【10-11 ZM专贴】280L：替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

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Lyon 1-1 Real Madrid: all square in tight game
February 22, 2011

The starting line-ups

Karim Benzema scored on his return to Lyon, but Bafetimbi Gomis netted a late equaliser.
Claude Puel fielded a 4-2-3-1 system, making just one change from the weekend game. Jimmy Briand’s spectacular bicycle kick against Nancy wasn’t enough to keep him in the side, so Brazilian Michel Bastos played instead.
The only minor surprise from Jose Mourinho was at left-back. Marcelo was left out, Alvaro Arbeloa started.
Real were slightly subdued throughout the contest, and the game was static for periods, with neither side really wanting to take the initiative and both preferring to wait for counter-attacking opportunities.

The game was never ‘poor’, but for spells it wasn’t interesting tactically. It was 4-2-3-1 v 4-2-3-1, the game had no overall pattern, both goals had an element of fortune to them, and neither manager conclusively out-tacticed the other. The points to take from this game were minor.
Arbeloa-Ronaldo combination misfires
The combination of Arbeloa and Cristiano Ronaldo down the left  didn’t work particularly well. It was widely assumed that Mourinho omitted Marcelo because he wanted someone more defensively secure in this match, but the defensive nature of Arbeloa actually invited pressure and made Real slower and more predictable with the ball.
It’s questionable whether a side can successfully function with two wrong-footed players on the same wing. The tactical trend of last season was to play ‘inverted’ wingers, but these were almost always used in conjunction with attacking full-backs. It’s a two-way system – the winger coming inside creates space for the overlapping full-back, and the overlapping full-back stretches the play to open up play for the winger.
Real tried to play through Ronaldo, so Lyon made plenty of interceptions in their right-back zone

When you have a winger looking to come inside and shoot (as Ronaldo inevitably does) in conjunction with a wrong-footed full-back who doesn’t stretch the play, you become quite easy to play against. Ronaldo showed a couple of good moments with stepovers, but his only three attempts on goal came from free-kicks. He offers more than simply goalscoring, but despite being a winger, he is Real’s main goal threat and was stifled here. Marcelo overlapping is a key part of Ronaldo’s game.
Real still tried to play down that flank, meaning Lyon generally won the ball in their right-back position. On the other side, Angel di Maria was tucked in, and also wanted to come inside onto his stronger foot.
Lyon defend well, attack poorly
Lyon had less possession but were more of a threat in the first half. They were often wasteful in the final third, with Bastos and Gomis both wasting promising chances. They were better when Bastos switched to the left of the pitch, where he teamed up with the left-back Aly Cissokho in fast attacks – on the other side, Anthony Reveillere remained in position against Ronaldo.
Lyon coped well in the centre of the pitch – they let Real have the ball in their own half, but then pressed when Real attempted to play it into the front four. There was little drive from Real’s six defensive players and hence no ’surprise’ element for Lyon when defending. Mesut Ozil had a very quiet game – he only influenced the play when he dropped deep or moved to the flanks – the chalkboard of his passing shows an almost perfect ‘wall’ (broken by one solitary pass and two corners) across the final third, that he couldn’t penetrate.
Mesut Ozil barely influenced the game in or around the penalty area

However, Lyon didn’t create much from the middle of the pitch when they won the ball, with Xabi Alonso and Sami Khedira remaining in position.
Second half
Real were better in the second half when they raised the tempo and moved the ball more quickly into dangerous positions. Lyon looked more nervous when their back four was put into action immediately, rather than having the shield of a midfield four as well.
Both managers changed the game from the bench. Benzema’s strike was his first action after coming off the substitutes bench, whilst Puel introduced three new men, all attacking players, which gave Lyon a renewed attacking threat and pushed them forward for the late goal. Mourinho had replaced Ozil with Marcelo, who played on the left of a midfield three along with Lassana Diarra and Alonso.
Conclusion
A draw was probably a fair result. Neither side played particularly well – Lyon didn’t make the most of their opportunities when they got the ball into the final third, whilst Real simply didn’t get the ball into the final third, with Ronaldo blunted, Ozil quiet, and di Maria fairly average.
Still, it is advantage to Real – 11 of the last 14 sides who drew the first leg of a Champions League knockout tie 1-1 away from home eventually progressed, according to Opta.

pedro

38# 北极海

版主客气了

不好意思

成了二道贩子

呵呵

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里昂1-1皇家马德里战术分析：阿贝罗亚难配C罗 激烈有余机会寥寥  
由 dfich 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

里昂1-1皇家马德里：全场激烈的比赛

2011/2/22

首发阵容

卡里姆·本泽马在回归里昂之战中进球，但巴菲蒂比·戈米斯在比赛结束前攻入了扳平的一球。

克劳德·普埃尔排出了一个4-2-3-1的阵型，和上周末的比赛只做出了一处改变。吉米·布莱德对阵南锡的华丽倒钩不足以保证他首发出场，所以巴西人米歇尔·巴斯托斯取而代之。

来自穆里尼奥的阵容小意外出现在左后卫位置上。马塞洛被弃用，阿尔瓦罗·阿贝罗亚首发出场。

比赛自始至终皇马都有点受到压制，而且有段时间比赛处于安静的状态，因为两边都不想真正接过主动权并且都等着防守反击的机会。

这比赛绝不“难看”，但好一段时间在战术上相当乏味。这是一场4-2-3-1之间的对话，比赛没有一个总体的规律，两个进球都有运气的成分在里面，而且没有一位教练在战术上决定性地超过另一位。这场比赛可以得到的要点很少。

阿贝罗亚-罗纳尔多组合失灵

阿贝罗亚和克里斯蒂亚诺·罗纳尔多在左路的组合没有取得特别的优势。广泛认为穆里尼奥弃用马塞洛是因为他想要有个防守更安全的人在场上，但是实际上阿贝罗亚天生的防守属性招致了压力，并使得皇马速度变慢，球路更容易被预判。

两位逆足球员在同一翼的情况下，边路能否运转正常值得我们发问。上赛季的战术趋势是打逆足边锋，但是这些差不多总是和进攻型边后卫结合在一起使用。这是个双向的体系——边锋内切为插上的边卫创造空间，插上的边卫带走防守为边锋赢得机会。

皇马尝试走C罗这边,所以里昂在他们的右边区域创造了大量的抢断

当你有一个寻求内切射门（如同C罗必然要做的）的边锋再搭配一个逆足又插上不彻底的边卫，你就会变得容易对付。罗纳尔多展现了数次精彩的单车绝技，但他仅有的三次射门尝试都是来自于任意球。他对球队的贡献并不只是进球，但尽管作为一名边锋，他是皇马主要的对球门制造威胁的人，而本场却被扼杀。马塞洛的套边插上对C罗比赛中的发挥至关重要。

皇马仍旧尝试打边路，意味着里昂基本上在右后方位置得球。另外一边，安格尔·迪玛利亚内收，而且也想要内切用惯用脚打门。

里昂防守上佳，进攻不给力

里昂控球率比皇马低但上半场更具威胁。他们数次浪费禁区内的机会，比如巴斯托斯和戈米斯都错过了绝佳机会。巴斯托斯转到球场左路的时候里昂表现更好，他在快攻中可以和左后卫阿里·西索科配合——另一边，安东尼·雷维埃守住位置对抗罗纳尔多。

里昂很好地处理了中场——他们让皇马在本方半场得球，但接着在皇马试图把球交给前场四人组的时候紧逼。皇马的六位防守球员很少有推进，因此对里昂而言防守的时候就没有“意外”的因素了。门苏·厄齐尔踢了一场很安静的比赛——他只有在纵深穿插或移到侧翼的时候对比赛稍有影响——战术板上他的传球数据展现了一道围绕禁区完美的“墙”（被一记单个的传球和两个角球所破坏），说明他无法渗透。

门苏·厄齐尔很少有禁区内或附近影响比赛的时刻

然而，里昂在中场赢得球权的时候并没有制造出多少机会，因为哈维·阿隆索和塞米·赫迪拉坚守了位置。

下半场

皇马下半场打得有起色，他们提升了速度，加快了向危险区域转移球的频率。相比有中场四人的护卫时，里昂的后卫四人组直接面对冲击的时候显得更加紧张。

双方教练都用板凳队员改变了比赛。本泽马的进球来自于他离开板凳席上场后第一次触球，而普埃尔换上了三个新人，都是进攻队员，使得里昂增加了新的进攻威胁，推动他们取得了后来的进球。穆里尼奥用马塞洛换下了厄齐尔，前者踢起了中场左路，搭档拉斯·迪亚拉和阿隆索。

结论

平局或许是一个公平的结果。没有哪一边踢得特别好——里昂禁区内得球时没有抓住大部分机会，而皇马在C罗迟钝、厄齐尔安静和迪玛利亚发挥平平的情况下连禁区内拿球的机会都很少。

形势依然对皇马有利——根据Opta，冠军联赛之前14支首回合客场1-1打平的球队中，11支回到主场最终晋级。

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原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/22/lyon-1-1-real-madrid-tactics/

译者：dfich
完工：2011/2/24

pedro

Birmingham 2-1 Arsenal: Martins scores late tap-in to win the cup
伯明翰2-1阿森纳:马丁斯最后时刻绝杀得分为主队赢得英格兰联赛杯
February 27, 2011

The starting line-ups

Birmingham blunted Arsenal, and took their chances to record a huge Carling Cup final shock.
Alec McLeish chose to field a 4-5-1 system from the start, despite favouring 4-4-2 in the league recently. Keith Fahey started on the left, Sebastian Larsson on the right, with Nikola Zigic alone upfront.
With Theo Walcott and Cesc Fabregas out, Arsene Wenger’s only decision was between Tomas Rosicky and Nicklas Bendtner. He chose Rosicky to play in the middle, with Samir Nasri moving out to the right.
The game hadn’t settled down before Birmingham threatened – Lee Bowyer darted through the defence and was brought down by Wojciech Szczesny – but was wrongly flagged offside and Arsenal breathed a sigh of relief.

Birmingham cautious 伯明翰小心谨慎
That was a rare occasion Birmingham threatened in open play in the first half. Their game early on was about settling in, competing in the midfield and keeping it tight. The use of three central midfielders meant they weren’t outnumbered in the centre of the pitch, and this was the zone where McLeish’s side did their best work.
On paper Barry Ferguson was the deepest of the three midfielders, picking up Rosicky. Ahead, Lee Bowyer and Craig Gardner broadly picked up Alex Song and Jack Wilshere, but as Arsenal’s midfield rotated, with Rosicky sometimes coming deep and Song and Wilshere taking it in turns to go forward, Birmingham’s midfield trio was happy to do the same – sometimes Garnder became the deepest midfielder, occasionally it was Bowyer.

Narrowness 中场密集防守
In addition, Birmingham’s wide players played very narrow, meaning they often looked as if they were using five central midfielders. By packing the centre of the pitch, Birmingham forced Arsenal into misplaced passes and Wenger’s side never really got that aspect of their game going, despite a good surface. Arsenal’s full-backs were forced narrow when out of possession in response to Birmingham’s lack of width, which meant that Gael Clichy and Bacary Sagna’s first movement when Arsenal won possession was often a run straight out towards the touchlines to stretch the play.
That was the extent of Birmingham’s tactics early on – stopping Arsenal. There was no obvious strategy in terms of goalscoring, other than launching balls towards Zigic. Still, that tactic worked perfectly – the Serb forced a corner after Arsenal gave the ball away cheaply, and from the resulting corner nodded the ball in.

Arsenal sloppy 阿森纳中前场脱节且乏力
Arsenal didn’t get going upfront in the first half. Rosicky was quiet, and failed to provide a link between midfield and attack. That was partly his poor performance and partly Birmingham’s doing, by crowding him in the centre, but when the wide players pushed forward to make it a 4-2-1-3, Arsenal had problems getting the ball forward. None of their attacking four had a particularly good game individually – Wilshere was probably the standout player in the first half – but Robin van Persie’s equaliser was a brilliant strike out of nothing, and it was 1-1 at half time.

Second half 下半场
The general pattern of play continued in the second half, though Arsenal seemed to defend higher, to get Zigic away from the penalty box as much as possible.
McLeish showed more intent to get a goal, however. He brought on Jean Beausejour for Craig Gardner, with Fahey coming inside. This offered slightly more width in attack, though it’s difficult to remember Beausejour doing anything notable on the ball.
Arsenal gradually started to play and had a good spell of pressure around the hour mark, forcing Ben Foster into some great saves – Rosicky got involved and Nasri was more prominent, and those two looked much brighter. Arsenal’s passing was better, they kept the ball for longer, and did more in the final third. It seemed to be only a matter of time before they went ahead.

Changes 换人是关键、高下分明
Substitutions were crucial, however. Wenger replaced van Persie, who was injured scoring the goal and didn’t seem to recover from the knock, and brought on Nicklas Bendtner. Soon after, Arshavin made way for Marouane Chamakh. These changes meant Arsenal were less comfortable on the ball, though. Bendtner and Chamakh are not as good passers as van Persie and Arshavin, and Arsenal were less threatening and assured in possession.
Those changes might have convinced McLeish that he could throw on another striker. Fahey was removed, Obafemi Martins was brought on upfront. With Arsenal having moved high up the pitch in response to Zigic’s threat, Martins’ pace behind was set to provide them with another problem – and it did, but only after he’d put his side 2-1 up. A disastrous cock-up at the back was responsible, with Laurent Kosicelny and Szczesny to blame, handing Martins an open goal.
Arsenal chucked the ball forward late on, but it was Birmingham’s day.

Conclusion
McLeish’s tactics in the centre of the pitch worked well for the majority of the game. Statistics show that Arsenal had more possession, more shots, more shots on target – but that was to be expected, and probably would have happened whatever tactics Birmingham used. The difference in class between the two sides on paper was minimised, and only briefly in the second half were Birmingham significantly under pressure.
McLeish also deserves credit for steadily increasing his attacking threat – a winger and a striker on for two midfielders takes guts (especially considering that the performance in the midfield was why they were doing so well), and whilst the winning goal was a disappointing way for a final to be won (or lost, if you like), Birmingham deserved a bit of luck after the early offside/penalty incident.

pedro

Bayern 1-3 Dortmund: Schweinsteiger tries to play deep, but Dortmund don’t let him play
拜仁1-3多特蒙德:小猪拿球活动区域靠后,但是多特蒙德却让他不能如愿以偿
February 27, 2011

The starting line-ups 双方首发阵型

Dortmund ended Bayern’s faint hopes of winning the Bundesliga with an impressive victory.

Louis van Gaal kept the same XI that started the midweek win over Inter. Luis Gustavo played at left-back, whilst Danijel Pranjic was in the centre of midfield.
Jurgen Klopp made one outfield change, welcoming back Neven Subotic in place of Felipe Santana, and also gave a debut to Mitchell Langerak in goal.
The first 20 minutes of this game were probably the most exciting of the European season so far, given the importance of the game. Dortmund went ahead on nine minutes when Lucas Barrios sidefooted home after Bastian Schweinsteiger was caught in possession, Bayern quickly equalised when Gustavo turned in a corner, then Nuri Sahin curled a wonderful shot into the corner to make it 1-2 after 18 minutes.

Open game 开放的比赛
The frantic start to the  game was helped by both sides’ commitment to attacking football. Often games like this are cagey early on, with both sides sitting back, playing on the counter and waiting for the other to make the first move. The openness made for a fantastic contest, with both sides playing high up the pitch.
Tactically, we had two 4-2-3-1s up against each other, a relatively common feature of European (and in particular, German) football this season. The two shapes were very different in practice, however. Bayern’s was based around width, with Arjen Robben hugging the touchline without the ball, and Frank Ribery staying reasonably wide and drifting deeper to collect the ball.
Dortmund’s two wide players played much narrower, coming inside early and attempting to combine with Barrios. They frequently got plenty of men into the box, and played a more direct form of football compared to Bayern’s patient passing game.

Schweinsteiger deep 小猪位置靠后
The defining feature of the game was the role of Schweinsteiger, who played very deep and dropped between the centre-backs both in and out of possession. We’re relatively accustomed to seeing holding midfielders drop between the centre-backs to provide a passing option at goal-kicks, which gets out of the natural press of a 4-4-2 / 4-2-3-1 quite easily. Schweinsteiger frequently simply looked like a third centre-back, though – within the first five minutes he found himself caught under a cross, and Robert Lewandowski sneaked in behind and volleyed over.
It’s not clear why he played in such a deep position. The average position diagram below shows that, in the first half, he was often level with his centre-backs. This could have been simply to provide an extra man at the back (Bayern’s centre-back partnership is far from established) or it could have been so he got more time on the ball. The former isn’t his strength, however, and the latter didn’t happen because Dortmund put a particular emphasis on closing him down when he  got the ball. The first goal came when Bayern played the ball to Schweinsteiger, and Lewandowski and Kevin Grosskreutz immediately closed him down. Schweinsteiger completely missed the ball with his passing foot and the ball hit his standing leg – rebounding to Grosskreutz, who set up Barrios.


Schweinsteiger's average position (No 31) - image courtesy of http://www.bundesliga.de/en/

Dortmund pressure 多特蒙德的压迫
That incident really summed up the game – Dortmund were putting pressure on Schweinsteiger which contributed to his poor display, but he still made basic errors. He was beaten in the air seemingly every time Barrios came in front of him – he only won 5 out of 14 challenges in the game, which for a central midfielder isn’t too bad, but for an auxiliary centre-back is a big problem.
Towards the end of the first half Schweinsteiger again found himself as the deepest defender when Bayern were facing a long free-kick from the Dortmund half – Schweinsteiger booted the ball against one of his teammates and then had to atone for the area by blocking the resulting shot with his face. This was a long way from the calm, intelligent passer we’d become used to.

Bayern keep ball deep 拜仁中场控球位置靠后
Schweinsteiger playing so deep meant that Bayern held the ball in non-threatening positions for too long. Often this isn’t a problem for them (and has become a key part of their game) but they were behind for 78 minutes of this game, and therefore needed to be playing the ball higher up the pitch. They finished with 70% of possession but too much of that was in deep positions – Schweinsteiger only completed two passes in the entire game to Thomas Mueller, for example. When Bayern had Mark van Bommel playing deep and Schweinsteiger had more license to go forward, those two would combine frequently.
Schweinsteiger’s deep role also meant that Bayern often found themselves outnumbered in midfield. When Muller moved forward he was picked up by the Dortmund centre-backs, leaving Pranjic on his own in the centre of midfield. When Barcelona used Sergio Busquets as a third centre-back against Atletico this season, they had Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta commanding the centre of midfield – Pranjic was hardly likely to do the same here, and whilst that problem wasn’t translated to the raw possession statistic, the nature of the possession wasn’t suitable for a game Bayern were losing from the 18th minute onwards.

Conclusion 结论
From the sake of tactical innovation, it’s a shame Schweinsteiger played so poorly here. The modern ‘centre-half’ or ’sweeper’ will possibly be the next craze in football, but any manager watching Bayern’s use of Schweinsteiger here will be put off from trying it themselves.
None of this should detract from Dortmund’s performance. They were simply the better team – more organised without the ball, more direct with the ball, and fully deserving of the win. It wasn’t an overwhelmingly tactical win from their point of view, though – in this game, and in this season, they are simply a far better side than Bayern.

pedro

46楼的参考译文
-------------------------------
联赛杯决赛战术分析：比换人，温格负于麦卡利什
由 Rivaldinho 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区
February 27, 2011

双方首发阵型

伯明翰抓住机会击溃了阿森纳，出人意料地夺得了联赛杯的冠军！
尽管最近在联赛中时常使用4-4-2，可麦卡利什本场还是排出了4-5-1阵型，法耶居左，拉尔森居右，日基奇突前。
沃尔科特和法布雷加斯的缺阵让温格不得不在罗西基和本特纳之间做出抉择，教授选择将罗西基放在中路，纳斯里就移到了右路。
比赛刚开始伯明翰就制造了一次威胁，鲍耶穿越防线被什琴斯尼放倒，但是越位旗语错误地出现，阿森纳应该感到庆幸。

伯明翰小心谨慎
上半场伯明翰在运动战中鲜有威胁，他们一开始的目标就是稳住阵脚，在中场展开争夺，保持阵型的紧密。在现有阵型下伯明翰中场人数并不吃亏，这也是他们表现最出色的区域。
从纸面上看巴里-弗格森是拖在最后的中场，他负责盯防罗西基。鲍耶和加德纳分别跟防宋河威尔谢尔，但是阿森纳的中场经常轮转，罗西基有时候会回撤，宋和威尔谢尔会轮流前插，伯明翰的中场三人组也很乐意跟着一起转，有时候加德纳会撤得最深，有时候则是鲍耶。

内收塞满，看你怎么传
另外伯明翰的边路球员收得很紧，有时候他们看上去有5个中路中场，在中场塞满之后，伯明翰迫使阿森纳传球失误，枪手场面上占优，却一直没能解决这个问题。伯明翰如此的占位还意味着枪手的边后卫无球时也必须内收，这样一来一旦得回球权，他们做的第一件事就是跑向边线拉开空间。
阻止枪手进攻——这就是伯明翰比赛初期的战略目标。他们并没有太多进攻策略，无非就是冲吊日基奇，但是这个战术很好用，塞尔维亚人逼迫枪手送出角球，随后在角球进攻中头球破门。

阿森纳不给力
上半场阿森纳的进攻不给力。罗西基碌碌无为，没能串联起中场和锋线。他的糟糕表现是一部分原因，还有一部分原因要归功于伯明翰对他的围抢。当阿森纳的边路球员插上形成4-2-1-3阵型时，他们的推进就会出现问题。进攻四人组没有谁表现得特别好——威尔谢尔也许是上半场最突出的——范佩西那次进球是无中生有的华丽一击，半场时双方战成1-1平。

下半场枪手入戏
下半场比赛还是如此，阿森纳防线压得很靠山，这样也能尽可能地让日基奇远离禁区。
麦卡利什看起来很想再进一个，他用博塞儒尔换下了加德纳。这给球队进攻带来了更多的宽度，虽然博塞儒尔也没有做什么太惊天动地的事情。
60分钟过后，阿森纳逐渐开始找到节奏，向伯明翰施压，他们迫使福斯特做出了数次精彩扑救，罗西基开始融入进攻，纳斯里更具威胁，这两位看起来比上半时好多了。阿森纳的传球越来越好，他们可以长时间控球，就算在30米进攻区域也是如此。看起来他们再度进球只是时间问题。

变招，亦是杀招
换人是关键的，温格用本特纳换下了范佩西，他在进球后就受了伤，看上去一直没恢复，不久之后查马克换下了阿尔沙文。这两次换人让阿森纳的控球能力有所损失，和范佩西与阿尔沙文相比起来，本特纳和查马克都不是好的传球手，阿森纳的威胁顿时减弱。
也许是这两次换人让麦卡利什坚定了再换上一名前锋的决心。法耶下场，马丁斯出战。枪手为了对付日基奇而设置的防线压上战术却为马丁斯制造了发挥速度的空间，这一点在2-1领先之后尤为明显。那是一次致命的后防失误，科斯切尔尼和什琴斯尼都要负责，马丁斯面对空门一蹴而就。
阿森纳在最后时刻频繁把球送往前方，但是这一天终究属于伯明翰。

结论
比赛大部分时间，麦卡利什在中场中路的战术都很好用，数据显示阿森纳控球更多，射门更多，射正更多，但这都是在预料之中的，不管伯明翰用什么战术都是如此。两队在纸面上的差距已经被缩小到了最低限度，伯明翰也只有在下半场明显感受到了压力。
麦卡利什还应当为最后时刻加强进攻而得到褒奖，他用一名边锋和一名前锋换下了两名表现出色的中场，最后的失球防守固然让阿森纳感到失望，但是考虑都伯明翰在比赛初期就被漏判一次点球，这点运气的弥补也是应得的。

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原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/27/birmingham-2-1-arsenal-tactics/
译者：Rivaldinho

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拜仁主场输球，小猪的表现以及位置，成了zm评论的焦点问题

centre - half or sweeper，具体如何定位呢？

文章中，还将巴萨的布茨克斯作为范例，来分析小猪角色

pedro

47楼的参考译文
----------------------------
拜仁1-3多特蒙德战术分析：小猪意欲坐镇后方，多特让其弄巧成拙  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer
http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/27/bayern-1-3-dortmund-tactics/



多特蒙德用一场漂亮的胜利终结了拜仁联赛夺冠的微弱希望。

范加尔沿用了周中战胜国米的原班十一人。古斯塔沃踢左后卫，普兰济奇则出现在中场中路。

克洛普作出了一个改动，苏博蒂奇取代桑塔纳重回首发，其他人选都和预期一样。

比赛前20分钟可能是本赛季欧洲联赛迄今为止最让人兴奋的20分钟，由于比赛的重要性。多特蒙德在第9分钟取得领先，施魏因施泰格被断球，随后巴里奥斯推射破门；拜仁很快还以颜色，通过角球由古斯塔沃攻入；之后第18分钟沙欣一脚弧线球直挂死角，2-1。

开放的比赛

双方对攻势足球的执着造就了比赛的疯狂开局。通常这样的比赛双方在开局阶段都会谨小慎微：固守后方，伺机反击，等对方先行动。而本场比赛双方都把阵线压上，开放的场面成就了精彩的比赛。

从阵型上看，双方用的都是4-2-3-1，这是本赛季欧洲足球一个相对常见的场面（尤其是德甲）。不过在实际操作上双方相当不同。拜仁的战术构建在场地的宽度上，罗本无球时贴在边线上，里贝里也相当靠边，回收到更靠后的地方接球。

多特蒙德的两名边路球员则靠里得多，他们早早地进入中路，尝试与巴里奥斯配合。多特蒙德频频以多人冲击禁区，相对于拜仁耐心的倒脚，他们的踢法更为直接。

施魏因施泰格回撤

比赛的关键因素在于施魏因施泰格的角色，他回收得很深，无论有球还是无球都后撤到了两名中后卫之间的位置上。相对而言，更经常看到后腰回收到中卫之间的场面是接应门将传球，给守门员开门球时多一个传球路线的选择，这样可以很容易地摆脱4-4-2或4-2-3-1阵型的压迫。不过施魏因施泰格频频扮演第三中卫的角色——前5分钟内，一次传中就越过了他，莱万多夫斯基从后边插上的凌空抽射打飞。

不清楚他为何回撤得这么靠后。下边的平均位置图显示，在上半场，他通常和中后卫处在一条水平线上。这可能只是为了给后卫线加多一个人（拜仁的中后卫组合远谈不上稳定）。抑或是这样他就有更多持球的时间。但前者不是他的强项，而后者又不成立，由于多特蒙德特别注意在他拿球的时候进行拦截。第一个进球正是发生在拜仁的球传到施魏因施泰格脚下的时候，莱万多夫斯基和格罗斯克洛伊策立即包夹抢截。施魏因施泰格的传球脚完全没打上，球打到了他的站立脚上——反弹给了格罗斯克洛伊策，后者助攻巴里奥斯破门。



多特蒙德施压

这个事件实际上是整场比赛的一个缩影：多特蒙德不断给施魏因施泰格施压，这是他本场表现不佳的原因之一，但他还是犯了低级错误。每次巴里奥斯出现在他面前时，他似乎都被打得没有脾气——整场比赛他14次拦截只成功了5次，作为中场这不算太糟，但对于一个“第三”中卫来说，这就是个大问题了。

上半场行将结束，拜仁面对来自多特蒙德半场的一次远程任意球时，施魏因施泰格又成了最靠后的一名后卫——他把球踢到了一个队友身上，随后不得不以脸挡球进行补救。这和我们印象中那位冷静、聪明的传球手判若两人。

拜仁持球靠后

施魏因施泰格站位过于靠后意味着拜仁在没有威胁的区域控球时间过长。通常这对于他们不是问题（而且已经成为他们比赛的关键一部分），但他们这场比赛落后了78分钟，因此需要将持球地点压得更靠上。他们占据了70%的控球率，但太多的控球都局限于本队后方——比方说，施魏因施泰格整场比赛只给穆勒完成了两次传球；而当拜仁拥有范博梅尔的时候，施魏因施泰格有更多权限插上，他和穆勒的配合也就频繁得多。

施魏因施泰格位置靠后意味着拜仁在中场经常面临以少打多。穆勒前移时盯他的是多特蒙德的中后卫，此时普兰济奇在中场就陷于单打独斗。巴塞罗那本赛季对阵马德里竞技时把布斯克茨当第三名中后卫用，不过他们有哈维和伊涅斯塔控制中场中路——普兰济奇不可能起到同样作用，虽然这个问题没有反映到控球率数据上，但对于18分钟起就失势的拜仁来说，如此的控球率本身并不适用。

结论

就战术创新而言，施魏因施泰格的糟糕表现让人失望。现代“中前卫”或“清道夫”或许会成为足球的下一波狂潮，但看过拜仁对施魏因施泰格如此使用的教练会打消仿效的念头。

不过这丝毫不会掩盖多特蒙德的表现。他们就是表现更好的一队——无球时更有组织，有球时更加直接，完全配得上一场胜利。不过这并非一场压倒性的战术胜利——单就这场比赛来说的话；而就这个赛季来说，他们比拜仁要好得多。

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58楼的参考译文

切尔西2-1曼联战术分析：蓝军精神属性回涨

Chelsea 2-1 Man Utd: second half turnaround

March 1, 2011

双方首发阵容

比赛被分成了两部分，兰帕德的点球最终帮助切尔西全取三分。

安切洛蒂继续将德罗巴放在板凳上，首发锋线为阿内尔卡和托雷斯，鲁伊斯首发出战，其余的阵容都在预料之中。
弗格森两年内第一次延续自己的首发，贝巴仍旧是替补。
两队都排出了4-4-2阵型，比赛非常开放，节奏飞快，充斥了大量单兵对决。

曼联的策略

曼联的策略机遇两队上赛季在斯坦福桥的比赛。那场比赛曼联控制了比赛却输了球，弗格森在战术上其实是占得上风的。对阵切尔西时你必须派人特别看防科尔，去年完成这项任务的是瓦伦西亚，今年是弗莱彻，这意味着纳尼要移到左路去。

上赛季弗格森排出了一个不规则的阵型去对抗切尔西的菱形中场。本场比赛他明白切尔西只有两位中场中路球员，自己亦可以这样做。曼联在无球时阵型非常狭窄，他们就是想把切尔西引向边路。

切尔西的策略

从切尔西自身的角度来讲，这是他们近几周最“4-4-2”的一场比赛，马卢达的位置比平时要略微深一些。他们缺乏宽度，马卢达还是要往中间靠，拉米雷斯也是如此。在科尔被弗莱彻盯梢的状况下只有伊万诺维奇能在边路拿拿球，不过伊万在脚下有球的情况下杀伤力很一般，去年的比赛就证明了这一点，切尔西在发动进攻的时候看起来没什么头绪。

中场争夺

曼联很少让斯科尔斯与卡里克在中场搭档，一般情况下他们搭配的都是更勤奋的某位球员，弗莱彻或者安德森，不过这两人凑在一起效果还不错，他们很好地控制球，很好地转移分边，很好地控制了节奏。在上半场的运动战中曼联威胁更大。

切尔西上周对阵哥本哈根虽然青涩取胜，但唯一的问题就在于埃辛和兰帕德都不是纯粹的后腰，后防与中场之间留的空太多了。鲁尼越来越多地回撤到那个区域，兰帕德就盯了他半秒钟而已，小胖在禁区外从容起脚破门得分，鲁尼毫无压力，蓝军压力很大。
切尔西也有自己的机会，但是基本都是来自定位球，他们在运动战缺乏明确的目的性。托雷斯初期有一次进球被判无效，伊万也没能将兰帕德主罚的任意球送进球网。

下半场

下半场切尔西迅速扳平比分，其实这次得分时间接来自定位球。角球被破坏，转入运动战，先是伊万抢到点，后是鲁伊斯完美抽射，此二人出现在对方禁区对于这粒进球至关重要。
是
什么改变了比赛？其实战术上的改变很少，但是切尔西在下半场更强势，更坚定了。这厮客观事实，不是主观评判，事实就是切尔西的对抗成功率提升了，上半场30次对抗赢得15次，下半场34次对抗他们赢得了20次，这暗示他们确实有所改变。



锋线换枪

德罗巴的出战同样起到了作用。切尔西在前场有阿内尔卡和托雷斯的速度，但是没有真正的组织者，他们没法互相之间提供需要的直塞球。德罗巴上场后前场有了支点，他能控住球，帮助切尔西完成推进。

弗格森也换上了前锋，贝尔巴托夫换下了埃尔南德斯。贝巴和德罗巴是完全不同类型的球员，但是他们上场都是出于同样的目的——控住球，这是埃尔南德斯和鲁尼不如贝巴的地方。



切尔西取得领先

日尔科夫之所以替下马卢达，大概是因为前者更喜欢拉边下底传中，在德罗巴出战的情况下这点尤其有用。日尔科夫并没有一直这么做，但正是他为球队获得了决定性的点球。

弗格森在下半场的策略很奇怪，他用吉格斯换下斯科尔斯，让吉格斯在中场踢相同的位置。更“合理”的做法应该是把纳尼调到右路，让吉格斯踢左路，把弗莱彻拉回中间。想来在1-1的情况下他还是忌惮科尔会脱缰奔袭。直到1-2落后他还是坚持这么做，但是这样一来曼联看起来完全脱节了，他们上半场耐心的传球令人印象深刻，但是在需要进球的时候这样做就没意义了。落后之后他们唯一的一次射门尝试就是弗莱彻离谱的远射。

结论

曼联上半场表现出色，但是下半场却被切尔西翻盘，看起来切尔西的突然提速让他们很不适应。在曼联上半场控制比赛的时间段内斯科尔斯与卡里克的组合表现很出色，可是此二人下半场的挣扎告诉了我们为何弗格森不经常使用这个组合。

切尔西展现了他们的团结、团队精神和过去几周被质疑的所有精神力属性，德罗巴和日尔科夫的上场作用很大。在运动战切尔西依旧缺乏创造力，他们的进球源于角球和点球。埃辛非常出色，他已经不是过去几年的全能超人的，但是本场比赛他有球状态下踢得很聪明。



原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/01/chelsea-2-1-man-utd-tactics/

译者：Rivaldinho

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81# 北极海

这场比赛双方有一些球员，还是令人失望，不堪大用

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Tottenham 0-0 Milan: Spurs hang on
March 9, 2011

The starting line-ups

Milan had the majority of possession in both matches, but failed to score in 180 minutes of football.
Harry Redknapp made one change from the first game, with Luka Modric returning in place of Wilson Palacios. Gareth Bale was only fit enough for the bench.
Max Allegri named a surprisingly attacking side, even when considering this was a game Milan needed to win. Clarence Seedorf and Kevin-Prince Boateng were in a midfield three alongside Mathieu Flamini, with Robinho in the hole.
This was another strange second leg. Tottenham have the glory, and in defensive terms they played excellently. It was Milan who dominated the game, though, by outnumbering Spurs in midfield, and in that sense, Allegri probably got his tactics spot on – he simply needed more inspiration in the final third.

Two phases
Spurs’ approach had two separate phases, and it’s important to differentiate between the first period – where they tried to play football but were outplayed – and the second period, where they accepted that Milan were going to dominate possession and instead ‘parked the bus’ deep in their own half.
That may seem an unnecessary distinction, but in strategic terms it is crucial – their initial tactic failed, their plan B worked well.

Milan start strongly
Milan were a completely different side from the first leg – in personnel, and consequently in style too. They were far more comfortable in the midfield, with Rino Gattuso suspended and Thiago Silva back in his preferred position at centre-back. Seedorf surprisingly played as a deep-lying regista – the Andrea Pirlo role – and was the game’s best player, completing 20 more passes than any other midfielder. With Boateng shuttling on the left and Flamini also providing energy on the right, Milan were much more positive and creative in midfield.
Spurs couldn’t compete in that zone because they had a simple numerical disadvantage. That wasn’t a problem in the first leg for three separate reasons – (a) because they were using two holding players, (b) because they were sitting back behind the ball anyway, and (c) because Milan were so ponderous and slow on the ball in the first leg. With Spurs having less of a strong spine here, with Modric alongside Sandro, and with Milan quicker at getting the ball forward, the away side dominated.
Despite all this, Sandro was actually having a great game, as his tackling and intercepting chalkboards show.

Sandro's tackles and interceptions - courtesy TotalFootball iPhone app

Midfield battle
The problem, though was that Milan had 4 v 3 in the centre of midfield. Sandro was broadly picking up Robinho, Modric kept an eye on Flamini, and Rafael van der Vaart played around Seedorf. That left Boateng free, and he drove Milan forward for much of the first half. He also got back and doubled up with Jankulovski against Lennon. In fact, Jankulovski and Boateng worked well together at both ends of the pitch, as the Czech constantly overlapped and stretched the play early on.

Crouch failed to hold up the ball, and gave away too many free-kicks

Tottenham failed to provide much of a goal threat. This was partly because of their own faults – their transitions from defence to attack were poor and it’s difficult to remember too many promising breaks, but also because Milan were able to keep a high line. Peter Crouch was a threat whenever he got into the penalty area, but with Milan’s centre-backs keeping him high up the pitch, Crouch was only able to move forward into the box when Spurs’ wingers got into the final 20 yards.
When that happened, Crouch won everything at the back post, but it happened rarely, and so he was instead left to challenge for headers 40 yards from goal – where he frequently conceded free-kicks.

Second half
Spurs played deeper after the break, and started to look as if they were playing for a 0-0. This approach seems to suit their back four – Michael Dawson, in particular, who is a great penalty box defender but often struggles when the ball is played over his head.
This meant Milan’s movement was less effective upfront – they had less space to work in when they got into the final third. Tottenham’s lines were closer together, and Robinho faded from the game. Milan then had the problem they encountered in the first leg – with no ‘link’ player, they couldn’t connect their midfield and attack.
Tottenham sitting deep meant that Seedorf had more time on the ball, though, and he continued to impress in possession.

Milan fade
However, both Boateng and Jankulovski departed midway through the second half, and Milan were less of a threat. Alexander Merkel came on and played one excellent direct forward ball, but otherwise overhit his passes and Milan’s play became sloppy.

Seedorf was the game's best player

On the other hand, Redknapp’s changes worked well. Bale came on – he didn’t provide much attacking threat, but as a converted left-back, was comfortable playing deep and helping out defensively. Jermaine Jenas provided energy in the second half, which helped Spurs compete in the midfield zone.
Milan were unimpressive late on. A couple of quick passing moves saw both Pato and Robinho go close, but Spurs sat deep and narrow – and Milan didn’t have any width to go around them.

Conclusion
Over the course of the two legs Milan had far more possession, but Spurs defended resiliently throughout. The opening to this game suggested that Redknapp wanted to take the game to Milan, but late on the policy of sitting back was the correct one. The poor transitions meant there was no counter-attacking threat from the home side, but good performances from the two centre-backs and Sandro kept the clean sheet in tact – and that was always going to be enough to win the game.
Milan were excellent in midfield but not good enough in the final third. The one consolation is that in Seedorf, they’ve found a short-term replacement for Pirlo in that deep-lying playmaker role.

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巴萨3-1枪手、矿工3-0罗马、沙尔克3-1、热刺0-0米兰

说明什么，前三支队伍，都是“宜将胜勇追穷寇、不可沽名学霸王”，换言之，就是借主场之利痛打落水狗

而热刺呢，典型实用主义，一看米兰来势汹汹，则用犀利的防守频频化解危机。

范德法特，还真不咋的。客场之战，换下他后，热刺进球了；这一次，主场换下他后，热刺的门前危机反而减少了。丫就是机会主义者，本色难改。皇马清理他，是对的，尽管他能打乱战。

反过来，米兰，若弃用伊布，至少下半场换下他，换上小组赛中主场力挽狂澜反超比分的因扎吉，或许就有戏。丫的运气差太多了

pedro

Man Utd 2-0 Arsenal: United counter excellently
曼联2-0阿森纳：红魔出色的反击
March 12, 2011


The starting line-ups 首发阵容

Both sides had their chances, but Manchester United were more clinical. 双方各自均有破门机会，但是红魔更具临门一击性。

Sir Alex Ferguson had an injury crisis in midfield, so used Rafael and Fabio da Silva on either flank, with John O’Shea alongside Darron Gibson in midfield. 弗格森爵士在用人上遭遇中场伤病危机，故此派出拉斐尔和法比奥分别打两翼，奥谢和吉布森坐镇中央。

Arsene Wenger was without Cesc Fabregas, so Denilson came into the side and Abou Diaby played further forward. Kieran Gibbs started at left-back, and Andrei Arshavin replaced Tomas Rosicky. 温格在小法缺阵时只好让德尼尔森填补这个位置，而迪亚比靠前一些。吉布斯出任左后卫，阿尔萨文代替了罗西基。

The pattern of the first half was fairly simple – Arsenal dominated possession and territory, whilst Manchester United looked to play on the break. 上半场对局相对简单明了 - 枪手在控球和地盘上具有主导地位，而红魔看起来是在反击上做文章。

Twins on the wing 双胞胎打拼两翼
In that respect, despite Manchester United’s highly unusual team selection, this was a battle we’ve seen many times before. United have overcome Arsenal in each of the previous two campaigns by playing almost exclusively on the counter-attack – think of Cristiano Ronaldo’s goal on the break at the Emirates in the 2008/09 Champions League final, or Wayne Rooney’s similarly devastating goal in the Premier League last year.
Rooney tended to take more of a back seat role in United’s breaks here, however. He dropped deep into midfield when Manchester United were without the ball, generally picking up Denilson so United weren’t outnumbered in the centre of midfield. When United won the ball, the two twins would scamper down the flanks and form a front three with Javier Hernandez, and United sometimes looked like a 4-2-1-3. This is rather like how Benfica play when Jorge Jesus fields Carlos Martins as an additional holding player, and when Javier Saviola drops off into deep positions – see the game against Schalke. Interestingly, one of the wide runners in that game was also a converted full-back, Fabio Coentrao.
The use of full-backs in wide positions also benefited Manchester United defensively. Not simply because their natural defensive qualities provided a shield ahead of their back four, but because they had the energy and positional awareness to track back and cover the wide zones. This afforded United’s full-backs license to stick to their respective men when they came inside – Patrice Evra stuck tightly to Samir Nasri and got a couple of hard tackles in, whilst Wes Brown did a similar job on Andrei Arshavin.

Arsenal strategy 枪手的对策
Arsenal played very nicely in the first half. Their movement was excellent, their passing crisp, but they suffered their old problem of not being able to create genuine goalscoring chances. Robin van Persie played right-of-centre and pulled Nemanja Vidic out of the defence – the Serb is superb when in the penalty box, but when dragged up the pitch he becomes vulnerable to pace and players going past him. Diaby provided that running, but was a little too clumsy and ponderous on the ball.
Another possible area of creativity came down Arsenal’s left. Gibbs frequently got time on the ball but his crossing was poor. Arsenal’s best chances came from a corner kick that van Persie headed wide, and from a Nasri shot that nearly caught Edwin van der Sar by surprise. Their ‘prettier’ moves came to nothing.

Second half 下半场

The line-ups for the start of the second half

Ferguson made a change for the second half, giving Antonio Valencia his comeback, with the goalscorer Fabio departing. This meant Rooney on the left, Rafael into the centre and United going 4-1-4-1, with John O’Shea ahead of the back four. Considering how well they’d played in the first half, it was a surprise to see Ferguson change his shape, but if anything he was simply playing a more extreme version of the initial strategy.
United immediately sat deeper. Their central midfielders were sometimes in amongst Arsenal’s midfielders in the first half, but here they were firmly behind play. O’Shea occupied the space between the lines and denied Arsenal time on the ball in that area.
The home side extended their advantage with another direct attack. Van der Sar passed to Valencia, who ran 50 yards with the ball, and a couple of seconds later Rooney headed home. It was not a ‘classic’ counter-attack, not one dependent on pace – but United took advantage of Arsenal being slow to get back, and Valencia’s run was more direct than anything Arsenal offered all game – he had the time on the ball Arsenal’s players weren’t afforded.

Changes 换人
Wenger’s changes were attack-minded. The deepest midfielder, Denilson, was replaced by a striker, in Marouane Chamakh. Wenger hasn’t been afraid to gamble this way in recent weeks – against Everton and against Barcelona he made a similar change and turned the game around on both occasions. It allowed van Persie to play in a permanently deeper role where he threatened straight away, winning a free-kick, but after that O’Shea played closer to him (almost a third centre-back at times) and Arsenal’s best chances came when they crossed the ball – Chamakh and substitute Tomas Rosicky should have scored from right-wing crosses.
Arsenal looked better when Denilson and Diaby were both withdrawn. There’s a time and a place for Denilson’s solid, reliable passing, but it’s when Arsenal are ahead and want to slow the game down, keeping possession. He wasn’t needed in the second half. Diaby continued to be cumbersome with the ball, and the return of Aaron Ramsey saw a Ramsey-Wilshere partnership in midfield – which might be something we see more frequently in years to come. Those two offered direct forward passing from midfield, and Arsenal had several half-chances (and better) – the finishing simply wasn’t there. Chamakh was introduced to get on the end of moves, but with one goal since November (and that was against Leyton Orient) he hardly provides the potency the rest of the team lacked.
Johan Djourou’s late injury meant Arsenal played the final ten minutes with ten men, which effectively ended the game – a shame, as it was an interesting contest throughout.

Conclusion 总结
On first glance United’s starting line-up was bizarre – seven defenders – but Ferguson managed to assemble them into a cohesive side with a clear gameplan – sit relatively deep, and use the pace of Hernandez and the da Silva twins on the break. It worked: Arsenal were always going to dominate possession, but United produced chances and could have had more than two goals, although the same could be said of Arsenal’s none.
The positioning of the twins was interesting. Brazilian full-backs are stereotypically attacking and therefore can often convert to playing as wingers with little problem, but it’s not always as simple as that. When Dani Alves has played as a winger, for example, he’s looked poor because his game is about making unspotted off the ball runs from deep.
However, Rafael and Fabio both adapted very well. They showed the expected energy and pace, but also good decision-making in the final third and a habit of getting into goalscoring positions. As Tom Williams has mentioned, there might well be a case for fielding pacey (young?) full-backs on the flanks in certain situations – it certainly worked for United here.

pedro

足总杯：怪阵奇效，曼联2-0淘汰阿森纳  
由 harbuzi 发表在GoalHi足球·英超专区 http://bbs.goalhi.com/yingchao

弗格森大胆地在首发阵容中排出7名后卫的怪异阵容，最终被证明起到了好效果。依靠本场改打边前卫的巴西小将法比奥的进球和鲁尼的锦上添花，曼联2-0击败阿森纳，晋级足总杯四强。值得一提的是，去年9月受重伤的瓦伦西亚完成复出，而去年2月受重伤的拉姆塞也完成伤愈后代表阿森纳的首秀。不过比赛最后时刻，阿森纳中卫朱鲁受伤被担架抬出场外。这样，阿森纳在最近2周内，连续失掉3座杯赛奖杯的夺冠可能。不过也意味着他们将可以把全部精力放到联赛冠军的争夺中。

弗格森在首发阵容的中场放入了法比奥，拉斐尔和奥谢三名原本踢后卫的球员，吉布森与他们搭档，布朗右后卫，埃尔南德斯和鲁尼双前锋。阿森纳继续缺少受伤的法布雷加斯，阿穆尼亚顶替受伤的什琴斯尼，不过范佩西首发出场，另外吉布斯也得到机会，顶替克里希首发。

开场后双方各有机会，不过阿森纳稍稍占据控球优势。但第28分钟，先进球的却是曼联：反击中鲁尼左路送出精彩挑传，埃尔南德斯小角度直接头球攻门被范德萨扑出，高速插上的法比奥抢先将球捅入空门。上半场曼联带着1-0的结果进入更衣室。

下半场开始前，因伤休战已经半年的瓦伦西亚换下进球的法比奥，完成复出后的首次出场，拉斐尔在其后的比赛里被解放到接近自由人的位置。4分钟后，正是相当活跃的拉斐尔右路传中制造了第二个进球：埃尔南德斯的射门被朱鲁挡出，鲁尼小角度头球扩大比分，2-0。此后比赛变成了全场做出11次扑救的范德萨的表演，他多次化解了阿森纳的射门，力保球门不失。第71分钟，查马克的头球吊射击中横梁弹出。随后，拉姆塞换下迪亚比，自去年2月以来第一次回到阿森纳的比赛中。第89分钟，朱鲁解围对方传球时不慎肩膀脱臼，被担架抬出场外。赛后被确认为肩膀脱臼，他的赛季已经提前报销。

pedro

Bayern 2-3 Inter: Pandev snatches the win
March 16, 2011

The starting line-ups

Inter progress on away goals after Goran Pandev’s late winner.

Louis van Gaal changed his two centre-backs from the first game, but it was a familiar 4-2-3-1 for Bayern.
Having started with a Christmas tree shape in the first leg, Leonardo switched to more of a 4-2-3-1ish shape here. Wesley Sneijder was used in a wide-left role, Goran Pandev started from the right but sometimes became a second striker, and Dejan Stankovic linked the holding midfielders and the attackers.
Neither side conclusively won the tactical battle – both sides had chances, and Bayern probably should have wrapped up the game in an excellent 20 minute spell either side of half time. Inter were far better than in the first leg, however, particularly in terms of ball retention.
Inter shape
Their formation was a major reason for the improvement. In the first game, Stankovic and Sneidjer played just behind Samuel Eto’o, but struggled to receive passes from the three holding players – Inter were a broken team. Here, with Stankovic playing the link role, Inter worked the ball forward gradually. With Sneijder and Pandev both coming into the centre of the pitch, the attackers combined nicely, and some quick passing created Eto’o’s early goal.
Inter were also much improved without the ball. In the first leg, Sneijder and Stankovic usually closed down the Bayern holders, which left Philipp Lahm and Danijel Pranjic free to scamper down the touchlines and launch attacks from the flanks. Here, Sneidjer and Pandev pressured both the holders and the full-backs in turn, and the presence of Stankovic higher up the pitch mean he could also move towards Bastian Schweinsteiger.
Thiago Motta patrolled the centre of the pitch well, and his passing chalkboard covers the middle third of the pitch almost perfectly

Against Thomas Muller, Inter had 2 v 1, rather than the unnecessary 3 v 1 in the first leg. Thiago Motta tracked him, and Esteban Cambiasso played slightly further forward, to either side. Upfront, Eto’o’s pace caused Bayern to defend deeper than usual, but when Inter didn’t have possession, the Cameroon striker often dropped off and moved towards Luis Gustavo.
Bayern take command
Bayern took a while to settle down into their passing rhythm, but eventually started to put together some excellent attacks. Their main strategy was to get the ball wide to Arjen Robben and Franck Ribery, who both got the better of their respective full-backs. The opening goal was amazingly similar to Mario Gomez’s winner in the first leg – Robben came inside, Julio Cesar spilled the shot, and Gomez turned in the rebound. Again, Inter didn’t defend well enough against Robben’s favourite movement (to come inside and shoot) – in particular, Andrea Rannochia was doubling up on the outside rather than the inside for the goal.
Robben was the catalyst for many Bayern attacks. He wandered away from his left-sided position without the ball, and moved into the centre of the pitch where he combined well with Ribery. Bayern had further chances, many from direct attacks rather than their usual possession play – Ribery missed a one-on-one with Julio Cesar, but Muller scored a second to make it 3-1 on aggregate.
Second half
After some fierce Bayern pressure, Inter increasingly dominated midway through the second period. Having largely sat back early on, they forced the issue more after the break – Motta and Cambiasso played higher up the pitch, and when this threatened to leave a huge space between the lines, the defence responded in turn.
Inter only had three shots on target in the game - all three found the net

Substitutions played a big part. Stankovic (seemingly injured) departed for Coutinho, who played on the left. Sneijder went into the centre of the pitch – and from that position, scored the equaliser. Robben’s departure robbed Bayern of pace on the break, which might have been vital as Inter’s defence played increasingly high up the pitch.
It was hard to tell what Bayern’s strategy was late in the game. Were they trying to play on the break and get another goal, trying to keep possession and kill the game, or sitting back and letting Inter have the ball, keeping their defensive shape? Whichever it was, it didn’t work very well.
Inter should be praised for their commitment to passing football, however. They continued to get the ball to Sneijder and Coutinho, and although it’s hard to say a goal was coming, they had persistent pressure in the final twenty minutes – and with Bayern’s weakness at the back, it was likely Inter would get one last chance. It fell to Pandev, who finished coolly to send the defending champions through.
Conclusion
Bayern should have won the game with their chances midway through the game. “Yet again, we’ve brought it on ourselves, and not for the first time this season”, van Gaal said. “We’ve learned nothing from our mistakes, and that’s a shame. We created so many chances, but we failed to put them away. We didn’t keep it as tight in the second half.”
Leonardo focused on his side’s mental strength. “This game cannot be explained, only experienced”, he said. We won and it was a victory all from the heart. We organised well, scoring after three minutes, but there was a period when everything went Bayern’s way and we lost our balance…tonight was all about heart.”
Tactically, this wasn’t a resounding win for Leonardo – but the change in strategy was a huge improvement from the first leg, so he deserves some credit.

Chalkboards from Total Football app

pedro

Real Madrid 3-0 Lyon: comfortable Real victory
March 16, 2011

The starting line-ups

Real Madrid finally managed to get past Lyon, and into the quarter-finals of the European Cup.
Jose Mourinho made one change from the first leg – Marcelo replaced Alvaro Arbeloa.
Claude Puel brought Lisandro into the side upfront, and had Jimmy Briand on the flank in place of the suspended Michel Bastos. The remainder of the side was unchanged.
After a strong start from Real, the game settled down into a tense but exciting contest. Lyon were looking to play solely on the counter-attack, and sat back with two banks of four, waiting to spring breaks.

Real dominate
Real had the majority of possession early on, but this dominance gradually decreased through the first half. Lyon defended relatively deep when the home side’s attacks continued, and Real struggled to draw men out of position and create space for midfield runners. Mesut Ozil looked to break through the defence in the first few minutes, but then drifted from side to side between the lines. When Real did play balls over the defence, they were caught offside as Lyon’s defence stepped up as a unit very well.
There was no obvious strategy with the ball for Real. Cristiano Ronaldo was played in as often as possible, of course, but aside from one blast which was well tipped over by Hugo Lloris, he didn’t threaten too much. It might well have been the case that, like Lyon, Real were also looking to play predominantly on the break, but with Lyon rarely committing more than four players forward, there were few opportunities to exploit space.

Lyon counter
Lyon broke intelligently down the flanks, taking advantage of the fact Ronaldo and Angel di Maria rarely offered their full-backs protection. They looked to play the ball quickly to the wings (though the balls out wide were often inaccurate) and when possible the full-backs got down the line to create 2 v 1 situations. A few balls were put into the box, and Lyon won a couple of corners. Lisandro often dropped off the front into deeper positions, however, and wasn’t in a great position to get on the end of the crosses.
Another key element to the game was its physicality. Ricardo Carvalho, Pepe, Marcelo and Dejan Lovren all made had tackles, and there were plenty of aerial collisions throughout the first half too.

Marcelo fires Real ahead
The key feature of the first game was how much Real missed the Marcelo – Ronaldo partnership down the left. Arbeloa didn’t offer the overlapping attacking threat down the touchline, and therefore Ronaldo was poor in that game. He had little space to work in, and was often up against two Lyon players.
Lyon often crossed the ball, but Lisandro (and Gomis, in the second half) rarely got to the ball first

It was fitting, then, that Marcelo and Ronaldo combined to break the deadlock – the full-back exchanged passes with the winger and finished after a mazy dribble. It also summed up the fact that Real needed something special to break the deadlock, as Lyon had defended excellently until that point.

Second half
Bafetimbi Gomis came on for Briand at half time, which meant Lisandro Lopez moving across to a high, narrow left-sided position, trying to combine with Gomis, but also occupying Sergio Ramos.
The Real Madrid full-backs stayed at home in the second half anyway, keeping the back four intact, and leaving the attacking to the front four players, with sporadic help from Sami Khedira.

Real wrap it up
The longer the game went on, the more Lyon pushed forward. The more they pushed forward, the more spaces they left at the back – and Real’s counter-attacking became more obvious and more effective. Benzema got the second when confusion in the Lyon defence left him free and through on goal, and Angel Di Maria added the third from a not dissimilar situation.
Lyon had gone 4-2-4ish, with Yoann Gourcuff off and Jeremy Pied on, but Real were comfortable in the second half. Mourinho used his substitutions to rest tired legs.

Conclusion
The start of the game was a tight ‘chess match’ with both looking to play on the break. Both were aware of the other’s intention, however, so few players were committed forward for fear of being hit with a direct attack.
In the second half, Lyon were forced to leave spaces at the back, which played into Real’s hands. That is still when Real are at their most fluent – using the pace and movement of their front four. Ozil was quiet here, which meant Real lacked creativity in tight situations, but the wide players combined nicely with Benzema.
Mourinho still has a 100% record at home with Real, in all competitions.

pedro

94楼中文翻译参考

皇马3-0里昂：一场落入皇马节奏的胜利

皇马终于战胜了他们的苦主里昂，打进了欧冠的1/4决赛。

和首回合相比，穆里尼奥在首发阵容上做出的唯一变化是用马塞洛替换了阿韦罗亚。

而普埃尔则用利桑德罗突前，边路选择了白里安取代巴斯托斯，其他的首发球员和首回合的完全相同。

开场之后皇马攻势很猛，随后比赛就进入了一种紧张但是非常刺激的状态。里昂的进攻手段完全依赖于反击，同时设置了中场和后防的两条4人防线，等待反击的机会。

首发阵容

皇马主导了比赛

开场之后皇马控球率很高，但是这种控球上的优势在上半场后段逐渐减小了。里昂的防线收的很靠后，用于克制皇马的进攻，而同时皇马也很难将里昂的球员吸引出来，从而使得中场球员获得足够的空间。厄齐尔在开场的几分钟有过好几次突破对方防线的机会，但是之后他经常在两个边路活动。当皇马尝试突破对手的防线的时候，他们通常会掉入里昂的越位陷阱之中。

皇马在控球时候的策略似乎并不明晰。C罗当然是一如既往的异常活跃并且有着充分的控球时间，但是除了有一次射门被洛里斯很漂亮的扑出之外，他对里昂的球门威胁不大。和里昂一样，皇马也试图在上半场就控制住比赛，但是考虑到里昂很少在进攻端投入四名以上的球员，皇马就很难在对手的半场找到突破口了。

里昂的反击

考虑到C罗和迪玛利亚很少为他们的边后卫提供保护和协防，里昂主要以两个边路为突破口。他们将球快速的输送到两个边路（尽管他们往边路的传球精度欠佳）并且在边后卫上前的情况下创造二过一的机会。他们确实有不少次往禁区里的长传，而且里昂也获得了不少角球的机会。同时，利桑德罗经常回撤到较为纵深的位置试图创造机会，然而他通常并不处在很好的接球位置上。

马塞洛首开纪录

回顾双方首回合的比赛，特点之一就是皇马在左路缺少了马塞洛和C罗的配合。阿韦罗亚在左路无法提供压上助攻的能力，因此那场比赛C罗表现很差。他很少有拿球和突破的空间，而且大多数时间被两名里昂球员所盯防。

而在马塞洛上场之后，双方精妙的配合再次打破了场上的僵局，他俩之间的一脚传递和马塞洛完美的突破给皇马带来了第一个进球。事实上，直到这一个进球之前，里昂的防守都做的非常出色，因此皇马确实需要巨星们的灵光一现来打破这个僵局。

里昂经常尝试传中，但是利桑德罗(下半场戈米)很少抢到第一点

下半场

中场戈米替换下了布里昂，这就意味着利桑德罗的位置将会左倾，尝试和戈米配合，并且会和拉莫斯对位。但是在下半场皇马的边后卫很少压上助攻，使得后防线的完整体系得以很好的保持。进攻的任务则被交给了前场的四人组，同时赫迪拉会偶尔提供一些帮助。

皇马拿下比赛

这场比赛越临近结束，里昂越倾向于压上，而这样做的后果就是他们后方留给皇马的空间会越大。因此皇马的反击就显得越来越有效。里昂后防的失误使得本泽马没有被盯死并且让他打进了第二球，很类似的，迪玛利亚打进了第三球。

里昂在比赛的后期变为4-2-4，换下古尔库夫换上了派德，但是皇马在下半场没有受到什么实质性的威胁。穆里尼奥的换人也主要是为了让主力们得到必要的休整。

总结

本场比赛的开局就是一场非常紧张的棋局，两支队伍都希望通过反击取得优势。然而，双方都深知对手有这个想法，因此两支队伍都不敢在进攻端投入过多的兵力，防止被对方直接打反击。

而在下半场，里昂不得不压上，这使得比赛进入了皇马的节奏。皇马最擅长的仍然是利用前场四人组的速度和跑位来创造空间和进球机会。本场比赛厄齐尔相对来说较为沉寂，因此皇马在被对手盯防较紧的时候缺乏了一些创造力，但是边路球员仍然和本泽马的配合良好。

本场比赛之后，魔力鸟延续了他的伯纳乌全胜记录。

译者：derekhh
接稿时间：2011-03-17
完成时间：2011-03-18
招工链接：http://bbs.goalhi.com/1992659.html
原帖地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/16/real-madrid-3-0-lyon-comfortable-real-victory/

pedro

93楼中文翻译参考

拜仁2-3国际米兰战术复盘：这就是杀不死比赛的后果  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer
http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/03/16/bayern-2-3-inter-tactics/

国际米兰队靠潘德夫的绝杀以客场进球优势晋级。

相比第一回合，范加尔更换了两名中后卫，但拜仁的阵型仍是让人熟悉的4-2-3-1。

在第一回合采用“圣诞树”作为首发阵型后，莱昂纳多本场改用了更接近于4-2-3-1的阵型。斯内德被放在左中场位置上；潘德夫的先发位置在右路，但有时更像是二中锋；斯坦科维奇担负连接后腰和攻击线球员的职责。

没有一方在战术上完全压倒对手——双方都有机会，而拜仁本能通过半场前后20分钟的上佳表现来提前解决战斗。不过，国米的表现比第一回合要好得多，尤其是在控球方面。

国米阵型

国米表现改观的主要原因在于阵型。第一回合的比赛里，斯坦科维奇和斯内德在埃托奥身后活动，但都难以接到三个后腰的传球——国米的队形被割裂了。本场比赛斯坦科维奇担当连接的职责，国米能把球逐步传递到前场。斯内德和潘德夫都往中间靠，前场球员之间有了很好的配合，几次快速传递造就出了埃托奥早早的进球。

而在无球时国米也有了很大改进。第一回合里，斯内德和斯坦科维奇经常被拜仁的两名后腰阻截，这让拉姆和普兰尼奇可以沿边线插上发动攻势。本场比赛斯内德和潘德夫轮番给对方的后腰和边后卫同时施加压力，而斯坦科维奇站位靠上使得他也可以冲击施魏因施泰格。

在对穆勒的防守上，国米是2防1，而不是第一回合中没有必要的3防1。莫塔盯他，坎比亚索站位稍前，靠边。锋线上，埃托奥的速度使得拜仁后卫线站位比平常更靠后，不过国米没有球权的时候，喀麦隆通常回撤，朝古斯塔沃的方向移动。

莫塔很好地扫荡了中路，他的传球也几近完美地覆盖了整个中场地带。

拜仁占优

拜仁调整传接节奏花了一些时候，不过一进入节奏他们就开始串联起一系列漂亮的攻势。他们的主要方针是把球分边给罗本和里贝里，两人对付各自一侧的边后卫。第一个进球和戈麦斯首回合的制胜一球如出一辙——罗本内切（打门），塞萨尔挡出射门，戈麦斯补射得手。国米又一次未能很好地防住罗本的习惯动作（内切射门）——特别是拉诺基亚在外围参与包夹而不是在里边。

罗本是拜仁多次攻势的催化剂。他无球时离开左路的位置，移动到中路与里贝里很好地配合。拜仁有更好的机会，多是来自直接（传球发动）的攻势而不是他们通常的控球组织——里贝里面对塞萨尔错失了单刀，但穆勒将球打进，把总比分改写为3-1。

下半场

经历了拜仁一阵暴风骤雨般的攻势后，国米在下半场中段逐渐占据了优势。早前他们大都退守后方，半场过后他们更多地向对方施压——莫塔和坎比亚索的站位更靠前，而当中场和后卫线之间的空当扩大到构成威胁的时候，后卫线也相应地作出反应（压上）。

国米只有3次射正——全部射进。

换人起到了很大作用。斯坦科维奇（似乎受伤）被换下，库迪尼奥上场出现在左路。斯内德移到中路——他正是在这个位置上打进扳平一球。罗本的下场让拜仁损失了反击时的速度，在国米防线越发压上的情况下，这或许成为了关键的转折点。

很难说清拜仁在比赛末段的策略是什么。他们是想通过反击再进一球，是想通过控球杀死比赛，还是退到后场保持防守队形，而让国米拿球？不管他们想的是什么，策略没有收到很好的效果。

不过应该赞扬国米坚持传球的做法。他们持续将球交给斯内德和库迪尼奥，虽然难说进球就会到来，他们在最后20分钟里不断给对方施压——由于拜仁后防的缺陷，国米有可能得到最后一次机会。机会最终降临到潘德夫头上，他冷静地将球打入，帮助卫冕冠军晋级。

结论

拜仁在整场比赛中本有数次机会拿下比赛。“但又是这样，我们搞砸了，这赛季不是第一次了”，范加尔说道。“我们没有从自己的失误吸取教训，这是个耻辱。我们创造了很多机会，但我们未能把握住。我们没能在下半场保持同样的强度。”

莱昂纳多则把重点放在队伍的精神力上。“这场比赛无法解释，只能体会”，他如是说。“我们赢了，这是意志的胜利。我们组织得很好，比赛三分钟就进球了，但有段时间进入了拜仁的节奏，而我们失去了自身的平衡……今晚意志是决定因素。”

就战术而言，这场比赛说不上是莱昂纳多的完胜——但策略的调整相对第一回合有了很大改观，因此他值得赞誉。

pedro

Brazil encouraging, but not yet cohesive
巴西队很给力，但是尚未凝聚好
March 29, 2011

Brazil's overall formation 巴西队的总体阵型

Whereas his predecessor Dunga had a very consistent, specific shape in his latter days as Brazil manager, Mano Menezes has switched between systems. He started off with a 4-2-1-3 against the USA, then moved to a 4-4-2 against France recently. 前任邓加，在担任巴西主教练的后期，其执教都有非常一致的、 特定的阵型，而现任主教练马诺梅内塞斯却尝试着不同阵型的切换。他起初用4-2-1-3阵法对阵美国队，然后最近对阵法国队时又变换为一个4-4-2阵型。

In this game, he was hampered by various withdrawals through injury (particularly attacking players) and therefore sent out a side in a strange 4-3-3ish system, which dominated possession but lacked fluency in the final third of the pitch. 在伦敦对垒苏格兰这场比赛中，梅内塞斯由于一些进攻球员受伤无法上场而使其排兵布阵受到了制约，所以祭出了一个奇怪的4-3-3阵型，那么在比赛中，巴西队在控球上占据优势，但是在最终第三线这个环节上缺乏流畅的终结劲。

Tactically, the back four was fairly unremarkable – recalls to Lucio and Julio Cesar meant that, along with Andre Santos and Thiago Silva, the defence had a distinctly Dunga-esque feel to it, though Dani Alves is now first-choice at right-back ahead of Maicon.

Ahead of them, Lucas was the primary holding midfielder. He played slightly right-of-centre and generally remained in his position, doing what he does for Liverpool – intercepting, closing down, playing the ball calmly from side to side, and rarely joining attacks. He was assisted by Ramires, who played to the left of Lucas (rather than to the right, as is usual), and played an energetic role.

Ramires’ role differed from his old ’shuttling’ role, however – rather than forced to cover an entire flank by himself, he had Neymar wide on the left, so instead played a box-to-box role, getting himself into the penalty area. Neymar’s role was not unlike Robinho’s old role, starting from the left but coming inside very quickly, with and without the ball. Upfront, Leandro Damiao was a ‘prima punta’ – holding the ball up, winning headers.

The confusion came from the roles of Elano and Jadson, who both played attacking, rightish roles in midfield. Elano started off looking like a central playmaker but actually dropped deeper and formed midfield three, whilst Jadson was half a No 10, half a winger. It was difficult to see what he was trying to do, and he contributed little to the game. The two got in each others’ way a couple of times and meant Brazil didn’t stretch the play enough with the ball.

Defensive shape 防守阵容

Brazil's defensive shape 防守时的阵型

Brazil’s defensive shape was interesting, because they morphed into a side that defended with two banks of four on the rare occasions they came under sustained pressure from Scotland. Strangely, Ramires moved out to defend the left flank, Lucas moved left-of-centre, with Elano dropping into the right-centre channel and Jadson defending the right.

This meant that Brazil’s right side was far weaker than their left – both because (a) Lucas and Ramires are simply much stronger defensively than Elano and Jadson and (b) the former two were already in a deep position and could shuffle across easily, whereas the latter duo had the retreat 20-30 yards to take up their defensive positions.
Upfront, Neymar stayed in a wide-left role, pinning back Scotland’s right-back (which made Brazil even more secure down that side).

Substitutions 换人
The most encouraging factor in terms of Brazil’s shape was that there was a stark improvement after the break, in two main respects. First, Neymar continued to be a force in the game but stayed much wider and expanded the active playing zone, which increased the gaps in Scotland’s defence and made them easier to play through.
Second, Jadson made lateral runs from the right flank into the centre of the pitch, which took Scotland’s left-back inside and opened up space for Alves, who was much more prominent in the second half – he should have had an assist, had Ramires not blazed over the crossbar from 12 yards.

The introduction of Lucas (Rodrigues Moura da Silva, of Sao Paulo) in the second half also gave Brazil drive and dribbling from the centre of the pitch – he was highly impressive, and it’s a shame he didn’t start over Jadson.

What went right? 得劲的地方

Leandro Damião had a promising debut. He is something approaching an ‘old-fashioned’ number nine, someone who can provide a central physical presence whilst Brazil’s more creative players play around him.

Brazil as their attacking moves developed 进攻时推进阵型

Ramires was also good (aside from his shooting) – he provided bursts of energy from the centre of midfield, which partially compensated that Brazil had no ‘number ten’ in the side, as he linked midfield and attack.

Neymar was fantastic – the best player on the pitch by far – and looks to be suited to a wide-left role with the freedom to come inside.

Brazil’s pressing was also very effective, although Scotland were poor in possession. Against stronger opposition there may be a problem with either (a) space between the lines or (b) space in behind the defence, as Lucio and Thiago Silva were reluctant to come too far up the pitch.

What went wrong? 不得劲的地方

The Elano/Jadson confusion was the main problem – they simply played too close together and were too predictable.

On a related note, Brazil didn’t take advantage of Daniel Alves’ runs often enough. Part of the problem was Jadson – in the first half he stayed too wide, and Alves missed having a Lionel Messi / Pedro Rodriguez character to move inside and open up space, though the situation improved in the second half – after Alves could be seen shouting at Jadson to move out of his way.

In a more complex manner, Alves was rarely making runs on the blind side, as he loves to do at Barcelona. There, Barcelona often build up play in the left-centre channel with Andres Iniesta, and Alves charges down the opposite flank. However, Brazil’s ‘equivalent’ of Iniesta was either Elano or Jadson (or both) – who were down the right. Therefore, Scotland’s attention was already on that side of the pitch, and Alves was in full view.

There also remains a slight problem down the left (a hangover from the Dunga era) – to allow Neymar to come inside, Brazil need someone able to consistently overlap down the left. Andre Santos did reasonably well, but there still wasn’t quite the understanding down that wing – perhaps that will come with time.

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pedro

98楼战术评论说，巴西队左翼进攻还有一些小问题，这是从邓加时代就遗留下来的问题。当内马尔向中间走时，还需要其他队员来填补这一空缺以保持左翼贯底的持续性。安德烈 · 多斯桑托斯表现相当不错，但是仍然有理解不到位地方。也许随着时间推移，这个问题会得到解决的

---------------------------

另附，98楼的全文译文，是转贴的

巴西战术报告(胜苏格兰赛后)：前景光明，默契不足
由 forzakaka 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer

邓加时代的后期，巴西的阵容变得相对稳定且具有针对性。而现在，梅内塞斯却趋向于在几种阵型中变化。对阵美国时他采用了4-2-1-3，最近对阵法国时又变成了4-4-2。

Brazil's overall formation

在这场比赛中，伤病的困扰，特别是进攻球员的伤病，使得他推出了一套注重控球，但在禁区前沿缺乏流畅性的怪异的4-3-3阵型。

后防4人并不令人惊讶，重招门将塞萨尔和中后卫卢西奥，再加上其搭档蒂亚戈-席尔瓦和左侧的安德雷-桑托斯，让人依稀能够感觉到邓加的印记，唯一的不同时丹尼尔-阿尔维斯顶替麦孔成为了右路的第一选择。

在他们前方，第一后腰是卢卡斯，他在中路略靠右侧做着在利物浦时相同的工作：拦截，盯人，冷静的过渡后场传球，并很少参与前场进攻。卢卡斯的搭档是拉米雷斯，他通常出现在卢卡斯的左侧，扮演着一个充满活力的角色。

拉米雷斯的任务不同于往常上下穿插的工作，由于左翼内马尔的存在，他不必去覆盖整条左边路，而是充当了一个中场自由人，并且适时插入禁区。内马尔的任务也和之前罗比尼奥的没有太大区别，不管是有球还是无球，他都需要经常从左路迅速的内切。最前方，莱昂德罗-达米奥则是桥头堡，负责拿球过渡和争抢头球。

疑问来自于埃拉诺和贾德森的角色分配，他俩都是中场右侧的进攻球员。埃拉诺开场时看起来像是中场组织核心，但之后却后退成为了中场三人组的一员。而贾德森则既像10号，又像边锋，很难明白他的职责是什么，结果导致他有些游离于比赛之外。他们两人的跑位多次出现了冲突，这也说明当巴西控球时，他们的进攻并没有很好的展开。

防守站位

巴西的防守站位很有意思，在遭受到来自苏格兰的持续性进攻压力时，他们会压缩到后场，组成两排每排四人的防守阵型。奇怪的是，拉米雷斯会移至左翼进行防守，卢卡斯在中间左侧，埃拉诺和贾德森则分别在中间右侧和右翼防守。


Brazil's defensive shape

这意味的巴西的右边路变得十分脆弱，因为卢卡斯和拉米雷斯的防守能力都远强于埃拉诺和贾德森，并且前两者的位置本来就是处于中路要害的，可以轻松的进行横移，而后两者则需要后退二三十码才能到达自己的防守位置。

在前方，内马尔则呆在左侧，以搅乱苏格兰的右边防守（这样就使得巴西的左侧防守变得更加的轻松）。

替补

关于巴西的打法，最让人满意的地方是在半场休息后他们的表现有了明显的提升。主要是在两方面，首先是内马尔持续着强势的表现，他的位置更靠近边路，活动范围也更大，这就导致了苏格兰防守阵型中的空当被拉开，让巴西能够更加容易的进攻。

其次，贾德森从右翼到中路的横向跑动明显增加，让苏格兰的左后卫跟随其至中路，这就为身后的阿尔维斯拉开了巨大的空当，而后者在下半场的表现也明显提高了不少。阿尔维斯本该有一次助攻进账的，但拉米雷斯在12码的位置却没能把握住机会。

来自圣保罗的小卢卡斯下半场替补出场后亦为巴西的中场中路提供了活力和盘带。他的表现实在令人印象深刻，没有让他取代贾德森进入首发是一个不小的遗憾。

出彩点

莱昂德罗-达米奥的处子秀十分出色。他的风格近似于古典的9号前锋，能够用强壮的身体卡住位置，让身后的创造性球员们围绕他而组织进攻。

Brazil as their attacking moves developed

拉米雷斯除了射门外整体表现同样也不赖。他在中场中路的爆发力和能量将中场和锋线连接了起来，并一定程度上弥补了巴西10号球员的缺失。

内马尔实在无与伦比，是这场比赛得最佳球员。他很适合在左路带球并内切射门的角色。

尽管苏格兰在控球率上完全处于下风，但巴西的压迫性打法仍然很有效。然而在面对更强对手时这种打法将会遇到一些问题：或者中场和后卫之间的距离太大，或者防线身后出现空当，因为卢西奥和蒂亚戈-席尔瓦都不愿意压得太过靠上。

问题

埃拉诺与贾德森的位置重叠是主要问题。他们的站位太过接近，而且太容易预测。

与上一点相关的是，他们没有充分利用阿尔维斯的进攻特点。一部分的原因要归结在贾德森身上，上半时他始终待在右路外侧，而不是像梅西或佩德罗那样经常内切为阿尔维斯拉开空挡。好在下半场这个问题有所改观，想必阿尔维斯在中场休息时也告诉了雅德森，让后者从他的进攻路线上闪开。

阿尔维斯在无球一侧的偷下并不像在巴塞罗那时那样频繁。在巴塞罗那时，伊涅斯塔通常在中路偏左处带球，而阿尔维斯则迅速沿右翼插上等候机会。而巴西类似伊涅斯塔的球员则是出现在右侧的埃拉诺或者贾德森（或者他们两人）。因此，苏格兰的防守焦点本来就集中在这一侧，阿尔维斯也因此完全暴露在了他们的视野之中。

左路同样有些小问题，是在邓加时代就有的。内马尔内切后，巴西仍然需要有人在左路套边下底拉开空间。安德雷-桑托斯做得不错，但这一侧的配合还是欠缺默契。或许随着时间的推移这个问题也会随之消失。

pedro

107# 北极海

zm上，至今还没有这场比赛的技术评论帖，比这场球赛晚的几场比赛却有

pedro

116楼的参考译文
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国米2-5沙尔克战术分析：防守有多差，比分就有多大
2011-04-07 / 吴老二脑血栓

沙尔克大胜国际米兰，使得自己的一只脚已经踏入了欧冠半决赛的门槛上。

鉴于球队上周对阵ac米兰时4-2-3-1阵型的差劲表现莱奥纳多将阵型改为了4-3-1-2。德扬-斯坦科维奇换掉了戈兰-潘德夫，而迭戈-米利托则搭档萨穆埃尔-埃托奥出任双前锋。

拉尔夫-朗尼克则采取了4-4-1-1风格的阵型。基里亚科斯-帕帕多布罗斯在中场担任着单防守后腰的工作，而胡拉多则被给予前插进攻的自由。而劳尔则处于单前锋埃杜的身后担任影锋。

比赛的开场无比精彩，斯坦科维奇在中场开球圈附近的一脚惊人的吊射帮助国际米兰在开场仅仅40秒不到便取得了领先。

沙尔克占优

尽管这粒进球帮助国米领先，但是沙尔克04毫无疑问地在上半场的大部分时间里都占有着优势。国米较为狭窄的阵型并不能控制住沙尔克的两名边卫，特别是主队左路的低迷发挥。沙尔克右边卫内田笃人大量的前插让国米的盯防颇为难办，而他与杰佛森-法尔范的多次二过一配合更是让右路的进攻风生水起。

而国米似乎颇为愿意让内田笃人——或是其他的沙尔克球员——在球场靠边位置持球进行进攻，因为国米的三名中场在速度上不占优势，可以通过收缩阵型来压紧空间。然而这是一个严重的错误，因为两名中卫克里斯蒂安-齐沃与安德烈-拉诺基亚本场的状态都极为糟糕，而沙尔克边路持续不断的传中球砸入禁区则会增加他俩犯错的可能性。之后不久沙尔克便利用角球机会扳平了比分。

中场拉锯战

国际米兰也许在球场中部有着更多的人数优势，但他们并没有很好地凝和成一个整体，并常常被沙尔克的传球调动地四处奔跑。蒂亚戈-莫塔在中场的站位最为靠后并承担着看防住胡拉多的责任，但他外侧的两名中场球员斯坦科维奇与坎比亚索，并不清楚他们在攻防中的具体职责（之前有提到）。在持球进攻时，是应当留在中场让边后卫上前套边，还是向两边拉开阵型增加进攻空间，他们并不清楚自己应选择的进攻方式。而随着这二人的火力全关，国米的进攻方式便十分容易地被预判了 ——韦斯利-斯内德将是国米进攻的唯一出球点。


国米的进攻组织基本都是通过中路偏左区域发起的，能是谁，斯内德呗。

这对于斯内德的要求甚高，因为他在开场的大部分时间里都被帕帕多普洛斯进行了弹力贴身盯防。而斯内德的应对方式是稍稍后撤，以摆脱他的盯防者并从靠近中线的位置来拿球进攻，并采取过顶球的方式送出长传。有几脚传球十分精彩，其中一次便策动了米利托帮助国米2-1领先的那颗进球，将球妙传给了远门柱端无人盯防的坎比亚索。

而考虑到两支球队的阵型以及比赛战术，将比分扳成2-2的那颗进球则真可谓奇葩一朵。国米已经选择压缩了中场空间的打法，而沙尔克则主要依靠从两条边路起球并尝试着去进行边路压制。因此，沙尔克依靠中路一次直塞空当而攻入的这颗进球着实让人意外。他们很好地利用了莫塔尝试压上进攻后的空当——巴西人一直在尝试着利用前方斯内德通过跑动拉扯开帕帕多普洛斯后的中路空间，可是作为站位最为靠后的中场，而球队又正2-1领先，莫塔也许更应该选择留守后防稳固防守，也许他并不能获得进攻球权，可沙尔克也不会那么轻松地用中路直塞撕开了国米的防线再次扳平比分。

要点拾遗

在这些进球过程中所蕴含的战术要素里，还有些其他需要注意的地方。劳尔在防守端极其卖力，从前方果断后撤至中场区域并对国米的中场球员尤其是莫塔进行施压，这使得沙尔克在中场区域的人数上不落下风。而回撤的劳尔也为沙尔克提供了一种不同的传球选择，相反地，国米方面的两名前锋却总是停留在较深的位置等着传球。

沙尔克防得很出色，保持着出色的防守阵线并在上半场便造了国米多达6次的越位。他们的两名边后卫具有着较高的自由度，出色地压制了内侧对方的进攻球员并使得球队在防守对方的边路进攻时始终保持着多一人的状态——特别是内田笃人很好地帮助了己方中卫进行协防。

下半场

到了下半场，沙尔克在短短的如同上了咒语般的十分钟里疯狂地连进两球迅速地将比分扩大为2-4获得了领先。这两颗进球单纯地来自现代足球中最经典的元素——移动，速度以及快速出球。第三颗进球由劳尔打入，通过一些漂亮的传球完全撕开了国米在中路的密集防守，而第四颗则源于右路的一次突破——有效地利用了齐沃身后的空间，就像ac米兰在上周末成功做到的那样—— 之后拉诺基亚英勇地铲球破坏，却闹出了个乌龙。


沙尔克能够持续地向右侧内田笃人的空当处转移球

齐沃本晚的表现堪称灾难，迟一步的拦截让他最终吃到了第二张黄牌变身红宝石战士下场。这是他4天里吃到的第二张红牌，而且老实说他的停赛也许对于国米来说还是件幸事。莱昂纳多被迫派上伊万-科尔多巴来担任另一名中卫，换下本因斯坦科维奇受伤而被替换上场的侯赛因-哈尔贾。这次换人在本场比赛中相对不是那么重要了，而且国米也很难去实现逆转，但换下哈尔贾的确是一个奇怪的决定，毕竟当时国米众大多已经体力耗尽，可哈尔贾可算是还能跑能跳的新鲜血液。

而国米后防上的一些更为滑稽的防守使得埃杜攻下了球队的第五粒进球——但是沙尔克在防守上做得也不算出色，留给了埃托奥足够的空间去尽情冲刺——可是他与米利托差劲的最后一击让国米的反击再三令人失望。
随后朗尼克简单地用替补换下了跑累了的队员，比分定格在2-5。

总结

一场滑稽的比赛，需要质疑莱昂纳多的问题太多了。沙尔克智取梅阿查，主要因为国米犯下了不计其数的个人失误并且在较早的阶段便耗完了体力。他们的进攻思路同样过于明显而且几乎全部都要依靠斯内德的力量去完成组织。

而另一方面，朗尼克的应敌之策应当受到夸赞。他赛前便详细研究了国米对于斯奈德的依赖程度并因此派上了帕帕多普洛斯并命令他对荷兰人进行紧贴防守。他同样很

原文地址：http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/04/06/inter-2-5-schalke-awful-defending-produces-an-incredible-scoreline/

pedro

纳尼都做替补，曼联把鲁尼、小豌豆、吉格斯、朴智星用到极至。那个25号也不错，双胞胎都上了吗，看直播没有分清楚。

因为曼联光开花不结果，以至于下半场开始10分钟左右没有怎么好好看，第一个进球时，偶还错过了第一时间

pedro

Real Madrid v Barcelona: tactical preview
April 27, 2011


Probable line-ups for this game

The third Clasico in twelve days presents the two managers with more selection problems.

Team news

There are some crucial absentees for this match. Barcelona captain Carles Puyol is back, but with Maxwell, Adriano and Eric Abidal all unavailable, Barcelona are without a recognised left-back. This means that, after being desperate for so long to get Puyol back in the side for his pace at centre-back, Pep Guardiola is probably going to have to use him at left-back, with Javier Mascherano in the centre of defence.

Andres Iniesta is also out – another big blow for Barcelona, and one that prevents Guardiola dropping one of his forwards to give Iniesta a place in the front three, which was a possibility. Seydou Keita will probably come into the side on the left side of the midfield triangle.

Jose Mourinho is also without two key players. Sami Khedira, who has been excellent in recent weeks, will miss out through injury, whilst Ricardo Carvalho is suspended after picking up a booking against Tottenham. Lassana Diarra is the natural replacement for Khedira, whilst Raul Albiol should come into the side at centre-back, with Sergio Ramos alongside him, and Alvaro Arbeloa at right-back.

Selection decisions

Injury problems mean there are fewer choices for both managers. Guardiola may have considered pushing Iniesta forward and using Mascherano and Sergio Busquets together in midfield, whilst Mourinho would have had a decision to make at the back about Ramos, able to play at either right-back or centre-back.


The starting line-ups in the recent league game

With Guardiola’s first XI very likely to be the one on the right, it is Mourinho who must make a decision about which forwards to play. His shape has varied in the previous two Clasicos, but he’ll essentially use three central midfielders and three attackers. Karim Benzema started the recent league meeting, but in the Copa del Rey Cristiano Ronaldo started as the main forward, with Angel di Maria on the left and Mesut Ozil on the right. That trio seems likely to start again here, and whilst there have been rumours that Ozil will be deployed at some point as a ‘false nine’, Ronaldo is the more natural striker, and has both pace over the top to threaten Barca’s backline, as well as the aerial power that was their downfall in the Copa del Rey final.

Overall strategies

Mourinho used completely different tactics in the recent league and cup meetings. In the league, his side sat behind the ball and soaked up pressure throughout the game, whilst in the cup he used Xabi Alonso deeper in a 4-1-4-1, and told Pepe and Khedira to get into the faces of Iniesta, Busquets and Xavi. It remains to be seen which approach he’ll use here, but the latter seems more appropriate for this game at the Bernabeu. Why? First, Real rested players at the weekend, so should be in a fit condition to press Barcelona throughout the game. Second, Mourinho’s strategy at the same stage of this competition last year (with Inter) was to attack at home, and then defend away. If he’s going for a mix-and-match strategy throughout this contest, it’s surely going to be easier to press effectively at home than at the Camp Nou.

For Barcelona – well, it’s Barcelona, they play the same way all the time, don’t they? Well, not really. And especially not when Guardiola knows he’s got a battle on his hands. He’s constantly adapted his shape for tricky away games over the past year. A quick recap reveals that he played Dani Alves as a right-winger and Carles Puyol at right-back away at Real last season, he switched to a three-man defence at Atletico, did the same at Valencia, and used Iniesta in the front three at Villarreal. He may have another plan here. A back three is highly unlikely since he has no-one who could reasonably play as a left wing-back, so any changes will be more incremental. With Iniesta out and the midfield looking more secure than usual, Guardiola may push Dani Alves even higher up the pitch, as he did against Sevilla, or switch the way the front three operates.

Key areas


The starting line-ups in the recent cup game

It seems silly to question Lionel Messi’s performances in any way, but in the Copa del Rey final, Barcelona struggled upfront (with David Villa and Pedro Rodriguez out of form) as Messi dropped so deep into the midfield. This was the knock-on effect of Real’s pressing, of course – Xavi and Iniesta didn’t have time on the ball to create, so Messi had to come very short to pick up the ball. He’s more than handy with the ball at his feet, but he’s also Barca’s main goal threat, and Guardiola may want him to play higher up the pitch.

Puyol is not used to playing at full-back, but he’s not alien to it either – in fact, at the Bernabeu last year Guardiola deliberately started him at right-back, and then switched him to left-back at half time. The major worry for Barcelona is still the centre-back pairing, both in terms of pace and in the air. Real will try and expose Barcelona at the back as often as possible.

Pepe is arguably the key player. He was excellent in the holding role in the league, and then equally impressive when pushed further forward in the cup. The physical nature of him and Diarra will attempt to overpower Barcelona in the centre – so Keita may actually come in handy.

Barcelona looked better in the cup final when they played with more width – particularly when Pedro started in wide positions and then moved inside to meet through balls. Barcelona usually stretch the opposition defence well, but when Messi drops deep the 4-3-3 can become more of a 4-3-1-2 and Barcelona suddenly look very narrow if Pedro and Villa make the same run inside. Pedro is more intelligent with his movement than Villa, and must give Barcelona options when they have the ball.

Finally, transitions from defence to attack might be vital. European first legs are generally very tight – but this year, that hasn’t particularly been the case. As mentioned earlier, Mourinho attacked Barca at home in last year’s semi-final, and the 3-1 Inter win was a very open game. Both sides can be prone to counter-attacks – Barca at the back, Real when Alonso is left stranded in front of his defence, and therefore quick breaks will be in the minds of both managers.

Other links

ZM preview for Betfair
ZM article on Guardiola / Mourinho for ITV
Sid Lowe on Xavi and Xabi for the Guardian

pedro

207楼的战术预测，对双方首发阵容，挺靠谱的