time change

Walcott had been poor on the ball, but he’s always going to be more suited to a wide role than Ramsey, who naturally came inside, as Rosicky continued to do on the other flank. That meant that, with two upfront and four narrow in the middle, Arsenal were now attempting to take on Milan at Milan’s game, an amazingly reactive and timid approach. Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain emerged late on and made a couple of promising runs down the flank.

In fairness, Henry did OK – van Persie was no longer isolated, and the two combined beautifully for the van Persie shot that forced Christian Abbiati into an excellent save.

The Milan diamond became flatter when Max Ambrosini replaced Boateng – he sat alongside van Bommel with Emanuelson left and Antonio Nocerino right. That was seemingly a response to Oxlade-Chamberlain’s introduction – Milan wanted more protection for the full-backs.

Milan still broke very well – the movement and decision-making on the counter-attack showed they were more than about brute force, and Ibrahimovic deserved his late goal after a brilliant all-round performance.

Conclusion

These are clearly two very different sides – good in some areas, bad in others. One’s strengths are the other’s weaknesses, and vice-versa. Here, one side focused strongly on putting energy into their preferred areas, with Milan dominating the centre ground and outmuscling Arsenal throughout. The away side, however, barely even attacked down the flanks, and it wasn’t really clear what Arsenal’s gameplan was, or what they were trying to do on the ball.

Milan certainly played well, but their performance was more about maximum efficiency than great skill. They actually only managed five shots on target in the game, and there were rarely slick passing moves or periods of utter dominance from them. They were just brilliantly ruthless when they went forward – ZM has questioned whether the approach of bullying their way past opponents is good enough to defeat top opposition, as shown by their poor record against big sides in Serie A – but Arsenal were weak, and Milan were brutal.

This is a genuinely shocking result for Arsenal. In terms of style, Milan seemed the ideal side for them to face, because of their vulnerability to pace and width, but Arsenal didn’t show either of those features here. It’s staggering that Arsenal didn’t go wide more readily, and difficult to explain.

In one of their long-running spats at the turn of the century, Arsene Wenger once commented upon Sir Alex Ferguson, saying that “His weakness is that he doesn’t think he has a weakness.” Wenger’s weakness is that he doesn’t seem to know his side’s strength.

pedro

760楼参考译文
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AC米兰4-0阿森纳：温格错漏优势，米兰胜在高效

2012-02-16 / baiy07


双方首发阵容

米兰用不可思议的统治级表现轻松击溃阿森纳。

阿莱格里排出了常规的菱形中场。西多夫首发出现在左侧但很快受伤下场，埃马纽尔森入替。梅克斯代替内斯塔出现在中卫位置。

温格派出了两个正统的边后卫，吉布斯虽然健康到足以首发，但还不足以完成整场比赛。罗西基令人惊讶地被安排在中场左路。
像赛前预测的一样，这场比赛的双方的打法完全不同。但显然赛前没预料的是，米兰将他们的优势发挥到了极致并给出了极具效率的表现。

中场争夺

中场的争夺是比赛的关键。在这一区域米兰拥有4对3的优势，但事实上阿森纳掌握了控球--上半场55%，整场比赛57%。从某种方面来说，这支阿森纳要面对的第一个问题---他们理想的比赛计划应该是退居半场、承受压力并利用速度反击。他们本不应该控球太多。但令人惊讶的是，尽管这个赛季的比赛中他们经常不懈地攻击对手的两翼，但这场比赛中他们却在有球时运转缓慢，而且似乎乐于长时间控住球而不是对对手造成直接的威胁。

米兰在长时间内得不到控球权，但他们运用了中场的优势并取得了很好的效果。阿森纳在无球时似乎没有什么明显的策略----人们本来期待要么(a)宋位置提前并放弃看守博阿滕，这意味着阿森纳可以压迫范博梅尔，或者更可能的一种策略(b)拉姆塞回撤，远离范博梅尔，这意味着宋可以盯住博阿滕，并且米兰菱形中场两侧的球员也有人看管。

但整场比赛中两种策略都没有很好地被执行---在中场阿森纳更多地是在追着对手跑---似乎没有一个球员明确自己的职责在哪，结果范博梅尔和博阿滕都没有被很有效地看管。无球时阿森纳看上去像是4-4-1-1阵型，两翼退回防守位置，拉姆塞稍稍靠前，但他们并不是真的需要两翼来支援防守。

当米兰拿球时，宋一般会看住博阿滕，但当阿森纳拿球时，他就试图压得比博阿滕更靠上。这意味着一旦阿森纳失误就会出现危险。第一个进球中，什琴斯尼开球失误的时候博阿滕的站位就比宋更靠前（译注：从米兰的角度来看）。博阿滕的射门精彩极了，就像对阵巴萨时那样，他倾向于移动到右侧进行攻击，同时罗比尼奥在左侧拉边。

阿森纳对宽度的利用不足

米兰在中路的强势是意料之中的，阿森纳本应该用快节奏的两翼冲击来应对。但这个策略从未被实施---让罗西基首发的决定很奇怪，这显示阿森纳根本没想过用那样的策略，更别提成功实施了。罗西基踢得并不是特别差，但他内收并传球给范佩西的倾向使阿森纳踢得更狭窄了，这正中米兰下怀。范佩西发现自己被三个米兰队员包围，在上半场完全孤立无援。

下半场有一个镜头，罗西基过了梅克斯，但却被对方拉倒，法国人很愿意得到一张黄卡来减缓阿森纳的进攻。这是阿森纳唯一一次越过对方防线，这显示了米兰对于对手快速打身后的进攻是多么不舒服，但阿森纳没有更多地这样做，令人费解。

拉姆塞踢得不好，反击时的决策也经常是错误的。他的长传也不好，但至少他还在寻求用对角线传球寻找己方两翼，这本应该是阿森纳的比赛计划。沃尔科特几乎没有参与到比赛中。

伊布拉希莫维奇

米兰实力的最后一环是伊布，阿森纳并没有制定对付他的计划。他似乎通过不同的方式让阿森纳的两个中卫都吃了一惊---维尔马伦跟不上他的速率，而当伊布拉到左路的时候，科斯切尔尼却站得离他很远。前瞻中提到，伊布的威胁传球比米兰任何人都多，本场他回撤得很出色，传出了打穿防线的威胁球，创造的机会比场上任何其他人都多。

相比于科斯切尔尼，维尔马伦更适应跟防对方回撤的前锋，因此伊布本场回撤到左路起到了很好的效果（译注：看阵型，科斯切尔尼是右中卫）。在受伤下场前，科斯切尔尼的站位离伊布很远，给了瑞典人大把空间。虽然阿森纳在场上曾经换过三组中卫（科斯切尔尼-维尔马伦，朱鲁-维尔马伦，朱鲁-宋），但都没起到作用。



换人

开场时温格并没有走拉开球场宽度的路线，而中场时换下沃尔科特更坚定了这一点。他让亨利顶在前面，因此中场排阵显得更狭窄了，拉姆塞在右路，罗西基在左路，形成了4-4-2。虽然理论上这意味着阿森纳可以更好地防守对手中路的球员，但对于一个想挽回比赛的球队来讲（阿森纳显然想），这是一个奇怪的变阵。


半场换人之后的阵容

沃尔科特虽然有球时踢得不好，但他比拉姆塞更适合在边路活动。拉姆塞更喜欢内收，而罗西基在另一边也一样。拥有两个顶在前面的前锋和四个踢得很狭窄的中场，这意味着阿森纳现在试图在对阵米兰时踢得像米兰一样，这招极为被动且懦弱。张伯伦随后出战，在边路作出了几次出色的跑动。

公平地说，亨利踢得还行---范佩西不再孤单，两个人作出了美妙的配合，范佩西的射门迫使阿比亚蒂作出精彩扑救。
安布罗西尼换下博阿滕后，米兰的菱形中场变得更平了。安布在范博梅尔身边辅佐，埃玛纽尔森在左，诺切里诺在右。这似乎是针对张伯伦上场的回应---米兰希望为边后卫提供更多保护。

米兰对对手的破坏还是做得很好---反击中的移动和决策显示他们并不只是肌肉流，伊布奉献了全面且精彩的表现，他的表现配得上最后那个进球。

结论

这是两个打法截然不同的对手---都在某些方面强，另一些方面弱。一支队的优势是另一支队的弱点，反之亦然。本场比赛中，米兰控制了中场并在身体对抗上完胜阿森纳，将他们的优势发挥到极致。然而，客队阿森纳几乎没有攻击对手边路。我们并不清楚阿森纳本来的比赛计划是怎样的，或者他们在有球时到底想怎么做。

米兰当然踢得很好，但他们的优秀表现更多建立在效率奇高而不是技术出色上。他们实际上就五脚打中目标，而且在全面压倒对手的情况下也鲜有娴熟的传接配合。他们仅仅是在向前推进的过程中显得毫不留情---ZM曾经怀疑在对阵强队的时候，米兰是否有足够的能力压制对手，就像在意甲中对阵强队时的糟糕战绩所显示的那样---但阿森纳太弱，米兰则毫不留情。

这对阿森纳来说真是一个令人震惊的结果。从风格上来说，米兰似乎是他们的理想对手，因为米兰对付快节奏和拉开宽度的进攻时显得很脆弱，但阿森纳今天没有做到以上任何一点。令人惊讶的是阿森纳并没有利用宽度攻击对手，这很难解释。

在温格和弗格森的长期斗嘴史中，世纪之交的时候温格有一次评论道，“他的弱点正是他并不知道他有弱点”。现在看来，温格的弱点是他并不知道自己的优势在哪里。

pedro

其实，偶觉得若是能有几个中后场球员，不多，两个也行，

能在米兰站住脚的话，对阿根廷帮助就太大了

看看94-02世界杯巴西队主力球员，在米兰多牛，例如卡福以及还有那个行为花哨但却强势的守门员

pedro

西甲外籍教练6人：阿根廷3人（波切诺蒂、贝尔萨、西门尼）、智利人佩莱格里尼、葡萄牙人魔力鸟、法国人Philippe Montanier

英超外籍教练竟然有17个，其中不列颠范围的有10人：威尔士2名、北爱2名、苏格兰6名

pedro

Barcelona 5-1 Valencia: Valencia do their Nou Camp usual – start well, then tire in second half
巴萨5-1瓦伦西亚：客队在诺坎普表现如常 - 开场较好，然后下半场却疲塌了
February 19, 2012


The starting line-ups

Lionel Messi hit four goals as 2nd-placed Barcelona thrashed 3rd-placed Valencia.

Pep Guardiola was without the suspended Daniel Alves, so Martin Montoya played at right-back. Xavi Hernandez was only fit enough for the bench. At the back, Gerard Pique returned after being left out in the 3-1 Champions League win over Leverkusen in the week.

Unai Emery was without Jordi Alba from the start, so played Jeremy Mathieu at left-back, rather than in the left wing position he’s thrived in against Barcelona in the past. Ever Banega’s strange injury ruled him out.

Valencia press

In the previous two seasons in this fixture, Valencia started very well before tiring and eventually getting beaten:

In 2009/10 they kept Barcelona scoreless before the break, then Barcelona switched to 4-2-4 and Messi got a hattrick.

In 2010/11 they were 1-0 up at half time, but Barcelona played much quicker in the second half and turned it around.

Valencia again started very well here, and pressing Barca was a key part of their approach. Pablo Piatti and Sofiane Feghouli moved forward and made Valencia 4-2-4 without the ball, pushing high up on Barcelona’s back four. The home side looked nervous at the back, and looked long much more frequently than usual, attempting to get out of the press.

Valencia had problems in deeper positions, though, because the pressing meant Tino Costa and David Albelda were moving high up on Cesc Fabregas and Andres Iniesta, and although the defence pushed up too, they left a lot of space between the lines. This played into the hands of Lionel Messi, who spent the first half playing as both a number ten and a number nine – collecting the ball deep, but also poaching in the six-yard box.

Messi

Messi started off by moving to the right-of-centre to receive the ball, similar to what he did in this game two years ago. Valencia tried to counter this by pushing Victor Ruiz forward onto him, with Adil Rami covering the space in behind.

But Messi often skipped past the first challenge, while Valencia also had a big problem in that Albelda picked up a booking after just four minutes, meaning their deepest midfielder was now scared to tackle between the lines. There was also the question of whether Jonas was good enough defensively against Sergio Busquets – the more responsible Banega probably would have started there.

Attacks

But Valencia opened the scoring, and although it was from the only shot they managed in the first half, there was some tactical logic to it. Piatti played very narrow, disregarding the attacking threat of Martin Montoya, who was clearly not as dangerous as Alves would be. That contributed to Piatti being in an attacking position to meet Feghouli’s cross.

In fact, the most interesting feature of the first half was that the sides effectively switched which sides they attacked down. Valencia had used the Mathieu – Alba combination to great effect against Barcelona previously, with the right-sided midfielder tucking in and becoming a goal threat. With Mathieu pinned back, they did the opposite – Feghouli ran with the ball and the right-back (Ricardo Costa, having replaced Miguel early on) overlapped – Piatti got into the middle.

Barcelona, meanwhile, were without the Alves threat which leads to them playing down the right frequently. Usually, 37% of their attacking play is on the right (30% in the centre, 33% on the left) but that figure seemed to be more biased towards the left in this game. Pedro set up Messi’s first (via a defensive error) and Iniesta laid on the second. Both did so from the left, and the injury problems in Valencia’s right-back zone (plus the fact the right-back was very attacking) certainly contributed.

Second half

The tactical battle didn’t significantly change in the second half. Barcelona were utterly dominant for long periods, and could have scored many more.

Montoya became more of an influence after half time, as if Guardiola had told him to take advantage of the space ahead of him, with Piatti coming inside. Montoya overlapped well, though he was pinned back midway through the second half when Alba replaced Piatti, meaning Mathieu moved forward to the left wing.

Closing stages

At 2-1, Valencia had a promising spell where they chipped the ball over the top for runners in behind the Barcelona defence, in particular Pique. His form has dipped recently, and he seems to struggle when forced to turn and run quickly. Barcelona’s pressing also dropped, however, allowing Valencia’s midfielders time on the ball to play the pass..

Still, Barcelona had extra attacking options, with Cristian Tello on for Pedro down the left. He dropped deep away from Costa, who looked tired, and ran with the ball to good effect – his end product was inconsistent, but Messi’s third came after his good work. Again, it was in Valencia’s right-back zone that the danger came from.

At 3-1 it was game over, and Messi took charge.

Conclusion

Nothing new learnt here – Valencia’s performance was what we expected, and Messi being brilliant is hardly a revelation. Guardiola didn’t seem happy with a couple of players (Tello and Fabregas) in the second half, possibly for their lack of pressing, but this was classic Barcelona – and in the classic Barcelona 4-3-3 shape, with wide forwards on either side.

Emery was brave and tried to press, and when sides are brave enough to do that – Villarreal, Arsenal, Espanyol, Real Madrid on occasion – it generally creates a brilliant game, though it generally ends in a Barcelona win too.

pedro

794楼参考译文
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巴塞罗那5-1瓦伦西亚：瓦伦西亚重蹈覆辙，开局良好后劲不足

2012-02-21 / kaminosin



在位列积分榜第二的巴塞罗那与第三的瓦伦西亚的比赛中，梅西打进了大四喜。

瓜迪奥拉阵中缺席了停赛的阿尔维斯，于是蒙托亚出任右后卫。哈维的身体状况只能打替补。在后防线上，皮克在缺席上周3-1胜勒沃库森的欧冠客场后重返赛场。

埃梅里首发阵容没有派出阿尔巴，于是马蒂厄任左后卫，没有踢之前对阵巴萨时他表现不错的左边锋位置。巴内加因为离奇受伤而未能上场。

瓦伦西亚的高位逼抢

在前两个赛季做客诺坎普时，瓦伦西亚开局都踢得很好，之后体力下降，最终被击败。

在09/10赛季，他们让巴萨上半场颗粒无收，之后巴萨变阵424，梅西上演帽子戏法。

在10/11赛季，他们上半场1-0领先，但巴萨在下半场大大提高了比赛节奏，并逆转成功。

这一次瓦伦的开局依然很不错，他们的踢法中高位逼抢是非常重要的一环。皮亚蒂和费古利位置前移，使得瓦伦无球权时阵型变为424，形成对巴萨后防线的高位逼抢。主队的后防线看上去有点儿紧张，开大脚的次数比以往频繁很多，试图突破重围。

瓦伦在他们的后方也有一些问题，因为高位逼抢意味着科斯塔和阿尔贝尔达会上前盯防法布雷加斯和伊涅斯塔，尽管后防线也提前了，但他们还是在两线之间留下了大量的空间。这正合梅西的心意，他上半场踢得既像10号又像9号——后撤较深以拿球，但同时也不断寻觅着在小禁区抢点的机会。

梅西的作用

开场之后，梅西在中路靠右的位置拿球，和他两年前踢法差不多。瓦伦试图让鲁伊兹上前盯防，并让拉米在后方补位保护。

但梅西轻松越过了这第一道障碍，而反观瓦伦这边则有了大麻烦，阿尔贝尔达开场4分钟即吃到黄牌，这意味着他们位置最靠后的中场现在不太敢在这个区域放脚铲断了。乔纳斯在防守时能否有效限制布斯克茨也是个问题——这本应是更可靠的巴内加的首发位置。

两队的进攻

然而首开纪录的是瓦伦，尽管上半场他们只有这一脚射门，但我们还是可以从中看出一些战术逻辑。皮亚蒂活动的区域很靠中路，无视蒙托亚的助攻威胁，巴萨小将自然不能和阿尔维斯相提并论。这导致费古利传中时，皮亚蒂能出现在攻击点。

实际上上半场最有意思的地方是两队交换了他们通常攻击的区域。在之前的交锋中瓦伦用马蒂厄-阿尔巴组合对付巴萨，收到了很好的效果，右路的中场能内切并威胁球门。现在马蒂厄被固定在后防线，他们采取了镜像的攻击套路——费古利带球，右后卫（在比赛较早时候科斯塔顶替了米格尔）插上助攻——皮亚蒂内插进中路。

与此同时，巴萨这边没了经常在右路插上助攻的阿尔维斯。通常情况下，他们37%的攻击发起自右路（30%在中路，33%在左路），但在本场比赛中，这个数据似乎更偏向左路。佩德罗助攻梅西第一球（抓住了对方防守端的失误），伊涅斯塔助攻第二个。两个助攻都是来自左边，而瓦伦右后卫的受伤（再加上右后卫喜欢助攻）自然是原因之一。

下半场

在下半场，两队的战术对垒没什么太大变化。巴萨长时间统治级地控球，本有更多进球的机会。

半场之后蒙托亚发挥了更大的作用，仿佛是瓜迪奥拉指示他去更多地利用皮亚蒂往中路走后，留在他身前的空间。蒙托亚插上助攻做得很好，但当下半场中段阿尔巴换下皮亚蒂后，他被限制回了原先的位置，因为这换人意味着马蒂厄要回左边锋的位置了。

收官阶段

在1-2落后的那段时间里，瓦伦有一阵儿踢得很有扳平的希望，他们长传打巴萨后防线身后找高速插上的己方球员，重点攻击皮克。皮克最近的竞技状态有所下降，当他不得不很快转身和回防时，他显得有点儿力不从心。而巴萨的逼抢强度也有所下降，使得瓦伦的中场有更多的时间完成传球。

但通过以特略换下居左的佩德罗，巴萨还是有更多的攻击选择。他的回撤站位离看上去已经疲惫了的科斯塔很远，利用速度带球，效果不错——他的最后一击质量不够稳定，但梅西的第三球有他的功劳。这一次又是瓦伦的右后卫区域出了问题。
3-1的时候比赛已经结束了，梅西已经掌控了比赛。

结论

本次没什么新鲜事——瓦伦的表现在我们意料之中，梅西的出色表现也不是什么新发现。在下半场，瓜迪奥拉对一些球员（特略和法布雷加斯）的表现好像并不满意，也许是因为他们逼抢不够积极，但这正是经典的巴萨——使用了巴萨经典的433阵型，两侧的边锋都很靠边线。

埃梅里很勇敢，努力去高位逼抢巴萨，而当客队有勇气这么干时——比利亚雷尔，阿森纳，西班牙人以及皇家马德里有时会这么干——比赛一般都很好看，但一般也以巴萨获胜结局。

pedro

原文结论处 有一句Guardiola didn’t seem happy with a couple of players (Tello and Fabregas) in the second half

这里似乎有误，不是特略而是佩德罗；他和小法在下半场，屡屡错失门前良机，而被特略和迪亚戈换下

特略上场后，在左路勇敢扯动，给梅西从中路中场发起攻击提供开阔空间，不知为啥右路今天进攻老不给力，始终挂不上档，唯一进球还是阿比达尔左路传中而梅西在禁区右侧包抄打进

特略这小伙子还在禁区底线附近过人后，兴奋得意动作失控而自己绊倒了自己，惹得大家哄堂大笑，瓜瓜抱头动作更显夸张

pedro

Arsenal 5-2 Tottenham: Arsenal complete an amazing comeback
阿森纳 5-2 热刺：枪手令人惊异完成主场大逆转
February 26, 2012


The starting line-ups

Tottenham went 2-0 up but then lost their shape completely and conceded five.

Arsene Wenger had something approaching his first-choice back four available. He used Tomas Rosicky in the Aaron Ramsey role in midfield, and Yossi Benayoun getting a start on the left.

Harry Redknapp picked two out-and-out strikers upfront, with Rafael van der Vaart and Aaron Lennon only on the bench and Niko Kranjcar making a surprise start on the right of midfield.

This was another ridiculously open Premier League game (and another North London derby with plenty of goals). Both back fours had poor games and Tottenham were unable to control the game at any point – even when they were playing well and 2-0 up. There were four major themes here:

(1) Tottenham play direct

This was a classic 4-3-3 v 4-4-2 match-up. In simple terms, the 4-3-3 is likely to dominate possession by virtue of having an extra man in the midfield, but the 4-4-2 can be more direct with two strikers.

That’s basically what happened early on. Tottenham played quick, direct balls towards Louis Saha and Emmanuel Adebayor, who battled with the Arsenal centre-backs. But the approach was slightly more complex than that – the two forwards drifted into wide and deep zones to split the Arsenal centre-backs and open up room for midfield runners. Kyle Walker made a clever off-the-ball run to drag Thomas Vermaelen into a poor position for the first goal, while the second came from a penalty won when Gareth Bale found space to drive into.

It was interesting that Adebayor worked the left side in particular, forcing Laurent Koscielny into difficult situations high up the pitch. As mentioned when Zlatan Ibrahimovic did the same, Kosicelny doesn’t like coming high up the pitch – he generally leaves that to Vermaelen and looks to get in covering positions.

But Arsenal’s problem was that they had no covering defender, leaving 2 v 2 at the back and telling both full-backs to push high up the pitch. This made them extremely vulnerable to quick breaks with no spare man and the full-backs not in a position to cover.

They aren’t used to having to play more conservatively at the back – this was only the second time in the Premier League this season that a side had come to the Premier League and played two upfront. The other side was Fulham, who also caused Arsenal problems and picked up a point having been 1-0 up, but at least that day Arsenal had a defensive-minded right-back in Johan Djourou to cover. (Manchester United also played two forwards, but Wayne Rooney was usually picked up by Alex Song to maintain a spare man).

(2) Arsenal pass well

Arsenal have been wider and more direct this season, and reliant upon their wide players for creativity – but this was a bit more like the Arsenal of a couple of seasons ago, with Yossi Benayoun coming inside from the left, and Rosicky moving forward from midfield without any defensive responsibilities. Those two actually played in similar positions, but this allowed them to work short passes, form triangles with van Persie or Arteta, and Benayoun drove well at the defence.

Arsenal had an extra man in this zone, of course, though Redknapp told Adebayor and Saha to drop onto the deepest Arsenal midfielder when Spurs didn’t have possession. This is one area where it works well for Arsenal to rotate their midfield trio, though – if Saha moves onto Song, then Arsenal tilt the triangle to bring Song higher up the pitch, Saha will have to move over and pick up Arteta instead. Not particularly difficult, but not natural for a centre-forward. Jermain Defoe, who was on the bench, has been very disciplined at playing this role in the past couple of years.

(3) Tottenham lack control

Tottenham were 2-0 up without playing particularly sparkling football – they just broke quickly and efficiently. At 2-0 up they were clearly in an excellent position, but they were unable to exert any kind of control upon the game, and invited pressure from Arsenal – Rosicky and van Persie both had good chances before Bacary Sagna got a goal back (and it’s important to note that the advanced positioning of the Arsenal full-backs did have positive effects despite the aforementioned problems at the back).


The second half line-ups

A side can control the game either in or out of possession – by keeping the ball and slowing the tempo, or by retreating into an organised defensive shape and soaking up pressure. Tottenham did neither – they were outnumbered in the centre and therefore unable to keep the ball. Modric’s pass completion ratio was down at 82% (compared to the usual 88%), and he couldn’t do it on his own anyway.

More surprisingly, their defensive shape wasn’t particularly good – previously against Arsenal they’ve defended well with two banks of four, but here the two wide players were particularly poor defensively, and there was also the problem with dropping a striker onto an Arsenal midfielder.

(4) Arsenal start to counter

At half-time Redknapp moved to a 4-1-4-1ish system – van der Vaart on the right in place of Kranjcar, but more significantly Saha off, and Sandro on. Tottenham lost their shape, became increasingly narrow and their gameplan was confused – it wasn’t clear whether they were trying to see more of the ball in the centre, or continue their direct attacking.

Either way, they gradually started to become very vulnerable to Arsenal counter-attacks. Rosicky got the third when Tottenham found six players ahead of the ball – Sandro wasn’t sitting as he was meant to, and Parker was now higher up – and Arsenal worked a 5 v 4 for the goal.

Then Walcott became involved in the game. Having been poor in the first half, he suddenly became excellent midway through the second half. But there was good logic to that – he’d been anonymous when Tottenham sat deep, he became useful when Tottenham pushed up and left space in behind. The away side’s offside trap was poor, and Walcott had the pace to take full advantage on two occasions.

Conclusion

On the face of it, this was a game that defied logic with how open it was…yet there were some fairly logical factors that contributed to the scoreline. In the first half, Arsenal left 2 v 2 at the back and were weak at the back, but dominated the midfield battle 3 v 2 and built pressure.

Redknapp’s changes at half time didn’t have the effect they did in this fixture last season, and in the second half Tottenham were extremely poor – lacking structure at the back and with no ideas going forward.

pedro

813楼参考译文
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阿森纳5-2热刺战术分析：枪手的逆转荡气回肠

2012-02-27 / maryantonia


托特纳姆热刺曾经2-0领先，随即阵型完全崩溃，被打进5球。
温格的首发四人防线是有一定目的性的。在中场他用罗西基代替了拉姆塞，贝纳永也得到了首发机会出现在左翼。
雷德纳普在前场派上两个纯前锋，他把范德法特和列侬放在了替补席，而克拉尼察首发出现在中场右路有点出人意料。
这是一场大开大合到几乎荒谬的比赛。两方四后卫的发挥都惨不忍睹，而热刺从头至尾都没有能控制住比赛——即使他们一开始打得很不错，甚至还一度2-0领先。主要有四个地方值得讨论。

（1）热刺打得很直接

这场比赛是经典的4-3-3与4-4-2之间的对决。简单来说，4-3-3一般会在控球上占上风，因为他们的中场人数占优，不过4-4-2拥有双前锋，所以在进攻方面更直接一些。
比赛刚开始的时候正是这样。热刺动作很快，直接传球至前场的萨哈和阿德巴约，而他们俩则与阿森纳的中卫们相对抗。不过实际情况要稍微复杂一些——双前锋的移动范围很宽，还会深入阿森纳的腹地去分开两名中卫，为中场的速度好手们打开空间。沃尔克做出了非常精彩的无球跑动，把维尔马伦引到了一个很尴尬的位置，从而造成了第一个进球，而第二个进球则来自贝尔找到突破点后制造出的点球。
有意思的是阿德巴约多在左路出现，迫使科斯切尔尼不得不上前去勉力招架。之前提到过伊布拉希莫维奇也是这么做的，而科斯切尔尼不是很喜欢出击到很前场的位置——一般他会让维尔马伦来应对，而自己则试图补位。
不过阿森纳的问题是他们没有补位的防守队员，而是任由后场形成2对2的情况，让两个边后卫都压在很前场的地方。这让他们的防线在面对快速反击的时候非常脆弱，因为并没有后场自由人的存在，而边后卫们也不在可以补位的位置。
阿森纳并不习惯相对保守些的防守方式——本赛季的英超联赛中，这还是第二次看到一支实行双前锋阵型的球队。另外一支是富勒姆，也给阿森纳造成了很大的麻烦，富勒姆曾经1-0领先，不过最后只带走1分，但至少在那场比赛中，阿森纳的右路有防守意识很强的朱鲁来补位。（曼联也是双前锋，不过鲁尼一般被宋盯得很紧，只能扮演自由人的角色。）

（2）阿森纳的传球很成功

阿森纳本赛季的阵型拉得很宽，打法也更加直接，他们很依赖拉边球员的创造性——这跟几个赛季之前的阿森纳很类似，贝纳永从左路进入中路，罗西基就可以从中场前移，不需要承担任何防守任务。其实他俩实际上的位置差不多，这样一来，两人之间可以做出许多短传配合，并与范佩西或者阿尔特塔组成三角形，而且贝纳永在防守方面做得很不错。
当然了，阿森纳在这个区域多一个人，尽管老雷也叮嘱了阿德巴约和萨哈，在阿森纳拿球的时候要退到阿森纳最后边的中场球员那里。即便如此，这仍然是阿森纳中场三人组运转最顺畅的区域——如果萨哈盯住了宋，阿森纳方就会稍微倾斜一下，让宋移到最前边的位置，那么萨哈就必须得挪开换盯阿尔特塔。其实这个任务不是特别困难，但对于一位中锋来说就不是那么自然了。板凳上的迪福更擅长这个角色，他过去的几年中在这个位置上的表现有如教科书。

（3）热刺缺乏控制力

热刺没怎么出招就已经2-0领先了——他们只是反击得很迅速而且有成效。局势对两球领先的热刺来说再好不过了，但是他们不但没掌控住比赛，还引来了阿森纳的攻击压力——在萨尼亚扳回一城之前，罗西基和范佩西也都有一次很不错的机会。（这里需要指出的是，之前提到过阿森纳的边后卫比较靠前的站位引起了后方的空虚，但确实也收到了正面的效果。）


下半场的阵型

一支球队不论是控球还是让对方控球，都可以对比赛有所控制——你可以持球减慢节奏，或者建立坚固的防线承担压力。结果热刺啥也没做——他们在中路寡不敌众，根本控不住球。莫得里奇的传球成功率降至82%（往常他一般有88%），不过他也没法子自己完成传球对吧。
更让人吃惊的是，热刺的防线也不怎么样——上一场对阵阿森纳的时候他们排出了两排4对4阵型，防的很不错，但这次两个边路球员防守很差，而且让前锋退后来盯防阿森纳的中场球员也造成了不小的问题。

（4）阿森纳开始反击

中场休息的时候老雷把阵型调整成有点类似4-1-4-1的样子——范德法特取代克拉尼察出现在右路，不过更重要的一个变化是桑德罗上场替下了萨哈。热刺的阵型完全崩溃了，变得越来越狭窄，战术计划也令人费解——看不出他们到底是想要控制中路，还是继续他们的直接进攻。
不管怎么样，热刺在面对阿森纳的反击时，逐渐开始脆弱起来。罗西基打入第三球的时候，热刺发现球的前边有6名球员——桑德罗没有卡住自己的位置，帕克现在也推得太靠前——阿森纳是在5对4的局面下打入的这一球。
接下来，沃尔科特也展现了自己的作用。他在上半场表现得很差，但是下半场中间的时候突然变得无懈可击。不过这也很合逻辑——热刺退守很深的时候他完全隐形，但当热刺推到前边后场空虚的时候，他就会发挥很大的作用。客队的造越位陷阱并不出色，沃尔科特有两次机会都靠速度完全甩开了对手。

结论

表面上看来，这场比赛开放到不合逻辑的地步……不过，从比分看来也是稍微有点逻辑因素的。上半场的时候，阿森纳在后场只有2对2的局面，防线很脆弱，但是在中场的3对2争斗中占据了优势并形成了压迫。

雷德纳普在中场休息时的调整并没有收到上赛季时候的那种效果，热刺下半场打得很差——防守缺乏结构性，进攻方面也是毫无办法。

pedro

[全场集锦]英超第26轮 阿森纳5-2热刺

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Link between Premier League goalfests and poor European progress of English clubs?
February 28, 2012

The top English clubs continue to perform poorly in Europe, and serve up amazingly open games at the top of the Premier League.

Many have drawn a link between the two. I wrote a column for the Guardian yesterday along these lines:

None of the top sides want to be submissive, to be seen as the underdog and play reactive football. That is the major difference between England and other major European leagues, where the food chain is more established…in England, everyone wants to play (attacking) football…naivety has contributed, a refusal to change strategy to suit the situation…a separate problem for each individual side is the lack of control they are able to exert upon matches…it is this lack of control that is costing English teams in Europe. With a fluid Barcelona side the template for continental success, it’s an inconvenient truth that English clubs perform better in Europe when they are defensive, organised and functional…4.9 goals per game in matches between the top five isn’t indicative of great quality.

Towards the end I touched on a link between goals per game in the Premier League, and English club’s success in Europe:

When the Premier League enjoyed its best run in Europe, between 2004-05 and 2008-09, the goals per game average in the Premier League was down at around 2.5. In the previous five seasons, when England had no European Cup finalists, it was over 2.65. Since 2009, it has risen to 2.8.

I thought this was worth a proper look with the help of some graphs, comparing the openness of Premier League games (making the assumption that this is reflected in the goals per game average) with English club’s progress in Europe this century.

Goals per game was an easy figure to find.

For progress in the Champions League, a simple point scoring system was used:

Champions League winner = 5 points

Champions League runner-up = 4 points

Champions League semi-finalist = 3 points

Champions League quarter-finalist = 2 points

Champions League second round / second group stage = 1 point

No points were awarded if a side didn’t make it out of the group stage.

So, if four English clubs got to the final four (hypothetically, this has never happened), it would be 5+4+3+3 = 15 points. If all four reached the second round, where they were knocked out, it would be 1+1+1+1=4.

Here’s a graph plotting goals per game in the Premier League (blue) against progress in the Champions League (red):

Some points to note here:

(a) If the goals per game average stays the same – it might not – it will be a record this century. Even if it drops slightly, it confirms a medium-term rise.

(b) The English clubs’ increase in performance between 2005-09 was quite staggering.

(c) If Chelsea and Arsenal don’t progress, this is a huge failure by English clubs compared to previous seasons.

(d) Both figures are, obviously, undecided for 2011/12 – current figures are shown. That means English clubs are assumed as 0+0+1+1, with the Manchester clubs eliminated and the English clubs underdogs going into the second leg of the second round.

(e) The goals per game ratio often dips in the middle of a season, so taking that figure now may be inaccurate.

But variations from season to season make it difficult to find an overall pattern. This is a particular problem with the Champions League progress – after all, this figure is taken from a much smaller sample size, and considering a fair number of points will have been decided by penalty shoot-outs, we can’t take sudden drops or rises too seriously.

Therefore, the next step was to create a three-year average for both figures. So, for example, the 2003-06 period would be an average of the figures from 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06.

This naturally created a smoother line, and a pattern is clearer:

(Note: It’s impossible to create a 2010-13 average with no data from 2012/13, so a two-year average of 2010/11 and 2011/12 was used for the final period)

This tends to suggest there is some kind of relationship – English clubs were doing better in Europe when the rate of goals in the league was very low. Or, if you like, the rate of goals in the league was very low when English clubs were doing better in Europe.

These are basic figures, but it’s probably worth further exploration.

pedro

816楼参考文献

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Benfica 2-3 Porto: pressing, transitions, set-pieces and substitutions
March 2, 2012


The starting line-ups

A stereotypically brilliant match between these two sides ended with a narrow win for Porto, who now have a crucial lead in the title race.

Benfica coach Jorge Jesus named the side that was largely as expected. In fact, it was exactly the same XI that played in the 2-2 draw in the reverse fixture.

Porto coach Vitor Pereira’s side was very different from that day, however. Marc Janko has since arrived to play upfront, Lucho Gonzalez has returned in the middle, while Djalma played on the left and Maicon was at the back.

This was a very attacking, aggressive game that went through various phases and was highly influenced by substitutions.

Early stages

Possession was pretty much even (51-49) in the first half, and the formation battle was as expected – 4-2-3-1 v 4-3-3. We know what to expect from these battles – the midfield triangles closely aligned, 1 v 1 battles on the flanks, and a spare man at the back. The key in positioning terms is to look for movement and fluidity.

We had this from both sides in the holding positions, though in different ways. Javi Garcia dropped into the back to push the Benfica centre-backs wider, the full-backs moved higher, and make Benfica roughly a 3-3-1-3 with the ball, once the wide players had moved forward and Axel Witsel had become the sole central midfielder. Porto, however, featured rotation in their midfield triangle, meaning Fernando stormed forward a couple of times, with Joao Moutinho becoming the deepest midfielder.

Pressing

More important than formations or movement when in possession was what the sides were doing without the ball. Both pressed heavily in midfield, with Porto doing this more effectively than Benfica, who suffered slightly from Pablo Aimar’s lack of work rate, and confusion about whether he was meant to be pressing one of the centre-backs or Fernando, plus the issue of Fernando’s forward movement.

Porto dominated the early stages because they were more energetic and more combative in midfield, with Gonzalez a key factor. When Benfica shifted briefly to three at the back with the ball, the Porto wide players tracked the Benfica full-backs, but the central midfielders continued to press Garcia and Witsel, meaning they actually ended up in advance of Hulk and Djalma. Porto went ahead through a Hulk thunderbolt – a freak goal, but one that reflected their dominance at that period.


The early second half line-ups, with the key changes highlighted

Fouls and high lines

The pressing from both sides meant three things for the game. First, it was played at a very high tempo. Second, there were lots of tackles, fouls and cards, which would prove crucial later on. Third, it meant both sides played with a high defensive line, which was not a huge problem because both Janko and Oscar Cardozo are both threats with their height and strength rather than raw pace.

However, Benfica did then create a couple of chances by lofting the ball over the top of the defence – Cardozo flicked a shot into the hands of the goalkeeper, then Aimar had a header saved.

Towards the end of the second half the pressing dropped in intensity, but both sides continued to do it. This meant the press was easier to get out of, transitions became more obvious, and Benfica grew into the game. They could get their wide players (and Aimar) involved in the game more easily to carry the ball forward, and again, while Cardozo’s equaliser didn’t arrive because of a particular tactical feature of the game, Benfica had looked strong at that point, and had forced three Porto players to go into the book after fouls.

Second half

This is when set-pieces started to become an obvious feature of the game (naturally, with so many fouls) – and Cardozo, unmarked in the centre of the goal, headed in a free-kick.

Jesus then made a substitution, with Aimar off and Rodrigo on to play slightly higher up the pitch. An Aimar injury may have contributed to Jesus’ decision, but although it left the midfield a little more open, the change made sense – Benfica wanted more energy high up the pitch, and Rodrigo could run a lot faster, and a lot further, than Aimar.

James and Djalma

But the crucial change came from Pereira, who made the extremely bold move of taking off centre-back Rolando, and bringing on wide forward James Rodriguez. This prompted a reshuffle – Maicon came into the centre, and previously anonymous left-winger Djalma moved all the way across to right-back.


Gaitan was moved to left-back

Djalma played brilliantly at right-back, and as Porto pushed forward, that was to become the key battlezone. That said, they were leaving space at the back for Benfica to counter into, and the game suddenly became a contest all about playing on the break. Porto’s goal actually came from a counter-counter-attack – Benfica had broken and left their midfield bare, so Porto went up the other end and James, playing narrower than Djalma, finished a sweeping move brilliantly. Pereira’s move was an inspired decision in that respect, but it could just as easily have been 3-1 as 2-2 at that point.

10 v 11

The substitution got even better, because Djalma continued to motor forward. Porto played predominantly down that side, and this may have contributed to Emerson fouling Hulk and picking up his second booking. He was off, and now Benfica had a real problem in the zone of the pitch they were already looking weak in. Jesus was made to pay for not having Joan Capdevila (hugely out of favour) on the bench, and instead he had to put creative midfielder Nico Gaitan there.

This was clearly not an ideal situation. Benfica sat back with two banks of four and Cardozo upfront, but Porto continued to get the ball out to Hulk. Eventually, the uncomfortable Gaitan dived in and conceded a free-kick in that left-back zone. Sure enough, Porto scored from the set-piece, with Maicon up from the back to head into the net. Porto were then comfortable for the final few minutes with 11 v 10.

Conclusion

Last season Benfica suffered one of their most humiliating defeats to Porto when they lost 5-0 at the Dragão. The problem there was a complete inability to defend in the left-back zone, with David Luiz terrible in particular. Hulk running riot, and all five goals coming from that zone. The same position turned out to be a huge problem tonight, and this may have a significant impact upon their title hopes.

That turned out to be the key factor in a game that featured pressing, counter-attacking and poor defending at dead ball situations. It was a fantastically open game, and Pereira came out on top with his brave substitution.

pedro

822楼参考译文

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Arsenal 3-0 Milan: Arsenal press excellently but lack options from the bench to maintain it
March 6, 2012


The starting line-ups

Arsenal got very close to the most remarkable two-legged turnaround in Champions League history.

Arsene Wenger named the logical side considering his injury problems – Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain played in midfield, Gervinho was on the left, but Wenger didn’t really have other options.

Max Allegri attacked, using Robinho and Stephan El Shaarawy in the front three. Djamel Mesbah played at left-back, with Urby Emanuelson ahead of him.

So near yet so far – Arsenal defended well throughout, attacked excellently at the start of the game, but fell away badly at the end.

Pressing

Arsenal pressed very well here, as heavily as they’ve done all season. Last season they did it brilliantly against Chelsea and Barcelona, while in 2011/12 they sit back more. But here, the wide forwards closed down full-backs and the midfield was energetic too.

Alex Song pushed high up the pitch and used his energy to pressure the Milan midfield (although he did leave gaps in behind), while Oxlade-Chamberlain dribbled with the ball and Tomas Rosicky also played in a quick, direct manner from the centre. This surprised Milan, and without Kevin-Prince Boateng bringing power and energy to the side without the ball, they got overrun in the middle. Robinho did little without the ball, and Mark van Bommel was seriously constrained by his booking in the first few minutes. Take out van Bommel’s ability to tackle (and his license to foul without fear of dismissal) and he is half the player.

Flanks

But despite the threat from the centre, what Arsenal did particularly well was to attack down the flanks, to get the ball out wide and run with the ball at the full-backs. That was what they strangely failed to do in the first leg (especially when Theo Walcott was removed at the break, and Aaron Ramsey came on down the right). Because of both shape and personnel, Milan are vulnerable at full-back, and with Mesbah making his European debut, he was the clear man to attack.

Sure enough, two of Arsenal’s goals came after attacking at speed down the right. Walcott’s run and cut-back fell to Rosicky for the second goal, while Oxlade-Chamberlain was brought down by Mesbah for the penalty for the third goal. Gervinho on the other flank didn’t contribute as much, though this may have been because Arsenal were focusing on the right (which was the correct strategy).

Allegri could have helped Mesbah out by bringing on another midfielder and getting Emanuelson to play in front of Mesbah – two banks of four seemed the more logical way to defend, but then Milan have defended with 4+3 for the entire campaign, and are more familiar playing that way.

Arsenal’s one problem was that they couldn’t actually cross the ball successfully, aside from the corner for Laurent Koscielny’s goal.



Milan blunt

Milan actually had good possession throughout the game, and completed more passes than Arsenal over 90 minutes. But Robinho is not a trequartista, at least not in this situation and with these players. Allegri loves Boateng because he has the energy to link midfield and attack and prevent Milan becoming a broken side – when he’s unavailable, Emanuelson often does a job there. Robinho ambled back, and Milan’s front three did the job of (at most) two players.

Arsenal also did very well to push their defence high up the pitch, in keeping with their pressing. This meant that Milan were frequently caught offside, although Arsenal’s closing down resulted in a lot of fouls.



Second half

It could have been different for Arsenal, had Robin van Persie not wasted a great chance midway through the half. But equally Antonio Nocerino missed a similar chance, and besides, the van Persie chance and the Gevinho effort that preceded it were the only two serious efforts Arsenal had in the second half.

Milan changed little – though were probably told to get their heads in shape by their coach at half time. However, they did sit a little deeper and were more compact from front to back – Arsenal got less space.

Tiredness

But having pressed so much at the start of the game, Arsenal were now exhausted. They desperately needed more energy from the bench to liven things up and increase the tempo, but as Wenger said after the game, he didn’t have any midfield options to introduce. Aaron Ramsey, Mikel Arteta, Jack Wilshere, Abou Diaby and Yossi Benayoun were all unavailable, and each would have been used in the second half.

Oxlade-Chamberlain got injured early on in the second period, and struggled on for an admirable period of time – but this just contributed to Arsenal’s lack of energy in the second half. It was unfortunate that both he and Walcott had to depart, because these were the two players offering the most pace with the ball, and most able to attack Mesbah.

Subs

The game was a good example of how throwing on more strikers doesn’t automatically lead to more of a goal threat. Maroune Chamakh and Park Chu-Young came on and played high up the pitch, but this allowed Milan more time on the ball in midfield, and they were actually the stronger side late on. It’s difficult to blame Wenger here – three of his available substitutes were defenders, another was a reserve goalkeeper.

However, at one point young attacking midfielder Oguzhan Ozyakup was getting ready to come on – but never appeared, and Wenger seemingly changed his mind. Whether he would have made a difference is debatable (ZM has never seen him play) but if he could run and press, he probably would have been more useful than two static strikers who contributed little.

Milan deserve some credit for their performance late on – Allegri brought on Alberto Aquilani for El Shaarawy, Emanuelson moved to the high tip of the diamond, and Milan were more compact and killed the game well in the second half – they completed much more passes than Arsenal did.



Conclusion

The preview to the tie mentioned “an interesting battle of very different styles”, and how it showed. Both sides were, at different times in this contest, both absolutely superb and dreadful beyond belief. When one got their gameplan right and played to their strengths, the other couldn’t cope. These are completely contrasting sides, which vaguely explains why we had two such extreme matches (with a large slice of pure freak football thrown into the mix).

Looking purely at the two results, the logical conclusion is that Milan maximised their period of dominance (the first leg) for longer. The truth is probably slightly different – Milan were able to fight back in the second half of the second leg and withstand pressure, whereas Arsenal never really got a grip of the away leg.

pedro

836楼参考译文

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Bayern 7-0 Basel: Basel’s brave strategy vaguely logical, but their application of it disastrous
March 13, 2012


The starting line-ups

Bayern stormed into the quarter-final after a comfortable victory.

Jupp Heynckes decided Bastian Schweinsteiger wasn’t fit enough to start – he was on the bench. Luiz Gustavo played in the middle with Toni Kroos ahead, Philipp Lahm switched to right-back, with David Alaba on the left.

Heiko Vogel made one change from the first leg, bringing in Cabral for Benjamin Huggel, so Basel were back to the XI that beat Manchester United last year.

Basel started off pressing high in the first five minutes, but then retreated into a deep shape with two banks of four behind the ball.

Basel leave two up

The final scoreline makes Vogel’s tactics look ridiculous, but there was some level of logic to his decisions here. The most notable feature of the first half was that Basel left both strikers high up the pitch. Marco Streller played upfront, and Alexander Frei drifted off, often to the left.

Usually, a manager would instruct one of the strikers to drop into the midfield onto Gustavo to help Basel out when they didn’t have the ball. Vogel didn’t bother, however, which meant the two Bayern holders had all the time on the ball they liked to dominate possession after Basel’s initial press had died down.

However, it did make some kind of sense. Basel wanted to play quickly on the break, and by leaving two strikers up, they could clear the ball downfield and get a 2 v 2 situation at the back. A couple of times towards the end of the first half, they created decent half-chances. The downside was that Bayern would dominate the ball, but then Vogel would have accepted that before the game anyway.

Defensively, the problem wasn’t the formation, but the fact the centre-backs both had awful games, and Bayern’s wingers were on fire. Some defences can defend more than capably with four players in front protecting them, but Basel let Mario Gomez have countless opportunities.

The problem offensively was the transitions from defence to attack. It’s reasonable to play two men high up the pitch and ask Fabian Frei and Xherdan Shaqiri to carry the ball when Basel broke up moves – that’s their natural game – but neither did so well, and Basel’s first pass out of defence was very poor and handed possession back to Bayern.

Bayern wide players

Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben were fantastic. Robben’s display was more impressive, because he drove Bayern forward when the score was 0-0 and 1-0, whereas Ribery did much of his good work at 3-0 and 4-0.

Robben’s positioning here was excellent. Often he stays wide, hugs the touchline to get space to receive the ball, then ducks inside and dribbles from there. He, here started much narrower and essentially played between four Basel players – Lee, Dragovic, Frei and Xhaka. When Basel pushed men forward, he reverted to being a traditional winger.

Part of Basel’s problem was that Fabian Frei had been told to help out Lee and double up, but Robben’s highness and narrowness made this difficult – Frei then played very narrow on the left himself, which simply opened up space for Lahm to motor into (although this did open up space for Alexander Frei higher up).



Robben’s movement was excellent, and varied. He could come inside into a number ten position, or burst between Dragovic and Lee to get in behind to pick up through-balls. This was where Basel’s numerical disadvantage in midfield did come into play, as they often couldn’t close down Kroos without opening up space elsewhere.

Ribery and Gomez looked great once Bayern were in control, but Robben was the man who gave them that control.



Conclusion

Bayern were excellent at times – brave enough to keep four men upfront at times, and also in leaving 2 v 2 at the back. They enjoyed the freedom of the midfield, and spread the ball intelligently from side to side.

Vogel’s overall approach wasn’t as ludicrous as the result makes it seem – but Basel’s penalty box defending was terrible, and the poor transitions meant the ball kept coming back at them. That’s a combination ripe for a thrashing.

Referring to Bayern’s 7-1 win over Hoffenheim at the weekend, Vogel said: “The margin of victory does not impress me. I have absolutely no fear that Bayern will score seven goals in one game [against us].” Oh dear…

pedro

845楼参考译文

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Chelsea 4-1 Napoli: Napoli unable to defend crosses
March 15, 2012


The starting line-ups

Chelsea produced an impressive display to qualify for the Champions League quarter-finals.

Roberto Di Matteo chose a rough 4-2-3-1 system, with Daniel Sturridge wide on the right, and Ramires tucked in on the left.
Walter Mazzarri named his expected side – Juan Zuniga in ahead of Andrea Dossena was the only small debate in his selection. Zuniga got the nod, but then had to move to the right once Christian Maggio picked up an injury, and Dossena came on down the left.

This was an entertaining game with either side being ‘ahead’ in the tie at two separate points – Chelsea came out on top, though it wasn’t a particularly enthralling tactical battle.

Napoli leave two up

The major point of interest in the first half was that Napoli left both Ezequiel Lavezzi and Edinson Cavani very high up the pitch, in a sense replicating the tactics used by Basel last night at Bayern, but also continuing the strategy from the first leg, where Lavezzi played very high up and exploited the space in behind Branislav Ivanovic.

But Lavezzi often remained quite central when Chelsea had the ball – as did Cavani. There was no attempt for Napoli to retreat into the 5-4-1 shape they often form without the ball, presumably as they wanted to offer a continued attacking threat.

To a certain extent they did – Napoli broke well in the first half, although their decision-making in the opposition half was often poor, and a couple of sloppy passes let them down.

But further back it caused problems. Marek Hamsik dropped deep and played as an extra midfielder, but on the opposite flank Napoli had little protection, with Walter Gargano forced to move across to that side. If he couldn’t, then the wing-back would move up the pitch and deal with the danger, and the relevant centre-back would move across into the full-back position. In theory that worked OK, but Napoli were terrible at putting pressure upon the man with the ball in the wide zones. The first goal, for example, came when Ramires was given all the time in the world to put a cross into the box, and Didier Drogba was exactly the man to thrive on this opportunity.



Napoli won 6-3 at the weekend against Cagliari, but all three goals they conceded were headers scored by Joaquin Larrivey, a basic number nine – this is suddenly something they’re vulnerable to (which is bizarre considering their system, which features three centre-backs and decent width on both sides). Morgan De Sanctis also flapped at an early corner, indicating he wasn’t happy with the ball being delivered from wide either.

But the problem continued, with John Terry completely free to head in at the start of the second from a corner. Even the corner had been conceded when Hugo Campagnaro headed behind under no pressure, suggesting poor communication – then from the corner, Gokhan Inler’s marking was non-existent. Lampard’s third came from a penalty, conceded after yet more poor marking from a corner.

Despite this clear weakness and Chelsea taking advantage, the home side weren’t doing their best to exploit the problems. Di Matteo persisted with right-footed Ramires on the left (granted, he provided the assist for the goal, but he’s hardly a classic winger, and certainly not on the left) and Sturridge on the right. Even more strangely, Fernando Torres replaced Sturridge later on, and started off playing on the right – again, he wasn’t likely to provide good service for Drogba.

It took until extra time for Di Matteo to realise the potential. He removed Juan Mata, who had been quiet, and introduced a player comfortable playing down the left, Florent Malouda. Ramires went to the right, and Torres went upfront. 4-4-2. Now Chelsea had two players in more comfortable wide roles, and two strikers in the box to get on the end of crosses. Chelsea were now more direct – see De Sanctis’ error for Torres’ missed open goal (from a narrow angle).

Eventually the fourth did come from a cross, of sorts. The combination of Drogba and Ivanovic wasn’t what the formation had intended, but the move did come after Ramires went down the outside on the right.



Other features

The game wasn’t all about Chelsea delivery from wide areas, of course. Napoli were surprisingly shapeless throughout the game, particularly in extra time when they seemed to tire quickly. Inler’s goal was excellent, but he gave the ball away too often, both with passes and failed dribbles. Walter Gargano was also disappointing, with a pass completion rate down at 67% compared to his usual 82%, although he would argue that his job was to prompt quick attacks with direct passes.

Chelsea did all the physical aspects of the game well – they won over two-thirds of the aerial duels, Ramires provided great energy from midfield and continued driving well into extra-time, and the substitutes gave them more freshness – Napoli’s two (tactical) changes came in extra-time when Chelsea were sitting deep behind the ball, and they didn’t enjoy the benefit of fresh legs.

Conclusion

Napoli broke well in the first quarter of an hour, but even then they didn’t look at their best with the ball. They needed to score in that period, because the constant balls into the box from Chelsea were defended terribly, and the limitations of three fairly average centre-backs (with the slight exception of Paolo Cannavaro) were highlighted. These are midtable Serie A players competing in the knockout round of the Champions League, and unfortunately they weren’t up to scratch. Like Basel, their gameplan depended upon sitting deep then breaking – but you have to be able to deal with the constant pressure, and defend the penalty box well.

However, Drogba was excellent. This was the old-style Drogba – the target of route one balls and crosses compared to the neater, tidier link-up man Andre Villas-Boas wanted:

pedro

847楼参考译文
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切尔西4-1那不勒斯战术分析：魔兽雄霸禁区，蓝军传中逞威
2012-03-16 / baiy07

切尔西打出令人难忘的表现从而晋级欧冠八强。

迪马特奥选用了一个肌肉流4-2-3-1体系，斯图里奇在右边路，拉米雷斯进入阵容左路。

马扎里祭出了他理想中的阵容——替代多塞纳的祖尼加是唯一一个值得商榷的首发人选。最终祖尼加入选，但当马乔受伤下场后他不得不去到右路，多塞纳入替来到左路。

这是一场有趣的比赛，两方都曾在比赛的不同时刻在总比分上获得领先——最终切尔西获胜，但这并不是一场在战术对决上特别引人入胜的比赛。

那不勒斯的前场两人压得很靠前

上半场的主要看点在于那不勒斯让拉维奇和卡瓦尼都压得很靠上，这复制了前一晚巴塞尔对阵拜仁时的战术。但那不勒斯也继续了第一回合所采取的策略，拉维奇顶在前面，试图利用伊万诺维奇身后的空间。

但当切尔西控球时，拉维奇经常站得太靠中路了——卡瓦尼也是一样。在无球时那不勒斯并没有回撤组成他们经常采用的5-4-1阵型，这大概是由于他们想给对方持续的进攻威胁。

在某种程度上来说他们也确实制造了持续的威胁——上半场那不勒斯的反击犀利，然而在下半场他们处理球的决定经常很糟糕，而且一大堆传球失误让他们士气受损。

然而这种布置在后场就产生了问题。哈姆希克回撤很深，踢得像一个中场，但在另一条边路那不勒斯几乎没有保护，使得加尔加诺不得不横向跑动去提供保护。如果他不这么做，翼卫就必须上抢应对威胁，这样一来相应的中卫就得去保护边后卫的位置。理论上这样做没问题，但那不勒斯在边路区域对持球人的压迫做得很糟糕。例如第一个进球，拉米雷斯有大把大把的时间来传中，而德罗巴是把握这种机会的最佳人选。

那不勒斯在周末以6-3战胜卡利亚里，但他们的三个失球都是被一个传统的九号球员华金-拉里维用头球打进的——这突然变成了他们的软肋（考虑到他们的体系有3个中卫并且在两个边路都很强，这一点让人感到奇怪）。

然而这个问题仍在持续，特里在下半场开始阶段接到角球传球，在无人盯防的情况下头球破门。角球机会来源于坎帕尼亚罗在无压迫的情况下将球顶出底线，这意味着那不勒斯队员相互沟通糟糕——然后角球开出后因勒也没有盯人。兰帕德的第三个进球是是个点球，仍然是来源于角球发出后的盯人不紧。

尽管那不勒斯有这个明显的弱点而且切尔西也用它获利了，但主队并没有完全地打爆这一点。迪马特奥坚持让右脚选手拉米雷斯出现在左路（坦白讲，他是助攻了一球，但他并不是一个传统边翼，显然更不是在左路），而让斯图里奇在左。更奇怪的是，托雷斯随后替下斯图里奇并开始在右路活动——又一次，他不可能给德罗巴提供什么帮助。

直到加时赛迪马特奥才意识到他的队伍还有多大潜力可挖。他换下了表现安静的马塔，换上了习惯在左路活动的马卢达。拉米雷斯去到右路，托雷斯顶在前面打4-4-2.这时切尔西有两个球员出现在他们习惯的边路，有两个射手在禁区里随时等待传中。切尔西踢得更直接了——看看因德桑克蒂斯失误而导致的托雷斯空门不进吧（小角度射门）。（译注：托雷斯无法摆脱被黑的命运）
最后的第四个进球也可以说来源于某种传中。德罗巴和伊万诺维奇之间的连接并不是这个阵型本来的意思，但当拉米雷斯在右边路外侧拿球后，这样的跑位确实发生了。

其他因素

当然，这场比赛也不全是切尔西在边路的各种传中。令人惊讶的是那不勒斯在整场比赛中阵型都很松散，特别是加时赛时，他们看起来很快就疲劳了。因勒的进球很精彩，但他太容易丢球了，不管是传球还是带球。加尔加诺的表现也令人失望，传球成功率由平时的82%降为67%，尽管他可以辩解说他的工作是传出直塞球来发动快攻。

切尔西的对抗做得很好——他们赢下了超过三分之二的高球争顶，拉米雷斯为中场提供了很多能量，在加时赛里也不知疲倦，替补们也提供了很多活力——那不勒斯的两个调整（战术性的）出现在加时赛，当时切尔西已经回撤很深了，他们的替补没能发挥什么作用。

结论

那不勒斯在前45分钟里的反击很犀利，但即使如此他们也没有做到最好。他们需要在那时得分，因为切尔西边路持续不断的传中防守起来会很困难，而且放大了三个能力较为平庸的中卫（小卡纳瓦罗稍好一些）的局限性。在冠军联赛淘汰赛的舞台上，他们算是意甲里能力较为一般的球员，很遗憾他们没能达到这个标准。就像巴塞尔，他们的比赛计划本来是摆铁桶并伺机反击——但你必须能抵挡住对手持续的压力，把禁区保护好。

但德罗巴是非常出色的。这是传统的德罗巴——那个输送皮球和传中的目标，而不是博阿斯希望的那个细腻优雅的串联者：

pedro

拿波里出局令人遗憾，不过主帅临场指挥在下半场后半段有很大问题，加时赛几乎是放弃感觉了