【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人

Alex2011

Argentina 1-1 Bolivia: Batista tries two systems but neither works well as Bolivia grab point 阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔连试两套战术皆不如玻利维亚抓住要害的战术那样奏效 July 2, 2011 The starting line-ups Bolivia took the lead at the start of the second half, but Sergio Aguero’s thumping volley rescued a draw for the hosts in the opening Copa America game. Sergio Batista’s main decision was whether to start Carlos Tevez or Angel di Maria on the left of his front three. He went for Tevez. Marco Rojo got the nod at left-back, and Sergio Romero started in goal. Gustavo Quinteros chose a 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 system, with Edivaldo Rojas just off Marcelo Moreno Martins upfront. The stars here were Bolivia, of course, but all the tactical interest came from Argentina’s two systems. Quinteros’ formation was extremely effective but also very simple – a defensive-minded shape with two narrow banks of four, trying to make it difficult for Argentina to play through them. Argentina wide forwards Just as in South Africa last summer, Tevez has forced his way into the side despite seemingly being out of the coach’s intended first XI shortly before the tournament started. He was asked to play as a left-sided forward here. There was an interesting contrast, then, between the positioning and movement of Tevez and Ezequiel Lavezzi. Lavezzi is used to playing as a wide forward for Napoli all season (albeit usually on the opposite flank), and his positioning -starting outside the full-back, before making diagonal runs towards goal – suited Messi well. The number ten could dribble with the ball and then slip it between centre-back and full-back to Lavezzi, as he did most famously in the 5-0 Clasico. This produced a good chance on 25 minutes, but Lavezzi’s finish was wayward – and the Napoli man’s end product throughout the first half was poor, and didn’t take advantage of his good understanding of the system. Tevez generally played narrower and was less effective at trying to stretch the Bolivia defence, which wanted to be narrow. They were also happy to play reasonably high up the pitch, however. Although one defender often came out to meet Messi, the full-backs tucked in to prevent the centre of the pitch opening up. They also had the pacey Ronaldo Rivero to cover, and besides, there was often no Argentina player looking to exploit the space anyway. That problem was related to the role of Banega, who did a decent job with the ball at his feet connecting midfield and attack, but was cautious with his movement off the ball. When Messi plays in the centre and drops deep he attracts two or three players to him, opening up space for an attacking midfielder to exploit – at club level, most frequently Andres Iniesta. Banega remained quite deep, however, and there was no real need for him to do so with both Javier Mascherano and Esteban Cambiasso in that zone, plus no real driving runs from midfield from Bolivia. Another difference between Argentina and Barcelona, in relation to Messi (it must be said that comparing Batista’s side to the greatest club side in the world and arguably one of the best of all time is extremely harsh, but since replicating those conditions for Messi has been one of his main goals, the comparison must be made) is the fact that Argentina don’t press anything like as much as Barca, and the wide players instead drop back when they lose possession. That leaves Messi as the highest player up the pitch in a 4-1-4-1ish shape, which prevents quick combinations between he and the two wide forwards on the break. Second half Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half All of this meant that Batista immediately turned to his plan B at half time, a 4-2-1-3. Cambiasso was removed, with Angel di Maria on as a left-winger, and Tevez becoming a centre-forward. Messi moved deeper, behind the three forwards. The issue is then about Messi’s positioning – he appeared too deep, generally picking the ball up deeper than the two Bolivia holding players, forced away from goal by Tevez’s presence. Just as Tevez rather got in Messi’s way and forced him too deep against Argentina last year as a second striker, he was broadly doing the same thing as the main central striker here. What kind of player would Messi want to play behind in this system? Tevez, a false nine at club level, is probably not the best option. Amongst all this, something far more important happened – Bolivia scored from their first real attempt of the game, as Rojas flicked in a corner kick at the near post, and Banega miscued the ball over the line. Bolivia could then sit deeper, with Rojas dropping off as more of a fifth midfielder and pressuring Argentina’s two holders. Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament. Here, we had a brief glimpse of it – Moreno had all the time he liked with a one-on-one against Romero, but wasted the chance. Batista had already reached for his alternative shape, and so had to stay with that same system. Sergio Aguero came on for Lavezzi and had an instant impact – superbly volleying home after Nicolas Burdisso had gone forward for a free-kick. That raised another question – whether Argentina needed a proper number nine who could, like Burdisso, be an aerial threat in the box. Argentina rallied late on, but Bolivia defended well and were content to do the basics as Argentina struggled to work out their best system. Conclusion The tactical decision-making and the actual game were almost two different things here. Both goals came from set-plays – and from (a) a mistake on the line and (b) a brilliant finish, rather than any great example of combination play. The match further outlined how many attacking options Batista has – Diego Milito, Gonzalo Higuain and Javier Pastore weren’t used at all – but provides more questions than answers. Tevez and Messi in the same team appears to be a problem unless their relationship improves significantly, and it would be a surprise if Batista starts against Colombia with the same team that played here.

Alex2011

上楼译文
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由 barcargentina 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔两套战术皆不成功，玻利维亚抓住了重点

July 2, 2011

The starting line-ups

































玻利维亚在下半场开场就取得了领先，但阿圭罗精彩的凌空射门为东道主在美洲杯揭幕战拿到了一场平局。

巴蒂斯塔最主要的问题是用特维斯还是用迪马利亚首发打三前锋中左边的位置。他选择了特维斯。罗霍成为了首发左后卫，罗梅罗是门将。

古斯塔沃-坎特罗斯选择了4-4-2/4-4-1-1阵型，莫雷诺在最前面，罗哈斯在他身后。

这场比赛出彩的当然是玻利维亚，但所有值得关注的战术都来自阿根廷的两套打法。

坎特罗斯的阵型十分简单也十分有效——以防守为主，两排4人组成的狭窄防线令阿根廷难以突破。


阿根廷的边前锋

就像去年夏天在南非一样，尽管特维斯似乎不是教练心目中的首发十一人之一，但在杯赛开始前不久他仍然成为了首发。他在这场踢左边前锋。

特维斯和拉维奇的位置和跑动的差异很有趣。拉维奇整个赛季都在那不勒斯打边前锋（虽然一般在另一边），他喜欢从边后卫外侧向内切，这种风格和梅西很配。梅西可以先自己带球，然后从中卫和边卫间把球传给拉维奇，就像他在5-0的那场国家德比中一样。第25分钟这种打法创造了一个好机会，但拉维奇踢飞了——整个上半场，那不勒斯人的临门一脚都很烂，他没利用好自己对战术的深刻理解。

特维斯一般在小范围内踢球，由于玻利维亚后防正希望如此，他在撕破防线上没多大作用。然而玻利维亚后防也乐于压上。尽管一个后卫经常跟随梅西上前，但边卫会收缩保护中路。他们还有速度快的里维罗来补位，而且一般没有阿根廷球员去利用这一空间。

这个问题和巴内加的角色有关，他持球时能很好地连接中前场，但他无球跑动很少。当梅西回撤很深时，两三个球员会被他吸引出来，这就给进攻型中场提供了前插的空间，就像伊涅斯塔在俱乐部经常做的。巴内加却待在很后面，由于马斯切拉诺和坎比亚索都在那个位置，而且玻利维亚中场几乎没有压上，他这么做完全不必要。

阿根廷和巴萨的另一个不同和梅西有关。（需要说明的是，把巴蒂斯塔的球队和世界上最好的，甚至可能是史上最佳之一的俱乐部相比很不厚道，但由于他的主要目标之一正是为梅西复制在巴萨的环境，这种比较很有必要）阿根廷不像巴萨一样压迫对手，当失去球权时，边路球员反而会回收。这让梅西在一个类似4-1-4-1的阵型中成了顶在最前面的人，导致进攻时他无法和两个边锋进行快速配合。

下半场

Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half

由于上半场的表现，巴蒂斯塔在下半场换到了B方案，4-2-1-3。坎比亚索被换下，迪马利亚上场打左边锋，特维斯打中锋，梅西回撤到三前锋身后。

这时的问题是梅西的位置——他位置太靠后了，一般在玻利维亚的两个后腰身前拿球，由于特维斯的存在，他基本没有进球机会。去年特维斯打二前锋时占据了梅西的跑动路线，使得梅西回撤很深，这次他在中锋位置也是如此。在这套战术里，梅西希望在谁身后？特维斯这个在俱乐部踢伪九号的球员大概不是最好的选择。

这期间发生了件十分重要的事——玻利维亚第一次真正的攻门就进球了。罗哈斯在前点接角球后蹭，巴内加不小心把球撞过了门线。之后玻利维亚可以更加收缩了，罗哈斯回撤后更像是第五名中场球员，他们一起压迫阿根廷的两个后腰。

阿根廷的压上暴露了后防缺乏速度的问题，这是个肯定会在这届杯赛上的某个时刻暴露的问题。在这场比赛中我们就看到了这个问题——莫雷诺得到了和罗梅罗1对1的机会，但他浪费了这次机会。

巴蒂斯塔已经换了备用阵型，所以他只能用这个战术了。阿圭罗换下了拉维奇，很快这就收到了成效。布尔迪索上前接任意球传给阿圭罗，阿圭罗漂亮地凌空一脚得分。这带来了另一个问题——阿根廷是否需要一个像布尔迪索这样的9号球员在禁区内制造空中威胁。

阿根廷此后士气大振，但玻利维亚防守很好。玻利维亚一直在做最基本的事情，而阿根廷在艰难地寻找他们的最佳战术。

结论

在这场比赛中，战术设计和实战基本是两个不同的东西。两个进球都来自定位球——一个由于门线上的失误，一个由于灵光一现，两个进球都不是精妙配合的产物。

比赛还显示出巴蒂斯塔的进攻选择到底有多丰富——米利托，伊瓜因，帕斯托雷根本没上场——但这带了的更多是问题而不是答案。特维斯和梅西的共存是个问题，除非他们的关系能显著改善。如果巴蒂斯塔还用这套人员打哥伦比亚，人们会震惊的。

Alex2011

A组另外一场比赛哥伦比亚1：0小胜哥斯达黎加
showfun 发表于 2011-7-3 09:07

仅仅看了一小会儿，1-0之后的主哥队踢客哥队很有章法的

Alex2011

Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament.

这句话太可怕了！
CFT 发表于 2011-7-3 12:20

天足论坛有人说，这时才像巴萨，就20分钟

Alex2011

Colombia 1-0 Costa Rica: Ramos goal beats ten man Costa Rica
哥伦比亚1-0哥斯达黎加：主队凭拉莫斯的进球击败10人应战的客队

July 3, 2011


The starting line-ups

Colombia squeezed past Costa Rica in a poor game.

Hernan Dario Gomez surprisingly left out Cristian Zapata, sticking with the partnership of Luis Parea and Mario Yepes at the back. Hugo Rodallega was also on the bench.

Costa Rica are participating in this tournament with an Olympic squad, so the majority of players are under 23, and the XI was unrecognisable from the side which contested the Gold Cup.

The match was disappointing – played at a very slow pace, with Colombia dominating possession but not creating many chances. There were only two real points of interest – first, Costa Rica’s formation, and second, how Colombia immediately readjusted after Randall Brenes, the Costa Rica forward, was sent off in the first half.

Costa Rica formation

Costa Rica’s formation was very odd, and impossible to categorise into a set formation in numerical terms. They’d been expected to line up in a 3-5-2 formation – and that is probably the closest you can come to describing it easily, but there were significant differences from how you would expect a 3-5-2 to line up.

For a start, Diego Madrigal played very high up the pitch, as a left-winger rather than a left wing-back – whilst on the other side, Jose Salvatierra played much deeper, between the lines of midfield and defence.

To compensate for Madrigal’s advanced positioning, the left-sided central midfield Hugo Leal played very deep, and looked to cover that side. But there was further confusion because he frequently seemed to swap positions with the left-sided centre-back, Francisco Calvo, who turned up all over the pitch in the first half. The result was a strange, disjointed system that seemed to feature too many players in deep positions, and the confusion in the centre-left channel may have contributed to Ramos’ goal, which started with a run from that zone.

Colombia


The line-ups after Costa Rica went down to ten men

Gomez’s starting system was a simple 4-5-1 / 4-3-3. The two wide players started relatively deep, which seemed overcautious considering Costa Rica were happy to let Colombia have the ball, and also because moving them forward and looking to stretch the three-man Costa Rican defence would surely have caused more problems.

The one area of interest was how deep Gustavo Bolivar played – he dropped into the back at times and allowed the two full-backs to motor on. Pablo Armero is the most naturally attacking of the two and had more space to exploit, but Juan Zuniga was probably more of a threat down the right.

When Brenes was sent off on 27 minutes, Gomez waited just five minutes to change his system and push men forward. he removed Abel Aguilar, who had been playing as the passing midfielder, and brought on Rodallega. This meant Fredy Guarin playing a little deeper, and Colombia moving to a 4-2-3-1 system, with the forward four players (with the slight exception of Falcao) allowed to switch around at will. The goal came partly because Colombia were overloading the Costa Rican defence, although it was through the simple addition of another attacker, rather than a more subtle tactical switch.

Conclusion

Not much to get excited about here – Colombia are the first side to pick up a win in the 2011 Copa, but they didn’t play particularly well and would have been in for more of a game had Costa Rica not gone down to ten so quickly.
The Colombian side seems to lack creativity to turn possession into chances. Guarin is the most attack-minded midfielder, but his first though is always to shoot (he must have had six or seven long-range attempts here) rather than thread a pass through the defence. There also needs to be a consideration of the roles of the wide players – Falcao thrives on crosses, but had little to work with here.

For Costa Rica this tournament is purely a learning experience. They’ll be reasonably proud of their efforts in keeping Colombia down to one goal, and caused some problems on the break.

Alex2011

7楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Brazil 0-0 Venezuela: Brazil fail to impress
巴西0-0委内瑞拉之战术评析：巴西未能留下深刻印象
July 4, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes’ first competitive game as Brazil manager ended with a poor 0-0 draw against a resilient Venezuela side.

Menezes played his expected side, which meant Ganso playing as the playmaker behind a front three.

Cesar Farias named a solid 4-4-2 side, with La Liga duo Nicolas Fedor and Jose Rondon upfront.

Brazil dominated possession, of course, and in the first ten minutes of the game looked like they were going to run riot. The longer Venezuela went without conceding, however, the more confidence the underdogs had, and the better they defended.

Opening stages

The match started at a much higher tempo than many of the Copa matches so far. Brazil looked to press from the front early on, whilst Venezuela closed down in the midfield, in a 4-4-2 system that became 4-2-2-2 when they won the ball.

Venezuela’s commitment to closing down got them into difficulties within the first ten minutes. Their two central midfielders, Franklin Lucena and Tomas Rincon, looked to pressurise Ramires and Lucas, but this simply left a yawning gap between their defence and midfield, which left Ganso in oceans of space. Brazil easily worked a 4 v 4 with Ganso on the ball after a few minutes, although they didn’t take advantage of the situation.

As we’ve seen before, most notably with Australia’s disastrous tactics against Germany in their opening World Cup game last year, closing down in midfield is suicidal if you have a numerical disadvantage in that zone.

Venezuela settle down

Unlike Pim Verbeek in that Australia v Germany game, Farias understood the situation here and told his two central midfielders to sit deep. The wide players joined them, and the whole Venezuela side played behind the ball and made it difficult for Brazil to play through them.

Brazil frequently looked like a broken team, with Ganso too high up the pitch close to the front three, rather than playing as the link man in midfield. The two central midfielders struggled for an available man to pass to, and Brazil’s dominance of possession wasn’t turned into chances. The best bet looked to be when the full-backs became involved, as the Venezuela wide midfielders often got drawn into the centre of the pitch, but they produced little on the ball.

The man who tried to connect the defensive ’six’ and the attacking ‘four’ with his typical energetic running was Ramires, but when he moved forward this left Lucas exposed in front of the defence (a little like Javier Mascherano in last summer’s World Cup), and Venezuela’s counters looked dangerous. Lucas was forced into two tactical fouls to stop breaks, and was fortunate to escape without a caution.

Second half

The first half pattern continued after half time. Venezuela got stronger at the back and actually looked more dangerous going forward – with the wide players coming narrow and making a 4-2-2-2, quick forward passes were always an option. They also dropped Fedor deeper, around Lucas, to help out in midfield.

Brazil continued to suffer from having a broken team in midfield, and long diagonal balls for Pato increasingly became their strategy. He controlled a couple of them well but Venzuela’s centre-backs positioned themselves intelligently, with Oswaldo Vizcarrondo particularly impressive.

Brazil brought on attacking substitutes – Elano, Lucas and Fred – and sometimes looked more like their 4-2-2-2 than their 4-2-1-3, but they had no cohesion in attacking zones and were relying on an individual moment of magic that never arrived.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming Copa game, with the underdogs able to shut out the favourites with relatively unspectacular tactics.

Brazil were poor in the final third and Menezes needs to work on the problems with a lack of compactness, but Brazil weren’t terrible. Unlike with Argentina, the shape and structure of the side seems OK, they just need some fine-tuning and some cohesion upfront.

Alex2011

9楼参考译文
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由 Sulley 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

巴西 0-0 委内瑞拉: 桑巴军团王气黯收
July 4, 2011

两队首发

在一支韧性十足的委内瑞拉队面前，马诺-梅内塞斯就任巴西国家队主帅之后的首场正式比赛最终以0比0黯然收场。

梅内塞斯的阵容选择在人意料之中，甘索在三名前锋身后扮演组织者的角色。

塞萨尔-法里亚斯则排出了一个稳健的四四二阵型，西甲二人组米古（尼古拉斯-菲杜尔）和何塞-容东搭档锋线。

不出所料，巴西队在控球方面占据了主动，开场十分钟内，他们的攻势看起来非常凶猛。然而，由于他们迟迟未能攻破委内瑞拉的大门，实力较弱的后者反而越踢越有信心，防守也愈发坚固。

开场阶段

比赛开场后的节奏远超前面的多场美洲杯小组赛。巴西似乎希望在比赛早期展开前场压迫，而委内瑞拉则选择卡死中场，一旦得球，即由四四二切换至四二二二。

委内瑞拉的中场紧逼战术让他们在前十分钟内颇为被动。两名中前卫富兰克林-卢塞纳和托马斯-林孔试图压迫拉米雷斯和卢卡斯，但这却一策略却使其防线和中场之间暴露出了巨大的空当，甘索四周一片开阔。当甘索控球时，巴西可以轻松形成前场四打四的局面，但他们却未能从中获得任何优势。

正如我们此前所见，以去年澳大利亚在其世界杯首场挑战德国时的灾难性战术安排为典型案例，在该区域人数处于劣势时采取中场紧逼无异于自取其辱。

委内瑞拉稳定战局

与率澳大利亚迎战德国时的皮姆-维尔贝克不同，法里亚斯发现了此刻的局势，并命令其两名中前卫回收。在两名边前卫也随之回收之后，整支委内瑞拉队形成了稳守的态势，让巴西人很难从中突破。

由于甘索站位过于靠上，几乎与锋线三人平行，却未能承担起衔接中场的任务，巴西看上去经常像一支被拦腰截断的队伍。两名中前卫很难寻觅到合适的传球目标，桑巴军团空有控球优势，却无法将其转化成破门良机。鉴于委内瑞拉边前卫经常收缩至中路，巴西队的最佳解决方案似乎来自于两名边后卫的插上，但他们得球之后同样建树寥寥。

一名球员试图以其标志性的积极跑动连接球队的“六”后卫和“四”前锋，他便是拉米雷斯，然而当他前插时，卢卡斯就被独自暴露在了本方防线之前（稍有类似于去年夏天世界杯上马斯切拉诺的处境），而委内瑞拉的反击则显得危险性十足。卢卡斯曾先后两次被迫用战术犯规来阻止对方的反击，并十分侥幸的逃过了裁判的处罚。

下半场

上半场的局势在中场休息之后得到了延续。委内瑞拉的防守愈发稳固，事实上，其进攻看起来也比巴西队更具威胁——通过让两名边锋向内收缩并切换到四二二二，他们总是能够觅得快速传切的空间。此外，他们还让米古后骚扰防卢卡斯，以便减轻中场的压力。

巴西依然深受前后脱节之苦，斜长传找帕托逐渐成为了他们的主要战术。帕托成功控制住了其中的几次，但委内瑞拉中后卫的选位非常聪明，奥斯瓦尔多-维斯卡隆多发挥得尤为出色。

桑巴军团相继换上了几位进攻型的替补球员——埃拉诺、小卢卡斯和弗雷德，相比四二一三，他们的阵型有时更接近于四二二二，然而他们在危险区域毫无默契可言，也始终未能等来某一名球员的灵光闪现。

结论

又一场略显乏味的美洲杯比赛，弱旅毫不出奇的战术让球迷眼中的豪强无能为力。

巴西在对方腹地表现不佳，球队的松散是梅内塞斯急需解决的问题，但巴西队也绝非一塌糊涂。与阿根廷不同，这支球队的基本打法和阵型结构都没有明显的问题，他们所需的只是战术上的微调和一些前场球员之间的默契。

Alex2011

Argentina and Brazil stutter out of the blocks at the Copa América

Both teams have tactical and selections issues to resolve after being held to draws in their opening games



Both Argentina and Brazil lacked cohesion in their opening-match draws at the Copa América. Photograph: Martin Acosta/Leo La Valle/Reuters/EPA

After a week of sporting gloom for Argentina, at last in La Plata on Sunday there came something to lift the mood. The misery began with River Plate's relegation, continued with Argentina's disjointed draw with Bolivia in the Copa América, and reached its nadir on Sunday when Argentina's women's hockey team lost a shoot-out to the Netherlands in the final of the Champions Trophy. Only then did there come a break in the clouds, as Brazil also began their Copa campaign with a disappointing draw, failing to score against a youthful but disciplined Venezuela.

In part, the pitch in the Estadio Unico may be to blame. The grass is longer than ideal, and a close look reveals a bumpy surface given a misleading sheen by piles of green sand. The ball didn't run smoothly, and that perhaps affected the rhythm of both sides. Nonetheless, both Argentina and Brazil have significant issues to resolve if they're to win the tournament.

It would be easy, in focusing on the two giants' shortcomings, to neglect how well Bolivia and – in particular – Venezuela played. Venezuela has never been a football country – it's won three times as many Miss Universe contests than it has matches at the Copa América – but reaching the quarter-final on home soil four years ago has given the sport a boost and qualification for the finals of the World Under-20 championship two years ago brought a number of young players to prominence.

Tomás Rincón, the Hamburg midfielder, was exceptional on Sunday, breaking up Brazilian attacks and carrying the ball forward with verve and imagination. Oswaldo Vizcarrondo, long-haired and muscular, was commanding in the centre of defence, while Renny Vega was quick off his line and surprisingly effective with his one-handed takes. They rode their luck to an extent in the first half, Pato hitting the bar for Brazil and numerous shots being blocked with desperate challenges, but in the second they were rarely troubled.

That fact, the way Brazil lost their way after half-time, is probably the biggest concern for Mano Menezes. In the first half Neymar was lively, if a little inclined to over-complicate; in the second he vanished. Ganso, in just his second appearance for the national team, struggled to make an impression, and seemed at times to be playing too far forward, so he was always receiving the ball under pressure. Pato, operating as a more orthodox No9 than might have been expected, was the pick of the forwards, one touch in taking down a long diagonal from Dani Alves quite sublime, but Robinho flickered to little effect.

Argentina had similar problems on Friday. Sergio Batista's talk of making Argentina play like Barcelona always seemed over-ambitious – trying to create the work of a decade in a fortnight – and so it proved. Lionel Messi may have played as he does for Barça, but it didn't matter, because Ezequiel Lavezzi, Carlos Tevez, Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso didn't play much like David Villa, Pedro, Andrés Iniesta and Xavi. Nor did – or can – Javier Zanetti and Marcos Rojo offer the sort of thrust from full-back provided by Dani Alves and Eric Abidal.

Batista criticised his team for becoming "too vertical" – a term, if not coined by Marcelo Bielsa then at least popularised by him, describing the tendency to head directly for goal, whether with long passes, dribbles or runs, rather than patiently building play. It usually suggests a lack of patience, a sense of anxiety, and Brazil could be said to have suffered the same problem (which isn't, of course, a million miles removed from a succession of England coaches lamenting the long-ball, headless-chicken tendency). Too many players tried to solve the problem individually, every dribble down a blind alley, every aimless cross, signifying a lack of faith in the team unit. That touches on a deeper issue – the growing gulf, both in terms of quality and entertainment, between club and international football.

A recognition of the bigger picture is of little use to Batista and Menezes, though. Both must energise their sides ahead of ostensibly tougher games later this week: Argentina face Colombia in Santa Fe on Wednesday; Brazil play Paraguay in Cordoba on Saturday. Batista seems likely to rejig his forward line, probably with Sergio Agüero, scorer of the superb equaliser on Friday, coming in. But does he replace Lavezzi, who was poor on Friday but has linked well with Messi in the past, or Tevez, who was equally ineffective, but whose popularity with the fans was demonstrated by the volume of the cheer when his name was announced? He may also change the make-up of the midfield, and introduce Angel Di María in a relatively deep role to offer a little more creative drive.

Menezes faces similar dilemmas. When he substituted Robinho and Neymar, the decisions were met by booing; dare he risk public wrath by leaving either out next Saturday? Neymar's first-half performance – which was enough to win him the nonsense that is the man-of-the-match award (which might more honestly be renamed the most-famous-attacking-player award) – should be enough for him to retain his place, but Elano could come in for Robinho and Ganso may find his position under threat.

In practical terms, the stuttering starts made by the two giants shouldn't matter. Assuming both finish in the top two, they can't meet in either quarter- or semi-finals, and it's fair to assume the organisers are desperate for a third straight Brazil-Argentina final. Bolivia and Venezuela, though, offer a reminder that there's more to South America than the big two.


Posted by Jonathan Wilson in La Plata Monday 4 July 2011 10.10 BST guardian.co.uk

Alex2011

19楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Chile 2-1 Mexico: Borghi’s change in formation prompts Chile’s comeback
智利2-1墨西哥：博尔基变阵提示智利回归3313
July 6, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chile recovered from 1-0 down to record a 2-1 victory in an excellent contest.

Claudio Borghi lined up with a 3-4-1-2 formation containing various players who are familiar from last year’s World Cup, and there were no major selection surprises.

Like Costa Rica, Mexico are competing with an Olympic squad in this tournament, and assistant manager Luis Fernando Tena is in charge. He played a 3-5-2, with Giovani dos Santos just behind Rafael Marquez Lugo, not to be confused with the more established Rafael Marquez.

This was the first game of the tournament that has provided real tactical interest. With both sides playing three at the back, it was an unusual and interesting match-up of formations.

Formation match-up

Tena instructed his midfield to play with one man deeper, Diego Reyes, who broadly tracked Mati Fernandez across the pitch. There were then two midfielders slightly further forward against two Chile holders, which meant that the battle in the central midfield saw each player occupied, 3 v 3. With the two sides both playing wing-backs, who competed against each other, plus 3 v 2 situations at either end, the game had an unusual but simple feel.

Chile were the more proactive side, retaining many of the pressing qualities that were a hallmark of Marcelo Bielsa’s reign. They conceded their first foul after just three seconds of the match because of some over-eager closing down, and Fernandez moved forward to join the two strikers and press 3 v 3 when Luis Michel had the ball.

Chile attacking intent

As we’ve become accustomed to, they also played an open, attacking game with the ball that saw plenty of forward runs, plus lateral movement from the two creative players, Fernandez and Alexis Sanchez. Their game was all about trying to create angles for clever neat passing between the lines, and a couple of fantastic moves produced good chances for Humberto Suazo, who moved from side to side and was always in a position to get on the end of moves.

Their football is less direct and more patient than under Bielsa, and there is much less natural width upfront – Sanchez now plays a support striker, like at Udinese, whilst Jean Beausejour is fielded deeper, as a wing-back rather than an outside-left. The combinations on the opposite side are generally more promising – Sanchez can move out to the right and combine with his Udinese teammate Marucio Isla, whilst Pablo Contreras plays an amazingly energetic role for a right-sided centre-back, often overlapping Isla to allow him inside.

Mexico were pressed into their own half of the pitch and rarely constructed good moves. With the three midfield players closed down quickly and the wing-backs a little slow to get forward, there was a huge gap between the midfield and the two forwards, who had to fend for themselves – their only promising moments in open play came when Giovani dos Santos got on the ball and ran with pace, as he did so brilliantly in the Gold Cup final. Still, their man chance of a goal was from a set-piece, and that’s where it came from, through Nestor Araujo.

Second half


On 60 minutes, Borghi changed shape

Like so many of the favourites in this competition, Chile were dominating possession but struggling for goals, and Borghi waited 15 minutes before making a substitution, bringing on Esteban Paredes for Beausejour. This meant a change of shape as Chile went make to an (even more) attacking version of the 3-3-1-3 that Bielsa loved – more like 3-1-3-3, in fact. Arturo Vidal, who didn’t have the influence on the game one might have expected in the centre of midfield, came to the left and cut inside to act as a third central midfielder, whilst Paredes played as a left-sided striker (rather than a winger) and Sanchez moved slightly to the right.

The impact of this shape was obvious – Mexico no longer had a spare man at the back, with Chile placing three forwards up against the Mexican back three. Because of that (or, to look at it another way, because Chile no longer had numerical superiority in midfield), Borghi’s side played much more direct with the ball, and the Mexican back three had immediate difficulties facing the longer passing. Paul Aguilar tried to play a little bit deeper, but this would have been a good time for Mexico to be able to shift between a back three and a back four, as their ’senior’ national side does so well.

Chile’s two goals came within 13 minutes of the change in shape. Granted, both came from corners (a notable feature of this tournament), and therefore it wasn’t the different combinations in open play that unlocked the Mexican defence. However, the increased pressure and more direct passing certainly had an impact, and the corners were both won by the restored Isla-Sanchez combination down the right, with the latter playing wider.

Conclusion

Chile were by far the most positive side we’ve seen in the competition so far, and it was amazing that they managed to find themselves a goal down at half time, because their proactive play without the ball had limited Mexico to very few chances.

The 3-4-1-2 actually suits Chile very well considering Sanchez’s move from being a winger to a second striker over the past twelve months, and will probably work better later in the competition. Here, however, they were up against a back three that was in a good position to nullify Chile, with a spare man at the back, and therefore it made sense to revert to a modified version of the old 3-3-1-3.

With such an unfamiliar squad, no-one was sure what shape Mexico would play, so Borghi can’t be blamed for not starting with that system, and should be praised for the attack-minded change – it is the best individual decision of the Copa America so far.

Alex2011

21楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

很有意思，智利队新教练，在搞了60分钟的3412后，又回归到贝尔沙的3313老路来了

Alex2011

根据zm分析所言，梅西和特维斯的战术上不兼容，是因为都是伪9号造成的。

一是表现在前场，伪9号特维斯在国家队的边锋位置不适应，但是前一场后半段，特维斯顶上去打中锋时也不适应啦，他做不了比利亚，那排什么433阵形呢？

退一步讲，梅西打左边锋，特维斯打伪9号，拉维奇打右边锋，这样也可以委曲求全吧？但是俺估计，这样的配置上，特维斯也完不成这个角色的

二是梅西后撤中场，与巴内加和坎比，也不能形成合力，这说明什么呢？

如果中场配置上这里不能跟梅西有效配合，还谈什么高仿巴萨呢？

这不是扯淡吗？！

Alex2011

Lionel Messi is an easy target for Argentina's collective failings

阿根廷集体失败，责难铺天盖地，而梅西首当其冲

When the albiceleste underperform with Messi in the side, he's the one blamed. Against Colombia, they underperformed again

当梅西和蓝白军团在本届美洲杯首演表现不佳时，他梅西就是那个被指责的人。对阵哥伦比亚，梅西们再次表现不佳。。。


Lionel Messi reacts after Argentina's goalless draw with Colombia in the Copa América. Photograph: Fernando Vergara/AP

He had his opportunity. With 10 minutes to go, Argentina won a free-kick by the right corner of the Colombia box. Lionel Messi stepped up. This was his chance to silence the grumblers, to mark his return to his home province with a deft assist, or perhaps even a goal. For a left-footer, the angle seemed inviting. He approached the ball – one step, two steps, three. Back went the left-foot, and ballooning high and wide went the ball, neither shot nor cross nor anything other than an indication of the lack of confidence that seems to submerge his game every time he pulls on the albiceleste shirt. As he trudged off at the final whistle after a goalless draw against Colombia, a smattering of boos rippled across the Estanislao López.

What makes it worse is that this was supposed to be his triumphant return home. It was only 110 miles to the south that Messi first kicked a ball. Some people say the boy's grandmother made the coach do it; Salvador Ricardo Aparicio himself says that he was a player short and asked the boy's grandmother if the five-year-old, who'd been kicking a ball against a nearby wall, would like to play. Everybody who was there on that dusty field in Rosario agrees what happened next. The ball came to the boy, clad in a shirt several sizes too big for him. He prodded at it with his right foot. When it came to his left, though, he started dribbling "as if he'd done that all his life", his grandmother said.

Those around reacted as if they'd seen a vision. Here was a pibe in action, the incarnation of the ideal of Argentinian football. The figure is an archetype that runs back to the earliest days of Argentinian football, from the days in the first decade of the 20th century when it first began to establish an identity distinct from that of the British ex-pats who had established the game in the country.

If Argentina wanted to erect a statue to its footballing spirit, the journalist Borocotó wrote in El Gráfico in 1928, it should depict "a pibe with a dirty face, a man of hair rebelling against the comb; with the intelligent, roving, trickster and persuasive eyes and a sparkling gaze that seem to hint at a picaresque laugh that does not quite manage to form on his mouth, full of small teeth that might be worn down by eating yesterday's bread."

The true embodiment of the pibe, of course, was Diego Maradona. Even Maradona accepts that Messi is his equal for skill, and he has a similar urchin build. Notably, though, Messi's hair no longer rebels against the comb – in fact, his may be the most sensible footballer's haircut since the days of Kevin Sheedy and Peter Davenport; a streak of European discipline has entered his soul.

It seems a trivial point, but it's not insignificant. Messi left Rosario for Spain at the age of 13, and there is a sense that Argentinian fans still don't entirely trust him. In that, he resembles another native of Rosario who found fame abroad and was never entirely accepted back home: Che Guevara. The move undoubtedly did Messi good, and not just because it secured him the growth hormones Newell's Old Boys could no long afford. It protected him, both against temptation – Pep Guardiola, then the reserve coach, quickly stepped in when he started partying with Ronaldinho – and against the machinations of agents, which may yet destroy the career of his contemporary Carlos Tevez.

But it also means that every time Messi underperforms for the national team – or, more accurately, every time the national team underperforms with Messi in the side – he is the one who takes the blame. In part that is natural for the best player in the team: he is the star, the genius, it's his shirt the counterfeit merchants are selling outside the grounds; therefore it's his job to drag the game the way of his side. But there is also a sense that whatever he does it will not quite be enough, that there will always be a suspicion that he doesn't quite give his all for Argentina. Given that he had the opportunity to play for Spain's youth teams and turned it down, that seems a little unfair.

To an extent the issue is generational. Younger fans accept that players leave for Europe as soon as they can; older fans seem still to find it hard to accept that the primera has become a diminished league. After the first game a taxi-driver even claimed that Argentina would be better picking only four Europe-based players if they wanted the team to play with pride.

There were chants for Messi before kick-off in Santa Fe but even here, the cheer for Tevez, rougher-edged and thus the more authentic avatar of pibismo, was much louder than the one for Messi when the teams were read out before kick-off. The stadium announcer neatly encapsulated the mood: "Con la 10, el mejor del mundo, Lionel Messi. Y con la 11, el jugador del pueblo, Carlos Tevez." Messi is the best in the world, but Tevez is the player of the people.

Messi, in truth, didn't look much like the best player in the world. He mooched around looking largely ineffective, perhaps all too aware that when he came deep in search of the ball it was not Xavi or Andrés Iniesta going ahead of him as it would be at Barcelona, but Esteban Cambiasso. Only once, after 34 minutes, as he slid a pass through for Ezequiel Lavezzi, was there a flash of his brilliance. The Napoli forward, though, described by Sergio Batista as Messi's co-pilot, was denied by Luis Martínez.

It's not Messi's fault, of course. Tevez, however popular he may be, was no more effective. This is an environment in which no player looked comfortable, anxious with the expectation and burdened by a tactical system that seems to suit nobody. As against Bolivia, Batista switched to a 4-2-1-3 late on, but Messi looked as uncomfortable as an enganche as he had as a false nine. This is a collective failure, tactical and mental, and ultimately Batista must take responsibility. It is Messi, though, the pibe with the European manners, who provides the easier target.

Posted by Jonathan Wilson in Santa Fe Thursday 7 July 2011 14.57 BST guardian.co.uk

Alex2011

上楼参考译文
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阿根廷集体失败 梅西却成替罪羔羊
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球



美洲杯阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚后梅西的反应。图片来源：Fernando Vergara/AP

曾经有一个机会摆在他的面前。比赛仅剩10分钟了，阿根廷在哥伦比亚禁区右角的位置获得一个任意球。梅西走上前去，这是属于他的机会，可以让那些叽叽喳喳的人闭嘴，他能用一记精彩的助攻，甚至是一粒进球来昭示他的王者归来。对于一个左脚将来说，这个角度看上去是个不错的机会。他走近皮球——一步，两步，三步。他抡起左脚，放了一记高炮，皮球不见踪影。这球既不是射门，也不是传中，其中除了自信心的缺乏再无他物，而每次当他拉起身上的蓝白球衣捂脸时，不自信似乎都要将他淹没。最后终场哨声响起，阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚，当他蹒跚而行时，几丝嘘声撕裂了洛佩斯球场的天空。

更为糟糕的现实是，人们原本期待这是他的荣归故里，这里离他第一次踢球的地方只有110英里远。有人说是他的祖母让教练带他去踢球的；阿帕里西奥他自己说当时缺一个队员，便问这孩子的祖母，这个对着旁边的墙踢球的5岁男孩愿不愿意过来踢球呢。每个当时在罗萨里奥那片尘土飞扬的空地上的人都知道接下来发生了什么。球滚到男孩的脚下，他身上还穿着一件大几个码的衬衫。他用右脚捅了一下皮球，当球滚到左边时，虽然是左脚，他开始带球，如他祖母所说，“他好像之前的一辈子都在做这件事。”

周围的人好像看到了一个幻影：这有一个跃动的孩子，是阿根廷足球理想的化身。他就像阿根廷足球早期时的一个典型球员，那还是在上世纪的第一个十年，是在英国移民把足球引入这个国度后，阿根廷开始发展与之不同、自己特有的足球的时期。

1928年记者Borocoto在《体育画报》杂志写道，如果阿根廷想要为她的足球精神立一座雕像的话，就应该塑造“一个脸上脏兮兮的小孩儿，头发桀骜不驯，眼神透露出聪慧，漂泊，狡猾，雄辩，还要带有一种闪光的凝视，其中流露出流氓式的笑意，嘴却没什么变化，其中满是小小的牙齿，好像啃一点儿昨天的剩面包就会掉下来。”

这个小孩儿的真实例子，毫无疑问就是马拉多纳。连老马都承认梅西在技术层面和他是同一个档次的，而梅西也是一个类似的顽童形象。尽管值得注意的是，梅西的头发不再张牙舞爪了——事实上他的头发也许是自凯文-席迪和彼得-达文波特的时代之后，最服服帖帖的足球运动员发型了，欧洲的纪律性已经深入他的灵魂。

这看上去是个不起眼的小细节，但它非常重要。梅西在13岁时离开罗萨里奥前往西班牙，我们能感觉到阿根廷球迷还不是完完全全地信任他。在这个意义上，他很像另一个在国外获得盛名，却在家乡永远也没能被完全接受的罗萨里奥人：切-格瓦拉。远走他乡对梅西而言毋庸置疑是有好处的，这不仅仅是因为在异国他能接受纽维儿老男孩提供不了的激素治疗。这里保护着他不受诱惑的勾引——瓜迪奥拉，这位之后的巴萨教练在梅西开始和小罗一起踢球时就很快介入了；也保护他不受经纪人阴谋的影响，而这有可能毁了他的同胞特维斯。

但这也意味着每次梅西在国家队表现不尽如人意时——或者更准确地说，每次当国家队阵中有梅西而表现不佳时——他总是替罪羊。在某种程度上这对于队中最优秀的球员来说是很自然的：他是闪耀的明星，是才华横溢的天才，场外那些盗版商买的都是他的球衣，因此带领球队走上正轨也是他的责任。但也会有人这么想：无论他做什么，那都还不够；人们总是质疑他没有为阿根廷奉献自己的全部。考虑到梅西曾有机会为西班牙的青年队效力，但他拒绝了这个邀请，这种质疑有些不公平。

在某种程度上这个问题是跟球迷的世代相关的。年轻的球迷能接受球员尽早前往欧洲踢球，而年纪稍大的球迷则还是很难接受阿甲日益式微的现实。在第一场比赛之后，一位出租车司机甚至说，要是阿根廷想要为荣誉而战的话，他们该只选入4个在欧洲踢球的球员，那整体会踢得更好。

在圣塔菲，开球之前有人为梅西高歌。但即使是在这儿，当开球前宣读球员名单时，人们为特维斯的欢呼远远高过为梅西的，这欢呼原始粗犷，于是他更像是理想中那个孩子的化身。体育场播音员很干净地表达了这情绪：“接下来是10号，世界上最好的球员，梅西。再接下来是11号，人民的球员，特维斯。”梅西是世界最佳，特维斯却是属于人民的。

事实上，梅西看起来并不像世界上最好的球员。他四处散步，看上去很没效率，也许他太清楚自己要是后撤拿球的话，这里不会像在巴萨那样有哈维和伊涅斯塔前插，这里只有坎比亚索。只有一次他闪现了他的天才，那是在第34分钟他妙传拉维奇。尽管被巴蒂斯塔称作梅西的副驾驶，这个那不勒斯前锋的球还是被马丁内斯扑出。

这当然不是梅西的错。不管特维斯人气有多么高，他也没什么效率。目前的这个环境没有人能踢得舒服，大家都因巨大的期望而焦虑不已，又被不知道是为设计的战术体系所累。在对阵玻利维亚时，巴蒂斯塔后来换阵4213，但梅西在踢伪9号时，看上去像是被什么钩住了一样不舒服。这是集体的失败，战术上和精神上的失败，最根本的是巴蒂斯塔必须担负这个责任。而梅西，这个带有欧洲风度的孩子，却成了更容易被攻击的目标。

Alex2011

狗孩一位网友说，全世界都知道梅西是阿根廷人，唯有阿根廷人例外

Alex2011

有没有ZM给乌拉圭VS智利的战术复盘？
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-7-9 16:17

还木有这么快吧，至少也得等到明日凌晨以后吧

Alex2011

Chile 1-1 Uruguay: in-game changes dictate the pattern of play
智利1-1乌拉圭: 比赛中调整支配着双方发挥的格局
July 9, 2011


The starting line-ups

Goals from Alvaro Pereira and Alexis Sanchez meant another Copa draw. 阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚和阿莱克斯-桑切斯的分别进球意味着，智乌之战是两队自美洲杯开赛以来的又一场平局，这场战罢，他们在c组均各积2分，分列第3、4名。

Both managers made changes. Claudio Borghi dropped Mati Fernandez and brought in Luis Jiminez behind the front two, but kept the same shape as in the opening day win over Mexico. 两队的主教练都对阵容做了调整。克劳迪奥-伯尔奇撤下马迪-菲尔南德斯而是让路易斯-吉米内斯出现在两位前锋之后，不过仍保持同首场取胜墨西哥时一样的首发阵型，即3412。

Oscar Tabarez made two changes from the draw against Peru. Nicolas Loderio dropped out and was replaced by Alvaro Pereira, whilst at the back Sebastian Coates came in for Mauricio Victorino, as Uruguay switched to a three-man defence. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯对首战秘鲁平局的阵容做了2处调整。首战打中场的尼克拉斯-罗德里奥被拿下，代之以阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚出场，而后卫线上用塞巴斯蒂安-克雅特斯替换马里西奥-维克多里奥，这样乌拉圭则改打三后卫阵型了。

The game took a similar pattern to Chile’s game against Mexico – they were the stronger side in possession but couldn’t break down the opposition until late in the game. 比赛走向同智利与墨西哥之战一样的格局——智利队在控球方面则显得更强一些，但是难以给对手致命打击，直到比赛后期才破门逼平对手。

Uruguay defence

Tabarez has switched to a three-man backline before – he did so against France in the opening game of the World Cup, when he was (perhaps too modestly, in hindsight) playing for a 0-0, having experimented with the shape in the pre-tournament friendlies. This three-man defence was more about creating a spare man at the back against the pace and power of Humberto Suazo and Alexis Sanchez, and the youngster Coates had a very good game as the sweeper, constantly covering for the other two centre-backs and getting in the way when Suazo thought he was clear.

The three-man defence was less successful as a whole, however. Sanchez is a very intelligent player and understands the tactical nuances of the game very quickly, and recognised that there was little point in him remaining high up against the centre-backs. Instead of moving to the right, as he did against Mexico, he dropped into the midfield more, as he did at Udinese throughout 2010/11 – see the game against Inter, for example. This meant Uruguay had a surplus of defenders, and Chile dominated the midfield ground.

The other interesting element of the midfield battle was that, with Lodeiro not in the side and an extra man at the back, the Perez-Arevalo duo had more freedom, with Arevalo venturing forward more.

Chile defence

The main battles were at either end, though, and Chile had to put up with a dangerous 3 v 3 situation at the back. Borghi’s predecessor Marcelo Bielsa always wanted a spare man, of course, and would have instantly changed to a back four – but Borghi stuck with his three, with the small caveat that Gary Medel dropped back and helped out.

The difference in the numbers in defence meant the two sides played with very different styles in their build-up play. Chile had midfield superiority and had to try and overload the Uruguayan defence, so played slowly and patiently in order to get midfield runners forward. On the other hand, Uruguay tried to play more direct to take advantage of the 3 v 3 situation. Their best two chances (a Luis Suarez shot and a Diego Forlan volley) came after long balls.

The 3 v 3 also meant they could press Chile at goal kicks easily, and Borghi’s side struggled to pass out from the back.

Uruguay three becomes a four

Tabarez and Uruguay realised that with Sanchez dropping into midfield, they didn’t really need three centre-backs, and so as the game progressed, they increasingly looked more like a four at the back. This was a simple switch – Maxi Pereira played deeper, Alvaro Pereira pushed on, and Martin Caceres moved back out to become more of a left-back. It was a 4-4-2ish system. The half-time change – forward Edinson Cavani off and midfielder Alvaro Gonzalez on down the right – was another sign that Tabarez had changed system.

A byproduct of this change was actually crucial in the goal, because Alvaro Pereira found himself in the box and swept home the opening goal – it’s difficult to imagine that he would have been in that position as a wing-back, rather than a winger.

Borghi makes attacking change

Typically, Chile became even more attacking after going behind. Unlike against Mexico, Borghi’s substitution didn’t change the shape of the side, but it was an even more offensive move – Arturo Vidal became the left-sided centre-back, Gonzalo Jara was taken off, and Jorge Valdivia, the number ten, came on to provide clever passes from the centre of midfield.

This had an immediate impact – four minutes later, Valdivia’s incisive pass to the left played in Jean Beausejour, who cut the ball back to Sanchez, who finished.

Chile then had the momentum, although bringing on Carlos Carmona for Beausejour seemed to kill this slightly.
Tabarez tried to go for the second goal with Lodeiro on for Arevalo, but it finished 1-1.

Conclusion

This was an interesting match, with Tabarez switching to three at the back to deal with Chile, and then reverting to a back four when he realised that Sanchez was increasingly dropping off the front. The change to a 4-4-2ish shape meant both sides ended up with a spare man at the back, rather than the situation at the start when Uruguay had two spare men, and Chile had none.

Alex2011

40楼参考译文:占位

Alex2011

Brazil 2-2 Paraguay: Brazil snatch the draw
July 10, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes ditched the “European” 4-2-3-1, went for a Dunga-style compromise system, then ended up with 4-2-2-2…

He dropped Robinho from his starting line-up, favouring Jadson who played much narrower on the right, as he has done in previous friendlies.

Gerardo Martino went for the 4-4-2 / 4-3-3 hybrid that he often favoured at last summer’s World Cup. Roque Santa Cruz played on the right, and made diagonal runs to a centre-forward position.

Both sides were ahead at some point in the game, but neither side ever had overall control. Brazil were much better than in the first game going forward, but looked significantly more vulnerable at the back (perhaps because they were up against a better team).

Paraguay tactics

Martino had a habit of frustrating bigger sides at the World Cup last year with this shape, and Brazil found it difficult to stamp their authority on the game. Santa Cruz nullifed Andre Santos, who wasn’t brave or intelligent enough to influence the game on the left, and the left-back also switched off and let Santa Cruz run past him for a couple of chances.

In the midfield, Enrique Vera sat deep and picked up Ganso, with two central midfielders ahead doing battle with Brazil’s two holders. Marcelo Estigarrabia took on Dani Alves. Paraguay generally defended very narrow both at the back and in midfield, forcing Brazil to go down the flanks.

Brazil tactics

The decision to bring in Jadson over Robinho was not about personnel, it was about shape. In Brazil’s first game against Venezuela, Ganso struggled to provide decisive passes for Brazil’s front three. Part of the problem was that there was too much emphasis placed upon him for creativity, and there was a separate issue: he played too high up, and Brazil couldn’t find him with an initial pass from midfield.

In purely numerical terms, having one man providing creativity and using three men higher up the pitch ready to put the finishing touches to moves didn’t make sense – the introduction of Jadson, in a deeper, more central role than Robinho, was about shifting the balance. Jadson meant Brazil’s build-up play was more gradual, and Ganso had a colleague in close proximity to help create.

Ganso-Jadson
This worked pretty well, even if Brazil’s attacking play was still patchy. The Ganso-Jadson combination caused problems for Paraguay between the lines, and twice they linked up well – first when exchanging passes for a great chance Pato wasted, and then for the goal, where Ganso teed up Jadson to fire home.

Interestingly, this change in system also meant an alteration to the way the two holding midfielders played. In the Venezuela game, Ramires generally played to the left of Lucas, but here he played to the right, presumably as Menezes wanted him to shuttle out to the right and cover the (barer than usual) right flank. Pato also moved out to the right more – his movement was less restricted with only one forward alongside him. Brazil again tried to hit long balls towards Pato, though, which doesn’t really play to his strengths.

Paraguay compete in midfield

Paraguay were defending well as a unit, pressing at the right moments and meaning that Ganso rarely picked up the ball on his way to goal – he had to come deep, or receive the ball with his back to goal, unlike in the first game, where Venezuela pushed up too high and gave him space between the lines.

Nestor Ortigoza was good on the ball for Martino’s side, dictating play from deep, and coming short to collect the ball. This caused Brazil some confusion in midfield as Lucas moved up the pitch to close down Ortigoza, when he would have preferred to sit deep with Ramires higher up.


The five stages of Menezes' move from 4-2-3-1. ONE: The 4-2-1-3 against Venezuela. TWO: The modified 4-2-1-3 for this game, with Jadson in for Robinho, and the two holders switching ides. THREE: Elano replaces Jadson on the right. FOUR: Lucas Moura comes on for Ramires, with Elano moving deep. FIVE: Fred replaces Neymar.

Second half

Menezes made a change at half time, withdrawing Jadson and bringing on Elano in the same position. His reasoning, presumably, was to guard against a second yellow card – and with Alves being given something of a difficult time by the tricky Estigarrabia, some extra cover was needed.

Unfortunately, this destabilized the Brazilian side, and despite enjoying a good relationship at club level, the Elano-Ganso combination didn’t work particularly well. Nor did it help defensively – Elano was caught out for Paraguay’s equaliser. Alves made an individual error for the slightly fortunate second Paraguayan goal.

Brazilian subs

Menezes made two further attacking substitutions to try and get back in the game. First, Ramires went off, and Lucas Moura came on. This meant Elano going deeper into the Ramires role, and Lucas Moura playing as something approaching a second number ten alongside Ganso, even more narrow than Jadson had played. There was now no right-winger, with Alves trying to cover the entire flank by himself.

That narrowed Brazil on the right, and the second change narrowed them on the left. The ineffectual Neymar was removed for Fred, who played as a central striker, and suddenly Brazil were more like a 4-2-2-2 – Lucas Leiva and Elano holding, Ganso and Lucas Moura creating, Fred and Pato upfront. This narrow system almost played into the hands of Paraguay’s narrowness, but late on an attack right through the middle got Brazil their equaliser – Ganso again got the assist with a clever flick, and Fred struck the ball into the corner.

Conclusion

The first Copa game with more than three goals in it – first and foremost, this was an entertaining match.

Martino kept roughly the same shape throughout, whilst Menezes chopped and changed. Neither conclusively won the tactical battle – Paraguay defended well in open play but sometimes got overloaded between the lines with two Brazilian creators.

Brazil’s problem defensively was their right flank, although Andre Santos had a habit of switching off and letting men run past him. Another change for the final group game wouldn’t be a surprise, perhaps with Fred starting permanently as a central striker.

Alex2011

44楼参考译文：占位

Alex2011

Alex2011

Alex2011