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【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L:美洲杯最佳阵容11人

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26#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-12 13:40:48 | 显示全部楼层
阿根廷 3-0 哥斯达黎加

首发阵容

昆               西瓜

            梅西  
天使
                 加戈
         小马
                  
萨内蒂             小萨

      小米利托  企鹅

下半场,换上小帕、比利亚、拉维奇
阵型变为 442 或者4312, 1是小帕、2是梅西和拉维奇
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27#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:01:06 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-15 11:03 编辑

Brazil 4-2 Ecuador: Brazil finally grab a win
July 14, 2011

The starting line-ups

An open game was always likely to favour Brazil, and they took advantage to confirm their progression to the knockout stage.

Mano Menezes changed his right side completely – Robinho and Maicon replaced Jadson and Dani Alves.

Reinaldo Rueda left out Segundo Castillo in the centre of midfield, with Oswaldo Minda coming in.

Brazil turned in their most impressive display in the Copa so far, though they still lacked cohesion upfront, and remain a little nervous at the back.

Ecuador tactics

Ecuador defended with two banks of four, but the key to their attacking play was fluidity. The talented Christian Noboa sat just ahead of Minda in midfield and looked to distribute the ball cleverly to the front players, but ahead of that it was difficult to give set roles to the attacking four.

Christian Benitez started as the left-winger but always wanted to move forward into his natural position as a striker, and so Felipe Caicedo sometimes moved out to that flank when the ball was lost. On the other side, Michael Arroyo and Edison Mendez played deeper, but also sometimes alternated.

Brazil shape

More interest stemmed from Brazil’s side. The major news was that Maicon replaced Alves after the Barcelona full-back played poorly in the previous game against Paraguay. It was notable how different they are as players, particularly in the way they attack. Alves is excellent at making off-the-ball runs down the right, but Maicon much prefers motoring forward on the ball, as he did most obviously for the final goal, which he assisted for Neymar to tap in.

It’s arguable that Maicon or Alves should be picked according to the type of player ahead of them. Alves always wants the player in front of him to stay in the centre of the pitch in order to leave space – he spent much of the Scotland game telling Jadson to get out of his way. Jadson learned his lesson by the time the Copa came around, and his role against Paraguay meant he could afford to play narrower anyway, because of a change in the shape of the midfield. Therefore, Alves was decent in an attacking sense.

However, if Menezes wants to play Robinho – more of a winger who will make direct forward runs – Alves won’t have that space to exploit. In that case, it might be better to have Maicon there, who can push forward with the ball at his feet.

Elsewhere, Ramires remained to the right of Lucas Leiva, and put in a good contribution with his off-the-ball running. Brazil were more compact than in the previous two games – Ganso’s positioning has improved immeasurably since the opening day disappointment against Venezuela – he comes and picks up the ball in deep if he can’t receive it between the lines, and Ramires shuttling forward meant that this section of the side was fluid, rather than the ‘broken team’ we saw in the first game.

Ecuador let Brazil play

Brazil were helped by a sloppy attitude from Ecuador. They stood off Brazil and let them play – often simply standing ten yards away and letting the opponent pick a good pass, as was the case when Andre Santos crossed for Pato’s header.

This attitude from Ecuador was combined with the necessity that they had to win the game. And, whilst they never looked likely to do that, this meant they they did try to push forward, leaving spaces in midfield for Brazil to break through. In the next round, where Brazil will face Paraguay again, they’ll face a completely different challenge – a side putting men behind the ball and trying to soak up pressure.

Conclusion

This tournament was something of a disaster for Ecuador – two games where they failed to score, followed by a defeat. A couple of decent moments brought them two goals, but there was little to suggest they’ve been harshly done by in this tournament, finishing with a single point.

Maicon was an improvement on Alves – less dodgy defensively, more threatening on the ball. The reintroduction of Robinho was less successful – he contributed little on the ball and his movement and positioning was inferior to Neymar’s in a wide position. Menezes might find another creative midfielder, playing deeper and narrower, more useful in the knockout stage. Jadson did reasonably well against Paraguay, and he might be the answer for the repeat of that contest.
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28#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:02:07 | 显示全部楼层
64楼参考文献:占位
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29#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:15:19 | 显示全部楼层
原来,巴西人也打起了4213
上麦孔等人,看来卫冕冠军决不是仅仅是锻炼队伍那么简单的
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30#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:25:49 | 显示全部楼层
巴西人一直在打4213

打巴拉圭的小组赛稍有变化,介于4213、4222和4231之间
主要是由于内马尔和雅德松(后换为埃拉诺)的位置比较活

但根本上,巴西队是双后腰+单前腰+三前锋框架 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:22


打巴拉圭时,上小卢卡斯不下干索,是两个前腰在场吧
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31#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:30:15 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-15 11:31 编辑
巴西4-2胜厄瓜多尔的比赛没看,但是麦孔比阿尔维斯表现好是可以预料的

巴西做不到像巴萨那样场均70%的控球率,并把后防线推到离底线40-45米的距离
这样阿尔维斯防守力的缺陷就容易被对手所利用了 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:25


是的,麦孔这场上前助攻,压住了对手,使巴西人这一路被打反击的风险降到了最小,但是巴拉圭冲击和厄瓜多尔冲击,还是区别很大的。

厄瓜多尔进2球,是巴西两个中卫松懈,以及塞萨尔的疏忽,但是连吃同一人同样的射门,是件诡异的事情
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32#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:33:38 | 显示全部楼层
巴西这支球队,如果你给他们足够空间的话,威胁非常大,巴西球员与生俱来的技术和速度自不消说,他们投入进攻的兵力也非常多,有时只留卢卡斯,席尔瓦和卢西奥这仨在后场,这也是利用人数优势弥补攻击手年轻,决定性 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:31

对头,厄瓜多尔不压缩,只是很开放的对攻,但是能收获2个进球,还一度追平比分,也很有意思的
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33#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:42:13 | 显示全部楼层
73# Alex2011  
厄瓜多尔这个进两球的凯赛多是个牛逼人物,坚决果断。在今年的西甲也打进了十几个球,我记得还进了巴萨一球,戏耍了皮克(好像是皮克犯2了)
巴拉圭打巴西那场压迫的非常不错。巴拉圭的身体优势和在 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:38


估计接下来阿根廷vs乌拉圭,乌队若是被淘汰,肯定吃亏在弗兰身上了,老大和进攻核心,但是明显不是去年世界杯状态,

然而,他的定位球和远射还是很大威力的
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34#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:45:06 | 显示全部楼层
巴拉圭这个队打得太没有美感了,不喜欢马蒂诺这类球风
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:39


感觉这支巴拉圭,比去年打日本时还厉害,很可能就是打西班牙时那种变态的兴奋劲,但是还不老道,否则如何能让委队最后10多分钟里,连扳2球呢
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35#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:49:08 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-15 11:50 编辑

设想一下,如果把巴拉圭中后场5-6人,换到阿根廷,与梅西、昆、西瓜、天使等组成队伍,打巴西时会是个什么样子呢?
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36#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:53:36 | 显示全部楼层
两位斑竹可否预测一下,阿乌之战,乌队阵型河、战略和战术吗?
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37#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 11:59:29 | 显示全部楼层
巴拉圭的后场就个人能力来说不会强于阿根廷
巴拉圭胜在整体防守贯彻的好,全队都注重就地反抢和压迫,换句话说他们是牺牲了部分进攻的力量来换取更高质量的防守,阿根廷不会采用这样的战术。 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:54


要的就是整体协防,以及丢球后就地反抢,这给前场支持很大的

阿根廷后卫一个不是危险时候的不该失误,就会招致满盘皆输的不利局势
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38#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 12:20:14 | 显示全部楼层
84# 北极海

卡瓦尼?
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39#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-15 12:48:35 | 显示全部楼层
如果上卡瓦尼的话就不能打442了

自从对智利队的下半场开始,塔瓦雷斯就弃433而用442
所以说卡瓦尼更可能出现在替补席作为后手而不是首发

用阿尔瓦罗-冈萨雷斯专门和迪-马里亚兑子应该说也是个不错的选择
因此我预 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 12:31


卡瓦尼不上,打442,很可能就是世界杯乌拉圭打德国队那样的战术。这种威力也不小,但是弗兰状态能否恢复到75%以上呢?
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40#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:25:04 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-17 21:28 编辑

Uruguay 1-1 Argentina (AET): Uruguay progress after disciplined defending and superb penalties
July 17, 2011


The starting line-ups

The hosts are out of the Copa America after an engaging 1-1 draw.

Oscar Tabarez kept faith with the same narrow 4-4-1-1 system as against Mexico, although there was one change – Martin Cacares came in for Cristian Rodriguez, with Alvaro Pereira moving forward to the left of midfield.

Sergio Batista named an unchanged XI in broadly the same system as in Argentina’s final group game against Costa Rica.

The game started frantically and then slowed down but remained enjoyable – the two red cards opened up the game, but didn’t produce any more goals.

High tempo

Many Copa America games have been played at a slow pace, but from an Argentina v Uruguay match, you can always count on closing down, tackles and rapid passing early on. Argentina dominated the ball, and like against Mexico, Uruguay tried to press – although the mismatch in systems made it more difficult here. Diego Perez played much higher up than Egidio Arevalo, trying to get into the face of Angel Di Maria, Argentina’s most advanced central midfielder.

Tabarez could afford to play his narrow 4-4-1-1 because of the relative lack of attacking thrust from Argentina’s full-backs. Alvaro Pereira came inside and hassled Gago on the ball, happy to let Pablo Zabaleta receive a pass. Behind Pereira, Martin Caceres generally did a good job on his old Barcelona team-mate Lionel Messi, starting narrow and tracking him inside – it was a good decision by Tabarez to play a converted centre-back there, rather than Pereira. That said, Messi did find space for Gonzalo Higuain’s goal – a drifted left-footed cross after he cut in from the right, in almost identical fashion to a chance which produced a shocking miss from Higuain against Costa Rica.

Perez involved

There were two other factors in the first half – both involved free-kicks and dead ball situations. First, Argentina defended set-pieces abysmally, and Gabriel Milito and Nicolas Burdisso showed no understanding of this situation by constantly giving away cheap free-kicks. Perez had poked in the opener from one of these situations.

Second, Perez himself was charging around the pitch and conceding an amazing number of fouls. He could have been sent-off on at least two occasions before his red card, and Tabarez must have considered replacing him before the inevitable happened. Having been forced to bring on Andres Scotti for Mauricio Victorino at the back because of injury, he probably didn’t want to use up a further sub before half time.

11 v 10

A common complain on ZM is that managers who find their side with a numerical advantage don’t adjust their side. The tactics you think will beat eleven opponents will not necessarily be the tactics that will beat ten – there will be more space on the pitch somewhere, the opposition will be more vulnerable in a certain way, and less dangerous in another.


After Uruguay went down to ten

This was a particularly frustrating example, because the best way to play against ten men is with width – especially, as it happens, because Uruguay here were playing a 4-3-2 formation, and asking their three central midfielders to shift across the pitch constantly (rather than a 4-4-1, for example, which covers the pitch with two banks of four). Tabarez felt he could afford to play this way, again, because of the lack of attacking threat from Argentina’s full-backs.

Indeed, Tabarez didn’t feel the need to make any further substitutions until the second half of extra time, which both demonstrates that Uruguay’s players performed extremely well, but also that Batista and Argentina made life easy for them.

With Messi immediately coming inside into the centre of the pitch with the ball, and Aguero staying wider but hardly a natural winger, Argentina lacked width and played through the middle too much, playing into Uruguay’s hands. The amazing thing was, Argentina had a winger, Di Maria, playing in the centre, drifting inside from the left. They could have afforded to play Fernando Gago and Javier Mascherano as the double pivot (there was little threat from Uruguay coming forward from central midfield), and put Di Maria on either flank to stretch the play and to force Uruguay to work harder. Instead, Argentina remained slow and predictable on the ball, and were far too narrow.

Uruguay’s only hope of a goal was from a set-piece. Luis Suarez put in one of the best performances you’ll ever see at getting opponents booked – both Burdisso and Milito were carded within three second half minutes, and later Mascherano got a second yellow for another foul on Suarez. Forlan’s delivery was often disappointing.

Batista waited until 72 minutes for the first change – Javier Pastore on for Di Maria. Pastore played a couple of great one-twos with Messi, but it’s arguable that he’s not the man to break down a packed defence sitting deep – he’s more dangerous on the counter. Ezequiel Lavezzi, despite his poor form in this tournament, would have been an interesting option, and the introduction of Carlos Tevez for Aguero late on didn’t really make any sense – Tevez continues to show no understanding of the football Argentina are trying to play – his positioning and movement from the wide-left position is very poor.

10 v 10

Mascherano’s red card opened the game up further, and Argentina looked nervous until Lucas Biglia came on as a true holding player – a Gago-Pastore duo was not very secure, and Forlan found space until the change was made. Uruguay were tired by this stage, although with their 4-3-2 formation looking more secure and solid than Argentina’s 4-2-3ish shape, Tabarez was the man who got things right in the extra time period – although they needed an astonishing Fernando Muslera double save to stay in it.

Muslera was also the hero in the shoot-out – and it was almost inevitable that Tevez would be the villain.

Conclusion

Argentina played for 48 minutes with an extra man, and despite the best attacking squad in the world, Batista’s side didn’t score. In fact, they didn’t even look like scoring, and even as the game was in progress, it seemed that Argentina would live to regret not taking advantage in this period.

Four Copa games played on home soil, and Argentina’s only victory was against a Costa Rican U23 side.

Tabarez should be commended for his tactics, however – the starting formation was correct, the way he adapted to going down to ten was correct, and his use of substitutions was brave but successful.
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41#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:25:44 | 显示全部楼层
94楼参考译文:占位
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42#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:36:34 | 显示全部楼层
踏巴雷氏是勇敢而成功的男人和主帅,而巴蒂似塌执教行为很龌龊,4场家门口的战斗,只赢了哥斯达黎加u23队
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43#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:43:42 | 显示全部楼层
96# 苍生劫

天使和昆频繁换位可以考虑

西瓜倒是常常后撤来反抢,但是家鸽对阵打铁的乌拉圭,明显节奏都出不来,或许俺没看清楚

下半场可以考虑用巴内加换家鸽,用比利亚换昆,将天使推向昆的位置
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44#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:45:08 | 显示全部楼层
到了后来,野兽换下KUN,回撤打中场,梅西顶到锋线,实在是很无厘头的一招,野兽虽然在中场可以拿住球,但创造力有限,传不到前锋线上去,等于浪费了梅西的作用,这和老马在世界杯下半时对德国用的招完全一模一样。
...
苍生劫 发表于 2011-7-17 21:41


俺看到一幕是特维斯打中锋,但后来才看清是t11打梅西位置,又是一个散布帝
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45#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 21:47:46 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-17 21:49 编辑

对了,家鸽被换下时,一瘸一拐的
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46#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 22:05:16 | 显示全部楼层
没辙,巴蒂斯塔换人上,不仅是别人搞不懂,连自己人都觉得别扭
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47#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-17 22:15:10 | 显示全部楼层
ls说的极是!看着他俩猴急样子,真是无奈呀
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48#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-19 04:13:42 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-19 04:17 编辑

Venezuela 2-1 Chile: Borghi’s changes put Chile on top, but set-piece vulnerability proves fatal
委内瑞拉2-1智利:博尔奇变阵助推智利,而定位球防守缺陷是致命的
July 18, 2011


The starting line-ups

Venezuela are through to the semi-finals after two goals from dead ball situations.

Cesar Farias’ defence and midfield were as expected – the only decision to make was upfront, where Miku played just off Giancarlo Maldonaldo, in a fairly basic 4-4-2.

Claudio Borghi was without Jean Beausejour, so Arturo Vidal moved out to the left and Carlos Carmona came into the centre of the pitch.

Chile were poor in the first half, then excellent in the second. Venezuela were never particularly inventive, but retained a threat from set-pieces – and that was enough for them to win the game.

First half

The first half of this game was flat, played at a slow tempo with few goalscoring chances created in open play. Venezuela were clearly expecting an early onslaught from Chile, but Borghi’s side struggled to get the ball into the opposition third of the pitch, or to penetrate the Venezuelan defence.

One of the major reasons for this was the Chilean midfield duo. With Vidal, usually the driving force from that zone (even if he didn’t enjoy a particularly sparkling tournament) shunted out to the left, Carmona and Gary Medel were essentially doing the same job deep in midfield – neither was moving forward or showing much quality on the ball, and the Chilean passing moves were too slow. With such a defensive-minded partnership there, the onus was on Luis Jiminez to link play, but he had a poor game.

The positive aspect of the midfield duo was that with Juan Arango and Cesar Gonzalez wanting to come into the centre of the pitch, Venezuela found it difficult to construct attacks, and were no threat themselves in open play.
Chile’s weakness, as seen in last summer’s World Cup, is a tendency to concede unnecessary fouls. One of these cheap free-kicks resulted in Venezuela’s goal, headed in by centre-back Oswaldo Vizcarrondo.

Second half


The line-ups at the start of the second half

Borghi’s obvious choice from the bench was Jorge Valdivia – not fit to start, but the creative midfielder Chile were missing. It was natural that he’d play as a number ten, Jiminez would move left, and Vidal would tuck inside. The decision was whether Medel or Carmona should depart, and it was a big error from Borghi to take off Carmona.

Medel is clearly the superior player, but he had picked up a booking shortly before half-time – and leaving him as the sole holder in such an attacking side was suicidal, especially as Venezuela were going to be looking to break through the middle. Medel is no stranger to bookings, and duly picked up a second yellow later in the half – it was almost as inevitable as Diego Perez’s second caution for Uruguay against Argentina, and shows that managers need to be alert to the threat of combative midfielders picking up second bookings.

The introduction of Valdivia was a huge boost, and he was the man who created many of Chile’s attacking moves in the second half – he hit the bar himself, and played some clever balls out to the flanks. His presence was not the only thing that made Chile better, however – they simply played quicker, higher up the pitch and much more direct – Venezuela were pinned back inside their own half, with the wide players playing much deeper.

Late developments

A second attack-minded Chilean change, Esteban Paredes on for Gonzalo Jara, with Vidal moving to the left of the back three, pushed them to a 3-1-3-3, similar to the formation Borghi reverted to against Mexico earlier in the competition. This gave them more width upfront, something they’d clearly lacked until the second substitution, with Alexis Sanchez as a right-sided forward, and Paredes on the left. Venezuela now had to deal with a different angle of attack, and Humberto Suazo became much more dangerous. He hit the bar after one ball in from the right, and then scored a very similar chance soon after.

Chile were in the ascendency, attacking with a lot of players and getting the ball down the flanks well, but it was ultimately their attacking changes that cost them the game at the back. First, Vidal, in his third position of the game, got caught out and had to concede the free-kick that resulted in Gabriel Cichero’s winner. Second, Medel was sent off.
Borghi’s changes had pushed Chile up the pitch, but also left them vulnerable at the back.

Conclusion
The first half here was a non-event – Venezuela were waiting to soak up pressure that never came. Chile only burst into life when they brought on Valdivia for the second half, and should have scored numerous times after his arrival.

Their vulnerability at free-kicks was partly a result of their approach – playing high up the pitch means that desperate tackles when out of position are always likely – but also simply ill discipline.

Ignore set-pieces and Chile were by far the better side, but such an obvious weakness was always likely to be a problem.
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49#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-19 04:14:10 | 显示全部楼层
115楼参考译文:占位
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50#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-7-19 07:37:31 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-7-19 07:41 编辑

Brazil 0-0 Paraguay: Brazil fail to score in 120 minutes – then miss all their penalties too
巴西 0-0 巴拉圭:巴西败于120分钟得势不得分,接着又在点球战中全部罚丢
July 18, 2011


The starting line-ups

Paraguay are through to the semi-finals of the Copa America, having drawn all four games so far.

Gerardo Martino took the surprising decision of dropping Nestor Ortigoza, bringing in Victor Cacares in the centre of midfield. Roque Santa Cruz dropped out, with Nelson Valdez making his first start of the tournament.

Mano Menezes kept his XI from the 4-2 win over Ecuador, meaning Robinho retained his place on the right.

Score this one on points, and Brazil would be the winners. More possession, more shots and more clear goalscoring chances meant they were in the ascendency for the majority of the game.

Paraguay pressure

Martino’s tactics took Brazil by surprise early on. More accustomed to sitting back and soaking up pressure, Paraguay pressed Brazil heavily in the opening minutes, denying their midfielders time on the ball, and also paying particular attention to Lucio, to prevent him bringing the ball out of the back.

The decision to omit Ortigoza made sense in this respect, because he probably wouldn’t have had the mobility and energy to close down as well as Caceres did. The downside, though, was that Paraguay were fairly clueless when they actually had the ball, with a complete lack of imagination from the centre of midfield, and little contribution from Marcelo Estigarribia on the left.

In contrast to Paraguay, Brazil were much more relaxed without the ball. Their front four made little attempt to win the ball back, and Brazil had to build moves from deep.

Formations

In terms of formations, Paraguay continued their 4-4-2 / 4-5-1 shapethat depended upon the right-sided player, Valdez, acting as a second forward when moves developed. Brazil’s right-winger also played narrow, with Robinho drifting inside and playing some good combinations with other attacking players, as Brazil tried to play through the centre – the area where their two goals in the previous meeting with Paraguay came from.

The key battle was deep in Paraguay’s midfield, where Cristian Riveros did a good job nullifying Ganso. As we saw in Brazil’s opening game against Venezuela, take Ganso out of the equation in the 4-2-1-3, and Brazil are a broken side, with no link between midfield and attack. The first half never looked likely to produce goals.

Second half

Brazil improved hugely after half time. Paraguay’s pressing was no longer so evident, and Brazil passed much better as a result. They got the ball to the wide players on the run, and produced more chances, despite lacking cohesion between the front four – it all seemed improvised rather than organised.

That aside, there was a lack of tactical interest in the second half. Neither manager wanted to change things, though considering the fate of Chile’s Gary Medel and Uruguay’s Diego Perez, we should give credit to Martino for withdrawing Enrique Vera, who had picked up one yellow card and was in danger of another.

The only tactical changes made things more narrow, disappointingly – Hernan Perez, a winger, came on but played broadly through the middle behind Barrios, whilst Fred replaced Neymar with Pato moving left. Brazil’s tactics became a bit confused at this point, and Fred didn’t have the influence he exerted on his previous substitute appearance. Still, Brazil were the better side in the second half, and some wonderful saves from Justo Villar kept Paraguay in it. The tactical interest, however, was minimal.

Extra time

The double red card – Lucas and Antolin Alcaraz – should have opened things up, but instead simply forced both sides to play more defensive football. Menezes reacted by bringing on Elano for Pato to strengthen the midfield, whilst Martino, having used all three subs, put Dario Veron at centre-back and substitute right-midfielder Edgar Barreto at right-back, with Perez moving to the right wing in a 4-4-1. Both sides sat back and didn’t take advantage of the extra space.

Conclusion

The least exciting of the four quarter-finals, where Brazil couldn’t even manage to score from four penalty kicks.
Menezes has made some errors in this competition, but it’s difficult not to feel some sympathy for him here. The decision to pick Robinho (the only real choice he had to make) was broadly a success, and it’s difficult to fault his tactics for this particular game considering how many chances his side created, plus the fact that Julio Cesar rarely looked in danger of conceding.

Martino continues to use the same formation, but he showed here that he has the ability to vary his tactics. Paraguay were more proactive in the first half, but when they could no longer close down, they came under sustained pressure.
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