阿根廷风暴

标题: 【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人 [打印本页]

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-3 03:02
标题: 【ZM美洲杯专贴】142L：美洲杯最佳阵容11人
Argentina 1-1 Bolivia: Batista tries two systems but neither works well as Bolivia grab point 阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔连试两套战术皆不如玻利维亚抓住要害的战术那样奏效 July 2, 2011 The starting line-ups Bolivia took the lead at the start of the second half, but Sergio Aguero’s thumping volley rescued a draw for the hosts in the opening Copa America game. Sergio Batista’s main decision was whether to start Carlos Tevez or Angel di Maria on the left of his front three. He went for Tevez. Marco Rojo got the nod at left-back, and Sergio Romero started in goal. Gustavo Quinteros chose a 4-4-2 / 4-4-1-1 system, with Edivaldo Rojas just off Marcelo Moreno Martins upfront. The stars here were Bolivia, of course, but all the tactical interest came from Argentina’s two systems. Quinteros’ formation was extremely effective but also very simple – a defensive-minded shape with two narrow banks of four, trying to make it difficult for Argentina to play through them. Argentina wide forwards Just as in South Africa last summer, Tevez has forced his way into the side despite seemingly being out of the coach’s intended first XI shortly before the tournament started. He was asked to play as a left-sided forward here. There was an interesting contrast, then, between the positioning and movement of Tevez and Ezequiel Lavezzi. Lavezzi is used to playing as a wide forward for Napoli all season (albeit usually on the opposite flank), and his positioning -starting outside the full-back, before making diagonal runs towards goal – suited Messi well. The number ten could dribble with the ball and then slip it between centre-back and full-back to Lavezzi, as he did most famously in the 5-0 Clasico. This produced a good chance on 25 minutes, but Lavezzi’s finish was wayward – and the Napoli man’s end product throughout the first half was poor, and didn’t take advantage of his good understanding of the system. Tevez generally played narrower and was less effective at trying to stretch the Bolivia defence, which wanted to be narrow. They were also happy to play reasonably high up the pitch, however. Although one defender often came out to meet Messi, the full-backs tucked in to prevent the centre of the pitch opening up. They also had the pacey Ronaldo Rivero to cover, and besides, there was often no Argentina player looking to exploit the space anyway. That problem was related to the role of Banega, who did a decent job with the ball at his feet connecting midfield and attack, but was cautious with his movement off the ball. When Messi plays in the centre and drops deep he attracts two or three players to him, opening up space for an attacking midfielder to exploit – at club level, most frequently Andres Iniesta. Banega remained quite deep, however, and there was no real need for him to do so with both Javier Mascherano and Esteban Cambiasso in that zone, plus no real driving runs from midfield from Bolivia. Another difference between Argentina and Barcelona, in relation to Messi (it must be said that comparing Batista’s side to the greatest club side in the world and arguably one of the best of all time is extremely harsh, but since replicating those conditions for Messi has been one of his main goals, the comparison must be made) is the fact that Argentina don’t press anything like as much as Barca, and the wide players instead drop back when they lose possession. That leaves Messi as the highest player up the pitch in a 4-1-4-1ish shape, which prevents quick combinations between he and the two wide forwards on the break. Second half Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half All of this meant that Batista immediately turned to his plan B at half time, a 4-2-1-3. Cambiasso was removed, with Angel di Maria on as a left-winger, and Tevez becoming a centre-forward. Messi moved deeper, behind the three forwards. The issue is then about Messi’s positioning – he appeared too deep, generally picking the ball up deeper than the two Bolivia holding players, forced away from goal by Tevez’s presence. Just as Tevez rather got in Messi’s way and forced him too deep against Argentina last year as a second striker, he was broadly doing the same thing as the main central striker here. What kind of player would Messi want to play behind in this system? Tevez, a false nine at club level, is probably not the best option. Amongst all this, something far more important happened – Bolivia scored from their first real attempt of the game, as Rojas flicked in a corner kick at the near post, and Banega miscued the ball over the line. Bolivia could then sit deeper, with Rojas dropping off as more of a fifth midfielder and pressuring Argentina’s two holders. Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament. Here, we had a brief glimpse of it – Moreno had all the time he liked with a one-on-one against Romero, but wasted the chance. Batista had already reached for his alternative shape, and so had to stay with that same system. Sergio Aguero came on for Lavezzi and had an instant impact – superbly volleying home after Nicolas Burdisso had gone forward for a free-kick. That raised another question – whether Argentina needed a proper number nine who could, like Burdisso, be an aerial threat in the box. Argentina rallied late on, but Bolivia defended well and were content to do the basics as Argentina struggled to work out their best system. Conclusion The tactical decision-making and the actual game were almost two different things here. Both goals came from set-plays – and from (a) a mistake on the line and (b) a brilliant finish, rather than any great example of combination play. The match further outlined how many attacking options Batista has – Diego Milito, Gonzalo Higuain and Javier Pastore weren’t used at all – but provides more questions than answers. Tevez and Messi in the same team appears to be a problem unless their relationship improves significantly, and it would be a surprise if Batista starts against Colombia with the same team that played here.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-3 03:03


上楼译文
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由 barcargentina 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

阿根廷1-1玻利维亚：巴蒂斯塔两套战术皆不成功，玻利维亚抓住了重点

July 2, 2011

The starting line-ups

































玻利维亚在下半场开场就取得了领先，但阿圭罗精彩的凌空射门为东道主在美洲杯揭幕战拿到了一场平局。

巴蒂斯塔最主要的问题是用特维斯还是用迪马利亚首发打三前锋中左边的位置。他选择了特维斯。罗霍成为了首发左后卫，罗梅罗是门将。

古斯塔沃-坎特罗斯选择了4-4-2/4-4-1-1阵型，莫雷诺在最前面，罗哈斯在他身后。

这场比赛出彩的当然是玻利维亚，但所有值得关注的战术都来自阿根廷的两套打法。

坎特罗斯的阵型十分简单也十分有效——以防守为主，两排4人组成的狭窄防线令阿根廷难以突破。


阿根廷的边前锋

就像去年夏天在南非一样，尽管特维斯似乎不是教练心目中的首发十一人之一，但在杯赛开始前不久他仍然成为了首发。他在这场踢左边前锋。

特维斯和拉维奇的位置和跑动的差异很有趣。拉维奇整个赛季都在那不勒斯打边前锋（虽然一般在另一边），他喜欢从边后卫外侧向内切，这种风格和梅西很配。梅西可以先自己带球，然后从中卫和边卫间把球传给拉维奇，就像他在5-0的那场国家德比中一样。第25分钟这种打法创造了一个好机会，但拉维奇踢飞了——整个上半场，那不勒斯人的临门一脚都很烂，他没利用好自己对战术的深刻理解。

特维斯一般在小范围内踢球，由于玻利维亚后防正希望如此，他在撕破防线上没多大作用。然而玻利维亚后防也乐于压上。尽管一个后卫经常跟随梅西上前，但边卫会收缩保护中路。他们还有速度快的里维罗来补位，而且一般没有阿根廷球员去利用这一空间。

这个问题和巴内加的角色有关，他持球时能很好地连接中前场，但他无球跑动很少。当梅西回撤很深时，两三个球员会被他吸引出来，这就给进攻型中场提供了前插的空间，就像伊涅斯塔在俱乐部经常做的。巴内加却待在很后面，由于马斯切拉诺和坎比亚索都在那个位置，而且玻利维亚中场几乎没有压上，他这么做完全不必要。

阿根廷和巴萨的另一个不同和梅西有关。（需要说明的是，把巴蒂斯塔的球队和世界上最好的，甚至可能是史上最佳之一的俱乐部相比很不厚道，但由于他的主要目标之一正是为梅西复制在巴萨的环境，这种比较很有必要）阿根廷不像巴萨一样压迫对手，当失去球权时，边路球员反而会回收。这让梅西在一个类似4-1-4-1的阵型中成了顶在最前面的人，导致进攻时他无法和两个边锋进行快速配合。

下半场

Batista switched to 4-2-1-3 for the second half

由于上半场的表现，巴蒂斯塔在下半场换到了B方案，4-2-1-3。坎比亚索被换下，迪马利亚上场打左边锋，特维斯打中锋，梅西回撤到三前锋身后。

这时的问题是梅西的位置——他位置太靠后了，一般在玻利维亚的两个后腰身前拿球，由于特维斯的存在，他基本没有进球机会。去年特维斯打二前锋时占据了梅西的跑动路线，使得梅西回撤很深，这次他在中锋位置也是如此。在这套战术里，梅西希望在谁身后？特维斯这个在俱乐部踢伪九号的球员大概不是最好的选择。

这期间发生了件十分重要的事——玻利维亚第一次真正的攻门就进球了。罗哈斯在前点接角球后蹭，巴内加不小心把球撞过了门线。之后玻利维亚可以更加收缩了，罗哈斯回撤后更像是第五名中场球员，他们一起压迫阿根廷的两个后腰。

阿根廷的压上暴露了后防缺乏速度的问题，这是个肯定会在这届杯赛上的某个时刻暴露的问题。在这场比赛中我们就看到了这个问题——莫雷诺得到了和罗梅罗1对1的机会，但他浪费了这次机会。

巴蒂斯塔已经换了备用阵型，所以他只能用这个战术了。阿圭罗换下了拉维奇，很快这就收到了成效。布尔迪索上前接任意球传给阿圭罗，阿圭罗漂亮地凌空一脚得分。这带来了另一个问题——阿根廷是否需要一个像布尔迪索这样的9号球员在禁区内制造空中威胁。

阿根廷此后士气大振，但玻利维亚防守很好。玻利维亚一直在做最基本的事情，而阿根廷在艰难地寻找他们的最佳战术。

结论

在这场比赛中，战术设计和实战基本是两个不同的东西。两个进球都来自定位球——一个由于门线上的失误，一个由于灵光一现，两个进球都不是精妙配合的产物。

比赛还显示出巴蒂斯塔的进攻选择到底有多丰富——米利托，伊瓜因，帕斯托雷根本没上场——但这带了的更多是问题而不是答案。特维斯和梅西的共存是个问题，除非他们的关系能显著改善。如果巴蒂斯塔还用这套人员打哥伦比亚，人们会震惊的。

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作者: showfun    时间: 2011-7-3 09:07
A组另外一场比赛哥伦比亚1：0小胜哥斯达黎加

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-3 11:21

A组另外一场比赛哥伦比亚1：0小胜哥斯达黎加
showfun 发表于 2011-7-3 09:07

仅仅看了一小会儿，1-0之后的主哥队踢客哥队很有章法的

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作者: CFT    时间: 2011-7-3 12:20
Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament.

这句话太可怕了！

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-3 12:22

Argentina pushed up, which exposed the lack of pace of their centre-backs, something that will surely be exploited at some point in this tournament.

这句话太可怕了！
CFT 发表于 2011-7-3 12:20

天足论坛有人说，这时才像巴萨，就20分钟

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-4 11:23


Colombia 1-0 Costa Rica: Ramos goal beats ten man Costa Rica
哥伦比亚1-0哥斯达黎加：主队凭拉莫斯的进球击败10人应战的客队

July 3, 2011


The starting line-ups

Colombia squeezed past Costa Rica in a poor game.

Hernan Dario Gomez surprisingly left out Cristian Zapata, sticking with the partnership of Luis Parea and Mario Yepes at the back. Hugo Rodallega was also on the bench.

Costa Rica are participating in this tournament with an Olympic squad, so the majority of players are under 23, and the XI was unrecognisable from the side which contested the Gold Cup.

The match was disappointing – played at a very slow pace, with Colombia dominating possession but not creating many chances. There were only two real points of interest – first, Costa Rica’s formation, and second, how Colombia immediately readjusted after Randall Brenes, the Costa Rica forward, was sent off in the first half.

Costa Rica formation

Costa Rica’s formation was very odd, and impossible to categorise into a set formation in numerical terms. They’d been expected to line up in a 3-5-2 formation – and that is probably the closest you can come to describing it easily, but there were significant differences from how you would expect a 3-5-2 to line up.

For a start, Diego Madrigal played very high up the pitch, as a left-winger rather than a left wing-back – whilst on the other side, Jose Salvatierra played much deeper, between the lines of midfield and defence.

To compensate for Madrigal’s advanced positioning, the left-sided central midfield Hugo Leal played very deep, and looked to cover that side. But there was further confusion because he frequently seemed to swap positions with the left-sided centre-back, Francisco Calvo, who turned up all over the pitch in the first half. The result was a strange, disjointed system that seemed to feature too many players in deep positions, and the confusion in the centre-left channel may have contributed to Ramos’ goal, which started with a run from that zone.

Colombia


The line-ups after Costa Rica went down to ten men

Gomez’s starting system was a simple 4-5-1 / 4-3-3. The two wide players started relatively deep, which seemed overcautious considering Costa Rica were happy to let Colombia have the ball, and also because moving them forward and looking to stretch the three-man Costa Rican defence would surely have caused more problems.

The one area of interest was how deep Gustavo Bolivar played – he dropped into the back at times and allowed the two full-backs to motor on. Pablo Armero is the most naturally attacking of the two and had more space to exploit, but Juan Zuniga was probably more of a threat down the right.

When Brenes was sent off on 27 minutes, Gomez waited just five minutes to change his system and push men forward. he removed Abel Aguilar, who had been playing as the passing midfielder, and brought on Rodallega. This meant Fredy Guarin playing a little deeper, and Colombia moving to a 4-2-3-1 system, with the forward four players (with the slight exception of Falcao) allowed to switch around at will. The goal came partly because Colombia were overloading the Costa Rican defence, although it was through the simple addition of another attacker, rather than a more subtle tactical switch.

Conclusion

Not much to get excited about here – Colombia are the first side to pick up a win in the 2011 Copa, but they didn’t play particularly well and would have been in for more of a game had Costa Rica not gone down to ten so quickly.
The Colombian side seems to lack creativity to turn possession into chances. Guarin is the most attack-minded midfielder, but his first though is always to shoot (he must have had six or seven long-range attempts here) rather than thread a pass through the defence. There also needs to be a consideration of the roles of the wide players – Falcao thrives on crosses, but had little to work with here.

For Costa Rica this tournament is purely a learning experience. They’ll be reasonably proud of their efforts in keeping Colombia down to one goal, and caused some problems on the break.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-4 11:24
7楼参考译文：占位

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-5 06:06


Brazil 0-0 Venezuela: Brazil fail to impress
巴西0-0委内瑞拉之战术评析：巴西未能留下深刻印象
July 4, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes’ first competitive game as Brazil manager ended with a poor 0-0 draw against a resilient Venezuela side.

Menezes played his expected side, which meant Ganso playing as the playmaker behind a front three.

Cesar Farias named a solid 4-4-2 side, with La Liga duo Nicolas Fedor and Jose Rondon upfront.

Brazil dominated possession, of course, and in the first ten minutes of the game looked like they were going to run riot. The longer Venezuela went without conceding, however, the more confidence the underdogs had, and the better they defended.

Opening stages

The match started at a much higher tempo than many of the Copa matches so far. Brazil looked to press from the front early on, whilst Venezuela closed down in the midfield, in a 4-4-2 system that became 4-2-2-2 when they won the ball.

Venezuela’s commitment to closing down got them into difficulties within the first ten minutes. Their two central midfielders, Franklin Lucena and Tomas Rincon, looked to pressurise Ramires and Lucas, but this simply left a yawning gap between their defence and midfield, which left Ganso in oceans of space. Brazil easily worked a 4 v 4 with Ganso on the ball after a few minutes, although they didn’t take advantage of the situation.

As we’ve seen before, most notably with Australia’s disastrous tactics against Germany in their opening World Cup game last year, closing down in midfield is suicidal if you have a numerical disadvantage in that zone.

Venezuela settle down

Unlike Pim Verbeek in that Australia v Germany game, Farias understood the situation here and told his two central midfielders to sit deep. The wide players joined them, and the whole Venezuela side played behind the ball and made it difficult for Brazil to play through them.

Brazil frequently looked like a broken team, with Ganso too high up the pitch close to the front three, rather than playing as the link man in midfield. The two central midfielders struggled for an available man to pass to, and Brazil’s dominance of possession wasn’t turned into chances. The best bet looked to be when the full-backs became involved, as the Venezuela wide midfielders often got drawn into the centre of the pitch, but they produced little on the ball.

The man who tried to connect the defensive ’six’ and the attacking ‘four’ with his typical energetic running was Ramires, but when he moved forward this left Lucas exposed in front of the defence (a little like Javier Mascherano in last summer’s World Cup), and Venezuela’s counters looked dangerous. Lucas was forced into two tactical fouls to stop breaks, and was fortunate to escape without a caution.

Second half

The first half pattern continued after half time. Venezuela got stronger at the back and actually looked more dangerous going forward – with the wide players coming narrow and making a 4-2-2-2, quick forward passes were always an option. They also dropped Fedor deeper, around Lucas, to help out in midfield.

Brazil continued to suffer from having a broken team in midfield, and long diagonal balls for Pato increasingly became their strategy. He controlled a couple of them well but Venzuela’s centre-backs positioned themselves intelligently, with Oswaldo Vizcarrondo particularly impressive.

Brazil brought on attacking substitutes – Elano, Lucas and Fred – and sometimes looked more like their 4-2-2-2 than their 4-2-1-3, but they had no cohesion in attacking zones and were relying on an individual moment of magic that never arrived.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming Copa game, with the underdogs able to shut out the favourites with relatively unspectacular tactics.

Brazil were poor in the final third and Menezes needs to work on the problems with a lack of compactness, but Brazil weren’t terrible. Unlike with Argentina, the shape and structure of the side seems OK, they just need some fine-tuning and some cohesion upfront.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-5 06:10


9楼参考译文
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由 Sulley 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

巴西 0-0 委内瑞拉: 桑巴军团王气黯收
July 4, 2011

两队首发

在一支韧性十足的委内瑞拉队面前，马诺-梅内塞斯就任巴西国家队主帅之后的首场正式比赛最终以0比0黯然收场。

梅内塞斯的阵容选择在人意料之中，甘索在三名前锋身后扮演组织者的角色。

塞萨尔-法里亚斯则排出了一个稳健的四四二阵型，西甲二人组米古（尼古拉斯-菲杜尔）和何塞-容东搭档锋线。

不出所料，巴西队在控球方面占据了主动，开场十分钟内，他们的攻势看起来非常凶猛。然而，由于他们迟迟未能攻破委内瑞拉的大门，实力较弱的后者反而越踢越有信心，防守也愈发坚固。

开场阶段

比赛开场后的节奏远超前面的多场美洲杯小组赛。巴西似乎希望在比赛早期展开前场压迫，而委内瑞拉则选择卡死中场，一旦得球，即由四四二切换至四二二二。

委内瑞拉的中场紧逼战术让他们在前十分钟内颇为被动。两名中前卫富兰克林-卢塞纳和托马斯-林孔试图压迫拉米雷斯和卢卡斯，但这却一策略却使其防线和中场之间暴露出了巨大的空当，甘索四周一片开阔。当甘索控球时，巴西可以轻松形成前场四打四的局面，但他们却未能从中获得任何优势。

正如我们此前所见，以去年澳大利亚在其世界杯首场挑战德国时的灾难性战术安排为典型案例，在该区域人数处于劣势时采取中场紧逼无异于自取其辱。

委内瑞拉稳定战局

与率澳大利亚迎战德国时的皮姆-维尔贝克不同，法里亚斯发现了此刻的局势，并命令其两名中前卫回收。在两名边前卫也随之回收之后，整支委内瑞拉队形成了稳守的态势，让巴西人很难从中突破。

由于甘索站位过于靠上，几乎与锋线三人平行，却未能承担起衔接中场的任务，巴西看上去经常像一支被拦腰截断的队伍。两名中前卫很难寻觅到合适的传球目标，桑巴军团空有控球优势，却无法将其转化成破门良机。鉴于委内瑞拉边前卫经常收缩至中路，巴西队的最佳解决方案似乎来自于两名边后卫的插上，但他们得球之后同样建树寥寥。

一名球员试图以其标志性的积极跑动连接球队的“六”后卫和“四”前锋，他便是拉米雷斯，然而当他前插时，卢卡斯就被独自暴露在了本方防线之前（稍有类似于去年夏天世界杯上马斯切拉诺的处境），而委内瑞拉的反击则显得危险性十足。卢卡斯曾先后两次被迫用战术犯规来阻止对方的反击，并十分侥幸的逃过了裁判的处罚。

下半场

上半场的局势在中场休息之后得到了延续。委内瑞拉的防守愈发稳固，事实上，其进攻看起来也比巴西队更具威胁——通过让两名边锋向内收缩并切换到四二二二，他们总是能够觅得快速传切的空间。此外，他们还让米古后骚扰防卢卡斯，以便减轻中场的压力。

巴西依然深受前后脱节之苦，斜长传找帕托逐渐成为了他们的主要战术。帕托成功控制住了其中的几次，但委内瑞拉中后卫的选位非常聪明，奥斯瓦尔多-维斯卡隆多发挥得尤为出色。

桑巴军团相继换上了几位进攻型的替补球员——埃拉诺、小卢卡斯和弗雷德，相比四二一三，他们的阵型有时更接近于四二二二，然而他们在危险区域毫无默契可言，也始终未能等来某一名球员的灵光闪现。

结论

又一场略显乏味的美洲杯比赛，弱旅毫不出奇的战术让球迷眼中的豪强无能为力。

巴西在对方腹地表现不佳，球队的松散是梅内塞斯急需解决的问题，但巴西队也绝非一塌糊涂。与阿根廷不同，这支球队的基本打法和阵型结构都没有明显的问题，他们所需的只是战术上的微调和一些前场球员之间的默契。

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-5 06:45

Tevez and Messi in the same team appears to be a problem unless their relationship improves significantly, and it would be a surprise if Batista starts against Colombia with the same team that played here.

连zm这种非口水风格的技术帖子，都直言不讳提到野兽和梅西兼容问题，可见非是战术层面可以解决的问题了！

何况，还是SergioBatisa教练！

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-5 10:52
SergioBatisa再捣糨糊，据说排出跟首战几乎一样的战阵，迎战哥伦比亚

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作者: 阿根廷怎样    时间: 2011-7-5 11:08
不排除烟雾弹

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作者: elite    时间: 2011-7-5 12:18

不排除烟雾弹
阿根廷怎样 发表于 2011-7-5 11:08

但愿如彼

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-6 05:56


Uruguay 1-1 Peru: Guerrero and Lodeiro the key men as both sides waste chances to win it乌拉圭1-1秘鲁：双方都浪费了取胜机会，而格雷罗和罗德依洛成为关键之人

July 5, 2011


The starting line-ups 双方首发阵容

A more exciting game than many of the previous Copa America contests resulted in another draw. 美洲杯开赛以来更为激动人心的一场比赛，结果又是一场平局。

Oscar Tabarez named his expected side, with all three of his star forwards on the pitch, supported by Nicolas Lodeiro from midfield. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯排出了他中意的阵容，前方是三前锋，之后由中场尼可拉斯-罗德依洛来支持。

Sergio Markarian wasn’t able to call upon Juan Manuel Vargas from the start, and so instead used Yoshimar Yotun, more frequently used as a defender, on the left flank. 塞尔吉奥-马卡连没能让胡安-曼纽尔-瓦伽斯（巴尔加斯）首发，而是代之以更频繁地出任后卫的友石马-约顿担纲左翼重任。

The match was played at a higher tempo than the previous four matches in the tournament, with Uruguay closing down quickly early on, and Peru trying to get the ball forward quickly to Paolo Guerrero upfront. 这场比赛，随着乌拉圭早早地快速推进，而显得比本届杯赛开赛以来前4场气氛都高涨，同时秘鲁队也欲求快速地将球传给突前的帕奥罗-格雷罗。

Uruguay shape

Uruguay’s system was very similar to their formation in the infamous game against Ghana at last summer’s World Cup – two holding players with a more attack-minded player to the left, and Diego Forlan starting central, then dropping deep to drag a centre-back out, usually Alberto Rodriguez. That space wasn’t exploited particularly well by his two fellow forwards, however – Luis Suarez was the closest man to Forlan, with Edinson Cavani staying wide, although the two did switch flanks.

Some good combinations early on came to nothing, and Uruguay suddenly burst into life later in the first half when Lodeiro went from being invisible in the first 20 minutes, to being the game’s key player. He drifted forward unnoticed into great positions in the centre of the pitch, a little like Andres Iniesta does, and looked to get beyond Forlan when the Atletico striker moved away from goal. Exploiting that space helped Uruguay create chances – first Lodeiro seemed to lose track of the ball coming towards him when making a forward run into a great position, but later on he threaded the ball through to Suarez who finished well. Strangely, after that excellent 15-minute spell, Lodeiro was much quieter after half time.

Peru strategy

Peru played a very simple game – they hit direct balls forward to Guerrero, who led the line excellently and brought the two wingers into play well. He most frequently combined with Luis Advincula down the right, although the opening goal cut out any combination play altogether – a huge long ball over the top to Guerrero saw him break the offside trap and round Fernando Muslera to score.

Peru’s other threat came from the long throw of Yotun down the right, but he was mainly focused upon his defensive duties. Maxi Pereira steamed forward from right-back and provided the same attacking thrust he does with Benfica. On the other side, Martin Cacares had a lot of time on the ball with Advincula trying to move central and link up with Guerrero, but is so right-footed that he didn’t really stretch the play as much as he should have – it would have been nice to see Alvaro Pereira used there to provide overlaps, but Tabarez seems to see him more of a wide midfielder than a full-back. Still, Cacares had enough time on the ball to start the move for the goal – but that sums up how much space he had at that point, rather than acting as an advert for his quality in possession.

Second half

The same pattern continued in the second half, although with Lodeiro fading, Uruguay looked less potent. Suarez become more involved, however, and he and Forlan created a good chance that the latter blazed over the bar.

Tabarez’s substitutions didn’t really change the game, with Abel Hernandez and Cristian Rodriguez straight swaps for Cavani and Lodeiro. Uruguay still needed more from left-back, but Pereira remained on the bench.

In fact, it was Peru who grew into the game, and the introduction of Vargas pushed them forward. He replaced Advincula, with Yotun moving to the right and nullifying Cacares.

Vargas’ quality also pushed back Maxi Pereira, and suddenly Peru were well in the game, having simply played defensive, direct football in the first half. Vargas had a couple of efforts that tested Muslera, and then late on his cross found Guerrero at the near post, who headed wide.

Conclusion

A little more excitement here, but there’s still been relatively little tactical interest from the Copa America – we’re still waiting for a game to be won through strategy, or for a manager to change things drastically from the bench. This was a decent game, but basically just the stronger side playing well and then struggling in front of goal, against an underdog getting men behind the ball and then hitting it long for the frontman.

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-6 06:14
15楼参考译文：占位

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-6 14:19
小组赛首轮战，仅有智利队打进2球。火热的南美足球热情，在阿根廷寒冷天气里还没高涨起来。

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-6 14:46
乌秘之战，很开放的，谁赢都很正常的。但是，令人印象很深的一点，还是弗兰一脚任意球直接打门，那么远距离质量特高，弗兰仍很老辣，要不是秘鲁守门员神级发挥，就进了

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-6 20:43




Argentina and Brazil stutter out of the blocks at the Copa América

Both teams have tactical and selections issues to resolve after being held to draws in their opening games



Both Argentina and Brazil lacked cohesion in their opening-match draws at the Copa América. Photograph: Martin Acosta/Leo La Valle/Reuters/EPA

After a week of sporting gloom for Argentina, at last in La Plata on Sunday there came something to lift the mood. The misery began with River Plate's relegation, continued with Argentina's disjointed draw with Bolivia in the Copa América, and reached its nadir on Sunday when Argentina's women's hockey team lost a shoot-out to the Netherlands in the final of the Champions Trophy. Only then did there come a break in the clouds, as Brazil also began their Copa campaign with a disappointing draw, failing to score against a youthful but disciplined Venezuela.

In part, the pitch in the Estadio Unico may be to blame. The grass is longer than ideal, and a close look reveals a bumpy surface given a misleading sheen by piles of green sand. The ball didn't run smoothly, and that perhaps affected the rhythm of both sides. Nonetheless, both Argentina and Brazil have significant issues to resolve if they're to win the tournament.

It would be easy, in focusing on the two giants' shortcomings, to neglect how well Bolivia and – in particular – Venezuela played. Venezuela has never been a football country – it's won three times as many Miss Universe contests than it has matches at the Copa América – but reaching the quarter-final on home soil four years ago has given the sport a boost and qualification for the finals of the World Under-20 championship two years ago brought a number of young players to prominence.

Tomás Rincón, the Hamburg midfielder, was exceptional on Sunday, breaking up Brazilian attacks and carrying the ball forward with verve and imagination. Oswaldo Vizcarrondo, long-haired and muscular, was commanding in the centre of defence, while Renny Vega was quick off his line and surprisingly effective with his one-handed takes. They rode their luck to an extent in the first half, Pato hitting the bar for Brazil and numerous shots being blocked with desperate challenges, but in the second they were rarely troubled.

That fact, the way Brazil lost their way after half-time, is probably the biggest concern for Mano Menezes. In the first half Neymar was lively, if a little inclined to over-complicate; in the second he vanished. Ganso, in just his second appearance for the national team, struggled to make an impression, and seemed at times to be playing too far forward, so he was always receiving the ball under pressure. Pato, operating as a more orthodox No9 than might have been expected, was the pick of the forwards, one touch in taking down a long diagonal from Dani Alves quite sublime, but Robinho flickered to little effect.

Argentina had similar problems on Friday. Sergio Batista's talk of making Argentina play like Barcelona always seemed over-ambitious – trying to create the work of a decade in a fortnight – and so it proved. Lionel Messi may have played as he does for Barça, but it didn't matter, because Ezequiel Lavezzi, Carlos Tevez, Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso didn't play much like David Villa, Pedro, Andrés Iniesta and Xavi. Nor did – or can – Javier Zanetti and Marcos Rojo offer the sort of thrust from full-back provided by Dani Alves and Eric Abidal.

Batista criticised his team for becoming "too vertical" – a term, if not coined by Marcelo Bielsa then at least popularised by him, describing the tendency to head directly for goal, whether with long passes, dribbles or runs, rather than patiently building play. It usually suggests a lack of patience, a sense of anxiety, and Brazil could be said to have suffered the same problem (which isn't, of course, a million miles removed from a succession of England coaches lamenting the long-ball, headless-chicken tendency). Too many players tried to solve the problem individually, every dribble down a blind alley, every aimless cross, signifying a lack of faith in the team unit. That touches on a deeper issue – the growing gulf, both in terms of quality and entertainment, between club and international football.

A recognition of the bigger picture is of little use to Batista and Menezes, though. Both must energise their sides ahead of ostensibly tougher games later this week: Argentina face Colombia in Santa Fe on Wednesday; Brazil play Paraguay in Cordoba on Saturday. Batista seems likely to rejig his forward line, probably with Sergio Agüero, scorer of the superb equaliser on Friday, coming in. But does he replace Lavezzi, who was poor on Friday but has linked well with Messi in the past, or Tevez, who was equally ineffective, but whose popularity with the fans was demonstrated by the volume of the cheer when his name was announced? He may also change the make-up of the midfield, and introduce Angel Di María in a relatively deep role to offer a little more creative drive.

Menezes faces similar dilemmas. When he substituted Robinho and Neymar, the decisions were met by booing; dare he risk public wrath by leaving either out next Saturday? Neymar's first-half performance – which was enough to win him the nonsense that is the man-of-the-match award (which might more honestly be renamed the most-famous-attacking-player award) – should be enough for him to retain his place, but Elano could come in for Robinho and Ganso may find his position under threat.

In practical terms, the stuttering starts made by the two giants shouldn't matter. Assuming both finish in the top two, they can't meet in either quarter- or semi-finals, and it's fair to assume the organisers are desperate for a third straight Brazil-Argentina final. Bolivia and Venezuela, though, offer a reminder that there's more to South America than the big two.


Posted by Jonathan Wilson in La Plata Monday 4 July 2011 10.10 BST guardian.co.uk

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-6 20:48
19楼参考译文：占位

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-6 23:12


Chile 2-1 Mexico: Borghi’s change in formation prompts Chile’s comeback
智利2-1墨西哥：博尔基变阵提示智利回归3313
July 6, 2011


The starting line-ups

Chile recovered from 1-0 down to record a 2-1 victory in an excellent contest.

Claudio Borghi lined up with a 3-4-1-2 formation containing various players who are familiar from last year’s World Cup, and there were no major selection surprises.

Like Costa Rica, Mexico are competing with an Olympic squad in this tournament, and assistant manager Luis Fernando Tena is in charge. He played a 3-5-2, with Giovani dos Santos just behind Rafael Marquez Lugo, not to be confused with the more established Rafael Marquez.

This was the first game of the tournament that has provided real tactical interest. With both sides playing three at the back, it was an unusual and interesting match-up of formations.

Formation match-up

Tena instructed his midfield to play with one man deeper, Diego Reyes, who broadly tracked Mati Fernandez across the pitch. There were then two midfielders slightly further forward against two Chile holders, which meant that the battle in the central midfield saw each player occupied, 3 v 3. With the two sides both playing wing-backs, who competed against each other, plus 3 v 2 situations at either end, the game had an unusual but simple feel.

Chile were the more proactive side, retaining many of the pressing qualities that were a hallmark of Marcelo Bielsa’s reign. They conceded their first foul after just three seconds of the match because of some over-eager closing down, and Fernandez moved forward to join the two strikers and press 3 v 3 when Luis Michel had the ball.

Chile attacking intent

As we’ve become accustomed to, they also played an open, attacking game with the ball that saw plenty of forward runs, plus lateral movement from the two creative players, Fernandez and Alexis Sanchez. Their game was all about trying to create angles for clever neat passing between the lines, and a couple of fantastic moves produced good chances for Humberto Suazo, who moved from side to side and was always in a position to get on the end of moves.

Their football is less direct and more patient than under Bielsa, and there is much less natural width upfront – Sanchez now plays a support striker, like at Udinese, whilst Jean Beausejour is fielded deeper, as a wing-back rather than an outside-left. The combinations on the opposite side are generally more promising – Sanchez can move out to the right and combine with his Udinese teammate Marucio Isla, whilst Pablo Contreras plays an amazingly energetic role for a right-sided centre-back, often overlapping Isla to allow him inside.

Mexico were pressed into their own half of the pitch and rarely constructed good moves. With the three midfield players closed down quickly and the wing-backs a little slow to get forward, there was a huge gap between the midfield and the two forwards, who had to fend for themselves – their only promising moments in open play came when Giovani dos Santos got on the ball and ran with pace, as he did so brilliantly in the Gold Cup final. Still, their man chance of a goal was from a set-piece, and that’s where it came from, through Nestor Araujo.

Second half


On 60 minutes, Borghi changed shape

Like so many of the favourites in this competition, Chile were dominating possession but struggling for goals, and Borghi waited 15 minutes before making a substitution, bringing on Esteban Paredes for Beausejour. This meant a change of shape as Chile went make to an (even more) attacking version of the 3-3-1-3 that Bielsa loved – more like 3-1-3-3, in fact. Arturo Vidal, who didn’t have the influence on the game one might have expected in the centre of midfield, came to the left and cut inside to act as a third central midfielder, whilst Paredes played as a left-sided striker (rather than a winger) and Sanchez moved slightly to the right.

The impact of this shape was obvious – Mexico no longer had a spare man at the back, with Chile placing three forwards up against the Mexican back three. Because of that (or, to look at it another way, because Chile no longer had numerical superiority in midfield), Borghi’s side played much more direct with the ball, and the Mexican back three had immediate difficulties facing the longer passing. Paul Aguilar tried to play a little bit deeper, but this would have been a good time for Mexico to be able to shift between a back three and a back four, as their ’senior’ national side does so well.

Chile’s two goals came within 13 minutes of the change in shape. Granted, both came from corners (a notable feature of this tournament), and therefore it wasn’t the different combinations in open play that unlocked the Mexican defence. However, the increased pressure and more direct passing certainly had an impact, and the corners were both won by the restored Isla-Sanchez combination down the right, with the latter playing wider.

Conclusion

Chile were by far the most positive side we’ve seen in the competition so far, and it was amazing that they managed to find themselves a goal down at half time, because their proactive play without the ball had limited Mexico to very few chances.

The 3-4-1-2 actually suits Chile very well considering Sanchez’s move from being a winger to a second striker over the past twelve months, and will probably work better later in the competition. Here, however, they were up against a back three that was in a good position to nullify Chile, with a spare man at the back, and therefore it made sense to revert to a modified version of the old 3-3-1-3.

With such an unfamiliar squad, no-one was sure what shape Mexico would play, so Borghi can’t be blamed for not starting with that system, and should be praised for the attack-minded change – it is the best individual decision of the Copa America so far.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-6 23:13
21楼参考译文：占位

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-6 23:29
很有意思，智利队新教练，在搞了60分钟的3412后，又回归到贝尔沙的3313老路来了

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-8 08:17


Argentina 0-0 Colombia: another goalless draw阿根廷0-0哥伦比亚：主队破门乏术，又是一场0平局
July 7, 2011


The starting line-ups

The third 0-0 from seven Copa America games so far, as Argentina again struggled.

Sergio Batista made one change from the opening day 0-0 against Bolivia. Marcos Rojo dropped out, with Pablo Zabaleta coming in on the right. Javier Zanetti moved to the left.

Hernan Dario Gomez also made a single change, bringing in Carlos Sanchez for Gutavo Bolivar, a straight swap in midfield.

Argentina had much of the play but failed to create enough chances to get the breakthrough, a common feature of this tournament. Colombia sat back and played on the break, and deserved their point.

Tactics v Messi

Colombia’s first task, of course, was to stop Lionel Messi. Unlike in the opening game against Bolivia, where was up against two holding players, here he was up against a sole deep-lying midfielder who looked to track his movement into deep positions, and therefore had to be more intelligent with his movement, diagonally moving away from goal to collect the ball.

The Colombian centre-backs rarely followed Messi – with the exception of one occasion when Luis Perea came out and harried him in midfield – they instead focused upon sitting deep, not allowing Carles Tevez or Ezequiel Lavezzi to find space in the back four.

With Messi-minding left to Sanchez, this meant that Argentina had 4 v 3 in the midfield when Messi moved deep, a situation they didn’t take full advantage of. A slight problem with a 4-1-4-1 is that when the holding midfielder is taken away from the centre (or if he departs completely, like Pepe in the Champions League semi-final first leg) and the midfield doesn’t drop deeper, there can often be too much space between the lines. Neither Ever Banega nor Esteban Cambiasso moved into that ‘red zone’ often enough – it was (surprisingly) the latter who did find himself in space there on 30 minutes, but Argentina didn’t play the ball to him.

Argentina disjointed

Colombia’s tactics higher up the pitch worked excellently. They let Nicolas Burdisso and Gabriel Milito have time on the ball, confident that neither are technically proficient enough to provide clever passes from the back. Instead, they dropped deep into their own half and pressed as soon as the ball was played into midfield, forcing Cambiasso and Javier Mascherano to return the ball to the back. The two Colombian wide players tracked the full-back, where there was less overlapping than in the first game, with Zabaleta not a great attacker, and Zanetti on the ‘wrong’ flank (albeit somewhere where he is comfortable).

Argentina’s best chance of a goal came from the same method as in the first game – Messi moving deep, then slipping the ball for Lavezzi between Mario Yepes and Pablo Armero. Again, Lavezzi’s movement was good but his end product was poor. On the opposite flank, Tevez still looks unsuited to that wide role – having played as a false nine all season, he seems more comfortable receiving the ball with his back to goal and moving towards play – and with Messi doing broadly the same thing, Argentina’s only real method of penetration was from Lavezzi.

Colombia breaks

Colombia were threatening throughout the game on the counter-attack, particularly with the two wide players moving inside and the full-backs overlapping – both Armero and Juan Zuniga have been very impressive in the two Colombia games in the competition so far. Argentina’s defence looks incredibly prone to pace – and considering Argentina are generally on the attack, Gabriel Milito and Nicolas Burdisso are high up the pitch, leaving lots of space in behind. Their first reaction when Argentina lose the ball is to back off quickly towards their own goal, which in turn leaves Mascherano stranded and forced to cover a lot of space by himself. It’s rather surprising that Argentina haven’t conceded a goal from open play in this tournament yet.

Batista tried to change things in the second half, first with Fernando Gago and Sergio Aguero straight swaps for Cambiasso and Lavezzi, then with Gonzalo Higuain on for Banega, and more of a 4-2-1-3. Argentina didn’t really get any better, and Batista will surely be forced into changes for the final game of the group phase.

Conclusion

Another underwhelming match – the tactical interest here came from Colombia’s tactics. The way they pressed the ball coming into midfield worked well, and by not allowing their centre-backs to be dragged out of the back, Argentina rarely looked likely to break through their defence.

Argentina’s side was almost unchanged from the first game, and their problems remain the same.

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-8 08:19


24楼参考译文
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阿根廷 0-0 哥伦比亚：破门乏术，阿根廷继续沉沦
July 7, 2011

两队首发

截止至目前的七场美洲杯比赛中的第三场平局，阿根廷依然没能找回自己的强队风范。

相比揭幕战对阵玻利维亚时的阵容，塞尔吉奥-巴蒂斯塔只做出了一处变动。尼古拉斯-罗霍无缘首发，帕布罗-萨巴莱塔出任右边后卫。哈维尔-萨内蒂则被换到了左闸位置。

埃尔南-达里奥-戈麦斯同样有一处调整，在中场用卡洛斯-桑切斯直接取代了与其位置相同的古塔沃-玻利瓦尔。

阿根廷在控球时间上占据了很大优势，但却并未创造出多少打破僵局的机会，这也是本届杯赛迄今几场的普遍特征之一。哥伦比亚则采取了稳守反击的策略，他们的表现配得上这场平局。

遏制梅西

哥伦比亚的首要任务无疑是遏制梅西的发挥。与首战玻利维亚时被两名后腰夹击不同，此次他所要应付的是一名专职的拖后中场，其任务便是在他回撤时保持如影随形，因此，他必须以更加聪明的跑动方式，沿斜线方向远离球门拿球。

除了路易斯-佩雷亚的一次中场破坏之外，哥伦比亚中后卫几乎从不紧逼梅西，相反，他们专注于收缩防守，不给卡洛斯-特维斯和埃泽奎尔-拉维奇留下在四名后卫之间觅得空当的机会。

在桑切斯一心盯防梅西的情况下，只要梅西回撤，阿根廷即可形成中场四打三的局面，但这一优势并未得到他们的充分利用。四一四一阵型中一个细微的问题是：若单后腰被带离中路（或与中场其他球员完全脱节，例如欧冠半决赛首回合中的佩佩），且其他中场球员没有随之后移，则中场首尾之间便会出现严重的真空。但埃维尔-巴内加和伊斯特班-坎比亚索出现在此“危险区域”里的次数却都不够多——而当第三十分钟，后者在这里跑出空当的时候，队友们又（令人诧异的）没有及时送上传球。

阿根廷混乱无章

哥伦比亚的前场战术效果显著。他们放任尼古拉斯-布尔迪索和加布里埃尔-米利托拿球，自信此二人皆不具备从后场策动攻势的技术水准。相反，他们稳守本方半场，一旦球至中场便立刻展开紧逼，迫使坎比亚索和哈维尔-马斯切拉诺回传防线。两名哥伦比亚边路球员时刻跟住对方边后卫，鉴于萨巴莱塔攻击力有限，而萨内蒂处在“逆边”（尽管他在这里踢得非常舒服），这两个位置的插上次数比第一场有所下降。

阿根廷最好的一次进球机会来自于和首场如出一辙的战术——梅西回撤，将球塞给正好处在马里奥-耶佩斯和帕布罗-阿梅罗之间的拉维奇。拉维奇的跑位照旧不错，可惜机会再次断送在了他的临门一脚上。另一侧，特维斯依然未能适应边路的位置——整季都担任伪九号的他看起来更习惯于背身拿球后再向前推进——而梅西的技术特点也是如此，于是，拉维奇就成了阿根廷唯一的冲击力来源。

哥伦比亚的反击

整场比赛里，哥伦比亚的反击一直都颇具威胁，尤其是当边前卫内收，边后卫插上的时候——截止至目前，阿梅罗和胡安-祖尼加在哥伦比亚的两场比赛中均发挥得十分出色。阿根廷的防线在速度面前显得极为脆弱——而且，由于阿根廷在大部分时间里都是进攻一方，加布里埃尔-米利托和尼古拉斯-布尔迪索的站位相当靠前，在身后留下了大片的空间。一旦阿根廷失去球权，两人的第一反应便是迅速撤向球门，而马斯切拉诺则会因此被置于只能独当一面的困境之中。本届杯赛开幕至今，阿根廷还没有在运动战中失球其实是一个相当诡异的现象。

下半场，巴蒂斯塔试图作出调整，先是用费尔南多-加戈和塞尔吉奥-阿奎罗换下对位的坎比亚索和拉维奇，继而又派冈萨洛-伊瓜因上场顶替巴内加，使阵型更接近于四二一三。然而，阿根廷的表现并未有任何实质性的提升，小组赛最后一场，巴蒂斯塔必须让一切有所改变。

结论

又（为什么是又）一场无趣的比赛——值得一提的战术现象多来自哥伦比亚一方。他们在球至中场时的施压策略收效很好，此外，其中后卫从不轻易离开自己位置的策略让阿根廷鲜有撕破其防守的机会。

与首场比赛相比，阿根廷队几乎没有任何变化，一切问题照旧存在。

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-8 08:20


Set-pieces dominate the first week of the Copa
美洲杯小组赛第一轮，定位球破门是主导

July 7, 2011



For a tournament often hailed for its flair and unpredictability, the Copa America has clearly been lacking excitement.

So far, the goals per game count stands at a pathetic eight, from seven matches. That gives a goals per game rate of just 1.14 – roughly half the goals per game rate of last summer’s World Cup, where the figure was 2.27. There have been three 0-0s, and only Chile have scored more than once.

Further analysis of the method of the goals reveals that – five of the eight goals have been scored from set-pieces. Only three have been from open play – Javi Guerrero’s cool finish after a long ball against Uruguay, Luis Suarez’s quick shot in that same game against Peru, and Adrian Ramos’ winner against Costa Rica.

The other five goals have come quickly after set pieces. The ratio of goals scored from dead ball scenarios is generally between 30-40%, but so far in this tournament it is 62.5%.

It’s not as if teams are actually scoring a greater number of goals from set plays, simply a greater proportion. To take a ‘normal’ number of goals per game (let’s take the ratio of the World Cup, 2.27) and multiply that by the number of games so far (7), we could have expected 15.89 goals.

Since the ‘normal’ percentage of goals scored from set-plays is 30-40%, we would have expected to have seen between 4.77 and 6.34 goals from set-plays so far. The figure of five is nothing unusual.

The problem, of course, is those goals have been obvious as there have been few goals scored from other methods. Three goals in seven games from open play is a disastrous figure – and whilst defensive organisation should get some of the credit, it’s been obvious that the main problem has been a lack of creativity.

Too many sides are depending upon one player (Lionel Messi, Ganso) for creating chances, rather than possessing a number of skilful players in the side to play key passes. The most exciting side so far, Chile, have been the side who have attacked with the greatest number of players – they’re also the only side to score two goals, and the only side to win a game against eleven men. And yet, even Chile’s two goals both came from set-pieces.

Hopefully managers will pick a greater number of players in the second week and the Copa will improve, as this is a worrying trend.

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-8 08:22


26楼参考译文
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由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球

美洲杯第一周 定位球是关键

美洲杯因其人才济济，充满不确定性而盛名在外，但现在的它明显缺乏激情。

到目前为止7场比赛的进球数只有可怜兮兮的8个，这使得场均进球才1.14个——大概是去年夏天世界杯场均进球的一半左右，当时是2.27个。目前有3场0-0，只有智利打入了一球以上。

对进球的进一步分析得，8球中有5球来自定位球，只有3球是运动战进球——对阵乌拉圭时格雷罗拿到长传后一个漂亮的击杀，苏亚雷斯在同一场比赛中攻入秘鲁大门的快速一击，以及对阵哥斯达黎加时拉莫斯的制胜球。

其他5个进球都是发定位球后很快就得分了。从死球开出后的得分的比例大概在30~40%，而目前美洲杯的比例是62.5%。

这实际上并不是球队们从定位球中获得更多的进球，单单只是一个更高的数据比例而已。用场均的“正常”进球数（就用世界杯的2.27吧），乘以目前的比赛场数（7），我们本应该能看到15.89个的。

既然从定位球得分的“正常”比例是30~40%，我们期望的定位球进球在4.77到6.34个之间，目前的5个没啥出人意料的。

这些进球存在的问题很明显，当然是从其他手段进的球太少了。7场比赛3个运动战进球，这个数据简直就是灾难性——防守端因此可以获得掌声，但同时最主要的毛病也是明摆着的：他们很缺乏创造力。

许多球队都过于依赖某一个球员（梅西，甘索）来创造机会，而阵中没有一批技术好的球员来完成关键的传递。目前最令人兴奋的球队智利，是调动球员参与进攻人数最多的——他们也是唯一一支攻入两球的球队，唯一一支对手11人全勤也获胜的球队。但是，就连智利的两个进球也是来自定位球。

希望第二周的比赛中，教练们能排出一批更出色的球员，美洲杯的比赛能更为好看，目前的情势可着实让人担心

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-8 18:29


根据zm分析所言，梅西和特维斯的战术上不兼容，是因为都是伪9号造成的。

一是表现在前场，伪9号特维斯在国家队的边锋位置不适应，但是前一场后半段，特维斯顶上去打中锋时也不适应啦，他做不了比利亚，那排什么433阵形呢？

退一步讲，梅西打左边锋，特维斯打伪9号，拉维奇打右边锋，这样也可以委曲求全吧？但是俺估计，这样的配置上，特维斯也完不成这个角色的

二是梅西后撤中场，与巴内加和坎比，也不能形成合力，这说明什么呢？

如果中场配置上这里不能跟梅西有效配合，还谈什么高仿巴萨呢？

这不是扯淡吗？！

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-8 18:55




Lionel Messi is an easy target for Argentina's collective failings

阿根廷集体失败，责难铺天盖地，而梅西首当其冲

When the albiceleste underperform with Messi in the side, he's the one blamed. Against Colombia, they underperformed again

当梅西和蓝白军团在本届美洲杯首演表现不佳时，他梅西就是那个被指责的人。对阵哥伦比亚，梅西们再次表现不佳。。。


Lionel Messi reacts after Argentina's goalless draw with Colombia in the Copa América. Photograph: Fernando Vergara/AP

He had his opportunity. With 10 minutes to go, Argentina won a free-kick by the right corner of the Colombia box. Lionel Messi stepped up. This was his chance to silence the grumblers, to mark his return to his home province with a deft assist, or perhaps even a goal. For a left-footer, the angle seemed inviting. He approached the ball – one step, two steps, three. Back went the left-foot, and ballooning high and wide went the ball, neither shot nor cross nor anything other than an indication of the lack of confidence that seems to submerge his game every time he pulls on the albiceleste shirt. As he trudged off at the final whistle after a goalless draw against Colombia, a smattering of boos rippled across the Estanislao López.

What makes it worse is that this was supposed to be his triumphant return home. It was only 110 miles to the south that Messi first kicked a ball. Some people say the boy's grandmother made the coach do it; Salvador Ricardo Aparicio himself says that he was a player short and asked the boy's grandmother if the five-year-old, who'd been kicking a ball against a nearby wall, would like to play. Everybody who was there on that dusty field in Rosario agrees what happened next. The ball came to the boy, clad in a shirt several sizes too big for him. He prodded at it with his right foot. When it came to his left, though, he started dribbling "as if he'd done that all his life", his grandmother said.

Those around reacted as if they'd seen a vision. Here was a pibe in action, the incarnation of the ideal of Argentinian football. The figure is an archetype that runs back to the earliest days of Argentinian football, from the days in the first decade of the 20th century when it first began to establish an identity distinct from that of the British ex-pats who had established the game in the country.

If Argentina wanted to erect a statue to its footballing spirit, the journalist Borocotó wrote in El Gráfico in 1928, it should depict "a pibe with a dirty face, a man of hair rebelling against the comb; with the intelligent, roving, trickster and persuasive eyes and a sparkling gaze that seem to hint at a picaresque laugh that does not quite manage to form on his mouth, full of small teeth that might be worn down by eating yesterday's bread."

The true embodiment of the pibe, of course, was Diego Maradona. Even Maradona accepts that Messi is his equal for skill, and he has a similar urchin build. Notably, though, Messi's hair no longer rebels against the comb – in fact, his may be the most sensible footballer's haircut since the days of Kevin Sheedy and Peter Davenport; a streak of European discipline has entered his soul.

It seems a trivial point, but it's not insignificant. Messi left Rosario for Spain at the age of 13, and there is a sense that Argentinian fans still don't entirely trust him. In that, he resembles another native of Rosario who found fame abroad and was never entirely accepted back home: Che Guevara. The move undoubtedly did Messi good, and not just because it secured him the growth hormones Newell's Old Boys could no long afford. It protected him, both against temptation – Pep Guardiola, then the reserve coach, quickly stepped in when he started partying with Ronaldinho – and against the machinations of agents, which may yet destroy the career of his contemporary Carlos Tevez.

But it also means that every time Messi underperforms for the national team – or, more accurately, every time the national team underperforms with Messi in the side – he is the one who takes the blame. In part that is natural for the best player in the team: he is the star, the genius, it's his shirt the counterfeit merchants are selling outside the grounds; therefore it's his job to drag the game the way of his side. But there is also a sense that whatever he does it will not quite be enough, that there will always be a suspicion that he doesn't quite give his all for Argentina. Given that he had the opportunity to play for Spain's youth teams and turned it down, that seems a little unfair.

To an extent the issue is generational. Younger fans accept that players leave for Europe as soon as they can; older fans seem still to find it hard to accept that the primera has become a diminished league. After the first game a taxi-driver even claimed that Argentina would be better picking only four Europe-based players if they wanted the team to play with pride.

There were chants for Messi before kick-off in Santa Fe but even here, the cheer for Tevez, rougher-edged and thus the more authentic avatar of pibismo, was much louder than the one for Messi when the teams were read out before kick-off. The stadium announcer neatly encapsulated the mood: "Con la 10, el mejor del mundo, Lionel Messi. Y con la 11, el jugador del pueblo, Carlos Tevez." Messi is the best in the world, but Tevez is the player of the people.

Messi, in truth, didn't look much like the best player in the world. He mooched around looking largely ineffective, perhaps all too aware that when he came deep in search of the ball it was not Xavi or Andrés Iniesta going ahead of him as it would be at Barcelona, but Esteban Cambiasso. Only once, after 34 minutes, as he slid a pass through for Ezequiel Lavezzi, was there a flash of his brilliance. The Napoli forward, though, described by Sergio Batista as Messi's co-pilot, was denied by Luis Martínez.

It's not Messi's fault, of course. Tevez, however popular he may be, was no more effective. This is an environment in which no player looked comfortable, anxious with the expectation and burdened by a tactical system that seems to suit nobody. As against Bolivia, Batista switched to a 4-2-1-3 late on, but Messi looked as uncomfortable as an enganche as he had as a false nine. This is a collective failure, tactical and mental, and ultimately Batista must take responsibility. It is Messi, though, the pibe with the European manners, who provides the easier target.

Posted by Jonathan Wilson in Santa Fe Thursday 7 July 2011 14.57 BST guardian.co.uk

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-8 18:59


上楼参考译文
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阿根廷集体失败 梅西却成替罪羔羊
由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球



美洲杯阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚后梅西的反应。图片来源：Fernando Vergara/AP

曾经有一个机会摆在他的面前。比赛仅剩10分钟了，阿根廷在哥伦比亚禁区右角的位置获得一个任意球。梅西走上前去，这是属于他的机会，可以让那些叽叽喳喳的人闭嘴，他能用一记精彩的助攻，甚至是一粒进球来昭示他的王者归来。对于一个左脚将来说，这个角度看上去是个不错的机会。他走近皮球——一步，两步，三步。他抡起左脚，放了一记高炮，皮球不见踪影。这球既不是射门，也不是传中，其中除了自信心的缺乏再无他物，而每次当他拉起身上的蓝白球衣捂脸时，不自信似乎都要将他淹没。最后终场哨声响起，阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚，当他蹒跚而行时，几丝嘘声撕裂了洛佩斯球场的天空。

更为糟糕的现实是，人们原本期待这是他的荣归故里，这里离他第一次踢球的地方只有110英里远。有人说是他的祖母让教练带他去踢球的；阿帕里西奥他自己说当时缺一个队员，便问这孩子的祖母，这个对着旁边的墙踢球的5岁男孩愿不愿意过来踢球呢。每个当时在罗萨里奥那片尘土飞扬的空地上的人都知道接下来发生了什么。球滚到男孩的脚下，他身上还穿着一件大几个码的衬衫。他用右脚捅了一下皮球，当球滚到左边时，虽然是左脚，他开始带球，如他祖母所说，“他好像之前的一辈子都在做这件事。”

周围的人好像看到了一个幻影：这有一个跃动的孩子，是阿根廷足球理想的化身。他就像阿根廷足球早期时的一个典型球员，那还是在上世纪的第一个十年，是在英国移民把足球引入这个国度后，阿根廷开始发展与之不同、自己特有的足球的时期。

1928年记者Borocoto在《体育画报》杂志写道，如果阿根廷想要为她的足球精神立一座雕像的话，就应该塑造“一个脸上脏兮兮的小孩儿，头发桀骜不驯，眼神透露出聪慧，漂泊，狡猾，雄辩，还要带有一种闪光的凝视，其中流露出流氓式的笑意，嘴却没什么变化，其中满是小小的牙齿，好像啃一点儿昨天的剩面包就会掉下来。”

这个小孩儿的真实例子，毫无疑问就是马拉多纳。连老马都承认梅西在技术层面和他是同一个档次的，而梅西也是一个类似的顽童形象。尽管值得注意的是，梅西的头发不再张牙舞爪了——事实上他的头发也许是自凯文-席迪和彼得-达文波特的时代之后，最服服帖帖的足球运动员发型了，欧洲的纪律性已经深入他的灵魂。

这看上去是个不起眼的小细节，但它非常重要。梅西在13岁时离开罗萨里奥前往西班牙，我们能感觉到阿根廷球迷还不是完完全全地信任他。在这个意义上，他很像另一个在国外获得盛名，却在家乡永远也没能被完全接受的罗萨里奥人：切-格瓦拉。远走他乡对梅西而言毋庸置疑是有好处的，这不仅仅是因为在异国他能接受纽维儿老男孩提供不了的激素治疗。这里保护着他不受诱惑的勾引——瓜迪奥拉，这位之后的巴萨教练在梅西开始和小罗一起踢球时就很快介入了；也保护他不受经纪人阴谋的影响，而这有可能毁了他的同胞特维斯。

但这也意味着每次梅西在国家队表现不尽如人意时——或者更准确地说，每次当国家队阵中有梅西而表现不佳时——他总是替罪羊。在某种程度上这对于队中最优秀的球员来说是很自然的：他是闪耀的明星，是才华横溢的天才，场外那些盗版商买的都是他的球衣，因此带领球队走上正轨也是他的责任。但也会有人这么想：无论他做什么，那都还不够；人们总是质疑他没有为阿根廷奉献自己的全部。考虑到梅西曾有机会为西班牙的青年队效力，但他拒绝了这个邀请，这种质疑有些不公平。

在某种程度上这个问题是跟球迷的世代相关的。年轻的球迷能接受球员尽早前往欧洲踢球，而年纪稍大的球迷则还是很难接受阿甲日益式微的现实。在第一场比赛之后，一位出租车司机甚至说，要是阿根廷想要为荣誉而战的话，他们该只选入4个在欧洲踢球的球员，那整体会踢得更好。

在圣塔菲，开球之前有人为梅西高歌。但即使是在这儿，当开球前宣读球员名单时，人们为特维斯的欢呼远远高过为梅西的，这欢呼原始粗犷，于是他更像是理想中那个孩子的化身。体育场播音员很干净地表达了这情绪：“接下来是10号，世界上最好的球员，梅西。再接下来是11号，人民的球员，特维斯。”梅西是世界最佳，特维斯却是属于人民的。

事实上，梅西看起来并不像世界上最好的球员。他四处散步，看上去很没效率，也许他太清楚自己要是后撤拿球的话，这里不会像在巴萨那样有哈维和伊涅斯塔前插，这里只有坎比亚索。只有一次他闪现了他的天才，那是在第34分钟他妙传拉维奇。尽管被巴蒂斯塔称作梅西的副驾驶，这个那不勒斯前锋的球还是被马丁内斯扑出。

这当然不是梅西的错。不管特维斯人气有多么高，他也没什么效率。目前的这个环境没有人能踢得舒服，大家都因巨大的期望而焦虑不已，又被不知道是为设计的战术体系所累。在对阵玻利维亚时，巴蒂斯塔后来换阵4213，但梅西在踢伪9号时，看上去像是被什么钩住了一样不舒服。这是集体的失败，战术上和精神上的失败，最根本的是巴蒂斯塔必须担负这个责任。而梅西，这个带有欧洲风度的孩子，却成了更容易被攻击的目标。

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-9 12:40
狗孩一位网友说，全世界都知道梅西是阿根廷人，唯有阿根廷人例外

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作者: elite    时间: 2011-7-9 14:20
关于智利1-1乌拉圭之战，下面有一个带有图的简要战术分析帖子
http://bbs.goalhi.com/2464807.html

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作者: elite    时间: 2011-7-9 14:34


Argentina's failures at the Copa America are system-based
美洲杯开赛以来阿根廷发挥不佳源于系统性桎梏

Story Highlights 全文要点：

Lionel Messi has borne the brunt of the criticism for Argentina's poor play；
梅西在遭受因阿根廷队表现不佳的责难中而首当其冲；

The real issue is the use of three holding midfielders and no real link man；
这个真正的实质性的问题在于使用了三后腰却没有真正串联之人；

Argentina's players have also been guilty of overdribbling at times
阿根廷球员也屡犯带球过多的毛病


The use of three holding midfielders such as Esteban Cambiasso (right) has stifled Argentina's midfield creativity. Jaso Jacome/Landov 使用象坎比亚索这样的三后腰战术（图中右边）已经限制了阿根廷中场创造性发挥

One player has emerged from the first week of the Copa America with his reputation enhanced. Sadly for Argentina, that player is Spain's Xavi Hernandez. 美洲杯开赛1周以来，有一个球员的形象愈发突现在球场上，人们对他渴望与日俱浓。（但是），这种渴望对阿根廷人来说是悲伤的，那位球员就是西班牙队的哈维-赫尔南德斯。

Outside of the Barcelona support structure, without the tiki-taka legions at his back, Lionel Messi has looked worryingly ordinary. 离开巴萨支持结构、缺乏身后的tiki-taka系的支援，梅西在美洲杯赛场上已经显现出之前令人担忧的平庸。The doubts that Argentina fans had about him have been magnified by his performances in the draws with Bolivia and Colombia. 阿根廷球迷对他的质疑，已经被他在阿根廷与玻利维亚和哥伦比亚两场交战的平局中的表现所强化。This has been a systemic failure, tactical and mental, for Argentina, and the more Sergio Batista tries to calm the fury of fans and the media by insisting this tournament is primarily about preparation for the World Cup, the more loudly comes the response that the next stage of that preparation will be to get rid of him. 这种情势和后果，对阿根廷队而言，已经是系统性失败了，不论战术还是精神层面；不仅如此，塞尔吉奥-巴蒂斯塔，还一再强调这届美洲杯主要是为2014世界杯作准备的，这样来面对球迷以及媒体的不满和愤怒，他愈加想要保持平静，那么，舆论对此反应是，下一步的准备工作就是要他从主帅位置上滚蛋的吼声，则愈发强烈。

Against Colombia on Wednesday in a 0-0 draw, it wasn't just that Argentina lacked a little spark, as it had against Bolivia, it was that it was shockingly, crassly open at the back. Colombia's Adrian Ramos and Dayro Moreno were guilty of extraordinary misses, and three one-on-ones were wasted in the second half. Colombia should have won the game comfortably and, had that happened, Argentina would be facing Monday's game against Costa Rica needing a win just to be assured of third in the group.

"The worst moment under Batista," said La Nacion. "Batista is directing the Titanic into an iceberg," said As. "The national team doesn't start," said Clarin. It was shambolic. The pattern was similar to the Bolivia game -- 20 minutes of calm, measured if slightly toothless soccer, followed by 70 minutes of panic and chaos. And at the heart of it all, oddly glum, stood Lionel Messi. Anybody who still believes soccer is just about picking the best players and letting them get on with it needs only to look at Batista's Argentina to see how flawed that idea is.

Batista has done his best to retract the comment, but before the opening game he said he wanted his team to play like Barcelona: a 4-3-3 with Messi used as a false nine, dropping deep from his center-forward's position to create space for the wide forwards to cut in, and for players to make breaks form midfield. This, he had decided, rather than as a classic enganche -- literally "hook" -- between midfield and attack, was the way to get the best out of his best player.

That may be true, but soccer is a holistic game. Can Carlos Tvez and Ezequiel Lavezzi cut in from wide? Yes, they can. In that sense the front three should work, and there were indications against Colombia, most notably in the sublimely-weighted pass Messi slipped through for Lavezzi 10 minutes before halftime, that some sort of understanding was being generated there. These things, of course, take time: at Barcelona they have been worked out over a period of a decade or so at La Masia; note how it took even David Villa, coming in to a settled and successful side, four or five months fully to adapt. Batista doesn't have a decade -- he has had maybe three weeks -- and to that existent he is due the sympathy of any national coach in the modern era.

So let's move to the next layer. When Messi drops deep for Barcelona, he has Xavi and Andres Iniesta breaking beyond him; with Argentina, it's Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso. Banega and Cambiasso are perfectly serviceable holding midfielders. Cambiasso has even shown a certain knack for getting forward to score over his career, but they are hardly players of the wit, intelligence or movement of Xavi and Iniesta. When they get the ball, it stops -- as it does with Tevez and Lavezzi; this isn't the pass-and-move tiki-taka of Barca; it's something a little more ponderous, something, frankly, heretical as it may seem in Argentina, with too much dribbling, and it leaves Messi playing at a different rhythm to the rest of his team.

Then there is the issue of the fullbacks. At Barcelona, the wide forwards can drift inside knowing that they have a very attacking fullback overlapping, both providing width and drawing the opposing fullback. This is the beauty of Barcelona's system: when Messi goes deep a midfielder can go forward or a wide forward can cut in opening space for a surging fullback. One player's movement creates a vacuum and that generates the swirl of movement. Argentina simply doesn't have that. With Pablo Zabaleta, Argentina had a measure of attacking width from deep -- he certainly seemed far better suited to the system than Marcos Rojo had -- but he is no Dani Alves (after all, who is?), and neither can the 37-year-old legs of Javier Zanetti offer regular surges forward on the other flank. Moreover, when players do push on, the instinct to cover isn't there. Javier Mascherano drops in as a third center-back at times, as the holding player does for Barcelona, which should in theory liberate the fullbacks , but the mutual understanding isn't yet there -- and, with the players available, may never be.

Amid all the Batista-bashing, it should also be said that Colombia's coach, Hernan Dario Gomez, got it absolutely right tactically. The use of Carlos Sanchez as a holding player in a 4-1-4-1 meant that there was always a player in the space into which Messi wanted to move, so that he never had the opportunity to turn and run at goal from that dangerous central area 30-40 yards out. The use of Ramos and Moreno wide also helped dissuade Zabaleta and Zanetti from being too aggressive.

So what does Batista do next? He could, as he did in the final stages, field Gonzalo Higuain as an out-and-out center forward with Messi in behind in a 4-2-3-1. Or he could heed the calls of the public for Javier Pastore to be used in midfield and stick with his 4-3-3. In theory, the linkup between Messi and Pastore could be devastating, but the dangers are twofold, particularly given the lack of practice-time available. Messi and Pastore could effectively end up occupying the same space and/or Pastore, not being used to this style of 4-3-3, could play too high up the field become isolated from the two holders, as Ganso did for Brazil.

The bonus for Batista is that Costa Rica should provide limited opposition; this is a game in which there probably is scope for experimentation before the quarterfinals. Then again, everybody thought that about Bolivia.
Jonathan Wilson is the author of Inverting the Pyramid; Behind the Curtain; Sunderland: A Club Transformed; and The Anatomy of England. Editor of The Blizzard.

Read more: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/jonathan_wilson/07/07/argentina.struggles/index.html#ixzz1RaU4J6Nk

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作者: elite    时间: 2011-7-9 14:38


33楼参考译文
-------------------------------

Jonathan Wilson：美洲杯阿根廷的失败得怪体系

由 kaminosin 发表在GoalHi足球·翻译团-足球


派上3个像坎比亚索这样的后腰限制了阿根廷中场的创造力。Jaso Jacome/Landov

美洲杯开赛一周以来，有一个球员浮现在人们视野之中，声誉大振。可这对阿根廷来说很遗憾：这个球员是西班牙的哈维。

没有了巴萨体系的支持，没有了身后的Tiki-taka军团，梅西看上去不过是一个焦躁的庸才。阿根廷球迷对梅西一直心存怀疑，而对玻利维亚和哥伦比亚的平局中，他的表现加深了这疑虑。对阿根廷而言，这是一个体系的失败，不论是战术上还是精神上。巴蒂斯塔坚称这次锦标赛主要是为下届世界杯做准备，以此为借口企图平息球迷和媒体的愤怒，他费的力越多，民众中“下一个阶段的准备工作就是赶他下台”的反对之声也越大。

周三阿根廷0-0平哥伦比亚，这场不仅仅是像上一场对玻利维亚时阿根廷就差那么一点儿闪光的火花，这次是后防线令人震惊、无比粗糙地门户大开。哥伦比亚的拉莫斯和莫雷诺该为他们没能把握住的绝佳机会而自惭形秽，下半场浪费了3个单刀。哥伦比亚本应该舒舒服服地全取3分，而要是这样的话，那阿根廷在下周一面对哥斯达黎加时必须赢下比赛，以保证小组第三的位置。

“这是巴蒂斯塔执教后最糟糕的时期”，《民族报》如是说。“巴蒂斯塔正开着泰坦尼克号撞冰山”，《阿斯报》戏谑。“阿根廷国家队未能成功启动”，《号角报》评论道。这场比赛就是个大混乱，走势和上场对玻利维亚有类似之处——前20分钟很冷静，踢得谨慎，甚至可以说是有点缺乏锐气，之后70分钟是惊慌失措和一团浆糊。在这一切的最中央，站着一个古怪而闷闷不乐的梅西。任何以为足球就是选出最好的球员，然后让他们自己去踢的人都得来见识一下巴蒂斯塔的阿根廷，这样他们才知道这个想法错得有多不靠谱。

巴蒂斯塔已尽全力少说话，但在揭幕战开始之前他曾说过，他希望这支队伍能像巴萨那样去踢：排433，让梅西踢伪9号，从他中锋的位置后撤，为边锋内切和队友从中场突破留出空间。他已拿定主意，这就是能让手下最好的球员最大力度发挥实力的方法，而不用那种将中场和进攻结合的古典Enganche——字面是“钩子”的意思。

这可能是正确的，但足球是一个集体项目。特维斯和拉维奇会内切吗？对啊，他们当然能做到。在这个意义上前场三叉戟应该能起作用，而在对哥伦比亚时他们之间也有了些相互理解的迹象，这最明显的是中场前10分钟梅西传给拉维奇那精彩的一球。这种理解当然需要时间，在巴塞罗那梅西和他的队友可是在拉玛西亚一起踢了十年或更长。但巴蒂斯塔没有十年的大好光阴——他只有大概3个星期——在某种程度上，他也应该得到现代任何一个国家队主教练都应得的同情。

那让我们继续到下一层吧。当梅西在巴萨位置后撤时，他有哈维和伊涅斯塔两个队友可前插，而在阿根廷队他只有巴内加和坎比亚索。这两人都是非常称职的后腰，而坎比亚索甚至在其职业生涯中展现出一种前插得分的特殊天赋，但与哈维和伊涅斯塔相比，他俩还是远不具有那种聪慧、才智和跑位。当他们拿球时，进攻就终结了——特维斯和拉维奇也是一样。阿根廷踢的不是巴萨式一传一跑的Tiki-taka，他们踢得更笨拙，而坦白地说，他们现在的踢法就阿根廷传统而言像是旁门左道，带球太多，并使得梅西和他的其他队友不在一个步调上。

接下来看看边后卫的问题。在巴萨，边锋知道自己身后还有个攻击欲望强烈的边后卫上前助攻，于是他们可以向中路移动，为己方提供宽度，也调动对方的边后卫。这是巴萨系统的美丽所在：当梅西后撤时一个中场可以前场，或者是一个边锋内切，并给插上的边后卫留出空间。一个球员的跑位造出一个空当，并继续生出一连串移动。阿根廷就是没有这一套东西。拥有萨巴莱塔的阿根廷可以选择从后场开始，利用宽度来进攻——他当然比罗霍要更适合目前体系得多——但他还不是阿尔维斯（毕竟又有谁是呢？），而另一侧37岁高龄的萨内蒂也扛不住来来回回的前插冲刺跑。此外，当真有球员前插时，剩下的人没有补位的意识。马斯切拉诺有时会后退一些作为第三个中后卫，就像在他巴萨踢后腰时所做的那样，这在理论上能解放边后卫，但他们现在缺乏默契——就目前的人员配备来说，也许永远都不会有了。

在一片对巴蒂斯塔的口诛笔伐之中，我们也得说哥伦比亚主教练戈麦斯的战术布置非常正确。在4-1-4-1阵型中让桑切斯踢后腰，这意味着在梅西想要移动的空间中总能有一个队员在那儿，于是梅西从来没机会在中路距球门30~40码的危险位置转身并奔向球门。让拉莫斯和莫雷诺拉边也有助于压制萨巴莱塔和萨内蒂的助攻。

于是乎巴蒂斯塔下一步该做些什么呢？他可以像比赛后期那样，让伊瓜因首发做一个彻底的中锋，梅西在其身后，变阵4-2-3-1。或者他可以听从民众的呼唤，让帕斯拖雷司职中场，坚持他的4-3-3。在理论上梅西和帕斯拖雷的联合将无坚不摧，但也存在两重风险，特别是考虑到他们缺乏有效的训练时间。梅西和帕斯拖雷可能会位置重叠，而同时也许帕斯拖雷不适应这种形式的4-3-3，在场上的位置太靠前而孤立在其他两个后腰之外，就像甘索在巴西的问题一样。

给巴蒂斯塔的额外收获是哥斯达黎加的威胁并不大，在这场四分之一决赛之前的比赛里他可以大胆尝试一把。最后再提一句，在对阵玻利维亚时每个人也都这么想的。

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作者: elite    时间: 2011-7-9 15:12


34楼的翻译，明显有个人喜好在里面的。例如，正文的第一二段的翻译中一些词的使用上，不是很恰当的。

看俺的翻译，味道肯定不一样。

例如“庸才”一词，这是个定性说法，最好不要轻易使用。而原文只不过是ordinary， 乃普通、平常、正常等的意思。

俺们可以说某球员某场表现不佳、平常、糟糕等，都是切合实际的，但是动不动使用天才、庸才，往往就是走极端的表现。一个天才级的球员，突然就成了庸才，这是量变还是质变？还是突变呢？如果是突变，那得是遭受了核辐射才对

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作者: 弗爵爷    时间: 2011-7-9 16:17
有没有ZM给乌拉圭VS智利的战术复盘？

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-9 16:19

有没有ZM给乌拉圭VS智利的战术复盘？
弗爵爷 发表于 2011-7-9 16:17

还木有这么快吧，至少也得等到明日凌晨以后吧

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作者: 弗爵爷    时间: 2011-7-9 16:21
好的，我等着，先谢过90兄了

智利确实打的很有内容，有整体有个体

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作者: sailor_l    时间: 2011-7-9 16:37
如果这界比赛收获一个罗梅罗也算是好事。

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-10 04:07


Chile 1-1 Uruguay: in-game changes dictate the pattern of play
智利1-1乌拉圭: 比赛中调整支配着双方发挥的格局
July 9, 2011


The starting line-ups

Goals from Alvaro Pereira and Alexis Sanchez meant another Copa draw. 阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚和阿莱克斯-桑切斯的分别进球意味着，智乌之战是两队自美洲杯开赛以来的又一场平局，这场战罢，他们在c组均各积2分，分列第3、4名。

Both managers made changes. Claudio Borghi dropped Mati Fernandez and brought in Luis Jiminez behind the front two, but kept the same shape as in the opening day win over Mexico. 两队的主教练都对阵容做了调整。克劳迪奥-伯尔奇撤下马迪-菲尔南德斯而是让路易斯-吉米内斯出现在两位前锋之后，不过仍保持同首场取胜墨西哥时一样的首发阵型，即3412。

Oscar Tabarez made two changes from the draw against Peru. Nicolas Loderio dropped out and was replaced by Alvaro Pereira, whilst at the back Sebastian Coates came in for Mauricio Victorino, as Uruguay switched to a three-man defence. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯对首战秘鲁平局的阵容做了2处调整。首战打中场的尼克拉斯-罗德里奥被拿下，代之以阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚出场，而后卫线上用塞巴斯蒂安-克雅特斯替换马里西奥-维克多里奥，这样乌拉圭则改打三后卫阵型了。

The game took a similar pattern to Chile’s game against Mexico – they were the stronger side in possession but couldn’t break down the opposition until late in the game. 比赛走向同智利与墨西哥之战一样的格局——智利队在控球方面则显得更强一些，但是难以给对手致命打击，直到比赛后期才破门逼平对手。

Uruguay defence

Tabarez has switched to a three-man backline before – he did so against France in the opening game of the World Cup, when he was (perhaps too modestly, in hindsight) playing for a 0-0, having experimented with the shape in the pre-tournament friendlies. This three-man defence was more about creating a spare man at the back against the pace and power of Humberto Suazo and Alexis Sanchez, and the youngster Coates had a very good game as the sweeper, constantly covering for the other two centre-backs and getting in the way when Suazo thought he was clear.

The three-man defence was less successful as a whole, however. Sanchez is a very intelligent player and understands the tactical nuances of the game very quickly, and recognised that there was little point in him remaining high up against the centre-backs. Instead of moving to the right, as he did against Mexico, he dropped into the midfield more, as he did at Udinese throughout 2010/11 – see the game against Inter, for example. This meant Uruguay had a surplus of defenders, and Chile dominated the midfield ground.

The other interesting element of the midfield battle was that, with Lodeiro not in the side and an extra man at the back, the Perez-Arevalo duo had more freedom, with Arevalo venturing forward more.

Chile defence

The main battles were at either end, though, and Chile had to put up with a dangerous 3 v 3 situation at the back. Borghi’s predecessor Marcelo Bielsa always wanted a spare man, of course, and would have instantly changed to a back four – but Borghi stuck with his three, with the small caveat that Gary Medel dropped back and helped out.

The difference in the numbers in defence meant the two sides played with very different styles in their build-up play. Chile had midfield superiority and had to try and overload the Uruguayan defence, so played slowly and patiently in order to get midfield runners forward. On the other hand, Uruguay tried to play more direct to take advantage of the 3 v 3 situation. Their best two chances (a Luis Suarez shot and a Diego Forlan volley) came after long balls.

The 3 v 3 also meant they could press Chile at goal kicks easily, and Borghi’s side struggled to pass out from the back.

Uruguay three becomes a four

Tabarez and Uruguay realised that with Sanchez dropping into midfield, they didn’t really need three centre-backs, and so as the game progressed, they increasingly looked more like a four at the back. This was a simple switch – Maxi Pereira played deeper, Alvaro Pereira pushed on, and Martin Caceres moved back out to become more of a left-back. It was a 4-4-2ish system. The half-time change – forward Edinson Cavani off and midfielder Alvaro Gonzalez on down the right – was another sign that Tabarez had changed system.

A byproduct of this change was actually crucial in the goal, because Alvaro Pereira found himself in the box and swept home the opening goal – it’s difficult to imagine that he would have been in that position as a wing-back, rather than a winger.

Borghi makes attacking change

Typically, Chile became even more attacking after going behind. Unlike against Mexico, Borghi’s substitution didn’t change the shape of the side, but it was an even more offensive move – Arturo Vidal became the left-sided centre-back, Gonzalo Jara was taken off, and Jorge Valdivia, the number ten, came on to provide clever passes from the centre of midfield.

This had an immediate impact – four minutes later, Valdivia’s incisive pass to the left played in Jean Beausejour, who cut the ball back to Sanchez, who finished.

Chile then had the momentum, although bringing on Carlos Carmona for Beausejour seemed to kill this slightly.
Tabarez tried to go for the second goal with Lodeiro on for Arevalo, but it finished 1-1.

Conclusion

This was an interesting match, with Tabarez switching to three at the back to deal with Chile, and then reverting to a back four when he realised that Sanchez was increasingly dropping off the front. The change to a 4-4-2ish shape meant both sides ended up with a spare man at the back, rather than the situation at the start when Uruguay had two spare men, and Chile had none.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-10 04:07
40楼参考译文:占位

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-10 10:57
乌拉圭是不断在三、四后卫中进行切换

智利的三后卫就相对明显一点

实际上智利队在防守阵型中也经常变成四后卫，后腰梅德尔的位置会回收到庞塞的身边，作为一名上抢的中卫

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-10 11:10

乌拉圭是不断在三、四后卫中进行切换

智利的三后卫就相对明显一点

实际上智利队在防守阵型中也经常变成四后卫，后腰梅德尔的位置会回收到庞塞的身边，作为一名上抢的中卫 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-10 10:57

看来南美人都爱玩很潮的战术？

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-10 23:00


Brazil 2-2 Paraguay: Brazil snatch the draw
July 10, 2011


The starting line-ups

Mano Menezes ditched the “European” 4-2-3-1, went for a Dunga-style compromise system, then ended up with 4-2-2-2…

He dropped Robinho from his starting line-up, favouring Jadson who played much narrower on the right, as he has done in previous friendlies.

Gerardo Martino went for the 4-4-2 / 4-3-3 hybrid that he often favoured at last summer’s World Cup. Roque Santa Cruz played on the right, and made diagonal runs to a centre-forward position.

Both sides were ahead at some point in the game, but neither side ever had overall control. Brazil were much better than in the first game going forward, but looked significantly more vulnerable at the back (perhaps because they were up against a better team).

Paraguay tactics

Martino had a habit of frustrating bigger sides at the World Cup last year with this shape, and Brazil found it difficult to stamp their authority on the game. Santa Cruz nullifed Andre Santos, who wasn’t brave or intelligent enough to influence the game on the left, and the left-back also switched off and let Santa Cruz run past him for a couple of chances.

In the midfield, Enrique Vera sat deep and picked up Ganso, with two central midfielders ahead doing battle with Brazil’s two holders. Marcelo Estigarrabia took on Dani Alves. Paraguay generally defended very narrow both at the back and in midfield, forcing Brazil to go down the flanks.

Brazil tactics

The decision to bring in Jadson over Robinho was not about personnel, it was about shape. In Brazil’s first game against Venezuela, Ganso struggled to provide decisive passes for Brazil’s front three. Part of the problem was that there was too much emphasis placed upon him for creativity, and there was a separate issue: he played too high up, and Brazil couldn’t find him with an initial pass from midfield.

In purely numerical terms, having one man providing creativity and using three men higher up the pitch ready to put the finishing touches to moves didn’t make sense – the introduction of Jadson, in a deeper, more central role than Robinho, was about shifting the balance. Jadson meant Brazil’s build-up play was more gradual, and Ganso had a colleague in close proximity to help create.

Ganso-Jadson
This worked pretty well, even if Brazil’s attacking play was still patchy. The Ganso-Jadson combination caused problems for Paraguay between the lines, and twice they linked up well – first when exchanging passes for a great chance Pato wasted, and then for the goal, where Ganso teed up Jadson to fire home.

Interestingly, this change in system also meant an alteration to the way the two holding midfielders played. In the Venezuela game, Ramires generally played to the left of Lucas, but here he played to the right, presumably as Menezes wanted him to shuttle out to the right and cover the (barer than usual) right flank. Pato also moved out to the right more – his movement was less restricted with only one forward alongside him. Brazil again tried to hit long balls towards Pato, though, which doesn’t really play to his strengths.

Paraguay compete in midfield

Paraguay were defending well as a unit, pressing at the right moments and meaning that Ganso rarely picked up the ball on his way to goal – he had to come deep, or receive the ball with his back to goal, unlike in the first game, where Venezuela pushed up too high and gave him space between the lines.

Nestor Ortigoza was good on the ball for Martino’s side, dictating play from deep, and coming short to collect the ball. This caused Brazil some confusion in midfield as Lucas moved up the pitch to close down Ortigoza, when he would have preferred to sit deep with Ramires higher up.


The five stages of Menezes' move from 4-2-3-1. ONE: The 4-2-1-3 against Venezuela. TWO: The modified 4-2-1-3 for this game, with Jadson in for Robinho, and the two holders switching ides. THREE: Elano replaces Jadson on the right. FOUR: Lucas Moura comes on for Ramires, with Elano moving deep. FIVE: Fred replaces Neymar.

Second half

Menezes made a change at half time, withdrawing Jadson and bringing on Elano in the same position. His reasoning, presumably, was to guard against a second yellow card – and with Alves being given something of a difficult time by the tricky Estigarrabia, some extra cover was needed.

Unfortunately, this destabilized the Brazilian side, and despite enjoying a good relationship at club level, the Elano-Ganso combination didn’t work particularly well. Nor did it help defensively – Elano was caught out for Paraguay’s equaliser. Alves made an individual error for the slightly fortunate second Paraguayan goal.

Brazilian subs

Menezes made two further attacking substitutions to try and get back in the game. First, Ramires went off, and Lucas Moura came on. This meant Elano going deeper into the Ramires role, and Lucas Moura playing as something approaching a second number ten alongside Ganso, even more narrow than Jadson had played. There was now no right-winger, with Alves trying to cover the entire flank by himself.

That narrowed Brazil on the right, and the second change narrowed them on the left. The ineffectual Neymar was removed for Fred, who played as a central striker, and suddenly Brazil were more like a 4-2-2-2 – Lucas Leiva and Elano holding, Ganso and Lucas Moura creating, Fred and Pato upfront. This narrow system almost played into the hands of Paraguay’s narrowness, but late on an attack right through the middle got Brazil their equaliser – Ganso again got the assist with a clever flick, and Fred struck the ball into the corner.

Conclusion

The first Copa game with more than three goals in it – first and foremost, this was an entertaining match.

Martino kept roughly the same shape throughout, whilst Menezes chopped and changed. Neither conclusively won the tactical battle – Paraguay defended well in open play but sometimes got overloaded between the lines with two Brazilian creators.

Brazil’s problem defensively was their right flank, although Andre Santos had a habit of switching off and letting men run past him. Another change for the final group game wouldn’t be a surprise, perhaps with Fred starting permanently as a central striker.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-10 23:07
44楼参考译文：占位

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作者: KAY    时间: 2011-7-11 05:46

34楼的翻译，明显有个人喜好在里面的。例如，正文的第一二段的翻译中一些词的使用上，不是很恰当的。

看俺的翻译，味道肯定不一样。

例如“庸才”一词，这是个定性说法，最好不要轻易使用。而原文只不过是ordinary ...
elite 发表于 2011-7-9 15:12

ordinary在字典里查是普通正常的意思，但是真正用来形容人是基本上就是委婉的骂人（参见电影美国美人末尾段，邻居家的儿子是怎么用ordinary来形容主角家女儿的那个漂亮同学的），类似于mediocre，说是庸才也不算违背原意，当然从语气上说，稍微过了一点点，说是凡夫俗子比较贴合英文原意

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作者: KAY    时间: 2011-7-11 05:49

如果这界比赛收获一个罗梅罗也算是好事。
sailor_l 发表于 2011-7-9 16:37

罗梅罗感觉比在世界杯时反应更敏捷了，但他还是有明显技术缺陷，抓球不稳，表现在比赛中很多把球扑出和击出，常常给对手二次进攻的机会

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-12 13:20

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-12 13:23

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-12 13:26

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-12 13:40
阿根廷 3-0 哥斯达黎加

首发阵容

昆               西瓜

            梅西  
天使
                 加戈
         小马
                  
萨内蒂             小萨

      小米利托  企鹅

下半场，换上小帕、比利亚、拉维奇
阵型变为 442 或者4312， 1是小帕、2是梅西和拉维奇

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作者: 内马尔    时间: 2011-7-12 14:49
巴西教练把内马尔换下，是踢假球。鉴定完毕。。。。

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-12 22:07

巴西教练把内马尔换下，是踢假球。鉴定完毕。。。。
内马尔 发表于 2011-7-12 14:49

那叫弗雷德情何以堪？

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-13 00:48

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作者: pedro    时间: 2011-7-13 02:02

Argentina safely through
Atletico Madrid striker Sergio Aguero netted a brace as Argentina played their best football of the Copa America to defeat Costa Rica 3-0 and progress to the final eight of the tournament.  Read

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-13 02:16


Argentina 3-0 Costa Rica: Batista finally changes system, and Argentina progressJuly 12, 2011


The starting line-ups

A much-changed Argentina side finally got a win, mainly thanks to some Lionel Messi magic.

Sergio Batista gave first starts to Gonzalo Higuain, Angel di Maria, Fernando Gago and Sergio Aguero. Carlos Tevez, Ezequiel Lavezzi, Ever Banega and Esteban Cambiasso dropped out.

Ricardo La Volpe brought in Jose Cubero and Cesar Elizondo in midfield, and their shape was similar to their opening day defeat to Colombia.

Argentina were utterly dominant here, recording 17 shots to Costa Rica’s five, becoming the first side in the competition to score three goals in a game.

Costa Rica tactics

Costa Rica sat deep without the ball in a broad 3-5-1-1 system, vaguely similar to the unusual shape North Korea contested last year’s World Cup with, albeit a more attack-minded version than that.

As in the game against Colombia, there was lots of movement, particularly down the left side of the team. Francisco Calvo, Pedro Leal and Cesar Elizondo often seemed to be playing in the same position, such was their tendency to cover each other on runs forward. On the other side, the right-sided midfielder Heiner Mora played much narrower, and the wing-back Jose Salvatierra was pinned back by Aguero.

Argentina shape

The main story in this game was all about Argentina’s new shape, however. Having persevered with the Barcelonaesque 4-3-3 in the opening two games – with little success – Batista’s radically-changed XI was expected to line up in a 4-2-1-3 shape, with Lionel Messi in the hole. This has generally been Batista’s plan B, although a more boxy 4-4-1-1 was also predicted by some.

In fact, it was neither of those shapes – it was a strange, lopsided system that was vaguely a diagonal 4-2-2-2, but featured so much fluidity and movement from the attacking players that it’s difficult to give it a definitive name. Javier Mascherano sat deep in his usual role, with Gago slightly in front of him, to his right. Di Maria was generally in the centre of the pitch in an attacking role, but retreated to become a third midfielder without the ball.

Further forward, Aguero moved around but generally stayed on the left flank, whilst Messi played as a number ten, and Higuain was a traditional centre-forward. All this meant that Argentina didn’t really have anyone on the right – both Messi and Higuain took it in turns to move out to that side, but with right-back Pablo Zabaleta hardly the most technically gifted defender, they lacked an outlet from that position.

Out-and-out striker

Having struggled so far without a permanent frontman, Argentina looked delighted to have an obvious reference point upfront, emphasised by the fact that they looked direct to Higuain for a half-chance within the opening thirty seconds of the game. Like Brazil, Argentina have attempted to play without a true striker – as if the fluidity enjoyed by Barcelona (and others who use a false nine) is a must for any side to play beautiful football.

That may be the ideal, but with little time on the training ground to work on attacking moves and combination play, it appears difficult for international sides to play without a true striker. Just as Brazil turned to Fred to save them against Paraguay, Argentina relied on Higuain here – the centre-forward is being treated as something of a ‘get out of jail free’ card.

In truth, Higuain had a shocking game in front of goal. Messi constantly teed him up for chances, only for the Real Madrid striker to slice the ball over, to fire straight at the goalkeeper, or to miss the ball completely, as he did when presented with a point-blank cross from Messi in the first half.

Messi influence

The key, though, was that Messi was involved. In the first two games, he only had two options – to run with the ball, or to play a through-ball for Lavezzi in the outside-right position. Tevez came inside into his space, and often wasn’t a worthwhile passing option. Here, he had more clear passes ‘on’ – Aguero was the wide forward Messi could look to in order to spread the play, Higuain was the man making runs over the top and providing a physical presence, and Di Maria broke forward from midfield far better than Banega did in the opening two games, connecting midfield and attack.

More crucially, Messi’s role allowed him to find space, and he could run at the ball with speed. Part of this may be simply the fact that he was up against an U23 version of a side ranked 53rd in the World, and perhaps we should expect a good performance from the World’s best player in these circumstances. However, there was an improvement in the way he received the ball – when playing as a false nine he always had his back to goal and was moving away from the danger zone (with only one player, Lavezzi, running towards it) and in the 4-2-1-3, he was picking up the ball deeper than the opposition’s two holding players, again, far too deep.

<vedio>

This position seemed a happy medium – Di Maria was the man who brought the ball forward from midfield so Messi didn’t have to, and Higuain provided the battering ram presence to occupy the centre-backs. Higuain’s role also worked in a similar way to Javier Hernandez’s at Manchester United, in the way Hernandez forces the opposition to defend deep, opening up space for Wayne Rooney in the whole. Higuain doesn’t quite have that searing pace, but the concept is the same – the centre-backs’ first thought was not Messi, but the centre-forward.

The first goal was lucky – Aguero tapped home an open goal after a deflection and a rebound – but the second and third were excellent, and both involved Messi picking the ball up, running with it, and slipping the ball through to a left-sided attacker to finish – first Aguero, then Di Maria. The runs from the latter two are exactly what Tevez didn’t do, and exactly what Messi wants and enjoys at club level. Having strived to replicate Barcelona-spec Messi by copying Pep Guardiola’s formation, Batista seems to have found Messi’s best form by ditching it entirely.

Conclusion

Argentina have finally arrived. The quality of their performance shouldn’t be overstated considering the standard of opposition, but then Costa Rica put in decent performances against Colombia and Bolivia.The Costa Ricans often defended with nine players behind the ball, and Argentina created enough chances to justify praise of their system.

Batista now has to make a decision about his next line-up – Higuain’s finishing was terrible, yet he played an important part in the way the team played. An unchanged line-up wouldn’t be a surprise, although opposition with a strong left side would relish the lack of protection afforded to Zabaleta.

For Costa Rica, this tournament was purely a learning experience, and they may be out. If so, they’ve acquitted themselves admirably…but a Venezuela win over Paraguay would see them progress to the knockout stage.

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-13 02:21
56楼参考译文：占位

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作者: thewall    时间: 2011-7-13 12:12
阿根廷对哥斯达黎加简评  


由 李典 发表在GoalHi足球·美洲杯


简单说说对哥斯达黎加之战。GIF太费力，就不做了。

此役由于背水一战必须取胜，因此，巴蒂斯塔的战术明显要积极了许多。我们先看布阵：





这里主要的变化表现在，首先，把马斯切拉诺推前，进攻时压过中场。正如上一贴所述，这样，就使得后场的防守资源不至于严重重叠，也更多地解放了加戈的作用（类比于上一场的巴内加）。而加戈上前后，则更多地分担了上两场梅西的任务，使得梅西不必总是回撤到中场拿球。在这个基础上，撤下右边锋，将这一路的助攻更多地交给插上的右边卫萨巴莱塔，使得梅西在右路活动的空间进一步扩大，角色更加自由。而伊瓜因则顶在最前面，牵扯对方的防线，也给梅西提供传球的机会。最后，迪马利亚相比坎比亚索而言，其位置更加靠前，也更强调带球突破和插入禁区。

这样一来，在阵地进攻中，阿根廷投入的人数明显增加（通常有6-7人），队员之间自然获得了更多相互配合的机会。而整体的压上，更是把对方始终压迫在半场，于是大大增加了控球率，也获得了持续不断的进攻机会。哥斯达黎加本场采用352，但中场线和后卫线之间的空当却很大。一旦阿根廷球员利用技术或者传球突破了中场防守，往往都能获得3打3或者3打4的机会。我前两天一再强调了，以阿根廷前场球员的能力，只要更多地获得这样的机会，破门是迟早的事情，而和具体人员的关系不大。个人认为，这场如果以特维斯顶替伊瓜因的位置，创造的机会未必更少。特维斯的悲剧主要在于，因为他的回防和拼抢能力更强，因此当他上场的时候，往往都是巴蒂斯塔更强调防守反击的时候。这一点在这里暂时不多做讨论。

而在由攻转守的时候，由于马斯切拉诺的压上，更多地照顾到了中场范围的防守，这样加戈的防守压力大大减轻。对方得球后，他不必迅速回撤，而可以展开就地防守，甚至上前进行抢断。从而创造了大量前场断球反击的机会。甚至两个中卫有时也会上前阻截。下图是第二个进球前的示意图，我们看到，当哥斯达黎加进攻时，加戈非但不回防，反而上前抢断，并迅速交给梅西，后者妙传阿圭罗得分。

另外，在本场比赛中，两个边后卫的插上也更加频繁，更加坚决，尤其是右路的萨巴莱塔。由于撤下了右边锋，他几乎在每次进攻中都要上前支援，并多次传中。在由攻转守时，萨巴莱塔的位置也更加靠前。而阿圭罗在左路，和上两场的特维斯相比，则更强调进攻，很少回到本方半场防守。这样，阿根廷就始终对对手保持了进攻压力。以上几点，我们都可以从下图中看到。




上面是哥斯达黎加的一次进攻，此时，阿根廷仍然在对方禁区前保留了伊瓜因和阿圭罗两个攻击点（这在上一场是不可想象的），而加戈并不回防，反而上前试图抢断。萨巴莱塔也仍然留在对方前场。在这个例子中，最后梅西成功断球，迅速传给前场形成2打2。我们同时注意到，哥斯达黎加的阵型在进攻中脱节严重，拖后的两个后卫和中场之间距离巨大，而另一个后卫则突兀地压到了中场。这在哥伦比亚的比赛中也几乎是不可能出现的事情，反映了哥斯达黎加的战术执行力不强。

对于进攻的投入当然是以削弱防守为代价的。加戈和小马上前后，阿根廷在进攻时，后场通常就是2防1或者3防2。其实这本来也是正常的防守人数对比，但巴蒂斯塔在前两场时，却死也不敢这样冒险，非要3防1或5防2不可。下图是一个反击时3防2的例子：



我们看到，由于本方边后卫更多地上前进行助攻，因此在对方反击时不能及时归位，这时候，就需要马诺和1个中卫到边路协防夹击，而另1个中卫做好盯人。幸运地是，本场比赛并没有出现太大的防守漏洞，令人担心的后卫致命失误也没有出现。

但是，考虑到哥斯达黎加的球员，无论技术还是身体还是战术执行力，都不能和上一场的哥伦比亚相比，因此对于本场的成功，也需要冷静思考。加戈本场表现固然出色，但前提是阿根廷实力明显高出一筹，能把对手按在半场狂攻，而不需要他时时迅速回防。一旦遇到强队时，万一他原地抢断抢不下来，而对方的中场和边卫又能够快速投入反击，阿根廷的后防还是非常危险的。这个问题其实上一贴就有讲到，我们还记得对哥伦比亚时，当加戈上场后，由于他压上时回不来，使得后场很快就至少遇到3次险情。进入淘汰赛后，如果加戈还能上场，他的位置必然要略微后撤，这样一来，他的组织作用是否仍然能够最大发挥，还是一个疑问（我们看到本场2:0之后，加戈就回撤到中线，之后的出镜率则大大下降）。

与此同时，哥斯达黎加的后场逼抢，比起上一场也差了一个档次，使阿根廷球员往往能比较轻松地拿球，再观察队友的跑位。当然，个人认为，凭借阿根廷前场的实力，逼抢并不是主要的困难，根本还是兵力的投入问题。进入淘汰赛之后，巴蒂斯塔是否还敢让后场2防1？是否还敢在前场始终保持4个人的投入？个人估计以巴蒂斯塔的性格，应该是不会的，至少上半场不会。目前还不知道下一场的对手是谁，不过下一场，中场肯定会略微回收，特维斯说不定还有机会要上（看中他的防守）。就算特维斯不上，阿圭罗和迪马利亚也必然要更多回防，梅西遇到的困难也肯定要比这一场多。只有万一落后或者打不开局面时，本场的价值才会体现出来。

本场比赛，帕斯托雷上了最后的10分钟。总体来看，拿球和短距离分球的能力不错。但是他的这个位置，在淘汰赛中，巴蒂斯塔最为看重的肯定还是防守和长传的能力，而这些还未得到证明。个人不太看好他在淘汰赛中出场的机会，如果有的话，也应该是在最后需要堆人狂攻的时候了。

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作者: paper155    时间: 2011-7-13 12:28

罗梅罗感觉比在世界杯时反应更敏捷了，但他还是有明显技术缺陷，抓球不稳，表现在比赛中很多把球扑出和击出，常常给对手二次进攻的机会
KAY 发表于 2011-7-11 05:49

如果是对方的传球，那不接住是胆小的表现。如果是力量小的射门，一个高素质的守门员也应该在大多数情况下把球拿住，如果是大力射门，你还想让守门员把球拿住，那是超出要求了。或者你举个例子哪个守门员符合你很少把球扑出和击出的标准的？

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作者: ychee    时间: 2011-7-13 19:19
56# Penelope

“Messi picking the ball up, running with it, and slipping the ball through to a left-sided attacker to finish – first Aguero, then Di Maria. The runs from the latter two are exactly what Tevez didn’t do”


的确这样。。希望巴蒂斯塔不要再变来变去了 皇马的几个应该太熟悉梅西了 跑位也很有默契

现在的问题就是右路 萨巴莱塔助攻留下的大片空间以及中后卫的速度了。。

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-14 06:42

56# Penelope  

“Messi picking the ball up, running with it, and slipping the ball through to a left-sided attacker to finish – first Aguero, then Di Maria. The runs from the latter two are exactly ...
ychee 发表于 2011-7-13 19:19

是的，左边后卫留下的空档是个风险。

小组第一场丢球，就源于在这个位置的对手一个任意球开始。

10世界杯对阵德国时被动也始于，尽管具体原因不同，但共同的一点均是防守不力造成的。

巴西队被巴拉圭打得很被动，阿尔维斯攻上流下的空档也是如此。

对了，谁先一味埋头进攻就有先丢球的风险，且大。

委内瑞拉与巴拉圭一战，委内瑞拉7分钟不到就先进球了，但是巴拉圭先攻势汹汹

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-14 06:43


Uruguay 1-0 Mexico: Uruguay’s pressing leads to dominance, and progression to the knockouts乌拉圭1-0墨西哥：乌队压迫占据主动和优势因而取胜得以晋级淘汰赛
July 13, 2011


The starting line-ups

Alvaro Pereira’s scrappy goal set up a quarter-final showdown with Argentina. 阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚混战中进球为乌拉圭谋得C组第二，将在1/4决赛中与阿根廷队较量。

Oscar Tabarez dropped Edinson Cavani and Martin Caceres, bringing in Alvaro Gonzalez and Cristian Rodriguez either side of a narrow 4-4-1-1, moving Alvaro Pereira to left-back. 奥斯卡-塔巴雷斯首发阵容中撤下艾丁森-卡瓦尼和马丁-卡塞雷斯，换上阿尔瓦罗-贡萨雷斯和克里斯蒂安-罗德里格斯出任两边翼，形成前窄的4-4-1-1阵形，其中将阿尔瓦罗-佩雷亚移到左边卫位置上。

Luis Fernando Tena made one change, with Miguel Ponce replacing Javier Aquiano. Mexico also lined up in a broad 4-4-1-1 system, with Giovani dos Santos behind Rafael ‘Lugo’ Marquez.

Uruguay played far better than in their previous two games, and only wastefulness in front of goal prevented them from recording a greater victory.

Mexico are now out, and Tena’s main priority here was to give experience to his young squad – the half time removal of his two most established players, dos Santos and Paul Aguilar (neither of whom had endured a bad first half) when Mexico were chasing the game at half time, indicated that his tactics were not primarily based around winning the game. Instead, we’ll focus on Uruguay, and their improvement.

Pressing

With the exception of Chile throughout the competition, Uruguay put on the best display of pressing we’ve seen at the Copa America. Diego Forlan and Luis Suarez worked tirelessly from the front, and it helped that the formations were ‘matched’, so Uruguay’s players each had a man to close down.

Mexico sometimes got out of the press when Diego Reyes moved deeper, but Forlan was happy to continue closing down in that deeper position, and Mexico rarely got out of their own half.

Width from left-back

A complaint in ZM’s report on Uruguay’s first game, against Peru, was that Cacares at left-back displayed little attacking prowess, mainly because he is very right-footed and therefore had problems stretching the play. The use of Alvaro Pereira at left-back, rather than in the left-sided midfield role he more frequently takes up at international level, effectively solved this problem. The use of a narrow midfield four meant that the possibility of overlapping runs was important – although as it happened, the early lead through Pereira’s goal meant that Uruguay’s full-backs took up more conservative positions.

The goal was a scrappy tap-in from a set-piece, but it means Pereira how has a record of five goals in 30 international appearances, a decent record for someone in his position(s). It will also boost his confidence and make Tabarez likely to stick with him for the game against Argentina – potentially crucial, considering how Sergio Batista effectively played without a right-winger in the win over Costa Rica.

Forlan drops deep + wide midfielders run on

A little like Gonzalo Higuain the previous evening, Forlan’s contribution to the shape of the side compensates for a poor game in front of goal – he’s had more shots than any other player at the Copa, but is yet to score. He moved into very deep positions to pick up the ball – and although he’d done this in previous games, here he had two midfield runners who looked to exploit the space, and therefore there was more fluidity and cohesion to Uruguay’s attacking movement. Suarez also seemed happy as an out-and-out striker, working the channels and moving to both flanks.

The other effect of the two wide players coming inside was to flood the centre of the pitch, a little like the way Villarreal play. This helped them keep possession for long periods, and ultimately resulted in chances being created.

Two holders + man-marking

As usual, Diego Perez and Egidio Arevalo worked brilliantly in the centre of the pitch, scrapping and breaking up play ahead of the centre-back. At the World Cup and Copa America, Tabarez has used 4-4-2, 3-5-2, 4-4-1-1, 4-3-3, 3-4-3 and a lopsided 4-4-2 diamond – but has never broken up the Perez-Arevalo combination.

At the back, Diego Lugano and Sebastian Coates tracked their respective strikers a long way across the pitch, often swapping side as they did so because of the movement of dos Santos and Marquez. Coates had another good game.

Conclusion

Just as Argentina finally found form after making sweeping changes, Uruguay have done similar. In terms of personnel it was less dramatic – only two changes – but with Pereira changing position too, plus a different shape to the way the front two played, it was a vastly different Uruguay side as a whole.

The game with Argentina will be interesting, particularly in terms of how Tabarez deals with Messi – the Perez-Arevalo combination will be needed more than ever. As always with Tabarez, however, the rest of the side is entirely up for debate – which means it should be a fascinating tactical battle.

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作者: Penelope    时间: 2011-7-14 06:44
62楼的参考译文：占位

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:01


Brazil 4-2 Ecuador: Brazil finally grab a win
July 14, 2011

The starting line-ups

An open game was always likely to favour Brazil, and they took advantage to confirm their progression to the knockout stage.

Mano Menezes changed his right side completely – Robinho and Maicon replaced Jadson and Dani Alves.

Reinaldo Rueda left out Segundo Castillo in the centre of midfield, with Oswaldo Minda coming in.

Brazil turned in their most impressive display in the Copa so far, though they still lacked cohesion upfront, and remain a little nervous at the back.

Ecuador tactics

Ecuador defended with two banks of four, but the key to their attacking play was fluidity. The talented Christian Noboa sat just ahead of Minda in midfield and looked to distribute the ball cleverly to the front players, but ahead of that it was difficult to give set roles to the attacking four.

Christian Benitez started as the left-winger but always wanted to move forward into his natural position as a striker, and so Felipe Caicedo sometimes moved out to that flank when the ball was lost. On the other side, Michael Arroyo and Edison Mendez played deeper, but also sometimes alternated.

Brazil shape

More interest stemmed from Brazil’s side. The major news was that Maicon replaced Alves after the Barcelona full-back played poorly in the previous game against Paraguay. It was notable how different they are as players, particularly in the way they attack. Alves is excellent at making off-the-ball runs down the right, but Maicon much prefers motoring forward on the ball, as he did most obviously for the final goal, which he assisted for Neymar to tap in.

It’s arguable that Maicon or Alves should be picked according to the type of player ahead of them. Alves always wants the player in front of him to stay in the centre of the pitch in order to leave space – he spent much of the Scotland game telling Jadson to get out of his way. Jadson learned his lesson by the time the Copa came around, and his role against Paraguay meant he could afford to play narrower anyway, because of a change in the shape of the midfield. Therefore, Alves was decent in an attacking sense.

However, if Menezes wants to play Robinho – more of a winger who will make direct forward runs – Alves won’t have that space to exploit. In that case, it might be better to have Maicon there, who can push forward with the ball at his feet.

Elsewhere, Ramires remained to the right of Lucas Leiva, and put in a good contribution with his off-the-ball running. Brazil were more compact than in the previous two games – Ganso’s positioning has improved immeasurably since the opening day disappointment against Venezuela – he comes and picks up the ball in deep if he can’t receive it between the lines, and Ramires shuttling forward meant that this section of the side was fluid, rather than the ‘broken team’ we saw in the first game.

Ecuador let Brazil play

Brazil were helped by a sloppy attitude from Ecuador. They stood off Brazil and let them play – often simply standing ten yards away and letting the opponent pick a good pass, as was the case when Andre Santos crossed for Pato’s header.

This attitude from Ecuador was combined with the necessity that they had to win the game. And, whilst they never looked likely to do that, this meant they they did try to push forward, leaving spaces in midfield for Brazil to break through. In the next round, where Brazil will face Paraguay again, they’ll face a completely different challenge – a side putting men behind the ball and trying to soak up pressure.

Conclusion

This tournament was something of a disaster for Ecuador – two games where they failed to score, followed by a defeat. A couple of decent moments brought them two goals, but there was little to suggest they’ve been harshly done by in this tournament, finishing with a single point.

Maicon was an improvement on Alves – less dodgy defensively, more threatening on the ball. The reintroduction of Robinho was less successful – he contributed little on the ball and his movement and positioning was inferior to Neymar’s in a wide position. Menezes might find another creative midfielder, playing deeper and narrower, more useful in the knockout stage. Jadson did reasonably well against Paraguay, and he might be the answer for the repeat of that contest.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:02
64楼参考文献：占位

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:15
原来，巴西人也打起了4213
上麦孔等人，看来卫冕冠军决不是仅仅是锻炼队伍那么简单的

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 11:22
巴西人一直在打4213

打巴拉圭的小组赛稍有变化，介于4213、4222和4231之间
主要是由于内马尔和雅德松（后换为埃拉诺）的位置比较活

但根本上，巴西队是双后腰+单前腰+三前锋框架

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 11:25
巴西4-2胜厄瓜多尔的比赛没看，但是麦孔比阿尔维斯表现好是可以预料的

巴西做不到像巴萨那样场均70%的控球率，并把后防线推到离底线40-45米的距离
这样阿尔维斯防守力的缺陷就容易被对手所利用了

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:25

巴西人一直在打4213

打巴拉圭的小组赛稍有变化，介于4213、4222和4231之间
主要是由于内马尔和雅德松（后换为埃拉诺）的位置比较活

但根本上，巴西队是双后腰+单前腰+三前锋框架 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:22

打巴拉圭时，上小卢卡斯不下干索，是两个前腰在场吧

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 11:29
小卢卡斯上去之后在边路活动较多，和甘索有明显的分工，但他没什么表现

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:30

巴西4-2胜厄瓜多尔的比赛没看，但是麦孔比阿尔维斯表现好是可以预料的

巴西做不到像巴萨那样场均70%的控球率，并把后防线推到离底线40-45米的距离
这样阿尔维斯防守力的缺陷就容易被对手所利用了 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:25

是的，麦孔这场上前助攻，压住了对手，使巴西人这一路被打反击的风险降到了最小，但是巴拉圭冲击和厄瓜多尔冲击，还是区别很大的。

厄瓜多尔进2球，是巴西两个中卫松懈，以及塞萨尔的疏忽，但是连吃同一人同样的射门，是件诡异的事情

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作者: 午时靡深蓝    时间: 2011-7-15 11:31
巴西这支球队，如果你给他们足够空间的话，威胁非常大，巴西球员与生俱来的技术和速度自不消说，他们投入进攻的兵力也非常多，有时只留卢卡斯，席尔瓦和卢西奥这仨在后场，这也是利用人数优势弥补攻击手年轻，决定性不够的劣势。
所以对上这支巴西队，一定要坚决的压缩空间，甚至可以不惜以犯规来破坏他们的节奏，而且这支巴西队普遍畏惧贴身逼抢，或者是在被限制空间的情况下发挥大大下降，甘索，内马尔，帕托，卢卡斯，拉米雷斯等无不如此。

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:33

巴西这支球队，如果你给他们足够空间的话，威胁非常大，巴西球员与生俱来的技术和速度自不消说，他们投入进攻的兵力也非常多，有时只留卢卡斯，席尔瓦和卢西奥这仨在后场，这也是利用人数优势弥补攻击手年轻，决定性 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:31

对头，厄瓜多尔不压缩，只是很开放的对攻，但是能收获2个进球，还一度追平比分，也很有意思的

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 11:36
72# 午时靡深蓝

智利这个欧化南美队，每次碰巴西都是惨烈的大败，这个现象很有趣

不知道这次如果半决赛再遭遇，博尔吉能不能一雪前耻

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作者: 午时靡深蓝    时间: 2011-7-15 11:38
73# Alex2011
厄瓜多尔这个进两球的凯赛多是个牛逼人物，坚决果断。在今年的西甲也打进了十几个球，我记得还进了巴萨一球，戏耍了皮克（好像是皮克犯2了）
巴拉圭打巴西那场压迫的非常不错。巴拉圭的身体优势和在定位球里的争顶能力非常强，很庆幸阿根廷是碰乌拉圭而不是巴拉圭。

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 11:39
巴拉圭这个队打得太没有美感了，不喜欢马蒂诺这类球风

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:42

73# Alex2011  
厄瓜多尔这个进两球的凯赛多是个牛逼人物，坚决果断。在今年的西甲也打进了十几个球，我记得还进了巴萨一球，戏耍了皮克（好像是皮克犯2了）
巴拉圭打巴西那场压迫的非常不错。巴拉圭的身体优势和在 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:38

估计接下来阿根廷vs乌拉圭，乌队若是被淘汰，肯定吃亏在弗兰身上了，老大和进攻核心，但是明显不是去年世界杯状态，

然而，他的定位球和远射还是很大威力的

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作者: 午时靡深蓝    时间: 2011-7-15 11:44
巴拉圭一向这样，十几年不变。
巴拉圭有个左前卫埃斯蒂加里比亚非常强，把阿尔维斯爆到替补去了。他们还有个中场奥蒂哥萨。那身材，简直是麻将牌里的白板

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:45

巴拉圭这个队打得太没有美感了，不喜欢马蒂诺这类球风
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 11:39

感觉这支巴拉圭，比去年打日本时还厉害，很可能就是打西班牙时那种变态的兴奋劲，但是还不老道，否则如何能让委队最后10多分钟里，连扳2球呢

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:49


设想一下，如果把巴拉圭中后场5-6人，换到阿根廷，与梅西、昆、西瓜、天使等组成队伍，打巴西时会是个什么样子呢？

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:53
两位斑竹可否预测一下，阿乌之战，乌队阵型河、战略和战术吗？

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作者: 午时靡深蓝    时间: 2011-7-15 11:54
巴拉圭的后场就个人能力来说不会强于阿根廷
巴拉圭胜在整体防守贯彻的好，全队都注重就地反抢和压迫，换句话说他们是牺牲了部分进攻的力量来换取更高质量的防守，阿根廷不会采用这样的战术。

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 11:59

巴拉圭的后场就个人能力来说不会强于阿根廷
巴拉圭胜在整体防守贯彻的好，全队都注重就地反抢和压迫，换句话说他们是牺牲了部分进攻的力量来换取更高质量的防守，阿根廷不会采用这样的战术。 ...
午时靡深蓝 发表于 2011-7-15 11:54

要的就是整体协防，以及丢球后就地反抢，这给前场支持很大的

阿根廷后卫一个不是危险时候的不该失误，就会招致满盘皆输的不利局势

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 12:16


我预测一个乌拉圭周日的首发，不一定完全能猜对

Formation: 4411

GK: Muslera

RB: Maxi Pereira, CB: Lugano & Coates, LB: Caceres

RM: Alvaro Gonzalez, DM: Diego Perez & Arevalo, LM: Alvaro Pereira

SS: Forlan

CF: Suarez

其中9个人应该没有疑问，就是卡塞雷斯和阿尔瓦罗-冈萨雷斯是否会上的问题

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 12:20
84# 北极海

卡瓦尼？

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 12:31
如果上卡瓦尼的话就不能打442了

自从对智利队的下半场开始，塔瓦雷斯就弃433而用442
所以说卡瓦尼更可能出现在替补席作为后手而不是首发

用阿尔瓦罗-冈萨雷斯专门和迪-马里亚兑子应该说也是个不错的选择
因此我预测了上面那个4411

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-15 12:48

如果上卡瓦尼的话就不能打442了

自从对智利队的下半场开始，塔瓦雷斯就弃433而用442
所以说卡瓦尼更可能出现在替补席作为后手而不是首发

用阿尔瓦罗-冈萨雷斯专门和迪-马里亚兑子应该说也是个不错的选择
因此我预 ...
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 12:31

卡瓦尼不上，打442，很可能就是世界杯乌拉圭打德国队那样的战术。这种威力也不小，但是弗兰状态能否恢复到75%以上呢？

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 12:56
福兰不进球不代表状态很差

乌拉圭最恐怖的还是苏亚雷斯，肯定

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作者: DanielCraig    时间: 2011-7-15 15:10
奥蒂戈萨  桑塔纳 巴里奥斯 马蒂诺 三个我阿球员一个教练 加上在乌鸦的 艾斯蒂加利比亚 阿根廷足球文化深入啊

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作者: 北极海    时间: 2011-7-15 15:29
89# DanielCraig

However, Paraguay prefers Italian football...

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作者: DanielCraig    时间: 2011-7-15 15:55
90# 北极海

阿根廷球员和教练品种多样化 瞧比拉尔多。。

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作者: 弗爵爷    时间: 2011-7-17 18:53

我预测一个乌拉圭周日的首发，不一定完全能猜对

Formation: 4411

GK: Muslera

RB: Maxi Pereira, CB: Lugano & Coates, LB: Caceres

RM: Alvaro Gonzalez, DM: Diego Perez & Arevalo, LM: Alvaro Pereira

SS: Forlan

CF: Suarez
北极海 发表于 2011-7-15 12:16

这个首发是完全猜中的，除了没做功课了解到科阿特斯实际上停赛

可惜有什么用呢...

塔瓦雷斯下半场安排苏亚雷斯后撤，巴蒂斯塔就再也找不到中场的节奏

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作者: 弗爵爷    时间: 2011-7-17 19:04
90兄有空把阿乌之战的ZM分析贴一贴，我想看看他们是如何理解巴蒂斯塔下半场的换人和应对的

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-17 21:25


Uruguay 1-1 Argentina (AET): Uruguay progress after disciplined defending and superb penalties
July 17, 2011


The starting line-ups

The hosts are out of the Copa America after an engaging 1-1 draw.

Oscar Tabarez kept faith with the same narrow 4-4-1-1 system as against Mexico, although there was one change – Martin Cacares came in for Cristian Rodriguez, with Alvaro Pereira moving forward to the left of midfield.

Sergio Batista named an unchanged XI in broadly the same system as in Argentina’s final group game against Costa Rica.

The game started frantically and then slowed down but remained enjoyable – the two red cards opened up the game, but didn’t produce any more goals.

High tempo

Many Copa America games have been played at a slow pace, but from an Argentina v Uruguay match, you can always count on closing down, tackles and rapid passing early on. Argentina dominated the ball, and like against Mexico, Uruguay tried to press – although the mismatch in systems made it more difficult here. Diego Perez played much higher up than Egidio Arevalo, trying to get into the face of Angel Di Maria, Argentina’s most advanced central midfielder.

Tabarez could afford to play his narrow 4-4-1-1 because of the relative lack of attacking thrust from Argentina’s full-backs. Alvaro Pereira came inside and hassled Gago on the ball, happy to let Pablo Zabaleta receive a pass. Behind Pereira, Martin Caceres generally did a good job on his old Barcelona team-mate Lionel Messi, starting narrow and tracking him inside – it was a good decision by Tabarez to play a converted centre-back there, rather than Pereira. That said, Messi did find space for Gonzalo Higuain’s goal – a drifted left-footed cross after he cut in from the right, in almost identical fashion to a chance which produced a shocking miss from Higuain against Costa Rica.

Perez involved

There were two other factors in the first half – both involved free-kicks and dead ball situations. First, Argentina defended set-pieces abysmally, and Gabriel Milito and Nicolas Burdisso showed no understanding of this situation by constantly giving away cheap free-kicks. Perez had poked in the opener from one of these situations.

Second, Perez himself was charging around the pitch and conceding an amazing number of fouls. He could have been sent-off on at least two occasions before his red card, and Tabarez must have considered replacing him before the inevitable happened. Having been forced to bring on Andres Scotti for Mauricio Victorino at the back because of injury, he probably didn’t want to use up a further sub before half time.

11 v 10

A common complain on ZM is that managers who find their side with a numerical advantage don’t adjust their side. The tactics you think will beat eleven opponents will not necessarily be the tactics that will beat ten – there will be more space on the pitch somewhere, the opposition will be more vulnerable in a certain way, and less dangerous in another.


After Uruguay went down to ten

This was a particularly frustrating example, because the best way to play against ten men is with width – especially, as it happens, because Uruguay here were playing a 4-3-2 formation, and asking their three central midfielders to shift across the pitch constantly (rather than a 4-4-1, for example, which covers the pitch with two banks of four). Tabarez felt he could afford to play this way, again, because of the lack of attacking threat from Argentina’s full-backs.

Indeed, Tabarez didn’t feel the need to make any further substitutions until the second half of extra time, which both demonstrates that Uruguay’s players performed extremely well, but also that Batista and Argentina made life easy for them.

With Messi immediately coming inside into the centre of the pitch with the ball, and Aguero staying wider but hardly a natural winger, Argentina lacked width and played through the middle too much, playing into Uruguay’s hands. The amazing thing was, Argentina had a winger, Di Maria, playing in the centre, drifting inside from the left. They could have afforded to play Fernando Gago and Javier Mascherano as the double pivot (there was little threat from Uruguay coming forward from central midfield), and put Di Maria on either flank to stretch the play and to force Uruguay to work harder. Instead, Argentina remained slow and predictable on the ball, and were far too narrow.

Uruguay’s only hope of a goal was from a set-piece. Luis Suarez put in one of the best performances you’ll ever see at getting opponents booked – both Burdisso and Milito were carded within three second half minutes, and later Mascherano got a second yellow for another foul on Suarez. Forlan’s delivery was often disappointing.

Batista waited until 72 minutes for the first change – Javier Pastore on for Di Maria. Pastore played a couple of great one-twos with Messi, but it’s arguable that he’s not the man to break down a packed defence sitting deep – he’s more dangerous on the counter. Ezequiel Lavezzi, despite his poor form in this tournament, would have been an interesting option, and the introduction of Carlos Tevez for Aguero late on didn’t really make any sense – Tevez continues to show no understanding of the football Argentina are trying to play – his positioning and movement from the wide-left position is very poor.

10 v 10

Mascherano’s red card opened the game up further, and Argentina looked nervous until Lucas Biglia came on as a true holding player – a Gago-Pastore duo was not very secure, and Forlan found space until the change was made. Uruguay were tired by this stage, although with their 4-3-2 formation looking more secure and solid than Argentina’s 4-2-3ish shape, Tabarez was the man who got things right in the extra time period – although they needed an astonishing Fernando Muslera double save to stay in it.

Muslera was also the hero in the shoot-out – and it was almost inevitable that Tevez would be the villain.

Conclusion

Argentina played for 48 minutes with an extra man, and despite the best attacking squad in the world, Batista’s side didn’t score. In fact, they didn’t even look like scoring, and even as the game was in progress, it seemed that Argentina would live to regret not taking advantage in this period.

Four Copa games played on home soil, and Argentina’s only victory was against a Costa Rican U23 side.

Tabarez should be commended for his tactics, however – the starting formation was correct, the way he adapted to going down to ten was correct, and his use of substitutions was brave but successful.

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-17 21:25
94楼参考译文：占位

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作者: 苍生劫    时间: 2011-7-17 21:34
这场实际打得是个433，我觉得梅西有点太靠边了，特别是下半场，这让中路向前的人只剩下天使一个，天使在这个位置比梅西更没感觉，而且太靠左，和中前场其他人缺乏呼应，后来越来越沉迷于个人盘带。

明显感觉阿根廷在中路很空，天使和梅西距离太远，缺一个人接应一下。

阿根廷这个4222其实结构还可以，但是太缺乏锻炼，执行力不够，碰上乌拉圭这样的强手，受压之下逐步变形成433了，前后场又被切断了。

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-17 21:36
踏巴雷氏是勇敢而成功的男人和主帅，而巴蒂似塌执教行为很龌龊，4场家门口的战斗，只赢了哥斯达黎加u23队

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作者: 苍生劫    时间: 2011-7-17 21:41
到了后来，野兽换下KUN，回撤打中场，梅西顶到锋线，实在是很无厘头的一招，野兽虽然在中场可以拿住球，但创造力有限，传不到前锋线上去，等于浪费了梅西的作用，这和老马在世界杯下半时对德国用的招完全一模一样。

后来加时赛后半段阿根廷攻势又起来了，就是梅西又撤回来了，在中场拿球可以向前推进一下。

明明中场的问题，巴蒂斯塔老拿前锋来解决问题，不知道是个什么思路

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-17 21:43
96# 苍生劫

天使和昆频繁换位可以考虑

西瓜倒是常常后撤来反抢，但是家鸽对阵打铁的乌拉圭，明显节奏都出不来，或许俺没看清楚

下半场可以考虑用巴内加换家鸽，用比利亚换昆，将天使推向昆的位置

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作者: Alex2011    时间: 2011-7-17 21:45

到了后来，野兽换下KUN，回撤打中场，梅西顶到锋线，实在是很无厘头的一招，野兽虽然在中场可以拿住球，但创造力有限，传不到前锋线上去，等于浪费了梅西的作用，这和老马在世界杯下半时对德国用的招完全一模一样。
...
苍生劫 发表于 2011-7-17 21:41

俺看到一幕是特维斯打中锋，但后来才看清是t11打梅西位置，又是一个散布帝

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