设为首页收藏本站

 找回密码
 注册

QQ登录

只需一步,快速开始

扫一扫,访问微社区

楼主: Alex2011
打印 上一主题 下一主题

【10-11 ZM专贴】280L:替补伊布戴帽助瑞典5-0横扫芬兰

[复制链接]
26#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-24 21:08:35 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-2-24 21:12 编辑

Marseille 0-0 Manchester United (UEFA Champions League): MATCH REVIEW

by Gene Um on Feb 24, 2011 5:40 AM GMT in 2010-2011 Champions League



They say absence makes the heart grow fonder. For 73 agonizing minutes, my heart yearned for a certain copper top to appear in order to spice things up. Then he suddenly did. Midfield maestro Paul Scholes came on for 17 minutes and injected passing wizardry into a lifeless Manchester United attack, but the brief encounter was not enough. United were held to a goalless draw at Stade Velodrome in the first leg of their UEFA Champions League match by hosts Olympique de Marseille. Manager Sir Alex Ferguson surprised many by starting Darron Gibson over Scholes, but the 23 year-old failed to yield much influence on this European night. The match contained shifts in momentum throughout, but neither side appeared to be a genuine threat. United will welcome Marseille to Old Trafford in three weeks time for the return leg in a favorable position, but still with plenty of work to be done in order to advance to the quarter-finals of Champions League play. The lack of an away goal may be somewhat worrisome, especially when considering United's recent fortunes in similar predicaments.

OPENING LINEUPS AND FORMATIONS:
Manchester United played in a '4-3-3' shape. Dimitar Berbatov lead the attacking line in the center. Wayne Rooney played on the left flank, and often drifted towards the center. Nani played on the right flank and stayed closer to his touchline than Rooney did on his. Michael Carrick played deep in the central midfield, just ahead of the center-backs in a holding position, and also as a double pivot when United were in possession. Darren Fletcher was also employed in the center of the pitch in a box-to-box role, and also slightly left-center. Gibson was the third central midfielder, playing slightly higher up the pitch than Fletcher and generally farther to the right. Patrice Evra played left-back, and made many forward over-lapping runs in support of Rooney when the latter tucked inside. Right-back John O'Shea was a bit more conservative than Evra and stayed back in his own half more. The center-back pairing was captain Nemanja Vidic and Chris Smalling, the latter deputizing for the injured Rio Ferdinand.
Gibson might have been inserted into the line-up over Scholes in order to provide a bit more energy and pace. Despite the Northern Irishman's inclusion, the '4-3-3' shape that United used was intended to be attack-minded in nature. Only Carrick played deep, and Gibson had the freedom to join the attack. Often a '4-3-3' shape includes two double pivots, which can resemble a '4-2-3-1,' but that wasn't the case for United at tonight's start.
Marseille typically play with a '4-3-3' shape, but their lineup resembled more of a '4-2-3-1' shape. In the central midfield, Charles Kabore and Edouard Cisse were used as holding players, with the former often providing cover for left-back Gabriel Heinze when in defense. The two holding players freed up Lucho into the attack higher up the pitch, and the Argentinean was free to act as a play-maker and link player to the attack. Rod Fanni played right-back, and was joined in the defense by the center-back pairing of Stephane M'Bia and Souleymane Diawara. In the attack, Brandao was the central striker, and he was flanked by Andre Ayew on the left and Loic Remy on the right. These three attackers were fluid in nature and interchaning often, especially Brandao and Ayew. It all looked a bit like this:



Further tactical breakdown after the jump...



1ST HALF:

* The opening 20 minutes was more free-flowing than most had anticipated. United started well and the freedom that Fletcher and Gibson had to join the attack displayed an away side that was initially attack-minded.
* Evra was really bombing forward in the opening moments of the match, and the Frenchman seemed invigorated by being back on native soil. Once again, Rooney gave his manager tactical flexibility as he was tasked out wide left due to the limited selection of wide players for United at the moment. But he kept drifting towards the center of the pitch, where he is clearly more comfortable. In the attacking half of the pitch for Marseille, Remy was tucking in central and didn't occupy the touchline much. This all provided acres of space down the entire left touchline for Evra to occupy and exploit. It was a class performance for Evra, both defensively and an in attack.
* On the opposite side of the pitch, O'Shea was more reserved, but he did pick times to join the attack. O'Shea was often dragged toward the center of the pitch by Ayew's movement. Both Brandao and Ayew were interchangeable on that side of the pitch, and in general, Smalling and O'Shea did well to communicate in handling this fluidity from the Marseille attackers. I remember two separate occasions where Smalling got dragged out too far by the movement of Brandao and Lucho, but in general the young defender was very solid. Another masterful performance for Ferdinand's deputy.
* Nani had a clear pace advantage on Heinze, and the Marseille left-back required the cover services of Kabore for help. It had initially looked like Nani was going to abuse the former United defender throughout the evening, but Kabore's help and Nani's wastefulness at times made the match one to forget the Portuguese winger. In the past, teams have tried to have the left attacking player provide help to their left-back in order to deal with Nani, but typically with unsuccessful results. Marseille had their left-attacking player high up the pitch in attack, and had one of their two holding midfielders provide inside cover on Nani leaving few chances for the United winger to exploit Heinze's lack of pace in one-on-one situations. This also forced Nani to retreat back much more often to help in defense than he typically does.
* About 20-25 minutes into the match, Marseille began to grow into it. Their tempo really picked up and they began to increase their pressure on United at this point. It was a game-changer. The pressing was high up the pitch, and United struggled to consistently deal with it. Fletcher had a string of poor passes from this point and until the half, which resulted from him not being able to adequately cope with the increased pressure. Carrick kept the passes simple and tried to ping the ball around, but at times he needed to provide a more positive pass since Fletcher was struggling to deal with the pressure. Gibson at this point needed to come deeper and provide a link to help relieve pressure, but he was very liberal with his freedom and stayed closer to the attack, rather than linking play. Gibson wasn't poor on the ball when he had it, he was just poorly positioned and didn't have the tactical awareness to adjust. The main result of this pressure was that Marseille was winning the ball back in United's half of the pitch, thus in a dangerous position. Fortunately for United, Lucho wasn't much of a factor at this point and the rest of the attackers couldn't come up with enough creativity, vision, or skill to unlock the United defense. Despite being on their heels for the remainder of the half, the Red Devils were never threatened much.
* At this point, it would have been very nice to have Scholes on the pitch. Because Carrick wasn't hitting the incisive pass to relieve pressure, as was his role to an extent (unfairly or not) by being paired with Fletcher and Gibson, the attackers weren't being given service. The only times that United appeared to threaten in minutes 20-45 were on counter-attacks, but Scholes would have been serviced better with his trademark long diagonal passes to the flanks. At this point of the match, Marseille's vulnerability on the counter-attack was the space behind Heinze, where Nani would have had time and space to exploit him one-on-one. Unfortunately, he wasn't provided enough service. Same goes for Berbatov as a chain-of-effect result. Berba needed the link-up play with Rooney or crosses from Nani. At this point, I was screaming like a mad man for Scholes.
* Ayew was the only the attacking player who worried me at all, as his quickness was somewhat troublesome for O'Shea. Maybe Rafael would have been better suited for this match-up?
* With all the movement between Brandao and Ayew on United's right side (Marseille's left), Vidic was often the free defender to sweep up any mess. He did this well. He picked up on a few sneaky runs into the box by Lucho when Smalling occupied Brandao or Ayew, and Vida even tracked a few diagonal runs by Remy when Evra was higher up the pitch into the attack. The Serbian was extremely well positioned throughout the evening, and was strong in tackle as always. Another fantastic match from our skipper; Vidic deserves to be PFA and FWA player of the Year at this point.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

27#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-24 21:09:28 | 显示全部楼层
续ls

2ND HALF:

* No substitutions (bring on Scholes!!!) or formation changes at half.
* More of the same to begin the half. Marseille continued to pressure, and clearly were feeding off the energy of their frenzied supporters. In what's starting to become a concerning pattern, our central midfield failed to cope with the pressure. I'm sure Fergie and his staff addressed this at half, but there's not much you can do if you simply don't have the skill and football brain to deal with it. Fletcher is a lightning rod for criticism, but he's a fantastic footballer if you pair him with the right partners. He's a great bulldog if he's surrounded by good and creative passers (e.g. Scholes, Carrick at times, Anderson at times, Giggs when he's central), but he can appear rubbish when paired with a struggling Carrick and an inexperienced Gibson.
* For about a 25 minute stretch to start the 2nd half, United were getting completely overrun and it progressively got worse. The midfield at this point was hopeless, and they couldn't involve the attack, let alone relieve pressure for their own defense. Marseille completely bossed the game at this point, but never had the ability to unlock the solid back four of our defense. However, no matter how rubbish the side, if you give them enough chances, the probability of one lucky strike or bounce goes up significantly. This was the threat to United at this point. It both felt like (to me at least) a goal was coming, but it also felt that it wasn't.
* Berbatov was drifting more to the left this half to link up with Rooney. This allowed M'Bia to provide cover for Heinze on counter-attacks directed towards Nani, and Marseille's left-back Heinze. This was needed because as Marseille grew more confident and had more of the possession, Kabore was getting forward a bit more. Therefore, the only threat was space on a counter-attack for Nani when Kabore was high up the pitch. This bit of space was United's most threatening channel but..... we didn't have the center-midfielder on the pitch who was able to provide the service on a consistent basis (Scholes likely agrees).

* Benoit Cheyrou subbed in for Cisse, and the substitute played higher up the pitch than the man he replaced. Marseille manager Didier Dechamps may have decided to chase the goal at home with this positive substitution. Kabore slid centrally into a strict holding role. Now cover was there for Heinze again by Kabore as the latter was clearly  instructed to support his back four defenders.
* Not long after, Fergie made his one and only tactical move by bringing on Scholes in the 73rd minute. United shifted their shape to a very postive '4-4-2,' but it more resembled a '4-2-4.' Scholes and Carrick played deep and United now had two double pivots to help relieve pressure. Nani switched sides to the left flank, and Fletcher moved out to the right flank. Rooney moved up top to pair with Berbatov, and both strikers often came deep towards Scholes and Carrick looking to link play with the two central midfielders. It looked like this about the 75 minute mark:



* Bringing on Scholes and shifting United's shape completely shifted the match's momentum in United's favor again. Scholes' direct approach began to expose Marseille. Carrick came to life as well at this point and linked well with Scholes, and together they were able to work the ball into the attack. United went from playing for a 0-0 draw with Marseille having run of play, to looking for a winner and the crucial away goal. The attack came alive, and play really opened up for both sides in the closing minutes.
* Deschamps possibly sensed an openness to the game, and maybe along with his desire to win at home, he made a positive substitution and brought on French international Mathieu Valbuena. Cheyrou moved a bit deeper, and Marseille now had two midfield creators in Lucho and Valbuena.
* The match opened up, United looked much improved, but neither side could come up with a moment of brilliance to unlock the stalemate. A goalless 0-0 draw seemed deserving for both sides.

MISC THOUGHTS:

* Man of the Match: I want to give it to Sir Alex Ferguson but for Marseille's sake. I've said it before... I respect the hell out of Fergie and I believe he's the greatest football manager that has ever roamed the Earth; and he knows more about football in his left pinkie fingernail than I'll ever know. But he really should have started Scholes, especially with there being rumblings that Scholes is unhappy with playing time. If it comes to light that Scholes was somewhat injured, then I understand. Otherwise, Fergie really hurt his squad tonight by not having his midfield maestro out there. As for the players, I give it to Vidic, Smalling, and Evra.... all were superb. I can't distinguish one over another.
* I keep trying not to get overly excited about Smalling, but he has been superb filling in for Ferdinand. Jonny Evans played well last year, but hasn't so much this year. This is the reason I'm trying to curtail my excitement for the young lad. But what a big time performance on a big time stage. The derby and this match show signs that he's going to be a terrific footballer. He really is Rio 2.0 in his ability to read the game, intercept passes, and ignite the attack from the back with his composure on the ball.
* Rooney wasn't brilliant by any means, even if I argue he didn't have the chance to be often enough due to poor service from the midfield. But a blue-collar effort from him tonight, he defended well on the left flank and did decently well to play as a true winger.
* Nani was our biggest threat... but also our biggest disappointment tonight. This was Nani from season's prior, not the world-class winger we've been witness to for much of the current season.
* I can't blame Berba for much because he got no service as well. The one time I can remember where he maybe should have done better was a break late in the game, where Scholes showed disgust that Berba didn't lay one off for him to strike on goal.... and instead passed to Nani.
* I'm curious to know if Rafael is now second-choice to O'Shea or if the Brazilian defender is just banged up a bit. Perhaps both?
* The fact that we're this poor in the midfield without Scholes is alarming. Very alarming. Hopefully reinforcements come in the summer. Even if our main point of attack is always going to be from our wide players, we still need central midfielders that can create in order to actually service our wingers, and also provide another point of attack centrally if teams attempt to shut down attacking channels on the flanks. Ando being out magnifies this problem, both for quality and depth. If I understood Deschamps' quotes correctly prior to the match, then I agree with him that we lack a bit of "fantasy."
* Passing certainly appears to be important; midfield passing, or lack of it, shows correlation to goal-scoring as evidenced by the statistical analysis done by Graham MacAree, of SB Nation's Chelsea FC blog. Keep the ball and you have more scoring chances; lose the ball in dangerous areas (midfield, defense) and you tend to give up goals. United might be another great case study for that.
* Getting back to the point of United being vulnerable to teams that press up the pitch against us. Obviously, no team is completely comfortable with it, United is no exception. However, we seem to be extremely vulnerable to it and I suspect this explains why we don't play as well away from Old Trafford. Teams are likely to employ this tactic more at home where players can feed off their supporters; no team can press for a full 90 minutes, not even Barcelona. At Old Trafford, teams are less likely to press us and are wiling to invite pressure and attack on the counter. I suspect this somewhat explains the stark contrast in our home and away form.
* I'm confident that we'll prevail at Old Trafford, but I'll be a nervous mess at Old Trafford if Marseille bag a goal. I hope lack of away goals don't come back to bite us in the ass.... again.
* We're certainly in a advantageous position with Marseille, and in hindsight, 0-0 may prove to be a positive result considering the injuries the club is dealing with.
* I know what you readers are thinking.... that I'm into gingers. I'm really not, I prefer brunettes, but I've had a recent affection for blondes after a holiday in Sweden/Denmark this past Autumn.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

28#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-24 21:22:08 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-2-24 21:24 编辑

Marseille 0-0 Manchester United: stalemate
February 24, 2011

The starting line-ups

A lack of goalmouth action resulted in the only goalless game of the Champions League second round first legs.
Mathieu Valbuena was only fit enough for the bench, and Andre-Pierre Gignac was out completely, so Didier Deschamps used a patched-up 4-2-3-1 with Brandao as the lone forward.
Sir Alex Ferguson fielded Wayne Rooney on the left of a 4-1-4-1, with Darron Gibson surprisingly starting over Paul Scholes in the centre of midfield.
The game was by far the poorest of the eight Champions League games that have been played over the past ten days – neither side were intent on scoring, and both seemed to settle for a 0-0 at a fairly early stage.

With similar formations, there was relatively little to choose between the sides in tactical terms. Michael Carrick broadly picked up Lucho Gonzalez, whilst United’s two more advanced midfielders did battle with Marseille’s double pivot. Neither side conclusively won the midfield battle – the sides attempted a similar number of passes (449-497) and had a similar pass completion rate (81%-80%). The ball spent most of the time in the middle of the pitch, but none of the six players in that zone dominated the game to any real extent – Carrick was disappointing despite having a fair amount of time on the ball, but Gibson’s passing was more incisive.
With such a stalemate, a full-scale match analysis would be rather unnecessary, so instead here are some chalkboards, courtesy of the fantastic TotalFootball app.
Wayne Rooney's passing

Wayne Rooney reverted to a disciplined left-wing role, rather than the lone striking role he’s played recently when Ferguson has gone 4-5-1 away in Europe. From that position his passing was generally sound, although he often lost the ball when attempting over-ambitious passes.
Both sides' interceptions

Both sides intercepted the ball reasonably high up the pitch – barely any interceptions happened in the final third – demonstrating how rare it was for the ball to actually be played into attacking positions.
Manchester United's crosses

Marseille coped well with United’s crossing (which generally came from the right wing) – none of the 14 crosses from open play were successful, it took a corner to provide a completed ball into the box.
Marseille's passes in the attacking third

Marseille’s passing was focused down their left – the vast majority of balls played into the final third came down that flank.
Paul Scholes' passing

Paul Scholes’ late introduction provided the assured passing United had missed until then – he completed 96% of his passes, the only exception being when he tried a ‘key’ pass into the opposition penalty box.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

29#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-24 21:33:50 | 显示全部楼层
国米0-1拜仁战术分析:这是最好的10分钟,也是最坏的10分钟  

由 cnzcnz 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer


马里奥-戈麦斯在第90分钟终于送出绝杀帮助拜仁在两回合比赛中抢到先手
莱昂纳多手里缺少前锋去年决赛梅开二度的迭戈-米利托和冬季引进的帕奇尼都因伤或者因为参赛资格的原因无法上场他派出了斯坦科维奇和施奈德两名攻击型中场队员协助单前锋埃托奥

事实上的首发阵容:范加尔貌似排出一个迷魂阵:比赛前5分钟古斯塔沃打左后卫,普兰尼奇打后腰;5分钟后两人互换

范加尔派出了上周和美因茨奇葩比赛一样的首发阵容不过比赛尚未过半就因为普兰尼奇的受伤不得不提前做出调整布雷诺替换上场打中卫巴德施图贝尔又回到左后卫的位置上
比赛从开始就丝毫不显沉闷双方都大开大合你来我往拉诺基亚一分钟不到便觅得一次破门良机可惜射歪界外球和定位球成了国米的一大威胁而劳模埃托奥一刻不停地给拜仁带来麻烦开场阶段卢西奥在前场接应角球之后给埃托奥送出一记漂亮的传球埃托奥的射门也颇具威胁

拜仁的优势
但是随着比赛的进行拜仁获得了更多的控球权进攻球员的灵光闪现也使他们逐渐占据了场上的主动在国米看来这支拜仁和9个月前的手下败将颇有不同去年的拜仁更多是以反击为主主要的进攻手段是罗本和里贝里在边路的突击而这个赛季由于两人频繁而又长期的缺阵拜仁的打法变得更加注重控球权这如他们今天所表现的。 (译者注从控球时间来说上赛季的拜仁并不劣于现在的这支球队而且上赛季拜仁的打法和防守反击相去甚远尤其在决赛。ZM说这赛季不那么依赖罗贝利的发挥了是对的不过到最后还是要靠罗本的神仙球……)
随后的比赛国际米兰在拜仁的压力之下回收得非常非常深以至于莱昂纳多拼命地挥手要求队员们向前压上于是拜仁获得了更多的控球时间尤其是他们的两个边后卫由于鲜有对手的威胁频频压上正如他们与罗马客场比赛时一样拉姆和普兰尼奇虽然没有传出特别有威胁的球也没有尝试射门但是他们的位置使得国米的后腰不得不往边路走来防守他们这就给中路的施魏因施泰格和古斯塔沃创造了空间他们也频频带球向前或传球或射门给国米制造了不小的麻烦除此之外拜仁的两个边后卫也经常与罗本里贝里做二过一配合以图制造传中机会


施魏因施泰格拿球机会很多, 而且频频给右路插上的拉姆输送火力


中场的争夺
国米的两个攻击型中场的情况很令人寻味斯内德一般在左路活动位置靠前斯坦科维奇的位置居右而且站位更胜拜仁的两个后腰并没有对他们进行盯人防守而是努力地站好位置施魏因施泰格和古斯塔沃始终保持合适的距离与后卫线的距离也控制得很好拜仁的防守阵型于是变得很紧密拜仁的两个边后卫也经常往肋部靠来协助防守国米的三名主要进攻球员这样一来就在小范围形成了63的局面(译者注:61也没用, 要不是克拉夫特, 埃托奥早进球了……). 国米的问题是他们太顾忌拜仁的攻击力在后场投入的兵力太多前场只留下3名队员国米后腰很少参与到进攻当中来而他们的两个边后卫齐沃忙于对付罗本麦孔也基本和里贝里兑子 (译者注: 这样就让卢西奥的插上进攻显得更为重要)。 国米的阵型于是变得非常破碎


下半场比赛
国米的进攻在下半场颇有起色他们把阵型向前顶了不少后防线也适当压上不过他们的边后卫还是经常遭遇12的情况拜仁也在47分钟创造出了一次黄金机会罗本的传球被无人盯防的穆勒顶偏
到这个时候国米的问题已经很清楚了他们在失去控球权的时候,,斯内德和斯坦科维奇几乎消失拜仁的边后卫无人看防而且他们的后腰也没有得到太多的限制可以自由地参与组织进攻从这一方面来看莱昂纳多完全没有吸取上赛季的教训这和上赛季AC米兰输给曼联的方式几乎如出一辙米兰失去控球权à小罗和帕托无所事事à球队最终失利莱昂纳多致力于攻势足球的决心是令人钦佩的但是他这种坚持的代价未免过高了一些当这种所谓的攻势足球不能产生进球的时候它也就难以为继了
双方的换人并没有改变局面哈贾拉换下了膝盖受伤的拉诺基亚齐沃去顶拉诺基亚的中卫位置萨内蒂于是移到了左后卫盯防罗本哈贾拉打起了熟悉的后腰位置但谁都没有想到这居然是全场比赛的最后一次换人而两次换人居然全部都是由伤病引起的被动换人莱昂纳多和范加尔都没有对球队的战术体系进行变动也许大家对00的比分都很满意
如果把比赛割裂成10分钟的片段国米最有威胁的时段应该最后10分钟但是这就是足球在国米表现最好的时候拜仁进球了罗本再一次放出了天下皆知的大招内切---射门---神仙球他射出的诡异弧线让塞萨尔罕见地发生了扑球脱手这样的失误戈麦斯终于不负众望补射中的戈麦斯本场比赛的平淡表现可能让人觉得这个进球有点拣皮夹的嫌疑但是整场表现出色的拜仁确实应该得到一个进球的回报

结论
这场比赛的开放程度在欧冠淘汰赛中是不多见的拜仁的表现更为出色他们阵型组织的很好占据了55%的控球时间, 通过边路配合创造了更多的得分机会从整场比赛来看他们直到90分钟才获得领先有些出乎我们的意料
刚刚结束的八分之一决赛第一回合的比赛对于意甲球队来说可以说是一场恶梦三支主场作战的球队无一幸免而且三支球队都被宽度和速度所击败似乎从战术角度来说意大利球队已经开始落伍了
原帖地址:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/23/inter-0-1-bayern-tactics/
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

30#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-24 21:39:57 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-2-24 21:47 编辑

哥本哈根0-2切尔西:442阵型的对决  

由 trueblueseu 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球 http://bbs.goalhi.com/fyt-soccer



        凭借阿内尔卡的两粒入球,切尔西轻松击败沮丧的哥本哈根人。

        索尔贝肯改变了在小组赛阶段运转良好的阵型(哥本哈根小组赛阵型分析在此:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/11/25/rubin-1-0-copenhagen-tactics/)——两名球员搭档锋线,格伦夏尔不再埋伏在他们身后(活跃在中路的边锋:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/12/03/introducing-the-central-winger/),而是改在左翼活动。
        安切洛蒂把德罗巴摁在了板凳上,托雷斯和阿内尔卡联袂出阵。
       哥本哈根在小组赛阶段表现出色,他们主场逼平巴萨并力压喀山鲁宾和帕纳辛纳科斯出线,成为史上首支晋级欧冠淘汰赛阶段的丹麦球队。
        因此,索尔贝肯变阵为442的举动相当令人吃惊,说老实话,这是个糟糕的决定。哥本哈根并不是顶尖球队,但周中的比赛远远不能体现他们的最好水平。有很多原因可以说明哥本哈根的战术为何失策,下面我们逐一分析。

1、442阵型意味着比赛简化成了个人PK
       由于两支球队都踢442阵型,比赛中自然会有很多的球员个人对位,而切尔西就是要比哥本哈根强——任何一名哥本哈根的球员都无法在蓝军阵中立足,因此当比赛简化为球员间的1VS1对抗时,切尔西取得了巨大的优势。哥本哈根需要在局部区域取得人数优势,这样才能找到切尔西的漏洞,如果可以主导中场自然很完美,若能找到对方防线的弱点也不赖。
2、这意味着比赛相当开放
        ZM曾分析过很多场类似的比赛,我们发现,和3VS3或3VS2的中场PK比起来,2VS2的中场对抗会导致比赛更加快速、更加开放。作为技术更加出色的一方,切尔西自然更欢迎这样的比赛。
3、切尔西得以摆脱没有控球型中场的窘境
       切尔西在本场比赛中变阵为更加典型的442,这意味着他们在一个球员并不熟悉的体系中运转。他们早已习惯了3名,甚至是4名中场中路球员的组合——两名球员稍稍突前,担任控球型后腰的马克莱莱或米克尔负责扫荡后方。兰帕德和埃辛并未在442阵型的中场中路奏出完美的二重唱,很多时候他们俩压得过于靠上,导致后防和中场间出现大片空当。如果格伦夏尔不是去踢边锋,而是出任中场组织者的话,他本可以在这片区域兴风作浪——此外,这种安排还可能会导致兰帕德或埃辛的后撤,这样一来本方的控球型后腰就有了发挥的空间。
4、恩多耶和锋线队友各自为战,利用速度打身后的战术无从发挥
        蓝军本赛季的转折点是在斯坦福桥惨败于桑德兰,那场比赛证明蓝军容易被对方利用速度打身后,特别是当特里和伊万搭档时更是如此。哥本哈根的恩多耶拥有出色的爆发力和力量,看看他在小组赛是如何肆无忌惮地完爆吉尔伯托-席尔瓦的吧(恩多耶的完美发挥:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2010/10/01/panathinaikos-2-0-copenhagen-tactics/)。可在这场比赛中,他不得不频繁回撤拿球,这导致桑廷在锋线上孤单影只。桑廷同样是以速度见长的球员,但他不具备恩多耶那样的力量,发挥受限的他中场休息时就被换下。下半场恩多耶曾突破了对方防线一次,无奈的特里只能选择将他放倒,这表明如果恩多耶的位置更加靠前,切尔西的防线本该遇到更大的考验。


下半场哥本哈根换回了自己熟悉的阵型,表现大有起色

5、过于积极的开场暴露了哥本哈根的体能弱点
       哥本哈根在最近3个月里都没有正式比赛可踢,因此开场时他们的疯狂压迫着实让人吃了一惊——但恶果是显而易见的,他们的球员在比赛末段明显体力不支。

切尔西

        尽管哥本哈根表现不佳,切尔西的精彩表现也不该被掩盖——通常来说要拿下这个对手需要付出艰辛的努力,但切尔西做到了兵不血刃地带走胜利。
       和周末的足总杯比起来(坑爹的点球:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/19/chelsea-1-1-everton-aet-everton-through-after-shoot-out/),他们在这场比赛中的阵型更接近一个典型的442,两名前锋在中路游动。马卢达的位置稍稍靠后,但仍要比右路回撤更深的拉米雷斯更靠近锋线。
        尽管轻松获胜,切尔西仍要注意到阵型中的问题——两名中路球员在无球状态下有些无所适从,好在他们压上的效果非常明显——正如下面的战术板所示。


兰帕德和埃辛的传球统计

阿内尔卡和托雷斯的搭档则擦出了更多的火花——他们曾几次踢出精妙的配合,两人都获得了不少得分良机。

托雷斯和阿内尔卡的射门统计

结论

       索尔贝肯意识到了自己布阵的失误,于是他在中场休息时用文加德换下桑廷,并将格伦夏尔挪回了中路。哥本哈根在下半场的表现大有改观,但开场的压迫式防守导致他们很快就体力不支。
        切尔西主导了整场比赛,他们的表现如教科书般标准,并未出什么奇招异式。他们收获了两个进球,对这个比分也心满意足,托雷斯-阿内尔卡的搭配同样相当来电,我们可以期待他们下周和曼联的恶战了。

原文地址:http://www.zonalmarking.net/2011/02/23/copenhagen-0-2-chelsea-4-4-2-v-4-4-2/
译者:trueblueseu
完工日期:2011年2月24日
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

31#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-25 11:38:41 | 显示全部楼层
41# 午时靡深蓝

这是每日邮报上一张阵型图,看法与zm也有差异



回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

32#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-2-25 11:48:20 | 显示全部楼层
43# 午时靡深蓝

对了,每日邮报那个图貌似是预测图
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

33#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 11:59:27 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 12:01 编辑
央视陶伟的现场解说个人感觉比上面这个说得到位。。小猪那种情况未必是主动的选择。莱万多夫斯基和格罗斯克罗伊茨中路靠得多也并不都是为了进攻,对位防守任务很重。拜仁中卫的协调能力不行。 ...
红酥手 发表于 2011-2-28 22:23


请说说,多特蒙德2个年轻中场吧

戈策和Nuri Sahin,后者是土耳其人,goal网上的技术评级比戈策高得多,但是,俺对后者没多大印象
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

34#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 12:25:10 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 13:23 编辑

Milan 3-0 Napoli: Napoli don’t turn upFebruary 28, 2011

The starting line-ups

Milan recorded a comfortable victory over a hugely disappointing Napoli side.

Max Allegri gave Marek Jankulovski a rare start at left-back. Upfront, he used the Robinho-Pato-Ibrahimovic trio.

Walter Mazzarri played his usual XI with one exception – Ezequiel Lavezzi was unavailable, so Giuseppe Mascara started instead.

Napoli were extremely poor throughout the game. Their passing was very sloppy, they lacked drive or creativity from the centre of midfield, and Edinson Cavani couldn’t get into the game. Milan were below par in the first half, but stepped it up in the second and never looked likely to give up the lead once Zlatan Ibrahimovic scored a penalty in the 48th minute.
那不勒斯整场比赛表现糟糕。他们的传球很草率,中场中路缺乏驱动里或创造力,而且埃丹松卡瓦尼迟迟不能进入比赛状态。米兰上半场没有破门,但在下半场加强了攻势,当伊布在第 48 分钟点球命中后,米兰领先优势则一发不可收拾。


Formations
The initial tactical match-up was interesting. As usual, Napoli used 3-4-2-1 as their ‘base’ formation, but varied it slightly to suit the opponents. Today, this meant that Walter Gargano was used higher up the pitch than usual, and Napoli often looked like a 3-3-3-1. Michele Pazienza played to the right and picked up Robinho, whilst Gargano tried to put pressure upon Milan’s three deep central midfielders.
For their part, Milan’s system was a cross between a 4-3-1-2 and a 4-3-3. Ibrahimovic was central but Pato started from the right, looking to come inside. Robinho drifted between a trequartista position and a leftish role – he would have preferred to remain central, but Pazienza’s presence made him look wide for space.

Napoli waste possession
Napoli did have the right idea from the start – they tried to switch play from flank to flank, hoping to use the pace of their wing-backs, and exploit Milan at full-back, as Spurs did so well recently. The moves broke down from the very beginning, however – a Napoli free-kick in midfield resulted in the concession of possession when they tried to play a crossfield ball, and Milan suddenly stormed forward. That set the tone for the match.
Napoli often looked down their right when they got the ball – Milan were weaker on that side of the pitch with Robinho inside, and Jankulovski was seen as the weak link at left-back. The Czech did well when called upon, however, and with Napoli having little joy down the flanks, they looked unable to create chances. In the centre, they were outnumbered as Milan’s three central midfielders sat deep without the ball, and Rino Gattuso and Matthieu Flamini should be commended for excellent, energetic performances – they shut down the wing-backs but also got back into position quickly when the ball was on the opposite flank.
Milan dominated possession (partly because of the numerical advantage in the centre, partly because Napoli have the ball to them so readily) but created little in the final third. Neither Pato nor Robinho’s attempted tricks came off, and the full-backs were reasonably conservative.

Second half
With that lack of creativity, it was rather fitting that Milan’s opener came from the penalty spot, rather than open play. Again, Napoli handed the chance to Milan – literally this time, as Salvatore Aronica needlessly used his arm when challenging Pato on the byline. Ibrahimovic thumped it home.
Napoli then spent ten minutes doing nothing when out of possession. Their natural game is to sit back, soak up pressure and sometimes switch to a 5-4-1 – but when behind, Milan simply kept the ball and didn’t commit themselves. It took a while before Napoli realised they had to try and close down, and press higher up the pitch – but it didn’t come naturally to them, and Milan passed around them in the centre of midfield.

Milan extend advantage
It became clear that Napoli didn’t really have a plan B – Juan Zuniga replaced Mascara and provided energy, but the shape was still the same. The away side couldn’t get the ball forward to Cavani, the dangerman, and it was also apparent that they lacked Lavezzi’s ability to stretch the play – in that respect, the wide forward does a similar job to Theo Walcott for Arsenal: even when he’s not playing well himself, he opens up spaces in the opposition for his teammates to work in.
Allegri took off Robinho and brought on Kevin-Prince Boateng, who provided drive from midfield – summed up by his late run for the second goal. Napoli then pushed forward more, but Pato got a third on the counter. Allegri replaced both his full-backs with fitness levels in mind, but Napoli were never a threat. Paolo Cannavaro’s header that dropped wide was their only meaningful attempt in the game.

Conclusion
Rarely can the concept of ‘big game experience’ have been such an obvious difference between two sides in a match. Milan’s veterans were up to the challenge, Napoli’s players simply looked nervous – nothing else can explain their poor use of the ball.
Napoli’s form this season against the other sides in the top 5 (Udinese, Lazio, Milan, Inter) is played five, lost five – you can’t challenge for the title with a record like that.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

35#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-1 12:59:23 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-1 13:04 编辑

那不勒斯客场0-3输给米兰,是不是欧联杯的失利还没缓过神来?

拉维奇停赛,以及范博梅尔出战,对双方进攻或者防守,都有很大影响呢?

这场比赛,伊布和帕托搭档,以及与罗比尼奥(后被博阿滕替换),组成前场三叉戟,看来是米兰后半程发力取胜的关键呢?

因为进球分别是伊布(点球)、博阿滕和帕托

当然扬库洛夫斯基出战也令人惊奇,那个点球赢得就是他禁区抢点施压造成的
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

36#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-2 12:52:57 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-2 12:55 编辑

蓝军攻势很猛,射门20比8,射正7比2

另外,红魔显然受了情绪影响,虽然吃亏很多

对于领先心里上准备不足?还是被逼扳平时受了刺激?

其实上半场红魔进球后不久,蓝军就有机会扳平的
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

37#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 11:20:32 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-3 11:35 编辑

Valencia 0-1 Barcelona: both sides try different systems, but both switch back to the usual
March 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

Lionel Messi had an off-day…and yet still scored the winner as Barcelona temporarily move ten points clear at the top.
Unai Emery had been trying Juan Mata as a number nine all week in training, and used him that position here, as Valencia went into the the game with no real striker. There was a reshuffle at the back, and two full-backs were used in tandem down the left flank.
Pep Guardiola left out Pedro from his starting XI. The shape wasn’t clear until the game actually started, but it turned out that Sergio Busquets was playing as an extra centre-back in a back three.
The first half was a bit  like Barcelona’s recent defeat at the Emirates. Their opponents seemed to be coping very well, and yet Barcelona still managed to manufacture chances – here, Lionel Messi missed two one-on-ones. As such, it’s difficult to say which manager had the upper hand, but for the third consecutive game between these two sides, it was an intriguing tactical battle.

Valencia formation
The headline here is perhaps slightly misleading, for Valencia’s basic shape was the same as usual, a 4-2-3-1. However, one cannot overlook the fact that Mata is a completely different type of player to Roberto Soldado, the man who usually plays upfront. Soldado is a classic central striker: strong, good in the air and a lethal finisher. Mata is very much a number ten, someone who plays between the lines and creates chances for others, and therefore whilst the formation was the same, the system was different.
Mata came short and linked play, but with Barcelona playing three at the back, they were relatively untroubled by Mata’s movement towards the ball – one defender could come out from the backline (Busquets, Gerard Pique and Eric Abidal are all happy to step up), and no notable space would be created.

Barcelona formation
Barcelona’s formation was a clear departure from their usual 4-3-3. Sergio Busquets played at centre-back, something he’s done before to good effect before. This was slightly different, though – previously he’s played as part of a back four, where nothing changes tactically, or as part of a 3-4-3 (for example, against Atletico). Since Barca often move to that system in games when they play a 4-3-3 anyway, with Busquets dropping in and the wing-backs moving on, that’s also a relatively comfortable shift.
In this game, Guardiola decided to use Javier Mascherano ahead of the back four, and omitted Pedro. This meant that Barcelona played with just a front two, which not only limited their attacking options, it also changed how the wing-backs operated compared to the 3-4-3. Against Atletico, Dani Alves and Maxwell caused such damage because Barcelona’s front three narrowed, in turn forcing the opposition back four to narrow, and opened up space on the flanks. From there, Alves and Maxwell could get forward unchecked – or they’d force the opposition wide players to move into a back six.

Battlegrounds
That happened here a couple of times early on – before Valencia realised that, up against a front two, they didn’t need to be so easily manipulated. Their centre-backs dealt with Messi and David Villa, whilst the full-backs were relatively free. They defended in lopsided way, however – with two left-backs down the left (the same tactic Emery used with some success at the Nou Camp), Jeremy Mathieu dropped in and picked up Alves, with Jordi Alba moving narrow. This meant that when Barca’s wing-backs got forward, Valencia were defending 5 v 4 – far better than 4 v 4 or 6 v 4, as they had a spare man at the back, whilst being able to compete in midfield.
The opposite side was their biggest worry. With Pablo Hernandez not tracking back nearly as much as Mathieu, and coming inside to join the attack (possibly trying to exploit any space created by Mata’s runs), Adriano had a lot of freedom down the left. Time and time again, Barca got the ball out to him 1 v 1 against Marius Stankevicius in the first half, but he couldn’t take advantage of the time and space. It might have been worth Barca playing someone else to the left of the pitch – Villa, Andres Iniesta or Abidal – to help out, and even if that dragged another Valencia player over to that side, it could have created space in the centre, where Iniesta and Xavi Hernandez were both quiet.
Aside from formations and positioning, the game was played at a quick tempo, with both sides pressing and subsequently using high lines. The game was essentially one huge midfield battle, and it seemed a goal would come as soon as one side exploited the other’s high line. The best chances came this way – Messi’s early miss, and Alba’s ‘goal’ that was disallowed for a narrow offside decision. From Barcelona’s point of view, the use of a (narrow) front two effectively restricted them to creating chances that way, especially with Alves tracked on the right and Adriano’s lack of a final ball from the left.

Second half
The line-ups after Barcelona's formation change on 63 minutes

Emery decided to change things at half time. He removed Joaquin (who had been playing, unusually, in the centre behind a main forward (another ‘central winger’)) and brought on Soldado, with Mata dropping into his number ten role. That was an admission that Valencia’s strategy hadn’t really worked upfront – Mata wasn’t creating space or causing the Barcelona centre-backs many problems.
The game continued in vaguely the same pattern, though with Soldado on, Valencia were more of a goal threat. A couple of decent chances came and went, with the Valencia full-backs supporting the attack well.

Barca change shape
That threat from full-back (as well as the obvious desire for more attacking threat at 0-0) prompted Guardiola to turn to the bench, and Pedro. He replaced Mascherano, and Barca moved back to their usual 4-3-3, with Messi in the centre deeper than Villa and Pedro on the flanks.
Barcelona looked much more comfortable with this shape – they had 2 v 1 rather than 3 v 1 at the back, they weren’t subject to being outnumbered 2 v 1 down the flanks, and they played with more natural width upfront, which is such a crucial part of their game. It also meant the sides were more naturally ‘matched’ in individual battles across the pitch, which made Barcelona’s pressing easier and more effective.

Goal
Crucially, the two players who had moved backwards, Alves and Adriano, remained an attacking threat. Alves continued to be tracked by Mathieu, but Adriano still had that freedom down the left, and finally produced a good ball for Messi, who squeezed a shot in on 77 minutes.
Emery threw on all the attacking players he could find for the final ten minutes, but Guardiola introduced Maxwell and Seydou Keita to keep things tight, and Barcelona were comfortable at 0-1.

Conclusion
A fascinating tactical contest, though it’s fair to say that neither side’s initial shape worked particularly well for them. Valencia’s false nine didn’t do much against a back three (which in itself is an interesting development) whilst Barca lacked width.
By the very nature of the result, it must be said that Guardiola’s tactical shift worked better. The real debate is whether it was a great move to start off with the 3-5-2 and move to the 4-3-3, or whether he simply should have gone with the 4-3-3 from the outset.
A final point – Barcelona had “only” 61% of possession in this game, their joint lowest figure of the season – the other game was also against Valencia. That suggests Emery’s tactics coped well in midfield (certainly, Xavi and Iniesta weren’t very prominent), but is also an indication that Valencia have good ball-playing midfielders, and a reflection on the fact that their full-backs were often ‘free’ until Barcelona made the tactical change.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

38#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 11:33:11 | 显示全部楼层
不知道这场球蒂诺和巴内加的表现怎么样
北极海 发表于 2011-3-3 11:24


基本算看了下半场,上半场俺是迷迷糊糊的,没怎么看

但下半场也有点眯眯瞪瞪

感觉双方都在高速攻防转换中,即使加时阶段,

巴萨进球后也没有过去的那种后场过多倒球的表演,就是前阵子客战枪手那种

有一个镜头,是梅西进球后不久吧,蒂诺还与梅西在禁区附近因摩擦发生口角,可见紧张程度
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

39#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 12:03:47 | 显示全部楼层
90哥一定要注意身体,欧战快接近白热化程度了,后续重量级的比赛不断

体能要跟上,劳逸结合
北极海 发表于 2011-3-3 12:02


多谢了

五点钟看球,是有点迷糊
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

40#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-3 18:36:21 | 显示全部楼层
63楼参考译文
------------------------
瓦伦西亚0-1巴塞罗那战术分析:瓜秃爱美丽,变阵大斗法  
由 rhapsodia 发表在GoalHi足球·西甲专区 http://bbs.goalhi.com/xijia



梅西今天状态不佳……但仍然踢进了制胜一球,巴塞罗那现在暂时以10分的优势高居榜首。

埃梅里整个星期的训练里都在尝试把马塔用作9号,本场比赛也正是把他放在了这个位置上,而瓦伦西亚的先发阵容里没有实际意义上的中锋。后防线也进行重组,两名边后卫一前一后出现在左边路。

瓜迪奥拉把佩德罗拿出了放在板凳上。直到比赛真开始了,阵型才显得清晰起来,布斯克茨成为三后卫里居中的一个。

上半场有点像巴塞罗那近来败走酋长球场的那场。他们的对手看起来应对得相当好,不过巴塞罗那还是制造出了机会——梅西错失了两次单刀的机会。不过,还是很难说哪一边的教练占了上风,尽管两队近来已是三次交手,这场比赛仍是一场难以捉摸的战术对决。

瓦伦西亚的阵型

题目或许有点误导作用,因为瓦伦西亚的基本阵型还是一贯的4-2-3-1。不过,无法忽视的事实是,马塔与通常出任中锋的索尔达多是完全不同类型的球员。索尔达多是典型的中锋:强壮,制空力强,临门一脚好。马塔很大程度是个10号,在前锋和中场两线之间活动,为他人创造机会,因而尽管阵型一样,打法不同。

马塔回收起连接作用,但在巴塞罗那起用三中卫的情况下,马塔的接应相对而言没起到太大作用——一名后卫可以从后卫线上压出来(布斯克茨、皮克和阿比达尔都乐于这么做),也没留下太多的空间。

巴塞罗那的阵型

巴塞罗那的阵型与他们通常的4-3-3明显不同。布斯克茨出现在中后卫位置上,之前他踢这个位置收到了不错的效果。不过这次稍有不同——之前他是作为四后卫体系的补充,战术上没有什么改变;或者是3-4-3的一部分(比如对阵马德里竞技的比赛):巴萨踢4-3-3的时候也常切换到这种打法,布斯克茨后撤而两名翼卫压上,他们相对而言也比较适应这种切换。

瓜迪奥拉决定在这场比赛起用马斯切拉诺出任后腰,拿掉了佩德罗。这意味着巴塞罗那只有两个前锋,不但限制了进攻时的选择,也改变了翼卫的运作方式,与3-4-3时相当不同。对阵马德里竞技时,阿尔维斯和麦克斯维尔能制造杀伤是因为巴塞罗那前场三箭齐发,迫使对方四名后卫往中间收缩,而在边路留出了空间。于是,阿尔维斯和麦克斯维尔就能不受阻碍地向前推进——或者他们迫使对方两名边路球员退防到后卫线,形成六后卫。

战场

这种情形在比赛初期发生了几次——之后瓦伦西亚队意识到,面对双前锋他们无需如此轻易地被人操控。他们的两名中后卫对付梅西和比利亚,而边后卫可以相对自由地活动。不过他们防守用的是一种不对称的方式——两名左后卫镇守左路(埃梅里做客诺坎普时采取了相同策略并获得了一定成功),马蒂厄盯防阿尔维斯,阿尔巴则往里靠。这意味着当巴萨的边后卫压上时,瓦伦西亚防守是5打4——比4打4或6打4要好得多,因为这样他们在后方有一个人可以空出来,此外在中场也有竞争力。

另外一边则是他们的最大隐患。由于埃尔南德斯不像马蒂厄一样经常回防,而是内收参与进攻(或许是尝试利用马塔扯动制造出的空间),阿德里亚诺在左路插上有很大的空间。上半场巴萨有好几次把球交给他,让他与斯坦科维休斯一对一,但他未能利用好时间和空间。或许巴萨值得一试的是让其他人到左路——比利亚、伊涅斯塔或阿比达尔——去协助进攻,就算这会把另一名瓦伦西亚的球员吸引到边路来,也能给中路创造出空间——中路的哈维和伊涅斯塔比较沉寂。

除了阵型和站位以外,比赛以高节奏进行,两边都采取压迫式打法,从而双方阵线都压得很靠上。比赛基本上是一场中场的大斗法,每当一方利用对方阵线压上发动攻势,进球似乎都要到来。最好的机会也是这么创造出来的:梅西在比赛早段错失单刀,阿尔巴的“进球”被判越位,也只有毫厘之差。从巴塞罗那方面来看,(站位靠近的)双前锋的使用事实上限制了他们利用这种方式创造机会,尤其是阿尔维斯在右路受到限制,而阿德里亚诺在左路又缺乏有效的出球。

下半场

埃梅里在半场休息时决定作出调整。他换下华金(他近来通常在中路,中锋身后活动,又一个“中路边锋”)换上索尔达多,马塔回收到他10号的位置上。这等于承认了瓦伦西亚在前场的策略并未真正奏效——马塔没有创造出空间,或者给巴塞罗那的中后卫们制造很多麻烦。

虽然索尔达多上场了,比赛差不多以一种相同的模式进行,瓦伦西亚对对方球门的威胁更大了。在瓦伦西亚两名边后卫对进攻的有力支援之下,几次不错的机会被创造出来了,但都没有把握住。



巴萨变阵

边后卫的威胁(以及0-0之下明显要求更多进攻的欲望)促使瓜迪奥拉作出人员调动,派上了佩德罗。他替下马斯切拉诺,巴萨回到他们惯常的4-3-3阵型,梅西在中间偏后,比利亚和佩德罗在两边。

巴塞罗那看上去踢这种阵型要舒服得多——他们在后场是2打1而不是3打1,在边路也不会陷入1打2的人数劣势,而这是他们比赛的关键环节。这也同样意味着两队在场地上的人员会更自然地形成对位的局势,使得巴塞罗那的压迫更容易也更有效。

进球

关键的是,两位后移的球员,阿尔维斯和阿德里亚诺,仍保持了攻击威胁。阿尔维斯继续受到马蒂厄盯防,但阿德里亚诺依旧有在左路插上的自由,最终在77分钟给梅西传了个好球,后者破门得分。

埃梅里在最后十分钟里排出了所有他能找出来的进攻球员,但瓜迪奥拉换上了麦克斯维尔和凯塔收紧防线,巴塞罗那也乐于接受1-0的结果。

结论

一场精彩的战术对决,虽然公平来说,双方的先发阵型都不是特别奏效。瓦伦西亚的伪9号在对方三后卫面前并没有太多作为(本身而言是个有趣的进展),尽管巴萨亦因此在边路缺少活力。

就结果的本质而言,必须说瓜迪奥拉的战术变动更加奏效。真正值得讨论的是,先发用3-5-2然后转到4-3-3是否明智,还是从一开始就该用4-3-3。

最后一点——巴塞罗那本场的控球率“仅仅”有61%,他们本赛季以来的最低记录——另一场低控球率的比赛也是对阵瓦伦西亚。这表明埃梅里的战术在中场所起的效果不错(当然,哈维和伊涅斯塔的表现不是很突出),但也表明瓦伦西亚有不错的控球型中场,同时反映出的一个事实是,他们的边后卫通常是“自由”的,直到巴塞罗那作出战术调整。
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

41#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-6 16:34:23 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-6 16:36 编辑

Juventus 0-1 Milan: leaders win poor game
March 5, 2011

The starting line-ups

Rino Gattuso’s scrappy goal settled a game lacking in creativity.
Gigi Delneri made various changes, with Gianluigi Buffon, Armand Traore, Luca Toni and Frederik Sorensen all coming into the side, in the usual 4-4-2.
Max Allegri was without Pato, so Antonio Cassano started alongside Zlatan Ibrahimovic, with Kevin-Prince Boateng just behind.
Many big Serie A games this season have been underwhelming because they’ve been slow, cagey and defensive. The surprise here was that the match was quite open from the start – but that didn’t translate into an entertaining contest. Neither side played good football in the final third, and the messy nature of the winning goal summed up the match.

Melo on Boateng
Milan had their usual problem – evident recently against Tottenham – when their trequartista is marked out of the game, they struggle to get the ball forward to their strikers and therefore become a broken team. Boateng has generally played very well for Milan since joining them last summer, but Felipe Melo did a good job on him (Melo seems to be at his best when tracking a specific man – he did a similarly good job on Wesley Sneijder last month), and Milan were too slow in possession.
With Melo staying goalside of Boateng, Juve’s wide players had to come inside to help out Claudio Marchisio, for otherwise he would be subject to a 1 v 3 situation in the centre of the park against Milan’s three central midfielders. They generally did this quite well, though the knock-on effect was that the Milan full-backs were free to overlap.

Full-backs poor on ball
There was little technical quality from full-back, though, and what the game needed was some drive from that position, some purposeful running or a player willing to take on opponents. Neither of Milan’s pair did this, and Juventus’ weren’t much better (they also had no direct opponent when in possession) – Sorensen was often having to keep an eye on Cassano, who moved out to his side, whilst Traore got forward but his final ball was generally poor. Luca Toni and Alessandro Matri did little of note, but then they had no service. Playing those two in a 4-4-2 and then failing to cross accurately is a disaster.
Milos Krasic was Juventus’ most promising attacking player, but Milan were very quick to get bodies around him, and often crowded him out when in possession. Mark van Bommel did his usual job of breaking up play ahead of his own defence – committing an amazing number of fouls and stopping quick Juve breaks.
At the other end, it was notable how tightly Juventus’ defenders stuck to the Milan strikers – tracking them all over the pitch. Giorgio Chiellini on Ibrahimovic was the most obvious case here, and it’s likely he felt able to do this because (with Melo tracking Boateng), there were no midfield runners looking to exploit that space.

Second half
The only change for the start of the second half was Boateng off and Robinho on, which created a more fluid front three for Milan, with Robinho playing high up the pitch in close contact with the front two.
The second period was no improvement on the first, though there was least a goal. It came from an unlikely source – Gattuso – and the surprise element probably caught Juventus out – especially as the centre-backs had been so willing to vacate their natural position in the first half. Buffon still should have done better with the shot, though.
Substitutions barely affected the game – Alessandro del Piero and Vincenzo Iaquinta came on, but Milan retained possession well – van Bommel was important here, often free in the centre of the pitch – and they saw the game out.

Conclusion
Both sides were extremely disappointing. Both had numerical advantages in different areas of the pitch, but neither side could take advantage of these situations enough to consistently offer a goalscoring threat. In particular, the full-backs offered little going forward, and the quality of those four players is simply extremely poor for a game of his magnitude.
Juve have now lost three league games in a row, and haven’t scored in any of them – has Delneri’s 4-4-2 has become too predictable and too easy to play against? It’s notable that Juventus have only scored more than two goals in a game once in 2011, and that was the only game they’ve started with a significantly different shape – a 4-1-4-1 against Cagliari.
That’s a very basic analysis and Juventus’ problems are more complex than that, but having lost seven of their last 11, it is ‘back to basics’ time.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

42#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-6 16:35:37 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-6 16:38 编辑

Man City 1-0 Wigan: City start strongly, but half-time change in mentality nearly costs them
March 5, 2011

The starting line-ups (Silva and Balotelli switched throughout)

David Silva scored the only goal of the game in a slow contest.

Roberto Mancini left Edin Dzeko on the bench. Nigel de Jong was also a substitute, so Patrick Vieira played in midfield, whilst Pablo Zabaleta started rather than Aleksandar Kolarov at left-back.
Roberto Martinez left out Charles N’Zogbia, playing Tom Cleverley on the left, and Victor Moses on the right. Adrian Lopez replaced Steve Gohouri at right-back.
The first half was strange – City dominated and should have been more than one goal up by half-time – and yet they relied on a terrible error from Ali Al-Habsi for their goal. Wigan were content to sit back and play on the break, which they did reasonably well, but were often let down by one of their front four making the wrong decision with the ball.

City tactics
City were an attack-minded 4-2-3-1, with Yaya Toure the closest support to Carlos Tevez for most of the game. In theory, the two wide players dropped back into midfield to form two banks of four when Wigan attacked, but because the away side only did so on the counter, it was rare that City actually had to take up that defensive shape.
Instead, the two City wide players were free to take up attacking positions for most of the game – although neither stayed on the flanks. They both drifted inside and frequently swapped positions – both seemed to prefer playing on the left, up against Lopez, who also made a mistake for the goal. Mario Balotelli caused early problems with a shot very similar to his recent goal against Fulham, whilst David Silva started from a narrow position and looked to work one-twos with the other City players, frequently finding himself in goalscoring positions, but only occasionally shooting.

Lack of fluency
On twelve minutes (12:44, to be precise) – five seconds of football summed up why City aren’t cohesive in their system yet. Tevez dropped deeper than the attacking band of three to pick up the ball, but then when he looked for one of them to make a forward run, all three moved towards the ball in unison. That epitomises why City often dominate games but score fewer goals than that dominance would indicate – they need more drive from midfield runners, especially if they have a false nine able to create space in the opposition defence.
Mancini may have regretted playing Zabaleta at left-back in the first half, because City needed their full-backs stretching the play and expanding the active playing zone when they had long spells of possession. Zabaleta is a good player but his speciality is not getting down the touchline, especially when used on the left. Still, despite that problem, City managed to create chances.
Wigan also created chances on the break in the first half. With Silva and Balotelli slow to get behind the ball, often City defended with only six players, which left them vulnerable to cut backs from wide positions, and players arriving late in the box. City also committed a high number of fouls when Wigan looked to get the ball forward quickly, which resulted in bookings for Micah Richards and Gareth Barry. Other than that, the midfield battle was fairly tame.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Second half
The game changed completely at the start of the second half. Mancini instructed Yaya Toure to move from an attacking midfield position to a holding role alongside Patrick Vieira – similar to the change in position Toure made at half-time in the 0-0 draw away at Arsenal. City were much more cautious in the second half, and as a result had to endure long spells of Wigan pressure – unthinkable in the first period.
Wigan were more attacking. There was more emphasis upon ball retention rather than playing merely on the counter-attack, although obviously this was also a reaction to City’s strategy. As a result, they got more men forward – particularly the full-backs, and had a couple of good efforts on goal.

Changes
Mancini again changed his system when City looked rocky, reverting to the system with Toure just off Tevez in a 4-2-3-1. City couldn’t completely snap out of the more defensive mindset, however. In general this season, they’ve been able to switch to a deeper approach midway through the game, but have struggled when asked to move up the pitch in order to be more offensive.
N’Zogbia was introduced down the right for Wigan and was an immediate threat, so Mancini brought on Kolarov for Balotelli, to sit ahead of Zabaleta.
The final twenty minutes of the game lacked any urgency or creativity, with so many substitutions (and changes in strategy) killing momentum. City seemed to have brought the game to a close when they brought on de Jong for Silva and packed the midfield – but Wigan did have late chances, and will feel they should have picked up a point.

Conclusion
In basic terms, job done for Manchester City – but they laboured to victory having started positively. Mancini was too cautious after half time and invited pressure unnecessarily. They won a very high percentage of their duels throughout the match, though:

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

If this game was at the beginning of the season, Martinez would have been pleased with the performance – but the time has come where Wigan need to be picking up points. They may have been outplayed for much of the game, but they should have scored at least once, and they goal they conceded was a horrendous goalscoring mistake.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

43#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-7 12:10:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-7 12:11 编辑

Liverpool 3-1 Manchester United: Kuyt x 3
March 6, 2011

The starting line-ups

Dirk Kuyt scored all three goals in a comfortable victory for Liverpool.
Andy Carroll was fit enough only for the bench, so Kuyt and Luis Suarez played upfront. Daniel Agger was out, and Kenny Dalglish moved to four at the back, after last weekend’s poor performance with a back three at West Ham.
Sir Alex Ferguson surprisingly named a 4-4-2 shape. Darren Fletcher dropped to the bench, Ryan Giggs came in and Nani switched flanks. Wes Brown replaced the suspended Nemanja Vidic.
Dirk Kuyt’s goals may have been remarkably simple, but he fully deserved to be the hero because of his excellent all-round display that was the main reason Liverpool played so well.

Early exchanges
Liverpool started much better – their movement was fantastic, their passing was slick. Steven Gerrard played a reserved role in the central midfield zone, just ahead of Lucas, but the four players ahead of those two had the license to move around the pitch, rotating positions and constantly catching United’s defence out.
Kuyt was the man who instigated many of these good moves with his movement to the flanks. His discipline and ability to ‘play a position well’ have been most obvious when playing out on the right in a Liverpool shirt, but since Kenny Dalglish took charge in January, Kuyt’s lone striker performances have been very good – at home to Stoke and away at Chelsea he was also one of the key players.

Kuyt opens up space
United’s two centre-backs – particularly Chris Smalling – were too keen to track Kuyt into deep positions, which opened up space at the heart of the defence. This space was exploited by plenty of runners – most notably Suarez, who played in the hole and ran directly towards goal, but also Raul Meireles from the right, who cut in and found himself in centre-forward positions.
At one point Smalling was seen encouraging his defence to move higher up the pitch, but United’s high line actually made them more vulnerable to the combination of Kuyt’s movement and runners from midfield. Ferguson famously got the better of Roma’s revolutionary 4-6-0 (with Francesco Totti pioneering the false nine role) by using his defence very deep – that might’ve been the answer here, with Kuyt dragging the defenders all over the pitch. His movement was usually towards the flanks:

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

Midfield battle
United weren’t set up to cope with midfield runners. The combination of Michael Carrick and Paul Scholes has rarely been used this season – having been exposed to Chelsea’s power in the second half in midweek, here they lacked energy. Darren Fletcher was on the bench having been used on the right at Stamford Bridge – there are still questions over whether he can do two ‘big’ matches in a short space of time given the energetic nature of his game, but he might have been useful here.
Indeed, United’s shape didn’t work as a whole. With Suarez playing in a deep role, Liverpool found it too easy to manoeuvre the ball through midfield towards their forwards. When Scholes and Carrick dropped deeper, they opened up space for Lucas and Gerrard. Until this week, Ferguson has been extremely committed to using 4-5-1 in ‘big’ games – it’s surprising that he has used 4-4-2 in two of his toughest away fixtures of the season.

United flat
United had much less movement from their forward four. Nani and Ryan Giggs often stayed wide and didn’t combine with the front two, though when they came inside, they were dealt with by Gerrard and Lucas. That opened up space for Carrick and Scholes – but their natural inclination is to hit balls to the flanks, which were now deserted. It was difficult to know how United should have gone about improving their game – more movement from the strikers would have been a start, but overall Liverpool coped well with everything United had to offer.
Individual battles were less important than the contrasting quality of movement and interplay. Meireles against Evra was an interesting duel, however – the Portuguese midfielder isn’t at his best out on that flank, but twice this season he’s subdued Evra and prevented him from overlapping and stretching the play.

Changes
Liverpool dealt admirably with the injury to Fabio Aurelio, which resulted in a complete reshuffle of their back four.
United were forced to bring on Javier Hernandez because of Nani’s injury, meaning Giggs went to the right and Rooney came to the left. Both those players wanted to come inside – Glen Johnson, now at left-back, was happy with Giggs coming onto his stronger foot, but Jamie Carragher, now at right-back, showed Rooney inside for shots too often.

Second half
Hernandez threatened with his movement inside the box – his outpaced Sotirios Kyrgiakos to a cross having pulled wide in opening minutes of the second half, and popped up for a late consolation goal. United had a decent spell just after half time, but in truth they were poor for much of the game – lacking creativity and confidence.
Liverpool sat back in two banks of four and soaked up pressure. That’s something they’ve done well all season – even when they were playing badly under Hodgson, a good defensive performance earned them a deserved win over Chelsea, and another should have resulted in a win on the opening day against Arsenal. They remain well-drilled when penned into their own third, and their biggest worry was how many free-kicks they conceded in and around the box. Liverpool’s tackling in their own half was actually quite poor – see Lucas’ tackling chalkboard below – but their defensive shape was excellent.

<flash> by Guardian Chalkboards

After Kuyt’s third goal, the game was essentially over, and the subsequent substitutions had little impact.

Conclusion
Better movement and interplay from Liverpool’s front players was the key here. Kuyt v Berbatov was an interesting comparison – and not just in terms of work rate. Kuyt’s pure energy was combined with intelligent movement to provide a better focal point for Liverpool’s attacks. The goals may have simple, but the Dutchman’s all-round performance was superb.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

44#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-9 21:25:08 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-9 21:33 编辑

Barcelona v Arsenal: tactical preview
March 8, 2011


Possible starting line-ups

In terms of injuries, this is a strangely similar situation to the second leg at the Nou Camp last year.

Barcelona went into that game with Gerard Pique and Carles Puyol unavailable (the same as today) – whilst Arsenal were without Alex Song, and had various attacking players out injured, or half-fit. The surprise inclusion of Robin van Persie in the travelling squad, and the likelihood that Cesc Fabregas will start after a recovering from a short injury means the similarity may apply slightly less to Arsenal. They are in a stronger position than last year.
That also applies to the tie as whole, of course. Arsenal went to the Nou Camp needing to score last year – here they would be content with a 0-0. Not that anyone expects that scoreline, though, and even Arsene Wenger said yesterday that “It is a little bit of an illusion to go to Barcelona and think they will not score at all.” Arsenal will need goals.
With so many injuries, the tactical element of the build-up is dictated by replacements and how that will affect the sides’ way of playing.

Barcelona selection
The absence of both Barcelona’s first-choice centre-backs means a mini-crisis for Pep Guardiola. Last year’s combination at the back was Rafael Marquez and Gabriel Milito, but today he looks set to turn to Eric Abidal and Sergio Busuqets. Abidal has been excellent in recent weeks in Puyol’s absence, and with Arsenal missing Theo Walcott, Guardiola won’t be as worried about not having Abidal’s pace at left-back (although, in fairness, Maxwell did well in the first leg).
Busquets has filled in admirably at the back when called upon in the past few months. Often this has been as part of a back three – see last week’s win over Valencia – but he can also play in the centre of the back four. In fact, if Arsenal start van Persie, Busquets might be the perfect man to deal with him. The Dutchman will look to wander into deep positions, and Busquets will happily track him into his more natural deep midfield position. The pace of Abidal would deal with onrushing Arsenal midfielders.
Perhaps the more crucial effect is that Javier Mascherano will start as the holding midfielder. Having looked completely unsuited to Barca’s football at the start of the season, the ex-Liverpool player has played well in recent weeks. He will have a big job here – he must break up counter-attacks without picking up a booking (that completely destroys his game) and his distribution must be tidy. Busquets may step out from the back to provide a better passing option from midfield.

Arsenal selection
The absence of Alex Song – and Wenger’s statement that he won’t use Jack Wilshere as the deepest midfielder – means a choice between Abou Diaby and Denilson. Diaby would bring physicality, but his understanding with Wilshere is highly questionable. Denilson played well against Barcelona last year – his introduction in the first leg last year really helped Arsenal because he was able to retain possession – and this might be the right kind of game for him.
Fabregas looks likely to start, but van Persie is more doubtful. The choice to replace him would be between Marouane Chamakh and Nicklas Bendtner. Chamakh started the season well but has suffered from a severe loss of confidence recently – something that Bendtner is unlikely to encounter – and the Dane did fairly well at the Nou Camp last year, opening the scoring and leading the line well. He seems a more likely bet.
Unusually for Wenger, his choice of wide players may be heavily dictated by Barcelona’s full-backs. Samir Nasri did a superb job against Dani Alves in the first game – that was emphasised by the fact that when Arshavin came on and played on the left (with Nasri moving inside) Alves was suddenly much more of a force, and Arshavin’s defensive clumsiness resulted in him handballing inside the penalty area when trying to track the Brazilian. Therefore, Nasri is probably the man to start on the left.
Arshavin is very rarely deployed on the right – but in last year’s first leg at the Emirates he was, in order for Arsenal to use his technical ability without exposing him to Alves. Arsenal might be better off with Eboue on the right, however – he provides energy and pace on the break, as well as more defensive discipline.

Strategy
The tactical factors for the game are almost entirely the same as outlined in the preview for the first leg of this tie. How high Arsenal defend is a crucial factor – the high line worked well in the first game, despite conceding a couple of chances to Barcelona through runs in behind the defence. It wouldn’t be a surprise to see Arsenal defend slightly deeper, and again selection and fitness will be an issue – if Arsenal are nursing half-fit players, they won’t be able to press relentlessly.

Arsenal learnt their first leg lesson – how to press – their second leg task is how to stop Lionel Messi. The truth is that it’s impossible to stop him completely, but Arsenal played into his hands last year with their 4-3-3 system – Messi simply drifted from side to side to evade Denilson, and constantly found space.
In that review, ZM noted that a 4-2-3-1 shape would have helped Arsenal – “But the real issue must be Wenger’s decision to play a 4-1-4-1 shape, with Denilson stranded in front of the defence…with Diaby pushed forward alongside Nasri, Arsenal’s defence was left exposed. Diaby’s natural game is not as a holding midfielder, but if he had played there in a 4-2-3-1 Arsenal would have been tighter in front of their defence, and given less space to Barcelona where they really like to play.”

Arsenal using a 4-2-3-1 this season means that they’re already in a better position to stop Messi.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

45#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-9 21:30:18 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-9 21:32 编辑

Barcelona 3-1 Arsenal: Barca press and progress
March 9, 2011

The starting line-ups

Arsenal didn’t manage a single shot, as Barcelona go through to the quarter-finals.
Pep Guardiola chose Eric Abidal and Sergio Busquets at centre-back, as expected, though there was a surprise at left-back, where Adriano started over Maxwell.
Both Cesc Fabregas and Robin van Persie were fit to start. Arsene Wenger decided to play Tomas Rosicky on the right, and Abou Diaby got the nod over Denilson.
The game was very strange – neither side played as well as they can. Arsenal could barely string more than four passes together, and whilst Barcelona dominated the game, they were tremendously wasteful when they got into the penalty area.
Despite appearing extremely comfortable in the final ten minutes, Barca were somehow only a Nicklas Bendtner shot away from being dumped out, in what would have been one of the unlikeliest progressions in European Cup history.

Arsenal stand off
Arsenal played very differently without the ball, compared to the first leg. In London they pressed relentlessly at the start of the game, but here they stood off more, and focused on getting into a good shape.
The fitness of van Persie an Fabregas may have contributed to this tactic (Fabregas, in particular, was clearly not fully fit) – but Wenger probably also accepted that it’s not possible to press for 90 minutes away at the Nou Camp, and so Arsenal stood off.

Barcelona strategy
Barcelona’s tactics were not markedly different from their standard approach. The full-backs hugged the touchlines and were very advanced – often pushing Rosicky and Samir Nasri back into a back six – and the three forwards took it in turns to come towards the ball and then spin in behind. Arsenal still defended relatively high, but they were deeper than at the Emirates, and therefore were less prone to the ball over the top.
Messi was a threat throughout, and often received the ball in space, but was guilty of trying to do too much – he overran the ball when entering the penalty area on more than one occasion. Take the Arsenal back four against the Barcelona front three, and Arsenal were doing OK – the problem came, of course, from the movement of Barcelona players from deeper positions. Daniel Alves played an especially advanced role and was always on for a diagonal pass when Xavi got the ball in central midfield.

Barca pressing

Barcelona's pressing meant they won the ball high up the pitch
(courtesy TotalFootball iPhone app)

The key feature of the game was something we all know Barcelona do well – pressing. Their energy and bravery in winning the ball back high up the pitch is now very well established, but tonight was a particularly good case study. The constant harrying meant that Arsenal were simply unable to work the ball up the pitch, and almost the entire game was spent in their own half of the pitch.

Fabregas’ backheel was a ludicrous decision, but Barca’s pressing can take some of the credit. Not just because there was a player closing down and intercepting at that moment, but because the pressure for 45 minutes had created the backheel. A backheel is something that you try on the edge of the opposition box, when you’re under pressure and need to do something ‘clever’ to get past an opponent. Fabregas is far from a stupid player, but Barcelona were pressuring so much that he felt he had to do something ‘clever’ merely to complete a pass on the edge of his own penalty area.

Second half
It’s not often a side scores a goal despite not having a shot in the entire match, but Busquets’ mistimed header from a corner gave Arsenal an unlikely lead in the tie. Three minutes later, the situation changed again with van Persie’s red card, and from then on, Arsenal could only dream of winning a corner kick.
The sending off alone can not explain the Barcelona victory (20 shots to none is a ridiculous statistic) but it’s fair to say Arsenal’s strategy was compromised. Having dominated the final twenty minutes of both first legs in the past year, Arsenal’s plan may have been to wait until the final quarter of the game and then push on, especially as Barcelona had pressed so much.

Arsenal clueless
Instead, they were barely able to play football. Sky Sports’ commentator Martin Tyler summed it up inadvertently when he suggested that when Manuel Almunia had the ball in his arms, he was attempting to kick the ball downfield at an angle, so there was a chance a Barcelona player would head it out for a throw. What a miserable state to be in – a side famed for their slick passing football reduced to trying to win a throw on the half way line from a goalkeeper’s clearance. The chalkboard on the left shows how few passes Arsenal played in attacking positions.


Arsenal's passing

Barcelona simply passed and passed and tired Arsenal. Xavi broke through for the second to round off a fantastic move, and Pedro won a penalty that Messi converted. Barcelona should have had more, but Almunia was making some good saves.

Changes
It was surprising that Wenger didn’t introduce Bendtner until the 77th minute – Arsenal clearly needed someone who could win the ball in the air from long balls, and also someone who could hold it up. The late chance was a bonus and came out of nothing, other than Wilshere’s determined closing down. He was Arsenal’s best player in each of the two legs.
Guardiola’s changes came after 80 minutes, and didn’t significantly alter the game.

Conclusion
Barcelona being good at pressing is hardly a revelation, and it hardly takes a genius to identify it as a crucial factor in this game – but it was the key feature. Arsenal couldn’t get the ball up the pitch, and Barcelona won possession in positions very close to the opposition goal.

Zero attempts on goal suggests that Arsenal ‘parked the bus’ – even Inter managed one shot in their semi-final last year – but they didn’t, they were simply unable to get past the first burst of closing down.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

46#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-11 03:17:01 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-11 03:19 编辑

Statistics: FC Barcelona 3 – 1 Arsenal FC
Posted at: 11:00 on Thursday, March 10, 2011 Category: Matches, Statistics Written by: Stevenson



Arsenal were overrun by a rampant FC Barcelona in the Camp Nou on Tuesday. The final 3-1 scoreline, frankly flattering to the London side, only tells part of the story of this match. The statistics available through Total Football paint another picture of the Barcelona’s dominance in this game. Read on for the gory details!

Overall passing

Simply put, Barcelona pressed and passed Arsenal out of this match; Guardiola’s post match comment about the Arsenal players’ inability to string together more than three passes was not far off the mark. Barcelona completed 792 out of 895 attempted passes, compared to 214 out of 307 for their opponents.





Barcelona dominates the midfield

In the first match in London, Barcelona’s midfield came up against spirited opposition from Fabragas and Wilshere. In this match, there was no competition. Xavi completed 121 out of 138 attempted asses, while Iniesta completed 97 out of 108. In contrast, Fabregas only attempted 31 passes in the entire match, completing 21 of them. Wilshere was only marginally better with 27 out of 34 passes completed.









A more direct attack

One of the criticisms levelled at the Barcelona attack in the first match was about the lack of incision in its attack. And while our MVP strike force may still lack the sharpness it had in October, the team in general was much more focused on penetrating the Arsenal area than it was two weeks ago. The slide below indicates the areas where Messi received passes, graphically showing how he played this match higher on the pitch.



The draw for the next round in this competition will be on Friday, March 18. Bring on the next opponent!

Read more: http://www.totalbarca.com/2011/matches/statistics-fc-barcelona-3-1-arsenal-fc/#ixzz1GE1qEYLi

评分

参与人数 1经验 +30 收起 理由
小豆丁梅西 + 30

查看全部评分

回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

47#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-12 23:33:10 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 Alex2011 于 2011-3-12 23:38 编辑

Schalke 3-1 Valencia: Schalke surprisingly go through after open second leg
March 10, 2011

The starting line-ups

Valencia had plenty of chances, but Schalke were more clinical.
Felix Magath made two changes from the first leg, both enforced. Sergio Escudero replaced the suspended Lukas Schmitz at left-back, whilst Mario Gavranovic came in for Klaas-Jan Huntelaar, who was out with a knee injury.
Having played a fluid system in the first leg that had no set shape, Unai Emery selected a standard 4-2-3-1 system here. The major news was that Artiz Aduriz started upfront, with Roberto Soldado on the bench.
Like all the second legs this week, this was a very open game – the tie was in the balance, but both wanted to attack.

Formations
Schalke went in with a system best defined as a 4-4-2, but there was a complex nature to the system when attacks developed. Jurado would immediately come in from the left and take up a central playmaking role, allowing Raul to move forward to become a second central striker. To solve the problem with width on the left, Peer Kluge would move towards that side of the pitch. On the other flank, Jefferson Farfan stayed much wider, and turned out to be the game’s key player.

Valencia played an attack-minded 4-2-3-1 system. They tended to press at times and sit back on other occasions – when they did defend aggressively, they often looked like 4-2-4. The wingers helped push back the Schalke defence, and Juan Mata often got a lot of space in between the lines – he played a couple of great passes.

Patterns of play
Schalke sent many crosses into the box - almost one every two minutes - mostly from the right

Partly because Valencia seemed to defend in different ways at different times, the game went through many phases. Schalke started well and focused on keeping possession of the ball in non-threatening areas before working it down the right – but then Valencia upped their game and dominated the rest of the first half. Valencia were obviously more comfortable on the ball in midfield, and when one of Schalke’s forwards was slow to get back into the midfield zone, Valencia took the most of their extra man in midfield.

There was a lack of creativity in open play, however. The goals came from set-pieces (Ricardo Costa stayed up in the area after a corner to head in, and Farfan curled in a free-kick). Jeremy Mathieu started brightly (as he had in the first game) but none of the full-backs had a consistent impact on the game.

Second half
Valencia should have scored numerous second half goals – Schalke tried to defend higher up the pitch, but Aduriz got chances on the break from balls over the top. His finishing was poor.
At the other end, having spent the game chucking crosses into the box from the right, Schalke went ahead with a scrappy goal after ball from the left. Vicente Guaita flapped at the cross, Gavranovic squeezed the ball in. Four of the first five goals in the tie had come from left-wing crosses – which was a surprise, as neither side had particularly looked to work down that side of the pitch.

Substitutions
Magath’s strategy at 2-1 was interesting – he kept both his forwards on to provide an attacking threat, and made changes in the midfield. Kyriakos Papadopoulos replaced Joel Matip in the holding role – Papadopoulos can play as a centre-back and played slightly deeper than Matip. Julien Draxler came on, and kept hold of the ball excellently.
Valencia frequently lost possession when their attackers tried to dribble past defenders on the edge of the box

Emery made three changes in ten minutes and Valencia went all-out-attack. They found spaces in the midfield and created some decent chances, but the more they pushed forward, the more Schalke got chances on the break. Gavranovic chipped the ball onto the bar from 40 yards, and eventually Farfan sealed the win. On the balance of play Valencia deserved something, but they simply missed too many chances.

Conclusion
The game was summed up by a fantastic analysis/rant from Emery after the final whistle.
“Maybe there have been games in the league where we didn’t deserve to win and that good luck deserted us this time. With everything in our favour we’ve ended up losing. It’s incomprehensible. At 1-0 up we had the game under control, with chances to hit them on the counter-attack, and then they go and equalise.
Then, in the second half, without creating much, they go 2-1 up. Then we have four chances and we don’t take any. We’ve been knocked out unjustly, we’ve missed an opportunity with everything in our favour. It was a game where we had more chances and we lost. I went back into the dressing room so disappointed that I couldn’t say anything to the players, but I have nothing to blame them for.”

回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

48#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-27 21:31:30 | 显示全部楼层
Wales 0-2 England: Lampard and Bent seal the victory early on
March 26, 2011

The starting line-ups

England recorded a comfortable victory over Wales at the Millennium Stadium.
Gary Speed sent Wales out in a broad 4-5-1 system. Craig Bellamy started on the right, with Andy King on the left. Aaron Ramsey, in his first game as captain, lined up behind Steve Morison.
Fabio Capello named a surprising starting XI. Ashley Young was given a game on the wing, with Wayne Rooney also out wide, off Darren Bent. Michael Dawson partnered returning captain John Terry at the back.
England effectively won the game in the first 20 minutes – that silenced the crowd, and probably ruined Wales’ gameplan too.

England positive with the ball…
England’s ball retention was very good throughout the match, especially as the game was played on a poor surface. The use of three central midfielders (something Capello had experimented with in friendlies, but had yet to try in a competitive game) worked very well, and England always had options in possession.
Rooney and Young were given free-ish roles (though defended the wide areas without the ball) – allowed to stay wide, or come inside and link play – Rooney tended to start higher up the pitch but ended up dropping deeper as moves progressed, whilst Young focused on breaking forward into the channels, getting in behind the full-backs and drawing the centre-backs out of position. He was responsible for ‘creating’ both the goals – being brought down for the penalty, and then crossing for Bent for the second.
Wales didn’t help themselves in the way they defended – the full-backs (particularly Danny Collins at left-back) came too high up the pitch and were also too wide, making it too easy for England to play balls between defenders. Glen Johnson’s pass for the second goal, for example, was excellent – but Wales were opened up with two passes from the halfway line to the six-yard box. Better defensive positioning wouldn’t have allowed that.
…and proactive without
England were equally impressive when defending – they pressed effectively, and made it impossible for Wales to play the ball forward in the first half. The layouts of the two midfielders meant that each player had an individual opponent to pick up, and therefore England closed down easily – Scott Parker marked Ramsey, with Frank Lampard and Jack Wilshere closing down higher up. Wales only had a man in space at the back, and that’s where most of their passing took place early on.
With Wales struggling to get the ball forward, Ramsey increasingly came deep, dropping between his two fellow central midfielders, and picking up possession in space. With Parker not tracking him and staying in the holding position, this meant Wales briefly had a 3 v 2 situation deep in their midfield, but it didn’t really solve their problems for two reasons – (a) because Ramsey was the ‘link’ player and therefore Morison became even more isolated, and (b) because Ramsey’s passing was poor early on, and he frequently gave the ball away. The midfield trio lacked fluidity – if another midfielder had moved forward when Ramsey dropped deep, they might have opened up England. Instead, Wales played in front of them.
Wales rarely threaten
Parker was England’s best player, showing discipline and restraint in the deep-lying role – something England haven’t had for a long time. It also allowed Wilshere and Lampard forward – they dovetailed in going forward and linking up with the front three, and both looked more comfortable than their England appearances this season in a midfield four.
Wales’ problems in getting the ball forward weren’t helped by Morison’s poor game. His first touch was terrible, meaning he rarely (if ever) held the ball up, so Wales never got up the pitch. The home side’s brightest moments came when Bellamy and King didn’t look to play in Morison, and instead played the ball to each other – particularly after they switched wings. Three times in a 15-minute spell either side of the break, Bellamy dribbled from the left flank into the centre, then played a clever pass to King in behind Ashley Cole – but the moves didn’t produce clear-cut chances.
The second half was almost completely uneventful – aside from various substitutions (which didn’t really alter the flow of the game, though David Vaughan showed some good moments and probably should have started) and lots of bookings.
Wales came into the game more and got into the England third of the pitch (this may have been caused primarily by England’s pressing becoming less intense), but lacked penetration. England had opportunities to counter but their transitions were poor – lazy, perhaps – and they didn’t really look to get a third.
Conclusion
Wales were poor, but England did their job very well. In possession they were assured and moved the ball forward nicely, whilst they also pressed well with the ‘new’ formation – something they wouldn’t have been able to do as well in a 4-4-2, as they would have been passed around in the centre of midfield.
The most encouraging performance came from Parker, who gave England balance in midfield and protection ahead of the back four.
Wales lacked quality in the final third – with no Bale and Ramsey not at 100%, they barely tested Joe Hart.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

49#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-4 09:01:53 | 显示全部楼层
Milan 3-0 Inter: Pato goals put Milan in charge
April 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

Two goals from Alexandre Pato and another from Antonio Cassano sent Milan five points clear of Inter.

Max Allegri started Pato and Robinho upfront in Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s absence. Clarence Seedorf played on the left of midfield, and Gianluca Zambrotta got a surprise start at left-back.
Leonardo chose to play 4-2-1-3 rather than 4-3-1-2. Javier Zanetti played at left-back, and both Cristian Chivu and Andrea Ranocchia were fit to start – Lucio was suspended.
The game got off to a sensational start – Pato scored the opener after just 44 seconds, and Milan were immediately in charge.

Midfield battle
The key to the game was the midfield battle, where Milan had a 4 v 3 advantage. As a result, they dominated possession and all four players played their roles well – Mark van Bommel sat, Rino Gattuso shuttled and doubled up against Samuel Eto’o, Clarence Seedorf was the most ‘free’ player and carried the ball well, whilst Kevin-Prince Boateng drove forward and connected the midfield and attack. Boateng also provided an aerial presence for long goal-kicks forward, which was quite useful – as Inter’s forwards occupied Milan’s defenders, Christian Abbiati couldn’t play out from the back, and neither could he play long to Robinho or Pato, who lack height and aerial prowess.
There were some interesting duels in the midfield. Gattuso started playing high up, putting pressure on Thiago Motta when he moved forward with the ball, but Gattuso soon dropped deeper and spent more time moving out towards Eto’o, who wasn’t very effective in wide positions as a result. Mark van Bommel tracked Wesley Sneijder well, though was happy to let him drift into deeper positions unoccupied. On the other hand, when Milan had possession in the early stages, Sneidjer dropped deep and let van Bommel have time on the ball – but later on moved forward to mark him, and Milan weren’t able to use van Bommel as a pivot.
With both defences defending relatively deep (Milan more so than Inter, who moved higher up the pitch as the game went on), the midfield zone was stretched and very open. Inter were essentially overpowered in this zone, and Leonardo really needed an extra body in midfield to help Inter compete. He decided to start with Goran Pandev on the right – he may have regretted not using Dejan Stankovic, because that would have given him more flexibility to move between systems. The use of Sneijder and three forwards meant he was tied to 4-2-1-3.

Milan's midfield diamond worked very well. Here is their movement (black arrows) and usual passing style (white arrows) in more detail

Inter defence
Despite Milan’s obvious midfield advantage, they were at their most threatening when they played quick, direct football, rather than working the ball gradually forward. With Inter behind from the first minute and therefore pushing both Maicon and Javier Zanetti up the pitch straight away, they often had 2 v 2 at the back.
Ranocchia and Chivu simply couldn’t deal with the pace of Pato and Robinho, who started from the channels and made diagonal runs into the centre of the pitch, in behind the defence. Really, Inter needed an extra man at the back, or at least a full-back playing a more conservative role, and in a position to cover when Milan broke quickly.
It was the first time Ranocchia and Chivu had started together at the back, and there was clearly no understanding between the two. Chivu was the most vulnerable. He became drawn up the pitch too easily, and then didn’t have the pace to turn and recover his position. Ranocchia and Zanetti had to cover on separate occasions when Pato went through in the first half.
It should also be noted that Milan’s midfield advantage meant there was often no Inter pressure on the ball for passes over the top. Pato was also guilty of not using his pace enough – turning back into play rather than motoring towards goal.
Inter had their chances, though. Both came from wide areas (where they naturally were more of a threat than Milan). Motta’s header from a corner was brilliantly saved by Christian Abbiati, whilst Eto’o somehow shot wide at the far post after a Pandev cross.

Second half
The game was decided soon after half time. Inevitably, the key moment involved Chivu being caught out for pace in behind – Pato got the ball in Milan’s centre-left channel, was through on goal, but cut across the pitch and was tripped by Chivu. The Romanian was sent off, and Ivan Cordoba replaced Pandev as Inter went 4-2-1-2ish.
Milan made very good use of their extra man (in stark contrast to how they failed to adapt (under Leonardo) when Jose Mourinho’s Inter went down to ten men in this fixture last year). They suddenly had their full-backs completely free, and spread the ball from flank to flank, stretching the play and making Inter’s ten men work harder. The goal came when Ignazio Abate (the poorest player in the first Milan derby of the season, but very good here) motored forward and crossed for Pato’s second.
That was essentially game over. Milan continued to be a threat with balls over the top, and Robinho should have taken advantage of these situations. His replacement, Antonio Cassano, won and scored a penalty in stoppage time, before being sent off.

Conclusion
A clear tactical victory for Allegri – or perhaps, more of a defeat for Leonardo. Inter were exposed in two different ways – they were outnumbered and outbattled in midfield, whilst also amazingly vulnerable at the back to balls over the top. Inter didn’t do well enough without the ball – the wide forwards, in particular, didn’t help out enough – which has echoes of Milan under Leonardo last year, particularly away at Manchester United.
Milan may have been helped by Ibrahimovic’s absence. Though he was the key man in the fixture earlier in the season (and his pace was a threat, winning the penalty in that game), Milan enjoyed having too very mobile players who played in the channels, rather with a more static focal point for the attack. Their two experienced Dutchman also had great games in the centre – van Bommel broke things up and distributed the ball wide, whilst Seedorf played intelligent balls higher up.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

50#
 楼主| 发表于 2011-4-4 09:04:17 | 显示全部楼层
Villarreal 0-1 Barcelona: Barca eight points clear
April 3, 2011

The starting line-ups

Gerard Pique smashed in the only goal of the game after Lionel Messi came off the bench.

Juan Carlos Garrido set out in his usual 4-4-2 / 4-2-2-2 system. Nilmar was only on the bench, so Marco Ruben started. Carlos Marchena continued in his new holding midfield role, pushing Borja Valero out to the right, and Jose Catala was at left-bac
Pep Guardiola was without Carles Puyol, Xavi Hernandez, Pedro Rodriguez, Eric Abidal and – from the start – Messi. This caused a big reshuffle across the side, with Pique and Dani Alves the only outfield regulars starting in their usual position. Thiago Alcantara started in midfield alongside Seydou Keita, Andres Iniesta moved into the front three, and Ibrahim Afellay was on the left.
With the absence of Xavi and Messi, Barcelona were clearly less creative and not particularly threatening when they had the ball. They still dominated possession, however, especially as Iniesta dropped into central positions to become an extra man in midfield, allowing Alves to scamper down the flank.

Rossi a threat
The main interest in the early stages came from Villarreal’s attackers up against Barcelona’s makeshift centre-back pairing. In particular, Pique and Sergio Busquets were very wary of Giuseppe Rossi, and he caused them problems in two separate ways – both with his creativity and trickery in deep-lying positions, and with his pace in behind.
It was notable that whilst Ruben was allowed time on the ball in deep positions, Rossi was always followed by one of the two centre-backs when he dropped off. This strategy had two parts – primarily, it meant that Rossi, the main threat, was closed down more quickly when he had the ball, but not following Ruben was because Barcelona were scared of their defence opening up for Rossi’s forward runs. He did manage to penetrate the backline early on, but Victor Valdes came to Barca’s rescue with an excellent save.
After around 20 minutes, Guardiola decided to switch Pique and Busquets – Busquets came to the right of the pairing and was directly up against Rossi (despite having previously been outpaced by him) though this meant that the quicker Pique was acting as the covering centre-back.

Barcelona not fluent
Barcelona’s problems upfront were twofold. First, they lacked creativity with Xavi and Messi out – that was obvious. Second, David Villa struggled for support throughout the game. Iniesta dropped off into midfield, whilst Afellay stayed very wide. Neither Keita nor Alcantara looked to break forward and connect with Villa, so he often looked isolated.
Villarreal were defending rather well – the full-backs stayed quite wide and stuck to their men (particularly Mario Perez up against Afellay), and although this increased the gap between centre-backs and full-backs (the area Barcelona love to play in), the lack of drive from midfield meant they didn’t take advantage in these areas.

Villarreal dragged out of shape
Alves caused Villarreal difficulties, though. He didn’t do a great deal on the ball, but his forward runs meant Santi Cazorla had to follow him into deep positions. This is the usual situation for left wingers up against Alves, but for Villarreal it was particularly problematic – because Villarreal’s wide players like to come inside into the centre of the pitch, Cazorla was forced a long way from the zone he wanted to create from, and Villarreal lacked a link player.
This meant Rossi dropped into that position, and started to pick up Javier Mascherano when Barcelona have the ball. Against a 4-4-2, Barcelona often look to drop their holding midfielder into the back and move to a 3-4-3, but this didn’t happen often – (a) because Mascherano is not as comfortable as Busquets at the back and (b) because Rossi moving onto Mascherano meant Barcelona had a spare man at the back anyway.

Second half
The line-ups after Messi's introduction

Especially with Real Madrid’s defeat earlier in the day, Guardiola seemed content with a draw – at no stage did Barcelona go all-out-attack. They did, however, have the luxury of bringing on the world’s best player, and Messi’s introduction, for Keita, changed the game.
It wasn’t necessarily all about Messi’s individual impact. The change prompted a reshuffle – Messi played as a false nine – arguably even deeper, as a classic No 10 – and Villa went to the right. In turn, Iniesta came inside into his best position, on the left of the midfield three. Suddenly, Barcelona had much more creativity – not just from Messi in playmaking positions, but with the silky Iniesta in the side in place of the more functional Keita. They stepped it up, and though they didn’t create many great chances, their pressure eventually resulted in the corner for Pique’s goal. Villarreal will be disappointed with their marking – Barca only had two real targets for corners, Busquets and Pique, and one of them flicked the ball on towards the other, who scored.
Villarreal had chances. Nilmar’s introduction for the static Ruben meant they had more movement and energy upfront, and Valdes was forced into another exceptional save – he was the game’s star man. Barcelona kept the ball for most of the final 20 minutes, though, and Villarreal didn’t have the energy to win it back.

Conclusion
This was nothing like the previous meeting between the sides, which was one of the best games of the season. It was slower, calmer and neither side pressed as intensely – and there were fewer natural attacking threats on the pitch.
The introduction of Messi pushed Barcelona forward and gave their side a more natural feel, but they needed a set-piece to win it.
回复 支持 反对

使用道具 举报

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 注册

本版积分规则

小黑屋|手机版|Archiver|阿根廷风暴 ( 沪ICP备05003678号   

GMT+8, 2024-6-5 19:33 , Processed in 0.140625 second(s), 20 queries .

Powered by Discuz! X3.2

© 2001-2013 Comsenz Inc.

快速回复 返回顶部 返回列表